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Acknowledgments

At the twelve years mark (after EWIC was first conceived in 1994), the *Encyclopedia of Women and Islamic Cultures* is two-thirds of the way through its print production, with only Volumes V and VI remaining. As with the three previous volumes, Volume IV is the product of the work of more people than can be acknowledged here. We recognize Brill for its continued support, especially Publishing Director Sam Bruinsma. Olaf Köndgen, former Senior Acquisitions Editor Islam and Middle East at Brill, assisted greatly in the production of Volume IV prior to his departure from Brill. Joed Elich, now Senior Acquisitions Editor Islam, Middle East and African Studies, seamlessly stepped in and has offered strong leadership for the EWIC project. Ingrid Heijckers and Isabella Gerritsen went to great lengths to facilitate communications between EWIC editors and authors, tracking articles, and keeping us within our time frames. Margaret Owen did a marvelous job copy editing articles from all over the world translated from many different languages.

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Jacqueline Siapno would like to thank Dina Afrianty, her research assistant based in Jakarta. Afrianty worked very hard to assure that we had as many Indonesian and Southeast Asian authors

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The work of EWIC could not have proceeded without the generous supplementary grant from the Ford Foundation. Constance Buchanan and her assistants, Maxine Gaddis and Irene Korenfield, shepherded the grant through the Foundation and elicited the joint contributions and support of Ford Foundation Regional Program Officers, including: Emma Playfair (Cairo), Ganesan Balachander (New Delhi), Omotade Aina (Nairobi), Gerry Salole (Johannesburg), Suzanne Siskel (Indonesia), and Adhiambo Odaga (Lagos). In addition, contributions came from the central New York offices: Constance Buchanan and Janice Petrovich (Education, Knowledge and Religion Program). The Ford Foundation grant allowed us to buy out time and to fund research assistants, editorial board meetings, supplies, and equipment. The grant made it possible for the editorial board to come closer to reaching our standards of encyclopedic knowledge production. We are greatly indebted to all who participated in the implementation of this grant.

In addition, EWIC is indebted to Mr. Faris Saeed of Diamond Investments, L.L.C., Dubai, United Arab Emirates, for a donation to the work of EWIC. His generosity helps to make possible the development of the EWIC vision.

We are grateful to the International Development Research Center, Ottawa, for a generous grant to revise, update, and expand and transform the EWIC author database into the EWIC Scholars Database. This will be available online (http://sjoseph.ucdavis.edu/>) for free public access from Summer 2006 (funded by the International Development Research Center and Jeff Gibeling, Dean of Graduate Studies, UC Davis) (see Preface).

EWIC Volume IV, like the three previous volumes, would not have been possible without the tireless work of EWIC's associate editors, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Julie Peteet, Seteney Shami, Jacqueline Siapno, and assistant editor Alice Horner. All have worked since 1999 (Horner since 2002), sacrificing their personal research at times. They have offered EWIC the highest intellectual vision and made possible our shared dream of an interdisciplinary, cross-cultural, transhistorical, collaborative, feminist project. I continue to be indebted to them for their generosity of spirit and devotion to this shared vision.

Many others have and will contribute to EWIC and as many as possible will be acknowledged in these pages of future volumes of EWIC. By the time of publication of Volume IV, we will have completed or nearly completed author solicitation on Volumes V and VI. Volume VI will include the complete index for all six volumes, entries which were not completed in time for their assigned volumes, and newly solicited entries. All entries that were accepted for publication but that did not meet our final deadline for Volumes I–V will be published in Volume VI of EWIC as well as in the online edition of EWIC. We continue to encourage and invite authors who are interested in contributing to contact us.

Finally, my thanks to my daughter, Sara Rose Joseph, who, as a junior in college, has lived with EWIC since she was eight years old. She continues to proudly own and display each volume as it is published, a small acknowledgment that the sacrifice was worthy of our commitment to feminist scholarship.

Suad Joseph
General Editor, EWIC
Davis, California
June 2006

Preface

With the publication of Volume IV (*Economics, Education, Mobility, and Space*), only two volumes of the print edition remain to appear: Volume V (*Practices, Interpretations, and Representations*) and Volume VI (*Supplement and Cumulative Index*); these will be published in 2007. The completion of Volume VI in 2007 will mark thirteen years from the first conversations about EWIC between Brill editors and myself, nine years from the formal signing of the contract to undertake EWIC, and eight years from the first EWIC editorial board meeting. While it has often seemed to the editors to be an endless project, the time from the first editorial board meeting in June 1999 to the publishing of Volume VI is relatively fast. This is especially so given the scope of the project and the ambition of a global reach in coverage and author participation embraced by the editorial board. Volume IV moves us closer to the compilation of the first ever encyclopedia on women and Islamic cultures.

Volume IV covers women and Islamic cultures in topics as sweeping as colonial cities, global cities, Islamic cities, homelessness, urban identities and movements, discourses and practices of development, family and development, housing policies, non-governmental organizations, sustainable development, credit organizations, marketing, craft industries, foreign aid, informal and formal labor markets, Islamic banks, labor and health, land reform, trade, domestic labor, pastoral economies, professional occupations, sex workers, education from pre- to postcolonial periods, environment, migration, slavery, space, technology, and tourism. As with Volumes II and III, the editors did not set out in June 1999 to create a volume on economics, education, mobility, and space. Rather, once we decided that we would organize Volumes II through V topically, these topics and the entries they generated appeared to cohere in important ways, which made the rationale of culling them together into one volume persuasive to us.

The broad sweep of entries share a number of critical threads that weave together the subjects of Volume IV. The entries address the material conditions facing women in Muslim majority societies and Muslim women in Muslim minority societies. The focus of most entries is the realities of everyday life for women around the globe in societies in which Islam has had a significant influence. The entries offer data-rich and empirically specific coverage of crucial topics from region to region and, at times, from country to country. The authors critically analyze factors leading to inequality and the structural conditions within which status and opportunity are shaped. Especially, there is a focus on how global and governmental forces impact the organization of the economy, labor, and environmental factors, including the built environment. Throughout, the authors look for evidence of agency, whether it is found in women's activism in non-governmental or community-based organizations, credit associations, or in the possibilities created by education. Authors often find, however, that the very conditions of agency may also offer constraints to choice-making – such as in the limitations of colonial and postcolonial education, or the channeling of women's labor into specific jobs, especially in the informal sector. The entries also highlight dramatic stories of change caused by urbanization, forced and voluntary migration, internal and international displacement, and refugee status, much of which disproportionately – or differently – affects women.

One question the editors asked in Volume IV is whether there is a specific "Islamic" character to any of these phenomena. Does homelessness, for example, take on a different form among Muslim women than among non-Muslim women? Can we identify any patterns to development that are specific to Muslim societies and systematically affect Muslim women differently from non-Muslim women? The authors were asked to be aware that they were writing for an encyclopedia that was concerned with "Islamic culture." Here the authors seem to have a range of findings. What is most striking is that evidence of overarching patterns of women in relation to economy, education, mobility, and space that appear to be systematically generated from Islamic cultures is tentative and in much need of rigorous, comparative research. Issues of labor, business, urbanization, refugees, diasporas, environment, movement, space, the public policies relevant to these issues, and so forth, appear to be finely nested in conditions informed by localities, histories, and cultural specificities. This is not to say that Islamic cultures

do not affect or contribute to the patterns that do emerge. Rather it appears that such patterns are often local, linked to local configurations of Islamic cultures. These entries, and the wide range of societies they cover, offer a foundational database for the kind of comparative, interdisciplinary work that will test the thematic continuities and discontinuities of Islamic cultures in relation to women, economy, education, and space across societies and regions.

Finding authors and soliciting entries for Volume IV was often challenging. The EWIC potential authors database grew to include well over 3,000 authors. The volunteers and networks continued to expand. But it was nevertheless often difficult to find authors within the timetable we were able to offer them for writing. Often the difficulty was the scarcity of research on some topics and in certain areas of the world. Originally, Volume IV was intended to produce 734 entries on 87 topics, of which 9 were to be overviews.

The editors solicited 539 entries on the 87 topics. Of these we found authors for 313 entries. From these authors, we received a total of 263 entries that were accepted for publication in EWIC Volume IV, including 15 overviews. Another 40 entries were received from authors, but are still in the review process and will be published in Volume VI of EWIC. Of these, 9 are overviews. The regional distribution of entries in part reflects the availability of research, but also reflects the manner in which editors solicited entries (see below). The entries in Volume IV are organized alphabetically by topic and within topics alphabetically by region.

As with Volumes II and III, deciding which countries to group together, which topics to solicit country by country, which to cover by a larger regional entry, and which to conflate were often decisions based on author availability as much as on theoretical conceptualizations of the issues or the areas. The geographic divisions by which to organize and solicit entries were often not self-evident. And the boundaries between the empirical or topical coverage in different entries was often hard to maintain. Collectively and individually we worked very hard to cover all the world regions as much as the available research (and author availability) would allow. Yet, we were frequently disappointed by our inability to cover whole regions of the world on some topics. The obstacles to materializing our vision and ambition for EWIC were themselves instructive – continually reminding us that geographical boundaries are not "natural," that naming research categories is not free of arbitrariness, that we are not only the subjects of our knowledge production but also its objects, and that the basis for our understanding of what constitutes encyclopedic knowledge continually shifts and reconstitutes itself even as we try to stabilize it long enough to describe it.

The associate editors approached the solicitation of authors for the regions they covered in a manner which fitted the availability of research on the topics and scholars to write the entries. For example, Afsaneh Najmabadi tended to solicit many short entries covering smaller regions where she found ample resources available and scholars to write. Jacqueline Siapno tended to solicit fewer but longer entries covering a larger regional spread – a situation reflecting fewer resources and fewer scholars to write on the selected topics. Since Volume III, Seteney Shami has had editorial responsibility for the broadest regional spread of societies: the Americas, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe and, with Julie Peteet, the Arab world. Here, too, the solicitation of entries varied considerably by region, depending on the availability of research and authors. We are aware that this variability in solicitation from region to region may affect the comparability of data in the entries. Nevertheless the entries represent the state of knowledge in these regions, or at least, the state of knowledge as we could access authors to write about them. As such, the entries offer a broad ground for further work, including comparative work across regions, rather than the fine-tuned comparison that will, it is hoped, become more possible with future editions, especially the online edition of EWIC.

The EWIC Scholars Database is a listing of over 3,000 scholars from all over the world and from all disciplines whose work focuses on a wide range of issues (economic, social, political, religious, artistic, etc.) relevant to women in Muslim majority societies and to Muslim women in Muslim minority societies. It contains considerable information about the scholars, their education, occupations, research, publications and other professional activities. Scheduled to be online with free public access by Summer 2006, the database will connect scholars, students, planners, and activists with each other and with non-governmental organizations, governmental agencies, and potential employers. The database is searchable by name, region of the world, areas of research expertise, and other critical topics. The online database will continue to be used for author solicitation for print and online volumes of EWIC. All the authors in the EWIC author database

received a request to update their templates and a request for permission to include their author templates in this online publication. The EWIC Scholars Database was advertised on many Internet sites to invite participation of scholars, practitioners, and graduate students. Those who would like to be included in this important database should contact <sjoseph@ucdavis.edu> or <ewic@ucdavis.edu> or fill out the author template on the EWIC web page (http://sjoseph.ucdavis.edu/ewic). The database will be updated regularly.

EWIC was also awarded a grant from the Swedish Institute of Alexandria to co-fund, with the Ford Foundation, the translation of Volume I of EWIC (*Methodologies, Paradigms, and Sources*) into Arabic. The translation was undertaken by the Women and Memory Forum, Cairo, Egypt, under the direction of Hala Kamal. The Arabic translation of Volume I is published online for free public access on the EWIC web page (<http://sjoseph.ucdavis.edu/ewic>).

The EWIC project will continue well beyond the publishing of the last print volume. As I write this Preface, I am working with Brill to compose the editorial board for the online edition of EWIC. EWIC online will be available by subscription. Initially, the online edition of EWIC will publish the print edition of EWIC, as is. Soon thereafter, EWIC online will publish regular updates and new entries in each of the volumes, as they are written and received. EWIC online allows for a number of new possibilities, such as publishing topic-specific or region-specific volumes and the like. We are particularly enthusiastic about the possibilities the online edition offers. We encourage those interested in writing for EWIC online to contact us.

With the publishing of Volume IV, we turn a corner and can see the coming closure of the first phase of this pioneering project. In every respect it has been an amazing undertaking. Soon we will be able to look back and take stock of the project in its entirety, at least in its entire first phase. No doubt, had we known in June 1999 that we would produce six volumes (instead of the planned three), had we known that we would organize Volumes II–V topically and not alphabetically, and that a Volume VI would allow for the publication of entries that were not finalized in time for inclusion in their intended volumes, or that finding authors for many of our topics was going to be nearly impossible – indeed, had we known that we, as an editorial team, would work together eight years to complete the print edition instead of the planned three years – no doubt many of our decisions would have been different. Knowing these things now leaves me in even greater awe of what has been achieved and what it took to achieve it.

Suad Joseph,
General Editor, EWIC
Davis, California
July 2006

Cities: Colonial Cities

Arab States

The experiences of women in colonized Arab cities varied depending on colonial powers; time frames of colonial encounters; economic constellations and class based contexts; cultural and social factors such as religion, ethnicity, and race; ideas of particular colonial administrators; and individualized encounters with the colonial project. No two colonial cities were alike; therefore it is important to stress that one common experience of women in colonized Arab cities does not exist. While there are similarities of experiences and controversies, there are also uniquely local events and circumstances. This entry seeks to identify similarities, to provide outlines of gendered conflicts, and to point to specific women's experiences in particular cities.

Cities

Colonial power to shape cities was exercised differently, and involved different dynamics and actors. For example, the early, intensive and brutal colonization of Algiers in 1830 was followed by massive interferences in the built environment. Demolition of buildings was rampant to facilitate the construction of a European cityscape, and prevent native revolts. As a result the precolonial and colonial city were physically segregated and socially polarized.

French rule in Rabat after 1912 also resulted in relative separation between precolonial and colonial quarters. This separation was guided by policies of preserving the old and "quaint," and informed by ideas that "exotic" places could be mined for tourism. Cultural and aesthetic visions of Governor-General Hubert Lyautey (1912–25), Orientalist fantasies, economic rationales, and security concerns directed Rabat's tranformations. The precolonial city was frozen in time and place and allowed little room for change and expansion. The modern city became an experimental field for the European planning ideas.

In the nineteenth century, Cairo had undergone urban modernization under the Muḥammad ʿAlī dynasty. Avenues were cut through the dense urban fabric. Boulevards, plazas, and a modern downtown grid were (incompletely) constructed. The British occupation of Cairo after 1882 was marked by laissez-faire urban planning. Lord Cromer, who autocratically ruled Egypt (1883–1907), believed that the market facilitated urban transformations. Unlike Lyautey, Cromer, for better or for worse, had no sense of urban aesthetics. Cairo grew into a patchwork of dense precolonial, modern foreign developments, and modern neighborhoods of the Egyptian elite.

The short colonial occupation of Beirut, Aleppo, and Damascus (1920–43/4) was partly characterized by rivalries between colonial rulers and the urban ambitions of established modernized elites who fought to realize their modern dreams and national ambitions, alongside or against the French rulers. Beirut included sizable modern quarters and institutions long before the French occupation. Like other cities, Beirut had undergone substantial modernization/Westernization before colonial occupation.

The short Italian occupation of Tripoli after 1911 unfolded in a different ideological context. The Italians claimed to "return" to their former Roman possessions; thus the search for the authentically Roman dominated their urban policies. The early years of the fascist period (1923–42/3) of Tripoli's colonial experience produced an architectural monumentalism that sought to highlight fascist power.

Jerusalem under the British Mandate (1921–48) was characterized by conflicts resulting from British lenience toward Zionist expansion. Under the Mandate, Arab Jerusalem continued a process, underway since the late Ottoman period, whereby it was rapidly engulfed by the growing Jewish city. Haifa and Jaffa entered the Mandate as vibrant ports that had flourished in the late Ottoman period as part of a prosperous Mediterranean economy.

Women

Experiences of colonial and colonized women differed vastly. Yet distinctions were not clear as, for example, lower-class Italian women in Tunis or Cairo, or Spanish women in Morocco fell uncomfortably between lines. Class was a central factor as women were more likely to interact with women of the same class, but of different national, ethnic, or religious background. For instance, in 1930s Cairo or Beirut, Muslim, Christian, and Jewish elites of various ethnic and national origins socialized more

with each other than with their lower-class fellow community members. They had more in common as their lives had markedly changed with new possibilities of education, professional opportunities, associations, emerging media, and travel. The lives of lower-class Muslim, Christian, and Jewish Arab women changed more slowly, as they struggled to make ends meet, and raised children in communities notoriously under-serviced with urban amenities. The latter were available in foreign and upper-class quarters. Lower-class Arab women were active participants in urban life, the economy (marketing, domestic services), and occasionally politics (anti-colonial demonstrations, resistance). Internal migrants including Berbers in Rabat, Nubians and Sudanese in Cairo, or tribal Arabs/Beduins in Baghdad moved into lower-class neighborhoods.

For European women, Arab colonial cities provided lifestyles vastly different from home. Wives of middle level colonial administrators and businessmen lived in luxury, surrounded by servants whom they could never afford in Europe. Elite colonial women led a stylized social life with afternoon teas, cultural entertainments, and balls. Women worked to maintain and boost their and their husbands' status. Power and entertainment met in strange ways. Once, Lady Cromer entertained guests on the premises of a juvenile penitentiary, with inmates showing their "improvement" through submission to colonial discipline. Women's charitable involvement was part of the *noblesse oblige* colonial ideology (for example, Lady Cromer's children's dispensary founded in Boulaq in 1906).

A few European women went East in search of adventure, or scientific or political careers that were out of their reach at home. Gertrude Bell traveled widely and published books about her travels in Syria and Iraq. In the 1920s, Bell worked as an intelligence officer and was named "oriental secretary" in early mandatory Iraq, and was instrumental in setting up the Baghdad museum of antiquities.

Gendered encounters

Urban colonial projects were vaguely centered around the imposition of order and control. They included nineteenth-century European notions of public versus private (male versus female), and the mono-functional use of spaces. Spaces had precise purposes, users, and modes of use. Thus streets were public, homes were private, streets were for driving and sidewalks for walking. Precolonial Arab cities expressed different social imageries. While the "private" and "public" were central, they were differently defined and physically constructed. Arab/Muslim spatial notions were expressed in vague concentric circles of private/sheltered/female space versus public/open/male space. These loosely defined circles allowed for flexible movements between home, alley, and street. Context, company, and purpose informed behavior and movement for men and women. Women, unlike colonial claims to the contrary, were active participants in precolonial cities. Women walked, worked, and traded in alleys and streets in addition to holding urban properties. In early nineteenth-century Arab cities, only elite women (of different ethnic/religious backgrounds) lived in seclusion. This remained an unattainable ideal for lower-class women.

In early nineteenth-century cities, authorities only partly controlled the use of street and alley spaces. Considerable control rested with residents and users. The concept of *finā'* illustrates this. *Finā'* is the street/alley space adjacent to one's entry/door. Residents can use their *finā'* so long as neighbors do not object. This semi-public space often accommodates female activities. Women supervise children and poultry and perform household chores at their doorstep. This right to individual use of street/alley spaces was (incompletely) undermined by modernizing and colonial policies. Authorities, for instance, fought battles against street vendors whom they deemed out of place in modern spaces. Spaces could no longer be semi-public or subject to flexible use. Spatial concepts rooted in Muslim traditions and jurisprudence, which circumscribe gendered uses of space, account for some spatial commonalities in Arab cities.

Colonial (and precolonial/indigenous modernizing) interference in cities redefined streets as public, male, and, most importantly, foreign. Concentric sheltering circles of privacy/seclusion gave way to a harsh line between private and public. Once women stepped onto the colonial streetscape, they entered a male/foreign public sphere. This sphere had been small in precolonial cities but now encompassed the entire modern city. To enter such spaces was dangerous for women because of consequences at the hands of colonial authorities, but even more so because such action could be seen as a transgression against their own cultural context. Photographs of modern sections of colonial cities show few colonized women in local dress. To freely move in colonial streets women had to modernize, i.e. don Western garb. This was viewed with suspicion by many. Women's presence/absence in colonial/modern streets, public spaces, and institutions became a central conflict in Arab cities. Shifting groups of colonizers, secular

nationalists, Muslim nationalists, and modern feminists negotiated the city and the colonial/modernizing project, and formulated nationalist visions and anti-colonial agendas. Women became one icon of the (anti-)colonial struggle. Were women walking on city sidewalks, or attending modern schools/universities for the sake of the emerging nation, as liberal nationalists argued; or were they victims of colonial immorality and corruption, as traditionalists argued?

Early twentieth-century urban ordering policies were similarly present in non-colonial contexts in the region (Istanbul, Tehran), where they partly reflected struggles to counter aggressive European imperial policies. In addition to urban projects and infrastructure, these interventions included missionary schools, which also admitted girls. Policies and institutions created conflicts before or without colonial occupation.

Controversial places

The controversy over cinemas in Damascus in the 1930s illustrates complexities of colonial spatial politics. Thompson's work (1999, 2001) analyzes this conflict. Cities in Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine had witnessed modernizing transformations under late Ottoman rule, fostered by the government and native elites, and financed by native and foreign capital. In 1916, the first cinema in Damascus was constructed. As new (gendered) public spaces, cinemas became contested sites. By the 1930s the downtown Marjeh Square was a hub of modern leisure and entertainment, of which cinemas were an integral part. The district was public and foreign, thus deemed inappropriate by many for respectable local women. With notions of gender, gendered spaces, appropriate female movements, and women's role in society in flux, cinemas became the stage where competing liberal and religious nationalists formulated and tested ideas. Starting from 1938, traditionalist groups repeatedly demanded that the government ban Muslim women from cinemas. On one occasion in 1939, upon hearing of the possibility of such a ban, elite Muslim women students staged a demonstration for their right to enter cinemas. These women maneuvered in a difficult territory between populist Muslim groups and colonizers. Women's education, their roles and rights as citizens, or their presence or absence in the modern street and institutions were similarly contested.

Public encounters

Cities accommodate changes and new lifestyles. Since colonial, late Ottoman, and indigenous elite modernizing projects were often intricately interwoven, it is difficult to discuss them in isolation. In 1927, Anbara Salaam lectured in front of the Women's Renaissance Society in Beirut without a veil. She was the first woman to speak unveiled publicly in Greater Syria. The daughter of a Lebanese politician, Salaam had started to attend French schools in 1907 at the age of ten. In 1913 she published an essay urging women to struggle for Arab rights under Ottoman rule. Salaam's removal of the veil at a public event was an act only secondarily defined by colonialism (Graham-Brown 1988, 141). Only part of Salaam's trajectory unfolded under the direct influence of colonialism, but in complex ways colonialism/imperialism underwrote aspects of her moves.

Prostitution

Prostitution thrived in colonial cities as colonial armies boosted demands for sexual labor. The problem of women physically serving colonizers, re-enacting their country's defeat in their sexual submission/penetration, centrally defines this sexual encounter. Inherent predicaments are best illustrated through a comparison of two fictional characters of Naguib Mahfouz. Zanuba (*Cairo Trilogy*) is a performer and mistress of wealthy men. Eventually she marries a less than perfect member of a respectable family. Initially shunned, through her tireless efforts Zanuba becomes a member of the family. In contrast, Hamida (*Midaq Alley*) ends up working in a bar frequented by English soldiers. The fateful step of entering a taxi headed for modern Cairo (out of place in her traditional garb/identity) costs Hamida honor and social existence. Unlike Zanuba, who never left Egyptian society, for Hamida there is no redemption, as she has committed the ultimate sin of sexual intercourse with the colonizer.

Ordinary lives

In the late nineteenth century Sitt Khadiga, a midwife, and her husband Hassan Yunis (ethnographic pseudonyms) moved from their provincial hometown to Cairo's outskirts. Midwifery as practiced by Khadiga had long been a point of contention for the modern medical establishment (pre-dating occupation). Schools of midwifery and new licensing procedures pushed practioners like Khadiga and later her daughters to illegal margins. Nonetheless they continued practicing in their quarter and nearby middle-class neighborhoods (Kuppinger 2000b, 232). Until about the late 1940s, competition only existed between local midwives. When, however, the colonial administration

denied traditional midwives the right to register births, the few traditional midwives who had acquired a license through a government course started to demand fees for registering deliveries by unlicensed midwives. While colonial administrations opened opportunities for professional advancement for female modern medical personnel they restricted activities of others (Kuppinger 2000a). Their traditional learning and free movements across public spaces maneuvered these women to social margins.

Resistance

Algerian women such as Zorah Driff, Djamila Boupacha, Djamila Bouherid, and Hassiba Ben Bouali participated in anti-colonial resistance. One woman noted, "we were nursing children as well as blowing up bridges" (Shabaan 1991, 195). Zorah Driff and Djamila Bouherid among other activities smuggled weapons and information across Algiers. Hassiba Ben Bouali, a central figure in the Battle of Algiers (1954–7), perished in a hide-out blown up by colonial forces. Her death and that of fellow fighters marked the end of the Battle of Algiers. Some years later, Djamila Boupacha was arrested for an alleged bombing. She was brutally tortured and raped by French forces. Boupacha became a symbol of the brutality of the French forces.

The occupation of Arab cities continues in Palestine and more recently Iraq. Women there are faced with violent struggles. Occupations in the twenty-first century have produced new responses, for example women's weblogs which chronicle urban warfare and resistance. One young woman, "Riverbend," noted about 9 April 2003 in Baghdad, "Baghdad was full of death . . . Seeing foreign tanks in your capital is devastating" (Gregory 2004, 213). Neocolonial women's resistance includes spreading instantaneous news around the world.

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Petra Kuppinger

South Asia

The period of British Crown rule in South Asia (1858–1947) witnessed the rise of urban forms, institutions, and attitudes that were entirely novel in the subcontinent. At the same time, pre-existing urban forms, institutions, and attitudes were selectively reworked, placed into new contexts, and occasionally disqualified or abandoned. Contemporary scholarship on colonial cities in South Asia has actively explored the gendered nature of these transformations.

Throughout colonial South Asia (including present day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar), older urban neighborhoods and markets were refashioned according to new ideas about sanitation and public health. New technologies for constructing, ornamenting, and tempering the interior climate of buildings found their way into even ordinary houses. A range of entirely new building types was introduced in response to new ideas about the role a house should play in supporting family life, to new forms of urban labor and leisure, and to changing ideas about the significance of the past as a guide to the present and future.

Less visible changes accompanied these more visible alterations. Formal and informal rules for using shared urban space were negotiated through a new nomenclature of "public" and "private" rights. Laws derived from British legal experience replaced local traditions of owning, transacting, and altering urban property. Urban development was orchestrated through new institutions of urban governance, new regimes of policing and surveillance, and new goals and practices for generating, controlling, and making information useful. As cities changed in these ways, moreover, people began to think about cities differently, using new languages and ideas to describe, evoke, and imagine them.

The effects of these changes on men's and women's roles in colonial urban society were multiple. Jobs in the limited industrial sector economy of India's colonial cities overwhelmingly went to men, unlike the case in Great Britain, where women's participation was historically high. Formal labor opportunities for women in India's cities were mostly limited to domestic services (such as sweeping, washing, and midwifery), hand-work in mills and factories (though often as unregistered labor), and making or selling goods produced in small-scale cottage industries. For the majority of women in cities, unremunerated household labor comprised the bulk of their economic activity. While urbanization prompted steady rural to urban migration throughout the colonial period, systematic cross-regional studies of the effect of migration on male–female ratios in cities and villages, and on the gendered structure of rural and urban labor, have yet to be carried out.

The status of the urban household, as both an architectural and social milieu, emerged as an important site in indigenous religious reform discourse during the colonial period. The gendered figure of the *zenana* (women's quarters) in particular, as a sequestered and custom-laden space tied to the moral integrity of the family, came to represent the fraught nature of demands on long-standing custom prompted by desires to reform the Muslim household. Vernacular literature directed toward domestic reform during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries included books and pamphlets on personal etiquette, cooking, home

medicine, domestic hygiene, child-rearing, and household management. The image of the home that emerged in this literature was that of a clean, orderly, and functionally specialized space, one whose female occupants ensured the social respectability of the household by practicing thrift and exercising vigilance over every domestic arrangement. This discursively produced image had a counterpart in late nineteenth-century architectural modifications to indigenous houses. In newly "modern" urban houses produced at the end of the nineteenth century, specialized rooms for cooking, sleeping, and socializing replaced an earlier tradition of flexible spaces whose use varied according to the time of day and season. Increasingly, turn-of-the-century houses made social respectability a visual feature of the house itself, something announced by a proliferation of ornament on house facades, the use of ventilating windows and other visible hygienic appurtenances on the building's exterior, and the introduction of interior hallways and reception rooms to separate members of the household from servants and visitors. Historian Partha Chatterjee has argued that South Asian domestic space came to stand for an inner, private, spiritual domain under conditions of colonial rule. At the same time, however, the discussion of domestic issues in publicly-circulated print media, and the reorganization of houses in response to publicly-aired attitudes toward domestic hygiene, urban sanitation, and moral improvement, meant that the colonial home in South Asia was equally a device for shaping those public sensibilities thought necessary for advancing family interests in colonial society.

The altered physical qualities of the home – with a new emphasis on hygiene, functional specialization, and the visual assertion of social respectability – mirrored changes in other building types and social spaces in the colonial city as well. Hospitals, schools, prisons, and courts – each segregated along lines of class and gender – became regular features of every medium and large colonial South Asian city. In the colonial city's new mixed European and South Asian neighborhoods, residences were spatially and functionally separated from shops, roads made separate provisions for vehicles and pedestrians, and written and unwritten rules asserted their claims over public conduct.

Gender relations were also reworked in response to new forms of leisure in the colonial city. As Sumantha Bannerjee has shown in the case of colonial Calcutta, late nineteenth-century reform-minded elites gradually withdrew their patronage from more traditional genres of urban popular culture, especially those based on literary and poetic compositions and performances by lower-class women, to patronize newer, more socially "polite" settings such as the cinema, theater, and literary gathering. Ostensibly open to everyone (while in practice overtly exclusionary), urban "public" parks emerged during the late nineteenth century as settings for the practice and display of genteel forms of leisure. At the same time, however, traditional forms of group assembly, such as *ʿurs* celebrations at Muslim shrines (on the death anniversary of a saint), recitations and neighborhood processions on Muḥarram, and the celebration of festivals at urban temples, mosques, and gardens continued to attract large numbers of male and female participants throughout the colonial period. Colonial-era ethnographic accounts of these events underscore both their widespread popularity and the spatial segregation of participants' activities based on gender, class, and religious affiliation.

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WILLIAM J. GLOVER

Sub-Saharan Africa

From the sixteenth century, European powers established factories and commercial sites on the African coasts to facilitate the passage to India and later the transatlantic slave trade. In the seventeenth century, French, British, and Portuguese bases were built that were linked to autochthonous settlements. The European settler colonies, such as South Africa, Kenya, and German East Africa created the prototype of the colonial town.

Without taking account of precolonial settlements, and according to colonial interests, towns were founded that functioned as centers for European farmers and merchants with port cities exporting the raw materials and foodstuffs crucial to the goals of mercantile capitalism. The European residential districts occupied large areas with a low population density, such as Nairobi, Kenya. In the colonial cities of East Africa, South Asians represented a high percentage of the population as a colonial intermediary group. In the early years, they lived above their shops in the commercial centers and later on in distinct residential districts. At the end of the colonial period, 350,000 South Asians lived in East Africa out of an estimated 25 million inhabitants. They did not form one uniform group but were subdivided on the basis of religion into Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, and Christian communities. Europeans, as the colonial elite, mainly worked in the administration of the colony. The Africans formed the most numerous, but were an economically, politically, and socially marginalized lower stratum. Most of today's large cities in Sub-Saharan Africa and many of the networks of middle and small towns had their origins in the colonial period. There are some exceptions, however, such as the cultural and religious center of Ibadan, Nigeria, the Ashanti political center of Kumassi in Ghana, or the precolonial commercial cities of Mombasa, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia.

Colonial cities became the centers of the diffusion of Western values and the monetary economy, which restructured African economies and societies by including them in the wider world economy and global markets. In the colonial period, it was typical to establish capitals or to relocate them because of changed economic and infrastructural conditions. In Kenya, the capital was moved from Mombasa to Nairobi (1907) and in the Ivory Coast, from Grand Bassam (since 1893) to Bingerville (since 1900), and then to Abidjan (since 1934). These changes were sometimes based on health issues and the European districts were kept separate from the African ones where sanitation was poor and diseases were prevalent. Migrant ethnic groups had already been settled in ethnic districts in precolonial African cities – such as the Hausa stranger quarters known as *zongos* – where they had lived according to their own lifestyles and where they built dwellings according to their ethnic customs.

In general, African women in Sub-Saharan Africa stayed in the countryside during the colonial period, where they were responsible for providing for the subsistence needs of their families. If their husbands worked in the towns, it was for a salary that was established to meet the needs of a male bachelor. It was only in the 1950s, for example, that in Nairobi, Kenya, the minimum wage was adjusted to take account of the worker's household. Female labor in the countryside was necessary and men were reluctant to let women go to towns. Yet, life for rural women was difficult: they were often exploited, frequently dependent on men, especially husbands, and rarely protected by new colonial laws. After receiving information on the opportunities that urban areas could offer to women, some decided to leave in order to pursue a different life in town, liberated from customary pressures.

A distinction should be made between these women and women of the elite who came to the towns in order to work in occupations such as nursing or midwifery, and later on, teaching. Only after the 1930s did women originating from the small and middle rural bourgeoisie have access to urban areas in order to receive more advanced formal education. But it was not until after the Second World War that these ideas were universally accepted; for example, in the 1950s, laws still authorized the repatriation of single women found strolling unchaperoned in Kampala, Uganda to their region of origin.

From the 1930s, women were accepted in urban areas of South Africa if their fathers or husbands had already worked there for not less than two years and if they could offer them shelter. After 1937, women also needed the authorization of the administration of their region of departure, even if it was difficult to control this measure. Women stayed minors and had a limited choice of jobs. They worked for unmarried African men or men without their wives in urban areas as clothes washers, cooks, tailors, and prostitutes.

The colonial administration used men to help run their bureaucracies. Secretaries, translators, postmen, and couriers were male migrants who left the countryside with the assistance of their region of origin and the colonizer. In towns, such as Natal in South Africa, more than 33,000 men worked as domestic workers at the turn of the twentieth century. In other towns at the beginning of the colonial period, clothes washers and tailors were also men. Only beginning in the 1930s did women enter these fields as well as developing other jobs, such as brewing beer.

The first Europeans who decided to tackle the lack of women in towns were Belgians. At the end of the 1920s, the directors of the Union minière du

haut Katanga looked for the stabilization of their workforce. Moreover, they wanted to act against alcoholism and malnutrition. They found that they had to encourage the installment of couples. Recruitment services were charged to import households and the enterprise encouraged marriages by advancing money for the dowry. This amount was so high that the laborers had to become indebted for one year in order to obtain a wife: they had to accept the concurrence of rich polygamous cotton planters who needed several wives in order to secure their production. Christian missionaries were charged to control, to protect, and to educate these women who had to participate in social, sanitary, and religious activities. Other voluntary associations were started by African or by European women, based primarily upon ethnicity or professional occupation. Colonial authorities did not favor associations founded by African women because they often united independent women, especially traders or prostitutes, whom the colonial administration tried to marginalize.

The large number of women in urban areas during the colonial period cannot be entirely explained by the labor migrations of their husbands. One of the main transformations of the latter half of the twentieth century was the creation of a new category of independent women capable of meeting their own financial needs and those of their families, in particular of their children, without the help of a man. Even if the colonizers indirectly promoted prostitution by only accepting unmarried men as workers in Kenya and South Africa, women found other economic activities in urban areas that required little capital and minimal adaptation to the local market such as working as small-scale traders or as domestic servants. Likewise, middle-class women in Lagos, Nigeria or Accra, Ghana were frequently involved in trade during the colonial period to the degree that colonial representatives negotiated with them directly regarding market matters. However, life in urban areas did not represent progress for all women. Migrants of poor backgrounds who had known a certain autonomy and female solidarity in some rural regions often lost these advantages in urban areas, and their life could be harder in the towns than it was before.

Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch observed that, contrary to the situation in West Africa, women who worked in urban areas were judged more or less contemptuously in East and Central Africa, from Kenya to Mozambique, whereas their work in the countryside was considered to be normal. This negative picture was influenced by the fact that women who were independent represented a challenge to local social systems based on ritual and reciprocal exchanges. The other reason was the European prejudice that a woman on her own could only be a prostitute, although colonial administrations received income from special taxes levied on young unmarried women and prostitutes who lived in cities, a tax that contributed to the fact that these categories of women were confounded (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1994).

But there existed further differences between women and men living in the colonial towns. Whereas women could return to their home villages and participate in rural activities, men were obliged to stay in the town because of the constraints of their work. Over time, other changes developed for women. In cities, women could negotiate marriage partners and were no longer obliged to choose their husbands according to ethnicity but they could include new criteria such as education, age, and social status.

It was in urban areas that women could become owners of buildings, thanks to their commercial activities of petty trade, domestic work, or prostitution, which permitted the first dwellers in the new colonial cities to acquire wealth without depending on a man (White 1990). Through diverse early initiatives, female migrants managed to earn enough money to build houses and to rent out rooms, which permitted them to obtain comfortable incomes. For example, in 1930s Pumwani, a Nairobi neighborhood for the African population in the then racially segregated Kenyan capital, more than 40 percent of houses were owned by women (Frederiksen 2001/2). Often these women decided to stay in the urban area until they died or to let their urban properties to their children who continued to receive incomes from them, while men often invested in the construction of houses in rural areas in order to spend their retirement years there.

As women became successful in their new context, they learned to rely on themselves and their female peers. They led responsible lives and they created new urban kin groups where property was sometimes transmitted from mother to daughter rather than from father to son according to customary inheritance rules. Ironically, the colonial town thus propelled African women into new social roles, which contributed to major transformations in Sub-Saharan African urban areas.

Despite colonial attempts to limit the immigration of women to urban areas, they continued to be drawn to the cities to pursue their own oppor-

tunities. After the independence of most of Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1960s, these processes continued. Today, there are many urban women (often a third or even a half of all households), some of them Muslim, who choose not to be legally bound to the fathers of their children, a fact that permits them to maintain their rights to their children in case of divorce or widowhood. For example, in Senegal, a widow would be "returned" to her parents according to Islamic law, whereas the children would be sent to the family of the father. Similarly in Tanzania, courts following Muslim customary law have often given children as young as the age of six or seven to their fathers in case of divorce. It is therefore understandable that women prefer to remain independent and circumvent these practices.

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Ulrike Schuerkens

Cities: Homelessness

South Asia

This entry explains homelessness as it originates and is sustained under poverty and patriarchy, including the experiences of homelessness pertaining to Muslim women in South Asia.

Nearly one-fifth of the population of the world resides in South Asia. A significant section of this population lives in deprivation, earning less than 1 US$ per day: Bangladesh 36 percent, India 34.7 percent, Pakistan 13.4 percent, and Sri Lanka 6.6 percent (UN-HABITAT 2005). The phenomenon of homelessness is a specific manifestation of deprivation that effectively jeopardizes the social, economic, physical, and psychological well-being of this section (Ghafur 2004). Home is the center of individual or group existence in South Asia, irrespective of class, caste, religion, or location. Becoming homeless puts an individual or household in the street, and thereby erodes people's social identity. Homelessness in South Asia, although unfortunate, is a recurring outcome of pervasive poverty, natural disaster, communal violence, slum eviction, or war. Recent studies in Bangladesh and India, in particular, have indicated that the causes and consequences of homelessness vary among women and men (Ghafur 2002, Bannerjee 2002).

Establishing criteria for defining and counting homelessness is as critical in South Asia as it is in other parts of the world. A narrow definition, based on the physical criterion of rooflessness, identifies homeless people. The *Census of India* defines homeless as those not living in "census houses," i.e. structures with a roof (GOI 1991). A broader definition, based on holistic social, physical, and economic criteria identifies squatter populations as homeless people. The extent of homelessness is significantly smaller under the first definition due to difference in criteria. Different approaches and criteria are used for defining homelessness in Bangladesh and India (Ghafur 2002, Bannerjee 2002). A typology of homelessness – floating homelessness, situated homelessness, and potential homelessness – based on residential circumstances in Bangladesh provides analytical clarity (Ghafur 2004).

Floating homelessness, the most visible type, is based on the criterion of rooflessness; it refers to people living in the streets or other public spaces without permanent shelters of their own. Floating homeless people are often called pavement dwellers, street dwellers, or destitute. A holistic view of the loss of identity, privacy, comfort, and shelter provides the basis for identifying situated homelessness as a type. From a physical perspective, unlike the floating homelessness, the situated homeless do have a residence. Squatters living illegally on public land are a major subgroup within this type. Squatters are situated homeless because their shelters do not conform to the notion of "adequate shelter." From a social perspective, the absence of identity as participating members in all spheres of society constitutes the basis of homelessness for abandoned children and orphans, domestic and child servants, brothel-based sex workers, and trafficked children. Lastly, the possibility of becoming floating or situated homeless because of social, economic, natural, and political factors constitutes potential homelessness. Individuals or households at risk of becoming homeless include people living in slums, especially those who are in shared accommodation (i.e. sub-tenants); stranded refugees living in camps; single female workers; poor rural widows; and functionally landless rural farmers, defined in Bangladesh as owning less than 0.5 acres of land.

National censuses and other studies in Bangladesh and India have shown similarity in observing fewer homeless women. In Bangladesh – a predominantly Muslim country – female homeless people in Dhaka Megacity and 118 cities and towns are 12.88 percent and 23.81 percent among a total homeless population of 14,999 and 32,078 respectively. The sex ratios (the number of women per thousand men) among homeless people are very low in Dhaka Megacity (280:1000) and 118 cities and towns (312:1000) compared to the sex ratio (961:1000) found in all slums in Bangladesh (BBS 1999). In India, the 1991 census reports the sex ratio as not only lower but also varying among Delhi (152:1000), Kolkata (463:1000), Mumbai (276:1000), and Chennai (797:1000) – four major cities in India (Bannerjee 2002). The total numbers of homeless people (and women) in these cities are 19,366 (2,552), 33,204 (10,513), 38,763 (8,391), and 19,044 (8,447). There are, however, no references to Muslim women or explanation for varia-

tion in sex ratio, especially for the high incidence in Chennai. Enumeration of Muslim homeless people in India is scant; in Delhi, one in every five homeless people were reported as Muslim whereas in Mumbai a 1985 SPARC (Society for the Promotion of Area Resource Centres) study found equal numbers of Hindus and Muslims (Bannerjee 2002).

That homeless women are fewer in number suggests the hidden nature of the problem. For women to be visible, and counted in a given census, requires their presence in the street. But public open spaces and streets in Dhaka, like elsewhere in South Asia, are unsafe for women. Married male heads of household usually prefer to remain on the street alone while keeping their wives and daughters in safe accommodation in order to avoid the potential threat of physical and sexual abuse, even from the members of the law enforcing agencies, especially the police. Daughters and wives may stay as a guest or paying guest in a (distant) relative's house in a nearby slum or squat from which they can visit their male relatives daily or even take a meal with them. This is evident from the fact that 70 percent of all interviewed pavement dwellers in Dhaka were living alone on the street while 54.9 percent of them were married (Begum 1997, 51). The proportion of girls and women between 10 and 19 years, especially in Dhaka Megacity, drops significantly in the age structure (BBS 1999). This is a unique coping strategy adopted by homeless people. A survey of disadvantaged women, for Concern Bangladesh, in eight cities and towns in Bangladesh reveals the plight of floating women (READ 2000). Disadvantaged women include floating women sex workers, floating disabled women and girls, and other floating women and street girls. The mean age of floating sex workers, disabled floating women, and other floating women are 28, 30, and 34 years respectively; 41.7 percent of floating women have suffered some form of oppression or torture. Homeless (young and single) women, being distressed migrants without any peer supports, prior information about the area of destination, education, or skills, are most likely to survive through prostitution, and are subsequently not counted by a given census.

Homelessness in the cities of South Asia comes about mainly through the influences of poverty and patriarchy in rural villages, which interact together, and have also been responsible for the erosion of the traditional safety nets against homelessness. Evolution in the agricultural production system, decreasing per capita land due to population increase, and increasing poverty leading to pauperization of the rural peasantry have been suggested as the main contributory factors for the demise of inter-household cooperation, observed earlier within extended families formed from kinship based relations (Arens and Burden 1977). Landlessness correlates with poverty, and in turn contributes to the rural poor's homelessness, which eventually pushes them to urban areas as "distress migrants." The urban informal housing market fails to cater to the shelter needs of most of these (newly arrived) migrants.

Women's homelessness has also been a social construction, triggered by and taking place under patriarchy: patriarchy makes women vulnerable to homelessness. On the one hand, patriarchy as practiced under Islam as elsewhere restricts women's rights to land. Islam sanctions inheritance by women but patriarchal society removes that right (Engineer 1995). What land women really own and, more importantly, how much they control whatever they own in a male-dominated society, remain questions to be reckoned with (Agarwal 1998). On the other hand, multiple marriage, triple *ṭalāq*, and purdah are the specific manifestations of patriarchy that make Muslim women vulnerable to homelessness. A Muslim husband's utterance of triple *ṭalāq* in order to divorce his wife is a misinterpretation of the Holy Qur'ān and the Prophet's sayings (Engineer 1995, xiv); defiance or overruling of *ṭalāq* brought even more persecution from society (Shehabuddin 2002). Although Islam provides security to Muslim women during their marriage in the form of *mahr* – allocation of an amount of money – this is rarely received by poor women at the time of their divorce. Purdah confines women within the domestic realm and restricts their access to information, social networks, and income generating opportunities. Society's interpretation of religious codes and values and the state's enactment of laws, however, deprive women of their equal share of opportunities and resources.

Being South Asian and female lends several factors that transcend class, religion, culture, and locality to affect the lives of most South Asian women (MHHDC 2000, Mehta 2004). Critical factors include vulnerability to domestic violence and unequal legal and social rights. To what extent Islam aggravates these disadvantages to render South Asian women homeless is a contentious question. A review of existing literature, however, does not suggest any direct relationship between Islam and Muslim women's homelessness. In India, the Muslim community in general, and Muslim women in particular, have a lower socioeconomic profile than their Hindu counterparts. This disparity and the gender inequality within the Muslim

community occur in the larger social, economic, and political structures within which Muslim women live (Hasan and Menon 2004).

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Shayer Ghafur

Cities: Informal Settlements

Arab States (excepting Sudan)

This entry provides a concise overview of informal settlements in the Arab states, focusing on the role and place of women in their production and management and the influences of Islam on this process. Informal settlements are defined here as neighborhoods that have significantly relied on social institutions in their development, such as kinship, geographic, or religious networks, as opposed to formal state-sanctioned institutions. Palestine is excluded from this entry because of its special status deriving from its ongoing colonization, resulting in a variety of unique housing settlement regimes, such as state-sponsored Jewish-only settlements, which fall under conflicting juridical statuses. The entry is also limited by the dearth of research on this subject.

Informal settlements in the Arab states

Several types of informal settlement can be observed in Arab states, including squatter settlements (illegally occupied land), illegal land subdivisions, constructions on legally occupied land, refugee camps, and workers' settlements. The formation and development of informal settlements in these countries are shaped by similar regional forces. They result, among other factors, from: 1. the modernization of property registries and building regulations that rendered many indigeneous practices of land distribution and construction illegal (during late Ottoman, Mandate or colonial, and early independence periods) (Clerc 2002); 2. exponential urban population growth due to industrialization, high rates of demographic growth, and rural migration (Bonine 1997); 3. forced population displacements within and across national borders generated by wars (especially the Arab–Israeli conflict), public development projects, and natural disasters (Shami 1993); and 4. public policies that fail to respond to low-income housing needs (Sadik 1996, Navez-Bouchanine 1995).

Regional patterns of urbanization (high, rapid, and concentrated in one or a few cities) also influence the location of these settlements that have all developed near the largest cities (for example Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, Amman, Rabat, Tunis, and others) (al-Hammad 1995) where they house considerable percentages of the populations (45 percent in Cairo, Harris and Wahba 2002). Processes of illegal land occupation and/or housing production are also affected by the nature of political regimes (undemocratic and repressive) in the region and the types of state–society contracts that discourage open acts of defiance. As a result, this form of housing production is relatively depoliticized and happens through "silent encroachment," unlike in other regions of the world (Bayyat 1997, AlSayyad 2004).

Although informal settlement dwellers are socially and economically heterogeneous (Miles-Doan 1992), they tend to belong to lower-income segments of the population, for example rural migrants, displaced households or individuals and, more recently, foreign (single) migrant workers and impoverished members of the middle class. Everywhere, and in line with international trends, the number of female headed households is increasing (Asfour 1995).

Broad regional trends should not conceal local specificities. For instance, local histories such as wars (Lebanon and more recently Iraq) or colonial legacies (Morrocco and Algeria) generated particular forms of informal settlements (war squatters) and the participation of particular constellations of actors (political parties and militias in Lebanon). Local social structures (for example tribes) have also influenced how settlements are developed and organized (Razzaz 1994). Economic trends in most Gulf countries dictate that foreign migrant workers rather than nationals dwell in informal settlements. Similarly, specific political circumstances, such as the arrival of populist national regimes (even if dictatorships) in Nasser's Egypt and to a lesser extent in Assad's Syria, influenced how and when squatters developed in these countries.

Women and settlement formation and development

As part of their "traditional" role of homemakers, women actively participate in settlement planning, especially at the household level (Deboulet 1993, Asfour 1995, Navez-Bouchanine 1995, Ghannam 2002, Fawaz 2004). Women are partners in the family's decision to move (rural migration or inter-

city) and in the selection of the future dwelling. Furthermore, processes of housing construction (often incremental, especially in the 1960s–80s) and service provision are perceived as extensions of women's traditional roles and are hence partially ascribed to them. Women have also led movements of open defiance to public authorities, whether to stop settlement eviction or to improve living conditions. This role is often integrated in a settlement survival strategy because regional customs and traditions often reduce the risk of women being arrested. Finally, women contribute financially to the provision of their homes through personal endowment (especially jewelry) or through their participation in informal credit institutions (for example *gamʿiyyāt* in Egypt).

Another central role played by women is the development, maintenance, and activation of webs of social relations (Singerman 1994, Ghannam 2002) that are deployed in housing provision and settlement management in order to compensate for uncertain market conditions or improve living conditions. These networks inform about housing opportunities, verify the credibility of a seller, secure transactions from default, and ensure credit (Varley 2000, Fawaz 2004). Networks are also deployed to ensure service provision, improve legal status, facilitate household management tasks with tight budgets, and more generally, provide mutual social support (Deboulet 1993, Bekkar 1994, Shami 1997).

The huge financial, physical, and emotional costs that women invest in housing production generate strong bonds between their homes and their personal narratives, infusing special meanings to their homes and strengthening their relations to the settlements where they live (Varley 2000, Ghannam 2002). Women also often ascribe additional value to their houses as the basis for their income generation activities, producing goods to be exchanged, traded, and/or consumed by the household directly (Hammam 1981). These include a wide range of home-based enterprises as well as subsistence activities, such as raising animals. Such roles are often inscribed in space, affecting the design of the house.

The central role played by women should not conceal structural and cultural inequalities that limit the roles they can play and the visibility they can acquire. There are, for example, very few women playing the prominent role of land developers or realtors, serving on official neighborhood committees, or participating in neighborhood delegations. These social differentiations are also often inscribed in space (Bekkar 1994, Petonnet 1972).

Property rights and claims

Property holding provides a good indicator of inequality between sexes in informal settlements. Although they are legally entitled to do so, a right that many authors have rushed to point out as enshrined by Islam, which guarantees equal entitlement to property holding for the two sexes, women rarely hold property titles to their dwellings (Hammam 1981, Qvist 1995, Asfour 1995). This inequality is exacerbated by Islamic inheritance laws that systematically favor men's shares over women's and by social practices that often lead women to concede their entitlement (Hammam 1981, Navez-Bouchanine 1995). Similarly, women's property claims in squatter settlements are weaker vis-à-vis those of men and a claim over property for a son has more credibility than one made for a daughter (Tekçe et al. 1997).

Inequality in access to property is exacerbated by public policies. Upon displacement, relocation, or compensation, public agencies assume male leadership in the household. As a result, they systematically negotiate with "local leaders" (men), compromising women's participation, and they automatically register titles or disburse compensations to the male "head of the household" (Navez-Bouchanine 1995, Shami 1997, Tekçe et al. 1997).

Living conditions

Physical and environmental conditions in informal settlements are reported to be poor and deteriorating in all countries, lacking basic facilities and infrastructure. Since women spend more time at home and are forced to compensate for deficient public services as part of their traditional roles (for example carrying water, laundry), their health and well-being are severely affected by these conditions (Tekçe et al. 1997, Dankelman et al. 1988). Poor infrastructure services also constrain women's economic activities since the time allocated to compensate for deficiencies in water provision, for example, prevents them from engaging in income generation activities. Such cases have been documented in North Yemen and in Egypt, but are likely to be relevant everywhere (Hammam 1981).

Informal settlements and Islamic movements

Several researchers have pointed out the dominant role of Islamic political parties in lobbying for and organizing communities in informal settlements (Ismail 2000). Research has also indicated that many Islamic NGOs have provided

social services (such as health and education) in these areas (Harb 1996, Fawaz 2000). Informal settlements do not, however, house the dominant constituencies of rising Islamic movements. Indeed, research in all these countries is showing that middle-income groups living in older established neighborhoods tend to form the majority of these movements' following (Clark 2004, Herrera 2000).

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Mona Fawaz

Indonesia: Jakarta

The growth of DKI (Daerah Khusus Ibukota, Special Capital District) Jakarta, Indonesia as a metropolitan city has given rise to a multitude of problems. The development of industrial zones, the concentration of capital, and the abundance of service and goods industries have drawn rural people from Java and other islands to Jakarta. This rapid process of urbanization has caused a steady

decline in living standards in the city. The limited land area available for housing has led to an increase in substandard residences and slum areas. It is not unusual to see the shacks of poor people surrounding modern skyscrapers. In slum areas, women make up the majority of the population. Women occupy a highly marginal position in terms of informal settlement in Jakarta.

Brief description of Jakarta

The city was established in 1527. At its inception, it was named by the Dutch colonial administration Gemeente en Stadgemeente Batavia, or simply Batavia. During the Japanese occupation in the Second World War, it was called Jakarta Tokubetsushi. Following the struggle for independence in 1949, it finally took on its current and popular name, that of Jakarta Metropolitan City.

DKI Jakarta province is divided administratively into five municipalities and one Residence. The five municipalities are South Jakarta, Central Jakarta, East Jakarta, West Jakarta, and North Jakarta with areas of 145.73, 47.90, 187.73, 126.15, and 154.01 square kilometers respectively.

Toward the south and east of Jakarta there is a lake and swamp with an area totaling 96.5 hectares. These areas are suitable for water catchments, and the climate is cool and thus ideal for settlement. Manufacturing activities mostly take place in North and East Jakarta, while business and office administration activities are mainly conducted in West, Central, and South Jakarta.

Population and workforce

According to city registration data, the DKI Jakarta population in mid-2002 consisted of 7.46 million Indonesians and 4,800 foreigners. Since the area of DKI Jakarta is 661.52 square kilometers, the population density was almost 11,300 per square kilometer, making it the most densely populated region in Indonesia. There are more males than females. In terms of highest level of educational attainment, the percentage of the population aged 15 and over who have completed high school (both junior and senior) is around 63.02 percent, primary school around 17.98 percent, and academy/university 19 percent.

Even though the population growth rate has decreased as a result of family planning programs, the population is high and in-migration is increasing. The provincial government has been making efforts toward urban planning and measures to provide living space, food, clean water, health services, medicines, education, jobs, housing, transportation, and other facilities to the DKI Jakarta population. The government has also implemented measures to promote the resettlement of Jakarta residents to other less populated areas of the country. In 2002, 130 families (415 persons) were resettled to South Sumatra and Jambi.

The population aged 15 and over can be divided into two groups, labor force and non-labor force. The total labor force was 3.84 million and the non-labor force was 2.44 million. The total working population was 3.27 million and, according to the National Socio-Economic Household Survey (SUSENAS), in 2002 another 567,600 people were looking for work, of whom 7,000 obtained jobs. The majority of the working population were employed in the trade, services, and manufacturing sectors, which constituted 37.2 percent, 23.7 percent, and 19.7 percent respectively of the labor force. In terms of employment status, 70 percent worked as contract employees, 26.6 percent as permanent employees, and 2.55 percent as part of family businesses.

Urbanization and poverty

Growth-centered development policies have sharply divided Jakarta society into two diametrically opposed groups. One group has strong economic standing and a good guarantee of livelihood. The other, the "floating mass," is larger and leads a precarious existence, easily shifting from one sector to another. Its members live from hand to mouth; all their income is used to buy food and they are not able to participate in the market economy.

Urban areas have always been viewed as centers of progress and development, as opposed to rural areas, which are seen to be synonymous with underdevelopment. The urban/rural dichotomy conjures up other opposing identities: "traditional" peasantry versus "modern" townspeople, news blindness versus well-informed sources, property resources versus human resources, low technology versus high production, and unproductive subsistence economy versus production based on capital investment.

The growth of Jakarta is largely caused by migration from rural areas and is creating a very complex urban community with differences of tribe, work, and also social group. There is a substantive and stable community of people such as those engaged in regular work, including entrepreneurs, small business owners, and civil servants. The majority of workers, however, do not work in the formal sector, namely government bureaucracy and industry. Those with regular employment are surrounded by the floating mass of people

from a variety of work groups that are recognized as the informal sector. These people are very mobile geographically and active at work. Seasonal migrant workers, temporary workers, and people looking for work generally do not have a permanent residence. They tend to have low levels of education (yet high skills as farmers, fishermen, or craftspeople) and their earnings are generally around subsistence level.

Kampung (neighborhood) improvement is one positive policy undertaken by the government to improve urban living conditions. Kampungs themselves are a rich source of opportunities for employment. The question of priorities, however, has been the subject of continued controversy. Although this program of improvement was launched with the intent that the worst should be improved first, it deliberately excluded the worst neighborhoods, specifically those built in illegal or unsafe areas such as alongside railway lines or canals. Houses in these areas were marked for demolition. No comprehensive solution was proposed for the poorest in Jakarta.

Women's position in urban development in Jakarta

According to the National Labor Force Survey (SAKERNAS), almost half of Jakarta's citizens are women. Women as a human resource have significant potential in terms of urban development but are still discriminated against in terms of access to education. Women experience a far higher degree of illiteracy in comparison to men (BPS DKI Jakarta 2002b, citing SUSENAS 2001). In 2001, the percentage of women who received education to junior high school level or below was 63.89 percent and that of women who attained a tertiary level qualification was about 3 percent.

Employment opportunities for women in Jakarta are recorded at 91.57 percent and employment opportunities for men are 93.50 percent. Women unskilled laborers tend to have a higher level of education than men, with 32.95 percent having graduated from primary school, as opposed to only 23.98 percent of men. In 2001, the percentage of unemployed women in Jakarta was high at 13.25 percent. This is significantly higher than the rate of unemployment among men (10.50 percent). It is also interesting to note that the number of Indonesian women migrant workers who originate from Jakarta is 6.46 percent of the total number of migrant workers nationally.

There are no clear statistics to adequately show the roles and positions of women in development of Jakarta; these are still largely obscured and have not been subject to serious efforts at documentation. This is surprising given that it is women who largely propel the everyday life of Jakarta.

Feminization of poverty

The growth-oriented policy of development pursued during the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a concentration of property and wealth among the elite. The distribution of wealth is particularly inequitable in Jakarta, Indonesia's main metropolitan city. Elite sections of society in Jakarta were able to obtain property on the back of the oil boom in the early 1970s. Most was obtained with the profits of export activities. The corruption of state assets is also a significant problem that sustains the disparity of wealth in Jakarta. This practice has been well documented in a number of legal cases.

Prostitution, domestic service, service industry employment, and small-scale trading offer many of the positions that women occupy in the informal sector. Many prostitutes come from West and Central Java, and some come from Jakarta. There are many reasons that motivate them to migrate to Jakarta and work as prostitutes. Generally, they experience difficulties finding work in the town or village where they live.

The relation of domestic service staff (housemaids) to their employer can be classified into three categories: the family relationship, in which the housemaid is considered as the employer's child but receives a low salary; feudalistic, in which the work hours must be obeyed strictly, with defined work duties and permanent salary; and family member with low salary. Small-scale traders at traditional markets and sidewalk traders are an interesting social phenomenon in Jakarta. Impoverishment among women in the informal sector in Jakarta continues to expand.

Informal settlement and women urban poor

Jakarta's urban planning problems are compounded by large numbers of urban poor. The local government of DKI Jakarta is aware that a section of Jakarta residents are living in unsatisfactory conditions in slum areas of the city. In recent decades, many people have flocked to Jakarta from other parts of Indonesia. These new Jakartans live in kampung-style, high density, unplanned communities where housing, infrastructure, and public facilities are inadequate. The formal, technical, and administrative regulations for building houses, which include building regulations and

permit procedures, cannot be met by lower income groups. This results in substandard settlements. The inhabitants of the kampungs often live in difficult conditions with overpopulated accommodation, unpaved roads, and poor drainage systems causing serious flooding during the rainy season.

Many people who have migrated to the capital city have no particular skills and an inadequate educational background for employment. As a result, many migrants are involved in informal activities in various sectors often perceived as having a negative impact on the city's environment. Many of these homeless people have become scavengers and make a livelihood from collecting discarded factory and household trash. Their efforts help to clean the city and reduce dumping in landfill sites and are a vital contribution to the functioning of the city.

The objective of the city housing development is to create a housing environment that will satisfy the requirements of the different income groups. About 50 percent of existing houses in Jakarta are considered to be substandard and are located in areas with severe infrastructural deficiencies. The houses are often semi-permanent dwellings located in flood-prone neighborhoods where the soil bearing capacity is poor and the groundwater is polluted. A primary constraint in urban management in Indonesia is the lack of a critical mass of local officials who can professionally manage urban settlements. Education and training opportunities for local officials are insufficient.

The form of settlement called kampung is often referred to by vernacular terms such as *pecomberan* (wild slum) or *pemukiman liar* (squatter settlement). Other less derogatory labels are "settlement of people with low earnings" and "marginal settlement." The kampungs represent areas of town that grow spasmodically, spontaneously, and in an unregulated fashion; they occupy about 70 percent of the metropolitan and modern areas of Indonesia and offer miserable living conditions.

In general, it is poor residents who live in slum areas of the city. The term slum connotes various kinds of poor quality housing and is used to specify a certain environment. Because of the wide scope of the term, it is often also qualified to distinguish one type of slum from another. Slums are thriving fast in diverse environments. Making a shift to life in slums is not always a sign of declining fortunes. Taking up residence in a slum might possibly represent the first phase in transition from life as a homeless drifter to having a household, or a place where people can make the switchover from absolute poverty to expectations of a better life. Slums also emerge because of the failure of governments to provide good housing at prices accessible by poor people.

In the slums of Jakarta, the direst problem is that of disposal of human waste. Families often discharge waste in rivers or ditches. Proper facilities for the disposal of human feces are not available, causing the spread of infection and disease. In slum areas, people tend to accept this risk as an inevitable consequence of life in the community.

The difficulties experienced by slum dwellers in Jakarta have become increasingly serious because of the high density of population and lack of personal freedom. High-density living means that all available space is filled with shacks and each shack is crowded with slum-dwellers. The lack of personal freedom, the risk of disease, and poor social environment represent just some of the consequences of life in an overloaded space, and also provide some indication of the many ways the health and dignity of the slum-dweller is challenged on a daily basis.

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HEGEL TEROME

Sudan

This entry discusses the pattern of urbanization prevailing in Sudan, the prevalence of informal settlements in urban areas, and gender relations in those settlements.

Arguably, most urban areas in Sudan have developed informally and continue to grow in that manner. Most were extant villages, or small marketplaces, which were transformed into urban centers by administrative decrees that assigned to them some urban functions with a concomitant replanning of their fabric and extension of basic services. The prime examples of such urban areas are Berber, Omdurman, and Al-Fashir, among others. Other centers, such as Port Sudan and Khartoum, were established as new towns by the Ottoman and British administrations, which ruled Sudan from 1820 to 1955. The nuclei of these centers included government offices, residences for expatriate administrators, a marketplace, and "native" housing areas. These centers became attractive to seasonal migrants who sought employment opportunities in them during dry seasons. Seasonal migration, however, became permanent in the past three decades as a result of mounting pressures in rural areas: a series of dry seasons and a proliferation of civil wars in southern, western, and eastern Sudan. Thus forced mass migrations from rural areas to urban centers became the dominant form of population movements in Sudan and led to a high pace of urbanization (Table 1). Coupled with relatively higher levels of services and economic opportunities in major urban centers, those push factors have resulted in depopulation of vast areas of southern and western Sudan and population explosion in the central regions of Sudan and Greater Khartoum.

The overall impact of this hyper-urbanization has been negative in the receiving urban centers because their economy could not keep pace with rapid population increase, resulting in mass unemployment. Similarly, basic services could not be extended fast enough to the newly arriving populations. Further, unlike seasonal migration waves, which included young enterprising men, forced migration waves included primarily children, women, and elderly people. Most were destitute and became dependent on charity and rations distributed by relief agencies.

Informal settlements proliferated in urban areas because planned neighborhoods could not absorb migrants and natural population increase. Four types of informal settlements can be identified:

1. Old villages that had been developed spontaneously without preconceived plans. Land ownership in such villages is often not documented, but is well known and sacredly protected. As urban areas expand, they often incorporate old villages within their boundaries, resulting in a juxtaposition of planned urban areas and unplanned villages.
2. Squatter settlements formed incrementally by households who occupy vacant, mostly government, lands at the periphery of urban areas and build their settlements on them. Others encroach upon land reserved for particular functions (for example industry, sport facilities, and the like). Some squatters may be land speculators who grab land and fence it off in anticipation of future price escalation.
3. Informal settlements surrounding extant villages: village councils or shaykhs often subdivide agricultural lands at the outskirts of their villages and sell them informally as housing plots. These parcels bear informal land titles that may or may not be fully accepted by central land authorities. Rudimentary plans are often used in parceling out these plots, which become the backbone for future planning when these villages are incorporated into urban areas.
4. Temporary settlements designated by authorities as temporary lodging for people affected by major disasters. Examples of such settlements are camps designated for people who have been displaced by war and famine during the past two decades. Often, plots in these camps are demarcated in regular patterns and are provided with a modicum of services, but they remain informal due to the haste in which they have been established, the shabby structures erected on them by destitute displacees, and the lack of official titles to the assigned lands.

Table 1: Population and Urban Growth in Sudan

	1955–6	1973	1983	1993	Author's Estimates for 2005
Population	10,300,000	14,800,000	21,600,000	24,900,000	33,000,000
Urban Population	854,000	2,600,000	4,150,000	6,275,000	11,000,000
% Urban	8.8	18.5	20.5	25.2	3.3

Most informal settlements have a dominant religion (viz. Islam, Christianity, or local African religions), while religious minorities often live in separate quarters. Religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence is often the norm. Depending on the regional origin of their inhabitants, which often is a good indicator of religious backgrounds, displaced people camps are mostly segregated along religious lines. Darfur displacees, for instance, are predominantly Muslims, while southerners are mostly non-Muslims.

In the case of Greater Khartoum, planning authorities adopted an action plan in 1992 to address the proliferation of informal settlements (estimated at 96 settlements accommodating about 60 percent of its population in 1991). Four approaches were adopted depending on the characteristics of each settlement: 1. upgrading and re-planning; 2. incorporation into the urban fabric; 3. relocation to planned areas; and 4. demolition of settlements built on land reserved for particular functions or on hazardous conditions. Consequently, most informal settlements have received some "treatment." However, due to the continuing population growth and unmet demand for housing, new settlements continue to mushroom in spite of tough restrictions.

Characterized by low levels of education and skills, poor health, and limited access to resources, the general situation of women in informal settlements is dismal. A study of urban problems in Khartoum (El-Battahani et al. 1998, 75) found that 61 percent of households in the surveyed informal settlements were headed by single women. Most of them earn a precarious living through the informal economy, as domestic labor, or as unskilled workers in the formal sector. Access to credit through official channels is limited for women; however, many credit programs initiated by development agencies target women in informal settlements because they have higher repayment rates and also because their increased incomes directly benefit their households. Thus, those women acquire a higher degree of economic freedom, and a more assertive decision-making capacity, than unemployed housewives in formal settlements.

Participation of women in local politics in informal settlements is appreciable. Elderly women from southern Sudan and parts of western Sudan play important roles in conflict resolution in private and communal matters. Many women are elected or appointed as members of local community groups (such as popular committees); however, their influence on major decisions remains insignificant due to male domination of local politics.

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Gamal Mahmoud Hamid

Turkey

Informal settlements, called *gecekondu*s (meaning "built overnight"), have appeared on the Turkish scene since the 1950s as the result of rapid urbanization. In the attempts to modernize and incorporate society into the global capitalist economy, the agricultural sector was mechanized to produce for the market by the support of the Marshall Plan; highways were built, and industrialization, although limited, grew in big cities, resulting in mass migration from villages to cities. Predictably, the cities failed to accommodate the housing needs of the incoming migrants. The solution to this problem was squatter (*gecekondu*) housing, although it was defined as illegal by the state. The fact that the Turkish state had inherited large amounts of land from the Ottoman Empire, and hence state-owned land was abundant, eased the growth of *gecekondu* settlements. First they were built in places close to the city center, and later on they increasingly appeared on the city's peripheries. *Gecekondu* settlements began to receive services and infrastructure after they were recognized for the first time by the state in the Gecekondu Act 766, passed in 1966. The Act decreed the upgrading of those *gecekondu*s in relatively good condition that did not pose any danger to health, the clearance of those that were poorly built, and the prevention of further *gecekondu* construction. Although the first of these three objectives was not difficult to put into action, owing, to some extent, to the labor contributions of local people, the other two have remained unattainable because of populist policies and limited state budget. The following data show the quick spread of *gecekondu*s in the Turkish context (Danielson and Keleş 1985, 166, Keleş 1997, 387).

In 1950 there were 50,000 *gecekondu*s and 250,000 people living in them (4.7 percent of the population living in cities). These numbers reached 240,000 and 1,200,000 (16.4 percent) in 1960; 430,000 and 2,150,000 (22.9 percent) in 1965; 600,000 and 3,000,000 (23.6 percent) in 1970; 1,5000,000 and 5,750,000 (26.1 percent) in 1980; and 1,750,000 and 8,750,000 (33.9 percent) in 1990.

In the process of rural–urban migration, single men were the first to come to the city. Soon they were followed by their families, usually those from the same village clustering in the same area and forming village-like communities. The hard work and burdensome life of village women created a strong desire to live in the city. They expected comfortable and clean lives free from the strict social control in the village. Their commitment to urban living made them active in the struggle to establish their lives in the city. They physically contributed to the construction of their *gecekondu*s, carrying water and bricks on their backs, as well as accommodating the daily needs (e.g. preparing food) of those who helped with the construction. Many sold their gold to contribute financially. However, all these contributions of women to their *gecekondu*s have remained largely invisible, and almost always it is the husband who owns the house. Women tried to make homes out of these poorly-built houses that lacked electricity, running water, and sewage systems until the settlements received some services and infrastructure. This happened after their presence was recognized by the authorities, usually when there were enough houses in a settlement to put pressure on the local government. This was possible because the voting potential of *gecekondu* residents brought them bargaining power.

Gecekondu environments both benefit and harm women. They are female environments in the sense that women can use outdoor spaces in the proximate environment freely; in the semi-public, semi-private spaces around their houses, they gather with their neighbors, usually talking while knitting. This is especially important for those women who do not work outside the home and spend almost all their time inside the neighborhood. Moreover, women form support networks in which they exchange their labor (e.g. baking large numbers of loaves of bread for each family in turns). On the other hand, *gecekondu* environments support traditional patriarchy. As migrants from the same village cluster in the same *gecekondu* neighborhood, and as informal and close relations among neighbors, who are almost always rural migrants, become the norm, intense social control over women is the outcome, exercised especially by women on behalf of men. The reproduction of traditional norms and values in *gecekondu* communities acts as an impediment to rural migrant women working outside the home. When economic difficulties make them start working, they have to be careful not to create the image that they are causing any harm to the family honor. This makes some rural migrant women, especially those who are oriented to urban society, prefer apartment districts where social heterogeneity and physical density render difficult the social control exercised in *gecekondu* neighborhoods.

The lives of women in *gecekondu* areas are affected by their religious sect (*mezhep*), namely orthodox Sunnism and heterodox Alevism. Although *mezhep* is not the determining factor in everyday life practices in the city's public sphere, it matters in *gecekondu* settlements, and residents are conscious of each other's *mezhep*. As migrants from the same village cluster in the same area, they reproduce their village-based identities that include their *mezhep*. In the present conjecture in Turkey, Alevis present themselves as democratic and secular, and as those who support gender equality. They are against women's seclusion, and Alevism permits women to participate in the public sphere. Hence it is easier for Alevi women to work outside the home. In some cases, everyday life in the *gecekondu* neighborhood is contested on the basis of sectarian difference, and Alevi women may differentiate themselves from their Sunni counterparts by their uncovered hair and short-sleeved dresses, often wearing pants. On the other hand, conservative Sunni *gecekondu* women tend to cover their hair and keep their distance from men. Thus, in *gecekondu* settlements Alevis and conservative Sunnis tend to play out their differences through the physical appearances of women and the kind of contacts they have with men. This serves as a warning against treating Islam as homogeneous, and not paying attention to internal variations.

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Tahire Erman

Cities: Islamic Cities

Overview

Introduction

The study of gender relations in urban milieus has developed as a part of a broad movement to rethink how one might characterize or study the "Islamic city." Orientalist scholarship claimed to be able to examine cities from the Maghrib to Afghanistan as variations on this ideal type, conceived in terms of the city's buildings, most particularly of structures such as mosques, baths, and markets. Little attention was given to the fact that such structures are often found in small towns or villages, or that many important cities had a pre-Islamic history that contributed to their organization. By the late 1960s, studies such as Ira Lapidus's work on medieval Damascus brought new trends in social history, anthropology, and urban studies to bear on the study of the city, emphasizing the importance of history and social interaction in their pursuit to understand urban life (Lapidus 1967). This led to further examinations of the historical development of aspects of the Islamic city such as Omar Carlier's work (1998) on the *ḥammām* that reveals not only Roman but pre-Islamic Berber forms of this "Islamic" institution, and draws our attention to that fact that while baths have been abandoned in much of the Middle East, they have flourished in France due to processes of migration. Such surprising transpositions of the "Islamic" as this one have encouraged more and more detailed case studies that carefully examine historical development, social interactions, and the relationship of built space to ethnic and religious identities and political power. The development of feminist scholarship and the fact that more women are being trained as scholars has led to a more nuanced understanding of women's roles in family and city life, as well as the centrality of gender to the structuring of urban spaces.

Nonetheless, in spite of these new interests, or perhaps because of their very attention to the particular, the idea that the cities of the Middle East and the Arab or Islamic worlds might share anything at all is either not addressed, or it is assumed rather than demonstrated. Generalizations continue to be made about the "region" in ways that tend to seek out a common denominator of observed religion, culture, or custom across the vast area that was once seen as united by the model of the "Islamic city." The ways in which "Muslim" cities are compared too often relates particular findings to those in other "Muslim" locations too evenly, and a hegemonic process similar to that described with reference to the naïve or ethnocentric adoption of "Western" models can ensue. Such a process is encouraged by political agendas that seek to define urban life in terms of a national agenda, for instance in the way that tradition is defined, and practices deemed inappropriate are claimed to be "foreign" and outside the purview of legitimate study or concern. Scholars who are conducting fine-tuned examinations of particular cities or neighborhoods, for instance, often tend to confront their findings to those of others working in the region, when in fact, historians as well as geographers and sociologists are increasingly demonstrating the importance of cross-regional and global connections (Gupta and Ferguson 1997, Sassen 2002). More attention to the kinds of movements and patterns of mobility that generate cities' social and architectural forms might better demonstrate connections that might not result from visible similarities or purported cultural underpinnings.

Gender relations have important implications for mobility throughout the world. Enforcing or doing away with gender-based limitations on individuals' free movement form the basis for ongoing debates concerning women's rights and equality with men. They influence how buildings are built, how people dress, and with whom they interact. In some cities where urban planning seems to encourage spatial segregation purely according to social class or ethnicity, the ways that people practice the city show that gender distinctions are crucial to the social construction of space. But in other places gender is taken as the most obvious and natural criterion for structuring space. The literature on women and gender in cities or neighborhoods with majority Muslim populations tends to show the salience of the spatial encoding of gender in these areas. Even casual observers who travel from Beirut to Riyadh, Tlemcen to Rabat, often describe the differences as well as the similarities between these cities according to where women appear in each of them. Developing dynamic maps of where women go, when, and with whom, might lead us to

identify a common thread that ties together not only women's experiences, but the very way in which we can understand the historical connections between certain cities. Attention to the diversity of the spatial implications of women's mobility can provide a route toward comparative approaches that open up new regions of study that are not necessarily coextensive with the borders of the "Islamic" or "Muslim" world (Slyomovics 1998).

Women on the move

Historical works such as Lesley Peirce's account of women of the harem and power in the Ottoman Empire show the extent to which relationships of space and visibility to power can be obscured by a too ready adoption of European ideas in the social realities of other settings (Peirce 1993). Yet, if one seeks to understand the nature of urban life today, it is important to pay careful attention to the ways that British, French, or Italian colonialists, and more recently, American firms, have radically transformed the way that cities and their populations are conceived. Urban planning is part of a larger effort to modernize and regularize people's movements and identities. Under colonial governments, social class, gender, nationality, and religion came to be territorialized in a more systematic way than had previously been the case. Notions of health, hygiene, and time were reviewed. The physical and social worlds of the family and women's place in them were envisioned. Homes and apartments for relatively small nuclear families have gradually come to be seen as the modern norm. Buildings such as factories, office buildings, and schools are built in specific places, distant from homes. They have helped to develop a new notion of the location of work, and instill a new sense of time and the work day. The development of European style cafés, sports stadiums, or beauty salons played a role in new conceptions of leisure. These basic ideas about space and modern society as well as norms for urban planning have continued to shape how modern cities and people's lives are conceived (Celik 1997, Fuller 2001, McGuiness 1997, Rabinow 1989, Raymond 1993, Wright 1991).

Colonial ideas about social divisions, and means of social control thus inform contemporary ways of envisioning cities and social interactions. One aspect of this vision that has been further developed today is the key role played by the control of circulation patterns. Thus, as Haussman knew so well, while the boulevards of modern cities make it easier to move about people and merchandise, they also offer a means to readily bring troops into rebellious neighborhoods. Similarly, coordinating the schedules for mass transportation and national television programming can help to police neighborhoods and keep people in their own parts of the city at particular times. Young men and women in Casablanca appear to mingle freely in parks and juice bars, but police routinely organize weekend raids to arrest couples strolling through the central upper-class neighborhood of boulevard Moulay Youssef – couples without cars, or those whose dress is not considered to match the upper-class neighborhood (Ossman 1994). Most of the countries with majority Muslim populations use particular interpretations of the Qur'ān to limit women's freedom of movement and designate what kinds of people might be allowed to mix. In many countries, a woman's male relatives must give her permission to move, in some cases even across town to go to work, and the same applies in most countries if she applies for a passport in order to cross national borders. Although Christian or Jewish women living in these states are not always legally bound by these laws, their difference is highlighted by this fact. Similarly, issues of women's confinement and issues of the gendered division of space have become key issues for neighborhoods and nations where Muslim immigrants form a major part of the population (Haddad 2002).

Studies of women in major cities demonstrate that it is a combination of political will, family pressure, and law that keeps certain kinds of women in particular places. The scope of a woman's movement is thus indicative of her social status and identity. A poor illiterate women in Cairo might be restricted to her neighborhood unless she is accompanied by a man, not so much because of legal or social interdictions, as of her fear of not being able to make her way through the sign-filled boulevards of the central city. A young woman girl in Rabat might be allowed to go to high school and to meet her friends in a neighborhood beauty salon, but not be allowed to attend a university on the other side of town unless she adopts the *ḥijāb*. A college educated professional woman would never think of entering a café outside the central district of Tunis, while a woman of the same status in Jeddah would probably have to have someone drive her if she cared to go out, and would not imagine going to a café where men were at all. Around the world, urbanity and modernity are often associated with an increased intensity and scope of movement for individuals, goods, and ideas. Much attention has been paid by anthropologists in particular to how poor women have been left out of this general movement. Yet, as work on feminists in Egypt or

Lebanon shows, other women have become increasingly mobile over the last century (Badran 1995, Thompson 2000). More attention needs to be given to the relationships between these two worlds, and to how at the same time as many women have started work outside the home, be active in charitable associations, or participate in politics, other women living in the same cities remain enclosed in extremely narrow geographic and social spaces.

Situating research

Mobility and changing gender relations are working together to reshape urban worlds. But from what vantage point can we best examine these forces at work? If both the moves of people, especially women, and the image of the city itself are recognized as a central part of the urban experience, the conduct of in-depth research on how people interpret, negotiate, and reshape these fleeting urban worlds requires us to find places to sit down and chat with them, or at least notice where they meet their friends as demonstrated by architectural forms or texts and photographs in archives.

Field research on women in urban milieus often begins in women's homes, or by reading accounts of home life in novels and autobiographies. Fatima Mernissi's romanced story of her early years in Fez, or Joëlle Balloul's study of her home in Algeria offer intimate glimpses of the relationship of family, urban space, and gender in North Africa under French colonial rule (Balloul 1996, Mernissi 1994). These and similar works demonstrate how central is the spatial encoding of gender through intimate portraits and examinations of personal interactions. They also suggest how varied and flexible responses to any given spatial set-up can be. To associate these insights with a broader picture, the logical next move seems to be to consider the relationship of family quarters to the next step up in terms of scale – to that rather nebulous but essential area loosely defined as a neighborhood. Indeed, neighborhoods have been a favorite site for scholars involved in qualitative, long-term research. Generally, the choice has been to focus on either "traditional" quarters, their transformation and renovation, or quarters that are poor or otherwise marginal (Porter 2000, McGuinness 2001). Several recent studies of this kind provide a wealth of information about day-to-day life, political participation, and aesthetics among women in working-class neighborhoods in Cairo (Early 1993, Ghannam 2002, Hoodfar 1997, Singerman and Hoodfar 1996). From the neighborhood, some studies move out to examine entire cities in terms of gender boundaries. Rabia Bekkar's analysis of Tlemcen, for instance, examines distinctions of female to male and "mixed" spaces there in ways inspired by research on the black/white/mixed zones of apartheid in South Africa and similar spatial distinctions in American cities (Bekkar 1994).

Urban studies and sociology have increasingly made us aware of the extent to which cities are defined relationally in a fast-moving, mediated world. While cities like Cairo, Istanbul, or Bombay disseminate films and television serials that display particular models of urban living to an international audience, publishing houses and advertising firms in Casablanca or Karachi produce less widely circulated versions of urbanity and glamour. New connections have to be traced in the conception of regions of research. Situating one's project and one's place in the city involves the kinds of media analysis that Walter Armbrust proposes for Cairo, or Fariba Adelkhah integrates into her account of life in Tehran (Armbrust 1996, Adelkhah 2000). Further ways of developing an understanding of how these cities are not only related to Paris or Los Angeles but in part produced by this relationship is suggested in Hamid Naficy's studies of Los Angeles as an Iranian media production center (Naficy 1993). As Larbi Chouikha's studies of Ramadan and television in Tunis suggest, the very shape of the city and people's sense of identity can be altered at specific times, and in relation to television programming (Chouikha 1998). The author's (2002) comparative study of the circulation of models of feminine beauty examines how images from magazines or television are "embodied" in the modern beauty salon in Casablanca. This led to an exploration of the relationship of the salon to the *ḥammām* and to other spaces of feminine sociability in that city. But it also led to a comparison of the media and conversations found in Casablanca with those of Cairo and Paris, where models for the television shows, beauty recipes, and fashions are imagined and given form. By developing a "linked comparative" approach based on research in the beauty salons of all three connected cities, the author suggests a strategy for examining how women learn to navigate the various geographic and social spaces of urban life that focuses on diverse ways of moving through geographic and social space. Similar work on semi-public spaces such as reception rooms, sports clubs, or concert halls will be important in developing a better understanding of how media, migration, and international fashions are related to the gendered structuring of urban space (Davis, Bekkar, and David 1997, Miliani 1998, Schade-Poulsen 2000).

Conclusion

Much important work has been dedicated to showing that Orientalist ideas that see Muslim women as powerless and home-bound are in error and that the "Islamic" city is truly a place that never existed (Abu-Lughod 1987). Yet the issue of the role of Islam and other religions in structuring laws, values, and practices has not been settled. The tendency in recent literature has been to emphasize the actor's role in shaping urban landscapes and experiences. Still, we sometimes continue to assume that the "Muslim" identity of particular subjects is more essential than any other – at least, judging by the way that we regroup our sources along regional lines. To fully recognize the fluid nature of experience, possibilities of transforming spatial referents to gender, or how they articulate notions of intimacy with divisions of private or public space, a re-evaluation of the shadow cast by the Islamic city is still in order. More comparative work and further examinations of the role of cities in broader configurations of exchange and power need to be done. Further attention to women's differential mobility can be a key element in devising comparative and collaborative research precisely because religious and political movements as well as nations stake their claims to power through their organization of urban space in terms of women's bodies. Nowhere is this fact more obvious than among those living under the shadow of the "Islamic city." For while this figure might be banished from academic sights, it has taken on new forms in relation to the development of ideas of nationalism and modernism, the traditional, and the authentic; it also continues to produced stereotyped images of the Muslim woman and her world. By comparative work that demonstrates connection, one might indicate how difference is a construct produced according to norms that are increasingly shared around the world. And by engaging in more examinations of masculinity and men's space, or the problems gendered spaces create for men, we can come to show more clearly why the gendering of space is not only a "women's issue" but an essential aspect of everyone's identity and of social and political power.

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Susan Ossman

Cities: Urban Built Environments

Iran

Since the rise of a distinctive urban culture in the Sassanid Empire (224–651 C.E.), the built environment in Iran has reinforced sexual differences, articulated assumptions about gender, and symbolically embodied gendered identities. Patronage allowed royal women like Gawhar Shad of the Timurid dynasty to exercise power by endowing urban institutions and shrines (Rizvi 2000). Women's physical presence in the city, however, was often restricted. As women were increasingly excluded from public spaces (especially since the time of the Safavid Shah Suleiman, 1667–94 C.E.), urban architecture of the Safavids as well as the following Qājār dynasty reflected these changes. A sign of honor, seclusion was often more stringent in wealthy neighborhoods, where houses were surrounded by tall walls with no window openings to the streets.

The twentieth century witnessed the gradual erosion of such restrictions. Popular women's magazines, such as *Shukūfih* and *ʿAlam-i Nisvān*, pioneered the introduction of modern concepts of healthy environments and public behavior. Although missionaries opened public schools for girls as early as 1838, it was not until the legal reforms of the 1930s under Reza Shah (1925–43) that urban middle-class women were allowed a more active presence in public spaces. Governmental institutions, cafés, and cinemas began to challenge the old system, which assigned women's work to private interiors and only allowed entertainment activities in places with exclusive female sectors such as pilgrimage sites, cemeteries, and bathhouses (Shahri 1991).

The urban environments of the second half of the twentieth century benefited from contributions of the wife of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Farah Diba, who was educated in Paris at the Ecole d'architecture. In the 1970s, Diba took a direct interest in the Ministry of Culture and Art, which supervised museums, the tourist industry, and historic preservation. Diba opposed the construction of cement high-rises, described in feminist discourse as the phallic symbols of a masculine modernity (Grigor 2005). Besides distorting the image of historic settings, taller structures would allow men to gaze on women in the courtyards below.

After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, governmental institutions demanded gender segregation in stairwells, corridors, prayer halls, and lounges. On university campuses, in sports stadiums, and on public transportation, new rules either limited or barred inter-gender interactions. Despite these restrictions, the Islamic Republic encouraged women to be present in public – present but veiled. This ideal of the concealed female even became a metaphor in the hardliners' discourse on public architecture, which appeared in the 1980s art journals such as *Faṣlnāmih-i hunar*. Cloth partitions substitute when architecture is not sufficient. Drapes separate the sections for men and women in mosques. During the month of Ramadan, black cloths cover actresses' portraits on billboards (*Badjens* 2002). Tall curtains ensure privacy in women's recreation areas. In general, Iran's civil codes as they relate to spatial privacy – for example tall buildings and windows that overlook other houses (Ebadi 1992, 49–58) – correspond to Islamic regulations from *ḥadīth*s and other traditional resources.

Freedom in urban spaces first improved in the 1990s, when the mayor of Tehran, Ghulāmhusayn Karbāschī, turned parks into places where women could exercise and attend cultural activities (Adelkhah 2000, Smith 2000). Introducing modern ideas within the traditional system often yields innovative results. In 2000, the Office of the Expansion of Iran's Inns turned the 200-year-old Gulshan house in Yazd into a Laleh (formerly Intercontinental) hotel branch. The hotel reserves a space for exclusive use by single female guests in its *andarūnī* (private) section, which formerly served as women's quarters in the residence (Lahiji 2006).

Since the early 1990s, many female architects – albeit a minority compared to male architects – have been active. Firouzeh Attari turned a former royal residence into a museum (*miʿmār*). Bahar Mushīrī rehabilitated cultural centers of Bam after the city's devastating 2003 earthquake (Rasūlzādeh 2005). Under President Khatami several women, including Zahra Nūrī, accepted high-ranking positions at the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (*Ḥuqūq-i zanān* 2005).

Women-organized non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have long contributed to urban environments. In the 1970s, women in Tehran's poor neighborhoods mounted organized resistance to the bulldozing of their homes. Soon after the revolution, a group of low-income women acquired running water for their houses through a mass petition (Rezayi 1982). By 1996, more than 20,000 women volunteers were active in helping poor neighborhoods. They have since taken charge of garbage collection, and petitioning for paved roads, clean water, better bus services, sports facilities, as well as turning former garbage dumps into green spaces or playgrounds (Hoodfar 1998). Although women's work for urban health has not yet focused on sustainable development in architecture, many women have joined governmental environmental groups and the NGO Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution, assisting reforestation, relocation of industries outside cities, and development of alternative energy sources. To save the built environment, women have also adopted traditionally male professions such as firefighting (Peterson 2005). Whether through symbolically female gestures and culturally defined identities or as a result of their relentless efforts, women have always had a great influence on Iran's urban environments.

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Z. PAMELA KARIMI

North Africa

This entry discusses the reasons behind the wide increase of four- to five- storey walk-up housing neighborhoods in North African cities and their impact on the quality of urban and domestic spaces. It discusses how major changes in the housing urban form have affected women's privacy and neighborly relationships and how the courtyard house form in medieval cities was successful in providing more responsive domestic and urban spaces.

Apartment buildings in the form of four- to five-storey walk-ups constitute today the most widespread form of housing in North African cities. The 1970s witnessed the extension of this type of housing as new housing neighborhoods were built to respond to increasing shortages of housing exacerbated by a high rate of population growth and the migration of the rural population to the cities.

Mass housing solutions were adopted requiring hundreds of thousands of dwellings to be completed on a yearly basis. This was particularly the case in countries with socialist political systems (at the time) such as Algeria, Libya, and Egypt.

Five-storey walk-up apartment blocks became the magical solution that was used to create new neighborhoods at the periphery of North African cities such as Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Cairo. Planning policies (often copied or adapted from European ones) concentrated on the creation of new urban areas based on a clear zoning of functions. This resulted in the creation of a fragmented urban fabric consisting of large and isolated housing neighborhoods lacking basic facilities and poorly connected to existing urban centers.

Such neighborhoods were generally badly planned with blocks of flats scattered on the site resulting in a poor definition of the public spaces and blurred boundaries between private and public domains. The orientation of the buildings depended on the geometric pattern of the master plan

rather than careful consideration for sun orientation and privacy. The spaces left between the blocks were initially no man's land and lacked landscaping and maintenance. They offered a very poor external environment for children to play or for any type of social interaction to take place.

Furthermore, housing allocation policies were such that people from different socioeconomic backgrounds ended up living in the same apartment block, resulting in tension and conflicts between neighbors. This is frequently reflected in the way communal spaces such as the staircases become part of the public neglected spaces as neighbors are unable or unwilling to get organized to maintain them or claim any sort of responsibility over them.

Minimal floor areas were adopted for mass-produced housing units, with little or no regard to local households' size and composition, local customs, or traditions. Most of the dwelling units are organized internally along a dark and narrow corridor and have a small loggia and/or balcony as the only private outdoor space. The apartments also suffer from a lack of acoustic privacy due to their poor construction quality. All these factors have contributed to less responsive urban and domestic environments and a reduced quality of life for women (Behloul 1991, 1999).

A survey was conducted in four mass housing estates in Algiers in the late 1980s by the author and revealed that mass housing units were far from being responsive to the needs of their occupants (Behloul 1991). A total sample of 128 women was interviewed (in the four selected estates) in order to investigate their perceptions of their housing environment and their housing unit. The results of the survey showed that most women complained about the lack of access to sunlight and fresh air and also about the small size of their dwellings. Most private balconies have been closed off in an attempt to gain more floor area in the housing unit and almost all respondents expressed the wish to be able to have access to the roof of their blocks of flats (Behloul 1999).

The poor relationship between neighbors and lack of privacy were also a source of distress for most respondents. Because of the overcrowded conditions in most dwelling units, children and male adults tended to spend most of their time outdoors. Furthermore, the housing crisis and the inability of new couples to find a flat or afford one means that there is a tendency for more occupation of the dwelling units by extended families. This was already the case in some of the flats surveyed in the 1980s where the kitchen function was transferred to a closed off balcony and its original space transformed into an additional bedroom. These factors have added to the significant deterioration in the quality of life of women. Lack of access to outdoor spaces and to basic facilities, and lack of privacy combined with overcrowded conditions have substantially affected the life of women not only in North African cities but also in other parts of the world.

The unquestioned growth of the four- to five-storey walk-up apartment buildings has been achieved on the basis of claims that this kind of housing allowed higher urban densities to be achieved. However, these claims are far from being fully substantiated. It is evident that similar densities could have been achieved with lower buildings and a much better provision of private and semi-private outdoor spaces, creating more user friendly and responsive urban housing environments (Martin and March 1972).

Urban architectural qualities that existed in the low-rise high-density medieval Islamic cities are today widely acknowledged as lessons of sustainability (Bianca 2000). Various strategies were developed over the centuries to ensure the highest level of privacy while maintaining a low-rise high-density urban fabric. This is evidenced by many of the surviving neighborhoods of courtyard houses in the medieval *madīna*s of, for example, Tunis, Algiers, and Fez (Bianca 2000). It is evident that the layering and detailing of the spaces allowed for clear transitions between the public, the semi-public, and the private domains of the house, this latter being organized around a private outdoor space: the courtyard. Privacy within the house was also protected by the way the guests' reception room was strategically located close to the entrance area.

While vehicular access is undeniably part of the requirements of contemporary life, it does not, however, exclude the reinterpretation of some of the basic principles that allowed the development of mixed use, coherent, and accessible urban fabric. It has frequently been argued that in the medieval Islamic city women were confined to their houses and therefore cut off from the outside world. However, the courtyard house form allowed women to have continuous access to fresh air and sunlight through access to the roof space which formed an upper layer of female urban semi-public spaces. A strong visual relationship to the whole city was re-established at roof level, maintaining contact with the urban level. Furthermore, the compact and hierarchical nature of the *madīna*'s urban fabric meant that women had pedestrian access to basic facilities such as the Qurʾānic school

or *madrasa*, the public oven, and the public bath or *ḥammām*.

It is interesting to note that privacy and good neighborly relationships, which played an important role in shaping the built environment in medieval Islamic cities, have completely disappeared within the new housing neighborhoods. However, the requirements for privacy, access to fresh air and sunlight, good neighborly relations, the reception of guests, as well as access to basic facilities are still important for women in Islamic cultures today. Furthermore, the ability of the domestic space to be flexible and adaptable over a period of time to meet the changing requirements of its inhabitants is a very desirable quality. Yet the courtyard house form has demonstrated through centuries its responsiveness to all these requirements and to the formation of low-rise, high-density mixed use urban fabric, widely acknowledged today as a form of sustainable cities (Edwards, Sibley, et al. 2005). However, this type of housing has been completely abandoned and failed to inspire innovative housing design projects (Abel 2000). It was and is still is wrongly assumed by decision-makers to be a house form that is inappropriate to contemporary lifestyles and modern times.

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MAGDA SIBLEY

South Asia

For women living in the Muslim regions of South Asia, the last three decades of the twentieth century proved to be a period of rapid change that significantly altered women's claim to, use of, and formation of the urban built environment.

Changes in political representation, enforcement of legal rights, and educational and employment opportunities have impacted the various nations and social groups of the region in different ways. In general though, women today – whether slum dwellers, members of the emerging middle class, or part of society's elite – are key players in determining what kind of urban environments evolve in the rapidly growing cities of the region.

North India and the Muslim regions of South Asia are societies that have been governed by a conservative code of conduct for women, embodied in the concept of purdah. For Muslim women, especially those unmarried and from lower socioeconomic groups, this meant seclusion within the private domestic sphere or separation from public view through the wearing of *ḥijāb*, a mobile form of personal space enveloping the body. Being in public placed women beyond the protection of relatives and, according to this belief system, put their own honor, as well as that of their families, at risk.

Hindu women in these regions also practiced a form of purdah, although there were significant differences. In conservative Hindu households, married upper-class women and those of higher castes saw it as a privilege of their social position to stay at home secluded from the chaos, dangers, and responsibilities of the public realm. While an attitude of modesty and protection from the gaze of unrelated males was still desired, achieving this was usually symbolic and involved covering one's head with the end of a sari or shawl.

By the 1970s all this was changing. The international women's rights movement made women's role and status in society transnational issues by engaging female activists from around the world in dialogues highlighting their shared concerns about equity and representation and by linking the local with the global (Antrobus 2004). As part of this larger mobilization – and despite numerous distractions and setbacks in the region brought on by a period of Islamization and cultural conservatism in Pakistan, Bangladesh's liberation struggle and famine, civil war in Sri Lanka, and a state of emergency in India limiting personal freedoms – South Asian women from across the socioeconomic spectrum came together demanding a voice in decisions impacting their lives.

Initiatives launched during the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) sought to ensure that benefits from economic development reached all segments of society. The starting point for discussion was that the lived experiences of women as well as those of the poor, and other marginalized communities, were distinctly different from those of the traditional decision-makers – men. Over the

next ten years and three United Nations conferences held in 1975, 1980, and 1985, the central issues were literacy, education, family planning, health, shelter, employment, and empowering women for social change.

Gender disparity in primary and secondary schooling was a main concern and action plans from the period made improving school enrollment a primary objective. It was now recognized that educating girls not only led to their own emancipation but extended the benefits to families and future offspring. Of equal concern were low female enrollment at the university level and the issue of "gender streaming" – where female students were encouraged to study the humanities, teaching, and commercial and secretarial studies, while being discouraged from engineering, science, law, and medicine (World Bank 2002). New opportunities for higher education, coupled with greater employment opportunities offered by economic liberalization and the growth of the information technology sector in India and the garment industry in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, led to greater rural to urban migration by women and meant that more women were entering the public sphere than ever before.

As South Asia's regional economies grew in the 1980s and 1990s and overall migration from rural areas to cities led to unprecedented rates of urban growth (3.9–6.9 percent annually), household and neighborhood structures changed both socially and physically. In the communities of newcomers, limited space, makeshift housing, shared facilities, a lack of extended family networks, and the need for many women to contribute to family incomes, meant that privacy boundaries were more difficult to maintain, forcing greater tolerance of female encounters with non-family members. For women working outside the home and for female students arriving from rural villages, urban life meant release from restrictive family structures. Overall, the increased presence of women on city streets challenged traditional understandings of public space as being the realm of men and forced urban society as a whole to renegotiate gender relations within this now-shared terrain.

When the poor migrate to urban areas in search of work, women continue to be responsible for managing the household, ensuring the well-being of the family, and overseeing the rearing of children. In the megacities of South Asia, where 35–50 percent of the population lives below the poverty level in informal settlements, finding shelter means finding available space in the overcrowded and sprawling slums with inadequate access to water and sanitation, in makeshift homes along railway lines, next to wetlands, or on abandoned lands at the fringes of the city.

Within slums and squatter settlements, women's space rotates around the home, in courtyards, on small agricultural plots manually reclaimed from adjacent marshlands, in the neighborhood of and along streets leading to water points, communal latrines, children's schools, local shrines, and the market (Sinha 1991). In slum settlements, public standposts supply water for drinking, cooking, and hygiene. Typically these serve 150–200 people and are located within a five-minute walking distance from the homes they serve. Urban women spend hours in line waiting for access to the pump. Public latrines also involve waiting lines. They are usually poorly maintained, have inadequate lighting and can be dangerous for women at night. As a consequence, women walk to the latrines in groups and often regulate their consumption of foods and liquids so as not to need these facilities after dark (Adarkar 1993). When leaving the neighborhood, most women move in groups and are reluctant to travel too far from home due, in part, to the lack of public facilities that can meet their own or young children's needs. Young women usually leave home only under the escort of a male relative as violence in the form of rape, acid attacks, or capture by sex traffickers is an all too real possibility.

Many working women operate out of their home and engage in such activities as sewing and embroidery, cooking food for sale in the bazaar, garland making, jewelry production, and the assembly of leather goods. Moving their products to market is usually facilitated by a male intermediary so as to limit contact with non-related males. When possible, many women prefer to work in small groups as work time can be combined with social time. The spread of microcredit programs focused on female entrepreneurship has led to the establishment of women's cooperatives and an increasing number of shared spaces of employment.

Women employed as domestic helpers often reside at the house of their employer and for visits to family are accompanied by a male relative. Unmarried women employed in the garment industry who do not have local family members usually live in women's hostels built to provide a safe, secluded realm where they can sleep, eat, take classes, and socialize. Not having the advantage of nearby male relatives who can accompany them home in the evening, these women will sleep on factory floors when they have to work late rather than risk being harassed by predatory men or police assuming prostitution.

The poorest of women working outside the home may be employed as sweepers, brick chippers, laborers at construction sites, midwives, hawkers, or beggars. For them, behavioral norms and the concept of gendered space are of little importance as basic survival is their top priority.

In general, Muslim women in South Asia do not use mosques. Space for devotion tends to be personal and within the home or, as in parts of India, in spaces reserved for women adjacent to mosques. Recently though, and despite the growth of fundamentalism across the region, there have been exceptions. In the state of Tamil Nadu in India, a group of women proclaimed it their right to engage in communal devotion and decision-making outside the home. They established the first women's *jamaat* (citizen's council) with the authority to settle disputes and plan to build their own mosque (Biswas 2001).

Women of the upper and middle class live much less restricted lives and more readily claim their right to public space. While the lives of many of these women mirror, on the surface, those of modern educated professional women elsewhere, South Asian society as a whole has not yet assumed responsibility for their right to the same space and resources enjoyed by males. Safety in the public realm remains a serious issue, especially on the street, in public parks, and at night, so these women too tend to travel in groups and, when not accompanied by a male relative or friend, frequent cafés, gyms, shops, and social spaces established by and for women. As urban societies as a whole become more Westernized, younger women can be seen with increasing frequency in mixed-gender gatherings at movie theaters, ice cream shops, music arcades, computer stores, shopping malls, and clubs.

The inclusion of lifestyle needs of women and the poor in urban development strategies of the last two and a half decades has paralleled the increasing numbers of women entering professions directly impacting the planning and design of rapidly changing city environments. Women now make up roughly 40–50 percent of the student body of architecture programs in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The number of female students in planning programs, while lower than in architecture, continues to grow, especially at the graduate level.

While in the West architecture and planning are traditionally male-dominated fields, in South Asia and other developing countries, as women demanded greater access to higher education, these disciplines came to be regarded as appropriate to women's concerns, expertise, and nurturing nature. Being able to take an active role in creating the context of lived experiences is of central concern to women. At the same time, these professions offer choice in terms of how women work (i.e. joining a private firm, a government office, or practicing on one's own) and how they might balance professional and domestic responsibilities.

For the professions themselves, the introduction of women has brought considerable change, most notably: the expansion of architectural practice to include housing for the poor, childcare centers for working women, women's centers, clinics, street-lighting programs, secure parks, public latrines, and issues of environmental sustainability in the urban context; and in planning, the adoption of more participatory and flexible planning processes that recognize and accommodate changing circumstances and the needs and rights of diverse and marginalized communities (Women Architect's Forum 2002). Moreover, significant numbers of female designers from across the region are now donating their professional services to organizations such as the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India, whose Housing Unit addresses shelter needs for poor and displaced families.

South Asian women have been willing to take the first step in challenging societal norms in their respective countries. They are overcoming class and cultural barriers by seeing the concerns of all women as their own and by aiming to ensure that the lives of all are represented and improved as development programs are pursued. Specifically, it is the willingness and ability of these women to reach across social, economic, and even political lines to form partnerships that identify problems and work toward sustainable and mutually beneficial solutions that has had the greatest impact on how South Asian women envision, appropriate, and transform the public realm that they too now claim.

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Elizabeth Dean Hermann

Southeast Europe

During the second half of the nineteenth century, major Southeast European cities such as Sofia, Sarajevo, and Bucharest experienced an initially slow but sustained growth. Land constraints, first steps toward industrialization, increased trade, and the expansion of provincial administrations during the reforms introduced throughout the Ottoman Empire during this period contributed to this urban expansion. The development was accelerated when these centers of provincial administration emerged as capitals of newly independent nation states, in particular after the Russo-Turkish war of 1878. Sovereignty and state power found expression in newly constructed, representative structures, and ambitious urban development attempted to mirror the nation-building processes in public space, mostly following the aesthetic model of Western capitals such as Paris, Vienna, and Berlin. With independence came the expansion and elevation of the former local administration to a fully-fledged state bureaucracy, with the concomitant growth in employment opportunities typically based in the new capitals. Migration, however, occurred mainly from smaller towns to the capitals, since the new opportunities required a certain level of education and experience, and a sustained growth in agricultural production continued to absorb the rural workforce. Thus, while the expansion of urban centers across Southeast Europe inaugurated the emergence of a rapidly modernizing, in some cases highly cosmopolitan, urban middle class, it also deepened the gap between city and countryside.

With urbanization came first attempts at advocating improvement in the social and legal status of women, and the first women's organizations typically came into existence in areas of relative economic advancement, such as Slovenia. However, even in pre-First World War Serbia, arguably one of the most reactionary countries in Europe as far as the legal status of women was concerned, in 1914 the Serbian Women's Alliance (Srpski Ženski Savez) comprised 32 organizations and had become a member of the International Women's League and the International Alliance for Women's Right to vote. In 1921, the National Women's Alliance of Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes comprised 205 organizations and a membership of some 50,000. Nevertheless, essential demands such as women's right to vote in elections were only achieved after the Second World War, with the notable exception of Romania, where women participated in elections as of 1929.

Bosnia-Herzegovina was the sole Balkan country to experience modernization as a result of outside initiative, after becoming an Austro-Hungarian protectorate in 1878. Building its case for full annexation, and in hopes to win over local Serbs and Muslims, the Austro-Hungarian administration invested heavily in industry and infrastructure. Modern city centers featuring wide boulevards, Haussmann-inspired star-shaped squares, and bold neorenaissance architecture were constructed alongside the old Ottoman urban cores. To placate the majority Muslim population, and as part of a general strategy to create a "genuinely Bosnian" national identity that would be at the same time detached from the Ottoman past and repellent to the aspirations of pan-Slavism, a number of representative buildings – such as the Mostar Gymnasium or the Sarajevo Library – were built in a peculiar orientalized style. Sometimes dubbed "pseudo-Moorish," these buildings would combine a pastiche of Muslim Spanish, North African, and Mamluk elements to create an "Islamic architecture" of European fantasy.

After 1945, the socialist regimes established across Southeast Europe again moved to extend and reshape urban space on a large scale in their attempts to address woefully inadequate housing conditions. While there is some scholarly disagreement about the extent to which a single Eastern European model of housing policy can be described for approaches as different as in Bulgaria (where home ownership was encouraged

and covered 80 percent of the housing stock), Hungary and Poland (where private savings were mobilized for the co-financing of so-called "cooperatives"), and ex-Yugoslavia (where large chunks of the housing stock were owned, managed, and often even built by "self-managed" public enterprises for their employees), the architecture and urban landscapes emerging looked remarkably similar from Bratislava to Sofia: vast complexes of residential high-rises would go up at the still semi-agrarian fringes of major cities while old centers would often fall into disrepair. Unlike the Western experience, however, residence in such housing projects tended to be a sought-after privilege, often tied to qualified employment in the state sector, and was thus the result of a sometimes highly competitive positive selection. Thus, such quarters tended to house a comparatively well-off, highly educated population, and continue to do so in the post-socialist era.

Despite all attempts, however, construction continued to lag behind demand. Young families would often reside for extended periods of time within the extended household of the husband's family, and despite industrialization the transition to the predominance of the nuclear family and autonomy of the individual did not occur to the extent observed in Western Europe or North America. Nor did the ideological commitment to gender equality of the ruling parties across Eastern Europe achieve or even attempt substantial changes in gender roles within the domestic sphere. Despite their accelerated integration into the workforce, the majority of women thus experienced only incremental improvement in their margin of independence and personal autonomy, with their status within the family remaining a function of motherhood. While such family configurations could potentially invest older women with considerable power through their male offspring (prompting some scholars to describe them as a form of "crypto-matriarchy"), gender roles and power disparities pertinent to an essentially patriarchal order survived modernization, industrialization, and urbanization. Yugoslavia and its Communist Party may serve as a case in point: while female party membership stood at 20 percent after the war (in which more than 100,000 women served in Tito's partisan forces), 40 years of socialist rule only improved the figure to slightly above 30 percent in the late 1980s, and less than 20 percent and in some cases even less than 15 percent in the central committees of the republics and the federal assembly. Within the "worker's councils" running the "self-managed" companies typical of the Yugoslav brand of socialism, fewer than 10 and often even fewer than 5 percent of the directors were women. While those figures may look quite reasonable when compared to many Western democracies at the time (and even today), they fell far short of the promises the various socialist parties held out for women as part of their ideological trappings.

Mostar: two halves do not make a city

During the wars of Yugoslav succession (1992–5), the complex ethnic puzzle of Bosnia-Herzegovina was largely unmade through the notorious practice of ethnic cleansing. In most parts of the country, the issue of ethnic dominance was thus violently resolved, and the subsequent return of displaced persons tended to be unproblematic where and when it was sufficiently clear that their numbers would pose no substantial threat to the newly established demographic facts on the ground.

Mostar, a city of roughly 100,000 and the main urban node of the southern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is an exception to this pattern. Historically, the Ottoman core of the city, straddling both banks of the Neretva river, was mainly inhabited by Bosnian Muslims (today generally referred to as "Bosniaks"), and to a lesser degree Orthodox Serbs. Catholic Croats, originating mainly from the mountainous hinterland of western Herzegovina, started migrating to the city in the wake of the Austro-Hungarian takeover at the end of the nineteenth century, and largely settled in the plain adjacent to the western bank of the river, where the major urban expansions of the Austro-Hungarian and later the socialist era took place, while the steep topography of the eastern bank precluded any such expansion. Finally, the large residential projects built up at the western and northwestern fringe of the plain in the 1970s represented the preferred (and often the sole) housing option for young couples of all nationalities, provided a neutral ground for couples of mixed nationality, and housed large numbers of civil servants and military personnel drawn from all over Yugoslavia.

During the two wars for Mostar (Serbs against Muslims and Croats in 1992, and Croats against their former Muslim allies in 1993–4), Serbs and Muslims were expelled or fled from the western, and Croat and Serbs (although, as a result of the historic settlement patterns, in much smaller numbers) from the eastern part of town. In particular, the highly mixed modern residential quarters of west Mostar saw systematic house-to-house

searches conducted to effect the "ethnic cleansing" of the Croat-controlled sectors of the city. Attempts by Croat forces to take over the whole city eventually failed, leaving Mostar divided into a largely Croat western and an overwhelmingly Muslim eastern part, with the line of division cutting right though the city center. In the end, all of Ottoman Mostar and a smaller part of the Austro-Hungarian city center, including the full length of the eastern and roughly two-thirds of the western bank of the river, remained under Muslim control, while the urban areas built up after 1945 were entirely controlled by the Croatian side.

The urban development of Mostar in the post-conflict era, and largely until today, reflects the anomalies and paradoxes of dividing the complex social and economic organism of a city (and a small one at that) into two rigidly separated and eventually dysfunctional urban units. Most public services such as electricity and phone grids and large parts of the education system remain divided. Where they were integrated, typically as result of direct pressure by the international community or foreign donors, bitter conflicts over the shares of each of the nationalities ensued and continue to stall day-to-day business. In general, any initiative to effectively reunite the city has originated from the international community, and often required the dismissal, or the threat thereof, of mainly Croatian officials.

While most people displaced during the war successfully reclaimed their dwellings, the large majority preferred selling or swapping their property to returning to an area where they would be part of a minority, thus rendering the ethnic divisions wrought during the war permanent. The geographic division of the city into two hostile halves effectively spelled the end to the urban functions of the former city center originating from the Austro-Hungarian period. Bisected by what used to be the front line during the war and what is now the border between two ethnically cleansed territories, and after suffering heavy destruction during the war, the area that used to offer a meeting ground and a margin of individual freedom for Mostarians of all communities is now at the respective margins of two communities essentially turning their backs on each other, while areas further inside the cleansed territories usurped its urban functions. The influx of refugees from "ethnically cleansed," mainly rural areas has caused suburban sprawl, puts stress on already insufficient municipal infrastructures, depletes the remaining land reserve to the north and south of the city, and, together with a high emigration rate among the most educated parts of society, has altered the former cosmopolitan character of the city beyond recognition.

For (Muslim) east Mostar, the division meant loss of access to the bulk of modern infrastructure, which for the reasons described earlier had largely been erected on the plain to the west of the river. Makeshift solutions for schools, hospitals, and other public institutions had to be improvised on the east bank, while serious destruction of the housing stock and the influx of refugees caused severe overcrowding. Today, and in spite of generous foreign help in reconstruction, the eastern sector still betrays a claustrophobic atmosphere and remains isolated from its hinterland and removed from other Muslim population centers such as Sarajevo or Tuzla. Largely as a result of this front-line position, major investment has not been forthcoming, while the uncontested grip of the major Muslim party over local politics continues to preclude transparency and stall reform. As a result, while there is almost no incentive for residents of west Mostar to cross into the east, residents of east Mostar have to rely on the western sector for a wide array of services and facilities.

The western (Croat) side of town, on the other hand, lost access to the Ottoman part of Mostar and most of the river bank, and thus to the main tourist attractions of the city. Today, the Croatian part of town largely gravitates around "Avenja," an area dominated by wide thoroughfares and large residential blocks erected during the 1960s and 1970s. While the street fronts of these blocks, notably those overlooking the Avenja and Splitska thoroughfares, were originally designed as commercial extensions to the city center, their often vast interiors (comprising separate apartment buildings accessed by internal roads) now see an impromptu development spurred by their unanticipated central location, with ground floors and sometimes even garages transforming into commercial space.

While some investment has reached west Mostar, most of it has been focused on the retail sector (with the notable exception of the massive Mostar Aluminum plant, rehabilitated at the personal initiative of the late Croatian president Franjo Tudjman as part of a general strategy to integrate the Croat-populated areas of Bosnia into the "mother nation" through a network of political and economic relations that would bypass the Bosnian government), with the majority of productive businesses preferring locations closer to the Croatian border, where most of their business interests lie. In spite of its obvious advantages over

the eastern half, west Mostar's position remains precarious and marginal, essentially a volatile borderland, with its potential as a regional center of development stalled.

As far as the position of women and related social practices are concerned, the war and its aftermath reinforced perceptions and concepts of gender roles that tend to reconfirm the patriarchal norms still in evidence before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, while discarding the ideological framework that called, at least in principle, for the abolishment of such perceptions and practices. Instead, "family values," typically in their most traditional and conservative version, became a blueprint for an authoritarian postwar order spelled out most clearly by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman: "Just as in any other family, in Croatia someone always must have the last word, someone that will make a decision in case of conflicts." Accordingly, representation of women in politics fell to an all-time low, with only one woman being elected to the first Bosnian parliament to convene after the war. Nationalism, on all sides, would place a high premium on the reproductive role or function of women for the sake of, as it were, recreating the nation and prevailing in a struggle that was, in essence, about changing demographic facts for political ends. Postwar legislation on reproductive rights, in particular limitations to the right of women to end unwanted pregnancies, enshrined such attitudes in the law. The notorious practice of systematic mass rape reaffirmed the status of women and their reproductive capacity as objects under the control of and fought over by men, and in general the state of war led to the empowerment of those bearing arms (mostly men) over those struggling to organize survival (mainly women, in particular as the war carried on and more and more men were either fighting, killed, or detained). In predominantly Muslim areas, the conflation of national and religious identities tended to create pressure on women to adopt behavioral patterns seen as compatible with mainstream Islam (in particular the veil), a tendency that was enforced by the influx of large numbers of refugees from rural areas into urban centers, and the emigration of large numbers of educated city-dwellers. The disappearance of public spaces providing anonymity severely curtails the individual freedom and autonomy of those mostly affected by social networks of control, again mostly women.

On the other hand, women today account for nearly 40 percent of the Bosnian workforce, slightly above the pre-war average of Yugoslavia. Official statistics even show a predominance of women in the middle and higher (but not the leadership) levels of certain qualified (and typically urban-based) occupations such as in the finance, health, and education sectors, and near parity in the field of public administration. To be sure, it is a very qualified success story: Overall unemployment rates are hovering around 45 percent, and if women are today faring "better" in what is left of the Bosnian economy than men, it is mainly because some of the sectors traditionally dominated by women (such as education and health) cannot be simply abandoned by the state, as happened with most state-owned (or "self-managed") manufacturing facilities, where most of the employees were men (except for the textile sector). Nevertheless, while the overall size of the workforce continues to shrink, the absolute number of employed women is slowly growing. Apparently, this relative advantage occurs as a result of better or more suitable and flexible education in the past (oriented toward qualified services rather than skilled manufacturing), and even more so in the present, with the number of female university graduates continuously surpassing that of males by a margin of around one-third, despite a slight predominance of males in the relevant age bracket. Conceivably, this development may reverse the adverse effects on gender equality wrought by nationalism and war, and may in the long run lead to the urbanization and empowerment of a much larger proportion of women than during the preceding social order.

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Cities: Urban Identities

Arab States

In the contemporary Arab world, over half the population live in urban areas, and in some countries, 80–90 percent of the people crowd together in city states. Urbanization, an intensifying trend around the world, is also a complex process of economic, social, and political negotiations in the cities of the Arab states. Poverty, housing shortages, income disparities, transportation woes, civic unrest – all form part of the politics of urban growth.

Urbanization means quite different lives for people of different economic classes; for nationals or migrant laborers; for residents of old cities with long histories as intellectual, religious, and trading centers; or for residents of more recent upstarts growing from the new oil economy and world trade. The negotiation of new urban identities over the last generation has diverged in Tehran, for example, marked by revolution, and Cairo, shaped by civic unrest but political stability. Cities fueled by oil rich economies in the Gulf states fare differently from those enmeshed in an agricultural world. Inhabitants living near troubled borders, such as in Amman or Beirut, face complications not encountered by those enjoying distance from civil war and border conflicts. Inevitably, urbanization means different opportunities and constraints for both men and women.

As one example, Cairo, a historic capital, has grown tremendously in the last generation, swelled by migration from the countryside, the lure of economic and social opportunity, and natural improvements in health care. Walking in the back streets of the city's districts seems like a stroll along a village street, as one negotiates the mud, goats, chickens, and tiny markets selling fruit, vegetables, plastic dishes, and pots and pans. Yet the central square is a modernized image of glassed in windows and global commodities. The old categories of traditional and modern cannot capture the new realities, however; changes in their city have altered the patterns of everyday life, creating new urban identities.

What does this mean for women and gender issues in Cairo? Beyond the stereotypes about women's lives in Arab states, to be an urban woman has several important meanings. Most importantly, it indicates that a woman is not a peasant, not part of the laboring masses who live in villages and work on the land, growing oranges or raising chickens. Instead, living in the city, a woman participates, or hopes to participate, in the urban and even the global economy. A woman might work in a factory, as a civil servant, in an import-export business, in a shop catering to tourists, or as a doctor. Women and their families expect higher incomes, better education, superior health care, and wider choice in all areas of life. For some, there are indeed more opportunities, especially for the ambitious, but this wealth of choices also means life is less settled and less familiar; there are costs for change. Some embrace the changes and some resist, but women and their families are all involved in the constant negotiations of daily life. Decisions women and their families make recreate, subtly alter, or dramatically change the new urban identities.

These negotiations can be seen clearly among lower middle-class women in Cairo. To be lower middle-class means facing the novel situation of women's employment in the formal sector. While the enduring tendency in discussions of gender identity seems to be the attempt to classify women as either "traditional" housewives or "modern," "emancipated" women who work outside the home, for most women the reality of daily life is difficult to place in either category. Instead, the intersection of household and workplace offers more information about the dynamics of urban identity. Class standing is crucial. The choices upper-class women face, to stay home or pursue professional careers, as doctors for example, or business opportunities, such as owning a boutique, allow women the luxury of a professional life supported by the work of servants to see to duties in the home. For lower-class women, survival and the attempt to educate children push women into a variety of informal economic work, such as peddling vegetables on the streets, or taking in sewing, while they continue to do the work of the household, without the advantage of labor saving devices. Middle-class families, distinguished from the lower class mostly by the ability to obtain a tiny apartment and by the status of ill-paid office work, must try to emulate the lives of the upper classes without the advantages of

servants, washing machines, or even enough money for food or tutoring children. They live on a precarious boundary, fearing a fall into the lower class. The second income women bring to the family is the sole reason these families can remain "middle-class." Women's central part in maintaining family status means that continued participation in work outside the home is crucial. Yet women's work is a new phenomenon for these families and has profound implications for definitions of femininity and masculinity, for the construction of gender. Often these constructions are negotiated through humor and jokes. Less happily, they are also negotiated daily in discussions and disputes over women's performance of household responsibilities. Men are generally unwilling to work within the home, due to clearly defined ideas of men's and women's work. Women suffer from the implication that they do not perform their culturally crucial roles as wives and mothers very well, or even acceptably. Therefore women face a difficult double bind, in which they must work, for their families, yet they are denigrated and they themselves feel apologetic for not being the wife and mother they would like to be. Economic aspirations and gender expectations are at odds. In addition to the complications of class and gender, the politics of globalization is increasingly important, as economic possibilities deteriorate and as the politics of Westernization vs. Islamism complicate discussions of appropriate roles for women.

These political struggles over identity are especially obvious in women's clothing. The *ḥigāb* (*ḥijāb*), or covered dress, a new kind of voluntary veiling, has become a highly visible symbol of Islamism in places as diverse as Tehran, Istanbul, Paris, and certainly in Cairo. While the rise of Islamic politics in Egypt tempts Westerners to think of the new veiling as evidence of "Islamism," women's use of veiled dress is considerably more subtle and complex. Veils are often perceived in the West as a reactionary symbol of women's oppression, yet in the Muslim world covered dress of various sorts serves a wide range of social and symbolic purposes, expressing, for example, kinship, class, nationalism, marital status, or religion. In Cairo, traditional dress for lower middle-class women was composed of long colorful dresses of flowered cloth, covered outside the home with black cloth, but younger women switched to conservative versions of Western style dress several decades ago. Many have now changed their dress again, to various versions of the *ḥigāb*. It is important to note that these women are not reverting to the dress of their mothers, now associated with women of lower class standing, but inventing a new form of Islamic clothing. While these clothes clearly owe some of their significance to the controversies over Westernization and Islamic authenticity, according to these women the new veils have more to do with the everyday tensions of mother and worker than with Islamic politics.

Women's choice of clothes in Cairo is controversial and part of the involved struggles over identity in the city. Covered dress expresses both women's urge to retain the income and mobility offered by jobs outside the home and their equally strong desire to be viewed as respectable wives and mothers. Their dress can be viewed as an imaginative solution to their difficult situation, a kind of symbolic protest, creating a novel and powerful identity of a modern and Muslim woman. These unfinished negotiations of dress, mobility, and respect are a signal of the tension points in the evolution of gender identity in the new urban environments.

A common sense of a shared past history and a cultural unity link the cities of the Arab states together, and inhabitants all face a common set of interactions with national governments and international organizations, with the processes of capitalism, and with the dynamics of globalization. Yet how exactly these dynamics proceed in each particular city is worth investigating to understand questions of gender and urban identity, and to create a complex picture of comparative urban identities in the Arab world.

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Arlene MacLeod

Malaysia: Kuala Lumpur

In Malaysia, which is multiethnic, multilingual, and multireligious, ethnicity and religious affiliation are central elements in the constitution of social identity. With a slight majority of the population on the Malaysian Peninsula, the Malays form the dominant ethnic group, followed in number by ethnic Chinese, ethnic Indians, and aboriginals (Orang Asli in Malay). The link between ethnic identity and religious affiliation is generally less fixed among the non-Malays than it is for the Malay population, who are predominantly Muslim and belong to the Sunnī branch of Islam and follow the Shāfiʿī school of Islamic law. The Malaysian constitution states that a Malay is a person who speaks Malay, follows Malay *adat* (tradition, custom), and adheres to the Muslim faith. Defining Malay identity, in Malaysia, is historically a political and contested field where emphasis on religion, *adat*, or language as defining elements has shifted over time. Although this corresponds to the way that the majority of Malays also express their identity, the picture is complicated by groups of people on the Borneo side of Malaysia who speak Malay and follow Malay *adat*, but who are not Muslim. There are also Muslims with ethnic identities other than Malay.

In the context of Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, which is the focus in this entry, Malayness is so closely linked to being Muslim that the two concepts are often used interchangeably. At the same time the ongoing process of Islamization has divided the Malay community into what could be labeled "Islamicist" and "moderate" Muslims. In party politics the divide is represented by the "moderate" UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) and the more "Islamicist" PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). The question of Malaysia becoming an Islamic state is a significant issue in this respect (Mutalib 1993).

Besides its particularly plural character, Malaysia has also gained international attention as one of the Asian tigers. The country has gone through major economic and social transformations as it has developed from a basically agrarian nation into a highly industrial society over a period of half a century. The most important political tool in this process has been the New Economic Policy (NEP) introduced in 1971, which emphasized labor intensive industries by introducing Free Trade Zones predominantly along the West Coast. Through its development into the country's center of economic and political power and as an important recipient of rural to urban migration, Kuala Lumpur, or K.L. as Malaysians prefer to refer to their capital, has played a key function in this transformation. Social anthropologist Eric Thompson describes K.L. as an ahistorical city – "the forward looking capital of a forward looking nation" (2000, 24). The nationalist discourse has been distinctly future-oriented, as is expressed in former Prime Minister Mahathir's vision of Malaysia becoming a fully developed nation by the year 2020. Kuala Lumpur mirrors the futurism of Malaysian nationalism and the city is constantly developing as new projects are taking over when old ones, such as the famous Twin Towers, are barely finished. In tandem with modernization projects, one of the chief aims of the Malaysian government has been to Islamize urban space in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur, in particular, has been made into the symbol of Malaysian modernization and Islamization. Visible signs of Islamization such as mosques, the Islamic bank, and the Islamic university have become familiar landmarks in the city. It was also in the early 1970s, on the campus of University Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, that the birth of the modern, local, movement of Islamization – the *dakwah* movement – can be located (Anwar 1987). The university campus was also where the first visible signs of that movement appeared in the form of women veiling and dressing in long dark robes. This new form of female dressing stood in sharp contrast both to the jeans and T-shirts that many young women wore at the time and to the more traditional female way of dressing in a close cut blouse of lace or transparent fabric together with a sarong.

The *dakwah* movement has usually been depicted as an urban and middle-class phenomenon. In the 1970s and 1980s, the movement attracted members and supporters mainly from newly urbanized Malays who, as a result of the NEP, had moved from the countryside either as work migrants or for educational reasons. The growing urban Malay middle class was thus forming the base of the movement. Several scholars have offered suggestions as to why the *dakwah* movement had such a great attraction for Malays in this particular context (Nagata 1984, Muzaffar 1987, Baharuddin 1995, Hassan 1995).

The readiness of modern Malay women to dress and act in accordance with Islamic ideals, in particular the practice of veiling, has attracted much scholarly attention. A dominant approach has been to focus on the negative effects of Islamization and modernization on Malay women. It has been argued that the Malaysian Islamization projects, both the government's and the local *dakwah* movement's, have actively introduced patriarchal

practices of gender and family relations into the Malaysian context and, as a result, have produced an intensification of Malay gender difference, segregation, and inequality, and a strengthening of male authority. These transformations are often described as being modeled on Arab, or Middle Eastern, Muslim practice. The image of Middle Eastern gender relations as patriarchal is thus used as a contrast to what are perceived to be more equal Malay gender relations (Karim 1992, Ong 1995, Othman 1998, Stivens 1998).

Focusing on the massive labor migration by young Malay women to Free Trade Zones in the urban area in the 1970s and 1980s, social anthropologist Aihwa Ong (1995) argues that the NEP had transforming impacts on Malay gender relations. The female labor migration meant that a large number of unmarried women, for the first time in Malay history, were living and working away from their parents and kin, something that, according to Ong, meant a great challenge to male authority and a threat to female morality.

In traditional Malay village life, Islamic law defined a man's identity in terms of his ability to provide the economic support for his household and to prepare his sons for independent householding. He was also responsible for the moral status of his wife and daughters. On the other hand, the bilateral, or in some cases matrilineal, kinship system provided women a measure of autonomy and influence in everyday life that prevented a rigid observation of male authority. The bilateral, and in some cases matrilineal, principles in *adat* often prevailed over Islamic family law and created a space where married women could move freely, tending to the fields or engaging in trade. *Adat* also gave married women the responsibility to make decisions concerning the household economy (Karim 1992, Peletz 1996).

Migration to the Free Trade Zones by young Malay women meant that they became morally, economically, and socially independent of their parents and kin – an independence that, according to Ong (1995), caused a moral confusion over the proper roles of men and women and a threat to the boundaries between private and public. The new form of mixing and dating in the urban context created a panic focusing on the morals of the young women. Factory girls became known as "Minah Karan" (Daud 1985), which is a combination of a common female surname – Minah – and the Malay word for electricity – *karan*. This derogatory expression (Electrified Minah) associated factory women with powerful and dangerous unregulated sexuality.

In terms of Malay gender relations, the new situation meant that men's control of women's sexuality was challenged and that the father's role as breadwinner was diminished. As a result, male authority was weakened in Malay society and the birth of the *dakwah* movement can be seen as a direct response to the breakdown in Malay gender relations and as an effort to restore male authority.

For the *dakwah* movement, the recovery of the *umma* became a central goal in dealing with the breakdown in social boundaries that had traditionally defined Malay group identity. Boundaries between men and women, as well as between Muslims and non-Muslims, had to be redrawn. This was done through the invention of Islamic traditions – prayer, diet, clothing, and social life. In the *dakwah* construction of the *umma*, attacks on changes in gender and domestic relations were central, focusing on the moral status of mothers, wives, and daughters. Female unregulated sexuality was seen as a symbol of social disorder and women were urged to guard their modesty and cover themselves. Many women responded to *dakwah* messages by starting to wear a small headscarf, locally referred to as *mini-telekung*, and the trend toward changing from jeans and T-shirts to loosely cut, long-sleeved tunics and full-length skirts grew strong on factory floors as well as in the public sphere in general.

The moral panic surrounding female factory workers faded out in the mid-1980s, but ten years later the same kind of panic emerged, now expressed in the concept of *boh sia* (Stivens 2002). This expression, of Hokkien origin, has a strong suggestion of "sexual promiscuity" and was used when referring to young people (from all ethnic groups), in particular female adolescents "hanging about" or "loafing" in shopping complexes and in the streets at night, presumably engaging in sexual activities. Girls were thought to sneak out at night to ride motorbikes with their boyfriends. The danger was the Western lifestyle created through capitalism.

In contrast to the young Malay factory workers, attention should also be paid to other groups of Malay women whose activities and concerns must also be understood in the context of urbanization, modernization, and Islamization processes. One such group is a well-known activist group called Sisters in Islam (SIS). This is a small religious reformist group whose members are urban Malay women with tertiary education who work professionally as, for example, journalists and lawyers. The explicit aim of SIS is to reclaim a social justice agenda within Islam and to promote a more egalitarian interpretation of gender statuses and rights. In this struggle, which they define as a feminist one,

they assert women's intellectual role in interpreting Islam and they define women's and girls' right to religious education as a necessary condition for such an assertion (Anwar 2002). SIS also struggles to enlarge the public space for debates over Islamic truths beyond the control of the local ulemas' forum. It is by arguing that the ulemas' claims are not divine revelations but man-made interpretations that they call for the participation of women in debates about religious truths. In this respect the group has not only had an impact locally in Malaysia, but has also influenced Muslim women internationally. Books published by the SIS have reached outside Malaysia: they cover a number of topics, such as women's rights within Islam in general (Ismail 1993), gender-biased aspects of Muslim family law (Othman 1994), and the implementation of *hudud* law (Islamic criminal law) in Malaysia from a gendered perspective (Ismail 1995).

As an intellectual, explicitly feminist, and elite group of women, SIS is not representative of urban Malay women in general. But their pious approach and their ambition to engage in the development of Malaysian Islam is also found in the broader layers of urban Malay women. The Islamization of Malay society has paved the way for an increased interest by urban women in religious education. Since the second part of the mid-1980s, the formation of religious classes and study groups among middle-class Malay women in Kuala Lumpur has been a growing trend. Women form religious study groups in various contexts: the mosque, the workplace, the neighborhood, or within formal *dakwah* organizations. Although generally well-educated, middle-class women seldom have any formal religious education. A majority of them were born in rural areas and moved to Kuala Lumpur as young adults. The basic teachings and practice of Islam had thus been transmitted to them by village teachers or grandparents. It is often as adults that they have been touched and inspired by the growing wave of Islamization that swept over Malaysian society and are actively seeking to realize lives informed by Islam in every aspect. They express a desire to live in obedience to God's will and identify their lack of religious knowledge as the main obstacle to achieving such a life.

Women's increased piety has had interesting effects on Malay social and religious life. It reflects in many ways the changes in recent years of Malaysian society and how women create more clear-cut religious identities and authority for themselves in that process. As an example of this, Frisk (2004) shows that women in Kuala Lumpur have begun to organize and perform collective religious rituals, *kenduri*, independently from men. The *kenduri* is a broad category of rituals central to Malay social and ritual life. It is described as a feast, or a communal rice meal, organized in connection with a ceremonial or a life crisis event, often, but not always, including an element of prayer, and as such shares basic traits with the ritual complex of *slametan*, described in Clifford Geertz's classic anthropological ethnography *The Religion of Java* (1960). The general pattern of the traditional *kenduri* is that there is a division of labor between men and women. The practical arrangements such as pooling of resources, decorating the house, cooking, serving, washing, and cleaning up are women's responsibility. Men are responsible for the religious elements of the ritual, the prayer, and recitation of the Qur'ān. What we see in the urban context is that women have started to perform collective rituals without the assistance of men or male religious authorities. The *kenduri* can thus be exclusively female, with the women as both organizers and performers of the ritual. In some cases the husband performs a separate ritual the same day or on another occasion. In terms of gender, it is also interesting to note that it is not uncommon for affluent households to have the food provided and served by a catering service – very often with male staff, thus, in terms of gender, showing a reversed image of the ritual.

Women thus play the active part in the religious part of the ritual and they have female religious authorities to lead them. This means that in some ways women have assumed the role of religious guardians of the household and its members. This could indicate that women are taking, and are being allowed to take, a more important role in terms of religion than before, something that women themselves connect with the increasing popularity of religious study groups for women in the city area. The religious aspects of the ritual are sometimes emphasized by individuals as they refer to their gatherings using a religious term, *majlis doa*, instead of the Malay *kenduri*.

Women's communal religious gatherings form a common feature of the Muslim world and have received some attention in anthropological literature. In many cases, particularly in the Middle East where patriarchal ideology limits women's movements outside the household, religious gatherings are said to offer women opportunities to meet socially in each other's homes and in groups that cut across the ordinary kin groupings (Fernea and Fernea 1972, Betteridge 2001). This analysis is of limited relevance when we consider modern, well

educated women who are not restricted to activities that take place within the household. Urban Malay women are a case in point. They do not have the same need to frame socializing in religious terms. As teachers, lecturers, and employees in private companies, or working for the government administration or running small businesses, they do not lack opportunities to meet other women outside the household. In fact, some of them even decide to leave their professional careers in order to able to devote more time to religion, for example attending religious classes and prayer meetings.

This is not to say that religious gatherings lack a socializing aspect. Many women value the gatherings highly as social events. But to reduce the analysis of prayer meetings to socializing would be a mistake. When women take on the responsibility for collective rituals they are also creating a space for religious agency in public. The rituals are held in the home and the hosts are individual women. Participants in the rituals are drawn from family and friends, but to a large extent from the context of the mosque and religious classes. The ritual is an event that requires the participation of the larger community, and is by no means a private matter performed in the close sphere of family members. It provides a means for women to reinforce their religious identities and actively create a basis for greater religious authority.

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Sylva Frisk

North America

Urban areas reshape relations in time and space, expand in size, and represent a diversity of cultures. Urban identity refers to the relations one has to the urban area in which one lives, and among Muslims varies depending on whether or not one is an immigrant, as well as the character of the urban environment. Urban identity in North America depends on each city's historical development, as well as its immigration patterns. The interplay between urban areas, race/ethnicity, gender, and Islam are also influential. Urban identities are not fixed, but instead vary according to place, time, and culture.

Muslims in North America overwhelmingly live in cities. According to the Canadian Council for Muslim Women (based on the 2001 Census of Canada), the largest concentration of Muslim women in Canada live in urban areas, including Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver (www.ccmw.com). The United States exhibits similar tendencies, with high concentrations in metropolitan areas such as New York, Detroit, and Los Angeles (see Numan 1992). It is difficult to juxtapose urban identity with rural identity in the North American context because Muslims, whether immigrant or born in North America, convert or revert, have historically lived in urban areas. In fact, it was in United States cities that African

Americans were first (re)introduced to Islam in the early twentieth century (Kahera 2002, Wadud 2003).

In the present-day North American context, an urban identity varies according to both class and whether or not one is an immigrant. Urban areas often house diverse groups of Muslims, both racially and ethnically. Interactions between and among these diverse groups occur frequently, encouraging tolerance and acceptance of difference. As a result, the role of women has also shifted in urban centers, where women often participate in more public ways. For example, Muslim women who are converts often assume an activist role (Lambert 2000). Lambert labels this trend "a new kind of American Islam . . . in which women can be at once devout and publicly active." The result is that Muslim women have become both more visible and vocal in North American urban settings.

In some urban areas, identity of immigrant Muslims is outwardly expressed via the building of mosques, *ḥalāl* meat shops, clothing stores, and cultural associations, which together represent successful integration into North American life (Saint-Blancat 2002). Dearborn, Michigan is a highly visible Arab/Muslim urban center in North America, comprised for the most part of working- and lower middle-class immigrants. This community contains buildings and institutions with an urban Western flair; that is there exists little attempt to architecturally replicate the homeland (Walbridge 1997). A Muslim urban identity is further extended by the decision of the Dearborn School Board to officially recognize Muslim holidays by granting vacations to all students in the school district, regardless of their religious affiliation. Walbridge describes the importance of dress among women within this urban area, where Western style predominates, even if one wears the headscarf (*ḥijāb*). Women who do not wear the headscarf are conscientious regarding their dress, intent on not looking as though they come from a village, wearing smart suits, coiffed hair, and make-up and jewelry donned for any public occasion. For those women who do wear headscarves, the style tends to again mirror Western dress, with a high likelihood of wearing jeans and long-sleeved shirts among the younger generations, and stylish outfits among those in adulthood, as opposed to the long overcoats. An urban identity influences dress among immigrant women in other metropolitan areas as well (see Kaya 2003).

Muslim women in urban spaces are multi-faceted, with diverse identities. Muslim women who wear headscarves and other distinctive forms of dress in urban areas often face being treated as the cultural other (Hallak and Quina 2004, Lambert 2000, Read and Bartowski 2000). An examination of identity among various middle-class immigrant Muslim women living in urban areas illustrates that for those who wear the veil, it symbolizes a source of esteem and positive identity. The veil is thought to create egalitarianism in an urban area where female sexuality objectifies women, and hampers their freedom to be viewed as equal to their male counterparts. Perhaps most centrally, among Muslim women who do not wear the headscarf, it is viewed not as a religious practice, but as a political statement to differentiate oneself in urban North American contexts. A case study in Austin, Texas (a liberal university town) suggests that the headscarf does not always become a contested symbol of identity between Muslims in the urban United States (Read and Bartowski 2000). Everyday experiences tend to guide women's perceptions in such contexts, as opposed to religious rhetoric.

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Kristine J. Ajrouch

The Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey

Istanbul, a port city and once the Ottoman imperial seat, had a human tapestry that was multiethnic, multiconfessional, and polyglot with nearly one million inhabitants by the late nineteenth century. The status of Istanbul shifted with the establishment of the Turkish Republic (1923), dislocating the city as the political center – although it retained a cultural and economic vibrancy. In the 1920s and 1930s, during a period of political and economic transition, women's bodies became a central factor in the discussion over the construction of nation and state, continuing a debate begun in the late Ottoman period about women's role in society. Represented as national and state symbols, as banners of progress, and as mothers and workers, women's lives and bodies were intricately related to establishing the parameters of public/private and the nation/state within a modernizing urban environment.

As Alev Çınar notes, "the building of a state and the creation of a nation involve different interventions and inscriptions on the body" (Çınar 2005, 53). In the Turkish Republican context, this translated into social regulations on dress and activities, the forging of roles as mother and worker, and the establishment of a new code of gender norms, morality, and mores. Central to commentaries was the link between consumption, sexuality, and femininity. Elite Ottoman women and men had debated issues on the Woman Question, education, employment, and polygamy since the late nineteenth century.

Educational and training opportunities in more "maternal" fields affected women's lives in the city. For example, in 1842 a midwifery program was introduced at the medical school. Likewise, in 1870, the Dar ül-Muallimât, or Teacher's Training College for Women, was founded. In the provinces, the industries of millinery and textile production offered women employment opportunities. However, the experiences of war, namely the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and the First World War (1914–18), and external events, such as the Russian Revolution (1917), not only altered the demographic portrait of Istanbul, but also created new public roles for women. Ottoman women were working in charity and social organizations, such as the Society for the Protection of Children and the Red Crescent, contributing and overseeing an active women's press, establishing purchasing power as consumers and wage-earners in a burgeoning commercial industry, notably as store clerks, cashiers, and bookkeepers. By the Republican period, women had moved into the workforce as stenographers, typists, and even into new professions, such as dance instructors, pilots, and taxi drivers (*Christian Science Monitor* 1930, Öztürkmen 2003).

As spectators and consumers, Ottoman and Republican women participated in fashion trends and cultural activities, which translated into new patterns of sexuality, morality, and behavior. As social and cultural commentators in the print media, elite and middle-class women partook in the fashioning and refashioning of elite, middle-, and working-class women's identities as good mother and citizen. For example, feminists, cultural critics, and social reformers, both male and female, provided opinions and advice on such issues as love, companionate marriage, the benefits of social dancing, and the idea of becoming a film star. Topics tackled reflected a changing urban fabric, which saw an increase of middle- and working-class female visibility as workers, as cultural consumers, and as participants in heterosocial activities, such as social dancing. As women gained more marital, spatial, and suffrage rights at the national level – the lifting of the partition segregating space in public transport (1923), the abolishment of polygamy (1927), national suffrage rights (1934) – women's visibility within a modernizing cosmopolis was regarded by conservative forces as an indicator of a societal pathology, a "family crisis," while at the same time celebrated by secular and Western-oriented Turks.

Women's dress and actions in urban spaces not only engendered discussion but were also the basis for negotiating contested visions of nation/society relations in gendered and sexualized terms. In the post-Ottoman context, how women dressed and publicly behaved indicated the degree to which post-Ottoman society had modernized/Westernized. A central symbol marking women's bodies was the veil. In the late Ottoman context, veiling identified women as elite and as urban. However, the act of unveiling had political resonances. For example, writer and feminist Halide Edib's act of unveiling in front of the American College in 1912 underlined the significant "political and cultural capital" of women's bodies (Lewis 2004, 79). Transformations in everyday cultural practices at the urban level necessitated the definition of a new morality and a demarcation of appropriate/inappropriate behaviors and urban spaces. In 1881, a code was passed restricting women from congregating in public and "sitting down in shops," and monitoring women's dress (Afetinan 1962, 32). Likewise, in 1919, a protest at Afife Jale's (1902–41) historic

stage appearance as the first Turkish Muslim female stage actor, provoked an official response, which prohibited the appearance of Muslim women on stage (And 1963–4). But it was not until the mid-1920s, in a period of rapid social change and the destabilization of cultural norms, that the image of the "feminine" Kemalist woman and the "modern woman" (*asri kadın*) was added to women's public roles as, for example, hostesses of balls and parties (Durakbaşa 2000).

Women's identities in the urban realm were also shaped according to ethnicity and confession. Since the late nineteenth century, the inclusive designate, "Ottoman," gave way to more national, religious, and ethnic differentiation by the republican period. The positions of Armenian, Greek, Levantine, and Jewish women were shaped by feminist and nationalist agendas as well as changes taking place at the commercial and economic level. In the late Ottoman context, they, like their elite Ottoman Muslim counterparts, were engaged in publishing, charity work, teaching, and feminist projects. A 1913 commercial directory lists Greek and Armenian women self-employed as midwives, corset makers, seamstresses, and shopkeepers – jobs that Armenian and Greek women held through the mid-1920s (*Annuaire oriental* 1913). Elite Ottoman Armenian women, such as the writer, publisher, and feminist, Hayganuş Mark (1885–1966), articulated a distinct Armenian women's identity in a language of legal rights and domestic welfare (Bilal et al. 2003).

The interplay of ideological shifts, perceived social and cultural anxieties, and experiences of political and social changes did shape the perception of Ottoman Muslim and non-Muslim women's public roles. For example, criminal behavior of minority women filed in a 1903 report questioned women's visible presence in the streets (Frierson 2000b, 198). In the late Ottoman context, Greek, Armenian, and Gypsy women appeared on stage as singers, performers, and dancers. Whereas some urban educated critics perceived these occupations as morally corrupt and disreputable, non-Muslim women also operated as their own cultural agents responding to professional opportunities and nationalist ideology. For example, the Greek cabaret singer and recording artist Eftalya Hanım (1891–1939), known as Deniz Kızı (The Mermaid), adopted a stage name that did not reflect her Greek identity and appealed more to a Turkish audience (O'Connell 2003, 206). Minority women's position in public was also affected by national economic interests. By the late 1920s/early 1930s, laws favoring Turkish employees eliminated polyglot Greek and Armenian girls as stenographers in favor of Turkish citizens (*New York Times* 1929, 1934).

Recent and current scholarship focusing on Muslim and non-Muslim women and topics of everyday life and cultural practices will continue to complicate and nuance conceptions of women's identities in late Ottoman and early Republican history.

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G. CAROLE WOODALL

South Asia

It is difficult to define a distinct urban identity for Muslim women in South Asia. In general, urban women form only a small percentage of the overall population. In some cases, Muslim urban women are an even smaller percentage of that whole, given the small numbers of the overall Muslim population in India, for example. Thus, it is not possible to generalize concerning all urban Muslim women living in the region.

In addition, the social and political contexts in the countries vary considerably, which affects the construction of gender roles and the position of Muslim women as well. For example, while Pakistan is a predominantly Muslim country, which also identifies itself as an Islamic republic, its neighbor, India, is predominantly Hindu and a secular country. Bangladesh is unique historically in that its society is shaped by a blend of Muslim and Hindu traditions, which has had a different impact on Bengali Muslim women.

Second, the rural–urban gap in each country is much wider than similarities between urban areas across the region. The common challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, lack of education, and access to health care and economic opportunity are much greater obstacles for women, which the rural–urban divide only exacerbates.

However, rapid urbanization in the last 50-odd years has rendered urban spaces the site of contestation over changing cultural, political, and social norms with regard to gender roles. Hence, in this context, urban Muslim women in South Asia are uniquely placed to define, to resist, and to create new spaces to express their voices.

One way is through political activism. This is true of both the colonial and contemporary time periods. Under British rule, urban Muslim women in India organized to call for education for Muslim girls and women and to challenge purdah, or female seclusion, seen as an impediment to access to education. For example, the Muslim Women's Association was founded at Aligarh in 1905, and the Anjuman-e-Khawatin and Central Muslim Society were formed in Lahore and Bengal, respectively (Chakraborty 2001, 86).

In the postcolonial period in Pakistan, partly as a response to the repressive regime of Zia ul-Haq, the Women's Action Forum (WAF) was created in 1981. The WAF was a platform for various women's organizations to unite across social, economic, and political backgrounds in protest against the government's attempts to Islamize the country, using religion as a tool to discriminate against women and limit their activities and rights. The WAF was the only organization to violate martial law and express dissent publicly by organizing a protest march against the proposed Law of Evidence in February 1983. This organization was and continues to be dominated by upper- and middle-class, urban women, who demonstrate the greatest degree of political mobilization in Pakistan (Zafer 1996, 47).

One of the criticisms of urban Muslim women is that they are not representative of the majority of women in their country who live in rural areas. On one hand, this criticism is valid, since many women's groups and non-governmental organizations are based in urban areas in South Asia, and tend to be the ones invited to speak to the media or at conferences and to represent the women of their country. One can argue that they have the resources to publicize cases, to mobilize support, and to challenge legislation that runs counter to women's rights.

However, on another level, the gap between rural and urban women and the issue of representation is belied by the fact that there are also rural-based women's groups who are active in safeguarding women's rights in their region. For example, the Sindhiani-Tehrik (Sindhi Women's Movement), with over 1,500 peasant women members in the 1980s, worked to safeguard women's safety, access to education and health care, and other issues of relevance to women living in rural Sindh (Zafer1996, 48).

One of the biggest factors in shaping urban Muslim women's identity is their participation in the labor force. But this factor is challenged by traditional understanding of purdah, which aims to limit women's sphere of activity to the domestic. Papanek identifies two aspects of purdah: the physical segregation of space by gender, and the covering of the female face and body when women go outside their homes. Taken broadly, purdah signifies the exclusion of women from what are identified as male spheres, i.e. public spheres of economic, social, and political life. While strict spatial segregation is not possible, what remains is a sense that women must limit their participation and presence in public areas, which are by definition male-dominated (Papanek 1982). The literature on female urban migration in South Asia and Muslim female urban identity emphasizes purdah as the lens through which urban Muslim women's responses are analyzed.

There are historical roots to this mode of analysis. Female seclusion was linked to socioeconomic class status and urban identity for Muslim women in Pakistan and India under British rule. The more upper-class a family was, the less it was financially dependent on women's capacity to work outside the home and contribute to the family income, and therefore the more likely to practice female seclusion. In rural areas, in contrast, women's labor outside the home was necessary and therefore female seclusion was less the norm. Upper-class status became linked to the family's symbolic ability to "protect" its women and also placed primary responsibility on the men to provide for the family. Hence, there are links between the value of labor

and delineation of gender roles and status, such that they tended to favor female seclusion among urban Muslim women in that time period (Lateef 1990, 134).

What was historically an upper-class phenomenon has been redefined by urban women in the postcolonial period. In the 1980s, a survey of urban Muslim women in India showed that they did not believe purdah was religiously binding, but that female seclusion depended on their family's social origins, level of education, and socioeconomic environment (Lateef 1990, 134).

In Bangladesh, purdah is being reinterpreted by lower middle- and working-class female garment workers. These women, also known as "garment girls," number about 800,000 women in the industry (Siddiqi 1998, 214–15). While there are economic reasons which drive their going out into the urban labor force, and in particular finding work in these garment factories, many women frame their decisions to do so in cultural and moral terms. They redefine purdah as internal behavior and not external, physical seclusion of women, and also reinterpret their role within the family as wage earners, when traditionally it has been men who have been the breadwinners (Kabeer 2005, 278).

Other working women in Bangladesh have reinterpreted traditional norms about female space and the meaning of purdah in a different way. Some middle-class and lower middle-class working women have started to wear the chador, which is different from the burqa. This new form of veiling represents a self-imposed form of social conformity with socially prescribed gender norms, but one which departs from the traditional appearance of a secluded Muslim woman because it is applicable only to women who move outside the household sphere, to work in public, in urban areas. Thus, it represents a form of agency on the part of urban Muslim Bengali women, and not a symbol of gender oppression, as the veil is traditionally viewed (Nasreen 1996, 98).

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Uzma Jamil

Southeast Europe

Urban Muslim identity in the Balkans can be characterized by longevity and endangeredness, tradition and change, and hope and despair – dichotomies starkly evident in the lives of Muslim women.

It is hard to generalize the urban experience in Southeast Europe, except to say people in Balkan cities like to claim urban status for themselves while "the villagers" are always someone other than one's own family. These claims to authenticity are often complicated by immigration patterns that favor urban areas; however, keeping in close contact with one's relatives in the village is equally necessary for surviving wars and hard times in the city (Bringa 1995). Moreover, women traditionally marry, visit, and otherwise conduct social exchanges across the so-called urban/rural divide, so it is hard to tell where a town ends and the surrounding villages begin.

However, the ambiguity associated with the urban/rural divide should not lead to an underestimation of the intensity of emotion associated with these labels. Urban centers have historically played a central role in both the Byzantine and Ottoman Empires. Islam's own urban orientation had a strong influence on the lifestyles of Muslim urbanites in the Balkans (Fraenkel 1985, Abu-Lughod 1987). Muslim elites, who ruled the Balkans until the late nineteenth century, tended to settle in towns as administrators and merchants (Braude and Lewis 1982, Faroqhi 1984, Karpat 1973). As a result, for Muslims, upward mobility in Southeast Europe came to be associated with migration from rural areas to towns, a pattern that survived well into socialist Yugoslavia, where cities provided job security and educational opportunities to upwardly mobile individuals. In fact, even today, one's "town" remains a core category that channels loyalties and economic opportunities (Brown 2000, Ellis 2003).

The prestige associated with being a Muslim urbanite is multifold, arising from traditional,

cultural, economic, and political sources. Coming from an urban family indicates a sense of rootedness as well as sophistication, cosmopolitanism, and tolerance (Fraenkel 1986). In Bosnia, for example, cities such as Sarajevo had the highest rates of interethnic marriage, and towns often displayed a more liberal set of social attitudes and styles compared to the surrounding countryside (Woodward 1995). Universities, schools, theaters, museums, and other cultural and economic venues that integrated Muslims into the socialist system also promoted such an attitude in former Yugoslavia. In fact, many of the educated individuals, or politically active or well-known Muslims throughout Southeast Europe, share an urban background (Ellis 2003).

Muslim urbanites, however, are internally divided; the old elites try to preserve a sense of bygone days; the secular and educated elites, who migrated to urban areas in the latter half of the twentieth century, sorely miss the opportunities provided by the socialist system; the new elites, often more recent immigrants to towns, have gained visibility through the nationalist movements in the post-socialist period. The elite status of these groups, however, is challenged by waves of upwardly mobile immigrants – whose destiny often leads them to Europe and back – that numerically overpower and culturally dominate the outlook of the towns (Brown 2003, Ellis 2003).

This competition for resources does not operate in a vacuum – it is embedded in the minority status many Muslims find themselves occupying throughout the Balkans (Mentzel 2000). With a history of discrimination, forced migration, and ethnic cleansing, Muslims' relationship to their identity remains complicated (Kirişci 1996, McCarthy 1995). Being Muslim, for example, can indicate ethnicity, as in the case of Bosnian Muslims, rather than just the profession of religious faith (Bringa 1995). As political and economic resources and loyalties operate through ethnic lines in most of the Balkan countries, such an association inevitably carries complex questions of survival and rights for Muslims, as in the cases of Muslims in Bosnia, Albanians in Macedonia, or Turks in Bulgaria (Poulton and Taji-Farouki 1997, Friedman 1996, Todorova 1998).

Muslims in the Balkans often perceive themselves to be at risk in the economic and political environment in which they operate. As a result, they can be wary of others and protective of their traditions and practices. Real and perceived endangeredness of the communities leads women to become the bearers of the traditions their communities desire to uphold, creating challenges, promises, and contradictory mandates on behavior for girls and women of various ages (Reineck 1990, Sugarman 1997, Cowan 1990). Historically embedded choices of dress codes or education produce gender hierarchies that are then perceived as the natural, intrinsic order of social relations. As women tend to embody communal identity and maintain social networks, they also serve as identity markers for each different set of urban Muslim elites.

Headscarves, for example, display the dynamics of such a complex environment. While factors such as age, religious devotion, educational level, or marital status might determine an urban Muslim woman's use of the headscarf, her outfit is invariably perceived as a social statement (Reineck 1990). For non-Muslims, an urban Muslim woman's headscarf pigeonholes her either as an uneducated and backward Albanian/Turk/Bosnian or an extremist – in either case perceived as a threat to the larger society. For Muslims, on the other hand, the headscarf embodies complicated social meanings. Headscarves can distinguish Muslims from other ethnic groups, so they have a functional value for asserting ethnic identity as well as status and class (Bringa 1995). Older, more traditional Muslim urbanites fashion headscarves to distinguish themselves both from non-Muslims and the peasants. Educated Muslims argue that the lack of headscarves distinguishes modern urban Muslims from the others.

In other cases, the headscarf represents freedom and assertion of an identity that the previous system tried to erase (Ellis 2003). As socialist systems often strongly discouraged – or outright banned – headscarves, newer urbanites may seek to distinguish themselves from the socialist elites by encouraging the wearing of headscarves among young women. However, depending on the context, nationalist groups compete with the new Islamist elite, and may look down upon the headscarf as a sign of religious fundamentalism. Thus, the choice to wear the headscarf might increase a woman's ability to move around in public and lead to increased job and educational opportunities free from social and family pressure. Yet, in a neighborhood down the street, the same headscarf might decrease her eligibility for marriage depending on how her headscarf is read as an identity marker of where a woman belongs in the urbanite ladder.

The same contradictory mandate is evident in issues of education for urban Muslim women and girls. The widespread stereotype in Southeastern

Europe is that Muslims do not educate their girls and the urban environment provides both obstacles and opportunities in this regard. More often than not, urban families are likely to educate their daughters. But the dilemmas associated with having daughters out on the street interacting with people from different nationalities can be hard for traditionalist families. In fact, social pressures lead to a survival of the fittest approach to women's education, where promising students are allowed to be educated while girls less successful in their studies are guided toward marriage (Reineck 1990, Ellis 2003).

While compulsory education of girls has been traditionally tainted among Muslims as an assimilation tactic by the socialist system, in the post-socialist era of ethnic competition, education in one's own language has gained utmost value. So new urbanites make use of educational opportunities for their daughters as well as sons. Devout families also find it important to provide education for their daughters for similar reasons, but they prefer to do so in private schools. In many cases, ability to go to school might require women to wear headscarves to make their movement easier and their education more legitimate in the eyes of the community, as is the case in Cairo (Singerman 1995).

However, fears of assimilation and scarcity of economic resources continue to be present, and have a stronger influence on women's life than cultural codes or Islamic tradition. For example, urban Muslim women throughout the Balkans continue to turn their share of family inheritance over to their brothers in return for protection in the event of divorce, or death of a spouse (Ellis 2003, Becker 1983). This occurs regardless of inheritance rights provided to women by civil codes or Islamic customary law. In real financial terms, it deprives women of property, but for the urban Muslim families, it is perceived as a way of strengthening the family and preventing division of scarce resources, and as such is practiced regardless of the status or educational level of members of the family.

In short, the urban/rural divide has been a historically powerful device of social, political, economic, and cultural exclusion in Southeast Europe. As with other categories of such fluid nature, its meaning changes over time, yet the division has real consequences for the so-called urbanites and villagers alike. Job opportunities, property rights, marriage, educational prospects, and even survival (as during the Bosnian and Kosovo wars) might depend on where a family situates or finds itself in this particular divide. Muslim women carefully navigate the complex waters of these divisions to adapt to changing times while cultivating their sense of identity.

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Burcu Akan Ellis

Cities: Urban Movements

Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia

Introduction

This entry gives a concise account of the voices and participation of Muslim women in Islamic urban movements in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia. Written from a perspective of social anthropology, it focuses on the participation of women in Islamic grassroots movements, especially in the Indian Tablighi Jamaat al-Da'wa, and on the question of how this participation affects female Muslim spaces in traditional society. Muslim women in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia find themselves in a borderland; Muslims in Southern Thailand are a minority, Muslims in Northern Malaysia are a majority. Movements that emerge in the urban centers and tackle the lower middle classes are civil society organizations and Islamic missionary grassroots organizations. The Tablighi's *markaz* (center) in Yala is a town in itself, combining mosque, school, housing, Islamic media, Islamic headwear, and food-stalls. The purdah of Muslim women in Yala's *markaz* contrasts with the colorful batik veils of women in the rural areas. Muslim women from rural areas in Southern Thailand migrate in increasing number to urban centers in Malaysia, leaving their children with their grandparents. Gender has become politicized in the Thai-Malaysian borderland, which is characterized by a flourishing illegal economy, sex tourism, and Islamization (Horstmann 2006).

Islamic networks and organization into movements, religious and political, are crucial for women and Islamic culture. This is especially true for Muslim women in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia who will have to choose among the different groups and movements in Southeast Asia and the Islamic world that are beginning to shape women's issues in local Muslim society. Although Muslim women from Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia are beginning to write about themselves, the gender issue is still one of the most underresearched subjects of Islamic cultures (but see Rattiya 2003, Zainah 1987). In Southern Thailand as well as in Northern Malaysia, local Muslims are looking back at a proud history of Islamic scholarship and Islamic education, with Islamic schools (*pondok*s) attracting students from Malaysia, Indonesia, and as far as Myanmar, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Most of these are based on the traditional knowledge of the Sufi Naqshbandiyya brotherhood, although reformist thinking was a steady source, mainly through the influence of teachers of Arab descent. Changes did occur, mainly in the 1970s and 1980s, when scholarships to Libya and Egypt opened access for Islamic education in the Middle East. Later, in the 1990s, Muslims from Southern Thailand also went to Saudi Arabia and to India (Deoband) and Pakistan. While scholarships were mainly given to men, women were also concerned about new opportunities for Islamic education. In the 1990s, Muslim local society was rapidly becoming globalized, with women being keenly aware of international politics, especially of developments in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Muslim women were agitated about the human rights violations in these countries; they demonstrated peacefully and became highly politicized in the process.

Voices of Muslim women in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia

In Southern Thailand, the Thai-speaking provinces of Nakhon Sithammarat, Songkhla, Krabi, Phang-gna, and Satun and the three Malay-speaking provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat were fundamentally different. In the area around Taleesap Songhkla (Songhkla Lake), local people, living in multi-confessional villages, developed shared cultural institutions, based on ritual exchange, which reproduced a whole pattern of social relations. With intermarriage being frequent, Thai-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist neighbors do not distinguish the religion of their ancestors. Here, a high degree of syncretism developed, with conversion existing in both directions. Ryoko Nishii reports that women in Satun changed their religion more frequently then men, women being more flexible in making decisions in their lives (Horstmann 2004, Nishii 2001). In the three border provinces of Patani, Yala, and Narathiwat, shared cultural institutions between Buddhists and Muslims could not develop as Siam imposed its culture and national identity on the Patani people. Political tensions escalated in 2004, when the Thai

government of Thaksin Shinawatra declared martial law, which led to violence and suffering, especially among women. Abductions, kidnappings, blacklists, and random murder all but destroyed the fragile balance and everyday interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim villagers. Women suffered most of all, many of them losing husbands, brothers, and sisters; and repression by frustrated soldiers included sexual abuse and rape (Mardent 2006). Sexual abuse against women symbolized collective humiliation of the Malay other in a Buddhist nation. Women resisted, forming a human barricade made up of women and children against the soldiers. Even before the escalation of violence, Malay-speaking Muslim women actively kept their distance from the Thai-Buddhist other by adopting purdah (Chavivun 1980).

Marriages beyond the Malay Muslim ethnic boundary are rare, although interreligious marriages do happen in contexts of long-term coexistence with Buddhist villagers. Muslim villagers believe that Muslims receive much merit (Thai, *bun*) for the conversion of Buddhist men to Islam. Muslim women show a keen interest in politics at the local and national levels and southern Thai Muslim women participate in Muslim organizations and in the representation of women in the media, especially the Islamic media.

Women's interest in knowledge and spiritual energy was only partly answered by the traditional *pondok*s that are mostly run by old, conservative men or by the male imam of the village. For this reason, women in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia were motivated to participate in Muslim organizations and movements that offered them access to new forms of knowledge and wide networks in the Islamic world. In Northern Malaysia, where Malays make up the majority of the states of Kelantan and Terrengganu, women joined organizations such as the Muslim youth movement ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia, Malay Youth Movement) or the political opposition Islamic party, PAS (Parti Islam SeMalaysia). In Southern Thailand, Muslims in a minority context did not have the option of electing a Muslim political party. Instead, they negotiated female spaces by participating in civil political organizations, non-governmental organizations and increasingly in Muslim *daʿwa* missionary organizations. In southern Thai and northern Malay villages, Muslim women used to play a conspicuous role in local ritual, such as preparing favorite foods for the dead, for merit-earning activities, or for the housewarming ritual. Women were dominant in the important space of the house, the kitchen, a crucial area for cooking, socializing children, and familiarizing the stranger with Malay food (Carsten 1997). This sometimes abundant investment in merit-earning ceremonies was criticized by Muslim *daʿwa* movements, which hold that most of the cultural baggage of the Malay people were pre-Islamic spirit beliefs that were not needed. The Tablighi Jamaat suggest that their rituals represent the original version of the authentic *umma*, rituals used by the Prophet Muḥammad himself and his companions while traveling from Mecca.

Tablighi Jamaat al-Daʿwa and the localization of transnational pietist movements

The Tablighi Jamaat is a transnational pietist movement founded in India in 1927 by Maulana Mohammad Ilyas, a disciple of the conservative Deoband school (Masud et al. 2000). Until today, the movement is controlled by the descendants of the clans of Ilyas and his closest associate, Zakariyyā, in New Delhi, India and Raiwind, Pakistan. The aim of the movement is to proselytize among Muslims. According to Ilyas, most Muslims were Muslim only by name. They needed to be guided to prayer and to rebuild their relationship with God. After converting to real Islam, these newborn Muslims would join tours to communities other then their own and even abroad. The Tablighi Jamaat teaches pietism, in which disciples dedicate their time, energy, and indeed their lives to the movement and engage in constant traveling. The movement has by its own estimate some 200,000 members in Thailand alone, although no definitive statistics exist. The Tablighi Jamaat dress in conspicuous missionary clothes, walk on the road (not unlike Buddhist monks), stay in the local mosque, and bring their own food and cooking utensils. In many districts, where the Tablighi Jamaat forms a distinctive majority, followers of the movement take over the space of the mosque. Women also proselytize, but they are not allowed to stay in the mosque, lodging instead in prearranged houses. Women are expected to cover themselves in full purdah and are urged to go out with either their husband or their closest male relative. The presence of women at the mass congregations (*istima*) is equally limited; they are only able to stay at the end of a congregation in prearranged housing and must listen to the sermons by loudspeaker behind a wall. Nevertheless, many Muslim women were attracted to join the

movement. Here three questions arose for scholars: Why does a Muslim missionary movement with such an obvious patrimonial face appeal to women? What are the advantages for women in joining such a Muslim missionary movement? How would women justify their participation in relation to their Muslim sisters?

Women, especially educated women, feel that people at the local level believe in a traditional Islam that they perceive as being backward, traditional *pondok*s being seen as conserving traditional Melayu Muslim identity only. The media, especially cyberspace, videos, and satellite television, have enabled Muslim women to learn about developments in the Islamic world. Indeed, Muslim women are much better informed and much more cosmopolitan then their Buddhist neighbors. Women are therefore no longer satisfied with the usual diet of old Islamic manuscripts (*kitab Jawi*) translated by the Patani ulema.

The Tablighi Jamaat offered women active participation in the defense of a pious lifestyle. The reading of Zakariyyā's book *Faẓā'il-i ṣadaqāt* (The virtues of good deeds) was believed to deliver merit in itself. Moreover, participation in the movement allowed access to a vast space of mobility, and a clear destination (Metcalf 2000). Some women argued that the movement had a positive influence on their husbands and would protect them from vices, such as alcohol, mistresses, and gambling.

In contrast, one of the most forceful critiques of the movement concerned the the burden suffered by the family during the long absences of husbands on religious retreat (Horstmann 2005). Muslim women were also concerned about the impact and the violent divisions that the movement creates by imposing its ideology on people. Traditional Muslim leaders are divided between those who travel with the Jamaat and those who resist the new ideology. Traditional leaders affirm that they are still willing to rely on traditional knowledge, that they do not want to hand over the mosque to strangers, and that they are not prepared to relinquish their ancestors. The emergence of a new, revivalist movement leads to a critical engagement with a movement that is redirecting gender relations in the region.

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Alexander Horstmann

Development: Community-Based Organizations

Arab States (excepting North Africa)

Islamic charities are part of a larger phenomenon of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) throughout the Arab world. NGOs offering charity services arose in the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries in response to socioeconomic ills associated with industrialization, migration, and urbanization. Women have been involved in secular philanthropic and religious NGOs, Christian and Islamic, since their inception. Their numbers have soared during periods of intense political activity, such as the struggle against the British in Egypt and the intifada in Palestine, and increased political liberalization, such as after the reintroduction of elections in Jordan in 1989. While Muslim women are active in all types of NGOs, increasing numbers work for Islamic charities, ranging from small independent charities, those affiliated with Islamist political movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine and Hizballah in Lebanon, to large nationally-registered organizations with numerous branches, such as Yemen's Charitable Society for Social Reform. The women are of the educated, predominantly urban, middle class – those who have the time and skills to contribute. They raise funds and distribute aid/services to the poor. Increasingly, the beneficiaries are also of the middle class as economic conditions have worsened and as Islamic charities have expanded to meet the demands of the professional middle class by providing private schools and hospitals. Within the literature on Islamic charities, which focuses on Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen, women remain underresearched. However, the gendered nature of their participation can be determined in the structure, operations, activities, and type of charities; the benefits women receive; the reasons for their participation; and the social and political impact of their participation.

The organizational structure and operations of Islamic charities reflect the Islamist ideal of sexual segregation. Women both participate in charities with men and run their own. In the former, women's activities may be conducted by a women's committee, a sub-section of the association that establishes its own facilities/services parallel to those of the men's. Alternatively, there may be one women's center for all women's services. In these cases, the charities are segregated although, for practical reasons, activities may be run jointly by men and women. Charities founded by women tend to be wholly female in terms of staff/volunteers. In keeping with norms of modesty, women cater largely to the needs of women and children.

Within the charities, women concentrate on activities deemed as natural extensions of their roles as mothers – fund-raising, the distribution of aid, and education. However, women participate in all services/activities Islamic charities offer, including the provision of medical, dental, and daycare; literacy, Qur'ānic, and skills training classes; emergency relief provision; and the organizing of mass marriages.

Lacking the contacts with affluent merchants or the public experience of men, and operating under greater family-related time constraints, women raise large numbers of small sums for the charities through social networking. Women integrate fund-raising into all facets of their lives. Requesting and donating small sums of money, jewelry, and skills, such as sewing, are common acts at social gatherings. As a result, women's Islamic charities are smaller with fewer services/clients than those founded by men.

The ambiguous nature of Islamic charities, in terms of whether they are religious or political institutions, plays an important factor in the widespread participation of women. Islamic charities are religious in that they aid the poor, in keeping with Islam's emphasis on *zakāt* and social justice. They differ in the degree of religious observation, such as the Islamic dress code, they demand. There may be little to distinguish between a secular and religious charity in appearances or practices. The degree to which the charities are political also differs. While charities may be affiliated with a party/movement with an Islamist social and political agenda, such as the Muslim Brotherhood or Hizballah, others have no affiliation. For many charities, the degree to which they are political depends on those who work in them and whether they view the charity as an act of religious political activism – an attempt to apply Islam to all aspects of public life. Charity does not reveal one's political persuasion; it may be a simple act of generosity or a political act aimed to help demonstrate the viability and superiority of the Islamic alternative.

Women maintain this ambiguity between religion and politics as it both contributes to the longevity of the Islamist movement and ensures their own participation in the institutions and society. Taken within the context of societies with conservative cultural norms, often restricting women's activities in the public realm, charity, as a common and highly regarded religious act, allows women to travel and work freely without challenging social norms. Work in an Islamic charity provides women with a non-threatening and honorable avenue to public life. Women expand their roles without challenging social segregation, even if the charities are affiliated with Islamist movements professing a restricted role for women within the home. Entering public life may be a woman's main aim; religious aims may be secondary.

The activities involved in charity work, including lecturing, organizing events, and fund-raising, offer experiences and benefits that are additional important reasons why women participate in charities. They provide women the rewarding opportunity to learn or practice a number of skills. Charity work may offer a woman a career that provides an income or raises her social status.

To different degrees, Arab states both support Islamic charities, as they relieve the state's burden, and limit them, as they represent a challenge to secular state legitimacy. Within this context, the political impact of women's participation may be overt and/or covert. Their participation ensures the viability and success of Islamist organizations. Depending on the association, women may also become overtly involved in political activism. Women furthermore play a key political role, in eroding the distinction between politics and religion. Activating Islam through deeds in all spheres of life, in an attempt to create a seemingly seamless web between religion, politics, charity, and all forms of public life, is central to the Islamist project. Through their charity activities women are contributing to this activist understanding of Islam.

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JANINE A. CLARK

Central Asia

Community-based organizations (CBOs) constitute one of the most important areas for participation of Central Asian women in public life. This is especially so in rural areas, where about 75 percent of the population of the region lives. CBOs also play an important role in the urban centers of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. CBOs have historical roots in Central Asian countries. Unlike non-governmental organization (NGOs), this system of self-organization (*mahalla, jamiuao*, Uzbek; *jamaat*, Kazakh, Kyrgyz; *jamohat*, Tajik) has a longer local history. Three distinct periods of development of CBOs in the region can be distinguished.

PRE-SOVIET PERIOD

Historically, CBOs were network elements of tribal self-integration. According to tribal identification, relatives established non-formal organizations, with recognized though not written rules, aimed to deal with various situations, with all members of this "mini-society" embedded in a hierarchy of interactions.

The decision-making rights on all questions largely belonged to senior men. In many areas women did not participate in the decision-making process. However, there were differences between nomadic and settled tribes. Kyrgyz and Kazakh women participated at important meetings. Women's roles at such gatherings depended on their social status, determined through marriage, age,

and mental abilities and qualities. For example, unmarried or divorced women, the second or next wives (*tokal*, Kazakh; *kun*, Kyrgyz) did not have these rights, and nor did women of settled tribes. The final decision belonged to men. These hierarchical differences have been explained in terms of the dependency of the survival of the whole tribe on all its members.

Soviet period

One of the main ideas of Soviet power was forming a united and uniform Soviet people. The policy of Russification aimed at unification of cultural values, traditions, language, and other attributes. Any attempts to keep traditions and self-identification of local community organizations were punished by law as an "action against the Motherland." The system of tribal relations was seen as a survival of the past to be replaced through a policy of collectivization. One could consider this period as one of intentional willful forgetting of this form of social networking on the part of the Soviet power.

Revival of community-based organizations in the post-Soviet period

This process began in the second half of the 1990s. With its political focus on building "civil society" in post-Soviet republics, the international community has had a great influence through its financial and juridical support for the reinvigoration of community-based networks. One international provider of support is an international foundation, Counterpart Consortium. This organization has had almost 30 years of experience in the Third World. In 2000, it signed an agreement with USAID according to which civil society support centers began to be established. These centers cover all parts of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Their main goal is to assist local NGOs, in particular to train them for problem-solving purposes.

These projects are organized around the concept of "work in four directions": mobilization of communities, expansion of methods of public activity, new methods of work, and skills of interaction between local communities and local state bodies. Counterpart Consortium branches worked in many regions of Central Asian countries. As a result, CBOs were established: about 10,000 in Kyrgyzstan, 7,800 in Uzbekistan, 1,257 in Tajikistan, and 17,700 in Kazakhstan. These are officially registered CBOs.

Some countries have adopted laws to regulate the process. For example, Kyrgyzstan has a special Law on Jamaats (21 February 2005). The aim of this law is to increase social mobilization in the rural areas in order to deal with poverty and to satisfy social, economic, and other problems of the local population.

There are both traditional and official communities in all countries of the region. All rural populations are in practice members of a traditional community. The traditional communities consist of relatives through the paternal line and provide the framework for solving social-cultural and moral questions of members concerning, for example, expenses for a wedding, trials, *sunnot toi* (initiation of boys as Muslim), family conflicts, divorce, and similar matters. Membership of this type of community is a fact of birth. As a rule, girls have a status of "temporary member" of a community before marriage. After marriage, a woman automatically passes to her spouse's community, and follows all its norms. Generally, the surname of the spouse is one of the important mechanisms by which women "pass" into their "stable" communities. According to tradition, a woman takes her spouse's surname after marriage. However, there are disparities among the Kazakh and the Kyrgyz. Whereas almost all Uzbek, Tajik, and Turkmen women assume the surname of their spouse after marriage, only about 40 percent of Kyrgyz and Kazakh women do so. Neither way is a guarantee of the material or moral rights of women. The head of family is a man, and usually, in accordance with this position, about 90 percent of property in families belongs to men. Decision-making rights belong to the most senior men. But the most senior women participate in the decision-making process in the framework of the communities. Men meet in a *gap*, a monthly men's party, where important questions are discussed and decided.

Apart from this basic structure of traditional community, there are other types of CBO. They are established for mobilization of the population in rural areas. The main criterion of membership is not ties among relatives, but rather territory. This type of CBO has to be officially registered with a local state body; it has to have a charter, specified aims, funds, and other attributes. Unlike the traditional community, this kind of CBO is supposed to disband itself after achievement of its goal. The decision-making in such an organization is carried out according to its charter through special organs of management, such as a general meeting of members, the chairman of the community, and the like.

The modern CBOs of Central Asian countries fulfill certain functions, such as uniting, disciplining, mobilization, and conservation. Each CBO has specific institutions that regulate relations between members of the community. The Aksakals' Court (*aksakal*, Turkish, respected, elder men) is one such institution. It is a non-formal group of respected men, who are called to solve different conflicts among the local population before such disputes are taken to the official state organs. The work of these courts is considered the most objective for making decisions on justice. They provide a suitable domain for presentation of locally well-known events in the rural areas. As a disciplining organ, the Aksakals' Court can decide to remove people who commit violence and theft from the community. Rural women often take their cases to Aksakals' Courts.

Aksakals' Courts can limit as well as assist realization of individual rights. The oldest men are members of Aksakals' Courts. However, women have the possibility of becoming members of these courts. As World Bank researches have argued, this process can stimulate women into participation. Besides, these courts have sometimes carried out decisions advantageous to women. At the same time, Aksakals' Courts defend traditional relations of power and submission between genders. In this sense, they play a conservative function, strengthening traditional values on the basis of the gender division of labor and the role of men and women in family and in society, which most often have negative repercussions for women.

All local state bodies have been forming (and reviving) women's committees, sometimes organized into regional units, such as the Association of Women's Committees of the Pervomayskiy region, Bishkek. The main function of these committees is to encourage self-help and mobilization of women concerning actual problems of the community. This form of activity allows women to exercise influence on the decision-making process at the regional level. The function of these organs is to lobby for interests of women from territorial units (community, organization) through local state organs.

Generally, the main aims of CBOs are to develop a sense of cooperation and self-help, and to draw in members of the community into community management and the local state body. Unfortunately, Central Asian countries do not have women-only CBOs. Women do form self-help groups or initiative groups around concrete problems, although it is not a widespread phenomenon. However, women are members of a traditional community and that is where their lives and activities are shaped.

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Egypt: Gamʿiyyāt

Informal associations, neighborhood networks, and community-based organizations (CBOs) that are independent of the state and of non-governmental organizations can be of great importance for the welfare, coping, and survival of low-income and poor households whether in urban or in rural communities in Egypt. The *gamʿiyya* (pl. *gamʿiyyāt*, group), a rotating informal savings/credit association, is probably the most relevant example of such organizations as it is all three: an informal association, a CBO, and usually a neighborhood network. It is the most widespread, significant, and well-known of these organizations. This entry explains what a *gamʿiyya* is and how it works; it draws heavily on the two books cited in the bibliography as well as on qualitative interviews conducted with five Egyptian women who were picked at random and all turned out to be members of *gamʿiyyāt*.

Women around the world usually play a central role in savings associations (Singerman 1997, 125). This could be because women's gender roles mean that they are more involved in social networks and are more in contact with each other on a personal level than men (Hoodfar 1999, 219). In Egypt as well, women are usually the leaders and the participants of *gamʿiyyāt*. Every *gamʿiyya* is led by one person who must have a reputation of being honest and be well respected in the community (Singerman 1997, 154). Running the *gamʿiyya* involves the responsibility of admitting trustworthy people to the group (ibid., 155) as well as

receiving the regular installments and giving them to the person whose turn it is to receive the next lump sum.

A *gamʿiyya* basically works when a small number of participants contribute a fixed sum to the leader at regular intervals (ibid., 124). The fixed sum, the time intervals of payment, and the number of people in the group can all vary. For example, a *gamʿiyya* can range from 25 piasters per day to L.E. 20 per week to L.E. 10,000 per month (L.E. = Egyptian pound; 1 L.E. = 100 piasters). As soon as the leader collects all installments, she gives it to the participant whose turn it is to receive the lump sum. The order of the lump sum payment to each member is agreed at the beginning by the group in coordination with the leader. Members can include friends, neighbors, relatives, work colleagues, or people referred by trusted members. If, for example, a *gamʿiyya* is organized to be monthly among 12 people for the sum of L.E. 100, then once a month a different member receives L.E. 1,200, of which each member contributes L.E. 100.

Commitment to payment is very important. It is rare to hear of a *gamʿiyya* that has failed (Singerman 1997, 155). If people default they risk losing their reputation and facing difficulty in becoming part of another *gamʿiyya*. "These associations, therefore, enhance a savings ethic in the community" (ibid., 126). This means that sometimes if a payment cannot be made, people go to the extent of forming a new *gamʿiyya* in order to make the payment that is due (Hoodfar 1999).

A woman can be a member of a number of *gamʿiyyāt* at the same time, with different amounts and for different reasons. One of the women interviewed was a member of two *gamʿiyyāt* at the time of the interview: one with the purpose of buying a new fridge where she pays L.E. 70 per month with a group of 12 people while the other *gamʿiyya* is for L.E. 20 per month with 10 people, which she will receive before her son starts school with the objective of financing the purchasing of the uniform, the schoolbag, and the school supplies. Maintaining "a broad financial network" (Singerman 1997, 155) is another reason that makes women participate in more than one *gamʿiyya* at a time. It ensures that when they need money in the future they will find a group of people with whom to start a *gamʿiyya*.

A *gamʿiyya* is not profit making. No interest is given to participants or to the leader. Furthermore the leader does not receive any fees for organizing it (Singerman 1997, 125). Non-payment of interest means that a *gamʿiyya* is viewed as more Islamic than the formal banking system (ibid., 154).

Gamʿiyyāt are the single most important means of raising money, saving, and helping out others at times of emergency without much cost or risk to the individuals involved (Hoodfar 1999, 239). A *gamʿiyya* is basically a way to obtain an interest free loan (Singerman 1997, 154). It is also a way to accumulate savings for significant financial needs, such as getting married, buying a house, buying machinery, hospital fees, burial costs, and the like. One of those interviewed said: "Everything I have bought for my house has been using a *gamʿiyya*. My furniture was with one *gamʿiyya*, repainting my house was with another, so was the deposit to buy my husband's taxi and so are my son's school expenses every year. My biggest dream is to be able to participate in a very big *gamʿiyya* to be able to buy a small flat, but I still cannot afford that."

People also start *gamʿiyyāt* at times of need to support each other. If someone is known to be facing a crisis, a *gamʿiyya* is started by a group of people and the first lump sum given to the person facing the emergency or financial need (Hoodfar 1999, 220).

Gamʿiyyāt are extremely popular. They present an alternative to the banking system, which is inaccessible to a large segment of society. Most of the poor are excluded from all formal financial institutions (Hoodfar 1999, 21). *Gamʿiyyāt* are also completely independent from the government and tax authorities who have absolutely no involvement in them (Singerman 1997, 156). Although *gamʿiyyāt* are formed by all Egyptians, they particularly play a key financial role in the lives of the marginalized in Egypt.

Gamʿiyyāt have existed for several decades, if not longer (Singerman 1997, 126). Although these types of savings associations are critical to the lives of the majority of Egyptians, they have not received enough attention from scholars, especially economists and historians (ibid., 126). There are other CBOs involving women in Egypt, and many newer forms of organization have only recently begun to emerge and hence have not yet received adequate research attention.

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Sarah Sabry

The Gulf

In recent years, women throughout the Gulf region have achieved an increasingly prominent role in professional life, particularly in education and commerce. They are, however, widely excluded from political life – with the exception of Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain, where women have taken part in municipal elections or been appointed to important decision-making positions in government. Despite these recent advances, there remains a hesitancy on the part of governments in the Gulf to allow women to form groups. And although a narrow range of women's associations, unions, and cooperatives do exist, these are most often created and tightly organized by men for women. The free association of women is notable by its glaring absence in most of the Gulf states as well as the Middle East in general.

A few, independent non-governmental women's groups do exist in Kuwait (al-Mughni 1993) and Bahrain; however, they are largely missing from the states of Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman where women-led income-generating groups, self-help teams, and professional associations continue to be actively discouraged from coalescing (Chatty and Rabo 1997). In Oman, for example, moves in 2005 to formally register the first Professional Women's Association, a home-grown women's effort supported by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), have been stymied, although similar professional associations (engineering, environment, petroleum, history) organized by men have succeeded in gaining formal recognition.

In most of the modern nation-states of the Gulf, women have been and continue to be manipulated to symbolically represent the cultural integrity of the dominant culture in the country. Women are perceived first and foremost as wives and mothers, and gender segregation is customary. Women are entering the labor market in greater numbers than ever before at all levels of employment from professional positions to unskilled cleaners and laborers. Despite this rapidly increasing presence, women in the Gulf are only permitted to form groups that are charitable organizations concerned with the welfare of the disabled or handicapped. Any other forms of association – including self-help groups, income-generating cooperatives, and professional, skilled volunteer teams are often prohibited by law or discouraged from official registration.

Women in a wide variety of contexts and in many other parts of the world find it easier to organize themselves formally and informally. Women's cooperatives, associations, and self-help groups exist in nation-states under many types of regime. Some are monarchies, some dictatorships, others elected republican forms of government. As a whole these programs present no threat to the state apparatus. Women's groups in the Gulf, however, are not nearly as visible or well documented as in the rest of the world. There are several reasons for this. The United Nations Decade for Women resulted in women being given a role of their own to play in development. But it also resulted in a more systematic appropriation of women as symbols of the development of the whole of their societies. The Gulf region has not been as welcoming to First World initiated women's projects. Many of the state apparatuses have been able to fend off close international attention. The oil-rich countries have had no need for international economic aid. As international aid to the region is limited, women's groups in the Gulf are not regarded as part of the international or Western discourse of "groups." They are instead part of a discourse of suppression and authenticity. Another reason for the lack of comparable presence or documentation on women's groups in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole is that a great many of the formal groups are politically controlled. Many women's groups and organizations are state run, or set up by political parties or religious organizations. In general, such organizations are dependent on male controlled power structures. And finally the lack of visibility and documentation in the Gulf and much of the Middle East can be seen as a side effect of fear. Many formal and informal groups operate under clandestine conditions, fearing that too much publicity will result in their closure or suppression. Thus these groups often do not want their work to be known outside a very small circle.

The significance of democracy and its relationship with civil society in the Gulf and the Middle East has recently become a topic of great interest. This debate also concerns issues of women's participation in formal and informal organizations. Several aspects stand out. First, civil society, as defined by the West, is often perceived to include only "nice" voluntary associations outside state control and repression. However, other forms of participation and cooperation among women in the Gulf are beginning to emerge (for example, neighborhood self-help, spontaneous village and community projects), though they lack formal recognition. Second, civil society is regarded as gender neutral, whereas in the Gulf it is often male organized if not dominated. There are grave risks

that women in the Gulf, and the Middle East in general, will continue to be disadvantaged in this new emphasis on civil society. From this point of view, greater efforts at organizing women into associations and groups will increase their dependence on the centers of power, whether these are national or international, civil or state run.

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DAWN CHATTY

Iran

Historically, community-based women's organizations in Iran have responded to a variety of needs in nomadic, rural, and urban settings. In nomadic communities, rapidly settled since the early 1990s, basic needs have been the reason for the rise of these organizations. In rural areas, where incomes are generally seasonal, it has been the requirements of steady income. Given the complexity and variety of needs in urban areas, many factors have shaped women's associations.

Among the nomads of Iran, the *shīrvāra* has been the most significant community-based women's organization. This is an association of women who do not own sufficient livestock to support themselves. Women in several families pool their resources, and milk and produce dairy products in order to satisfy the weekly or monthly needs of one family at a time.

The *shīrvāra* is also found in rural communities, complementing other women's associations for religious, economic, lending, and production purposes. Religious associations take the form of all-women *hayʿat*s or *sufra*s in which religious sermons are given about the suffering of Shīʿī imams. These gatherings also provide a space for women to talk about their problems and exchange experiences in solving them.

Lending funds of interest-free loans, initially created among a few neighbors or women in the same family, have proved successful and attracted the membership of other women. These organizations usually have a treasurer, rely on membership dues, and meet in a member's home.

In recent years, in villages close to large cities, there has also been a rise in economic organizations in which a few women pool their savings to engage in some sort of economic activity. Usually they buy a taxi or a bus and allow a male member of the family to use it and then divide the income.

In the cities, community-based women's organizations have included cultural, religious, charity, sports and leisure (hiking clubs have been particularly popular among women), and workers' associations. Their origins can be traced to the Qājār era (1795–1925) and in particular during the period of Constitutional Revolution (1906–11). Women related to well-known constitutionalists began to create associations as well as write critical commentaries for newspapers. Ideas for Iran's first all girls' schools were shaped in these associations. What brought these women together were not familial relations or religious ceremonies but national sentiments. They worked to help the poor, put on performances to draw income for establishing schools, and encouraged boycott of foreign products and consumption of domestic products.

With the increasing number of educated women during the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavī (1941–79), there was a comparable increase in the number of cultural associations devoted to reading books and poetry as well as discussion of family issues and new interpretations of religion. These women's associations also developed among religious minorities but they witnessed a decline in the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 with the emigration of many educated women. They have since been revived, particularly after the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988.

By far the most stable of city associations have been devoted to charity. They are considered to be the oldest of formal and non-formal organizations and mostly have religious tendencies. Many of them have become full-fledged non-governmental organizations (NGOs) but there are still a few that continue to work informally.

The presence of associations devoted to religious teachings and ceremonies has also been longstanding in the cities. During the Pahlavī era (1925–79), they were the most important venue for sustaining religious practices. The 1979 Revolution enhanced their presence, allowing religious women to become more active in society. Since the 1990s, the task of giving religious sermons has been increasingly taken over by women.

Finally, there have also been a few independent and spontaneous women's workers' associations. They mostly deal with socioeconomic issues, with funds for interest-free loans. But they have also mobilized to celebrate occasions such as International Women's Day. Initially, many of these funds run by women did not acknowledge their acti-

vities but with their increasing success they have become more public and women's capabilities as financial managers have become acknowledged.

In general, community-based organizations in the cities have not proved to be very stable, losing their coherence after the departure of a few active members. Those that have been stable have mostly turned themselves into formal NGOs. Nevertheless, increasing activities of community-based organizations have opened a forum for women to learn from each other and demonstrate their capabilities.

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PARDIS GHANDEHARI

North Africa

Community-based organizations are the main vehicle that women in North Africa use to create and obtain rights, opportunities, and support. Though the Islamic nations of North Africa have differed greatly in their forms of government and their positions on the balance between Islamic law and secular legislation, some common issues emerged in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Women in North Africa have historically been involved in community-based organizations that focused on charitable works, but the struggles each nation had for independence changed the goals and structures of such organizations. During the struggles for independence from the French colonizers, women in North Africa worked at the community level, directed by men, to assist in the national struggle for rights. Most often, they worked as smugglers of weapons, correspondence, and money.

After independence in each of these nations, women were demobilized, expected to return to the private space they had previously occupied, and again focus solely on their roles as mothers and wives. A number of issues, however, altered women's acceptance of this. Each of these nations was struggling with its own identity crisis, negotiating a place within the opposing forces of traditional Islamic and secular politics. Women's rights and opportunities became one of the most visible symbols of where each nation stood. As a result of this debate, each country eventually created its own personal status code that grants decision-making authority over the family to the oldest male relative, limiting women's ability to make decisions outside the home.

This contrasted greatly with life under colonial rule when women had become accustomed to public life and the availability of education and employment opportunities. Additionally, the economic impact of industrialization and colonialism only permitted upper-class women the luxury of focusing solely on their roles within the home. Denied the same occupational and educational rights and opportunities given men, women became second-class workers. This struggle over women's social and economic place and their lack of confidence in, or success with, the political process was the catalyst for women's community-based organizations.

Women's community-based organizations reflect the tradition of charitable organizations of Islamic societies. Such organizations form around a number of issues and interests, but most commonly they address women's needs to access education and employment. Within them women work with other women to provide information, education, and services in their communities. Community-based organizations range in size from neighborhood groups of five to ten women, to larger cooperatives with more diverse programs and opportunities. Women of means who recognize a need within the community often start the grassroots groups.

Because employment is of great concern to women, many community-based organizations focus on skills training or the provision of work opportunities. Local neighborhood groups are usually organized by one or a few wealthier, more educated women, who invite or recruit individuals to teach skill sets to the poorer, less educated women in their community who need marketable skills. Commonly, community-based organizations train women in spinning, weaving, leatherwork, embroidery, ceramics, and confectionery.

Sometimes, in larger organizations, in addition to the provision of educational opportunities, the organization founds a joint cooperative that provides women with an outlet for retailing their goods and services. These businesses are exclusively run for and by women. Such cooperatives or micro-enterprises include carpet and artisanal weaving cooperatives, calf-breeding projects, restaurants, and bakeries. In addition to the skill set they learn, these cooperatives give

the women involved in them valuable business training. Because the cooperatives are owned and managed by women, the childcare needs of mothers are often addressed within, and become part of, the enterprise.

Literacy is another focus of North African women's community-based organizations. Particularly in rural areas, young girls receive little to no schooling. Poor urban women are often forced to leave school early in order to help support their family. Women's illiteracy makes it difficult for women to obtain work, manage their property, work within the legal system, or access adequate health care. Community-based organizations, small and large, often recruit volunteers to teach community women basic reading and writing skills so that they are more capable of participating in the public arena.

Community organizations develop around need and a shared social situation. It is common to see women's groups that form around their similar status as widows, mothers, divorcees, or single mothers, and the particular needs of that station. Their affiliation, however, extends beyond their similar social position. Women come together for a common goal of answering a question or fulfilling a need that can not be easily addressed with individual resources.

At the same time, women's grassroots community organizations are limited in their scope by the availability of community resources. The generosity of community members with funds, materials, or volunteer time, as well as the availability of a knowledge base (particularly in rural areas) limits what organizations can do. This is particularly true with groups that attempt to address legal or health care concerns. When such needs arise, women are forced to turn to more formal organizations for assistance because of the lack of community volunteers to assist them.

North African women's community-based organizations serve a grassroots political function, whether intentionally or unintentionally. Community-based organizations provide many of the rights and opportunities that have not yet been granted or funded by the state or civil society. Or, they supplement the limited resources offered by national programs or national political organizations. Especially in the case of women's rights, a debate entrenched in historical and religious symbolism, the traditional charitable nature of community organizations, and their position as giver to the community helps them advance women's position while simultaneously avoiding the political debate.

Despite their resistance to the political debate, successful grassroots community-based organizations often evolve organically, and some organizations that began as small community groups have grown into non-governmental regional or national organizations. Others expand locally from education centers, to cooperatives, to small political organizations. Similarly, community-based organizations sometimes seek initial funding from larger women's political organizations, and become linked to the larger political cause.

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Turkey

It is difficult to distinguish between NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and community-based organizations of women, since the line is not clear cut. However, this entry aims to focus on the NGOs involved in development projects and income generating projects, in addition to the cooperatives, neighborhood organizations, and village projects that start without formal funding, grassroots organizations, and mothers' organizations.

According to the data provided by Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom), the number of women's organizations in Turkey has increased considerably since 2000. While the number was 311 in 2003, the 2005 data give this number as 473. However, the women's organizations have been founded in the big cities, not in the rural areas, which should be read as a backdrop against women's organizations' choice of location of operation. The Flying Broom also gives further statistics: there are no women's organizations in 27 cities, and there is only one

women's organization in 18 cities. Of the 18 organizations, 13 are the branches of the women's organization in the big cities, and only 5 of them are original community-based organizations (Uçan Süpürge 2005).

Considered within a historical perspective, development projects and income generating projects have increased since the 1980s, thanks to national and international funding opportunities. While some projects are aimed at women, some aim at young girls and the husbands of the targeted women (Kümbetoğlu 2002, 159–61). Several rural development projects, including those focused on women's and children's heath, as well as family planning campaigns, were implemented successfully at the end of the 1980s (Ertürk 1996, 351).

For example, Çok Amaçlı Toplum Merkezleri (ÇATOM), the multi-aimed community centers, develop projects in Southeastern Turkey especially for women as the "unjustly treated" people of the region, only implying but not openly referring to Kurdish women. These projects include developing skill-gaining courses so that women can establish their own income generating projects. ÇATOM also choose peripheral areas of the big cities to develop and implement their projects and they underline the importance of participatory citizenship. They try to make women become aware of their own problems and to create an environment that would enable these women to solve their problems. Overall ÇATOM aim to increase the number of working women and women's entrepreneurship and work toward a gender-balanced development project (GAP 2005).

There is also an increase in the number of women's cooperatives. One good example is the Amargi Woman's cooperative, which is not related to state or any party. Amargi organizes workshops, working groups, and seminars, in addition to neighborhood meetings (Amargi n.d.).

The Marmara earthquake of 1999 impacted the formation of NGOs to a large extent. Regions which were affected by this devastating experience soon realized that women were important not only in the domestic but also in the public sphere. As economic life had been influenced by the male workforce, women became aware that they could contribute to their families economically. They already made traditional handicrafts, but found an opportunity to use their skills in terms of income-generating projects. These mainly include handicrafts such as knitting, crocheting, and other crafts mostly associated with women. Some feminist scholars have been critical of this approach, as it confines woman to traditional spheres and roles.

Perhaps the most important grassroots organization is the Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı (KEDV, Foundation for the Support of Women's Work), which was established in 1986. As a nonprofit NGO, it addresses the issue of economic empowerment of grassroots women through income generation, education, and developing community-based childcare. KEDV has introduced women to social and economic life in an active fashion and supports them in this. It established handicraft centers and nature stores. It also developed neighborhood mothering (having 3–4 mothers in a neighborhood to provide daycare for children on a rotating basis) and microcredit projects (to provide the seed money for small initiatives by women), and opened children's houses in the earthquake areas with the help of local government. Especially since 1999, KEDV has supported the creation of new grassroots women's initiatives in most deprived parts of Turkey and established partnerships with other women's grassroots organizations worldwide (Akçar 2001).

Another grassroots organization is the Değirmendere Kadın Destek Çevre Kültür ve İşletme Kooperatifi (Değirmendere Cooperative for Supporting Women, Environment, and Management), which was established immediately after the 1999 earthquake in one of the most devastated zones. It organizes courses for giving women the necessary skills to produce handicrafts, and offers counseling services for women to establish their own jobs and to direct them to sources for credit in order to market their products. It offers kindergarten services for working women and works in liaison with local government. Another important women's community organization is Kadınlarla Dayanışma Vakfı (KADAV, Foundation for Solidarity with Women), which in September 1999 implemented the very first steps toward soldarity after the earthquake, in the women's tents, by offering counseling and courses for women. A year later, KADAV established an atelier for candle-making and home textiles.

Women's organizations have also forced political situations that are not necessarily in line with those of the state, and this can be best seen in the case of Cumartesi Anneleri (Saturday Mothers), an initiative of the mothers' organization. Mothers gathered on Saturdays in Galatasaray, Istanbul, demanding answers concerning their children, who were mostly of Kurdish origin or leftist, and who had been "lost" during political investigations. The mothers of the lost children met, regularly, every Saturday at noon, between 1995 and 1999, and demanded that the lost children should be found

and that the people who were involved in the investigations should be tried. In fact, the term "lost" was a euphemism for the people who had been arrested for political reasons and had died during investigations. This initiative had started with the discovery of a body in a cemetery after the arrest of a young man who was exposed to torture in 1995. The mothers whose sons or daughters had been subject to similar treatment gathered in front of Galatasaray Lycée in Pera, Istanbul, to protest against the political attitude of the government and to demand that their children be found, although the police exercised firm control on these women in an attempt to make them refrain from meeting in public.

Last to mention are community-based organizations founded by the municipalities in different cities; they aim to offer women's shelters for battered women. Again, there is a higher density in the big cities, except for the few which have centers in cities in the eastern region.

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HANDE A. BIRKALAN-GEDIK

The United States

> Never will I suffer to be lost the work of any of you, be they male or female; ye are from one another . . . (3:195). If any do deeds of righteousness be they male or female and have faith, they will enter heaven and not the least injustice will be done to them (4:124). Whoever works righteousness, man or woman, and has faith, verily to him will We give a new life, and life that is good and pure, and We will bestow on such their reward according to the best of their actions (16:97).

These verses from the Qur'ān provide the catalyst for a group of women in the United States who have dedicated their lives to the cause of Islam, emulating the first generation of Muslim women.

Like their previous sisters in faith, who strove and struggled during the time of the Prophet (pbuh), Muslim women of today and the various organizations they represent have played and are playing an active role in the development of Muslim communities in the United States. One such organization is the Regional Network, comprising several Muslim Women's organizations on the East Coast of the United States. Since the founding of the Network, other women's organizations in other cities have evolved to meet the needs of women in their areas. Such organizations as the Muslim Women of the Carolinas (Charlotte and surrounding counties in North Carolina), North East Muslim Women's Alliance (NEMWA, New York City), and United Mothers for Moral Excellence (Washington, D.C.) are meeting the needs of a growing number of Muslim women on the East Coast. National organizations such as the National Association of Muslim American Women (Ohio and other parts of the United States), Karamah (Washington, D.C.), North America Council of Muslim Women (NACMW, Northern Virginia), Muslim Women League (MWL, Los Angeles), and others cover the needs of Muslim women on a national and international level. Some of the organizations are independent of the *masjid* (mosque) and others are an integral part of it, yet they all benefit the community with their various programs and activities.

The Regional Network was founded in December 1992 by a group of Muslim women from the following organizations: Muslimat Al-Nissa Jamiyat (Asma Hanif, Atlanta, Georgia); Muslim Women United (Latifah Abdus-Sabur, Richmond, Virginia); Women's Committee of Masjid As-Saffat (Zakia Amin, Baltimore, Maryland); and the Department of Women's Affairs of the Institute of Islamic Involvement, Inc. (Safiya Griggs, Winston-Salem, North Carolina). The organizations held separate annual conferences (most of them are still holding various conferences or retreats) and they decided to network together. Their goals were to:

1. Pool their knowledge and resources together to benefit Muslim women, children, and the greater *umma* (community).
2. Identify standardized curricula of Islamic studies for Muslim women and children.
3. Publish a quarterly newsletter.
4. Coordinate scheduling of conferences to avoid conflicts and duplication in program content.
5. Nurture organizational skills in youth.
6. Establish a support system for Muslim women.

The Network has no official officers; however, its activities are coordinated by the Department of Women's Affairs in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, where it originated. The Network meets annually at a retreat hosted by the Department of Women's Affairs. Other meetings are scheduled as needed or at the conferences of member organizations.

Membership is open to other organizations that adhere to the Qur'ān and *sunna* (tradition) of the Prophet (pbuh). Membership of organizations or individuals may be terminated for lack of adherence to any of the membership guidelines. However, no other organizations have joined since the Network was founded.

There were four working committees established with the following objectives:

1. Education – standardization of curriculum for full-time schools and weekend programs.
2. Resource Directory – produce a directory of women who reside on the East Coast.
3. Networking – develop a network of Muslim women's organizations.
4. Newsletter – publish the *Regional Gazette* (a quarterly newsletter), which is the voice of the Network. Books and other material are also occasionally published by the Network (see bibliography).

Organizations of the Regional Network

Muslimat Al-Nissa Jamiyat

Muslimat Al-Nissa Jamiyat (MAJ) was started in the early 1980s following the demise of the Women's Committee of the Islamic Party of North America. The founder and executive director, Asma Hanif, continued the mission of the Women's Committee and worked with the Regional Network until the late 1990s.

MAJ operated the Al-Nissa Health Clinic for Women, a full-time women's health clinic in Atlanta, and held various conferences and seminars in the Atlanta area. The founder continues to serve the community by providing alternative health care and holistic medicine education. Herbal alternatives to traditional medicines, aromatherapy, and therapeutic massages are included in services for women.

Muslim Women United

Muslim Women United (MWU) of Richmond, Virginia was established in 1989. MWU organizes workshops, conferences, classes, and special events that address the issues and problems of Muslim women as well as seeking to provide solutions for them. Since 1992, the MWU has been an active member of the Regional Network, Masajid Maujlis Ashura Committees, and the United Eid Committee of Richmond, Virginia.

MWU has produced a bimonthly newsletter (*Arisala*) and three cable television programs: *Evolution of Islam* with Sheik Hesham Jaaber, Muhammad Jaaber, and Ali Jaaber; *Women in Islam* with Aminah Wadud and Latifah Abdus-Sabur; and *Awareness of Political Prisoners* with Latifah Abdus-Sabur.

Over the years, their conferences and seminars have consisted of the following: a Father and Son Seminar; Janazah Workshops; Health Workshops; Eating Health; Islamic Education of Women; Domestic Violence (Domestic Dis-Ease) Workshops; Hajj Preparation; Unity in the Community Seminar; Muslimah Women in Business; The Muslim Youth; and Substance Abuse Awareness. In addition to these workshops and seminars, they have provided wholesome entertainment with a message.

Women's Committee of Masjid As-Saffat

The Women's Committee of Masjid As-Saffat was founded in 1974 to provide opportunities for Muslim women to grow in Islam and to promulgate Islam as a way of life. The Committee works under the auspices of Masjid As-Saffat, Inc. of Baltimore and lends its support to *masjid* administration in matters concerning women. The goals are to foster the growth of Islamic education for Muslim women and youth, to facilitate the practice of Islamic culture, and to increase the public's awareness of Islamic beliefs.

The Committee operates a full-time Islamic school. Funds are raised through annual conferences that the Committee has held for over two decades. The money is used to provide scholarships for Muslim students who graduate from Islamic schools.

Department of Women's Affairs of the Institute for Islamic Involvement, Inc. (III, Inc.)

The Department of Women's Affairs (DWA) was established in 1979 as part of the III, Inc. under the auspices of the Community Mosque of Winston-Salem. The objectives of the DWA were to foster high Islamic standards by promoting correct behavior for Muslim women and to work toward the eradication of backward, chauvinistic concepts of the role of Muslim women.

The DWA has attempted to facilitate meaningful dialogue between Muslim sisters throughout the nation, particularly in the Midwest and on the East

Coast. It hosted, in the 1980s, a conference for Nissa, a national sisters' organization of which it was a member. DWA sponsored four regional sisters' conferences from 1988 to 1991, and a summer camp and sleepovers for Muslim girls in 1992, and has been the host for the 14 annual working retreats for the Network at an area campsite.

Washington, D.C./Philadelphia Unit

In 1994, a Washington, D.C. Unit was formed under the auspices of Maryam Abdul-Aziz. Soon after, Maryam Abdul-Karim from Philadelphia united with the Washington, D.C. Unit to form the Washington, D.C./Philadelphia Unit and the Unit continues to be a viable part of the Network. In 1995, the Unit held their first major event at Howard University. The Unit co-sponsors workshops and seminars on the East Coast.

Other Organizations

The North American Council for Muslim Women

The North American Council for Muslim Women (NACMW) was created in February 1992 as an independent non-profit educational, advocacy, and legislative organization. The founders were 150 Muslim women of varying ages from 30 ethnicities, including African, African American, Asian, Caucasian American, European, Latina, Middle Eastern, and South Asian backgrounds. The Executive Committee was formed by President Sharifa Alkhateeb, Vice-President Iman Elkadi, Administrative Secretary Hagga Abugideiri, Finance Secretary Judy Shokoor, and Legal Coordinator N'Zinga Al-Shams. Committee heads included Iman Al-Shingieti, Mildred El-Amin, Seham Eldadah, Mary Lou Gutierrez, Fatimah Jibrell, Wanda Khan, Sahirah Muhammad, Shahidah Rasul, and Michelle Saka-El.

NACMW dedicated itself to educating Muslim women about Islam from original sources, to helping women develop and act upon their own self-concept in order to become confident and strong as individuals and as members of their families, and to connecting to the larger American society in a positive contributory way. Their main objective was to positively change the public image of Muslim women through leadership training, promoting networking, providing all facets of the media, academia, and the government with accurate information and interviewees from their speakers' bureau, by correcting stereotypes, and by participating in several national coalitions with non-Muslim organizations.

Since 1992, NACMW has done groundbreaking work by effecting positive change for Muslim women in the areas of research, Islamic thought, policy, interfaith work, proactive charitable giving, and domestic violence opposition. Among the highlights of their work, NACMW has:

1. Conducted a survey about violence against women and children in 1993.
2. Helped pass a new United States law, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
3. Convened a national retreat in 1994 to look at the connection between the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*.
4. Facilitated the gifting of an entire computer center for women in Uzbekistan, Central Asia, which is now a successful business center.
5. Co-directed the Muslim Women's Georgetown Study Project in preparation for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China.
6. Presented several panel discussions at the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China.
7. Sponsored the 1999 White House Reception.
8. Co-sponsored the interfaith 1999 two-day conference at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. entitled "Two Sacred Paths: Christianity and Islam."
9. Held the First Dialogue on Violence Against Muslim Women for the United Department of Justice, Violence Against Women Office, Washington, D.C. in 1998.
10. Participated in several national policy planning meetings at the Aspen Institute and the American Assembly on public square issues, religion, family, and race.
11. Sat on advisory groups for the United States State Department's Islam Roundtable, Women's Networks of the Pluralism Project of Harvard University, the Interfaith Alliance, and the STOP Violence against Women Technical Assistance Project of the United States Department of Justice.
12. Acted as a continuing member of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, the Coalition for Religious Freedom in the Workplace, the United States Campaign to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and the Coalition to Stop Trafficking and Slavery in the United States.

Sharifa Alkhateeb was the spark that kept NACMW moving. She was a virtual spring of information and resources, could galvanize support for any given project NACMW happened to

be working on, and always "made things happen." Since her demise in 2004, the organization has become stagnant without her light. There continues to be a need for a Muslim women's organization in America on the scale of NACMW, and *inshā'allāh* (God willing), young Muslim women may revive it one day. Her works continue on through the Sharifa Alkhateeb Foundation.

Muslim Women's League

The Muslim Women's League (MWL) is a Los Angeles based organization dedicated to disseminating accurate information about Islam and women and to strengthening the role of Muslim women in society.

> The MWL is a non-profit Muslim American organization working to implement the values of Islam and thereby reclaim the status of women as free, equal, and vital contributors to society. The MWL accomplishes its mission through:
>
> 1. Cultivating and asserting the relationship of Muslim women with their Creator through spiritual retreats, study groups, and dialogue.
> 2. Supporting and promoting the efforts of individuals and organizations working toward similar goals through conferences, symposia, and other educational forums.
> 3. Informing the American public, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, of the perspectives of Muslim women and articulating our concerns to the media and relevant decision-making authorities.
> 4. Publishing articles, position papers, and other texts which express our understanding of Islam, with careful attention to alternative perspectives on issues of concern to Muslim women.
> 5. Networking with grassroots, civic, religious, and other organizations.
> 6. Participating in global efforts to improve the lives of women (MWL website).

Karamah

Karamah was founded in 1993 by Professor Azizah al-Hibri and it seeks to advance the voice of the Muslim community on the issue of human rights. It is a registered non-profit organization in the State of Virginia with 501(c) (3) tax status. The executive board includes prominent American Muslim women lawyers, experts in mediation and conflict resolution, and experts in Islamic jurisprudence. Over the years, the directors have lectured to numerous Muslim and non-Muslim audiences to raise awareness about human rights. Both domestically and internationally, Karamah's directors have met with government officials, lawyers, religious leaders, and various non-governmental organizations in support of women's rights. Since its inception, Karamah has operated as a purely voluntary organization, with its executive board working to further its objectives.

In the summer of 2000, Karamah hired Ifrana Anwer as the executive director of the Washington, D.C. branch. She has a law degree from the University of Essex (England). In her role as executive director, Ifrana will seek to expand Karamah's impact and to strengthen the organization's efforts to uphold the rights of Muslim women and human rights worldwide. Most women who are affiliated with Karamah are of Arab or South Asian descent.

Bios

Latifah Abdus-Sabur is one of the founders of MWU. She has been a community activist and organizer for more than 20 years.

Sharifa Alkhateeb was the first president and one of the founders of the NACMW. She was also the president of the Muslim Educational Council. She died on 20 October 2004.

Azizah al-Hibri is one of the founders of Karamah and a professor of law at the University of Richmond Law School.

Zakia Amin is an author, teacher, and organizer and principal of the Islamic Community School in Baltimore, Maryland.

Safiyah Griggs is the director of the Women's Affairs Department as well as a teacher and educator. She was instrumental in the opening of a free health clinic at the Community Mosque for the needy citizens of Winston-Salem.

Asma Hanif is a nurse-practitioner who operates a women's health clinic in Baltimore, Maryland. She is also a speaker on women's health issues.

Maryam Abdul-Karim is a mother, wife, and owner of a health food store in Philadelphia. She writes articles for the Regional Gazette.

Maryam Abdul-Aziz is a community worker and consultant in the Washington-Baltimore area on social services issues. She was the first Muslim female chaplain in the D.C. area.

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MARYAM FUNCHES

Yemen

The scope and work of women's community-based organizations (CBOs) in Yemen is better understood by looking at the progress of civil society in Yemen. Although the concept of civil society organizations (CSOs) is relatively recent in Yemen, the work of local development organizations has been prominent in the last 50 years. Three main stages have marked the growth of CSOs, including CBOs, in Yemen during this period. The first was during the 1950s and the 1960s prior to independence in the south of Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen) where the British colonial authorities allowed the establishment of syndicates and clubs. The second was in the north of Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) during the 1970s and the 1980s when elected local development associations were established to tackle different basic service projects such as water, schools, health facilities, and roads (Colburn 2002). This period also witnessed the establishment of local agricultural cooperatives, which made significant contributions to local development.

Apart from the General Union of Yemeni Women (GUYW) in the south and the Yemeni Women's Association (YWA) in the north, which were large governmental organizations for women at that time, women were absent from any formal CSOs. Although Yemeni women are responsible for at least 70 percent of the agricultural work, they were marginalized and did not participate or benefit from these male-dominated cooperatives. However, there were some cases where women organized themselves politically or culturally, supported by the political ruling party. One example is the strong women's movement in the southern part of Yemen combined with the political will of the socialist ruling party, which resulted in the revolutionary Family Law of 1974. This was a pioneering action in achieving gender equity compared to other Arab and Muslim countries at the time.

The third stage is from unification of the two states in 1990 to the present. Laws, the relatively open political atmosphere, and increasing donor support have contributed to a dramatic expansion of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and CBOs. The numbers and efforts of women's organizations and CBOs have increased during the last 15 years. By 2005, over 4,000 NGOs and CBOs were registered with at least 20 percent of them run exclusively by women.

Some are governmental instruments, for example the National Women's Committee, and others are NGOs that work on different domains such as human rights, economic empowerment, and charity activities. After unification, the previous YWA and GUYW were merged in an NGO called the Yemeni Women's Union, which is now the largest women's NGO. Additionally, most of the main active political parties have a women's section, but these are only active during parliamentary and municipal elections.

The most common and sustainable form of women's CBOs in Yemen are the microfinance associations, which target poor women with small loans to start small projects such as sewing, selling clothes, animal husbandry, or opening small shops. Women-only programs have been very successful with a higher rate of loan repayment and high levels of voluntary saving.

One good example of women's CBOs is the Family Development Association, which combines literacy, health education, saving, and small enterprise development activities to promote women's empowerment in poor communities. One reason for its success is that it builds the capacity of local women to self-manage the CBO activities.

However, most of these CBOs are active only as long as the donor supervision is present. No technical capacity building is given to women who receive loans, for example how to market their products or how to expand their activities. Further, the difficulty of women's mobilization for cultural reasons limits women's voices in deciding critical issues regarding CBOs. Male relatives, rather than the women who run the CBOs, are usually the ones who assist in finalizing the legal

or financial procedures and who make decisions.

Another emerging form of CBO are the School Mothers' Councils, which provide a formal community structure that works on improving girls' education and creating interactive linkages between the community and schools. These councils are relatively new and need more capacity building and support. However, their existence in remote rural communities is significant for illiterate village women who are becoming organized for the first time and have a say in the education of their children.

In poor communities, mainly in urban areas, women organize themselves in informal saving groups (*ḥuqbas*); each member contributes an equal fixed amount of money monthly to be given to one of the group in turn as a coping mechanism to combat poverty. They are also found in other places, for example Cairo. They help women to face family economic crises and to save money in a relatively short time. It has been observed that women have been successful in forming their own groups and organizing the process of saving and distribution democratically.

These different forms of CBO have given women a space and a voice in public and family affairs in this conservative and sex segregated society. However, most of these CBOs lack capacity and skills and focus on acquiring available financial resources, which sometimes results in directing activities to respond to an external demand rather than local needs.

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Sabria Mohammed Al-Thawr

Development: Discourses and Practices

Afghanistan

With the rise of the Taliban in 1994 and their eventual defeat by United States and allied Afghan forces, worldwide attention focused on the severe treatment of women in Afghanistan under Taliban rule. As the Afghan people work to rebuild their country in an insecure environment, experts say that countries that promote women's rights and increase their access to resources and schooling enjoy lower poverty rates, faster economic growth, and less corruption than countries that do not. Many international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing assistance to Afghanistan have therefore added gender components to their larger projects. The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and numerous NGOs are among those that have sought to improve women's status in Afghanistan.

Emphasizing the importance of gender equality to development, the World Bank seeks to promote this philosophy in all aspects of its assistance to Afghanistan. For example, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Microfinance Support for Poverty Reduction Project (US$17 million) aims to assist the government of Afghanistan in developing a sustainable microfinance sector under which poor people, particularly women, will have access to credit and other financial services, allowing them to invest in business opportunities, meet emergency needs, reduce vulnerability, and build assets. The grant was processed in June 2003.

In 2004, the UNDP undertook the preparation of Afghanistan's first National Human Development Report (NHDR). According to the UNDP-constructed gender-related development index (GDI, a composite index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions – a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living – adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women) mentioned in this report, Afghan women rank low on the scale of human development. With a GDI of only 0.300, Afghanistan is just above only Niger and Burkina Faso; and Afghanistan's GDI is much below all its neighbors. The UNDP has supported Afghan women's groups in securing women's participation in the Emergency Loya Jirga; funded the physical rehabilitation and Internet connection of the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA); and provided ongoing institutional capacity-building support to the ministry, including gender training and women's professional training, in collaboration with the United Nations Women's Fund (UNIFEM), United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), and United Nations Volunteers (UNV). In support of the Judicial Commission, the UNDP, with Italy as the lead donor country, will assist in forging links and partnerships between legal actors in Kabul and regions, with particular attention to the role of women in the judicial system.

USAID has been particularly active in providing aid for gender-related projects. The organization helped establish the first MoWA in Afghanistan and granted an additional $2.5 million in assistance in 2005. The MoWA has been able to establish 17 women's resource centers in provincial capitals. USAID has re-established schools and classrooms for more than 12,000 girls around Mazar-i-Sharif; completed a grant to support war widows through handicraft training; supported Ariana, a national women's NGO; and is funding bakeries that employ widows and provide bread to Afghanistan's urban poor – to mention some of its projects.

NGOs in Afghanistan are currently acting as key implementing partners of large relief and development aid agencies and are now instrumental in the rebuilding of all sectors of Afghan society. Women for Women International – Afghanistan (WWIA) is the only international NGO in the country that works exclusively with women. In the next six months, the office will begin its transition to full local ownership and management. The office is set to transfer leadership to a local woman director; it will then be eligible to become a local NGO and will remain in Afghanistan for the long term. The programs of WWIA assist the most marginalized women of the country, by providing them with direct aid, vocational training, and income-generating opportunities.

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Arab States (excepting Sudan)

The term "development" carries different meanings in different contexts. As Elson (1999, 95) points out, development may refer to "a concern with national processes of accumulation, structural change and economic growth," but may also involve discussions of poverty and well-being, economic and political representation, and/or international economic relations. Economists have generally defined development as the transformation of an economy from an agricultural to an industrial/service orientation, with the assumption being that through this process society will become better off. Government involvement in development is a contested issue. Neoliberal economists tend to favor minimal government intervention in markets, while (post-)Keynesians, (post-)Marxists, and most feminist economists tend to favor more interventionist approaches. Postcolonial scholars also point out that approaches that focus exclusively on the performance of individual states are flawed as they ignore the important role that the legacy of colonialism, as well as current global institutions and economic structures, play in producing the oppressive conditions under which many women live. Among more radical critics, the term development itself is contested, with some arguing that the term implies "the belief in the superiority of industrial culture" (Zein-Elabdin 2004, 31) and the notion that poverty and economic well-being issues can only be addressed within a framework of industrial development and growing consumerism.

In assessing the effectiveness of development, the focus has generally been on examining trends in economic indicators such as national income, poverty, literacy rates, health outcomes (such as life expectancy and infant and maternal mortality), and economic participation. In addition, the United Nations has developed various aggregate indicators, including the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gender Development Index (GDI), and the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), to gauge (the gender aspects of) development. The HDI, which includes measures of income, literacy, life expectancy, and employment, provides a single number meant to measure human development, while the GDI adjusts the HDI to reflect differences in outcomes by sex. The GEM compares women's earnings, as well as women's access to the highest level of the political sphere, and incorporation into professional and managerial occupations, to men's, in order to identify gaps in equality.

In examining gender concerns related to development in the Arab world, it is important to begin by pointing out that two distinct, but rarely overlapping, literatures must be addressed. First, a substantial literature examines the development experiences of Arab countries. Much of this literature focuses on how "inward looking" development strategies, and the uniqueness of the region due to oil and natural gas reserves, shaped these economies. Emphasis is often on the problems associated with limiting trade, or with "Dutch disease," the name given to economies that rely extensively on the export of a primary commodity (such as oil or natural gas). As a number of studies have pointed out, the Arab states performed quite well economically during the 1960s and 1970s, when gas prices were high, but economic performance dropped off considerably in the 1980s, when gas prices fell.

In addition, when the debt crisis hit in the 1980s, the neoliberal economic approach became much more influential in the policy arena, leading to countries being pressured to reduce government intervention, especially in terms of trade restrictions. Arab governments were particularly criticized because they were slow to liberalize. While neoliberals continue to pressure Arab governments to reduce government involvement in various aspects of the economy, other researchers have stressed the need for reforms that continue to emphasize government involvement in managing the economy. The relatively low poverty rates in the region are sometimes held up as an example of past Arab policy success (Adams and Page 2003) and the need for continued intervention in the market (Bush 2004). Discussions of poverty, though, contain few references to the way development and economic policies may impact men and women differently.

Feminists have critiqued the development literature for a number of reasons, arguing that (mostly male) economists and policymakers have ignored the crucial role women have played in the economy and that neoliberal policies in particular are damaging to women, because of women's greater role in non-market economic activities. Beginning with Boserup's influential 1970 book, early critics of development policies began pointing out how these policies often bypassed women. Advocating that women needed to be part of the development project, and thus that policies need to address women's participation and needs explicitly, this movement soon became known as the Women in Development (WID) approach. A somewhat later, more radical critique of development became known as the Gender and Development (GAD) approach. This literature focused more on gender relations and the need for policymakers to go beyond merely integrating women into development. The GAD literature instead focused on the need to examine how gender relations and norms shape economic outcomes. As Bakker (1999, 84) points out, the "GAD approach to development thinking and practice is more difficult to apply . . . as it focuses on relationships between women and men as well as [the need for] institutional change."

An examination of the WID and GAD literature suggests that women of the Arab world have often been left out of these discussions. Much of the literature has focused on women in (Sub-Saharan) Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The focus in Africa is often on how women have been bypassed in the process of shifting from subsistence to more market oriented agricultural systems, whereas debates in Latin America and Asia have focused more on whether women have benefited from or been exploited by industrialization and in particular export oriented industries, which often use female labor.

A number of reasons may explain why Arab women are often ignored in both strands of literature. Gender blindness is certainly a problem in the first case. But data problems are also an issue for analysts interested in focusing on the gendering of development patterns in the Arab world. Not only are poverty statistics rarely broken down by gender, but in countries such as Saudi Arabia gender disaggregated labor statistics are not available. Concerning the former, while it is true that the poverty data that are available suggest that female headed households are no more likely to experience poverty than male headed households (Olmsted 2005) (with the exception being the Occupied Palestinian Territories, where alarming rises in poverty, from 25 to 60 percent, have occurred in recent years) (UNSCO 2002), far more research is needed to address the question of how females fare within households and whether women are more likely to be negatively affected by poverty.

Where data are available, they suggest a mixed story. An examination of various indicators suggests that while the Arab countries began the postcolonial period with socioeconomic indicators that were in some instances extremely low, in recent years significant progress has been made. In particular, improvements in life expectancy in the region have been quite remarkable, with the life expectancy of women rising by an average of ten years between 1980 and 2002, a larger rise than in any other region. Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia experienced some of the largest improvements. Tragically, but not surprisingly, female life expectancy in Iraq has only risen by one year in the recent period (World Bank 2004).

Similarly, literacy rates have risen rapidly in this period, with the average female literacy rate increasing by 28 percent. Again, some of the greatest increases have been in the large Gulf states and North Africa, in part because in these areas women's literacy was quite low to begin with. Some of the smaller Gulf states, as well as Jordan and Lebanon, which had relatively high literacy rates historically, have also seen large increases. Even in Yemen, where female literacy remains very low, at 29 percent, gains have been made over the past 30 years. In contrast, Iraq again stands out, with a literacy rate of 24 percent. A recent United Nations report (UNDP 2005) states that in Iraq literacy rates among younger cohorts may be lower than among older ones, suggesting that girls' (and boys') access to education has actually worsened in the recent period.

An examination of maternal mortality rates indicates similar patterns. While the number of women dying in childbirth has declined, in some cases quite rapidly, in the Arab world, in Iraq maternal mortality rates have actually risen in the last decade. In the Gulf countries, the number of maternal deaths is below 40 per 100,000 women, and in most of the Arab countries it is around 200 per 100,000, but in Iraq the rate is 370 per 100,000. Countries with higher rates include Morocco (390), Sudan (590), and Yemen (850) (World Bank 2004).

Repeated military conflicts, first with Iran and later with the United States, have not only limited Iraq's ability to develop, but have been linked to particular hardships for women as well. While a number of other communities have also experienced extensive military conflict (e.g. Algerians,

Lebanese, Palestinians, Sudanese, and Yemenis), statistics suggest that despite difficulties, overall literacy and life expectancy rates have continued to rise in other communities. This is not to say that conflicts in other areas have not affected women adversely, and at times even horrifically, but to argue that the case of Iraq is particularly acute, since women (and men) have seen few improvements in their lives, and in many cases have experienced worsening of living conditions in recent years.

While most Arab women have made gains in terms of educational attainment and life expectancy, GDI rankings among Arab countries remain somewhat low, whether compared to the country's own HDI ranking, or to other countries' GDI rankings, suggesting that women continue to lag behind men. The gap between the HDI and GDI is of particular concern in two relatively wealthy countries, Saudi Arabia and Oman, as well as in the two poorest countries in the region, Yemen and Sudan. More serious still is the fact that GEM figures, where available, remain quite low for Arab countries.

Such measures do provide insights into how women are faring, but it should be noted that relying only on such statistics is problematic, for a number of reasons. First, the data used to calculate these indicators may not be reliable, nor entirely comparable across countries. In addition, such aggregate statistics do not shed light on the differing economic experiences of individual women, and in particular on how factors such as class, race, and location (rural/urban) affect women's economic position. In addition, such measures define development rather narrowly and tend to privilege certain indicators. For instance, the GEM focuses primarily on elite women's accomplishments. Finally, because a particularly strong emphasis is placed on women's labor force participation rates in these aggregate measures, Arab women appear particularly disadvantaged, due to the low employment rates of women in the Arab region (Olmsted 2005).

In fact, it is worth noting that much of the recent empirical research that does address Arab women focuses on the question of why Arab women's employment rates are low (e.g. CAWTAR 2001, World Bank 2004). While these studies shed some light on the labor conditions facing Arab women, the narrow focus leaves out the 72 percent of women in the Arab world who are not labor market participants. Thus the question of how those not engaged in the labor market are experiencing development, and in particular recent structural adjustment policies, remains largely unanswered. How, for instance, have women's health and education outcomes been affected by policy changes and could policymakers improve outcomes in these areas? One study by Yount (2001) that does examine differences in infant mortality among boys and girls in Egypt argues that at least in the 1980s there was a small gender bias in survival rates, and that policy could be used to improve this outcome, but more studies are needed to determine the extent of gender biases in the region, and the ways of addressing them.

Low participation rates of Arab women may in fact be another reason why few researchers have focused on development issues in the Arab world, as some scholars may be dismissive of Arab women's contributions because of these low rates. In fact, when Arab women are being discussed, it is generally to remark on their relatively slow integration into paid employment, with suggestions on how to speed this process.

A recent World Bank report (2004) provides an excellent example of the standard way in which Arab women (and more generally women in the Middle East and North Africa) are discussed in the mainstream development literature, which continues to follow the WID approach in analyzing women's well-being. As the "Overview" to this document points out, the region is said to contain a "gender paradox," since while women's education has risen, female participation in the labor market remains low. The report also contains a list of "What Needs to Be Done" on pages 12–14. This section focuses on four suggested policy changes including: "1. [A r]eview of the legislative environment to provide consistency between women's constitutional rights and ordinary legislation . . . 2. A supportive infrastructure that will facilitate women's participation in the public sphere . . . 3. Continued attention to education, particularly in areas that provide women with better market skills . . . 4. Reform of labor laws and regulations that need to be realigned with the region's new development model." The emphasis is very much on how women's low employment rates represent a waste of resources. Conspicuously absent is any recognition of women's non-market contributions to the economy, although a number of recent time use studies suggest that these are considerable. "Non-working" Moroccan (Royaume du Maroc 1999) and Palestinian (PCBS 2002) women, for instance, do an average of four to six hours of work per day. Nor is there much discussion of how to address potential problems that may result from drawing women into the labor force, such as the possibility that they will face a double burden, or

questions of whether markets themselves cause and perpetuate certain types of gender inequalities. Also missing is an analysis that examines how structural adjustment programs have affected the vast majority of women.

While World Bank documents are certainly correct in raising questions about why women's participation in both the economic and the political spheres, at least within the formal, measured segments of these spheres, is low, the assumption that low levels of paid employment by definition implies that women are disempowered, or that access to paid employment necessarily will lead to women becoming more empowered, is somewhat problematic. It could, for instance, be the case that women enter paid employment when facing severe economic hardship linked to either the disintegration of the family or male unemployment. In these cases, women's employment may indicate increased economic hardship, rather than increased empowerment, suggesting a trade-off between patriarchal and capitalist exploitation.

In order to address better the question of what development has meant for Arab women, and how women's lives can be improved in the future, a number of issues need to be examined. First, the question of data accessibility must be looked at, particularly among states that continue to limit access to their data. Detailed studies that examine how policy changes, particularly structural adjustment, are affecting differing groups of women are also needed. Finally, far more research is needed, to challenge (or verify) the two-pronged assumption that Arab women are disempowered because of their limited access to paid employment, and that paid employment will necessarily lead to women's empowerment.

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Turkey

The discussion of women, gender, and development discourses and practices in Turkey should be placed in the historical context of the modernization process led by the national elite following the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Women's emergence from the private into the public sphere as equal citizens has been perceived as an important component of this modernization process, which has been almost synonymous with Turkey's integration into the Western (particularly the European) community. As such, the situation in Turkey parallels the experiences of a number of other Muslim nations in the region, such as Jordan, Iran, and Egypt, where modernization and development discourses have been closely intertwined and the Woman Question has been a critical issue (Al-Ali 2003).

The early years of the Republic (from the 1920s into the 1940s) saw the formation of the nation-state and the implementation of social reforms by a strong authoritarian state, which included a substantial gender component such as the granting of equal rights to education to girls (education reform, 1924); banning of the *ḥijāb* (dress reform, 1925); granting of equal rights in the family and civil affairs (adoption of the new Civil Code, 1926); and granting of women's suffrage (1934).

From this point onwards, the development discourses and practices can be addressed in two phases: the 1950s through the 1970s, and from the 1980s onwards, where the major distinction lies in the absence/presence of a women's movement. In the first period, the official and dominant discourse on the gender question claimed that Turkish women had achieved equal rights with men through the social reforms of the Republic. It suggested that rural women, mostly illiterate and under the burden of local gender-discriminatory traditions, were the only unfortunate exception to this general case. Urban educated women were assumed to be "emancipated" and "modernized" while rural uneducated women were considered to be the ones needing to be "developed." As such, the programs in this period aimed at either improving rural women's access to literacy and education, or supporting them to exercise a number of civil rights in the family as foreseen by the Civil Code. This included the right to civil (rather than religious) marriage as a precondition to the enjoyment of equal rights in marriage and the prevention of traditional discriminatory practices such as male polygamy, bride money, and forced and early child marriages, all perceived as "backward" religious practices against modernity. In addition, there was some emphasis on income generation through support of women's traditional handicraft activities, such as carpet weaving.

In the 1980s, with the emergence of the new women's movement, the women, gender, and development discourse is transformed from one which emphasizes modernization and Westernization into one which revolves around women's human rights. Violence against women becomes the championing issue around which activists and a number of emerging feminist groups mobilize. By its nature, the issue of violence against women is one that emphasizes the commonality of patriarchal subordination to women from all walks of life; and as a result the rural/urban, educated/uneducated, low income/high income distinctions become deemphasized. The official discourse claiming equal rights with men since the foundation of the Republic is widely challenged, and replaced instead by a more realistic acknowledgment that gender equality has remained true on paper but not in practice for a majority of the female population (İlkkaracan and İlkkaracan 1998). Furthermore, feminists emphasize that, contrary to the claims of the official discourse, equality before the law is also incomplete due to a number of grossly gender discriminatory clauses of the Civil, Penal, and Labor Codes as well as the constitution (WWHR 2002). In the meantime, massive rural-to-urban migration, from the mid-1950s onwards, has established a new group of urban women, first- or second-generation rural-to-urban migrants from low education, low income backgrounds, based in peripheries of urban metropolises.

A few feminist organizations, emerging in the 1990s, have started to work on a number of new issues such as advocacy and reform for legal change, legal literacy, awareness-raising around women's human rights, and women's representation in politics, in addition to the continued emphasis on work concerning violence against women. As far as national and international development agencies are concerned, these issues identified as priority areas by national and local women's organizations and groups make up the gender and development agenda. Hence, parallel to the reconceptualization of the development paradigm at a global level in the last decade, women's organizations in Turkey have taken development much beyond its generally understood meaning of "economic and technological" development into development "with a human dimension" (Çağatay and Ertürk 2004). Gender projects on elimination of honor killings, and other forms of domestic violence, or implementation of legal literacy and awareness-raising programs, have been commonplace for development agency sponsorship. The economic perspective, where present, is for the most part brought about through programs sponsored by international governmental development agencies, such as the 1994 World Bank project on Women's Employment, and the recent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiatives on women's entrepreneurship. In recent years a number of national and local women's organizations have also started working on women's economic empowerment. While the issue of economic empowerment has not taken its rightful place on the agenda of the women's movement, it is nevertheless important since one of the worst gender indicators in Turkey has been its record low female labor force participation rates in the world: 24 percent country-wide, which entails a significant portion of unpaid family workers in agriculture, and as low as 18 percent in urban areas (SIS 2005).

International mandates have also had great impact in the shaping of the gender and development agenda by the national women's organizations; namely, ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW, 1986); adoption of the Beijing Platform for Action (1995); and the European Union candidacy accession process (which has seen

increased momentum from 2000 onwards). On the national governmental terrain, the women's issue entered the National Five-Year Development Plan as a separate heading for the first time in 1985 and women's national machinery, the Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women, was established in 1990.

An emerging distinction in the 1990s that replaced the urban–rural emphasis has been the east–west regional disparity. It is generally acknowledged that basic gender indicators with respect to education, labor force participation, reproductive health, and so on, are subject to serious regional disparities to the detriment of women in eastern Turkey, where gender discriminatory local practices continue to thrive in the context of a semi-feudal socioeconomic structure. The Southeastern Development Project, a multi-year regional infrastructure and economic development project launched by the government in 1986, started a social component targeting women in 1995 with the establishment of multi-purpose community centers in order to improve the status of the region's women. Similarly the Directorate for Social Services and Child Protection started to establish community centers primarily servicing women and children of rural-to-urban migrant communities in the low-income peripheries of big metropolises, many of which are from eastern and southeastern Turkey. Some international development agencies, mostly European bilateral aid, but also to some extent the UNDP, have earmarked funds for gender and development projects particularly in these eastern regions.

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İpek İlkkaracan

Development: Family

Overview

Introduction

This entry identifies the characteristics and relationships of Muslim families in order to show how, despite critical differences among them, national governments and states, domestic and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational institutions that include the World Bank, the United Nations community of organizations, and, perhaps less directly, the International Monetary Fund, contribute to remaking the Muslim household unit into a "modern" nuclear family. Our purpose is to reveal the complex and contradictory patterns and practices that characterize the Muslim family.

The rhetorical climate

The Muslim family, whether living in South or Southeast Asia, the Middle East and North or Sub-Saharan Africa, or in Europe, North America, and parts of Latin America, is generally caricatured as a patriarchal social unit, homogeneous in its practices, and persistent as a primary site of the subjugation of women and gender inequality. Since the Bretton Woods development era in the Second World War, but increasingly in the period following 11 September 2001, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iraq war of 2003, the rhetoric of development, liberty, and freedom has reinforced this view. This new rhetorical climate conceals the complex and highly differentiated relations and practices that constitute Muslim families worldwide. This is so despite significant changes encouraged by the efforts of the Women in Development and Gender and Development initiatives over the past quarter century, and, as importantly, in response to national and transnational feminist mobilizations during this same period. Evidence reveals that Muslim families are rural as well as urban, female and male headed, nuclear and extended, patrilineal and matrilineal, as well as neolocal and patrilocal. Muslim families reside in religious as well as secular states where women and other family members often negotiate among *adat* law, customary practices, and a civil legal system.

This entry reviews how changes in aid and development policies alter market dynamics, production relations, the legal system, and various welfare policies, including education, training, and population programs, to contribute to constituting new family systems and relations among Muslim peoples. Despite diverse gender relations and marital arrangements comprising the family, cross-nationally there is a growing similarity among family forms that both shapes and constitutes responses to political, economic, social, and cultural changes. This convergence – as well as responses and movements challenging it – corresponds to efforts by development institutions to transform economic and social relations in ways that help to meet the interests of an expanding and increasingly coordinated global capitalism. It also corresponds to the policy choices and implementation strategies of national governments that are adopted to secure political authority.

Development policy reform

Development policies, whether promoted by multilateral and bilateral agencies or national elites, are shown to alter family forms in several significant ways. In some countries, particularly those in South and Southeast Asia that subscribe to neoliberal reform – the privatization of once nationalized sectors, trade liberalization, and the expansion of agricultural and manufacturing wage employment – the extended family has been slowly replaced by the mobile, individualized nuclear family. This reorganization of production from the household to the market, however, is neither uniform within particular communities nor across place or time. Rather, these changes are most likely among economically vulnerable households forced to sell their labor in an increasingly diversified labor market. The proletarianization of their labor is characterized by low wages and a growing dependence on dual income households to support family sustenance. Where these conditions reign, there is an increasing demand for work among women and children who can secure employment in agriculture, the rural non-farm and informal sectors, as well as as migrants to other rural communities, urban centers, and abroad. In other contexts, and particularly for upper- and middle-class rural families where development policies and urbanization have not unsettled the power of older family members that derives from land ownership,

or where male heads of household earn a family wage, households may continue to be organized as extended family units able to benefit from the labor exchanges that support production as well as childcare and other household reproductive needs.

The policy shift from import substitution to export led growth, for example, profoundly altered women's lives and the lives of families through consequent changes in labor markets and labor forces, property and production relations, migration, and resource allocations to different economic and social sectors. Re-imagining the development project from national self-sufficiency to comparative advantage, and from a predominance of household forms of production to individualized, market-based exchanges of labor and commodities was led by international and bilateral donor agencies with the assistance of national elites. It was premised on reallocating resources and reducing agricultural subsidies while increasing consumer dependence on commercial inputs. This shift improved the well-being of some families while impoverishing others as it privileged work for cash remuneration over self-provisioning. Contributing to this transformation were mandatory education that reduced the availability of child labor and processes of land fragmentation that left families with insufficient control of landed property to secure self-provisioning and support extended family relations. The shift witnessed declines in the extended family form where women's (and children's) labor was part of an integrated household production system (Caldwell 1982, Chayanov 1966, Shanin 1973, 1974).

Dislocations, migrations, and new production regimes

To build a labor force and expand commodity production, development agencies introduced training activities and credit for women, sometimes in concert with family planning or functional literacy programs. These programs often were introduced under poverty alleviation schemes that accompanied macro-structural reform and investments in industrialization, the latter including credit schemes to spur urban industrial expansion, incentives to increase foreign direct investments, and support for urban infrastructure to secure opportunities for export and central to debt servicing.

In the towns and rural areas, industrialization was implemented to expand microcredit to facilitate household and small and cottage industry production. Home-based production and an expanded informal economy incorporated women directly into credit networks but with the demise of the family wage and subsistence production a new system of family-work relations emerged. These new relations of indebtedness and market dependence created new intra-household inequalities with women usually working a double and triple day for hours that far surpassed those invested by household males (Caldwell 1982, Dixon 1982).

For migrant households, entire families may move for permanent employment or husbands may migrate for seasonal and/or permanent employment, leaving behind increasing numbers of *de jure* and *de facto* female-headed households (FHH). Some of these households benefit from remittance incomes while others are simply abandoned leaving women to care for children and provide subsistence usually without the security of extended kin relations. The number of FHH also has increased in response to war, as when tens of thousands of Iranian women became widows in the war with Iraq, as did a far larger number of Afghan women in the 1980s and 1990s. FHH are increasing in parts of Morocco and Egypt as well (Moghadam 2004, 139–40). Where male household heads are the norm, such as in Bangladesh and Egypt, being from a FHH increases one's risk of poverty (Buvinic and Gupta 1997). Where matrilineal descent is the norm and women inherit land and a right to an independent household, as among the Minangkabau Muslims of West Sumatra, poverty is less likely (Schwede 1991).

Women, as well as young, unmarried girls, also migrate for work in urban centers where urban biased policies often conflict with rural needs. Such migrants, particularly young women, sometimes live in collective housing arrangements with other women or with extended family members. These arrangements challenge the practice of daughters remaining in their natal household until marriage and highlight the loss of family labor even if it is replaced by remittance income. As Moghadam (2003) acknowledges, massive intra-regional migration from the labor surplus countries of Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen to better-paying jobs in the oil-rich states of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates also affects female employment rates in sending countries. These new migration streams transform household relations by challenging, often abruptly and sometimes with tragic results, the values associated with both family and civic life, many of which are areas of policy reform that are central to development organizations.

For some women, wage employment offers opportunities for independence and autonomy, but it may also increase debt dependence, personal insecurity in contexts where such women are negatively labeled, employment insecurity in environments of volatile and highly mobile capital, and unbinding contracts and low wages (Mather 1985, Wolf 1996). The result of these new opportunities is thus contradictory since some women may gain a sense of autonomy and independence from their participation in wage production, and may increase their decision-making authority with parents, husbands, and extended kin, but they often do so under conditions of increased dependence on a risky and insecure global and national marketplace. This is especially so for women from poor households with limited education and access to skilled work in the more secure commercial, industrial, and public sectors. Moreover, as women increase their independence within the family and the labor market they may increase their control over their own futures and those of their family, as well as participate in autonomous ways in community matters, but they are likely to do so in a context that continues to keep them economically and socially unequal. Policy reforms, therefore, must not only address barriers to female employment and wage and education discrimination, but also the costs of wage work, the double or triple day, and debt dependence if family well-being and stability are to be assured.

Marriage, family, and social reform: changing laws and religious codes

In addition, policy reforms must respond to intra-household inequalities. Women's second-class status is reinforced by the customs and prescriptions – both religious and secular – shaping their access to resources, control of property, and the rights and obligations of marriage and divorce. In patrilocal peasant households, males dominate, sons are preferred to daughters, and women's behavior is highly circumscribed since family honor is prescribed by female virtue. This characterization well describes families in the regions of the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (MENA), other African countries, as well as in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and parts of Southeast Asia and Muslim North India (Miller 1981, Kandiyoti 1988, 1991, Keddie 1990, Joseph 1992, Moghadam 1995, 2003, Feldman 2001) where peasant women have had relatively limited access to the formal economy. In some countries, Muslim women engage in field production (Indonesia, Malaysia, Tunisia), while in others their activities center on food processing that is often carried out in the household compound since the constraints of female seclusion limit their field and market participation (Bangladesh, Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria, Pakistan). Even where women play a central role in family farm production and processing, within the intra-household division of labor they usually find themselves under the authority of their fathers or husbands.

For instance, although marriage is viewed according to some interpretations of religious law as a contract between two individuals with equal (or near-equal) rights to inheritance, in practice, male relatives, including brothers, uncles, and husband's agnates, often circumvent these rights (Afshar 1985). In combination with endogamous, cross-cousin marriage among patrilineal kin groups who retain child custody rights, male family members solidify their control of family property through their control of women in densely embedded lineages. Recognizing their dependence on male kin, some women forego control of inheritance rights in anticipation that doing so will increase their likelihood of being cared for should anything happen to their fathers or husbands. Further, where the seclusion of women prevents them from direct cultivation or entering the market to secure inputs including labor, males who perform these functions "thereby gain *de facto* control over . . . land and its produce" (Kabeer 1985, 88).

The perpetuation of unequal inheritance practice continues to bolster intra-household gender inequality (Charrad 1990). This spills over into other aspects of the marriage relationship. Marital practices vary greatly, especially in regard to divorce and polygamy (Mashhour 2005). Clearly egalitarian relations may characterize some marriages. In others, however, husbands are viewed as having rights to their wife's body making marital rape an unrecognized offense. Similarly, in some marriages, a woman is expected to accede to her husband's every request for sexual intercourse except during the time surrounding childbirth: "It is a sin for her to refuse, for 'the wife is the field to be sown'" (Mather 1985, 163). While one might risk committing the sin, failure to comply may put one at risk of divorce or polygamy.

While some (Esposito 2001, particularly chapter 3, 47–126) stress the unchanging character of Islamic law, particularly Muslim family law, which includes marriage registration, reproductive rights, contraception, abortion, child custody, divorce, death, and abandonment, as well as the

provision of care among family members, others, particularly feminist scholars, emphasize the interpretive character of legal doctrines and examine how different states, communities, families, and women variously instantiate legal norms. They reveal how social behavior is constituted by complex configurations of family and gender relations as well as by varied institutional formations and regulatory regimes. Interpretations of religious codes, for example, are shown to differ by class and ethnic group within countries and by historical experience (colonization, war), resource endowments, and political practices, including social movements and the mobilization of women, among countries. Thus, relationships among religious codes, family customs, development policy, and implementation strategies differ from place to place, and each is a site of ongoing reform and contestation.

Social reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries addressed women's access to education and public space and by mid-century included the abolition of polygamy and unilateral male divorce (Tunisia). Ongoing efforts to eliminate polygamy, though unsuccessful thus far, have been made in Indonesia as well, where offices and courts have been quietly sympathetic to women in bad marriages (Lev 1996, 193). This contrasts with countries that restrict polygamy through legal oversight (Syria, Morocco, Iraq) or, as in Pakistan, to adjudication through an arbitration council. In Jordan it must be stipulated in the marriage contract that a wife, too, has the right to divorce should her husband marry another wife (Mashhour 2005), and in Iran, reforms of Sharīʿa include the Pahlavī state's Family Protection Act (1967 and 1973) to increase women's rights in family matters and raise the legal age of marriage. Similar reforms of marriage and family practices were carried out in Turkey under Atatürk, in Yemen in the late 1960s and 1970s, and in Afghanistan in the late 1970s. Postcolonial modernizing elites, in other words, recognized the emancipation of women as an important part of their development programs and supported various reforms affecting women and families.

Importantly, such reforms are in continual negotiation. In 1967, for example, following the Pahlavī regime, the centrist Bazargan regime repealed the 1967 Family Protection Act (McNeil 2004) only to reinstate it in 1973. It was again challenged by the 2003 governing council order reintroducing Sharīʿa law in personal status matters. Similar retrogressive policies are being invoked in Nigeria, Algeria, and Palestine but they continue to be challenged, in some cases successfully, as in protests responding to the call for a strict Islamic dress code by the Malaysian Parti Islam SeMalaysia. Interestingly, minority Muslim communities continue to exert power by attacking family law under the guise of religious freedom and, in Muslim majority contexts, family law continues to be a site of contestation as in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and, more recently, in Mali and Senegal, and may be the first casualty in struggles between moderate governments and fundamentalist opposition (Algeria, the Philippines) (McNeil 2003). What these differences reveal is that women and family relations are important institutional sites of control and legitimacy for competing national elites.

Development investments and policy reform of education and family planning are also key arenas of negotiation. At the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, for example, conservative groups within Muslim countries in alliance with conservative Catholic and Protestant interests and NGOs debated abortion, family planning, and sexual rights. At the conference, Bowen (1997, 161–4) notes that with regard to abortion, conservative Muslims agreed that governments should take steps to avoid abortion but it should not be made illegal "because the mother is the source, the origin of life, her life and well-being is given priority. If a mother's life is endangered by a pregnancy, abortion is not only a viable option, but the expected option," even though the husband's approval is sought before one may be performed.

Transnational movements and alliances

Women and their transnational allies continue to oppose restricting access to family planning, abortion, and sexual rights and offer alternative, feminist readings of the Qurʾān or organize in ways that empower them within the frame of Islamic values (Mashhour 2005). Mahmood (2005), for instance, shows how the women's mosque movement was a vehicle for women to organize religious practices and interpret scripture in empowering ways that centered on the family as a central social unit; and the international solidarity network, Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML) shares information and organizes across Muslim communities to challenge all forms of fundamentalism and to highlight the particular costs of fundamentalist practices for women and families. They also offer critical challenges to "unholy" alliances among progressive forces that

too readily equate anti-globalization and human rights with Westernizaton (WLUML 2005). As Bowen (1997) points out, the conflation of the terms anti-globalization and Westernization has been key in debates over abortion and women's sexuality where support for abortion has been viewed as a move to limit Muslim population growth (Hosna 2003). Such views can reproduce traditional interpretations of personal status law that reject attempts to grant women independence in decisions concerning marriage, abortion, divorce, and inheritance. They can also succumb to supporting the political demands of multilateral and bilateral agencies that seek to limit family and individual life choices by, for example, restricting allocations to NGOs and institutions that support abortion (McNeil 2004).

Conclusion

In sum, what this discussion reveals is that women and families play a central role in development policy-making whether they are the direct focus of particular policy reforms or constitute the ground upon which production, markets, and consumption policies are framed and implemented. Women are sources of labor for households and markets and key targets of development aid and NGO support. While cultural and religious practices play key roles in regulating women's behavior, systems of social regulation respond to and are constituted in and through global relations of inequality. In combination these changes have broadened the range of organizational strategies that families deploy in meeting subsistence needs. Where transformation of the productive environment has changed in response to neoliberal policy reform, for example, some extended families form nuclear social units in order to enable them to secure employment in an increasingly volatile and diversified labor and migration market. In other cases, families operate as household based production units able to institutionalize new and maintain older practices of agricultural and home-based enterprises. These diverse expressions of gender relations and family forms reflect compromises that people make through strategic alliances such as those between donors and elites, owners and workers, and women and patriarchal authorities, whether of fathers and husbands or of community-based institutions that hold authority for securing what are sometimes viewed as collective norms. In this negotiated environment, constraints posed by new demands on households or by oppositional social movements can mediate the costs that some families pay for neoliberal policy reform whether such reforms are externally framed, as in debt service requirements, or state initiated to secure particular class or elite interests.

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Shelley Feldman and Lindy Williams

Iran and Afghanistan

Over the past few decades, sociologists and development practitioners have argued that before any real development can take shape in a country, there must be a focus on women and family (Yount 2005/6). Iran and Afghanistan have been struggling with establishing a balance with achieving development ideals, but without relinquishing patriarchal control over women and family.

In both countries development programs have both directly and indirectly affected the status of women and impacted the family. There is a reluctant agreement that development and reform must take place. Yet a push for reform too quickly could lead to a backlash. The reforms introduced by the King of Afghanistan in 1928 that led to a tribal rebellion included schooling for girls, restriction on polygamy, and forbidding the bride-price.

There is an acknowledgment of the need to embrace development ideals, but a resistance to embrace modern family ideals. However, separating the two may be impossible. Women's education programs in Afghanistan have demonstrated women's willingness to consider daycare programs, participate in local community, and approve of policies calling for women's autonomy. Parental education has been associated with re-enrollment of girls in school in Kabul, Afghanistan and with the preference that adolescents select their own spouse in urban Shiraz City, Iran. Overall, an exposure to satellite television, family planning programs, and occupational forces has strongly been associated with modern family ideals.

This balancing act was nothing new to Iran. Directly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini introduced laws concerning women that were based on the Sharīʿa, which included lowering the age of marriage, forcing the wearing of the veil in public, dismissing female judges, and reinstating temporary and polygamous marriages. However, only seven years after seizing control, the regime was faced with the need to address an unexpected population growth (by 1986 there were 14 million people more than expected), a weak economy, and inability to provide the promised health and education reforms. This led to the beginning of what has been described as bargaining with fundamentalism (Hoodfar n.d.). Despite previous protests against Iran's 1967 family planning program, which had been labeled by the regime an imperialist tool, the regime found itself in the position where a family planning program was desperately needed. Due to the overwhelming need, an extensive family planning program was introduced and even ratified by Ayatollah Khomeini himself in 1989. The program is seen as one of the most successful family programs in the region.

It is clear that the program was designed for the benefit of the nation rather than as a pro-women policy. However, Iranian women were quickly able to recognize their access to policymakers. In fact, many women have begun to use Islamic texts coupled with the government's interest to persuade policymakers of the need for change. Women were able to invert the argument on women's segregation to argue for women's labor participation. The Islamic regime also quickly recognized the power of women, particularly when it came to the concept of elections. Despite Khomeini being one of the biggest objectors to the 1963 law allowing women to vote in Iran, the regime has consistently targeted and encouraged women's political participation.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has been able to implement policies for women's education, family planning, and personal status law that show sophistication in working with contradictory beliefs and allowing the regime to benefit from all that modernity has to offer (Hoodfar n.d.).

This flexibility or, some would argue, manipulation of Islamic law used by the Iranian regime has been viewed as a model for many Muslim women to work within an Islamic framework to achieve their rights. As a result, it should have been no surprise when many Afghan women called for an examination of Iran's laws and policies after the fall of the Taliban. Countless Afghan women interviewed firmly disagreed with the fundamentalism of the Taliban, but did not see a secular state as a solution. They argued there would have to be a middle approach that respected Islamic views toward the woman and family, and that protected women's rights on a legal level as well.

Finding the middle ground was important during the debates on the new constitution in Afghanistan because the women at the grassroots level felt alienated from the Afghan women returning with more secular views. In the case of Afghanistan, women's rights activists have been able to use the influence of the United States to pressure the Afghan government. But many of the educated and elite women, such as Sima Summar, the Afghan Minister of Women's Affairs, have pointed out that lip service has not developed into pressure for implementing policy.

Although Afghan women suffered under the Taliban and during the civil war, there is still a strong legacy from the late 1920s and the late 1970s when the Communists were in control. As a result, the current struggle for women to be more active in the reconstruction process and the development of a new constitution and legal setting is not surprising. However, the country's socioeconomic problems and the overall violence are making it more difficult for women to convince policymakers to focus on women and development issues. Sweeta Noori, Country Director for Women for Women International – Afghanistan, described two Afghanistans during her testimony to the United Nations Security Council on 27 October 2005: one that was developing and another that was violent and unstable. Women are undoubtedly caught in the middle, and are struggling to ensure their rights through the country's transition.

Whether in Afghanistan or Iran, there is a clear resistance to promoting women's rights and providing them with equal rights as fully active citizens. Nonetheless, the implementation of development ideals and the emergence of the modern family needed to build a strong nation are forcing government to look more closely at the status of women within the country. This can potentially open a window of opportunity for women to take advantage of from within.

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MANAL OMAR

Southeast Asia

As is the case around the world, state policies, including development policies and practices in Southeast Asia from colonial times to the present, have had profound effects upon individuals and families. Although such policies are enacted nationally, often on the advice or under the direction of international actors or organizations, they are implemented within local and regional social, religious, and economic contexts, into which they may fit easily or into which their application may seem less straightforward or appropriate. Women, while rarely directly responsible for formulating national development strategies, often have been either the explicit or implicit targets of such initiatives. As a result, both the intended and the unintended consequences of national policies may weigh particularly heavily on them and on their families. For example, population control programs have often been criticized for their focus on women as demographic targets. Other development initiatives, too, play a part in determining what families should look like and what roles will be encouraged or discouraged among their various members.

The scholarship on this topic as it pertains to Muslim populations within Southeast Asia is

extremely uneven, with extensive writing on some areas, such as Indonesia, but very little written about others (e.g. Burma/Myanmar). This entry, of necessity, reflects this imbalance in the literature. It therefore outlines key arguments with illustrations from two contexts in which Muslims comprise the majority population, Indonesia and Malaysia. Two contexts in which Muslims constitute important minority populations, the Philippines and Thailand, are then discussed.

Indonesia: history of colonial and state policies to construct gender roles and the family

Colonial powers typically had considerable interest in regulating marriage and non-marital sexual relationships, in part because the social status and rights of children born of such unions had to be established and managed. The Dutch in Indonesia were no exception, as lengthy debates eventually gave way to codification of numerous "sexual sanctions and conjugal prohibitions" (Stoler 2002, 47). For a number of reasons, with very few exceptions, European women were explicitly prohibited from emigrating to the colonies until the 1880s. The Dutch East Indies Company recruited single men from Europe and set about establishing policies that would have profound effects on local marital and non-marital relations. While both legal and non-marital unions were encouraged between lower echelon men and imported slave laborers, men higher in the colonial hierarchy were discouraged from marrying local women and encouraged to form informal unions. These practices were "insured" by state regulations that forbade men to return to the Netherlands with Asian women and children.

While men's behavior was thus very much influenced by state policy, the impact on local women was arguably still greater. Arrangements varied considerably, but most women were not afforded the rights or status cohabitation might signify, since legally they were viewed as laborers and "could be dismissed without reason, notice, or severance pay. They also could be exchanged among Europeans and 'passed on' when men left for leave or retirement in Europe" (Stoler 2002, 49). In addition, they lacked legal rights to their own children born of these unions.

During this period, conversion to Islam was occurring throughout much of Java with upper-class Javanese adherents subscribing to sex segregation and seclusion for unmarried women. Eventually, women who were the descendants of Eurasian unions, and who married Dutch husbands, attained a position in the household that approximated that of a principal wife in a wealthy Javanese home. Paid concubines were often part of such households. These women were at some disadvantage, however, because they were in relationships with European Christians, and not Javanese Muslims. While polygamy was allowed in Muslim households, women joining Christian households in a role other than first wife could not "attain the status and rights of [a] minor wife" (Taylor 1996, 229–30).

Although concubinage faced occasional, if ineffectual opposition, it did not face active resistance until early in the 1900s. Eventually the complexity surrounding the practice created enough controversy that colonial support for the practice gave way to a preference for marriages between European men and women and, where necessary, prostitution between European men and Asian women.

Pre-independence and early post-independence

A number of women's organizations grew in response to concern about women's education, polygamy, and prohibitions on their public activities. The first National Women's Congress, convened in 1928, articulated the need for improvements in women's education and knowledge of legal rights, particularly those pertaining to marriage and divorce. In the pre-independence period, the Indonesian woman was to be first, a good wife, and second, a good mother, but the importance of additional opportunities for women was starting to be recognized. As the move to independence intensified, the participation of women in the movement was thought to be critical and the emancipation of women and the nation were seen as linked (Parawansa 2002). This "progressive nationalism" in dialogue with Dutch, Islamic, and local cultural influences allowed for the growth of the women's movement in Indonesia (Lev 1996, 194). A reduction in the extent to which women were subordinate to men proceeded in the early aftermath of independence, in part because post-independence elites were highly educated and reform minded, and "ideologically committed, if not to equality, then to some measure of equalization" (Lev 1996, 197).

The New Order

The constitution that had been developed in 1945 combined important principles of Indonesian *adat* (customary law) with "modern theories of the state" (Suryakusuma 1996, 93). In New Order Indonesia, however, some of the early progress of

the women's movement stalled as state interest in controlling sexuality and prescribing gender roles intensified. New Order interpretations of the state were that of an organic unifying body comprised of groups and individuals, but the interests of the latter were never to take precedence over the needs of the state. The new organizing principle of "state as family" had at its head the national father figure, or *bapak*.

Early New Order policies regarding women focused on their involvement in the PKK (Organization for Family Welfare) and Dharma Wanita (Sen 1998). PKK members operated at the local and village level to implement state policies and the role of women as central players in development programs became institutionalized. In addition, it became mandatory for all women who were civil servants or the wives of civil servants to be enrolled in Dharma Wanita. In both organizations, their positions reflected their husbands' positions within the bureaucracy, not their own personal qualifications or interests. Regardless of a woman's rank, she was to be a faithful companion to her husband, support him in his official duties, and avoid disreputable behavior. Based on a military model, Dharma Wanita imposed a "double patriarchy" on women; the "state controls its civil servants, who in turn control their wives, who reciprocally control their husbands and their children and the wives of junior officials" (Suryakusuma 1996, 100). Women's participation in New Order social and economic development was embraced and controlled through this set of structures, where their roles were clearly defined as good wives and mothers, the producers and educators of future generations, homemakers and caretakers, and citizens of the state (Sen 1998, Parawansa 2002). Women who stepped outside these roles were considered a threat to civil stability, as "women on the margins, or marginal women, are dangerous, are equated with chaos and seen as a threat to the state" (Sears 1996, 19).

Although the New Order government passed numerous international conventions in support of women, men continued to maintain their superior position in Indonesian society. Development budgets have disproportionately gone to projects that have benefited men, while the often arduous work done by women continues to be defined as a mere supplement to men's earnings. A combination of factors has served to raise the visibility of women's issues, however. The Ministry of Women's Affairs and a range of women's organizations that were established around the time of the United Nations International Decade for Women have set the tone for expanding opportunities for women. Sen (1998, 44) argues that: "The 'femocrats' and women academics . . . see themselves as liberating Indonesian women from the domesticity which is the ideological justification of Dharmawanita." While early liberation discourse focused on women as a homogeneous social category, there was growing recognition that women's experiences, needs, interests, and expectations differ across class boundaries, including the disruptions poor women generally experience with shifts in the economic structure, among them those associated with the commercialization of agriculture and the recruitment of young girls into factory production. The effects of temporary disruptions, such as those experienced during the economic crisis of the late 1990s, also reveal women's continued disadvantage, particularly in the rural wage labor force (Cameron 2002).

The role of Islam in influencing the current set of circumstances in which women find themselves remains considerable in Indonesia, although it is heavily mediated. Lev (1996, 193) contends that "the further east one moves from the traditional Islamic heartland, the more serious are the battles over women, until one arrives in Indonesia." Local religious institutions have allowed women's legal position to be defined in comparatively favorable terms. "The Indonesian Islamic family law regime has long been one of the most liberal in the Muslim universe. Contracts of marriage are elaborate and flexible, partly because of pressure and advice by women's organizations in recent decades" (Lev 1996, 193). In addition, while efforts to eradicate polygamy have been defeated thus far, probably because of the passage in the Qur'ān that endorses it, at present it is not all that common and is "met with some social embarrassment and hushed tones" (Lev 1996, 193).

Malaysian parallels

As in Indonesia, in British Malaya colonial authorities sought to control unions between European men and local women. In their view, the "proliferation of prostitutes and their mixed-blood progeny was viewed as a social blight, but one preferable to the worse alternative: increased numbers of impoverished white men struggling to maintain a properly appointed lifestyle fit for European wives" (Stoler 2002, 30).

The growth of the middle class in present-day Malaysia has its roots in the colonial period and early independence (Stivens 1998) when British colonial officials began the practice of differentiating the peoples of Malaysia along racial lines.

This categorization continues today with Malays, Indians, and Chinese comprising the three main ethnic groups. Of the three, the Malays are often argued to be the country's only indigenous group (even though many Malays originated in Indonesia); they are Muslims and make up nearly 50 percent of the population. Peletz (2002, 58) has argued that British officials in Malaysia actively debated "whether 'to keep the natives native,' 'make them better Muslims,' and/or 'bring them into the modern world.'" At the time of independence, however, the Malays remained largely in rural communities where they were allowed access to very limited educational opportunities and where their "traditional way of life" was reinforced by state policy (Leete 1996, 7).

After independence in 1957, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was instituted to reduce persistent poverty and racial inequality. While the NEP improved certain aspects of village living conditions, it created new class divisions and new gender relations. Women were given a prominent role in improving the circumstances of the family by, among other things, instilling "'progressive' values in their children. This privileging of the mother-child relationship reflected the Western family model while ignoring the central role of the Muslim father" (Ong 1995, 173–4). The unsettling of gender roles in combination with the uncertainties of rapidly changing multiethnic culture, "contributed to a crisis in national identity" (Ong 1995, 174) that may have set the stage for the Islamic resurgence and concurrent attempts at strengthening patriarchal order.

Ambiguities, however, continue to exist, especially as concerns legitimate authority and rule. As is true in Indonesia, for instance, life in Malaysia is governed by a combination of customary law or *adat*, Islamic law, and national statutory law, much of which was introduced by the British colonial authority. The Islamic courts within this legal system have become instrumental in promoting "the projects of modernity that the leaders of Malaysia, and in former times Malaya, have set for themselves and their countrymen" (Peletz 2002, 278). Among the recent reforms achieved by Malaysia's Islamic courts are the democratization of the family and the dilution of "some of the gendered inequalities that obtain in Islamic law . . . In this the courts are, in effect, contributing to the destabilization of one of the most basic fulcrums of Islamic and state-sanctioned inequality" (Peletz 2002, 280).

Again, as in Indonesia, women's groups now play an important role in influencing public policy. Sisters in Islam (SIS Forum Malaysia), for example, was founded in 1989 and is comprised of women of widely diverse backgrounds. Its members embrace Islam as a liberating religion that, at its inception, uplifted the status of women and gave them rights that were considered revolutionary 1,400 years ago – the rights to contract marriage, to divorce, and to inherit and dispose of property. SIS seeks to establish the spirit of gender equality in Malaysian society, asserting that women's human rights are inherent to Islamic religious teachings and that actions taken in the name of Islam to circumscribe those rights are not based on true Islamic principles.

For example, SIS claims a separation between what is divine in Sharīʿa law and what, in the scholarly tradition interpreting it, is of human origin. They examine cultural and religious reinterpretations of women's roles and rights in the family, community, and society; women's legal and citizenship rights; and women's sexual and reproductive roles and rights. By grounding human rights in Islamic cultural traditions and religious teachings, SIS aims to position Malaysia's women's movement in the context of local religious norms, requirements, and laws and contends that women's rights have been distorted to justify patriarchal principles by an increasingly powerful conservative faction of predominantly male Muslims who are influenced by the more parochial views of Islam's Middle Eastern heartlands (Othman 2005).

The Philippines and Thailand

Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand are an important minority and are concentrated in the south of both countries. Their religious and cultural traditions and geographic location separate them somewhat from the majority population and align them on some dimensions more closely with Muslim communities in Indonesia and Malaysia. In the pre-1900 Philippines, Muslim women had little autonomy to make decisions regarding their well-being. With rare exceptions, common women appeared in public only on specific occasions, and were largely relegated to activities involving household maintenance and childcare. The arrival of the Americans brought changes in education and public health policies, and an attempt to incorporate women in social change initiatives. For example, one boarding school favored the assimilation of Muslim girls into the Christian majority. By promoting monogamy to young women, it was thought that the practice of polygamy could be effectively undermined. Behind this intervention was the belief that the government's role was not to bring about religious conversions, but, perhaps

contradictorily, was to unite the country through shared values. In such efforts, Muslims were to become more like their neighbors and women were to play a central role in bringing this plan to fruition (Angeles 1998).

After independence, Muslims were governed by a combination of Islamic law and a national legal code. Scholars then developed what would become Muslim Personal Laws. Women were not involved in this process and many of the provisions that shaped the code were antithetical to women's interests. For example, while women were to be notified in the event a new wife was taken, men were allowed up to four wives. Wives also needed their husband's permission before entering a profession or becoming involved in business. While objections to these provisions could be heard by arbitration boards, women's complaints were often ignored.

Recent legislation has attempted to improve women's rights to seek employment and to accept gifts without seeking permission. While Muslim law protects the status of male family head, the New Family Code and the Women in Development Act aim to allow women equal rights within and outside the household. Obviously the various systems of regulation are frequently at odds and emergent tensions are not always easily resolved (Angeles 1998). Interestingly, Singapore has resolved similar difficulties by allowing Muslims to choose which court to use in cases of domestic dispute, an allowance that has proved to be of benefit to Muslim women (Abinales 2004).

There are a great many parallels between the experiences in Indonesia and Malaysia and those of Muslims in Thailand. Loos (2006) argues that the Bangkok-based Siamese government adopted colonial policies that were in place elsewhere in the region and applied them to the Muslim minority population in the southern provinces. Ever since the border between Siam and British Malaya was drawn (1909) the government has tried to assimilate Muslims, yet conflicts between state and Islamic law persist. Attempts to mandate attendance at state schools, for example, have met with widespread resistance in the south (Houben 2003). Socioeconomic inequality that continues to disadvantage the Muslims in the south contributes to ongoing tensions in Thailand as a whole.

Conclusions

In these four country contexts – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand – a number of common themes emerge. First, colonial experiences helped to shape state policy toward women in general and Muslim women in particular. Second, norms governing public and private behavior have been negotiated through Islamic and secular schools, as well as through civil and Muslim courts, and customary, *adat* practices. Third, local women's movements are playing an increasingly prominent role in policy debates. Such engagement, including efforts by Malaysia's SIS, encourage a discourse among all Muslims in which informed critical reasoning and cultural mediation are used to confront the claim by militant resurgent Islamist forces that their interpretation of Islam is "universal" and the only legitimate view for all Muslims. For Muslim women, particularly those active in struggles for universal human rights, such a claim is open to negotiation and challenge within the internal discourse of contemporary Muslim societies (Othman 2005).

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Shelley Feldman and Lindy Williams

Development: Housing Policies and Projects

North Africa

North African countries still suffer today from an inexorable demographic demand for housing. The increase in population has been accompanied by high rates of urbanization as well as unemployment. Whereas the discourse in the 1960s and 1970s was about the acute shortages of housing, there is a shift today in that it is housing affordability rather than availability that has become a major problem.

In the 1970s and 1980s the public sector played an important role in housing provision, usually maintaining affordable housing through subsidies. This was particularly the case in those countries that were following the economic model of the Soviet Union, such as Algeria and Egypt. Thousands of dwellings were to be built as part of major development plans. In the case of Egypt, the scarcity of agricultural land meant that new urban communities were to be created in the desert (Law No. 59 of 1979) resulting in the creation of twelve new towns. In the case of Algeria, targets of building 100,000 dwellings on a yearly basis were set and resulted in the proliferation of new neighborhoods around major cities.

Mass housing policies in both countries resulted in the spread of five-storey walk-up dwellings. An average size of dwelling (usually a three-roomed apartment) was decided on for an average size of household, ignoring the various socioeconomic backgrounds of their future occupants, their lifestyles, or indeed the local climate. The European apartment was considered the ultimate modern provision and decision-makers assumed that families were to adapt their lifestyles to the new housing form and not vice versa.

The failure of the mass housing dwelling to meet the needs of its future residents became apparent in the type of transformations that were carried out by the occupants. The acute shortage of space resulted in the closure of all forms of private open spaces such as balconies or loggias. Any possible extensions of the dwelling unit were made to alleviate severe overcrowding brought about by the inadequate size of the dwelling (Behloul 1991). Extreme cases of informal transformations of formal housing have been documented in Cairo. The case of Ain Al Sira, a housing estate of 5,000 dwellings built in the late 1950s, illustrates clearly how the distress brought about by overcrowded conditions provoked uncontrolled vertical stack extensions by the inhabitants. Extreme cases of informal extensions of formally provided housing have been studied and documented in the 1980s and the 1990s by Steinberg (1984), Tipple et al. (2000), and Salama (1994)

The changing conditions of the residents over a period of time, as children grow and reach the age of marriage, and the impossibility of housing mobility (mainly because of shortage of affordable housing) result in major alterations to the public housing units. There is a tendency to return to the extended family scenario not by choice but through economic constraints and lack of access to affordable housing.

The worsening living conditions of women because of overcrowded housing, unemployment, and the inability of new couples to afford an apartment have contributed to high stress levels. Furthermore, women, as the primary consumers of shelter, are in a disadvantaged position with respect to acquiring shelter; as they occupy a secondary position in the labor market their earning power is limited. In addition to that, women's employment possibilities are also inhibited by their domestic responsibilities, which in turn decrease their wage-earning capacity.

Women's vulnerability regarding shelter is further aggravated by some of the legislations that have made them more prone to homelessness. This is particularly the case in Algeria where the Algerian Family Code introduced in 1984 has contributed to their marginalization and victimization. A married woman could find herself and her children homeless if her husband decided to divorce her. The Family Code was introduced despite a fierce struggle against it.

Article 52 gives custody of the children to the mother. Daughters are under her custody until their marriage whereas the sons are only under the custody of their mother until they reach the age of ten. If the mother has no guardian after her divorce, her ex-husband must support her if he can. Because divorced women are not entitled to stay in the house of their ex-husband (according to the 1984 Family Code), many of them have ended up on the streets with their children. Furthermore,

a divorcee cannot take her children abroad, and nor may they enrol in certain education courses without her ex-husband's signature.

After 20 years, this code has seen some modifications, the most significant one concerning women's right to shelter. It is now stated that in case of divorce the husband has the responsibility to ensure shelter for the mother of his children, either paying rent or maintaining the family in the original marital home. In terms of inheritance, women are largely disadvantaged and could find themselves homeless as the result of the existing laws.

In all North African countries, housing demand by low-income groups is left to the informal sector and informal settlements are the result of the affordability issue. The proliferation of informal settlements and unserviced peripheral neighborhoods is evident in cities such as Casablanca, Algiers, Tunis (Vigier 1987), and Cairo (El Kadi 1987). The ratio of informal settlements is already very high in Egypt and Tunisia and is on the increase in other North African countries. The shift from socialist to market economies in the case of Algeria and Egypt has further exacerbated the situation. Increasing housing demand combined with low levels of flexibility at which the housing stock is used have resulted in high housing prices and low levels of affordability. The problem is not the quantity of housing production but by whom and for whom housing is produced, as well as how it is produced.

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Magda Sibley

Development: Non-Governmental Organizations

Afghanistan

There has been a proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan since 2001. These organizations have grown exponentially in the process of Afghan reconstruction since 2002, many with the understanding that support for women's issues was the only way to access funding.

The first Institute of Afghan Women was created in 1946 by Queen Homira, wife of Zahir Shah (r. 1933–73). Throughout Afghan history, there have been several periods where strong pushes for women's rights have led to violent backlashes. The state-sponsored organizations that provide the forum for discussions of women's rights are usually viewed as internationally imported and imposed, namely containing Western agendas of aggressive social change and modernization focused on women's rights. Thus, the history of women's rights in Afghanistan is one that is highly contested and remains on delicate ground. Women's NGOs have therefore only recently found their place in Afghan society.

During the Taliban era, a few NGOs remained in Afghanistan to serve women. This was particularly contentious given that the Taliban forbade Afghan women to work in international organizations. Many of the local organizations began in refugee communities in Pakistan, particularly in the border town of Peshawar, and migrated to Afghanistan in late 2001 and early 2002.

In the immediate post-Taliban period, it was clear that Afghan women were the focus of much international attention and the cornerstone of the largest ever gender-focused international aid intervention. This provided the impetus for the proliferation of NGOs of all varieties, many of which were focused on women or had women's components in their work. It was also clear at the time that funding was tied to the ability of these young NGOs to address women's concerns.

There is still much work to be done. Social indicators and statistics focusing on the situation of women in Afghanistan are currently emerging and reveal some of the worst indicators in the world for women. Afghan women face an 85 percent illiteracy rate, a life expectancy of 43 years, and the highest maternal mortality rate in the world. Afghanistan's rank is not at all in line with its neighboring countries but more closely resembles the poorest Sub-Saharan African countries.

To date, there is no central database on women and organizations assisting them, but efforts are underway to provide information that could reduce gaps in service delivery and promote coordination.

While there are hundreds of NGOs focused on women, below is a sample of certain prominent groups:

1. The Afghan Women's Network was established in 1995 by Afghan women participants of the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. In 2005, there were 72 NGOs and 3,000 individual women who were supported through the network.
2. Physiotherapy and Rehabilitation Support for Afghanistan (PARSA) was established in 1996 by Mary MacMakin, an American woman who had lived for 30 years in Afghanistan. PARSA supports widows in Kabul and has gained international repute.
3. The Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) is easily the best-known NGO for women. RAWA was founded by Meena, the legendary martyred leader, in 1977. The exposure of the situation of women in Taliban-occupied Afghanistan was due in no small part to RAWA members, who smuggled video-cameras under burqas to capture tortures of women.

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Lina Abirafeh

Central Asia

One of the main features of the modern development of Central Asia is the increasing rate of women's activity in the public sphere. Civic and

volunteer initiatives of women's non-governmental organizations (WNGOs) make important contributions toward solving actual social problems of these countries. Similar organizations were established and worked during the Soviet period. They were formed "from above" and were financially supported by the state and the Communist Party. They worked under strict supervision. Their function was to implement the state ideology in all spheres of society. Initiative "from below" was impossible.

The post-Soviet situation has differed. The auxiliary resources of NGOs began to form in the difficult period of transition. The first NGOs were established by international groups and were embraced because of the objective necessity for social support and in order to implement reforms in these countries.

Establishment of NGOs (and WNGOs as a part thereof) has had four stages of development:

1. 1991–4. The stage of formation and legal consolidation of local NGOs. A typical particularity of the stage was that all NGOs worked on philanthropical projects and human rights protection. They conducted information disseminating activities. It was a stage of experience accumulation in program management. WNGOs were also formed in this period: in Kazakhstan 20 WNGOs (out of a total of 500 NGOs), and in Kyrgyzstan 17 WNGOs (out of 476 NGOs). NGOs were established only in the cities. This can be explained by the differences of political culture and modes of life in urban and rural areas, where commuity-based organizations (CBOs) are more widespread. This first stage also established the legal base for NGO activities (Tajikistan, Law on Public Organizations, 1990; Kyrgyzstan, Law on Public Unions, 1991).
2. 1994–7. The stage of spirited expansion of NGOs. The NGOs' activities spread in several directions. Foundations and centers predominated as judicial forms. Some rural NGOs were established in this period as well. Thanks to financial support of the international foundations, there was an increase in the number of NGOs. New countries joined the legal process of recognizing NGOs: Uzbekistan adopted the Decree of the President, "On women's role strengthening in society" (3 March 1995), which provided opportunities for the establishment of WNGOs in that republic.
3. 1997–2000. A process of selection was set in motion in this period. NGOs became differentiated into strong, stable, and weak or unstable formations. Many united into centers and associations. For example, the association Ayol was formed in Tajikistan in 1999 and an association of NGOs was established in Kyrgyzstan in 1998. Some countries adopted new laws (Law on Non-Commercial Organizations, Kyrgyzstan 1999; Law on Public Organizations, Tajikistan 1998). Uzbekistan's NGO activity was legalized for the first time (Law on Non-Governmental, Non-Commercial Organizations, Uzbekistan, 14 April 1999).
4. 2001 to the present. NGO activities became totally accepted by governments. NGOs arranged the first interactions with government and other institutions of civic society. As first steps of collaboration, NGOs began to include government programs of development as equal partners regarding social problems.

By 2005, the numbers of WNGOs were Kyrgyzstan 236, Kazahstan 171, Tajikistan 145, Uzbekistan 41, and Turkmenistan 31. The majority of initiators and members of NGOs are women. Women are heads of 75 percent of Uzbekistan's NGOs and 49.6 percent of Kyrgyzstan's NGOs. Of NGOs formed in Kyrgyzstan, 20 percent have been sustainable; all of them are headed by women.

WNGOs' activities differ in each country of the region. They stipulate various levels of development. But WNGOs' main goals are the realization of equal rights and opportunities for women; the improvement of women's status in family and society; and assisting women's adaptation to new socioeconomic conditions.

WNGOs have a characteristically active desire for building partner relations with governments. Many of them carry out various projects through collaboration with local governments and structures. Among them are the Association of Business Women, Olimo, the Women's Resource Center, the Institute of Women and Society, Sabo, and Mehri (Uzbekistan); Diamond, the Center for Women's Support, Shans, and Sezim (Kyrgyzstan); Perzent (Karakalpakstan); Chasmo, Ayol, and the Association of Educated Women (Tajikistan); and Moldir and the Center for Single Women (Kazakhstan). All participate in collaborative projects in realization of state programs.

Special institutions for gender issues and state programs for the support of women have been formed. These include the Year of Women (1996), the National Program Ayalzat (1996), and the State Committee on Family Issues and Gender Development (1996, Kyrgyzstan); the Committee on Women and Family Issues (1991, Tajikistan); the National Committee on Gender and Family Issues

under the President (1998, Kazakhstan); and the official division of Uzbek Oliy Majlis (1998, Uzbekistan).

WNGOs have different legal statuses (foundations, organizations, centers, etc.). They work in all regions and in different directions on actual problems faced by women. Some of the next directions prioritized are:

1. Human (women's) rights protection (juridical help, education service, and the like).
2. Support for women's social-cultural initiatives and business.
3. Maternity and childhood protection.
4. Crisis and adaptation centers for women who have suffered from violence, and for the disabled.
5. Informational, research, and editorial programs on issues of democracy and gender.
6. Training programs on health protection in family relations, family planning, and reproductive health.
7. Gender expertise in law and lobbying practices. For example, WNGOs campaigned for legal adoption of social-judicial bases of family violence protection (2004) and changes in the family, labor, and criminal codes of Kyrgyzstan.
8. Realization of international projects. For example, the First Forum, "Women of Central Asia for Peace and Stability" (Hudjant, Tajikistan 2002), where problems of cultural relations and the role of women in interethnic conflict resolution were discussed; WNGO Irshod (Tajikistan); Omur Bulagi (Osh, Kyrgyzstan); Center of Women's Initiatives (Osh, Kyrgyzstan) realizing the project "The Role of Women in Interethnic Conflict Prevention; the project "South in Danger" supported by Foundation Soros Kyrgyzstan (1998); and International Action "18 Days for Rights of Women to Live without Violence," with the participation of WNGOs of all Central Asian countries and Belarus, Moldova, Latvia, and Azerbaijan (2001).

Besides WNGOs, there are some NGOs that do not have strong gender direction but take part in support of women's programs. Central Asian WNGOs have been activated by the support of the international community during recent years. One of the early signs of new social relations is the formation of women's movements. WNGOs have developed new methods of work on the basis of concrete problems of social groups. They have demonstrated themselves to be flexible and independent.

In spite of such progress, the activities of WNGOs face some serious problems:

1. Only a small number of WNGOs have sustainable long-term projects and serious strategic plans. Others only engage in short-term projects.
2. There are difficulties in interactions between WNGOs and state structures.
3. The majority of donors do not have serious plans for institutionalization of NGOs.
4. There is a low level of political culture of the population, reflected in the difficulties in human rights protection and rights of citizens in electoral activities.
5. Activities of WNGOs are little reflected in the mass media. The mass media have more influence on the consciousness of population than the hard work of WNGOs. In the majority of cases, the mass media propagate and strengthen traditional values. WNGOs' attempts have been directed to fixing skills and remaking these values. WNGOs and the mass media are often at cross purposes.

Evaluating the role of WNGOs in the region, it is possible to say that they have became part of public life. While WNGOs have increased women's participation in all countries of the region, they have not turned into public movements.

Of course, there are differences among countries. The level of activities and achievements of WNGOs vary in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The different characters of the political regimes of these countries cannot be ignored.

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[all items are in Russian]

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Sairagul Matikeyeva

Eastern Europe

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Eastern Europe are a relatively new phenomenon, appearing only after the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the countries and regions where there are significant Muslim populations: Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Albania. NGOs that focus on women's or gender issues arose at roughly the same time, although resources to these organizations did not really begin to flourish until after the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 (Tisheva 2000). It was in Beijing that the international feminist organizations discovered the hardships of the women in the Eastern European region, and when activism in the region began in earnest. Furthermore, the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo also encouraged the formation of many grassroots women's organizations to respond to the pressing humanitarian needs of war victims and refugees.

These countries were a part of the Eastern Bloc for a period of at least four decades, and independent organizations were not allowed outside the official umbrella of the Communist Party. Although each country had some form of mass women's organization, these organizations were controlled by the state and their primary goals were to build classless societies by creating a united proletariat with no distinct ethnic, religious, or gender differences dividing individual workers from one another (Ghodsee 2004). After the end of the Communist period, new organizations – primarily funded by Western governments and foundations – began to appear (Wedel 2001). These new NGOs explicitly represented the interests of ethnic and religious minorities as well as those of women in newly democratizing states. Funding for these organizations circumvented national governments and went directly into the hands of educated locals eager to build a "civil society."

Islamic communities in Eastern Europe are quite heterogeneous, and so are the types of NGOs created to serve Muslim women in the region. Throughout the region there are Slavic Muslims, Turkish Muslims, Albanian Muslims, "Bosniaks" (i.e. Muslim Bosnians), and Muslims among the Roma communities. Even within these communities there is considerable diversity between those who are devout and "secular" Muslims. Furthermore, whereas Muslims are a majority in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, they are minority populations in Macedonia and Bulgaria. Cooperation between Christian and Muslim women has not always been successful, even in the so-called "civil society" arena. Thus, women from among these different communities may be more loyal to their ethnic identities than to their identities as women or Muslims, making it very difficult for women's NGOs to service the needs of all women (or even all Muslim women) in the country.

In Bosnia and Kosovo, the primary focus of most women's organizations has been to deal with the crises brought about by the violent break-up of the former Yugoslavia (Einhorn and Sever 2003). Women's organizations have been set up to deal with rape victims, refugees, those in need of medical care and those suffering from the psychological trauma caused by war. Women's organizations have also been charged with many postwar reconstruction efforts, in particular ethnic reconciliation and refugee return. Medica Zenica is one of the best-known women's organizations in Bosnia. Some

scholars have argued that foreign donors have relied too heavily on women's NGOs, and have constructed women in these countries as "natural" peacemakers (Helms 2003). This had the effect of marginalizing them from real political power. However, Helms also found that women in Bosnia have been able to use these "affirmative essentialisms" to gain moral authority in countries where politics is seen to be a corrupt male sphere, and have been able to gain indirect power to create social and political change.

In Macedonia, the types of women's organization range quite broadly, although they are also primarily concerned with fostering ethnic harmony between the Macedonian Slav and Albanian populations. There are two types of women's organization: umbrella organizations with large memberships and multiple subsidiary organizations and smaller organizations that deal with particular issues (Tisheva 2000). The Organization of Women of Macedonia (OWM) and the Union of the Organizations of Women of Macedonia (UOWM) are examples of the first type. Examples of smaller organizations include Open Door 1, which is focused on supporting the Albanian women refugees from Kosovo and the Union of Albanian Women in Macedonia (UAWM), which works to support Albanian women by increasing their access to health care and education.

In Albania, women's organizations are also quite varied, dealing with legal issues, trafficking in women, domestic violence, and supporting women's human rights. One exceptional example is the Women's Legal Group, a coalition of twelve women's organizations, which was formed in the fall of 1994 as an advocacy group to analyze proposed and existing legislation that affects Albanian women and make recommendations for change to the Albanian parliament. Because Albania has largely avoided ethnic violence, resources for the formation of women's organizations have been scantier than they have been in countries of the former Yugoslavia, and therefore civil society groups, support for women and gender issues are not as well developed (Macguire 1998).

Although Bulgarian women's organizations have also been underfunded compared to their Yugoslav neighbors, the number of women's organizations in the country has flourished. Bulgarian women's NGOs tend to focus on issues such as trafficking in women, domestic violence, child abuse, increasing women's political participation, and ensuring legal equality by actively lobbying the parliament on issues of concern to women. Some of the most prominent women's NGOs in Bulgaria include the Women's Alliance for Development, the Bulgarian Gender Research Foundation, the Animus Association, and the Nadia Center.

One characteristic that united most of the women's organizations in Eastern Europe throughout the 1990s was their heavy reliance on foreign money and their lack of accountability to local populations. This has often meant that the agendas and projects pursued by women's NGOs are determined by their foreign donors and do not arise from local concerns. In some cases, this has meant the women's NGOs in this region tended to focus on non-political issues such as domestic violence and sexual harassment, rather than on unemployment, health care or education – issues that are of primary concern to women in the individual countries. When NGOs were able to deal with these issues, it was only as service providers of the last resort. Women's NGOs often provided social services in the place of national governments whose fiscal budgets were squeezed by the economic austerity of the transition period, and the strict structural adjustment and stabilization policies of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This has led some scholars to accuse women's NGOs of being complicit with a neoliberal economic agenda by justifying the destruction of social safety nets by agreeing to provide services at the so-called "grassroots" level (Ghodsee 2004, 2005, Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). Thus, community-based health clinics or hospices largely staffed by women volunteers allow governments with IMF-imposed fiscal constraints to transfer costs from the public budget into the non-profit sector. Another example is when government-funded hospitals increase the number of clinical outpatient surgical procedures in order to cut recovery care costs. This saves money for nationalized health care systems, but the labor required to care for recuperating patients is transferred primarily to women as additional unpaid work in the home. Despite these criticisms, however, women's NGOs have been important in making sure that women's issues are kept on the national agendas of these countries, and will continue to play a significant role in shaping the discourses of feminism for years to come.

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Kristen Ghodsee

The Gulf

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as defined by the World Bank, are "groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of governments and characterized by humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives . . . private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, or undertake community development" (quoted in Abdelrahman 2004, 41–2). The focus in this entry is on the relationships between women, gender, and NGOs in the Gulf.

Since the 1960s and 1970s, the growth in oil wealth has spurred urbanization and development in the Gulf Coast countries. Women's education has dramatically increased, they have slowly entered the labor force, and some have become involved in NGOs. Many of the NGOs are "establishment women's organizations" and are found in nearly all of the Gulf. They are state controlled and run by female members of the elite, merchant, or ruling royal families (Peterson 1989). The United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85) encouraged the formation and support of national women's organizations, including those in the Middle East, as governments were urged to send delegates to the United Nations world conferences on women (Taraki 2000).

Most establishment women's NGOs focus on providing charity and are concerned with the welfare of women and children. They work closely with the Gulf governments (through the ministries of social affairs) distributing donations to the poor, establishing housing for women without familial support, daycare centers, and centers for disabled children, and offering vocational (mostly in handicrafts), literacy, hygienic, and domestic training (Pharaon 2004, Salloum 2003, al-Mughni 2001, Yamani 2000, Chatty and Rabo 1997, Peterson 1989). In Saudi Arabia and Oman, women can only form charity organizations; other types of associations are prohibited by law (Pharaon 2004, Chatty and Rabo 1997).

The 1980s and 1990s also saw the growth of semi-independent women's groups, predominantly professional women's organizations and human rights groups throughout the Middle East. These organizations have focused on political and legal reform, social policy and employment, reproductive health and population policy, domestic violence, and other gender-related issues (Taraki 2000, Moghadam 1998). In Kuwait and Bahrain, urban upper- and middle-class women have formed professional associations, sports clubs, and women's societies, which advocate for women's education and health, access to employment, legal reform, and rights to political participation. However, these groups have been unsuccessful in their attempts to change the personal status laws. Even though they have had some success in educational programs, providing daycare and increasing women's health awareness, these groups have failed to achieve a broad base of support, particularly among the lower classes, Beduins, and rural women (Rizzo 2005, al-Mughni 2001, Seikaly 1997).

Finally, there are a growing number of women's NGOs associated with the Islamist movement in the Middle East. While many focus on charity and religious activity (Moghadam 1993), a few espouse an "Islamic feminist" agenda. Even though these "feminists" do not publicly challenge the Islamist ideal of a "good Muslim woman as wife and mother," they indirectly defy this ideal by their lifestyles, high levels of education, professional occupations, and growing visibility in the public arena (Taraki 2000). In Saudi Arabia, even though the movement does not as yet have a clear political agenda, the leading members are professionals in universities and banks and are using an Islamic discourse to question women's limited access to employment, despite growing educational opportunities, and to justify a more public role for women (Yamani 2000). In Kuwait and Bahrain, some Sunnī but particularly Shīʿī female Islamists are lobbying for an active public role for women in education, employment, and religious institutions (Rizzo 2005, al-Mughni 2001, Seikaly 1997). The Kuwaiti activists vehemently justify the need for women's political rights and participation using Islamic principles (Rizzo 2005, al-Mughni 2001).

The potential and limits of NGOs for women's rights, democratization, and development, particularly in the Middle East, have been debated

extensively in the scholarly literature (for fuller discussions see Adelrahman 2004, Carapico 2000, Moghadam 1998). Women's NGOs in the Gulf face constraints because they are not grassroots movements and many are still state-dominated charity organizations. These associations have nevertheless questioned traditional women's roles in Gulf society (Peterson 1989). Given the historic exclusion of women from the public sphere, the mere existence of women's NGOs in the Gulf and the Middle East challenges the patriarchal social structure (Moghadam 1998).

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Helen Mary Rizzo

Iran

Drawing on the Iranian and Islamic traditions of charity work, civil organizations in Iran fall roughly into two groups. The first group, community-based organizations (CBOs), tend to be religiously based and focus on service delivery, health issues, and education. They have strong roots in the communities they serve and are primarily funded by local donations. CBOs provide a number of direct services to women, including legal counsel for women seeking divorce.

A second group of civil organizations more closely resemble non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the conventional sense. Although a small number of palace-initiated NGOs were created during the Pahlavī regime, for the most part NGOs are recent phenomena in Iran, inspired by Iranian participation in United Nations (UN) sponsored conferences in the 1980s and 1990s. Many NGOs were set up by government officials who participated in these UN conferences and who witnessed firsthand how NGOs in other countries addressed social problems. Since the 1979 Revolution, much NGO funding has come from the Iranian government rather than private or foreign sources. This has led to the criticism that Iranian NGOs are not actually NGOs at all, because of their dependence on governmental grants. However, NGOs with close ties to government officials and agencies have ironically enjoyed a greater level of independence than those receiving significant foreign aid: they are less prone to illicit government scrutiny, which in turn makes them well situated to address more sensitive issues, such as domestic violence. In addition, they act as a bridge for dialogue between civil society and the government.

Women's NGOs, those initiated or led by women, are particularly strong in contemporary Iran. In contrast to CBOs, which tend to be led by men, NGOs provide a space where women have been able to hold leadership roles. There are an impressive number of advisory roles for women in federal and provincial government; however, in the NGO community women have also become important decision-makers.

NGOs in Iran focus on a range of activities important to women. They provide direct services to women: daycare, job training, health care, financial assistance, and legal advice. NGOs also conduct research and educational outreach, raising awareness about issues ranging from sexuality and hygiene to family planning and domestic violence. Finally, although NGOs in Iran do not engage in direct partisan politics per se, they do lobby for legal reforms and support female candidates for elected office.

NGOs can themselves be broken down into two groups. One group focuses primarily on research and education. Their goal is to influence government policy and educate civic leaders about a range of development issues. For example, the Institute of Women's Studies and Research (IWSR) has established women's studies courses in Iranian universities, and provides training courses for heads of NGOs and governmental officials. The exclusive

research focus of organizations like the IWSR affords them more freedom to address contentious issues, such as prostitution and domestic violence. Research NGOs have been criticized by some within Iranian civil society as too narrowly focused on issues important to the intellectual elite.

A second type of NGO aims to be more responsive to a particular need in society, whether health education in a poor rural community or the issues facing Iranian youth. These NGOs understand themselves as offering services that CBOs have not undertaken or will not provide, either because these services are contentious, given Islamic teachings, or particularly contemporary and thereby neglected by traditional CBOs. One example of such a grassroots NGO is Green Spring of Hope, started by a group of female law students to provide services for young girls, including sex education and lessons in oral hygiene.

Despite government efforts to support NGOs, a protracted registration process is still required. An NGO must register with the relevant ministry of its issue area and the ministry of the interior in order to operate legally. There have been reports of long delays in this process. NGO employees are also subject to background checks by Iranian intelligence services. The exact number of women's NGOs in Iran is difficult to assess in the absence of a reliable NGO databank; however, some estimates put the total number of NGOs at over 7,000 and (with only a small percentage of these being registered) and the number of CBOs at well above 5,000.

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Elizabeth M. Bucar

Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria

Women in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine have formed non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and worked in them since the beginning of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century, these women were generally urban-based upper- and middle-class educated women who aimed to contribute to solving social, economic, and political problems present in their societies. Some of the organizations that they formed started out as charitable in nature. Supporting poorer segments of the population, some aimed to raise awareness of women, some supported nationalist movements, while others were interested in advocacy of women's rights, which were being affected by the women's movement in Egypt. In the 1940s and 1950s and onwards, as a result of political independence and the creation of the State of Israel, some of these organizations turned to relief of Palestinian refugees. Other organizations, especially those aligned with nationalist movements and political parties, formed a part of the women's movement and aimed to mobilize women, reaching out to larger numbers of women in rural and urban areas and advocating women's political rights, despite giving priority to nationalist causes over women's issues. During this phase the class background of these women started to become more diversified and to include more middle-class women.

From the 1970s and onwards, there was an increase in the number of these organizations and a shift in their nature to what are currently known as NGOs. This change resulted from neglect by the state to provide social and health services, the organizations' shift toward development and empowerment, their receipt of funding from international agencies, and their aim to distance themselves from their governments. They were influenced as well by the global change in the agenda of the women's movement, which aimed to transform gender relations in society. The Cairo and Beijing population conferences (1994 and 1995) played a critical role in this expansion and led to the creation of advocacy organizations for women's rights and research and policy studies on gender issues. Parallel to this phenomenon, religious parties and sects also established women's associations, which focused on spreading religious values emphasizing the role of the family and the role of women in its preservation.

Royal charitable organizations established for assisting women have been active in Jordan since the 1940s (for example the Jordanian Women's Union). Charitable societies were established by both Jordanian and Palestinian women from the upper and middle class following the arrival of Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967 as a way to reduce their ordeal. The period between 1967 and 1989 witnessed the intensification of structural adjustment programs in Jordan and led to de-escalation in the creation of charitable societies because of legal restrictions. The liberalization

policies of 1989 and onwards led to the creation of NGOs that differed from the previous generation and worked in new areas such as human and women's rights and encouraging women's participation in political life. Royal NGOs, especially those led by female royal members, have continued and also expanded and established several community development offices (for example, the Jordan River Foundation). NGOs focused as well on domestic violence, health education, environmental issues, and rural development. Coalitions were formed to unify women's efforts regarding policy formulation, raising the awareness of the public of women's issues, and lobbying for changing laws, especially regarding honor crimes. Professional women's associations were created during the 1990s as a way of encouraging the participation of women in the economy. Islamist NGOs, which include women's associations, have expanded while focusing on spreading traditional values in addition to solving social problems facing young men and women (for example Al-Afaf).

Similarly, in Lebanon charitable societies were established by urban elite women at the beginning of the twentieth century for philanthropic and humanitarian purposes. Some of these organizations had sectarian or familial bases. During the 1950s, coalitions of women's associations were established, which crossed regional, ideological, and confessional backgrounds and which were urban or rural based. During the civil war (1975–90), women's associations multiplied to fill the gap created by the absence of governmental services and to help the displaced, orphans, disabled, and widows. The rehabilitation efforts following the war slightly slowed the growth of NGOs despite their previous successes. Sectarian NGOs have existed historically in Lebanon but multiplied during the war to provide services for the displaced, orphans, and the poor, with many families being female-headed (for example the Imam el Sadr Foundation). During the 1990s, NGOs focused on integrated development approaches, rural women (for example the Women's Association of Deir El Ahmar), microcredit, human rights, and empowerment of women (for example the Lebanese Association for Human Rights), rehabilitation of addicted young people, and lobbying for civil marriages. Lebanon has been the base for regional NGOs coordinating for combating violence against women, and policy studies on women's issues.

In Palestine, women established charitable societies from the beginning of the twentieth century (for example the Arab Women's Association). Their goals were social, economic, and political, such as the support of poorer segments of society and participation in the nationalist movement. Following the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians, these organizations expanded to support disadvantaged Palestinians. With the rise of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Palestinian national movement, women's unions (for example the General Union of Palestinian Women) were established inside and outside the Palestinian areas. Following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in the 1970s a grassroots movement emerged to strengthen the community's steadfastness against the Israeli occupation and included a women's movement seeking social development. This movement resulted in the creation of women's committees affiliated with most political parties (for example Women's Work Committees) that became dynamic during the first intifada (1987–93). The programs of these NGOs focused on women's development, health, education, and skill development. In the meantime, several religious charitable organizations were established to help the injured, families of martyrs, and female-headed households. The Madrid peace conference led to the emergence of women' technical committees, which were formed as a coalition of women representatives of different political parties to represent the needs of women (for example Women's Affairs Technical Committees). The Oslo Agreement (1993) led to the professionalization of the women's committees formed in earlier phases and the emergence of women's research centers that stressed advocacy of women's rights, support for rural women, training and development, income generation, and microcredit. The second intifada (2000 to the present) led to less emphasis on community development and women's issues following militarization of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Islamic associations continued to be active while having special programs targeting women's education and training (for example the Islamic Association).

Charitable organizations in Syria go back to the nineteenth century; they were established to alleviate the suffering of orphans, to support the needy and widows, and to educate women (for example the Light of Damascus). Women's organizations were established as part of the nationalist movement in coordination with women from different Arab countries. This trend continued after independence in 1949 when these organizations focused on health services, the elderly, the disabled, widows, and women's programs, such as resistance to violence. Associations dealing with

women were merged to form larger unions that were incorporated within the ruling Baʿth political party (for example the Syrian Women's Federation). From 2000 onwards, professional NGOs were encouraged by the new president and his wife, especially the ones focusing on women and development (for example Firdos). These NGOs were active in the areas of rural development, income generation, education and training, environmental issues, women in business, child protection, and disabled people. Several of these NGOs cooperate with the government and with development agencies in implementing these programs.

Women in Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria have been active in creating organizations that served the public good, empowered other women, supported nationalist movements, and developed their societies since the turn of the twentieth century, witnessing large expansion from the 1970s and onwards. The space given to these organizations depended on many factors, such as the presence of colonialism, type of political regime, sectarian conflicts and the power of sectarian leadership, and the intervention of international donor agencies. The relationship between the expansion of NGOs and their impact on the women's movement has been debated because of the issue-oriented nature of NGOs, their professionalization, and their strict organizational forms.

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Salma Aown Shawa

South Asia

Introduction

While regardless of class, caste, ethnicity, and religion, South Asian women face unequal access to property and decision-making roles within family, community, and state levels, the nature and extent of disadvantages usually differ by socioeconomic class and level of education (HDSA 2000, 77).

This entry presents some country case studies that will demonstrate that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have partly succeeded in raising awareness about the oppressive structures that women have to face at various levels. However, this success has been quite limited, especially because NGOs have failed to mount a direct challenge to the existence of gender hierarchies and inequities that have become institutionally entrenched in society. The situation is aggravated by the prevalence of widespread poverty, which is itself perpetuated by the limitations on the full participation of women in socioeconomic spheres. The relative absence of South Asian women's access to formal schooling and health care aggravates the situation even further.

It is also important to point out that many policies of NGOs that are assumed to be gender-neutral are in fact gender-blind, and thereby gender-inequitable despite their public commitments to uphold women's rights.

Bangladesh

Immediately after independence in 1971, the state-initiated focus on women was rehabilitative rather than proactive. Most efforts went to rehabilitate the women who faced "dishonor" at the hands of the occupying Pakistani Army. However, the subsequent development plans emphasized both economic and political empowerment of women. In particular, the Fourth Five Year Plan (1990–5) introduced such terms as "mainstream" and "gender," and adopted the Women in Development (WID) policy. Although the WID approach partly addressed some of the important aspects of discrimination faced by women, it failed to challenge the prevailing socioeconomic and

political structures within the framework of which such discrimination was embedded. Consequently, overall empowerment of women was quite insignificant, especially while discrimination against women within the family remained almost totally unchallenged.

In 1997, a more comprehensive approach was adopted through the National Development Policy for the Advancement of Women and the Fifth Five Year Plan for 1997–2002. For the first time, the need to eliminate all discriminatory laws, rules, regulations, and practices governing the family, social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of life was emphasized. Institutionalized approaches by both public bodies and civil society organizations were adopted, involving such groups as the National Women's Council, the Jatiyo Mohila Shongstha (JMS), the Ministry of Women's and Children's Affairs, and WID Focal Points.

In Bangladesh, matters of family law of the majority Bengali community fall under the jurisdiction of the family court, while personal laws of the indigenous or "tribal" people are generally regulated by customary law and indigenous institutions (Halim 2004, 71). The movement in South Asia to develop a uniform family code for all peoples and communities has gained considerable support from major secular groups but is sometimes viewed with suspicion by indigenous communities that fear assimilation of their distinct ethnic and religious identities (HDSA 2000, 77, Halim 2003, 72–3). The absence of consensus among women activists themselves discourages governments to carry on with the commitments in terms of legal reform.

Bangladesh has numerous criminal laws aimed at the prevention of violence against women and children, but crimes involving violence against women and children have continued to rise over the years (Halim 2004, 104). A number of microcredit oriented institutions, such as Grameen Bank, BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), and Proshika, have sought to address the issue of women's empowerment by integrating it into their poverty reduction programs. However, in the face of the largely unchallenged social barriers, overall success has been limited at best. On the other hand, some NGOs, for example Nijera Kori, Samata, the Society for Environment and Human Development, and Taungya (an indigenous NGO), have adopted a more rights-based approach, focusing more on land rights and environment. In addition, a number of Islamic NGOs are also providing welfare-oriented programs for women (AMWAB 2003), but the impact of such NGOs has been piecemeal and limited.

A few NGOs and research-based organizations such as Ain-O-Salish Kendra, Women for Women, Nijera Kori, Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust, Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association, Naripokkho, and Bangladesh Mohila Parishad emphasize strengthening women's position in the family and at the workplace by addressing such issues as legal rights, domestic violence, trafficking of women and children, and acid throwing, among others.

Bhutan

All South Asian countries except Bhutan maintain constitutional provisions guaranteeing equal rights to women. In Bhutan, 85 percent of the population follow matrilineal traditions, giving women some advantages with regard to ownership of land and livestock. This, has not, however, given them high socioeconomic and political status. The Marriage Act, as amended in 1996, acknowledges child custody rights of divorced mothers, while maintenance responsibilities remain with the father (HDSA 2000, 45). Participation by women in national life is almost nil. The government has made no efforts to protect and promote women's rights even though it has ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The National Women's Association of Bhutan has been active since 1981 and encourages women to improve their living standards and socioeconomic status.

India

Women's involvement in various people's movements in India dates back to the early twentieth century. The Women's India Association, the National Council of Indian Women, and the All India Women's Conference were all engaged in eradicating social problems of women. The 1970s brought women into mass movements in large numbers, although the issues of women's oppression differed from case to case. The Chipko movement, organized by the Garwal women – who stopped the felling of trees for commercial purposes – is among the most successful women's movements. A very important women's organization, the Self-Employed Women's Association, emerged during this period (Sen 2004, 188–97). Various institutional mechanisms in India that are now working for the advancement of women are the result of all these efforts. Of these, the prominent ones are the Sub-Plan for Women in 9th Plan and the National Policy for the Empowerment of Women (NPEW 2001), which incorporate all

major issues that the women's movement in India has engaged in over the past two decades. The Department of Women and Child Development and the Women's Bureau are currently undertaking a review of laws that discriminate against women. Feminists argue that microcredit programs may help women, but others argue that such programs cannot effectively challenge macroeconomic policies that affect women's development (Chaudhuri 2004, xxxvii–xxxviii). The All India Coordinating Forum of the Adivasi/Indigenous Peoples (AICAIP) was established as a forum for Adivasi/indigenous people's movements all over India. Its objective is to strengthen the process of building solidarity and alliances amongst struggle-oriented indigenous people's organizations. AICAIP aims to identify shared issues and problems, to generate debate on these issues, and to provide support to help deal with them. Majlis is another minority organization working as a legal and cultural resource center in the area of women and minority rights. Majlis is also involved in research and documentation on issues concerning women. The mission of the Centre for Health Education, Training and Nutrition Awareness is to contribute toward the empowerment of disadvantaged women and children to enable them to gain control over their own, their families', and their communities' health.

Maldives

A systematic effort toward addressing women's empowerment in the Maldives dates back over 20 years. Concern for the welfare of women is evident in the introduction and implementation of programs organized through women's networks to address social and economic issues relating to women in the country. Women's favorable situation is reflected in positive rankings in the Gender-related Development Index. Maldivian women have always kept their own name after marriage, may remarry, inherit property, and mix relatively freely with men. However, several factors, including the somewhat patriarchal nature of society, and development processes that favored men's entry into the modernizing sector, have restricted the development of women on a par with men. A number of measures have been taken by women's organizations during the past decade to address gender issues in the country. The passing of the Family Law Act by the People's Majlis in December 2000 is a milestone, setting a minimum age for marriage (18 years), and also somewhat restricting men's right to enter into polygynous relationships. As part of its efforts toward gender mainstreaming, the Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Security (MWASS) has been advocating for the greater participation of women at political and other decision-making levels. Advocacy has focused on improving the representation of women at policy levels in the government as well as in public office (http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/5appc/doc/Maldives_country_report.doc).

Nepal

The Nepali women's movement is rooted in the long history of women's struggle against monarchy and feudal structures. There are NGOs such as Didibahini, Asmita, Maiti Nepal, the Women's Foundation, and the Lutheran World Federation, among others, which are working for the rights of women, economic development, social justice, and preventing trafficking (<www.peace.women.org/context/asia/nepal/hp_index.html>).

In 1995, the Nepali government formulated a plan to collaborate with NGOs for poverty reduction and ensuring better health care services. In spite of this intervention, discrimination against women persists within the criminal justice system, and in property laws and laws relating to citizenship, marriage/divorce, tenancy, adoption, rape, and trafficking. The National Women's Commission has been set up, but has been criticized for not taking up women's issues more forcefully and for remaining silent, thereby giving the impression that the situation of women has improved. Indigenous Nepalese women do not see their issues and concerns being incorporated in this commission (HAIWES 2004, 31–2).

Pakistan

According to virtually every socioeconomic indicator, women in Pakistan fare worse than their South Asian counterparts elsewhere. The disadvantaged situation of women in Pakistan is based upon a combination of low income/development levels, disparities between rural and urban opportunities, and high instances of discriminatory tribal customs and practice of feudalistic social systems and controversial laws.

Two constitutional bodies, the Council of Islamic Judiciaries and the Federal Sharia Court, guarantee women's constitutional rights in Pakistan. Women-specific provisions in the constitution usually highlight a protective approach to women's rights. Such a conceptual framework of "protection" can quite often be harmful toward women because it reinforces social perceptions of women as being subordinate to men, and incapable of looking after themselves, as in the case of children (HDSA 2000, 78).

The vision and mission of the government-sponsored program differ from that of civil society-based women's organizations, which adhere to an empowerment approach rather than welfare based programs. The programs of the Government of Pakistan, for example those of the Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, extend credit to women. The Family Planning Association of Pakistan, the All Pakistan Women's Association, and the Aga Khan Rural Support Foundation have been instrumental in bringing changes in raising the education status of women. However, these organizations do not challenge the sociocultural and legal subordination encountered by Pakistani women (World Bank 1989, 165–84).

In contrast, certain NGOs are challenging the prevailing sociocultural barriers and focusing on women's empowerment and following a gender and development approach. Aurat is a civil society organization formed in 1986 committed to women's empowerment in the context of women's participation in governance at all levels through their greater control over knowledge, resources, and institutions. Shirkat Gah (Women's Resource Center) aims to increase women's autonomy, and works to change policies and attitudes toward women. The Women Empowerment, Literacy and Development Organization is an NGO working for every woman in Pakistan who is violated in any way that harms her self respect, dignity, equal rights as a human being, or well-being, or who is discriminated against in any field of life on the basis of gender. Women's Awareness for Networking and Development is working for gender equality irrespective of religion, race, or status. Aagahi (Intelligence) is an independent NGO struggling for gender equality. Aagahi is dedicated to the promotion of socioeconomic development among the disadvantaged strata of society by utilization of local resources with optimum community participation (http://www.net-ngo.com).

Sri Lanka

NGOs in Sri Lanka play a crucial role in challenging citizenship laws and personal laws of communities that discriminate against women with regard to property rights, divorce, and marriage. Kantha Handa (Voice of Women), formed in 1978, was the first alternative women's group in Sri Lanka committed to the ideals of feminism. This organization campaigned for the economic, political, social, and legal rights of women in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan Women's NGO Forum (1998) initiated a national media campaign to promote women's political empowerment (HDSA 2000, 50). The Sri Lanka Women's NGO Forum's main objectives are to function as a lobbying and advocacy body on women's concerns at regional, national, and international levels and to popularize the Beijing Platform for Action, in particular raising awareness on women's issues and rights in Sri Lanka (<www.cenwor.lk/slwomenngoforum.html>).

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Sadeka Halim

Turkey

Women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engage in undertakings related to public issues such as education, health, politics, and culture. They vary in legal and fiscal organization and seek funding according to their legal status (Çızakça 2000). Today, there are 90,000 associations and 5,000 foundations in Turkey. Foundations existed in the Ottoman Empire and a variety of associations were established in modern Turkey. The earthquakes of 1999 had a great influence on the formation of NGOs.

The history of women's NGOs can be found as early as 1908 in the Ottoman period (Çakır 1994). For example, in 1919 the Anatolian Women's Protection of Motherland was established. The Union of Turkish Women – which began as a political party in 1924 – changed its status and became an effective organ for women's rights.

The number of women's NGOs increased in the period between 1950 and 1970, although their policies did not empower women individually. Rather, they organized activities for social help and social service. The 1980s mark the most political period in Turkey and the period between 1970 and

1980 can be characterized as the political period of the women's movement (Tekeli 1990). More often than not the women's organizations established in this period were allied with the leftist parties (Özbudun 1994). When women boldly raised their voices after the 1980s, they adopted a feminist perspective that emphasized their own bodies, their work, and identity. Many of the women's NGOs established in this period questioned the patriarchy and the unbalanced social life among men and women. One of the important associations was the İlerici Kadın Derneği (Progressive Women's Association), which was active between 1975 and 1980. The issue of working women was central for the association, although it was oriented to the political struggle and women's problems (Akal Aslan 2001).

Domestic violence assumed greater importance in the women's NGO agenda in the 1980s and 1990s (Nazik Işık 2002) and both the number and the scope of women's initiatives enlarged, including working groups, platforms, initiative forums, and centers working independently or established at the universities. These undertakings specialized in women's human rights, women in politics, women's health, and women in the workplace.

In the 1990s, identity politics emerged in Turkey and women's organizations were profoundly marked by ethnic identity. Also in the 1990s, Kurdish women, who were not even on the map of feminism in Turkey, became recognized. For example, Jiyan (Life), established in 1997, aims at bringing Kurdish women together, assisting them to take part in politics as Kurdish women, in addition to offering counseling for their problems.

In the 1990s, in concert with the transformation, in academia, of "woman" into "gender," gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual NGOs were established. These NGOs include Lambda Istanbul, Kaos GL (which published the first gay and lesbian journal in Turkey), Pembe Üçgen İzmir Eşcinsel Kültür Grubu (Pink Triangle Homosexual Cultural Group of İzmir), and Antalya Gökkuşağı Eşcinsel Kültür ve Dayanışma Grubu (Rainbow Homosexual Culture and Solidarity Group of Antalya). Between 1996 and 1997 Lambda Istanbul aired the first GLBT (gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender) radio program and took part in the Istanbul Ecology Platform.

Kadının Statüsü ve Sorunları Genel Müdürlüğü (KSSGM, Directorate General on the Status and the Problems of Women) emerged in 1987 under the aegis of the State Planning Institute and presented itself as a mirror of Turkish modernity (Acuner 2002, 127). State feminism had already been criticized (Z. Arat 1994, Berktay 1992, Y. Arat 1995, 2000) and the directorate had also been criticized for extending state feminism. Although the NGOs, government bodies, and the local governments cooperate with each other, Ecevit (2001) emphasizes the confrontational relationship between organizations.

Among the health NGOs, women were divided by profession, such as doctors, nurses, and pharmacists. Another health NGO, AÇEV (Mother-Child Education Foundation) aims to educate women in child-rearing and developing a certain level of consciousness.

One of the most effective women's NGOs in Turkey, established in Ankara, is Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom). It participates in shaping an information-based society in Turkey. Flying Broom houses a database on women's organizations in Turkey. Starting in October 2004, the project "From Paths to Roads" had seven pilot locations, aiming to develop cooperation among the local NGOs and local governments (Uçan Süpürge 2005, Ecevit and Kardam 2002). Mor Çatı (Purple Roof), established in Istanbul in 1990, is the first organization in Turkey to work on violence against women, serving as a shelter for three years. It created volunteer solidarity networks and offered psychological and counseling and support groups. In 1998, it closed because of financial constraints. Established in 1997, Ka-Der (Kadın Adayları Eğitme ve Destekleme Derneği, Association to Educate and Support Women Political Candidates) has been an important women's NGO. Criticizing Kemalist feminism, Ka-Der emphasizes women in politics and aims to raise civil society's awareness (Bora 2002, 110–11).

There are several other NGOs centered in Anatolia. Diyarbakır Ka-Mer Kadın Merkezi (Women's Center) was established in 1995 to shelter abused women, because fiscal regulations did not allow it to call itself a foundation (Akkoç 2003). It is also a model as a transitional employer of women entering paid labor for the first time. Ka-Mer provides emergency response, group awareness, a childcare center, and regional development. It has established a restaurant as an outlet to employ women (Erkan 2003, 61). The Antalya Women's Movement started in the early 1990s to create awareness groups (Eroğlu-Üstün et al. 2002, 217) and allied itself with the women's movement in the ÖDP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi, Freedom and Democracy Party) (Eroğlu-Üstün et al. 2002, 225).

Islamic NGOs have increased in the last few decades (Pusch 2000): AK-Der (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hareketi, Women's Movement against

Discrimination), Özgür-Der (Özgür Düşünce ve Eğitim Hakları Derneği, Association for Freedom of Thought and Educational Rights), and Mazlum-Der (İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği, Organization for Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed). The first two associations defend women's right to wear the headscarf, while Mazlum-Der is a human rights organization (Kadıoğlu 2005).

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Hande A. Birkalan-Gedik

Development: Sustainable Development

Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been in process of reconstruction since 2002. While there is much talk of sustainable development, it is difficult to assess sustainability at this early stage. Wars lasting 23 years have played no small part in debilitating the local economy. In particular, the years of conflict have hampered women's ability to earn an income and support themselves and their families. Efforts are underway to promote women's livelihoods, focusing on local capacities and the central role that women play in the informal economy in Afghanistan.

The Afghan economy is primarily agricultural; 85 percent of the population resides in rural areas. The agricultural economy was crippled during the conflict due to violence, displacement, drought, and the shift to poppy production. While programs in rural areas are focusing aggressively on reducing violence through disarmament, violence continues. Warlordism remains a threat, and the trade in arms and drugs persists. The years following the demise of the Taliban boast the largest cultivation of poppies.

Agricultural revitalization programs focusing on women are being undertaken for the support of women's livelihoods. Women's participation in rural Afghanistan is essential to all aspects of post-conflict work – conflict prevention, relief, reconstruction, and transformation. Engaging women in these efforts ensures sustainability and helps develop women's resilience to combat the ongoing violence and illegal trades.

Building capacities of women in Afghanistan in urban areas takes the form of vocational skills training. While these skills have been largely focused on the traditional sector – tailoring, embroidery, handicrafts, carpets – there is a nascent effort to promote alternative skills. In the first years of reconstruction, vocational skills training programs for women have been conducted by various non-governmental organizations. These organizations generally lack the capacity to design interventions based on market research and gender analysis. As a result, the markets in major cities such as Kabul have been saturated with women tailors who, upon completion of training programs, are unable to find work. The trainings have raised women's expectations in generating income, yet they are often too short, too small-scale, and too low income-generating. The focus on low-paid gender-stereotyped occupations has been a frequent criticism.

Recently, the focus has begun to shift slightly. It is now believed that sustainable development for women in Afghanistan can be fostered through support for women in mid-level positions across sectors – government, business, NGO – and leadership training and skills building for these women. Many NGO programs offer training-of-trainer components, building in sustainability and offering women an opportunity to acquire skills to help other women. In so doing, efforts will be more sustainable and foster ownership.

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Lina Abirafeh

Eastern Europe

The term "sustainable development" has only been applied to the countries of Eastern Europe since the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and in many ways it is not applicable to the post-Communist context. Sustainable development implies an increase in the economic standard of living of people in a given country, usually accomplished by growing its stocks of physical and human capital and improving its technology, but done in such a way that the results of development benefit not only the present generation of citizens, but also future generations. The term was born in the postcolonial context of the developing world, where development practitioners from the Western, advanced capitalist nations

set out to reshape largely subsistence agricultural societies in order to modernize their economies by creating markets and encouraging specialization, trade, and individual initiative.

All the countries of Eastern Europe with significant Muslim populations – Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia – were Communist countries that followed a different path to "modernization" from that proposed by the traditional concept of "development." As Communist countries, these nations successfully raised the standard of living of their populations by largely eradicating markets and private property and centralizing the economy under the control of state planners. More importantly, women were granted legal equality with men and brought into the formal labor force. Although socialism never completely defeated local patriarchies, the Eastern Bloc countries were able to boast some of the highest female labor participation rates in the world. For example, in 1989, on the eve of the collapse, 84.7 percent of Bulgarian women were employed as waged workers outside the home (Women's Alliance for Development 2000). As paid workers, women had rights to all the benefits of formal employment: their own wages and pensions, access to personal credit through workplace cooperative savings schemes, paid holidays, access to enterprise-owned hotels and camps, and so forth. Some women also managed to infiltrate traditionally male professions such as steel processing and engineering, and were thus able to earn some of the highest wages available in the economy.

In this respect, the economies of Eastern Europe were already developed prior to 1989, and they were only "de-developed" after the onset of democratization and marketization in the 1990s. For women in these countries economic marginalization did not begin until the onset of capitalism. The practice of sustainable development arrived in Eastern Europe with the armies of consultants who followed the windfall of funds made available for easing the transition away from socialism and for supporting women who were expected to be harmed by the transition once the state could no longer guarantee full employment for all citizens. Most of these consultants and experts gained their expertise in the developing world, a group of countries with a vastly different social, cultural, and economic history from that of the so-called Second World. Yet instead of creating new models and projects specific to the needs of postsocialist countries, the consultants often merely imported prefabricated development templates and imposed them on the unique problems of dismantling Communism (Wedel 2001).

Many women in the region were greatly harmed by the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, either because of economic hardship or because of ethnic conflict and war. Despite the real challenges of the transition period, however, women in the region had valuable skills acquired under the Communist period, which could help them survive the economic and political chaos (Ghodsee 2005). Most women in the former socialist countries were literate, well-educated, and had many years experience in formal employment. Furthermore, they were politically conscious and often considered themselves to be the legal equals of men in their societies. Despite this, the many Women in Development practitioners who came to the region to help women survive the process of marketization and democratization used models developed for women who were largely illiterate, uneducated, and without any formal employment experience (Ghodsee 2003).

One excellent example of a sustainable development template imported from the developing world to all the countries in Southeast Europe is that of supporting microcredit schemes for women. Microcredit schemes were developed in Bangladesh and one of their main goals was to deal with high levels of rural unemployment in Bangladesh through a strategy of self-employment for the poor. Micro-loans were made available to help men and women start micro-enterprises such as selling prepared street foods or market vending. These micro-enterprises could employ many people in the informal economy under economic conditions when the formal economy could not provide enough jobs. This is a fairly typical scenario in many developing countries, and microcredit has been very successful in helping individual men and women provide for their own basic needs through self-employment.

However, the historical development of the socialist countries created an entirely different context for microcredit schemes. In these countries, the state guaranteed employment for all, particularly in rural areas where agriculture was cooperatized and peasants were given salaries, pensions, and paid vacations. In Bulgaria, many women and rural populations continued to support the socialist system even after global Communism had collapsed in 1989, and were instrumental in re-electing the Bulgarian Socialist Party to power immediately after the changes (Creed 1998). Thus, the concept of self-employment to meet basic needs would be a very foreign

concept to Southeast European rural populations used to the largesse of the Communist state. Microcredit schemes aimed at helping the rural poor by promoting self-employment in the post-socialist period would inevitably meet resistance.

Microcredit schemes are usually accompanied by micro-entrepreneurship training programs, which teach the poor essential business skills. These kinds of training projects were especially important in developing countries where there were high levels of illiteracy and innumeracy. However, these programs built upon existing cultural traditions of market trading. Micro-entrepreneurship training was not about teaching women how to be traders, but about teaching women how to be better traders. Communism's focus on manufacturing and its centralization of the means of production meant that those who engaged in trading activities were severely ostracized during the socialist period. Micro-entrepreneurship training, therefore, would have little cultural basis upon which to build.

Despite this, microcredit and micro-entrepreneurship programs have multiplied throughout Southeast Europe since 1989. Because microcredit had been so successful in both the First- and Third-World contexts, aid agencies and non-governmental organizations assumed that they would be able to replicate their impressive accomplishments in the post-socialist context. However, there is ample evidence to demonstrate that this has not been the case.

A study for the Microcredit Summit Campaign (Cheston and Kuhn 2002) found that women in Eastern Europe "lag far behind" women in other parts of the world in microcredit participation. Recent USAID (United States Agency for International Development) Gender Assessments have also found that women are far less likely than men to take advantage of microcredit in Bulgaria (Nails and Arnold 2001) and Romania (Rosenberg and Arnold 2002). In Romania, these authors found that although women owned or managed approximately 44 percent of all Romanian businesses, they only accounted for 2.7 percent of the total amount of money loaned (loan value) in 1999. The study suggests that low levels of lending to women may indicate "a reluctance of women to borrow money," and recommends further research on the issue. In Bulgaria, there are at least twelve different sources for microlending (for instance, the Nachala Cooperative, the Resource Center Foundation, Caresback – Bulgaria, the Phare Program, Catholic Relief Services, the Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund, the National Network for Micro-Funding, among others) and here too, women consistently borrow less than men. Even when programs are specifically targeted at women, many women are reluctant to participate even if loan amounts are relatively small.

Opportunity International is an organization that promotes microcredit around the world. While the vast majority of its clients are in the developing world, it also coordinates local microcredit programs in Russia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Croatia. The organization's regional director for Eastern Europe has recognized that Eastern Europe presents particular challenges for the expansion of microcredit services. In a 1998 interview, Ken Vander Weele (1998) explained, "On a microentrepreneur level, I think we've had to face lots of psychological barriers. People who grew up in the communist system viewed private business negatively, as a sort of black market activity. . . . We've run into a lot of resistance to group lending in certain countries."

Overall, microcredit schemes targeted at women in Eastern Europe have met with questionable success. True sustainable development projects for women in this region will only be possible once it is recognized that not all women in poor countries share the same causes of poverty. Thus, although the conflicts and hardships of the last 15 years have certainly created economic conditions that are similar to those of the developing world, the stocks of physical and human capital, and the level of technological achievement were far higher in Eastern Europe, and sustainable development strategies are only now beginning to take these factors into account.

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KRISTEN GHODSEE

Turkey

Statistics indicate that the status of Turkish women has been increasingly empowered with respect to literacy and educational levels, and also in regard to employment and thus economic conditions. According to the statistics of the Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women, the percentage of illiterate women fell from 65.55 percent in 1975 to 27.38 percent in 2000, while the percentage of illiterate men fell from 29.12 percent in 1975 to 7.02 percent in 2000. These figures indicate that the drop in the percentage of the total illiterate population from 47.22 percent in 1975 to 17.24 percent in 2000 is mainly due to the improvement in literacy of Turkish women during the period 1975–2000. With regard to the level of formal education completed, the percentage of primary school graduate Turkish women almost doubled, with an increase from 23.95 percent in 1975 to 45.24 percent in 2000. The percentage of junior high school and equivalent graduate Turkish women increased from 2.08 percent in 1975 to 5.3 percent in 2000, while the percentage of high school and equivalent graduate Turkish women increased from 2.48 percent in 1975 to 9.11 percent in 2000, a 672.8 percent increase in nominal terms. The percentage of higher education graduate Turkish women during the same period increased from 0.7 percent to 5.39 percent. These figures indicate that the educational level of Turkish women consistently improved significantly during the period 1975–2000.

An examination of the female labor force with respect to educational level for the years 2003 and 2004 reveals that while there was a decrease in the labor force participation rate of illiterate and below high school graduate Turkish women, there was an increase in the labor force participation rate of high school and equivalent graduate and higher education graduate Turkish women. The labor force participation rate of illiterate Turkish women fell from 23.6 percent in 2003 to 19.3 percent in 2004; the participation rate of below high school graduate Turkish women decreased from 23.4 percent in 2003 to 22.8 percent in 2004; the participation rate of high school and equivalent graduate Turkish women increased from 28.9 percent in 2003 to 30.6 percent in 2004; and the participation rate of higher education graduate Turkish women increased from 69.5 percent in 2003 to 71.3 percent in 2004. However, the overall labor force participation rate of Turkish women decreased from 26.6 percent in 2003 to 25.4 percent in 2004. On the other hand, the unemployment rate of Turkish women improved, decreasing from 10.1 percent in 2003 to 9.7 percent in 2004. When the data are examined with regard to differing educational levels, the unemployment rate of illiterate Turkish women decreased sharply from 5 percent in 2003 to 1.3 percent in 2004 and the unemployment rate of below high school graduate Turkish women fell from 7.6 percent in 2003 to 6.1 percent in 2004. However, there was an increase in the unemployment rate of high school and equivalent graduate (from 20.5 percent in 2003 to 24.2 percent in 2004) and higher education graduate Turkish women (from 15.3 percent in 2003 to 17 percent in 2004). The data also reveal that the group most hurt by unemployment is the high school and equivalent graduates.

The number of employed female population increased from 5,812,545 in 1970 to 9,429,736 in 2000. With regard to employment status, the percentage of women working as employees increased from 10.24 percent in 1970 to 24.28 percent in 2000, with an accompanying slight increase in the percentage of women working as employers from 0.2 percent in 1970 to 0.9 percent in 2000, while the percentage of self-employed women fell slightly from 6.63 percent in 1970 to 5.98 percent in 2000. By contrast, the percentage of women working as family workers decreased significantly from 82.93 percent in 1970 to 68.84 percent in 2000, mainly after 1985.

An examination of the percentage of employed population by economic activity reveals that while the percentage of employed female population working in agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing decreased (from 90.3 percent in 1970 to 75.7 percent in 2000), from 1970 to 2000 there was a rise in the percentage of employed female population in manufacturing industry (5 to 6.6 percent); retail trade, restaurant, and hotels (0.5 to 3.7 percent); transport, storage, and communication (0.3 to 0.7 percent); finance, insurance, real estate, and business services (0.5 to 2.8 percent); and community, social, and personal services (3.1 to 10.2 percent).

The percentage of female educational staff working at universities reached 38.5 percent according to the 2003/4 Academic Calendar, a self-evident indicator of women's empowered role in shaping Turkish society with regard to their influence on future generations.

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Ece C. Karadagli

Economics: Access to Credit Organizations

Egypt

This entry examines Egyptian women's access to credit and the implications for women's economic participation. First, however, access to credit needs to be understood within the macroeconomic context of the country, which has undergone a shift from a state-led economy under President Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s to the adoption of Infitah, an open-door policy under President Sadat in the 1970s. Under the adoption of an open-market economy system, the government has actively sought to promote the private sector as the engine for growth, especially by increasing employment.

One way that private sector activities are to be supported is through the extension of credit to those aspiring to establish new enterprises and those managing existing ones. Credit-providing organizations, whether governmental, non-governmental, or private, have mostly been donor initiated and supported. The most renowned credit-providing initiative is the Social Fund for Development (SFD), established in 1991 as a governmental program run by the Cabinet to mitigate the negative implications of structural adjustment programs and to increase employment through support for entrepreneurial activity. One of the main objectives of the SFD was the extension of credit to young graduates, both men and women, through its Enterprise Development Program (EDP). However, one study indicated that women represent only 19.9 percent of the recipients of these loans (Marʿī 2005, 204). This statistic reflects a general trend that applies to all credit-providing schemes that supposedly operate on a gender-neutral basis in Egypt, whether governmental, non-governmental, or private.

Even though credit providers claim a policy of extending credit that is gender neutral, men consistently represent a disproportionately larger percentage of loan recipients. The phenomenon is multifaceted: in a patriarchal society such as Egypt, it is socially understood that men are more qualified and able to deal with formal institutions, especially in matters pertaining to money. Moreover, men are encouraged more than women to take the initiative and the risks involved in applying for credit. There also exist legal obstacles restricting women's access to credit. For example, women who do not possess identity cards are not eligible for most credit-providing schemes, especially those offered by banks and the government. Women tend also to have less access to collateral than men, a prerequisite under several formal credit-providing schemes, especially those of banks. The latter's record in extending credit to women is generally poor.

However, millions of dollars have been invested in credit schemes to provide women with credit for the purpose of poverty alleviation and economic empowerment. Women have been encouraged to apply for credit under various programs and projects that specifically target them and have a women-only eligibility requirement. For example, there are local and international non-governmental organizations that provide credit specifically to women and seek to make access to a loan as non-bureaucratic and as simple as possible. Some of the credit schemes follow the Grameen model: women form groups and agree to guarantee each other in order to secure credit. Others offer individual loans with minimal collateral, often requiring far fewer guarantees than the SFD or any of the credit-providing banks.

These women-only schemes generally tend to offer women small seed money for the support of cottage industries or microenterprises. Very few of these schemes offer the credit necessary to expand into larger businesses and generally tend to focus on poor women. Nonetheless, these schemes have often been met with antagonism from some male members of the community who resent the notion that credit should be provided strictly for women, and who protest that it is the men who are more in need of credit. Like some of the credit-providing schemes in South Asia, many of the Egyptian counterparts have also experienced a problem whereby men use women as a proxy to access credit, which is then used and controlled by them. Religious objection to the payment of interest under these credit schemes, however, has generally not been a significant problem.

An important source of capital for women, particularly the poor, is informal credit secured through *gamʿiyyāt*. *Gamʿiyyāt* operate as interest-free rotating credit schemes in which people choose members to form a group that pools agreed sums on a regular basis, and the total sum of the credit

collected is distributed to a single member of the group until all members have had a turn in collecting the credit. Such informal credit schemes are highly popular and tend to provide an important and accessible source of capital for women – more so perhaps than formal credit schemes, which enforce interest rates and require highly effective outreach programs in order to connect with women.

In general, a myriad of schemes offer credit to women, although most suffer from a conspicuous gender disparity in the disbursement of credit, with the majority of recipients being men. Cultural and legal factors need to be overcome in order to remedy this situation. Credit schemes operating on a women-only basis generally operate on a small scale, and they have not been able to make sure in all cases that women are not used by men as a way to attain credit. Because of their lack of easy access to more formal credit sources, women tend to rely heavily on *gammʿiyyāt* as an informal source of credit that is accessible and has minimal or no formal requirements for eligibility.

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Sudan

Women in Sudan have been largely excluded from formal financial institutions of the Anglo-Egyptian and independent Sudan, even as they have demonstrated the ability and desire to profit from financial transactions. The exclusion is not based on legal criteria, but rather on informal practices that control institutions of the formal sector. However, women – particularly in urban areas of northern Sudan – have access to informal financial institutions, and in recent years there have been some attempts by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to offer financial services, especially loans at discounts, to women.

Modern financial institutions were introduced in Sudan in the early twentieth century, as a consequence of the Anglo-Egyptian conquest and development of the colonial state (1898–1956). Initially, the banking sector was an extension of the Egyptian banking sector. Commercial banks concentrated on import–export finance and government retained an important role in providing credit to the more risky agricultural sector. The broad branch network of the Post Office Savings Bank channeled remittances from urban centers to rural areas. Banks were not used for savings; rather merchants and the general public preferred to invest their surplus in land, livestock, or other assets. Independence brought some changes to the financial sector: the new state established its own central bank and several special purpose banks (in particular the Agricultural Bank of Sudan and the Industrial Bank of Sudan), which lent at less than market rates. In 1970, the nationalization of all private banks and other large private companies was a more important watershed. Private banks re-emerged in the late 1970s. Islamic banks and Islamic banking appeared in 1978. In 1983, the whole financial system was Islamized in the sense that interest (both paying and receiving) was prohibited. These policies continued following the 1989 coup that brought Islamists to power.

At present there are 26 operating banks and an equal number of specialized financial companies. Financial institutions remain concentrated in and around the capital and neighboring states; there are only a handful of bank branches in all in southern Sudan and other marginalized areas. Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement on 9 January 2005 – will lead to important changes in the financial sectors since banking in southern Sudan will follow conventional principles while in the rest of the country Islamic rules and regulations will remain in force. The Bank of Southern Sudan, although a branch of the central bank, will have considerable autonomy, including the right to charter and supervise financial institutions in southern Sudan.

Exclusion of women from formal financial institutions is a worldwide phenomenon, and Sudan has not been an exception. The mechanisms of exclusion are subtle or implied since they are not the result of specific legislation. Examples of cultural practices that prevent women from gaining access to formal financial institutions are the predominant role of males in the household, inheritance rules that favor male family members, and the gendering of economic spheres. It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of Sudanese, whether male or female, are excluded from formal finance. Hence reform efforts should not only address the issues that are particular to women but also take into consideration factors that cause marginalization and severe regional imbalances within the country.

Formal microfinance programs for women, involving small loans issued to groups of women who agree to be jointly liable for the credit and do not post collateral, continue to grow in Sudan as in other developing countries. Sudan has not, however, exhibited the kind of success in microfinance seen in countries such as Bangladesh or Bolivia. In part this can be explained by reference to extremely adverse economic conditions in the 1980s and 1990s. Undoubtedly the effects of the civil war and very strained relations between Sudan and many neighboring countries, as well as Western countries, are important factors as well. Quite high growth rates from 1997 have not yet been coupled with pro-poor policies. Microfinance programs remain heavily subsidized by NGOs and their donors.

Informal financial institutions in Islamic Sudan include both rotating credit and savings associations, known collectively in Arabic-speaking Sudan as *ṣandūq*; informal money lending for trade, known as *dayn*; and informal money lending to finance smallholder agriculture, known as *shayl*. As a largely female phenomenon, the *ṣandūq* has been the subject of extensive commentary and research. The broad outlines of the institution are familiar. A group of women agree to meet monthly and each contributes a certain sum. The total is allocated to one person at each session, according to an order determined at the first meeting. The *ṣandūq* in Sudan, as elsewhere, serves three main purposes. First, it insulates women's savings from the demands of the household, and especially from a husband who might rather spend than save. Second, it facilitates the speedier purchase, for those early in the queue, of lump sum investment or consumption goods. Instead of each woman saving until she has enough to make the purchase, women who receive the pot early can buy immediately. Third, it acts as a savings discipline device using peer pressure to commit individuals to save, especially necessary in an environment where poverty and sudden calamities tempt savers to draw down their assets. The Sudanese *ṣandūq* also functions as a focal institution for deepening women's collective solidarity by providing social occasions for regular meetings and developing common interests.

In rural and urban areas all over northern Sudan, women work in the informal sector selling handicrafts and foodstuffs. It is not uncommon to find a tea lady under a tree, and a basket lady at the local market. Many of these women are heavily dependent on borrowing (*dayn*) to finance their working capital. They may obtain sugar and materials from store merchants on credit. Often this credit will be at zero interest, and is a way for the merchant to assure customer loyalty. The size of this daily circulation of capital can sometimes be substantial. The drive toward Islamization that characterized the 1990s made it more difficult for women to gain access to informal trade credit as women were discouraged from participating in market activities. Some traditional female activities, such as the brewing and selling of beer, carried stiff penalties.

An extensive literature that surveys the common informal agricultural finance transaction of buying crops forward (that is, receiving monies for a projected harvest), known as *shayl*, suggests that women are also largely excluded from this form of credit. This exclusion follows from the difficulties women in northern Sudan have in exercising independent ownership and control of land. Although women's labor is extremely important in agriculture, women are infrequently occupied as independent farm managers.

The issue of women's access to credit is absent from the recently concluded Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army of southern Sudan and the military regime that constituted the government of Sudan, based in Khartoum. The Oslo donors' conference that followed the peace agreement was the site of criticism by women's groups that the "New Sudan" to emerge from the peace process would continue to ignore gender issues such as women's credit. Future legal reforms, not least with regard to the right of women to own land, may make it easier for women to gain access to formal credit.

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Turkey

In Turkey, women's access to formal credit organizations as well as to informal financial services and networks has always been limited.

Broadly speaking, the formal credit organizations serve only a small fraction of the population. Banks primarily favor lending to larger and more successful enterprises or to large family holding companies to which they are affiliated. Consequently, the majority of Turkish enterprises are usually self-financed, with family, social network, and religious and ethnic solidarity being the only other appreciable sources of funds (Özar 2003a, 2003b, Özcan 1995). In Turkey, as in other countries, men have more choices in terms of accessing formal or informal financial resources than women, regardless of their social class background (DGSPW 1996, Özar 2003a).

Theoretically, banks do not discriminate between women and men regarding the delivery of credit. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that it is not uncommon for women who apply for credit to be asked by bankers to provide proof of their husbands' approval before their applications are considered by the bank.

Banks advance credit only to businesses that are able to fulfill the established legal requirements, especially those regarding collateral. They require either property collateral, usually about twice the value of the loan, or a letter of guarantee by a civil servant. Moreover, they analyze the balance sheet of the enterprise and thus are usually reluctant to extend credit to start-ups. Since it is estimated that only 9 percent of the assets in Turkey are owned by women, they are less likely to fulfill the collateral requirements of the banks (KSGM website). In addition to this, women's ability to use household savings and property is very limited. Household assets are mainly placed under the control of male members of the household. Consequently, women usually tend to look to businesses for which a low level of start-up capital is sufficient (Özar 2005).

Two state-owned banks, Halk Bankası and Ziraat Bankası have been providing subsidized credit to artisans, tradespersons, and small farmers for decades. Special credit facilities have been offered by Halk Bankası to women entrepreneurs and housewives who have wanted to start new businesses in order to promote women's entrepreneurship. The outreach of such credit has been rather limited. Moreover, as a result of the structural adjustment programs in 2001 both banks have undergone a process of restructuring and consequently their activities have been seriously limited (Özar 2005, Burritt 2003).

The last two decades witnessed a radical change in economic policies for promoting entrepreneurship among the poor, in line with the strategy to alleviate poverty and generate employment in developing countries. As a result of this new strategy, microfinance institutions, mainly targeting women, proliferated in almost all major parts of the developing world. But in Turkey the microfinance sector was absent before the late 1990s. The devastating impact of the earthquake in 1999 and the economic crisis of February 2001 were felt most severely by the poor. These two disasters seem to have determined the context that gave rise to nongovernmental organization activities in the field of microfinance services.

In June 2002, the Kadın Emeğini Değerlendirme Vakfı (Foundation for the Support of Women's Work, KEDV) launched the Maya Enterprise for Microfinance in the earthquake region as well as in Istanbul. The initiative was followed by the Turkish Grameen Microcredit Project introduced in southeastern province of Diyarbakır in partnership with the Grameen Bank and the Türkiye İsrafı Önleme Vakfı (Turkish Foundation for Waste Reduction) in June 2003. The microfinance initiatives still lack an appropriate legal framework. The Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, BDDK) has recently prepared a draft act concerning microfinance institutions in Turkey. But the draft has not yet been ratified and remains subject to deliberation.

Thus far, little information is available on the outcome of the existing microcredit programs in Turkey. The only information provided by the microcredit programs concerns their high repayment rates. Although high repayment rates are essential for the sustainability of the programs from a financial point of view, they do not reveal the effects of the microcredit on women's lives, that is, whether participation in microcredit programs is sufficient to provide an escape from poverty or to improve the position of women in the family and in society at large. Current investigations point to the fact that in Turkey, particularly in the southeastern region where poverty is prevalent and the male and female unemployment rates are above the national average, male members of the family frequently make use of loans given to women.

However, women have invented informal ways of accessing credit which may not be for business, but for the daily expenses of the household or their own needs. Groups of women organizing tea par-

ties at regular intervals started *altın günleri* (gold coin days) or *dolar günleri* (dollar days) as an informal source of obtaining credit. In this case the host receives as many gold coins as the number of the guests. These parties thus act as informal rotating credit sources.

The number of credit card users in Turkey has increased rapidly in recent times. However, there is no information on the gender distribution, especially regarding possession and frequency of use, of credit cards. On the other hand, shortage of cash seems to have revived the tradition of *bohçacı kadınlar* (women vendors), who in the past used to provide particular goods for the *çeyiz* (trousseau) for unmarried daughters of the household. A similar practice is also in evidence at present. In this case usually mobile male vendors, small neighborhood retail shopkeepers, and open market stallkeepers try to sell their products to women by weekly or monthly installments without asking for any legal contract. The relative immobility and reliability of women in repaying their debts play an important role in the perpetuation of these transactions.

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Economics: Advertising and Marketing

Egypt

New forms of commercial marketing emerged in Egypt at the beginning of the twentieth century as a result of three concomitant processes: increased consumption of manufactured goods (both imported and domestically produced) and the development of new commercial spaces, especially in urban areas; the construction of a new role for middle- and upper-class women as the "New Woman" and bearer of the nation's sons (and thus future level of culture); and the expansion of the local press, including the development of print advertising. This novel marketing capitalized on new gender roles assigned and to a certain extent assumed by women, but overall, print advertising did not target women as consumers (or make use of gender) until well into the twentieth century. By the late twentieth century, the marketing of Islamic visions of womanhood emerged more strongly to contest a nationalist projection of women as consuming in the service of the state. However, more informal and personal strategies, many of which used gender differently, continued to be important at all levels of the market throughout this period.

Print advertising emerged as an important arena for marketing in Egypt at the turn of the twentieth century. The period between the 1890s and 1914 witnessed the first dramatic increase in advertising, in both the general press and the women's press, which was rapidly expanding in this period. This initial advertising especially targeted cosmetics, medicines, and pharmaceutical products, although these were pitched "androgynously" (Russell 2004, 60) to maximize their reach into generally small reading publics. Alexandra de Avierino was one of the first editors of the women's press to employ advertising in a significant way. At the turn of the century, her periodical *Anīs al-jalīs* devoted about a fifth to a third of its space to advertising, and she wrote articles on the benefits of advertising in the press. In 1914–22, more sophisticated and gender-specific advertising emerged in the local Egyptian press, although overall, advertisements remained relatively simple and direct, and marketing primarily focused on the commodity rather than the creation of a specific or idealized image of the consumer. Female readers of the press were generally of a higher class status than their contemporaries in the United States or Europe, and print advertising reflected the class basis of the press's readership, focusing less on devices to save domestic labor or on cleaning products or soap (because of the availability of servants) but rather on health/beauty aids and clothing. Cigarettes were also avidly marketed using gender, with advertisements for Egyptian cigarettes in foreign markets employing photographs of women in sexually suggestive poses. By the 1920s, "Western-looking" women began to figure in local advertisements for cigarettes targeted at both men and women; these advertisements used women to portray the glamour and "health benefits" associated with smoking as well as target women as smokers (Russell 2000/1, 70, Shechter 2003, 66–8).

In the interwar period, advertising continued to focus on cosmetics and pharmaceuticals and other imported products. New, popular illustrated magazines, especially those published by Dār al-Hilāl, expanded the graphic context for advertising commodities, but the monopolistic tendencies of advertising agencies in Egypt mitigated against textual innovation; advertising remained essentially the business of selling space in the press. Fashion advertising, especially connected with larger retail establishments in Egypt such as the local department stores (Cicurel, Chemla, Sidnawi, ʿUmar Effendi/Orosdi Back), did depict "modern" women (and men) in this period, often more complexly than earlier imported portrayals of European women. Images of indigenous or veiled women began to appear in advertising in the early 1920s, both to create a local base for imported products, such as Kodak cameras, and also to reflect the indigenous modern culture projected by local commerce. In these depictions, clothing tended to mark women as "Egyptian" (although often inaccurately), but women's facial features remained "Europeanized." After the nationalist uprising of 1919 and especially in the 1930s, advertising emphasized nationalist campaigns to "buy Egyptian." The new national communities projected by these advertisements often included women (as companionate wives and dutiful mothers but also independent salesclerks or consumers) as an important constituency.

By the 1940s and 1950s, however, nationalist marketing of locally produced commodities (especially textiles) positioned men and women in their advertisements very differently: advertisements portrayed the nation-as-market as a community of multiple men of different classes or generations, but often relied on an image of one woman, or only part of her body (such as her legs), to appeal to women. This objectification of women then contrasted with the diversity of men as consumers. The state capitalism in the Nasser era directed advertising toward the functional and practical, but the local production and marketing of consumer durables (such as Ideal refrigerators, stoves, and other household furnishings, or Singer sewing machines) or toys (Sabrina dolls) positioned Egyptian women as frugal housewives consuming in the service of the nation. The shift to the open-door economic policy in the Sadat years led to a public promotion of an ethic of consumerism that objectified both men and women, especially in television advertising (which began in 1960).

Print advertising has remained only one element of marketing in Egypt. Even as late as the mid-1950s, newspapers only reached about 2 percent of the population (Shechter 2002/3, 49). By the 1960s, radio, cinema, and television advertising became increasingly powerful as a marketing medium. More importantly, Egyptians throughout the century made consumption decisions based on relationships (personal, familial, or communal) to retail goods and spaces; marketing was often most intense in interpersonal encounters, markets, stores, workshops, or popular culture (namely *arāgūz* theater). Many of these more informal marketing strategies emerged from local class and religious practices. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, marketing textiles, clothing, and household goods to upper-class women often accommodated their seclusion in harems of large households, a practice linked in the Egyptian imagination to both class and Islam. Although many cloistered women relied on husbands or household servants to do their purchasing, goods were marketed to harems through the use of itinerant saleswomen, known as *dallāla*s, often Coptic, Jewish, or Armenian women. Department stores also advertised special rooms or partitioned areas where veiled women could shop in relative privacy.

Marketing practices affect the vast majority of Egyptians primarily in the purchase of foodstuffs, livestock, and basic household goods such as used clothing, kitchen utensils, textiles, and plastic footwear. These products are frequently marketed in informal or periodic markets, in both rural and urban areas. Marketing in such spaces generally involves oral calls from sellers to buyers, and decisions on what and where to purchase are often based on price or the relationships between buyers and sellers rather than on external or objective advertising for goods. The provisioning and marketing of such goods, and especially food, is nevertheless highly structured in terms of gender. Among low-income households in Cairo, for example, women have historically shopped for vegetables, whereas men purchased meat and fruit. As a result, women tend to market vegetables, dairy products, and perhaps poultry and intestinal meats, whereas it is men who sell meat, fruit, and grains (Hoodfar 175, Mohieddin 311). Butchering meat tends to be a male occupation, especially because of Islamic prescriptions on slaughtering practices.

While many of these marketing situations have historically applied to all religious communities in Egypt (being more inflected by class than religion), marketing practices target women specifically as Muslims as well. In Egypt, Ramadan marks an important season of marketing and consumption, as many families purchase clothing and toys to last the year. Ramadan had been a significant commercial season since the beginning of the nineteenth century, if not before, and in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century, stores and merchants actively promoted their wares to Egyptians to mark the holiday, along with the feasts associated with the Muslim calendar. This commerce was so important that commercial employees, especially in department and clothing stores, were legally required to work extra hours during those periods of the year.

Marketing an Islamic identity to girls in Egypt and the Middle East more broadly has in recent years turned to mass-produced commodities such as fashionable headscarves and Muslim-themed toys. Boutiques in Cairo display ornate and fashionable head coverings and long dresses for women, demonstrating an increasing commoditization and trendiness for styles of clothing previously made at home or by tailors in drab colors and plain fabrics, to signify the modesty and counter-cultural valence of the new sartorial style associated with the Islamist movement. The Syrian-based NewBoyDesign Studio has marketed the Fulla doll widely in Egypt since 2003. The Barbie-like Fulla is promoted as part of a "Muslim" female identity: the doll sports either a *ḥijāb* and long coat or a black *ʿabāʾa*, her accessories include a pink prayer rug, and cartoon and

text depictions of the character emphasize her "Muslim values" – respect for her parents, modesty, and interest in "appropriate" women's careers, such as medicine and teaching.

Thus, the expression of gender and images of women propagated in marketing is sensitive to overall changes in women's status and roles in society and also helps form the broader social culture that creates those changes.

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Nancy Y. Reynolds

South Asia

Introduction

In two Muslim-majority South Asian countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the depiction of women in advertising is often determined by prevalent state media policies; strategies are, therefore, planned accordingly to target women as consumers.

Pakistan and Bangladesh, with populations of 150 million and 140 million respectively, have predominantly Muslim majorities. India has an almost equal number of Muslims (about 140 million), forming the single largest minority group. While Pakistan and Bangladesh identify themselves as Islamic republics and Pakistan has even introduced certain Islamic laws, India continues to be governed by secular laws, though in family matters Muslim personal laws are applicable. The identity of the state, reflected in constitutions and in laws, has determined the status of women in society of which the media is a powerful component.

As a secular country, India does not have Muslim-specific advertising or censor codes. While Muslim women form a large number of consumers, they are not perceived as a group to be targeted by advertisers – at least in the mass media. Since advertising tends to target the majority, there is, however, a greater projection of Hindu culture. Urban cultures, too, are great equalizers. Muslim women working in the glamorous environment of advertising agencies in Mumbai, for example, would not be very different from colleagues of other faiths.

The projection of women as consumers

In developing countries, such as those of South Asia, where governments and society are attempting to use the mass media as an agent of social change, women are targeted both as consumers of products and services, as well as of knowledge of health matters and family planning. In both these roles, there are discernable changes in women's image that have evolved over decades.

In Pakistan, where television was introduced in the late 1960s, the image projected in television commercials throughout 1960s and 1970s was of the free-spirited, glamorous woman – flying planes, riding horses, and even posing in swimsuits. This changed dramatically in the 1980s when the military regime embarked on a policy of Islamization. Apart from laws, severe restrictions were imposed on the appearance of women in advertising. They were required to be fully covered, and headscarves became mandatory. The role of women in advertising was further limited by the largely conservative censor board constituted to review and approve commercials prior to broadcast. Commercials were often rejected for reasons based on the censor board's imagination rather than what was actually depicted on screen.

While Bangladesh never adopted the extreme measures seen in Pakistan in the 1980s, advertising continues to be governed by a censor code dating back to pre-independence times. Women cannot, for example, be shown in tight-fitting or revealing clothes, though headscarves are not necessary. In advertising for bath soaps and shampoos, only the face and part of the neck of a woman can be shown.

Changes in the past two decades

The advent of satellite television in South Asia opened up a whole new world for viewers residing in the countries of the region. It broke down many barriers and led to popular acceptance of other peoples' culture and lifestyles. It was inevitable that the restrictive policy of censorship would be replaced by a more liberal one if local channels were to compete with the satellite invasion of homes across the region. These policies covered advertising as well. Advertising in Pakistan now comes under the Code of Advertising Standards and Practices, instituted by Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). The clauses of the PEMRA code that cover the projection of women in advertising are as follows: "Exploitation of females in a sensuous manner for propagation of products is not allowed, as it denigrates women and makes them sound and appear like commodities . . . Propagation of female undergarments and sanitary pads and hair-removing creams or powders, are not in good taste and hence not allowed to be advertised." It is, however, apparent from this that censorship authorities in Pakistan continue to arbitrarily determine what is "not in good taste"; these include items essential to women, such as sanitary napkins.

Many of the developments in the media are due to women's own evolving status in the dynamics of social change taking place in South Asia. In Bangladesh, in particular, the availability of microcredit through non-governmental organizations in the rural areas and the large-scale employment of women in the garment industry have resulted in women becoming more self-reliant. This, in turn, has spawned a large market for cheap consumer goods, leading to changes in habits and personal lifestyles. Global brands of toothpastes, detergents, and shampoos, available in sachets, are recording phenomenal increases in sales in villages across South Asia.

The image of urban women in advertising is also being transformed. From one of women with no clear identity of their own, they are now being shown as professionals taking independent decisions. Banks that traditionally showed only men as customers now target women; moreover, women are also portrayed as professionals advising male clientele in financial matters.

Backlash from religious groups

Lately, extremist religious parties have challenged the projection of women in advertising as being contrary to the values of a Muslim society. Women's rights groups, such as Women's Action Forum, as well as the government-appointed National Commission on the Status of Women, have also objected to the exploitation of women in advertising. However, they do not call for a total ban on the use of images of women. In several parts of Pakistan, young men incited by religious parties have defaced images of women on advertising billboards claiming that these are indecent, although most of them show little more than a smiling face. In the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan where a religious alliance is in power, the attacks on billboards were led by senior party leaders.

On 9 April 2005, members of the religious alliance presented a private members' bill in Pakistan's national parliament, titled "Prohibition of Indecent Advertisements Bill 2005" demanding punishment for those companies and individuals who use female models to promote their products. The definition of "indecent" was deliberately left vague in the bill.

Impact of conservatism on communicating essential knowledge to women

Women's health, particularly reproductive health, suffers greatly when conservative forces influence government media and advertising policies. Pakistan has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world. This is a consequence of women's low status, as well as the high birth rate. However, advertising messages relating to reproductive health and contraception tend to remain indirect and, therefore, largely ineffective. The private sector companies promoting contraceptive products have attempted to communicate messages that are more specific to contraceptive usage but often the government, after allowing the broadcast of such advertising, has backed down in the face of criticism. However, messages on infant and maternal health, most of which address women, are generally allowed.

Women in the advertising profession

Advertising agencies in South Asia are seeing the entry of women in greater numbers. There are also more women than men in professional institutes offering degrees and diplomas in disciplines ranging from marketing and advertising to graphic design and film production. Presently, on average women form only about 30 percent of those in the advertising profession. Judging by the trend, this is expected to change dramatically in the coming years.

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Zohra Yusuf

Turkey

Advertising is not merely a means of providing the consumer with rational product information, but perhaps more importantly a process through which goods and services are transformed into signifiers of something that is highly valued in society or by the target audience in question. The gender identification of products has created gendered markets for most goods and services in modern society.

Advertising uses two ways to promote products: gender typing and metaphors. Gender typing of commodities has been a powerful strategy in selling products. For instance, automobiles, perfume, tobacco, and alcoholic beverages are sold as a sign of masculinity and detergents and household items as a sign of housewifery. In their study of gender stereotyping of products, Debevec and Iyer (1986) found that products were perceived generally as either exclusively masculine or feminine, although men and women tended to view goods and services as being more often than not unrelated to their own gender. As gender roles in society are gradually changing, advertisers are beginning to explore the possibilities of dual gender positioning, using both male and female directed positions in their marketing as a way of expanding or creating new markets.

In addition to gender typing, metaphors work as a way of linking the concrete with the more immanent. For example, a sentiment or an ideal is portrayed as being harbored in a commodity, such as when an advertisement promotes a diamond ring as a token of a man's love for a woman, or margarine is presented as signifying true motherhood.

Through use of gender typing and metaphoric signification advertising has always been an important and pervasive cultural institution that represents women in problematic, unacceptable, and ambiguous ways.

The long history of feminist analysis of advertising has criticized advertising texts for maintaining and even enhancing aspects of male subordination of women, typically by depicting men as breadwinners, hunters, and decision-makers and women as homemakers and objects of male gaze and desire. Just as in many developing countries, Fordist consumer culture was organized around the family as a key unit of consumption in Turkey as well, and thereby positioned women's socioeconomic role around a responsibility for consumption. Traditionally in Turkish advertisements, women have been positioned within the private sphere of the house and have been presented in a subservient role to men, where men are usually depicted as being in control and in authority over everything. Content analyses of female images in advertising belonging to both global and national brands have pointed out a serious bias toward stereotyped sex role portrayals of women as primarily homemakers in promoting certain images that pertain especially to FMCG (Fast Moving Consumption Goods) categories such as food, drinks, cleaning products, personal care, clothing, and the like, whereas durable goods such as cars, white goods, special equipment and services, and corporate identities are represented by men, quite often with a typical man's voiceover advocating the durability, strength, and credibility of the goods and services. Turkish women still seem to be more vulnerable to manipulation by advertising than men because their upbringing and social expectations have already been influenced toward accepting gender stereotyping. Several academic research projects have also shown that advertising imagery constructs woman's sense of beauty and may in fact have detrimental effects on their sense of worth. However, other researchers have found that women are perfectly able to identify and resist unrealistic gender portrayals in advertising, even in a country such as Turkey where sex role portrayals of women as primarily homemakers, and deficient Third-World beauties in need of acquiring Western shapes and looks, prevail.

Advertising trends in Turkey show a marked shift from traditional gender portrayals in advertising during the period 1980–90 to more gender-neutral advertisements and more male gender positions, specifically since the beginning of the 1990s.

During the last few decades, feminist critique of the domestic role of women has entered mainstream social discourse in Turkey as well. Today it is not particularly radical to argue that certain advertisements have also co-opted feminist themes in order to market to women who have crossed the boundary from the domestic sphere to the professional arena. With changes in the expectations and representations of women, the stereotypical character traits attributed to women have shifted from weak and dependent to self-assured and autonomous. The transformed social positioning(s) of women in marketing and advertising has also shown itself as an important social development in Turkey. Although traditional portrayals of women still tend to dominate advertisements, especially around household items and food categories, these have been decreasing since the late 1980s, while equality portrayals are increasing as a result of Turkey's social, economic, and cultural endeavors to become integrated into the European Union. The outstanding workforce of women, both in creative and strategic terms, in the Turkish advertising business, especially since the early 1990s, with the flux of international agency structures, has had visible influence on the new portrayal of the Turkish woman not shown leaning on a man or surrounded by other women, which might imply that she requires the company of others to legitimate her identity. Global brands especially, such as Nike, Dove, Wella, and Knorr, have integrated the images of "real women" who look natural, and do not use exaggerated tones in their global advertising campaigns, which are aired in most of the countries where they market their products. By showing all women comfortable in their own skin, look, status, and limits, these brands seem to have challenged the standard of either supermodel and sexual imagery or domestic sphere representations associated with most advertisements targeting women. However the brands have not yet aired these campaigns with the "real women" strategy in Turkey. In a leading bi-weekly Turkish integrated marketing communication magazine, *Marketing Türkiye*, the brands' executives have indicated that values and realities that pertain to Turkish women do not yet seem to match with those of Western women, in that Turkish women still attach great value to their looks and beauty, not particularly for themselves but for others around them; they hold that other people and their opinions are superior to theirs, which, the executives think, emphasizes Turkish women's altruistic and emotional personality traits. Therefore they warn that it is not the right time to launch their global campaigns in Turkey since these kinds of adaptation might be dangerous in terms of the target audience's perceptions of the brands as providing the ideal beauty and form. Yet it is a widely held belief in the Turkish marketing circles of the 2000s that soon all the national and global brands will need to adopt this kind of strategy if they want to resonate with the more conscious female audience which, they believe, is becoming braver and more confident in questioning the stereotypes and formats of feminine beauty and limits.

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Hande Bilsel

Economics: Agricultural Labor

Central Arab States

Agriculture is usually understood as the cultivation of plants, the raising of livestock and poultry, or small-scale aquaculture activities (namely the cultivation of fish and aquatic plants). Women's contribution to agriculture was largely unacknowledged until the 1980s, when the failure of gender-blind rural development projects highlighted its fundamental importance. Since then, a growing number of organizations, international institutions such as the United Nations (UN), and international treaties such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, have focused on the role of women in agriculture. However, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), decision-making bodies, and development agencies are still implementing gender-neutral policies that harm female farmers, as seen, for example, with Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) that have been adopted worldwide in the last decades in order to commercialize agriculture.

Women's participation in agricultural work is determined by a number of factors: social and marital status, age, farm size, land management practices, degree of mechanization of the farm, household composition, availability of male labor, regional cultural norms, labor market forces, and even meteorological conditions and international market systems. These variations impede to a great extent the establishment of regional patterns of female agricultural labor. Nonetheless, it can be stated that in rural areas mostly poor, young, and unmarried women participate in the family economy by working in the unskilled informal sector, often as unpaid family labor. Their agricultural activities are mainly manual and vary in ways that complement men's work and allow women to adapt to labor needs. For example, women often take care of livestock and poultry and process dairy products. Economic disadvantages affect the majority of female agricultural laborers, who are excluded from marketing the produce, receive low salaries, and rarely own land, livestock, or machines.

A general survey performed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) at the beginning of the 1990s estimated that women's participation in the agricultural labor force was 30.7 percent in Iraq, 33.0 percent in Jordan, 40.7 percent in Lebanon, and 52.2 percent in Syria (FAO 1995). In the 1970s, the percentages for those countries were 5.3 percent, 23.5 percent, 22.7 percent, and 13.4 percent, respectively (El-Fattal 1996). More recent data, though nonsystematic, show an ever-increasing feminization of agriculture; they also indicate that Muslim countries have the lowest female participation in the labor force (Baden 1992). Many argue that the only ascertained evidence that can be deduced from the statistics is the systematic underreporting of women's role in agriculture in the last decades, particularly in Muslim countries (El-Fattal 1996). In fact, gender-disaggregated data on women and agricultural labor in central Arab states are scattered and inconsistent, mainly because of researchers' and farmers' gender bias.

The frequent association between women and the domestic sphere, particularly in Muslim societies, leads many researchers to overlook women's work in the fields. Restrictive definitions of agricultural work as wage labor and fieldwork fail to capture unpaid and off-field work mainly performed by women. Similarly, definitions of farmers as plot holders exclude women, who rarely own land. Women's involvement in multiple agricultural activities performed at different stages and according to need also renders their work less visible to superficial observers. Timing is often neglected in the process of data collection, yet it is very important for a comprehensive analysis of agricultural labor, which varies annually, seasonally, and daily for informal workers like women. In Syria censuses are performed in September when the agricultural work is low. Official surveys often collect data by interviewing only the male household heads, who can be unaware of women's work or reluctant to admit female contributions to the family economy. In patriarchal societies, women's work is viewed as nonessential and auxiliary to that of male breadwinners. In Lebanon almost 30 percent of female farmers are considered "helpers" as compared to 7 percent of men. Also, the produce of female agricultural work is often considered economically non-profitable because it is consumed in the family and not commercialized. In Jordan, 19 percent of crops produced by

women and only 5.6 percent of crops produced by the whole household are consumed in the family (Flynn and Oldham 1999).

Gender-biased surveys provide "hard" data depicting women as mainly "domestic workers." By informing agrarian policies, these data reinforce the status quo to the detriment of rural women. Land and agrarian reforms often curtail the livelihoods of the poorest women by disregarding their unofficial land uses. They exclude women from entitlements to agricultural rights and assets, such as water and land. These entitlements to resources are conditional on men's presence in the field and do not transfer to their wives or daughters even if these are the sole farmers. The organization of the agricultural work addresses only male farmers and disregards female needs. Women thus have to give priority to agricultural activities, such as timed delivery of irrigation water, over reproductive activities, such as breastfeeding.

Women's access to services is also constrained by the moral etiquette that limits their interaction with male employees. Furthermore, since they are hired on a temporary basis, women are not eligible for state benefits often reserved for permanent employees. In Lebanon, for example, 75 percent of female farmers are seasonal workers (UNESCWA 2001). Agriculture technology benefits only men, since its use by women is considered improper. Moreover, the machines are designed for strong male farmers; big handles, high chairs, and heavy levers thus limit female use. Excluded from mechanized work, women are left with menial handwork.

In Syria gender-neutral development plans in rural areas have greatly disempowered rural women and have institutionalized discrimination that persists to date. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Syrian state initiated land and agrarian reforms that restructured the ownership and production system of the countryside. The land reforms assigned small plots to male, landless farmers as heads of households. The women became dependent on the entitlements of their husbands in order to cultivate their fields and to access social security benefits. Consequently, women's independence and their status at the household and community level have declined. The agrarian reform centralized the sale of agricultural basics, such as seeds and fertilizers, as well as the marketing of the final produce in government offices that dealt exclusively with official landowners. Deprived of land titles, women were thus excluded from the cultivation process. Land reform plots were insufficient for family subsistence, and poverty induced a male outmigration that has resulted in the feminization of agricultural labor. Women's workloads thus increased but not their entitlements or independence, because the management of their households was transferred to male relatives. Female farmers had to rely on absent men for accessing basic products for their agricultural work and for selling the produce. In 1999, female unpaid family workers constituted 36.1 percent of the rural economically active population while men constituted 12 percent (Farah 1999).

In the 1980s, the mechanization of Syrian agriculture favored the return of many peasants to the fields by increasing production. Excluded from the use of all machines, women were assigned new time-consuming and tedious jobs to be performed by hand, such as weeding, cropping, or thinning. Intensification of production due to growing family size and national policies for food self-sufficiency further increased the demand for manual agricultural labor by women. Women became the bulk of the national migrant labor force. Because of social custom, their seasonal migration was confined to nearby governorates. Consequently, women's work choices diminished together with their power in negotiating working conditions and salaries, the latter already affected by gender-based wage differentials. In 1999, women received between 60 and 75 percent of male incomes in agriculture (Farah 1999). Intensification of working patterns also increased the rate of girls dropping out of school. In 2002, girls' attendance in primary schools was 36 percent, and in high schools, 18 percent.

The invisibility of women's roles in agriculture often results in persistent, discriminatory policies and practices that affect women in their daily activities. Mainstreaming gender in agriculture means recognizing women as farmers and transforming the parameters of the agricultural system from those that are male-based into ones that are gender-sensitive.

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Alessandra Galié

Egypt

Agriculture in Egypt consists of the intensive cultivation of irrigated land in the Nile Valley. Crops range from wheat and other grains to cotton and fruits and vegetables. Animal husbandry is important for dairy products, work, and as a store of value. Overall, agriculture represents about one-sixth of the gross domestic product, although this value is declining. The proportion of the labor force involved in agriculture is still around one-third, however, but is also declining as cities grow, and non-agricultural work opportunities increase in rural areas. The Nile Valley has been an agrarian civilization since ancient times, and there is evidence for a variable degree of female participation as owners, tenants, and workers through this history (Bowman and Rogan 1999).

The characteristic unit for organizing labor is the family household, whose organization reflects the gender-based division of labor. Most farm households manage relatively small units of land, overwhelmingly less than two hectares. Production is both for the market and for family consumption. The family household can be described as petty capitalist in that people produce for the market and buy many of their needs from the market, and make their living on the excess of income over production costs. Agriculture is part but not all of rural life; many men and women are employed in commerce or by the government.

The concept of "work" remains linked to the idea of a formal job, so women who work in the family context are likely to see themselves as providing "service," help, or labor exchange rather than "work" (Ghosh 1987). This distorts the figures on labor force participation, as many casual and household workers, women and men, may not declare themselves to be "employed." About one-sixth of rural women are considered "active" though mostly not in agriculture, and the overall figure was declining in the 1990s (Fergany 2002, 221, Arab Republic of Egypt 2004, 25).

A conventional gender-based division of labor is understood in rural Egypt (Toth 1999, 61), although there is a difference between northern or Lower Egypt (the Delta) and southern or Upper Egypt (the Said). In this respect the dividing line is not Cairo but about 150 kilometers further south. In the Delta women (and girls) may help out in the family fields, and may work as wage labor. They also are responsible for looking after the fowl and livestock, they market small amounts of fruits and vegetables in nearby weekly markets, they market milk products and eggs, and they carry out the final stages of preparation of agricultural produce into food. In Upper Egypt women rarely work in the fields, though girls sometimes do, and they rarely go to market (in fact there are fewer markets in Upper Egypt). They have considerable responsibility for looking after livestock at home.

The reasons for this difference with regard to work in public are not clear. Poverty is often cited to explain women working for wages, but as Upper Egypt is generally poorer than the Delta, one would expect the opposite result. Upper Egyptian men attribute the absence of women working in agriculture to their strict interpretation of Islamic values, but it is doubtful that Lower Egyptians would agree that their Islam is less correct. The contrasting Delta view is that there is "no shame in work" (Abaza 1987, 77), or indeed that household work, wherever it is performed, is covered by household values (El-Aswad 1994, 366). In both areas ideas about the appropriateness for women of different jobs affects the assignment of tasks by gender.

Even in the Delta, however, women who work for wages are typically assigned lower-status unmechanized tasks such as planting or weeding for lower pay, about half that of adult men. But their availability at lower wages for some jobs means that men's wages can also be reduced as there is some inter-gender competition. On the other hand, the fact that Saidi women do not work in agriculture places pressure on the men to earn all the money, and undercuts men's ability to choose jobs freely.

Through their marketing and occasional wage labor, Delta women make a greater contribution to household income than Saidi women do. In fact, some Delta women wonder how Saidi families can survive without women's input (Zimmermann 1982, 102). One can speculate that this may be part of the reason for the relative poverty of the rural Said. Nonetheless, Saidi farm women work hard at animal husbandry and the care of fowl and rabbits, in addition to the usual family chores. They do not aspire to working in the fields. A few very poor women appear in the fields to glean after

the harvest. Some work as seamstresses or as servants. Adolescent and pre-adolescent girls are often recruited for the cotton harvest, where they are considered to be more serious workers than the boys. Some women keep small shops or work as petty traders.

Relatively few women are listed as owners or renters of agricultural land, and even fewer of those are operationally in charge. Women sometimes work through a male relative to manage the land in their name.

Questions of status emerge as family income improves. Work abroad has been a major source of improved incomes. As Delta families become more prosperous their womenfolk are likely to drop out of working in the fields and in marketing. When a husband returns from the oil countries he may insist on this. The general increase in economic level is marked by a decline in women's participation rates, whether working on a family farm or for wages, whether the women are married or not (Saunders and Mehanna 1986). Another factor reducing women's participation in agriculture is the availability of non-agricultural jobs, principally working for the government in education, health, or general administration. However, there were fewer such opportunities after the mid-1990s as government hiring was reduced.

In the 1990s, a new law covering access to farm land was implemented in Egypt as part of a slow move toward liberalization (Saad 2003). This law repealed certain pro-tenant aspects of the 1952 agrarian reform. According to the new law, many farmers who were renting land on a long-term basis had to return the land to the owners. The result in many cases has been an impoverishment of already poor tenant families; while in other cases poor owners regained access to land. In the resulting family strategies, women have come up short. As income declines children, especially girls, have been withdrawn from school to save the fees. Some women sold their gold to provide temporary relief. Women are pushed back into wage labor from which they escaped during the period of prosperity. Families sold their cattle, perhaps because the family lost its access to fodder, thus depriving women of an occupation and income. Direct access to farmland provided women as well as men with security and prestige, which were lost in the counter-reform. Women as well as men have protested publicly against these pressures from large landowners. This law has been in effect for less than ten years, since 1997, and its full implications have not yet been evaluated.

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Nicholas S. Hopkins

Iran

According to the census data (1966–96) the share of women in full or part time labor in agriculture is roughly 10 percent. The percentage of women in rural (farm and off-farm) labor ranges from roughly 10 to 16 percent of the total in different surveys (Markaz-i Āmār 1972, 59; 1993, 73; 2003, 99). A growing body of field research, however, estimates the average combined labor inputs in agriculture and animal husbandry, processing and preservation activities, and handicrafts to be within a 40 to 50 percent range. Studies suggest that on average women spend 9.4 hours per day performing production and processing tasks during high agricultural seasons. There are variations between crops and regions: in Gilan women account for 76 percent of the labor input for rice and 80 percent for tea, in Mazandaran 50 percent for rice, and in Gurgan 40 percent for cotton and 90 percent for summer crops. Women provide labor input for fruits, animal husbandry, dairy products, and preservation and processing activities. Lower contributions are reported for wheat

and barley. Labor participation is reported as unpaid family labor by both field studies and the official data. Studies demonstrate that most small-scale farms would have been unprofitable if, instead of family, wage labor was used. Rural women also provide significant cash incomes for their families. Research shows that in Yazd one-half and in West Azarbaijan one-quarter of active females earn direct cash income. Some studies estimate the average contribution of the combined family labor and cash earnings to be about 30 percent of the rural household income. Thus women are a major source of labor and income earnings for their families. But their work is largely unaccounted and invisible (Ḥaydarī and Jahān Nimā 2003, 129–64, Sarḥaddi 1994, 143–56, 1999, 59–81).

Aspects of the official survey methods contribute to the underestimation of women's work. For each survey, interviewers visit farmers only once. Data relate to one week prior to the interviews. Many female seasonal activities are not included. Nearly all farms have small-scale animal husbandry and processing of dairy products that women tend to. These are often unrecorded. Activities related to women processing and preserving products remain unrecorded (Shādī Ṭalab 1996).

Cultural factors accentuate the measurement problems. In some areas direct interviews with women are not acceptable and men generally report their wives as homemakers. A study of 30 villages in Isfahan province showed that in 81 percent of households women were active. In only two cases, however, where the wives were a teacher and a health worker, the husbands reported them as active. A study of 42 villages in Yazd indicates that at least 76 percent of women were active. But the majority of these women (67 percent) considered themselves to be only homemakers. Women's work has also been ignored by many male rural sociologists. Agricultural policymakers have also ignored women's work and discriminated against them in resource allocation. In planning for the agricultural sector in the First Development Plan (1989–93) the word *zanān* (women) was mentioned once, in the second (1995–99) twice, and that only in the context of family welfare, with no reference to labor and/or resource allocation (Shādī Ṭalab 1995, 29–46, 1996, 88–9).

Land ownership is highly gender biased. Historically some elite absentee urban women owned and controlled agricultural land. But within rural areas the Islamic laws of inheritance were overlooked, and men controlled land. In the 1960s, a massive land reform redistributed ownership to male peasants, creating a predominantly small-scale owner-operated system. A modest redistribution after the 1979 Revolution also excluded women. Since the reform women have had the legal right to inherit ownership. Studies indicate, however, that women are either unaware of or do not exercise their rights. Conventionally, land is in control of husbands, sons, or brothers who hold the deeds. In some areas such as Boyer Ahmad, local customs prevent women from inheriting land. Only if she is a widow with underage children may a woman manage the farm (Daftar-i Muṭāliʿāt va Barrisi-i Ravishhāy-i Tarvījī 1998). Lacking the deeds to property, women are unable to borrow from banks, which often require collateral (Ḥaydarī and Jahān Nimā 2003, 129–64).

With the exception of the Caspian and other regions where women play key roles in production, men make most managerial and market-related decisions. Male migration and/or off-farm employment have also affected women's position. A study shows that in 17 percent of the surveyed farms women had major managerial inputs. The share in farms of under two hectares, where men are more likely to migrate or work off-farm, was 44 percent and in farms of five/ten hectares only 3 percent. Male members generally deal with banks, attend institutes of higher education, and undergo training for use of mechanized inputs (Ḥaydarī and Jahān Nimā 2003, 129–64).

There are also positive changes, especially the rising literacy from about 1 percent (1956) to about 60 percent (1996) of the total rural female population of ten years and older, with much higher rates for young girls (Markaz-i Āmār 2003, 58, 606). The overall positive changes in income and infrastructure have also improved women's lives. With some exceptions, such as female cooperatives and NGO activities, however, girls are not trained to use mechanized inputs or manage farms, and growing mechanization is reducing demand for female labor. A study of Boir Ahmad notes that women missed working with other women and were not satisfied with being dependent on husbands and confined to homes, but did not wish to go back to hard farm labor (Friedl 2004, 218–39). On field visits to Mazandaran, where rice production is being mechanized, and in Yazd, the author, too, noted that young women, most of whom had secondary level education, had no desire to work in the fields, produce traditional low-wage crafts, or be trained to use agricultural machinery. They were unwilling to perform hard labor and wished to have a personal business or work in an office. Their skills, however, were limited. Some non-

governmental and government organizations are involved in rudimentary attempts to provide resources and trainings. There has also been some change in the lending policies of the Agricultural Development Bank. In 1994, 2.6 percent and in 1995, 4.1 percent of the loans were given to women (Milānī 1995, 93–104). There are also research groups and activists involved in advocacy in favor of rural women. Rural female labor is, thus, undergoing a transition: unskilled labor demand is falling, new opportunities are scant but seem to be growing.

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FATEMEH MOGHADAM

Sub-Saharan Africa: East Africa

INTRODUCTION

The agricultural practices of Muslims in East Africa, including those of Muslim women, defy generalization, involving groups as diverse as the Benadir of Somalia, the Somali communities of Brava and Gendarsha, Kenya's Lamu residents, and the Zanzibaris of Tanzania. Although their agricultural practices may be the same as those of neighboring non-Muslim communities, their religious and cultural lives are uniquely Muslim and both reflect and rationalize local systems of land tenure, gender-based divisions of labor, irrigation and water management, and crop marketing.

East African Muslim women's agricultural practices may be divided into two main livelihood settings: pastoralists who dominate much of northern Kenya and the interior of Somalia/Somaliland; and small-scale farming communities, often living along the Indian Ocean coast or near *tog*s or *wadi*s (seasonal rivers) and harvesting their water through various irrigation technologies.

HISTORY

The East African coast has, for centuries, been considered a breadbasket of the region. Al-Idrīsī, relying in the twelfth century on travel accounts, described the largely Muslim "Zanj" coast as productive of "fruit, sorghum, sugar cane, and camphor trees." In other passages he cited references to abundant rice and bananas (Freeman-Grenville 1962, 19), observations echoed by European eyewitness accounts in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While these travel accounts do not focus

specifically on women's roles, it is clear that much of the food in these Muslim regions, in keeping with longstanding African practices, was grown by women. In the nineteenth century, when the British presence along the coast increased, they recorded many references to Muslim women in agriculture, both as slaves and as free householders. Some worked on plantations producing rice, cotton, sesame, palm oil, coconut products, and bananas. An "Afro-Arab" minority owned the land and controlled the commercial trade across the Indian Ocean with exports including timber as well as a number of agricultural products. Among the more humble classes, both Muslim and non-Muslim women gathered fuel wood; tended family garden plots of peas, beans, rice, maize, and millet; dried palm fronds; and worked as unskilled labor on the plantations. It is clear that Muslim women in the nineteenth century were doing much the same as they do presently: providing unpaid labor for the men's cash crops and growing and otherwise providing food for their families (Romero 1997, 120–1).

Early into the twentieth century, slave labor had disappeared but plantation approaches to food production continued, this time as large projects supported by the private sector and development agencies. And as before, these plantations relied heavily on women for much of the unskilled labor, both in the fields and in the processing and packing arenas.

Example 1: Pastoralists

The Muslim pastoralists of northern Kenya and Somalia include the Boran, Rendile, Galla, and Somalis. The Oromo of Ethiopia also support Muslim pastoralists and many of the Somalis in Ethiopia's Ogaden pursue pastoral livelihoods. The following example comes from a Somali pastoral village, Jeded, in the northeast of Somalia (98 percent of the Somali population is Sunni Muslim). Located 500 kilometers inland from the Gulf of Aden and the thriving port city of Bosaso, Jeded's 100 households illustrate how women have developed their own subculture within the larger pastoral society.

Jeded is dry, treeless, windy, and lacking in any type of amenity (clinic, school, piped water, household electricity) that one might associate with a productive community. Houses are mostly huts of light frames and canvas or plastic covers though there are a few built of stone and adobe. Yet Jeded is a highly productive, even wealthy, village and supports one of the most profitable lifestyles of the entire region. It has a borehole. Drilled by the Italians in an earlier era, the 400-meter deep borehole sustains 25,000 camels plus an unknown number of sheep and goats. The camels arrive each day in groups of approximately 2,000, coming over a 14-day cycle, hence, 25,000 camels. On the 13 days when a herd is not at the well, the shepherds take their animals up to the grazing lands that lie in the valleys within 100 miles of Jeded. The camels drink only once every two weeks. In between they fill themselves with sweet grass. If the value of one camel is $500, the wealth of Jeded's people and the surrounding settlements is approximately $12,000,000.

Where are the women? Generally the women do not travel with the herds. Instead they stay in Jeded, grow small numbers of irrigated vegetables, and engage in petty trade of tea, rice, pasta, *kat*, and other staples that the herders buy. Because the men are largely absent from the village, the women are the dominant force in the community and have a substantial influence, informally, in Jeded's affairs. While they do not maintain the borehole and have no formal duties in managing the herds – these are a man's responsibilities – they do just about everything else. Harvests of onions, melons, and mangoes provide small cash and enable them to earn money, but their major livelihood does not come from agriculture but, instead, from commerce. Virtually every woman in the community has a shop or stall somewhere along the main walkway where each sells goods to the herders. An elaborate system of credits and debits enables herders to buy staples, with credits provided against their animals – mostly sheep and goats – that they will sell at some point in the future. Management of the credit system is the responsibility of women and follows traditional rules. The women's interests are protected by clan law, disputes are brought before the Council of Elders, and settlements are almost always paid.

Yet life is hard for the women of Jeded. Because of the treeless landscape, the women trek at least a kilometer into the bush before sunrise – their only way to maintain privacy – to attend to needs of toilet and washing and they do not perform any toilet functions until twelve hours later when the sun has set. Women are not included in the formal decision-making process of the elders, although they have a profound shadow influence on what happens in the community and because they control the commerce of the village, they have strong economic command over village affairs. Yet if a diagram of village decision-making were to be drawn, the women would not appear on the chart, or if they did, would be charged with household

tasks such as providing potable water, securing small credit, and managing village commerce.

Where does Islam fit in the lives of Jeded's women? It is central to their identity, their sense of self, and their world-view of where they fit in the larger scope of community life. They manage their children, maintain cash accounts for their shops, manage the village's in-ground water tanks (*berked*s), educate the young girls, look after their family's health as best they can in a pastoral settlement, and form the backbone of the village economy, except for the camels and the borehole (Ford et al. 1994).

Example 2: Small-scale Agriculture

Another important source of livelihood for East African Muslim communities is small farms. Given the aridity of many areas where Muslims live, agriculture is practiced mostly through one form or another of irrigation. One example will suffice, taken from the agricultural community of Dararweyne in the northwest of Somalia, in the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland. The inland communities rely primarily on small-scale agriculture, especially irrigated fruits and vegetables. Those along the coast focus energy on palm and coconut production, some vegetables, small artisan products, and occasional fishing.

Dararweyne, a village of 120 households, lies 40 kilometers northeast of Hargeisa, situated along a *tog* that eventually empties into the Gulf of Aden. It offers a unique story of survival and even prosperity during the debilitating years of the Somali civil war in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Given the presence of both government forces and insurgent groups operating in the region, Dararweyne women survived by their wits. The men left as the war worsened, either because they were part of the insurgent militia or because they knew they would be shot if the Somali army found them in the village. They fled primarily to refugee camps in nearby Ethiopia. But the women stayed put. They had too much to lose by anything other than staying home where they became the labor force, tending the farms that they previously had managed jointly with their now-absent husbands. They learned of the lucrative markets in Hargeisa that provided cash income for the sale of their highly prized vegetables and citrus, and they learned how to save the profits of their farm sales so that they could invest in new commercial opportunities once the war was over. During 1988 to 1991, the worst years of the war, the women carried water from their shallow wells in the *tog* to their fields. Tomatoes, onions, and citrus were the most common items as they play such a large role in the Somali diet. Yet they also produced beans, papaya, bananas, mangoes, and greens, almost all of which went to Hargeisa where fresh fruits and vegetables were a rarity in those years. When government soldiers or insurgent militias drew near, the women took initiative to go out and talk with the commanders. They explained that there were no men in the village and that they were peacefully growing food for their families and neighbors. Their skills of negotiation were so successful that neither side ever bothered their farms.

When the violence subsided, the men of Dararweyne returned from the militias or the refugee camps. They were surprised at the prosperity their wives had achieved and asked for cash advances from the women so they could get their farms going again. The women agreed but set stiff terms. The most important condition to secure loans was that there would be no revenge killings to settle old clan-based scores of rape and murder during the years of violence. Revenge killings, the women argued, would simply start up a new cycle of violence. They had had enough of that. Because the women had financial capital from their agricultural production and the men needed help, the men agreed. While there continued to be clan and sub-clan friction in the area, there was little violence or settling of old scores. Much of the credit for the peace rested with the women and their agricultural success.

The women, learning from their agricultural achievements, continue to play a major role in the economic, political, and decision-making life of the village. One woman was elected to the Dararweyne Council of Elders, a rarity in Somali culture. The women have been prime movers in rehabilitating the village clinic, extending the water system, rebuilding their collapsed school, expanding the number of shallow wells in the *tog*, introducing a new sub-surface dam, and continuing to market their vegetables in Hargeisa. In one unprecedented action, when the men could not agree on the exact arrangements for an agreement with a non-governmental organization (NGO) to rehabilitate their school, the village women's group intervened after several months and traveled to Hargeisa. They told the NGO that they would sign the agreement on behalf of the village. The NGO agreed and the school rehabilitation was completed, with the women's group providing the village's share of labor and building materials.

While the experience of Dararweyne is not necessarily typical, it is part of a growing trend

among Somali communities in which the women are playing increasingly visible roles in economics, commerce, agriculture, education, and peace building while continuing their long established roles of childcare, education, health care, and household tasks. Whether these new roles are a direct result of the debilitating war or simply the slow process of change is hard to say. What is clear is that the war created new roles and new opportunities for the women and they rose to the challenge heroically and competently and that the men are happy with the changes (Ford et al., 2002). Furthermore, the actions of these women challenge simplistic notions about women living in rural African Muslim societies, especially stereotypes regarding gender relations in clan-based, patrilineal groups.

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Turkey, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan

Women are indispensable to farming and other agricultural pursuits, whether as partners, managers, or laborers, throughout the Islamic communities ranging from Turkey in the west, through the Caucasus, to Central Asia, to Afghanistan in the southeast. Female agricultural laborers' position and well-being are, however, distressingly similar; they are marginalized and often poverty-stricken, even though the national agricultural infrastructures within which they live and work vary enormously because of divergences in the recent histories of the different states. Agricultural women have been mostly invisible until very recently.

This entry concerns women in agriculture in Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. The eight countries covered differ widely in the basic characteristics that influence the appraisal of women and gender in agriculture, such as population, political stability and structure, changes in the pattern of agricultural production, recent experience of war, and degree of urbanization and modernization of the economy. Turkey's population, at over 66 million, more than equals the aggregated populations of the six Central Asian and Caucasian states. Uzbekistan, the largest of these with a population of 25 million, is a bit smaller than Afghanistan, which has 27 million. Kazakhstan has some 17 million people and the others range from 8 to about 5 million.

Within the 85-year time period from 1920 to 2005, from the almost simultaneous collapse of the Czarist Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire to the present impoverishment of the agricultural populations of the successor states, farming and pastoral enterprises have been transformed into farm production units tied to commercial domestic and world markets controlled outside these countries. Now large industrialized farms employing some women as workers and small family-centered farming and animal-raising enterprises in which women labor as unpaid workers exist side by side. The proportion of the population supported by agriculture of all types varies: Afghanistan 70–85 percent; Tajikistan 74 percent; Kyrgyzstan 65 percent; Uzbekistan 63 percent; Turkmenistan 56 percent; Kazakhstan 44 percent; Azerbaijan 31 percent; and Turkey 35 percent.

In order to explain the political-economic frame within which farming and animal-raising women in these countries work and live, we must move from

the local through the regional to the global to make visible the political-economic hierarchy of the world system which regulates the lives of everyone in these countries and of which women form the base. This hierarchy, which seeks to be all-encompassing, is male dominated, reaching into family households through media and religion and male cultural norms. The hierarchy is corporate and military in culture, reserving power for men at all levels. This power is displayed at the family/household level by control of wives and daughters. In prosperous households, fathers may act privately as partners but the agency of control is always available. These countries form interesting contrasts yet the status of women is very similar among them. Increasingly, women are withdrawn from the labor market through long-term unemployment or being kept at home as unpaid family workers. This withdrawal relieves pressure on both the private corporate and public government sectors to create jobs.

Euro-American forms of industrialized agriculture were introduced in two major models: that of collectivized farming during Soviet control of the Central Asian Islamic communities and that of commercial export-oriented mono-cropping, in which women (and children) are shifted into a field labor role. The male dominant gendered design of industrialized agriculture management and ownership came as an integral part of the production model. As part of the global modernization agenda of the European and American imperial states, traditional village-based production systems were systematically stigmatized and state resources of financial and educational support were concentrated on industrialized agriculture with the avowed agenda of replacing traditional forms of agricultural production, which were labeled as primitive and simple whereas, in actuality, they were highly complex systems of multi-cropping sensitive to the growth requirements of the crops.

In long-enduring traditional farming and pastoral systems during times of peace, women have been vital partners in family productive enterprises. These family productive enterprises were grouped in networks of villages with interacting pastoral nomad groups. When the village systems of agricultural production were operating as they were designed to do, there was gender equity within family households based on a web of complex gendered sequences of production tasks, which had developed over thousands of years. Two stark conditions of traditional rural life framed village agriculture and pastoral nomadism: the personal security of households of extended families depended upon themselves (there was no professional police force), and the family was with every pregnancy at risk of losing the mother to death in childbirth. The potential disruption to the production system which fed the family and household increased with every subsequent pregnancy as mothers aged. Nevertheless, for such farming enterprises to be successful, women were respected partners of men, their power increasing as they became grandmothers. In these systems, the agricultural technologies specific to the variety of crops and domestic animals were complex. Young family members learned them gradually over a number of years, the daughters taught by the older women, the sons by their fathers, uncles, and older brothers. Reproduction of these complex multi-cropping systems required multiple skills, intelligence, and hard work, as well as the capacity to cooperate effectively in intensive work situations.

The last of these eight countries in which such a system survived, Afghanistan, has been devastated by over 20 years of massive modern warfare that culminated the rivalry between Great Britain and Czarist Russia through their surrogates, and later between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Massive bombing destroyed villages, fields were mined, animals seized or killed, wells caved in, and fruit and nut orchards uprooted. With the overthrow of the Taliban, who restricted women in traditional agriculture less than urban women, and the continuing American occupation, multiple projects are focused on women in agriculture. A current project of the ministry of agriculture states that "women's contribution to agriculture in Afghanistan usually goes unrecognized and all too often women who play a very active role in the agricultural sector do not benefit from government donor and NGO interventions in the sector." Afghanistan still suffers from intermittent warfare. Afghan farmers have responded to their precarious situations by again growing their most profitable crop, opium poppies, in response to the steady demand from European and American markets.

The Soviet Union forcibly transformed the agriculture of Central Asian republics, as well as Azerbaijan, into production of cotton grown on huge irrigated farms organized on factory models that replaced self-sustaining villages. Nomadic groups were forcibly sedentarized as well. The Soviet state and collective farms employed women as workers within a male bureaucratic hierarchy and provided social services for families. These services disappeared after the Soviet Union collapsed. As the agriculture infrastructure collapsed,

women were the first to be unemployed. Their unemployment rate in all these countries is higher than that of men. Men are more prosperous than women, and better equipped with the technical skills and networks necessary for life in a commercial hierarchical economy. Nevertheless, these farmers are at the margins of the world economy and poorer than townsmen. They are at the bottom of the male hierarchy in the urban-privileging world system and bring hierarchical behavior into their families. The difficulty of the reorientation from Soviet command economies to market-based privatized economies is currently signaled by civil turmoil such as recent regime changes, protests, and civil disturbances in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. Tajikistan endured a four-year civil war in the 1990s and Azerbaijan fought Armenia over Ngorno-Karabakh.

Out-migration is one recent answer to this situation. In Turkey, unlike the other countries, migration has been to the largest cities and to Western Europe beginning in the 1960s. This out-migration has kept the rural population almost stable and provided more than 40 years of remittances to rural areas. The recent migration from Central Asia has been primarily to Russia, creating, for instance, a flow of thousands of men from mostly rural Tajikistan. This increases the number of women-headed households in agriculture.

The transition to private enterprise for these countries has been very difficult, in fact traumatic, for women. Privatization of state and collective farms has meant the abandonment of the social service net that they provided for their workers. Mothers have been most hurt by this move because social norms make mothers responsible for children. They have lost health care, subsidized commodities, and the central place for their social networks. Privatization has also meant the development of private land rights, official initiatives that have privileged men as "heads of households," everywhere informally denying women access. Women have lost land rights and men now dominate the ownership and proprietorship of land resources whether in formal cooperatives or business enterprises or as family farmers. Female-headed households are at the most disadvantage. This transition has proceeded unevenly with some countries preserving the industrialized farm units partly or wholly. In Uzbekistan, mandatory quotas for cotton and wheat production at government set prices below the world market price have impoverished farm families. Basic sustenance for families throughout the Soviet era came from individual plots on these farms. Especially the responsibility of wives and old people, these very productive plots supplied vegetables, fruit, animal products, and so on. Women are expert at this type of agricultural production.

Women in all these countries except Afghanistan and Turkey are caught between two systems of industrialized agriculture producing commodified crops as countries shift from collectivized industrial farming models to commercial industrial farming models. In both Afghanistan and Turkey, replacement of traditional long-enduring forms of agriculture by commercial industrial farming is the goal which has been institutionalized. Besides the goal of integrating rural populations into the globalized agricultural commodity production system, this replacement implements another goal, that of political control by increasing the dependency of rural populations on the financial and commercial infrastructures for credit and production inputs. Commercialization of family farming households fosters training men and marginalizing women. In Afghanistan, for instance, women are being trained in poultry raising, a traditional occupation of farm wives in the United States where keeping hens and chickens provided the family with eggs and tough stewing hens and sale of the surplus provided the wife with "pin money" to buy sewing supplies. Microcredit projects introduced by foreign donors provide women with small amounts of capital to establish similar tiny money-making activities and keep them marginal.

Turkey's commercial agricultural development is an instructive contrast especially to the Central Asian countries formed from the Soviet Union. Turkey is the only one of these eight countries which is in the low middle income category for development indicators. The other seven countries are in the low income category. Turkey also has achieved more than 80 years of peace except for a recent 15-year war with eastern border populations, which ruined those districts' agricultural and herding activities. After escaping involvement in the devastation of the Second World War, Turkey, which for centuries had looked westward toward European Mediterranean countries, profited from the 45-year Cold War military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. After Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, American foreign aid flowed into Turkey. For agriculture the benefits of building a network of highways meant that long-distance marketing of agricultural commodities produced by village farmers, such as citrus and early vegetables, became profitable. Pastoral nomads abandoned their treks in favor of transporting their

flocks and their families to the mountain summer pastures in trucks. The import of tractors and wagons revolutionized access from villages to the main road. Under the Kemalist reforms, Turkey had already institutionalized an agricultural development infrastructure. After the Democratic Party victory in 1950, commercialization of agriculture gained momentum, especially with the development of industrialized cotton production in the Cukurova at the eastern end of Turkey's Mediterranean coast.

The 61 percent of the female labor force working in agriculture, however, have not profited equally from these agricultural developments. Increases in industrialized agricultural production have raised the number of women field laborers. Changes in crop mix to produce more commercial crops at the expense of self-sustaining food crops have altered the yearly cycle of women's tasks and the balance between men's and women's tasks. Women are increasingly marginalized as village farmers increase their involvement in commercial agriculture. The Turkish ministry of agriculture, which for years framed projects for farm women about their reproductive tasks of childcare, housework, food processing, and crafts, has since 1990 established some projects which view women as farmers and address their role in agricultural production.

In their marginalized positions in these Islamic cultures, women have turned to the forms of Islam accessible to them. Without classical Islamic education, women go to saints, magicians, and healers as they have done for centuries. Secularism and state atheism discouraged and suppressed Islam for up to 80 years in this region but Islam as a belief system has proven resilient and strong. Now Islam is serving gendered purposes. A source of hope for women, Islam for men is a means of control of women, as well as a way of expressing distrust and repudiation of the aggressive Western political-economic system to which they are expected to transition. The Taliban experience in Afghanistan is an extreme expression of such repudiation. Women seen as the heart of the family were kept within the family stronghold. Ironically, the Soviet–Afghan war and the Taliban regime's domination provided the opportunity for international non-governmental organizations to teach basic Islamic women's rights to Afghan women, for instance in the refugee camps in Peshawar.

Women's agricultural labor in these countries is more visible than in the past. The institutional framing of gender relations, which keeps agricultural assets in the hands of men, marginalizes women and shapes their opportunities for development and prosperity. The marginal economic position of these countries' agriculture on the edge of the industrialized urbanized European community further reinforces women's marginalization, as do the Islamic initiatives to express rejection of Western modernity through shaping women's roles and culture. These rural women are trapped at the base of the global male dominated hierarchy, many unemployed and others working, yet all remain impoverished.

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Yemen

Yemen was known historically as verdant Yemen because of its highly developed agricultural tradition. Rain- and spring-fed cultivated terraces cover the southern and northern highlands. Agriculture in the large valleys (wadis) on the Tihama coastal plain and in Hadramawt is spate (flood) irrigated. In the past 30 years, artesian wells have brought new lands into cultivation or permitted cash cropping on previously rainfed lands. The total amount of land cultivated, however, has declined as a result of urban migration and a new reliance on imported grain for food.

Even with rapid urbanization, 73 percent of the population is still rural, and the vast majority of rural women, whether wealthy or poor by local standards, participate actively in agriculture and/or livestock care. (Women in fishing communities are active in processing and, sometimes, marketing the fish that men catch.) In contrast, women living in communities defined as urban (including small rural towns) rarely participate in agriculture.

Rural women's roles in agriculture, as well as their participation in local markets, vary by region, community, social status, and often by family. In most of the cultivated highlands, where subsistence-based agriculture is traditional, the economy is household-based and agricultural labor is distributed among members of the extended family. Although some chores are defined as men's and others as women's there is a great deal of flexibility, with women performing "men's work" and vice versa if the need arises. When men migrate for work to Yemen's urban centers or overseas, they may relegate men's activities to a male relative, or their wives may choose to maintain control of the household's land holdings, employing people to help if necessary. This increases both the women's workload and their control and decision-making powers concerning management of the land and income.

Everywhere, plowing, irrigation, terrace repair, and the repair of diversion dams in areas irrigated by floods are considered ideally men's work. In much of Yemen, the planting and harvesting of fruit, coffee, qat, and other cash crops (with the notable exception of alfalfa, which is usually harvested by women) are done by men. Armed men guard qat fields. Women help men with irrigation, plowing and sowing grain crops and alfalfa. Along with the entire household, they participate in the harvesting of grains and legumes. Women are responsible for weeding and thinning. They also strip and bundle the stalks of sorghum and maize to use as fodder. They apply manure or commercial fertilizers and pesticides, except to qat trees. In many households in which the men have migrated overseas or to urban centers in Yemen, women take over all of the agricultural work, including plowing and irrigation.

Women are active in processing grain and legumes (lentils, sesame, mustard) into flour. They husk maize, thresh and winnow wheat and barley. In the past, they ground grain into flour on heavy hand mills. Currently, they generally take grain to local diesel-powered mills for processing, but they are responsible for paying the miller. Food processing and preparation and collecting, making, or purchasing cooking fuel are the responsibility of women. Collecting water for drinking and household use is almost always the task of women, although in some areas young boys fetch water which they load on donkeys' backs.

Women are responsible for the care and feeding of livestock (cows, sheep, goats, chickens), cleaning and repair of animal quarters, and collecting fodder (which also coincides with weeding and thinning). In the past, children grazed sheep and goats. Where children are now enrolled in school women graze small livestock or deplete their herds. Men are responsible for care of bulls and camels (including milking camels).

In general, men were traditionally responsible for cash crops and women for subsistence crops. Yet, women in the western and southern coastal areas cultivate, harvest, and pack vegetables for sale in regional markets. In recent years, women have participated in harvesting qat, separating and bundling small bunches of qat leaves after the men cut the branches from the trees. Women and men migrate to large spate-irrigated wadis at harvest time to work for wages (a portion of the harvest or cash). In these cases, women are almost always paid less than men for equivalent work.

In most of rural Yemen, the market is a male domain, and women's participation, if any, is voluntary. (That is, a man may not force his wife to go to market.) This, however, varies regionally and by social status. In some areas, such as Jabal Sabir in the Southern Highlands, and in coastal fishing villages, women's market participation is economically important. Some women, usually older women with no domestic chores, poor, landless women, or women from certain low status groups, are full-time traders.

Women's participation in agriculture and livestock care provides them with considerable economic decision-making power in the subsistence economy, mobility, and a significant, although

informal, voice in community affairs. In areas where women are active in agriculture, the potential is greatest for equitable relations between men and women and women's control over resources.

Although many rural women value their participation in agriculture, women's work outside the house is sometimes thought to conflict with the prevailing ideology that the man as head of the household should be the sole provider for all its members. This is particularly true for urban Yemenis and those who have had extensive contact with towns and cities. In such cases, or when the ideal is being described, the agricultural roles of women are understated. If one asks what women do in agriculture or if women work outside the home, the response is generally a normative one: "Women do not work in agriculture; they are responsible for child rearing and domestic tasks." It is only when one observes women in the field or asks specific questions, such as "Who weeds?", "Who thins?" "Who sows?" "Who harvests?" that the variety and importance of women's activities come to light.

Although it is largely women who are maintaining Yemen's agricultural traditions, women's agricultural labor is largely invisible to policymakers and international donors. Their labor is not included as "productive" in national censuses. Their contributions to the labor force are not recognized. While women and their families are the primary beneficiaries of their agricultural labor, the fact that they are not paid in wages has implications for various development indices. Most important is that agricultural extension is directed at the men who sink tube wells, rather than the women who cultivate the crops. Fertilizers and pesticides are applied by women who are not trained in their use and are largely illiterate, so cannot read the printed instructions on packages. While women care for livestock, extension services are not available to them. There are also attitudinal implications for women's invisibility in agriculutural labor. Because they are not seen as productive members of their communities, they are patronized by local non-governmental organizations and donor organizations rather than listened to and offered useful skills.

Rural women often complain about their heavy labor loads. One may hear women saying, "*Naḥnu ghayr bahā'im*" (We're nothing but pack animals). When yields are small, or the work is very taxing, they may say, "*Ma bish fil dunya khayr*" (There is no good in this world.) On the other hand, most rural women value their participation in agriculture and the mobility this allows them. If one meets women working in the fields and asks what they are doing, the most frequent initial response is, "*Binuqṣud Allāh*" (We are serving God). In agricultural areas, even elite women participate actively in agriculture and livestock care. Although a few women welcome the opportunity to migrate to towns and cities to live in comfort, most rural women pity their urban sisters who do not often leave their houses, and they assert that in the countryside they are "free to breathe." Most rural women refuse to accompany their husbands who migrate to the cities.

Older women in areas where qat cultivation has replaced a substantial portion of grain agriculture express resentment toward changes in agricultural practice. They complain of insufficient fodder for their animals, and that their current diet does not have the flavor of traditionally grown grain. These women, who have lived through two famines, are more comfortable physically and economically than they have ever been. Their complaints seem spurious until one realizes that they are lamenting the loss of a much deeper involvement in local economic and political affairs than they now have.

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Economics: Child Labor

Iran and Afghanistan

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that worldwide there are at least 250 million children laborers; Iran and Afghanistan have a history of child labor.

The concept of child labor in Iran and in Afghanistan

The Afghan childhood experience is complex: every child has been the victim of war and suffers trauma. In Iran, the spiritual well-being of the child is put forward: children are perceived as the backbone of society. Both Iranian and Afghan peoples have a collectivist understanding of children's well-being. Growing up in a holistic way and having positive relations with others is essential: it influences the Afghan concept of *tarbiya* which concerns children's manners, responsibility, morality, and behavior. In Iran and in Afghanistan, education is regarded as the most important factor determining children's well-being. Consequently child labor is frowned upon in both countries and seen as a social disorder that has to be curbed. According to the ILO, 24.2 percent of Afghan children between the ages of 5 and 14 work. The ILO estimates that there are 601,000 economically active children, 269,000 girls and 332,000 boys. As for Iran, there are 265,000 economically active children, 149,000 girls and 116,000 boys, between the ages of 10 and 14, representing 2.6 percent of this age group.

Law and child labor

The 1958 Iranian Labor Law prohibited child labor below the age of 12 except in family workshops. However, many younger children worked in agriculture or factories. Iran has not ratified international conventions defining a minimum age for work. According to Article 79 of the code, children under the age of 15 are not allowed to work. For teenagers above 15 years old, work is restricted to eight hours a day; dangerous and hazardous jobs or work at night are forbidden.

The 1964 Afghan Constitution and the Bonn Agreement are a mixture of labor laws from different periods. They only restrict child labor: children under the age of 15 are not allowed to work more than 30 hours per week. However, there is no evidence of enforcement of this rule. Afghanistan is not a party to the ILO Convention 182 on Child Labor.

Forms of child labor

The major workforce in both countries is street children: they are exploited by businessmen and gangs. They shine shoes, clean cars, and sell newspapers or other objects. Many children work in bazaars. For many, child labor is a life experience as it will guarantee them a job in the future.

In Afghanistan, because of the continuous state of war, many children have lost at least one parent, and children have to support the family. Children of the age of 6 work: they harvest, shepherd, collect all kind of materials (which is a dangerous activity because of the landmines), shine shoes, and beg. However, Afghan children seem proud to play a role in the rebuilding of the nation. Some educated Afghan children are abducted to be used as accountants or work in factories. Some girls are kept in brothels. Children are sometimes trafficked out of the country to deal drugs.

In both countries, girls are employed in carpet weaving factories. This activity has an impact on girls as it deforms the pelvis making future child bearing difficult. Runaway girls end up in prostitution to support their families. Females are often employed at home or in domestic workshops. In Iran domestic work is legal.

Both countries have child soldiers: the Taliban recruited 5,000 children and about 45 percent of the combatants of the Northern Alliance army were children. During the war with Iraq, the Iranian Basidj hired many children. These children did the housework and took care of weapons but were also combatants. Today, there are approximately 8,000 child soldiers in Afghanistan; some of them are only 11 years old. There is a new Afghan decree prohibiting military recruitment of children under the age of 22 (Human Rights Watch 2004). Evidence, however, suggests that insurgent groups continue to exploit child soldiers. In Iran, the minimum recruitment age for the army is 16 and for the police forces 17.

The tasks assigned to these children shorten their lives: their health deteriorates and many die soon, replaced by younger siblings. Even if they

survive, they have few prospects for a future. It is difficult in both countries to control child labor as children work in small structures, non-official branches, or non-structural environments such as agriculture. Most of these jobs are hazardous. Some of the children in Iran are unregistered refugees or illegal immigrants, and it is almost impossible to locate them and control their work conditions.

Efforts to curb child labor

In Afghanistan, government policies are set to eliminate child labor, with the help of international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and local organizations launched in 2002 a "Back to School" campaign with the ministry of education, hoping to reduce child labor. There is also a trend to empower children, through conferences and meetings. Children's words are therefore published in local journals or heard on supported local networks. The local community, through mosques and local information networks, plays an important role in sending appeals to find abducted children. Girls are put at the forefront of the effort.

In Iran, there are NGOs tackling the issues of child labor, working together to be more efficient. A number of organizations are working on a draft law to make child labor more restricted with which they hope to lobby the government. The ILO and UNICEF have a program in the country called "Eliminating Child Labor." In 2002, UNICEF and the Interior Ministry's Bureau of Social Affairs set up a committee to address the problem of street children.

In general, child labor has decreased in Iran over the last decades because the economy is improving. Experts say that the number of children working will continue to drop. In Afghanistan, in contrast, child labor is on the rise because many families are now supported by the work of children as the man of the household has died or is still at war.

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South Asia

South Asian countries, like other developing countries, have been struggling to eliminate child labor. However, complex sociopolitical and economic factors help to maintain child labor in the region. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has identified poverty as the cause and consequence of child labor.

India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bhutan, and Nepal, all seven countries in South Asia, are trying to achieve Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). MDG 2 (Achieve Universal Primary Education) and MDG 3 (Promote Gender Equality and Empowerment of Women) are both connected with elimination of child labor. To achieve MDG 2, nearly 17 million children will have to be covered in 2005 and in 2015, 213 million people will have to be reached (United Nations 2005).

Bangladesh is one of the few countries that drafted the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in accordance with the MDGs. The final PRSP is expected to be approved by the end of 2005. South Asian governments hold frequent meetings with the local Consultative Groups

(LCGs) of the Donor Consortium to achieve MDGs by 2015.

People of South Asia are highly conscious of politics and are extremely active in non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Bangladesh has a vibrant NGO culture, with the head offices of indigenous world famous NGOs such as BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and Grameen Bank in Dhaka, the capital city. The NGOs in South Asia are working toward achieving MDGs in collaboration with the governments and donors.

Gender sensitivity

According to the United Nations report (2005, 19, 24), gender disparity is a reflection of complex social, cultural, and economic issues. While some improvement in gender sensitivity is noticeable in education, health, labor and employment, and democratic participation, South Asia needs to mainstream gender equity principles into policies, strategies, institutions, and practices.

Policy and legal framework

There are six major international human rights instruments that help to improve gender relations and social, economic, and political rights:

1. ICESCR, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
2. ICCPR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3. CERD, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
4. CEDAW, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
5. CRC, the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
6. MWC, the international Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.

Total population and total child labor population in South Asia

A huge portion of the population in South Asia are under the age of 15 and millions of them are involved in child labor. Table 1 gives some figures from five South Asian countries. Often, accurate data are not available because of lack of regular documentation.

The civil wars in Nepal and Sri Lanka have contributed to child labor in the form of child soldiers. Child soldiers are often found to be abused and traumatized and miss out on regular childhood by having been brought up without a family environment and often without guardians. They are subjected to violence with regimented training and pushed into undefined battlefields because child labor is used in guerilla fighting. Regular uncertainty and living with violence become the norms of their childhood.

A large percentage of child labor in South Asia is involved in different types of sectors, for example agriculture, industries, services, and the informal sector. Table 2 shows some of the figures available for different sectors.

It has been found that in Bangladesh children work up to 43 hours a week (ILO 2005). In South Asia children are trafficked between districts and villages, and also internationally to become exploited as sex workers. Children from South Asia are trafficked to the Middle East to become camel jockeys in a very cruel sport enjoyed locally.

Though Tables 5 and 6 show that children are enrolling in primary and secondary schools, this does not necessarily mean that they are not having to work before or after school hours. Cheap child labor gives comparative advantage to South Asia over its neighboring regions and that is why there is also a high rate of children dropping out of

Table 1. Country by Population of Child Labor

Country	Total Population (millions), 2002	Total under Age 15 (%), 2002	Total Child Labor (millions), 5–17 years
Bangladesh	143.8 (i)	38.3 (i)	7.9 (ii)
India	1049.5 (i)	33.3 (i)	11.2 (ii)
Nepal	24.6 (i)	40.2 (i)	2.6 (ii)
Sri Lanka	18.9 (i)	25 (i)	NA
Pakistan	149.9 (i)	41.5 (i)	NA

Sources: (i) UNDP 2004; (ii) ILO 2005.

Table 2. Country by Percentage of Child Labor in Different Sectors

Country	Child Labor			
	Agriculture (%)	Services (%)	Industry (%)	Informal Sector (%)
Bangladesh	56.4	25.9	17.7	93.3
Nepal	94.7			
Sri Lanka	60			

Source: ILO 2005.

Table 3. Population Living below the Poverty Line and GDP Per Capita

Country	Population Living below the Poverty Line (%), 1990/1	GDP per capita (PPP US$) 2002 (i)
Bangladesh	49.8 (ii)	1,700
India	28.6 (i)	2,670
Nepal	42 (i)	370
Sri Lanka	25 (i)	3,570

Sources: (i) UNDP 2004; (ii) UNICEF 2004.

Table 4. Breakdown of Child Labor by Gender in Three South Asian Countries

Country	Child Workers 5–17 years (%)	
	Boys	Girls
Bangladesh	73.5	26.5
Nepal	54	46
Sri Lanka	62.3	37.7

Source: ILO 2005.

Table 5. Primary School Enrollment Ratio (Gross) by Gender in 1997–2000

Country	Male	Female
Bangladesh	100	101
India	111	92
Nepal	128	108
Sri Lanka	107	104
Pakistan	93	94

Source: UNICEF 2004.

Table 6. Secondary School Enrollment Ratio (Gross) by Gender in 1997–2000

Country	Male	Female
Bangladesh	45	47
India	57	40
Nepal	58	43
Sri Lanka	70	75
Pakistan	29	19

Source: UNICEF 2004.

school in South Asia. Without completing education, millions of children seek to secure their immediate livelihood, mostly from work available in the informal sector; thus security of their future livelihood based on education is bankrupted in the process. Tables 5 and 6 do not therefore demonstrate much positive impact in the long run in the region.

A large number of female and male children are also trafficked and made to engage in sex work in South Asia and beyond. Often it is not possible to rescue them and they grow into adulthood without any freedom or human rights.

Though child labor is a recognized national problem in all the seven countries of South Asia, it is extremely difficult to eliminate or even reduce the problem because of international business interests, which benefit from cheap labor and the sex industry.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

From the rural farm to the urban street, girls are participating in the economies of the Muslim societies of Sub-Saharan Africa. That girls do participate in the tasks of households and the rigors of work is both a symptom of the region's poverty and one of its causes. The long-term impact of girls working rather than going to school results in fewer trained individuals available to promote modern economies in the region. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of girls at work in Muslim Africa is an important part of their socialization process and families' household budgets, and a foundation of many contemporary economies.

Islam is the dominant religion in Africa in a belt stretching in a wide arc from the central East African coast through Sudan and west to Senegal and Mauritania. The *sunna* of the Prophet Muḥammad stresses an age-based consideration of children's responsibilities, with an emphasis on nurturing up to the age of seven, and acceptance of social responsibility only at puberty's onset. That the child be guided by good parenting is another Qurʾānic injunction. Islamic societies in Africa have placed faith at their centers so that social norms regarding child rearing and the proper place of children are largely seen as Islamic standards. The tension between the fulfillment of these requirements and the pressing economic needs of families is a crucial aspect of household decision-making.

Islamic socialization of children and particularly of girls continues in no matter what other social activity they are engaged. Contemporary Sub-Saharan African societies are making strides in promoting at least universal primary education but illiteracy and the low level of girls' school attendance predominate. Selected countries from the region that have data in the UNICEF-ILO-World Bank project on Understanding Children's Work (UCW) (www.ucw-project.org) illustrate the gap (all data are year 2000 and are for girls aged 10): Chad: 49.8 percent of girls are in school and 64.6 percent are economically active; Gambia: 51 percent in school and 40 percent economically active; Guinea: 30 percent in school and 55 percent economically active; Mali: 36 percent in school and 80 percent economically active; and Senegal: 47 percent in school and 43 percent economically active. (Numbers adding to more than 100 percent are cases where girls work and go to school.) The search for symbiosis between school and work continues as girls are expected to perform myriad domestic tasks in household maintenance, cooking, and childcare, as well as sometimes contributing to the household economy.

The paternalism that characterizes many Sub-Saharan African societies determines that under general circumstances girls' work is part of a family subsistence plan. Agriculture has dominated these economies throughout their history; its sea-

sonality means that girls' activities do vary throughout the cycle allowing for the inclusion of school attendance in some cases. Subsistence farming with women as the primary farmers (their husbands migrating to work either in towns or on large-scale commercial farms) provides most of the food of the region, and "Africa is the region of female farming par excellence" (Boserup 1970, 16). This vast region, much of it Muslim, exhibits considerable variation in both the types of agriculture practiced and the crops produced. It is dominated by the Sahel, the southern edge of the Sahara extending along the Senegal-Mauritania area east through Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and northern Nigeria and Cameroon to Chad. Dry land or "female" farming (after Boserup 1970) continues into Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia although there are extensively irrigated areas in Sudan as well. Girls can be found engaged in the herding of small ruminants, milking these animals, and providing household assistance in food preparation, pounding of grain, and childcare. As among agricultural societies worldwide, girls are part of the labor available to poor families. In many rural communities the girls may from an early age be able to identify different types of seeds, plants, and agricultural weather patterns. In urban areas of the region girls may assist their mothers or other women relatives in petty trade, as in the *sūq al-niswān* (women's market) of Sudan, for example. Here women, who are widowed or divorced and in need of independent income, are permitted to engage in trade, an occupation generally reserved for men. Their daughters, granddaughters, nieces, and others may fetch tea for them or act as the actual seller of small household goods with the older woman supervising the small business.

The Swahili and other Muslim societies of the East African coast, in today's Kenya and Tanzania, have been urban-oriented cultures for generations. Higher percentages of girls are attending school in the cities here in the contemporary period, as do girls in urban West Africa, and work is generally restricted to domestic chores. Young girls in poorer families may be found engaging in petty trade within short distances of the family home, perhaps selling prepared foods for their mothers who are restricted to the house by childcare constraints or custom. Swahili girls in more rural areas, such as Pemba Island, follow the agricultural pattern discussed earlier, likewise taking on more strenuous duties as they mature.

From the 1960s, with African independence, the shifting paradigms of development and the differential impact of change on gender and age groups have drawn much attention to the topic of children and work. As education has taken a central role in the economic development plans of poor countries, governments and international agencies have attempted to regulate the decisions that families make about their children's work. Children's work is delimited in the 1959 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child by taking place at an "appropriate age" and not interfering with education. The Declaration also urges that children be protected from exploitation. Subsequent UNICEF and International Labor Organization declarations (e.g. 2004) outline the differences between child work and child labor. "Light work" is permitted after age 12, that is, work that does not interfere with education. "Child labor" is defined as work that contravenes these standards, that is, any work before the age of 12, harmful work between the ages of 12 and 14, and any activity that has children "enslaved, forcibly recruited, prostituted, trafficked, forced into illegal activities, and exposed to hazardous work" (UCW Project 2004).

Children's welfare has become an important cause among Western non-governmental organizations and other advocacy groups. Within the countries of Islamic Africa there are religious-based organizations that assist families with general welfare issues. And there are advocacy groups that focus on hazardous work and/or the issues of female circumcision, child marriage, child trafficking, and the like, in order to bring world attention to the problems and end them. Human rights groups have also taken on children's issues in recent years, expanding beyond and adding to their earlier campaigns for gender equality.

Yet while no one disagrees with preventing child prostitution or efforts to stop forced and exploitative child labor practices, there are significant cultural differences between Africans and members of Western societies regarding what constitutes acceptable work for children. Many Westerners view childhood in terms of the conditions of their countries as a carefree time divided between learning and leisure with chores assigned less out of necessity than as character building activities. Although childhood is also seen nostalgically in African societies, it is never conceptualized as entirely without usefulness; and as children grow, so do their responsibilities. African individuals will often contribute to the debate on children's work activities and, indeed, challenge its underlying assumptions, when they reminisce about the household chores that "disciplined us" or "made

us what we are today." For example, helping mothers and other female relatives may be regarded as arduous but also valued for forming tight bonds, shared experiences, and senses of self-worth. Succeeding at difficult tasks and contributing to the welfare of the family often developed self-confidence and self-esteem.

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Turkey

Employment of children is a common phenomenon in many developing countries, including Turkey. One need not go to rural areas to see children engaged in economic activities. In cities, they work as street vendors, as apprentices, and as service sector workers in restaurants and the like. Female children are primarily employed in agriculture, both as wage earners and unpaid family workers, and in textile manufacturing. Male children are more evenly spread out among a dozen or so activities, though underrepresented in agricultural work and in textiles – the female domain.

The first two general laws concerning working children are the Law of Obligations and the Law on General Health Protection. The Law of Obligations (1926), which includes provisions on labor relations, also contains some rules with the aim of protecting the rights of apprentices. The Law on General Health Protection (1930) is one of the most important laws of Turkey concerning public health. It implemented important provisions through its special section entitled "Protection of Children."

The Labor Law was ratified in 1936. Several amendments have been made to this law at various dates. A new Labor Law became effective in 2003, which establishes the minimum age for employment at 15 years, but allows children of 14 to perform light work that does not interfere with their education. This law prohibits underground and underwater work for boys under the age of 18 and precludes children under 17 from heavy and hazardous work.

The Turkish government has been a member of ILO-IPEC (International Labour Organization-International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour) since 1992. IPEC projects carried out over the last 12 years have reached approximately 50,000 children. Of these, 60 percent have been withdrawn from work and placed in schools. The remaining 40 percent have benefited from improved working conditions and health, nutrition, and vocational training services. IPEC Turkey is now in the process of increasing assistance to constituents through the development of national time-bound initiatives that formulate concrete policies and programs to eradicate the worst forms of child labor within a determined period of time.

The Ministry of Labor Inspection Board is responsible for enforcing child labor laws in Turkey. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security established a Child Labor Unit (CLU) that chairs an interagency advisory committee, comprised of representatives of government ministries, universities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and other United Nations agencies. The CLU is responsible for making and promoting child labor laws, launching new programs, and raising awareness with the public.

In 1997 the government raised compulsory years of schooling from 5 to 8 years. However, the level of schooling of women is still very low in Turkey.

The first Child Labor Survey (CLS) was carried out in 1994 and the second in 1999. A comparison of results of the two surveys shows an important decrease in the percentage of working children in the 6–14 age group. The fall in incidence of child labor seems mainly to originate from the agricultural sector. There does not seem to be a significant change in the number of children in other sectors.

In urban areas, the overwhelming majority of children are employed as wage earners. Unpaid family workers constituted an important share of the employed children. However, in 1999, following a drastic fall in the number of children employed as unpaid family workers, the proportion of wage earners increased further. The decline

was especially noteworthy for female children. Due to the important role of agriculture in the rural economy, over 80 percent of male and female children work as unpaid family workers. The proportion of female children employed as unpaid family workers is larger than their male counterparts. Among the children engaged in economic activities, the most frequently cited reasons for work were contribution to household income and to help in household economic activities.

Along with governmental organizations, many public and university youth clubs, organizations, and NGOs taking part in ILO-IPEC projects are now involved in working for termination of child labor. Child labor oriented intervention models are being investigated in developing countries other than Turkey, but everywhere it is recognized that it is not possible to withdraw child workers from working life at one fell swoop. What is required is protection of children in their working life with the aim of the elimination of child labor in the long run.

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Dilek Temiz

Economics: Commodification and Consumption

Arab States

In the Middle East, the changes that nurtured capitalism fostered the growth of consumer culture in three related ways. Although capitalist development during the precolonial (pre-1900) and colonial eras (1900–19) was generally uneven and geared toward the production of a cash crop, the future Arab states developed ports, roads, and railroads, which connected centers of production with centers of consumption. Second, this economic infrastructure helped to increase the quantity of goods that were available. Finally, the growth of a middle class, a natural by-product of capitalism, greatly increased the number of potential consumers. Even with these factors in place, consumer culture would not spread without companies, stores, and agents promoting products that seem suitable and desirable. Potential consumers had to be acclimated to spending and consuming. By the late nineteenth-century, women were the arbiters of taste and function in middle- and upper-class homes. Support for this role was clearly present in the mainstream and women's presses, as well as in the textbooks of government, missionary, and community schools.

Historians have long debated the impact of consumer culture on women. Some see consumerism as an empowering force that provides new opportunities. Others argue that the separation of home and work took prestige away from women. Consequently they view consumerism as insidiously providing the appearance of power and choice, masking a reality of male authority, fettered in male conceptions of fashion and beauty that reinforce the economic and sexual subordination of women. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in between. Much in the same way that adolescents test new identities, women in a period of historical change can consume in ways that challenge, reinforce, or subvert traditional conceptions of womanhood.

The "tulip period" of the eighteenth century represents an era of transition. Although most famous for the elaborate gardens cultivated by Ottoman elites, this period also reflected significant changes affecting broader segments of the population. For example, previous restrictions on mass consumer items, e.g. coffee and tobacco, faded and their use spread. It was during this period that the upper class began to purchase Western items for the home, e.g. clocks and furnishings. Charlotte Jirousek (2000) speculates that such purchases were easier than those related to the changes that would take place in clothing in the following century, since such items were not as connected to identity as clothing.

Elite homes in the precolonial era demonstrated not-so-conspicuous consumption. Islamic architecture traditionally maintained plain exteriors, with the interior and inner courtyard receiving greater attention. The more elite the owner, the more features there were, for example bathhouses, ovens, and laundry facilities, aimed at creating self-sufficiency. In other words, distinction came from separation. While some neighborhoods might be exclusive, most urban neighborhoods were mixed. Furnishings included rugs, cushions, mattresses, and trays that could be arranged such that any room could be used for sleeping, eating, or visiting. The wealthy furnished their homes in ways that were quantitatively and qualitatively better, but not entirely different from their lower-class counterparts.

The home, its divisions, and its furnishings changed dramatically over the course of the nineteenth century. Location in a "proper" neighborhood, new architectural styles, rooms with specification of function, and Western styles of furnishings became common in middle- and upper-class homes. Male and female contributors to the turn-of-the-century press identified the woman as being responsible for the home, the building block of reformed political life.

What began in the mid-nineteenth century in urban areas of the future Arab states became common in rural areas by the early twentieth century (Khater 2001). The continued development of regular postal systems, the creation of journals subsidized by advertising, and the spread of catalogs enabled women in smaller towns and rural regions to follow the trends of the cities. Previously, it was quite common for women of the upper classes to receive female traders, *dallāla*s, in their homes. Some *dallāla*s worked independently, while others worked in partnership with men, usually husbands or relatives. These women familiarized female consumers with new trends in furnishings, fashion,

and cosmetics. The arrival of department stores in the late nineteenth century did not eradicate the role of *dallāla*s, who continued to function even after the turn of the century.

Education in modern school systems and the rise of a women's press in cities, e.g. Alexandria, Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut, made women aware of new changes reflected in the science of home management. While gender specification was not all that common in the pre-First World War advertising, by the 1920s/30s it was. Interestingly enough, some of the trends in advertising mirror some Western trends, e.g. an emphasis on raising strong, healthy children; preoccupation with modernity; and an adherence to the parable of civilization redeemed. Nevertheless, the average female reader in the Middle East was wealthier and better educated than her Western counterpart. Thus, labor-saving devices and ready-made food rarely appeared since most literate women had at least one servant to do the menial tasks of the household. In this era, men and women were encouraged to purchase "national" or local products and services (Russell 2004, Frierson 2000).

Early on, few representations of women appeared in advertisements, aside from Western companies that redeployed sketches from older campaigns. There was some effort to represent indigenous women in their late teens and early twenties in advertisements; however, they appeared alongside women in Western dress, sometimes literally hand-in-hand. The message to the consumer: our products or services garner a wide audience. There was a need to target both conservative and Westernized customers. Although female literacy rates across the region were extremely low, female literacy in urban areas far exceeded national averages. It is during this era that some advertisements begin to speak directly to women. Nevertheless, whether in advertising or in the press more generally, there were not many pictures of indigenous women. Coverage of far-reaching political events, e.g. the 1919 Revolution in Egypt or the Wailing Wall riots in Palestine, might spark more coverage of women. Nevertheless, there were few close-ups of women, and where these existed, veils/hats and/or modesty garments often obscured them.

By the 1930s, advertising moved to the New Woman model, who was entirely Western looking in style and features. Where a woman appeared working, it was usually as a servant, depicted with dark skin and exaggerated features. Only products seeking a mass market, e.g. Pepsi, attempted some (but not all) advertisements with women in *baladī* attire. Although the number, quality, and size of publications receded at the outset of the depression, by the early 1940s more journals appeared and those that survived returned to their pre-depression size. Trends toward "national" advertising receded somewhat; however, the boundaries of what constituted national were quite porous. Between the late 1930s and early 1940s women became a much more visible force in content, advertising, and political cartoons. Indeed, the research of Lucie Ryzova (2005) indicates that the female body became commodity for mass consumption in movie magazines, pulp fiction, and in homemade scrapbooks filled with pin-up girls.

Revolutions throughout the Middle East between the late 1940s and the late 1960s brought forth a new class to positions of power. State socialist regimes redistributed property and nationalized businesses from banks to department stores. More women received education, and states provided more opportunities for women to work. It is in this era that labor-saving devices and various forms of ready-made food appeared in advertisements. The New Woman remained in Western-style clothing, one exception being during the war for independence in Algeria where traditional forms of dress provided a form of resistance and means for carrying out covert operations. As for household furnishings, older Western styles remained popular. While Arab Socialism called for sacrifice and austerity, magazines continued to promote bourgeois consumption. An issue of the Egyptian women's magazine *Hiya wa huwa* from 1964 demonstrates these points. It is filled with Western fashions, an article provides the layout for the apartment of the reader's dreams, a photographic spread displays a tasteful home with Louis-Philippe and Louis XVI style furnishings, and an advertisement for the state-owned appliance factory depicts a woman in pedal-pushers and a short sleeved blouse, controlling her vacuum with her fingertip while she relaxes in a chair reading a book.

The rise of Islamicist trends since the 1970s brought changes in consumption. While women in Western dress remained prominent in advertising and the media, more women began dressing according to their own interpretation of the dictates of Islam. This could range from modest clothing and a headscarf to completely covered, including face, hands, and ankles. In Saudi Arabia the state dictates the parameters of decency utilizing the morals police. New stores across the region encouraged women to dress Islamicly without compromising fashion or taste at home, work, or

formal parties. The expansion of the Internet has meant that companies, for example Jordanian Sajeda, can market products ranging from *jilbāb*s to *ʿabāʾa*s to consumers around the world. Sajeda's Islamic bathing suits each carry the warning that the company provides no fatwa (religious opinion given by a learned individual) in support of the suit and recommends that the wearer use her own judgment.

The spread of radio, film, and television over the course of the twentieth century provided women with positive and negative models of consumer culture. Women involved in media programming have generally promoted feminist aims. The research of Lila Abu-Lughod on television feminism indicates that while women of all classes might consume these forms of media, they do not necessarily agree with the tone, tenor, or the meaning of the message (Abu-Lughod 2001).

Gender stereotypes prevail in advertising, and Western companies utilize themes that perhaps would not work in their campaigns at home. A 1992 Bayer insecticide campaign clearly demonstrates these points. The commercial opens with a view of a modern kitchen. The camera then focuses on the lady of the house, who is sobbing. The husband addresses the audience and says, "Wait, while I ask her what's wrong." On the verge of hysteria, the wife complains that she has heard insects crawling around various parts of the kitchen and that her spouse is late. The patronizing husband knows what is wrong, because he has a can of Baygon behind his back, and he laughs condescendingly as his wife's tirade continues. He demonstrates how effectively the product works and assures her that the problem has been solved. The wife's tears to turn to laughter as she announces that she can now live in peace.

Bayer hired Lotus, an Egyptian advertising company, to shoot two versions of this commercial, one for Egypt and one for Saudi Arabia. Both versions were shot in an exclusive kitchen-furnishings store in Maadi, a Westernized suburb of Cairo. The lip-synching Egyptian-American actress portraying the wife wore modest, but Western clothes for the Egyptian version and a *khalījī ʿabāʾa* for the Saudi version. Furthermore, for the latter there was no camera angle that shot a part of her body not covered by the *ʿabāʾa*. Similarly, the Egyptian actor portraying the husband wore his own clothes for the Egyptian version and changed into a *thawb* (robe) and red and white checkered *ghuthra* (headscarf) for the Saudi version. Had this been for an American audience, the company likely would have portrayed the wife as a superwoman who could work, cook, clean, and kill insects, rather than the powerless, hysterical denizen of the kitchen.

Consumerism in the Arab states over the course of the twentieth century has often involved strange hybrids of old/new, Western/non-Western. Research by an Israeli anthropologist in an Arab village in the Galilee traces changes in housing over three generations. Residents went from small, extended-family households made of mud to larger, nuclear family residences made of concrete with Western-style furnishings. Nationalist aspirations provided a motif for decoration including portraits of Nasser, local heroes, and maps of Palestine. By the 1990s, a parallel trend emerged: "old fashioned" interior designs that celebrate a non-existent authenticity (Forte 2003).

While consumption has been an important marker of identity, so too has non-consumption. In Palestine women of all sorts participated in economic boycotts and non-consumption of Jewish-owned goods and services during the Great Revolt (1936–9) and more recently in the first intifada, and many continued even after official cessation (Fleischmann 2003). While economic boycotts of British goods took place in Egypt in 1922 and again in 1931, their effects were not particularly far-reaching. Other forms of non-consumption are not-so-freely chosen. In post-1989 Sudan, the government's forced Islamicization program has meant dramatic drops in the quality of life, including a reduction of protein consumption, not just for the lower classes, but also for the middle class (Gruenbaum 2001).

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Mona Russell

Iran

Because of the state of research on this subject, this entry concentrates on the period after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. It is generally agreed that the Pahlavī period (1926–79) was one of modernization, understood as Westernization, and that an emerging Iranian upper and upper middle class acquired Western tastes during this period, displaying specific consumption patterns. However, the gender dynamic of these patterns has been less, if at all, researched.

After the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian economy was reorganized on principles combining private initiative with state control over the main resources. The dynamic of post-revolutionary Iran in the last 26 years combined the regularization of the social, political, and economic space under Islamic rule with the emergence of a new urban middle class with specific tastes. Material and symbolic consumption was subsumed under the same attempt at regularization, certain types of products and their uses being associated with Western lifestyle, and thus held to be counter to revolutionary ideals and exemplary citizenship. This was reflected in economic laws and social policies that in turn gave highly contested political meanings to commodities. For example, until March 2002 the import of finished garments was formally forbidden, as a protectionist measure; the use of satellite television is still forbidden at the time of writing.

Historically in Iran (and elsewhere) women are regarded as exponents of nationhood, and are seen as a priority for regulatory policies under "male guardianship" (Amin 2002). In this context, the Islamic regime put forward an ideal type of woman-citizen characterized by restraint and modesty. The Islamic moral police *(pāsdārs)* check that those principles are respected, and ensure that the display of Western-style clothing and behavior is minimal on the streets.

After the Iran–Iraq war of 1980–8 and the consolidation of the Islamic regime, a phenomenon of relative generalization of mass consumption was seen. The emergence of the new middle classes, the relaxation of the regime with the coming to power of President Mohammed Khatami (1997–2005), the increased imports of goods for domestic use, and the influx of members of the Iranian diaspora returning temporarily or permanently influenced the patterns of consumption in Iran. Women gained more rights and economic independence, becoming targeted consumers for many products and services. An interesting gender dynamic is reflected in the patterns of commercialization:

1. Fashion and cosmetics, produced locally and imported. Commercialized in modern shopping malls (in 2003 Tehran had twelve well-known upper scale malls), fashion products address both women and men. However, the publicity for women's beauty products (posters) does not depict women's bodies, although sometimes facial features or hands are suggested around the photographed commodity. In 2003, *Lotus. The First Persian Fashion Journal* appeared on the market featuring for the first time models showing their

faces. Female plastic mannequins lack the upper part of the head, but male ones do not.

2. Beauty services (parlors, gym/fitness clubs, and plastic surgery). The emergence of gyms and body-related consumption is notable, being somehow in harmony with the emphasis that the Iranian government puts on women's participation in sports. Iran was the organizer of the fourth Muslim Women's Games in 2005. In Tehran there are private fitness clubs and state organized sport clubs, both popular among women, and both gender segregated. Private fitness clubs are places of encounter for women in which significant social links are made in a modern ambiance. Rhinoplasty is popular among both young men and women.

3. Domestic appliances. In the publicity for domestic appliances the images of women abound. Women's bodies are shown as they engage in domestic chores, using the desired commodities (see Fig. 1). The most popular brands among middle classes are: LG, Tefal, and Samsung. Counterfeits may be bought in Tehran Bazaar.

4. The rapid urban development in Tehran and other Iranian major cities brought new forms of habitation. In the middle- and upper-class neighborhoods, apartments with an "American kitchen" (open kitchen with bar) are the norm, a fashion generated mainly by the return of Iranian architects trained in the United States or Western Europe. This new layout changed the patterns of alimentary consumption: pre-packed food became popular. It also opened up this domestic space to male presence.

5. Private cars. Although advertisements are not gendered, a greater number of men own cars. Middle- and upper-class urban women usually own and drive their own cars. However, women are not allowed to have a motorcycle driving license.

In contemporary Iran, while public advertising promotes an image of a model Iranian woman, consumption patterns show much more flexibility of gender models. The generalized consumption of Western lifestyle products in the urban areas make it impossible to associate political stances with the brand or type of product consumed.

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Alexandru Balasescu

Turkey

In a consumer society, identities are expressed through the medium of consumer goods. For example, secularist and Islamist identities in contemporary Turkey are seen to a large extent as products of consumer culture. Research in this field shows that the identity politics of secularists and Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s was involved with a history of commodification (Navaro-Yashin 2002). "The veil" and "Atatürk" have become central signifiers in the contemporary politics of identity over the last two decades.

Since the mid-1980s, economic and political changes at the global level and the modernization process have shaped Turkey's contemporary political and cultural environment. The process of economic liberalization introduced by the Özal administration in the 1980s led Turkey to open up to the world socioculturally as well as economically. This particular period is seen as responsible for the new Islamist movement in contemporary Turkey.

Islamist movements have mostly represented themselves in reaction to commodity cultures that spread Western lifestyles and values. However, the mainstream of the Islamist movement has shown a different approach to consumer culture in the Turkish context, and this played a significant role in shaping the politics of culture over the last two decades. It is argued that the realm of Islamist and secularist cultures was from the beginning commodified (Navaro-Yashin 2002). The most significant way for Islamists to form identities in distinction from secularists was the development of specialized businesses for "Islamic goods" and the formation of market networks for believers.

Women's clothes have been highly symbolic in a market war over identities: the rise of the Islamist movement was integral to the creation of a market for headscarves, overcoats, and veils for women.

While secular companies claimed to produce a "secular lifestyle" and the "modern woman" image, Islamist companies tried to construct their understanding of the "modern Islamist/Turkish woman" identity. Thus, through commodification of the female body, a "modern woman" and/or "Muslim womanhood" in contemporary Turkey have been constructed.

Modernized Muslim woman wears *tesettür*. *Tesettür* is a distinctive form of Islamic dress which consists of a long, feminine, loosely tailored coat and a large silk headscarf. As White points out, *tesettür* is more than a style of clothing: "it is part of a life style that encompasses a religio-cultural code of behavior prescribing the special segregation of men and women" (White 2002, 206). *Tesettür*, as a form of cultural Islam, is used as a marker of difference from the secularist elites as well as the masses. Despite the Islamist elite's attempt to distinguish *tesettür* and its associated lifestyle from their traditionally lived context, today *tesettür* is associated with everyday urban life.

In the 1980s, big cities witnessed the emergence of new shopping malls. Not only did they transform the traditional bazaar and lead the feminization of shopping in Turkey (Durakbaşa and Cindoğlu 2002), but they also generated a debate among the Islamist groups. Radical Islamist intellectuals, who associated consumerism with the culture of Westernists in Turkish society, were critical of these places. Nevertheless, one significant reaction was the establishment of Islamist department stores. Tekbir, meaning a call to cry "God is great," is one of the first. It is claimed to have a role in popularizing covering among Turkish women (Navaro-Yashin 2002), and students were their main target group.

In the mid-1990s, some covered women's clothing companies organized fashion shows, which caused debates within the Islamist circles. For example, while the conservative press published appreciative reports on such events, the radical Islamist press criticized Turkish Islamists for integrating Islam within the capitalist system and questioned the value of exhibitions of veiling. Despite these discussions, *tesettür* and fashion shows are increasingly becoming a significant part of the Turkish fashion industry.

Islamist women present diverse discourses in their writings and magazines and question women's identity in relation to Islam, other women, and the state (Acar 1995). Issues such as the meaning of woman/femininity and the sexuality of women in the Western world, the objectification of women and abuse of women's sexuality in the capitalist system, and women in Islam are emphasized (Kural 1997). Although the majority of the Islamist women writers tend to perceive feminism as a product of Westernization, which could offer nothing to a true Muslim woman, some of them use feminist terms, such as "sexism" and "patriarchy." They claim that it is tradition, that is, traditional patriarchy, and modern capitalist structures, not Islam, that have oppressed and subordinated women. Nonetheless, conceptualization of Islam in this way by Islamist women does not prevent them from criticizing Islamist male writers and intellectuals for not paying enough attention to empowering the position of women in society.

To conclude, it may be said that the particular socioeconomic, political, and cultural context of the 1980s and the 1990s provided women with disputed ideologies and identities as a means to reproduce and reconstruct themselves through the medium of consumption. Commodification had much to do with the reification of certain symbols, such as "the veil" and "Atatürk," as signifiers of identity during this period. Consequently, Turkey's integration into consumer culture and networks of global consumerism has resulted, on the one hand, in providing a space for these communities to develop their politics of identities, and on the other hand, in sharpening existing ideological differences and cultural cleavages. Thus consumer culture has a close link with the politics of identity in Turkey. By establishing consumable signifiers in conflict with one another, commodification had a role in transforming the politics of culture into a war over symbols. Women's bodies and sexualities are used as symbols of this war. In this process, women are addressed as consumers of goods and also as objects of commodification by both secularists and Islamists.

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Süheyla Kirca Schroeder

Economics: Cottage Industries

Egypt

It is common for Egyptian families to rely upon a variety of economic resources, which may include money made by women who earn income from home. So while the Qur'ān states, "Men are in charge of women, because Allah hath made the one of them to excel the other, and because they spend of their property (for the support of women)" (4:34), the reality can be quite different.

South Sinai

> He brought the sewing machine so that I could work and earn money and not as a gift for me. When there is no money on any day, he says "Why do you not work, you have the machine with which to work." I work very hard but some months I do not even make 20 pounds. [A little less than $10 then, spring 1990.] In a day, if I make 5 pounds it is quickly spent.

So said a Beduin wife and mother, living on the coast of the South Sinai Desert. She did not mind earning some income for that was what was excepted of most wives in all but the wealthiest of families. What she minded was her husband frequently being absent, often with no explanation for days on end, with mainly her sewing work and their extended family members for support. To prevent her from leaving him, as was her right, he was chastised by their male family members for shirking his responsibilities.

Women in her village worked at home due to their housework duties and also because of recent modesty concerns. In the more positive situations, a wife's income ability was a valued asset admired by husbands and others, with her earnings covering some household expenses as well as providing her with discretionary income. Machine sewing and embroidering was a typical way to make money, as was raising fowl to sell, along with eggs, to others in the village. They also made handicrafts using traditional skills, especially beaded jewelry, sold to tourists.

Over the years, the women and also some girls became engaged in an impossibly stiff competition for such work because a main source of male income, tourism, was unreliable (Gardner 2000). So in 2002, a handicraft center opened to provide them with beading material and wider marketing support, with initial financing from the European Union. Their center was a satellite of a well-established handicraft center near the famous St. Catherine's Monastery, in the interior. The unmarried salaried manager of the new center, the first girl in the village allowed to finish high school, had high hopes:

> I am happy that a "door of wealth" has been opened for the women. I feel I have a personality and that I can rely on myself; that I have become independent . . . The center has a large amount of accounting and paperwork; my education has enabled me to manage this. I am able to teach and set an example for the younger generations (Selim 2003, 12).

Sales expanded at first but the beaders did not have time to do labor-intensive work. The global market was already awash with beadwork similar to theirs and the local market was liable to collapse for months at a time due to terrorist bombings in nearby Israel and then along the South Sinai coast. So the center faltered. The women had already lost their role as herders in the last generation, when their tribe lost its coastal land to hotel development.

Cairo

Children in low-income homes may be needed to work, at the loss of an education. So the NGO, Community and Institutional Development (CID) has taken the pragmatic approach of setting up projects to combine working in a cottage industry with basic education for some of the children of garbage collectors in Cairo. Laila Iskandar, director of CID, stressed:

> Learning schemes grounded in local systems of economics and culture allow youth to create their own path towards sustainable development, a path on which even the most excluded can lead the way. Basic non-formal education, and by extension practical skills training in the informal economy, remain among the few means of addressing the dire situation of excluded youth (2005, 63).

Working from home with the support of a training center, daughters weave already recycled rags into rugs, while women engage in patchwork quilting. The girls use handlooms, reviving an ancient tradition, but on the downside, operating a handloom is back-breaking work. So the weaving is done three hours a day by mostly young girls, as it is too much for married women (Iskandar Kamel 2002, 38).

The girls attend literacy classes at the center and also learn business accounting skills in relation to their work. For the women, who have time-consuming household duties, the focus is more on numeracy and the ability to adapt to the changing demands of creating and selling handicrafts – basic mathematics and adaptability are skills useful in other areas of their lives. The women and girls can come to the center for health-promoting activities. Boys collect brand-name bottles, such as shampoo bottles, to prevent their reuse and then destroy the bottles at the center so that the plastic can be recycled. They are also taught basic reading, accounting, and about health and safety concerns. (Detailed in Iskandar Kamel 2002, Iskandar 2005.)

There are also recycling and compost projects for men in the same area, which are an extension of the garbage-collecting community's long-held skill of sorting usable items from the trash. Some of the young men from these projects in Cairo went to the South Sinai coast, which has been overdeveloped for hotel tourism, to set up a much-needed CID sorting and recycling center there. The Beduin children in this region of South Sinai typically go to school for at least some years. So it would not be appropriate to establish a home-based handloom project for young girls there.

Colonial Asyut

Women working at home in cottage industries have a long history in Egypt. During the latter years of the Ottoman era, some women and girls in the farming area of Asyut assembled shawls and tulle, the material for veils, at home. Merchants sold imported raw material to the women, who then resold the finished shawls and the piecework material for veils back for a tiny return (Chalcraft 2005, 111–13).

While we do not have the women's words to consider, this assessment of their situation can be made: "Moreover, geographical dispersement and gender norms constraining women to the domestic realm operated as an obstacle to women's organizing in defense of wage rates, and made women easier targets for exploitation. Finally, neither women nor merchants had to make capital outlays to train female workers, whose skills had often already been learned in domestic settings and thus could be transferred cheaply and rapidly to more commercial activities" (Chalcraft 2005, 112).

Their income was apparently considered supplemental to the household resources, which would often have included home-grown food since this was a farming area. So even such low income had some worth because it was better than nothing, but it was clearly very exploitative work.

Conclusions

Too many Egyptians have long been marginalized by a lack of access and rights, especially women in the face of wider changing socioeconomics (Lynch and Fahmy 1991, Tucker 2002). Women who work in home-based cottage industries in Egypt are not often factored into official accountings with some exceptions, such as in a survey sponsored by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (Chen et al. 2005). A focus on cottage industries, however, is very much part of the ever-growing body of studies on household economics, detailed along with the other resources that middle- to lower-class families might rely upon. Both genders, for example, might work in the informal sector, whether by being self-employed or though insecure wage employment. Even having a long-term job with benefits outside the home in the formal sector often does not mean economic security for a man or a woman. So a family will develop a multi-resource household, which may consist of one or more family members having salaried employment with benefits; second jobs; food and profit from farming in rural areas; personal enterprises set up in and outside the household; bartering; government aid; and the extended family (Singerman and Hoodfar 1996, Lobban 1998).

Researchers have differing points of view as to what is of interest, sometimes using different definitions for the same economic terms, but a common theme, whether stated or implied, for women with household responsibilities is, "by invoking Islamic rights and traditional ideology, women try to ensure that additional contributions to the household on their part are not reflected in decreased contributions by their husbands" (Hoodfar 1998, 259). While most men may work away from home if they choose, that can be, depending upon the circumstances, an opportunity or a burdensome obligation.

As the examples from South Sinai, Cairo, and Colonial Asyut highlight, home-based cottage industries can offer women and girls the opportunity for income and sometimes status, independence, and some education. Yet it is also true that the invisibility of working at home has the potential to be very exploitative insecure work, with no protected benefits and rights. The danger of exploitation must also be guarded against in handicraft self-help projects, given the often intricate nature of the work. Even the manager of the

Beduin handicraft center had actually wanted to attend university to earn a business degree, but that was unprecedented in her village. It is not forbidden in Islam for women and girls to be out and about, as long as they do so modestly (Qur'ān 33:59).

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ANN GARDNER

North Africa

Women's crafts and cottage industries largely overlap in North Africa, and consist of the production of ordinary household items for the use of others; this production until recently occurred in the home. The description in this entry focuses mainly on Morocco because of the author's depth of field experience there, with references to other areas. While literature on the material aspects of crafts exists, detailed information on women's involvement with them is quite sparse. North African women's most widely recognized products are elaborate varieties of embroidery and weaving, but in addition include more mundane items such as clothing sewn or knitted for home use as well as simpler embroidery and weaving, basketry, pottery, rayon woven trim for clothing or cushions (*passementerie*), plus tiny buttons, dyed yarn, and home cooked food. Weaving and embroidery are probably the most practiced crafts, with fewer women participating in each of the other activities. The entry examines the impact of this work at home on women, and whether their work means they make economic contributions to the household. In addition, the entry addresses whether economic contributions, or women's visibility or not in this production, affects their roles in decision-making. Finally, it looks at the historical development of women's crafts and cottage industries from the relatively recent past.

Women's crafts and cottage industries are nearly always learned from a female relative, or were until fairly recently. In some they begin quite young; girls may start weaving between the ages of seven and ten, helping their mothers and older sisters. They may also sew clothing for dolls by hand. They are often entering their teens when they begin embroidery, sewing with a machine, and knitting, and these may be learned from a woman or girl with special skills outside the family. Girls develop cooking skills at home in their mid to late teens, but the females who cook for others at special occasions such as weddings are usually married women. This is also true for those who create braided trim or *passementerie*, while girls start making buttons before their teens. Those crafts are also the only ones that women do only for sale, not for home use. Both older teens and married women can dye yarn for weaving, although some take it to men in the cities now and even more purchase yarn already dyed. Pottery appears to be made by more mature women, often Berbers in certain villages in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, but most often by men.

Women's production of crafts and work in cottage industries at home has a variety of impacts on them. One aspect is the impact on their reputations. A woman who produces excellent products, especially the highly esteemed embroidery and woven rugs, cloaks, belts, and pillows, earns the respect of both her family and community members for her skill. These products are seen at special events: a Middle Atlas Moroccan bride wears a cloak she and/or her mother have made, and she brings to her new home a large complex flatwoven rug and several woven pillows. An excellent weaver in some areas has a better chance of marriage than other young women. An urban bride may bring table and bed linens she has embroidered for her trousseau, often taking over a year to prepare them. The bed linens will be used when she has

her first child and people come to congratulate her. Even women without exceptional skills are admired for weaving simple wool cloth for men's robes or *jellaba*s, or sewing or knitting clothing for the family. A woman who is asked to cook at weddings brings pride to the whole family for her skill.

There are also less positive impacts of home-based production for women. Although weaving can be creative, it is also usually arduous. Weavers complain of back pain from sitting at the upright looms, and their hands crack from contact with wool that has lost most of its lanolin. The weaving area is also full of wool fibers, sometimes inhaled and difficult to clean up. Fes embroidery, the most prestigious type in Morocco, is similar to a counted cross stitch and done by counting threads with no printed design on the fabric. In addition, it should be the same on the front and the back. Most women in their twenties who have been doing Fes embroidery for a few years are very near-sighted; it takes a toll on the eyes. Depending on how important the craft or cottage industry is to household income, it may cause women to have less leisure time.

Work being based at home also has various economic impacts on the women who do it. For the majority of girls and women, the fact that they are home-based means that it is difficult to sell their products. They often learn from relatives, which means the skill is widely known; and if most can do it, who would buy it? It frequently happens that young women will be asked to embroider or sew or knit something for a relative or neighbor outside the immediate family, and then feel obliged to refuse payment when it is (halfheartedly) offered. To get goods to a market, women must work through a middleman or middlewoman, who then takes part of the profit. This happens at all levels. A young village woman gives fabric and thread to other young women to embroider; they are paid by skein of embroidery thread completed, and the products are sold in towns or cities. A more entrepreneurial and mobile young woman manages to gain entrance to government offices in the capital city and takes embroidery orders from female civil servants. Weavers sell rugs at rural markets or to traveling middlemen who deliver them to urban centers and take a good share of the profit. Sometimes women themselves sell at the rural markets, but in areas where women are more secluded their husbands sell and women may not even know the price their work brought.

Even if women do not sell their products widely or for a good price, there is an economic impact in that they are producing something (fabric, sweaters, clothing) that the family does not then need to purchase, so they are helping economically. Traditionally most rural home furnishings were woven, including a tent of aloe fiber or goat hair. Highly skilled women, especially weavers in the south and embroiderers in urban centers, can make a definite contribution to the family's income. Many weavers say they do not weave for sale, which is true, but in times of crisis like an illness or major celebration, textiles serve as a form of savings that can be cashed in. In areas such as southern Morocco, where rainfall is very irregular, women's weaving often contributes more to the family's income than men's agriculture.

Women's economic contribution in different craft sectors has varied with time. Traditionally only women embroidered, and they still do. In the past it was all done by hand, but now some use machines as well. Weaving rugs was done by women at home; now some is done in workshops but all is done by women. Men weave fabric for robes and blankets by hand, but not rugs in Morocco. Both hand and machine sewing was traditionally done by men, and they are still the majority of tailors. But since the 1980s there are many clothing factories in Morocco and they are populated mainly by seamstresses. The majority of potters are male, as are those who dye yarn. Women used to make *passementerie* braid and buttons at home. While they still "needle-weave" the tiny buttons, men have developed and use a simple machine for the braid and are displacing the women. Men also make varieties of braid using card weaving, but women do not. While women are the usual cooks at home and for simpler ceremonial events, there are only a few in restaurants and working as caterers.

Women's ability to make decisions affecting themselves and others can be influenced by their participation in cottage industries and craft production. Since these activities are carried out at home, one might expect that women would not be visible to the larger community. Yet we have described above how a woman's skill, visible through her products, can enhance her own and her family's reputation. However, this is not the same as her ability to make decisions. That is more influenced both by local custom and by her economic contribution to the household through her products. For example, weavers in central Morocco sell their own rugs at market, and say they can, and do, decide what to buy with the money. But in southern Morocco men sell the rugs and receive the money, sometimes sharing with

their wives and sometimes not. Much more work needs to be done on what influences women's ability to make decisions.

There have been many changes in women's crafts and cottage industries in the recent past. While most began as learned and practiced at home, there has been a movement outside the home, and to different environments. The products have also been commodified. The elaborate Fes embroidery provides a good example of these kinds of changes. Initially this embroidery was known by upper-class women, so was a mark of high status. Families who could afford it sent their daughters to "study" with these gentlewomen and learn the skill and other proper behavior, somewhat like a finishing school. In the 1960s the Moroccan government began a *nādi* or women's center program where they were taught home economics skills including sewing and embroidery. Some girls and women were also organized into cooperatives to produce the embroidery for sale. Traditionally, a young woman who did not embroider herself ordered from a skilled neighbor; today there are shops selling fine embroidery. There are also now machines that can mimic the embroidery – though not very well, so the embroiderers are not displaced. And in a final step of commodification, luxury table linens are mimicked by paper napkins printed in a Fes embroidery pattern.

There has been a similar commodification of rugs, with some weaving moving from the home to cooperatives and especially workshops, and many Moroccans now favor machine-made rugs from Belgium because they are inexpensive and light to move and clean. Some weavers still make traditional wool rugs at home to sell, but for themselves they make rag rugs or use recycled sweater yarn to be economical. Egypt as well has seen a movement of some craftswomen from weaving and embroidery at home to cooperatives outside the home. A famous Egyptian example is the Wissa Wassef tapestry workshop located near the pyramids in Giza where both men and women work. Other crafts, such as rugs and ceramics, are marketed to tourists, who play an important role in several North African economies. Tourist taste for muted colors has led to the bleaching of many rugs in Morocco, and this role is played by men. Women traditionally collected plants and prepared vegetable dyes in Morocco, but today very few have these skills. In one project directed by an Austrian man, a local male prepares and uses natural dye for wool rugs woven by women for export to Europe. Pottery workshops usually employed only males, but now one sees a few women in Fes painting designs on the pottery; one wonders if this is to cater to tourists. Male and machine-produced pottery is replacing that made by Berber women across North Africa.

Women have played an important role in the cottage industries and craft production of North Africa, and some earned respect as excellent artisans, as well as income to help their families. Today that is diminishing with increased education for girls and commodification of many crafts, and both respect and income are earned in other areas by many of today's women.

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SUSAN SCHAEFER DAVIS

South Asia

INTRODUCTION

The recorded history for South Asia has been traced back to the fourth century B.C.E., with clear evidence of flourishing civilization consisting of cities, palaces, and forts. The region was considered culturally and monetarily rich for centuries. It exported soft silk and textiles to North Africa, the Middle East, and southern Europe. It became famous for its music and hospitality. During the Mughal period (seventeenth and eighteenth cen-

turies), Dhaka muslin (soft silk) was legendary in the world fabric markets. The unique craftsmanship of the artisans, cheap labor, and locally developed technology were the basis for the textile industry of Bengal, which flourished for several centuries prior to the British invasion in 1756. The British East India Company defeated the Nawab of Bengal, Nawab Siraj ud-Daula, in 1757 at Plassey. The company destroyed the Bengali textile industry and imposed indigo cultivation because British manufacturers of mill cloth were unwilling to compete with the cheaper and better cloth from Bengal. Bengal became desperately poor and even today Bangladesh struggles to revive its weavers and the textile industry. Because of the legacy of the British rule of 200 years, instead of prospering as an industrial country, the region became extremely poor with most countries having an agriculture-based economy. Women suffered the most through feminization of poverty. This entry covers some of the specifically South Asian patterns and types of contemporary cottage industries.

Nakshi kantha

Nakshi kantha means embroidered quilt. However, because of the demand for the design, the name has been applied to saris, cushion covers, wall hangings, purses, bedspreads, and wallet, diary, and file covers. The designs of *nakshi kantha* of Bengal are artistic and intricate; each stitch is made with the intent of representing a personal story of the woman involved with the stitch work. Often it has pictures of the woman's own surroundings, for instance her neighbors, children, relatives, in-laws, friends and acquaintances, villagers in different professions, cattle and poultry, and the flora and fauna of her village. *Nakshi kantha* has traditionally been done as piecework in the home by women and girls. Men are not involved in this type of stitching and needlework.

Dhakai jamdani's geometric manifestation

The *dhakai jamdani* sari of Bengal is a manifestation of geometric shapes and though the saris are worn by women, they are always handwoven by men in a home-based production. The *jamdani* sari is worn only on special occasions. It is always starched when worn and it is so fine that the combination of multiple threads cannot be felt. It takes a month to weave a simple *jamdani* sari. It takes longer if the design is more complicated. Vegetable dye has become very popular for dying thread for *jamdani*s. It is exported worldwide from both Bangladesh and West Bengal, India.

Ceramic dinnerware and terracota

Ceramic dinnerware of Bangladesh, which is mainly exported to Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia, is hand painted with different colors and terracotta design manifesting its Bengali authenticity but keeping in mind modern taste. Both men and women are involved in this industry and there is division of labor based on gender.

Sri Lankan artifacts

Sri Lankan woodwork is enriched with animal and bird figures, for example tigers and peacocks. The International Airport in Colombo is rich with traditional artifacts and handicrafts. Cane furniture with sophisticated finishing is another specialty of the island country.

Himalayan gems

Nepalese cottage industries use graphic designs of Hindu gods and goddesses. Brassware and copper statues are precious examples of traditional cottage industries. Intricate embroidery and beadwork on pashmina shawls and purses are sold at high prices at airports and malls abroad. Silver and gold jewelry with Himalayan gems are worn and sought after by women everywhere and both men and women are involved in their production.

Indian exports

Indian cottage industry encompasses a variety of products that are exported worldwide. Kashmiri shawls, Rajasthani dopattas, Orissa Kota saris, Punjabi beadwork, and Bengali muslin are some of the varieties of Indian products. Gorgeous lehangas, used by actresses Madhuri Dixit and Aishwairya Rai in Sanjay Leela Bhansali's movie *Devdas*, were sold across the world at very high prices for their extraordinary needlework, time-consuming sewing, and complicated designs. Muslin saris, which are translucent and extremely fine material, and dhotis (men's outfit) are worn by high-class women and men in India, at parties and festive occasions.

Pakistan's historic link

Handwoven carpets of Pakistan are world famous and they very much follow the tradition of Persian rugs in their reflection of craftsmanship and taste. Geometric shapes and color combination are eye-enticing and viewers and users feel a sense of rich tradition in them. The carpet industry is male dominated and children from a very young age join their fathers and uncles to learn the skills.

Family trade and tradition

Generally in cottage industries in South Asia, the entire family is involved with any specific craftsmanship and the skill is transferred from generation to generation. For instance, pottery making, carpet-weaving, embroidering, ceramic making, sari weaving, basket making, dying, furniture making, brass carving, copper sculpting, and so forth are learned from family members and from a very early age. The whole of childhood is dedicated to learning the skill and producing the goods with comparatively older family members.

Exploitation of goods and services

Though the products are sold at high prices both in the national capitals and internationally, the workers themselves make meager incomes and are often found to struggle because of lack of international support, lack of subsidy from their own government, and their own lack of awareness of international marketing and networking strategies. They fail to make direct contacts with potential buyers in order to make greater profit out of the goods and services they produce.

Most workers are part of the informal sector and are outside the realm of national and international labor laws. They receive no compensation or severance package if they experience accidents at work. They have no health insurance and the multinational companies who benefit from their work also turn a blind eye to their rights and sufferings.

In Bangladesh, *jamdani* weavers face difficulties because they have to weave with thread imported from India and they live in areas such as Demra where commuting is still dependent on traditional boats. To market their products they rely on middlemen, based in the capital city, and for such weavers, profit made internationally from their product is beyond their reach.

Comparative advantage and cheap labor

Hallmark has outsourced the making of mugs, cards, and other items to South Asian countries and thousands of people in developing countries are involved in making candles and photo frames for the company without knowledge of the price paid by retail buyers for their products. Most of them never get a chance to visit Hallmark shops because of poverty and distance from their villages.

Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Bangladesh have excelled in the production of leather goods, for example sofas, bags, shoes, and belts. European investors have relocated factories in South Asia to take advantage of its cheap labor and artistic and skilled leather goods workers.

Donor agencies and microcredit

Foreign donor agencies, for example Oxfam, CIDA, Danida, the World Bank, Care USA, UNICEF, Save the Children, AusAID, USAID, Community Aid Abroad, Action Aid, Dfid and many other agencies and organizations provide microcredit to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in developing countries in South Asia with the goal of improving cottage industries. The World Bank-funded Silk Foundation project in Bangladesh has revived Rajshahi silk, which is renowned for its softness, fineness, and sophisticated designs. Batik silk, which India and Bangladesh have been successful in marketing internationally, is more in demand worldwide.

Microcredit serves many purposes: first, it helps to keep people involved in creative work in cottage industries, and second it helps commodification of products that are in high demand in developed countries. Though microcredit is also supposed to help reduce poverty, poor people often remain below the poverty line, despite having paid work. Donor agencies are biased toward traditional work, which helps to keep traditional skills alive but also keeps poor countries dependent on traditional skills; this is detrimental for fast growth in an age of post-industrialization and a hi-tech world.

NGO policies are donor-agenda driven and they therefore pursue targets set by outsiders, which can serve as a backlash to modernization, empowerment, growth, and development of other aspects of life because of low income, low output, and lack of the cutting edge necessary for industrial competition. People are made to remain poor with limited purchasing power for the sake of artistic products and the comfort of others; a cycle of poverty is perpetuated at its own incredible and cruel pace.

South Asian culture and market relations based on gender

Though women are extensively involved in different types of cottage industries, South Asian culture makes them highly invisible when it comes to marketing and selling the products. Women are deprived of their income by their male relatives and also by buyers. The Grameen Bank portrays a positive picture of women who have gained

control over decision-making through their involvement with the bank and microcredit-based basket weaving and handicrafts-oriented businesses. Some of the projects have been very successful. However, millions of skilled female workers in cottage industries are having to struggle financially and fight endlessly because of cultural constraints, in terms of religious barriers and social and financial infrastructure.

It is very difficult for poor women in South Asia to get access to banking for saving their income because the banking system is still not poor-friendly and opening an account is a bureaucratic and referee-based process. National bank forms in Bangladesh require the signature of a male guardian, perhaps reflecting fundamentalist views of certain Islamic cultures in relation to gender and women's access to activities outside the household.

Women are becoming increasingly aware of infrastructural problems and are voicing their opinions and concerns about the limitations across South Asia through NGOs and independently. There are many rights-based NGOs functioning in the region that are helping women engaged in cottage industries to have better understanding of their worth in all aspects of their contributions to their family, society, country, and the world.

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Syeda Sharmin Absar

Economics: Crafts

Afghanistan

Originating as a way to decorate household items of utilitarian use, handcraft production has played a central role in Afghan women's lives for centuries, while in recent decades it has become a significant source of income for women.

Afghan women are particularly well-known for their intricate embroidery and carpet weaving skills. Both skills are passed down within the family from mother to daughter. Traditional patterns, in all their variations, are commonly reproduced from memory and not written down, which means that patterns have been passed from one generation to another.

From the time of a daughter's birth, a mother begins to work on items for her dowry including articles of clothing, household linens, and decorative wall hangings and coverings. Until the later twentieth century, handcrafted items were produced by women primarily for personal and family use, and women were not widely involved in the production of goods for commercial sale, with the exception of carpets and skullcaps.

The patterns women embroider on clothing and skullcaps are clear identifying markers of a person's ethnic and regional origin. Kuchi and Hazara women are known for their elaborate beadwork, which is used to embellish clothing and caps.

In the 1980s, as Afghan refugees began to flow to Pakistan, sewing cooperatives were formed in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. Handwork was easily transportable as people moved from place to place, and it was a way to preserve traditions and keep them alive while maintaining a symbolic link with their homeland.

As families settled into long-term living situations in these camps, some of the more well-established embroidery cooperatives began to produce goods for sale to expatriates working in the region as well as for export. Carpet exporters in Pakistan also began to use women in the camps for carpet production. Through these cooperatives and businesses, embroidery and carpet weaving grew to be a major source of income for women. One of the more notable cooperatives is the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) Sewing Centre, which was founded by the Danes in 1984 and now as an independent organization provides employment to 2,000 Afghan women in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As families began to move back to Afghanistan in the early 2000s, these cooperatives also moved with them and now have an established presence in Afghanistan itself. In some cases, staff of the cooperatives drop off work to women in their homes and pick it up when completed. This system allows women to earn income even if they remain restricted to their homes.

Women also play a role in the production of handcrafts that are traditionally male trades when those crafts are part of a family business. For example, in the pottery village of Istalif in the Shomali Plain, women in many families paint the surface decoration on clay forms that are made by their husbands or fathers who then glaze and fire the pots after the decoration has been added. In recent years, women have also begun to explore non-traditional handcraft skills including gem and stone cutting, candle-making, and leather working as ways to earn income.

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BETH GOTTSCHLING

The Caucasus

In the Caucasus, women artisans are primary transmitters and producers of vibrant craft traditions that transcend ethnic and regional boundaries. Craft objects serve both domestic and trade uses and have utilitarian, cultural, and religious values. Carpet weaving is one of the most common crafts in the Caucasus; designs are not attributed to one artist but to an entire region. Patterns and weaving techniques are taught by and to close female relatives. Strikingly, though different religious groups sometimes live in close proximity to one another, similarity in designs can be recognized but religious or ethnic adaptations are made clear by use of the Christian cross, Armenian dragon motif, or Muslim prayer rug.

The geographical diversity of the Caucasus is reflected in materials used, including wool, cotton, and silk. Also, natural dyes, whether vegetable dyes, madder plant or insect dyes, are indicative of regional availability and not necessarily stylistic preferences.

During the Russian and Soviet periods, the carpet industry became industrialized and synthetic dyes were introduced. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been increased interest and appreciation of indigenous folk art in efforts to foster national identities. Soviet economic planning left many state-owned carpet factories in dismal shape, struggling in the transition to market economies.

Other challenges are the violent conflicts in northern and southern Caucasus, notably Chechnya and the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Nevertheless, strides are being made by non-governmental and governmental organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme to revive women's status in traditional crafts. Several initiatives have been launched to assist and encourage female entrepreneurs in craft-making industries. Also, some regional tourist agencies list craft-making centers as points of interest. However, Caucasian crafts are largely produced by community efforts; thus their vitality is dependent on the status of formal and informal female networks.

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SONIA CHINN

Central Asia

Handicrafts have traditionally reflected the skewed gender relations in Islamic society; men worked mainly for the market, while women worked to satisfy family needs. There were exclusively male handicrafts: ceramics, coining, jewelry, cloth production and tailoring in special workshops, gilding, and wood carving. Women's crafts included luxury textiles: embroidery, carpets, and felt. Women also made inexpensive cotton cloth, ceramic toys, and dishes. But male crafts used women as auxiliary workers in raising silk worms, spinning, and dying thread. This imbalance reflected women's isolation, for they spent their lives secluded behind the walls of their homes. And from earliest childhood girls began to prepare their dowries, which consisted of various embroideries and rugs.

In the twentieth century the traditional way of life changed entirely. Urbanites began to forget how to make traditional crafts, although on the periphery it was precisely women who guarded the craft traditions. But dramatic changes followed in the wake of the Soviet Union's disintegration. Women began to actively engage in craft production, not entirely voluntarily. The disintegration of the economy in the post-Soviet period forced people to flush out new forms of work. In the economic destabilization a positive attitude to traditional craft work was a logical exit from the crisis. The revolutionary change was that women craft workers developed the market.

Women's choice to re-engage in craft work was supported by the government. On the one hand, the authorities encouraged the population's work choices. On the other hand, the revival of cultural traditions in general encouraged the revival of traditional crafts. Further, craft production began to develop thanks to foreign tourists who happily bought craft objects as souvenirs. Another important factor was that ancient customs and costumes became popular among the people, and these objects depend on handwork.

The governments' support of handicrafts strengthened the position of women handicraft workers. A new social layer emerged – women entrepreneurs whose activity was linked to handicrafts. They formed cooperatives that produced both for tourists and for the local populations.

In Uzbekistan there are quite a number of women's organizations supporting handicraft work. For example, the Association of Business Women of Uzbekistan (Tadbirkor Oila) encourages the revival of forgotten crafts and the creation of new workplaces for women. Among its most notable actions the association has revived Bukharan "khan-atlas" textiles, and has taught more than 300 women to do gold embroidery,

carpet weaving, chain-stitch and hand embroidery, and basket weaving. In cooperation with representatives of the German Trade Palace, the association offers courses in techniques of carpet weaving and gold embroidery in several Uzbek provinces. The association's main goal is to help women survive and achieve economic independence in unstable economic conditions. The association enables microcredit trade associations and independent women experts.

The center for handicrafts, Khamsa (Tashkent), has offered a great deal of support to craftswomen. The Volida association (Samarkand) supports women invalids by teaching them crafts. Women members of the association learn how to make national dolls with traditional fabrics and materials (satin, alpaca, velvet, braid, glass beads, plastic scraps, *kurok* [patchwork], and gold thread). The association's goal is to help women and children with physical disabilities to raise their professional level and to ameliorate their material conditions. In Karakalpakia there is a social charitable organization called the Golden Heritage of the Aral, that raises the living standard of women and revives the traditional culture of the area. Cooperatives that women organize exist in every one of Uzbekistan's cities. In Kyrgyzstan craftswomen make felt rugs (*shirdak, kiiz*), toys, and embroideries. Felt products are especially popular with foreign buyers.

Military conflicts in Tajikistan have forced women to take responsibility for the well-being of the family, and they have chosen activities linked with craft production. There the most developed crafts are gilt-sewing, embroidery, and clay toys. Tajik women experts have been able to revive the art of amazing vessels, original mini-refrigerators made of unglazed clay with stone reinforcement. In Kuliab there is an independent cooperative, Chashma, which makes rugs. In Gornobadakhshan autonomous region there is an establishment called Umed that produces hand embroidery. Women of the Ferghana Valley work in a non-governmental organization (NGO), Fatkh, which supports a variety of craftswomen. Under the complex economic relations between regions like the Ferghana Valley, the work that women undertake helps to ameliorate underlying social problems.

Working alongside women's organizations there are various regional and governmental craft organizations that help both men and women. Among the larger regional organizations is CACSA (Central Asia Craft Support Association), a non-commercial NGO with open membership (Bishkek). It unites more than 25 production cooperatives from Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The association is especially concerned to introduce effective training programs that help women adapt to the new social conditions, to encourage their professional growth, and to put their products on the international market.

International organizations offer enormous aid to women wishing to work in craft production, among them UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation), the British Union, CADA (Central Asian Development Agency), and CAMP (Central Asian Mountain Program). Thus, an international seminar on "New Design in Felt Production" for women of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan was held under the aegis of CAMP (which supports Central Asian mountainous regions). The seminar taught women new forms of felt production with new designs and aimed to establish standards of quality, in particular in using natural dyes for wool. Women make traditional Kyrgyz felt rugs, purses, hats, cushions, and shoes. Craftswomen are also interested in reviving traditional techniques, such as the use of special scissors in carpet weaving and natural dyes (indigo, madder, pomegranate rind, and nuts.)

Women's active participation in craft production has undermined the stereotypic divisions between women's and men's crafts. Thus, we see that jewelry making and gold embroidery has almost entirely passed into female hands. One of the winners of Uzbekistan's competition, Tashabbus-2001, for the best craftswoman, was Gulorm Iuldasheva (Tashkent) who initiated a school for jewelry making. With the support of the Association of Business Women of Uzbekistan and a jewelry school in Hanau (Germany) a jewelry school for young girls was established in Tashkent.

Thus, the participation of women in craft production is exceptionally high. This process is supported by the governments, by international organizations, and women's organizations that are dedicated to helping women adapt to new economic realities. The main tasks of this movement are to increase the income and social status of women and to revive traditional crafts. But there is a negative aspect to this process: the attempt to sell on a mass level lowers the quality of craft production. It encourages women to sell what is popular with the consumer rather than what is historically authentic. For example, in Dzhizak

(Uzbekistan), where the traditional craft was long-haired carpets, women are now turning to gold embroidery.

Among craftswomen there are already leading lights who have been capable of creating quality business and entering the market, successfully utilizing the support of international organizations. This has been achieved by Faziliat Kadyrova (traditional embroidery, Shakhriziabz), Fatima Guliamova (traditional embroidery on modern artifacts, Samarkand), Shoira Ganieva (silk decorated with natural dyes, Samarkand), Zarina Kenzhaeva (traditional embroidery, Bukhara), Leila Khaitova (weaving and embroidery, Ashgabad), Maia Orazmuradova (weaving and embroidery, Ashgabad), Ludmila Kiseleva (carpet weaving, Ashgabad), Tatiana Vorotnikova (felt, Bishkek), and Galina Pulatova (felt, Bishkek). They are all well known in their regions and abroad.

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ELMIRA GYUL

India

Craft objects can be broadly defined as those objects made primarily by hand with the aid of simple technologies. An Indian government report further adds that craft objects "are generally artistic and/or traditional in nature. They include objects of utility and objects of decoration" (Government of India 1989, 6).

According to the Government of India, Ministry of Textiles, the craft or handicraft sector is the largest decentralized and unorganized sector of the Indian economy (Press Release, 2000), and is among India's largest foreign exchange earners (Vijayagopalan 1993). Craft is also one of the cornerstones of distinctive and powerful political and cultural traditions on which Gandhian nationalist ideology is based. Craft development is one of the priorities of the modern Indian state, both because of its economic significance, and because it is seen as a key component of the nation-building project within India and abroad. Craft is also seen as a way of empowering marginalized groups including women, and members of minority groups, lower castes, and tribes.

Craft is thus of political, social, and economic importance, and the target of development projects initiated by both the state and international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The latter include Oxfam, the Crafts Council of India, and a number of local NGOs. In Pakistan and Bangladesh as well, the state and NGOs support craft producers for similar reasons.

While craft production is not confined to any one religious group in India, the involvement of Muslims in what have been termed "traditional craft activities" in the twentieth century partly arose from the demands of royalty and nobility, though not entirely. Studies of Hindu craft producing groups have focused on several issues including caste (see, for instance, Brouwer 1995, 1996, 1999, Ludden 1996, Mines 1984), the *jajmani* system (but see Fuller 1989), and village republics.

There is also a very large literature – both historic and contemporary – on hand-woven textiles, also considered craft today – especially focusing on handloom weaving and the effects of colonial rule on weavers – both Muslim and Hindu (see, for instance, Arasaratnam 1986, Bayly 1986, Brennig 1990, Chaudhuri 1996, Guha 1996, Haynes 1993, Haynes 1996, Hossain 1996, Parthasarathi 2001, Roy 1993, 1996, Specker 1996, Thurston 1899, Yanagisawa 1996).

Muslim craft producers have been relatively neglected in the academic literature though there are exceptions (Wilkinson-Weber 1999, Venkatesan 2001, Kumar 1988, Mehta 1997). Of these, Wilkinson-Weber's work focuses on female *chikan* embroiderers in Lucknow city in Northern India and discusses, among other things, the origin of the craft, the role of the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in creating a craft-based organization, and the role of the state in developing *chikan* embroidery.

Mehta's book focuses on the Ansari weavers of Barabanki in North India. It discusses the nature of weaving, its links with the sacred, and its embeddedness in the Ansari social structure. The processes of weaving are formulated with reference to the Mufidul Mu'minin, the sacred text of the weavers. Through its strategic uses, the Ansaris constitute a tradition of work, one that talks of the nobility of the craft. In this tradition, the role of women workers is subordinated. However, as quilt-makers, women also constitute an autonomous domain of work, from within which they critique the orthodox tradition.

Venkatesan's work focuses on a group of Muslim weavers in Tamil Nadu in South India.

This group has been weaving high quality silk-like craft mats for a little over a century. Their mats were first identified as craft objects in 1952 though they did also receive recognition and some measure of support from the colonial government, notably through the awarding of a bronze medal for a mat in the Delhi Exhibition of 1903. Both men and women weave, but they are both also engaged in other occupations. Some men migrate to Indian cities and beyond seeking work. Women and children stay on in the village and either weave mats, roll leaf cigarettes, or do tailoring within their homes.

These examples are useful to demonstrate the diverse contexts in which objects that can be described as craft are made by Muslim producers. It may thus be helpful to make a further distinction between commercial craft production and craft that is produced for use by makers, that is craft objects that do not have exchange value in the monetary market. A focus on commercial craft production allows us to engage with questions of craft revival and development, attempts to empower marginalized sections of society – minority and low status groups, including Muslim women. Of course, some producers may, of their own accord or encouraged by development agents, switch to commercial craft production and commodify objects they hitherto made for their own use.

One of the reasons why the state and NGOs see craft as instrumental in uplifting the status of poor Muslim women is that craft objects are primarily produced in the home. Encouraging women to work for piece-rate wages producing craft objects for sale is therefore perceived as not challenging cultural mores, including the seclusion of women. This leads, as may be expected, to particular kinds of issues. These will be discussed later.

Local and national governments as well as NGOs seek to revive and develop craft production through marketing support and through product development. The two are closely connected. Craft objects are modified in form and function, often with the aid of designers or development agents, in order to be made more relevant to contemporary urban lifestyles within and beyond India. Meis's (1982) study points to the irony inherent in artisanal production of luxury goods that are circulated transnationally while the artisans themselves lack mobility and resources. While product development is certainly able to create new markets for craft objects, it also might have the unintended consequence of turning craft producers, strongly associated with a politics of work since the Arts and Crafts Movement of the early twentieth century (Greenhalgh 1997), into laborers who produce objects for sale.

Craft development may also have the second unintended consequence of creating new hierarchies wherein those producers or traders who are most able to engage with development agents and the state become brokers between development agents and other producers. Women, especially Muslim women, are most vulnerable in this regard. Portrayed as shy and unable to participate fully in the public sphere, they may be rendered voiceless precisely out of a desire on the part of development agents not to interfere in people's "culture."

In Pattamadai (Venkatesan 2002), this trend has been especially visible and male traders who belong to the same Labbai Muslim subgroup as the weavers dominate in the mat weavers' cooperative society as well as in interactions with most, albeit not all, non-governmental and governmental agencies. They frequently refer to the female weavers as helpless and unable to adapt to changing requirements, including new technologies that development agents seek to import. In the case of attempts to improve the mat weaving loom, while there were important considerations to do with the notion of the body at work, which meant the failure of such attempts, the male traders and office bearers of the weavers' cooperative society were quick to claim that their non-engagement with any intervention to do with technology was because the weavers they represented were women who were stuck in their ways and could not adapt to new methods of doing things. The presence of women in the producer group and the ways in which they were rendered voiceless through new hierarchies opening up through development, as well as their perceived place within the home, has meant that they therefore may be used as an excuse for non-engagement with certain development initiatives.

However, this is not always the case, as can be seen from the working of SEWA in Ahmedabad, with women engaged in blockprinting, embroidery, sewing, and other craft activities; Lucknow, with women who work as *chikan* embroiderers; and Banaskantha, where women are primarily engaged in embroidery and other textile decoration work. Organizations such as Dastkar, based in Delhi, though working with craft producer groups throughout India, are particularly sensitive in this regard.

Other ways in which female craft producers are encouraged to become more active and economically independent is through increasing their participation in self help groups (SHGs). One of the key advantages in joining an SHG is the possibility of applying for loans from microfinance schemes. For many Indian artisans, male and female, loans from the formal sectors of the economy are rarely available. For work-related and other expenses they often have to turn to moneylenders or to rolling credit and saving schemes (ROSCAs; for a description of these see Ardener and Burman 1996). The former in particular can be financially crippling in the long run. As for many Hindu Indians, dowry payments as well as other marriage expenses for daughters among several Muslim groups (including artisanal groups) can be steep, leading to high levels of indebtedness. This is despite the fact that many Muslims say that dowry payments are un-Islamic, and the result of Hindu influence.

The relationship between Hindus and Muslims in India has been extensively studied (for example Ahmad 1976, Ahmad and Qarshi 1995, Ahmad and Reifeld 2004, Bayly 1989, Gottschalk 2001, Mayaram, Pandian, and Skaria 2005). However, the kinds of relationship that emerge as a result of craft objects, and the ways in which these are represented in the public sphere have not been the subject of much analysis. While craft objects are used in secular settings, they may also be used in rituals. Silk saris woven by Muslim weavers of Banaras (Varanasi) and mats woven by Muslims in Pattamadai are used widely in Hindu marriages. Crafts may thus be used to embody liberal ideas of harmony between Hindus and Muslims – indeed larger discourses about craft in India explicitly make this point (see Greenough 1995). For Indian Muslims, who are often objects of suspicion and whose loyalties toward the nation are frequently questioned in the public sphere, this is an important means of gaining an acceptance that comes out of their identification as craft producers. In this role they are seen as the guardians of India's unique tradition, people who keep alive the continuity of Indian culture from ancient times to the present day.

While most issues discussed in this entry, namely the importance of craft in nation-building, the attempts to use craft as a way of empowering marginalized groups, resultant problems and questions, and the difficulty in defining the term craft, apply to discussions about craft and gender in Pakistan and Bangladesh, the fact that Muslims are a minority group in India, means that the last point raised is uniquely Indian.

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Soumhya Venkatesan

Turkey

The history of crafts in Anatolia can be traced back to 6500–5500 B.C.E. to Çatalhöyük, a Neolithic settlement where pottery making, painting, and embellishing were far ahead of other civilizations in the Near East and the Aegean world (Erbek 2002, 15). The native Hatti settlement that invented the potter's wheel, the highly aesthetic craftwork of the Hittites, Phrygians, Urartians, and Lydians, and later on Roman sculpture, Seljuk carpet weaving and tile making activities, the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire, must have had significant influence on the development of handicraft traditions in the Republic of Turkey.

In Turkey today, the craft production associated with women comprises carpet and kilim weaving, quilting, crochet work, lace-making, knitting, needlework *oya* (edging embroidery), tatting, bandling, basketry, doll making, frame embroidery, knitting socks, knotting, matting, tile-painting, and textile weaving on home looms. It represents the skill, creativity, and imagination combined with the knowledge that mostly rural women acquire from their female kin or network in their early childhood. Besides the religious and cultural significance of these crafts in daily usage, they also serve as a medium for nonverbal communication through which women find a way to express their feelings within the traditional social structure dominated by religious and patriarchal values. As opposed to intergenerational transmission of the craft repertoire among women in rural areas, there are schools, courses, workshops, university departments, and community training centers that teach traditional handicrafts as an economic or leisure activity, as a hobby, or as a career in the urban areas.

Internal migration and the rapid change in traditional economic and cultural structures since the 1950s resulted in the emergence in big cities of squatter settlements inhabited by rural migrants. Rural women are categorized as unskilled labor force in the market economy. Their handicraft skills became an income generating activity as they engaged in home-based production, formed part of a chain of production, or worked in textile and carpet factories in the cities. Thus, handicraft production for domestic usage became a commodity

in the market. Lack of proficiency and education needed to attain jobs in the formal sector forced migrant women to work in the informal sector. The structural changes in the economic policies of the 1980s resulted in "flexible" forms of production on the way to industrialization, namely "the informalization and decentralization of employment, whereby firms rely more on part-time, casual or temporary workers, subcontracting production and/or using homeworkers" (Çağatay and Berik 1994, 78).

Statistics show that the participation of women in the labor market is 25.4 percent overall, whereas it is 18.3 percent in the rural areas and 36.7 percent in the urban areas (DIE 2004). "Unpaid and informal sector work are largely uncounted in labor force and national income account. As a result they remain statistically invisible and despite their importance, are generally ignored in national human resource and economic policies and in budgetary priorities" (Esim 2000, 8). Thus, traditional handicraft production is one of the forms of home-based activity of women. There are also state or NGO supported cooperatives as well as self-employment. The transformation of the traditional knowledge of women in handicrafts to paid work dates back to the 1980s: "policy oriented studies concerning women in development have emphasized the importance of women in paid work as a way to improve their socioeconomic position. This concern has led to the development of income-generating projects, most notably in handicrafts, for women in the 3rd World as a means of incorporating them into the development process and alleviating poverty" (Berik 1987, 1).

Turkish crafts have a distinguished place within world handicraft production and heritage due to their authenticity, functionality, variety, richness, and high quality. In the early periods of modern Turkey, a special emphasis was given to the continuation and preservation of authenticity and revival of the cultural heritage; however, today, many crafts are either disappearing due to the death of their producers or have to compete with cheap and less time-consuming factory goods. State and local authorities develop and initiate projects for the protection and continuation of these handicrafts via workshops in folk training centers and supply marketplaces to sell them. There are also women's cooperatives, NGOs, and other organizations that promote women's crafts as an economic activity (see related websites). A committee in the parliament works for the development and protection of these crafts for their more effective utilization in cultural and economic areas, including forming a cultural heritage databank, supporting e-commerce, and incorporating handicraft education into the public school curricula.

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<www.dobag.com>, Woman-run carpet cooperative in Orselli.

<www.gapculturalheritage.com>, EU funded Cultural Heritage Development Program in Southeast Anatolia.

<www.gap.gov.tr>, Multi-purpose Community Centers (CATOM).

<www.homenetww.org.uk>, International Network of Homeworkers (HomeNet)

<www.itkip.org.tr>, Statistical data for exported hand-woven carpets.

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Zerrin G. Tandogan

Economics: Foreign Aid

Afghanistan

Foreign aid to Afghanistan incorporated a gendered dimension even during its earliest stages in the decades after the Second World War. Soviet and United States donations during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s aimed to equalize opportunities for Afghan women in schools, universities, and government. Women's issues continued to have a comparatively high profile in subsequent decades. During the Taliban period, foreign aid organizations grappled constantly with issues of need- versus rights-based aid, and whether aid should be delivered at all when women's rights went completely unacknowledged. In recent years, during and after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, foreign assistance has continued to treat women's issues – especially education and women's health – as vital.

Foreign aid during the Soviet era aimed to cultivate a coeducationally trained bureaucratic class among Afghans. The aid provoked bitter and violent reaction among conservative, Islamically-oriented Afghans. In the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan during the Soviet and post-Soviet period, disbursal of aid to women was greatly influenced by religious groups who operated in the camps and responded strongly, sometimes violently, to aid perceived to be un-Islamic or contrary to local values. The education of women in urban centers contributed to a widening gap between the experience of rural Afghan women and the experience of the smaller population of women in Kabul, Herat, and Mazar-e Sharif. Although university attendance in Kabul reached a point where over a third of students were women, female literacy rates nationwide never topped 5 percent for women (compared to 20 percent for men).

During the Taliban period (1996–2001), aid agencies noted the change in Afghan women's fortunes but acquiesced and for a short while called for tolerance of the rigid restrictions on women's activity – restrictions that were presumed to be Afghan tradition. By May 1997, however, when the Taliban began requiring all aid money to be channeled through its morals police (the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice), aid agencies began to see their missions in Afghanistan as necessarily linked to the deteriorating position of Afghan women. Oxfam, for example, opted to refuse to give aid if girls were not permitted equal access to lessons with boys. Tensions arose in the aid community between those focusing on meeting human needs and those intent on promoting human rights and women's rights. Some NGOs sidestepped the problem by, for example, barring men from aid distribution points. Other NGOs preferred or were forced to suspend operations entirely, often because they viewed continuing their work as perpetuating the Taliban rule. Still others tried back-channel solutions: the Swedish Committee claimed to support 134,000 girls annually in home schooling after the Taliban banished girls from what few schools still existed.

After the fall of the Taliban in December 2001, foreign aid from the European Union and the United States resumed. Publicity campaigns in the popular press, led by the Revolutionary Afghan Women's Association (RAWA), ensured that the plight of Afghan women received attention immediately. Some even criticized governments and NGOs for focusing on secondary issues such as compulsory *ḥijāb* when health, education, and sanitation were still at a near-neolithic state for Afghans of both genders.

Aid since then has concentrated on vocational training for widows, education for girls, and women's health. Maternal mortality and child mortality remain among the highest in the world, and family structures have crumbled after decades of war and death. At the same time, aid focusing on the position of women has been parceled out with some hesitation and trepidation, due to the record of resentment toward fast modernization during the Soviet and pre-Soviet eras.

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Graeme Wood

Egypt

Egypt is one of the largest recipients of foreign aid in the world and the second largest recipient of aid from USAID (United States Agency for International Development) in the world (after Israel) – the largest, in fact, if military aid is excluded. Furthermore, foreign funding is expected to be directed to the cause of women's empowerment from 2005 onwards, as part of the Greater Middle East Partnership Initiative, since Egypt is one of its targeted recipients. In addition to contributions from the United States, Egypt has received foreign aid from the World Bank, the EU (European Union), United Nations agencies, and several other major donors.

In response to Egypt's adoption of an Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP) package in 1991, a Social Fund for Development (SFD) was established to mitigate the package's negative effects. Although the SFD was a multidonor-funded initiative, it was too modest to counter the effects of the ERSAP, which were far reaching in Egyptian society. For example, the implementation of ERSAP further deepened the unemployment crisis, particularly for new entrants to the labor market. The SFD was supposed to assist in employment generation through the extension of loans to youth, men, and women to help them establish their own enterprises. The outreach of the SFD was somewhat limited, and there was an evident gender gap between men's and women's access to the loans, with the latter representing a far smaller percentage of clientele.

The SFD and other donor-supported initiatives were also not able to provide satisfactory alternative channels of welfare provision to the millions of poor and low-income Egyptian families who relied on state-provided health and education services. While the state continues to provide education and health services, they have been insidiously privatized and are no longer readily accessible to all. Poor Egyptian women in particular have born the brunt of the availability of affordable services, since they are the ones responsible for their families' welfare, particularly that of their children. Faced with increasing expenses associated with health and schooling, poor mothers have often had to compromise their own personal needs as a survival strategy for coping.

Substantial funding has been allocated in the past 35 years by foreign donors and channeled to the Egyptian government and civil society organizations for addressing issues associated with women's inequality in Egyptian society. Funding channeled toward the Egyptian government has been directed at the ministry of health, the National Council for Childhood and Motherhood (NCCM), as well as the National Council for Women (NCW). In the 1980s and up to the early 1990s, donors channeled substantial resources to the former ministry of health and population for the purpose of promoting family planning, and many of these initiatives targeted women through a traditional welfare approach. From the 1990s onwards, donors allocated more funding to reproductive health services via the ministry of health, which was supposed to design and implement programs that dealt with women's reproductive health needs in a more holistic and gender sensitive manner.

Foreign aid channeled to women's projects via the Egyptian government has been characterized by substantial duplication of efforts, a problem that donors have recently become aware of and have sought to address through the establishment of a Gender and Development Donor subgroup. The subgroup aims to coordinate joint initiatives by pooling resources to some key targeted goals. Many donors in the Gender and Development subgroup are contributing to a nationwide program managed by the NCCM, a government agency aimed at eliminating female genital mutilation (FGM), along with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund), the Netherlands, and Dannida (the Danish development agency). There also seems to be more coordination between government and donor agendas, reflected in the multidonor support for the girls' education initiative, which coincides with First Lady Mrs. Suzanne Mubarak's plea for a government focus on narrowing the gender gap in girls' enrollment in basic education. UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and Dannida are among the supporters of the girls' education initiative undertaken by the NCCM, while USAID is supporting the establishment of one-classroom schools in remote rural areas to support girls' access to education.

In the past decade, there has also been an observable shift in the focus of foreign aid from welfare and education toward the promotion of economic opportunities for women and women's increased access to the political arena. The concentration on creating economic opportunities for women has been framed in the light of promoting women's economic participation in an increasingly marketized economy. Consequently, a significant proportion of foreign funding allocated

for women's economic activities has been channeled toward credit extension programs that provide female clients with access to loans for income-generating purposes, either through the establishment of their own microprojects or through support for the expansion of existing enterprises. Most of these programs, however, have focused on microscale economic activities, with only a limited number of female entrepreneurs graduating to higher levels of entrepreneurial activities.

Recently, foreign donors have prioritized funding projects aimed at promoting women's political participation with a view to reducing the gender gap in both participation and representation on the local and national levels. For example, the European Union, the UNDP, and UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) have channeled significant resources to the government-affiliated NCW, with a view to supporting the latter in its role in working with non-governmental organizations nationwide to identify and train female candidates to nominate themselves in national elections, as well as to raise awareness of women of the importance of electoral participation. The impact of such funding, however, has been far from tangible.

Since the 1970s, there has been an influx in foreign funding directed toward civil society organizations in the wake of the arrival of major international development agencies in the country. Many of these donors had a particular interest in funding women's associations and causes. While women's organizations have existed in Egypt since the nineteenth century and represent one of the oldest types of civil society associations, the injection of foreign funding helped establish new types of women's organizations that were structurally and functionally different from the organizations that existed in the pre-1950s phase. Foreign aid has contributed to the growth of new women's organizations that are led by professional, middle-class women who espouse a development-oriented approach to the assistance of poor, marginalized women in rural and urban communities. These organizations are different from the former women's organizations, which tended to be under the patronage of upper-class women or wives of political figures, who espoused a charity approach toward extending welfare services to poor beneficiaries.

Moreover, foreign aid has also been instrumental in the sustenance of Egyptian women's organizations that have espoused an advocacy approach to addressing issues pertaining to gender inequality. Many of these organizations are working to address gender inequities that stem from government-sponsored and government-enforced laws, policies, and decrees. Nonetheless, women's organizations' reliance on foreign funding for their survival has undermined their legitimacy in the eyes of a significant proportion of the public. Accepting foreign funding is still regarded as collaboration and political betrayal, or, at the least, misguided opportunism (Sa'id 1997, 71). Such organizations have had to live with the perception that they are agents of Western imperialism (ibid., New Woman Research Centre 1999, 358). Thus, their efforts to promote social and political change in favor of gender equity are often interpreted as implementation of a foreign-inspired agenda that is tied to enormous donor funding. Reliance on foreign funding has also been held responsible for encouraging the emergence of a class of elitist women who are more accountable to the foreign donors than to any grassroots constituency.

The changing agendas of foreign donors in the kind of initiatives they support for women's equality have had negative implications in terms of support for projects that require long-term commitment and strategies to elicit social change and impact. A good example is adult literacy, which used to be a priority issue for donors two decades ago but currently attracts limited donor support. Literacy projects targeting women have consequently been negatively affected. A sense of changing donor agendas relative to issues that seem fashionable at the time has also led some critics to protest that insufficient attention is being paid to women's needs and priorities as identified by indigenous organizations and individuals in Egypt.

Moreover, foreign aid to women's issues in Egypt, as in many other parts of the developing world, has often been tied to international events. For example, substantial funding was allocated to supporting women's causes and organizations around the time of the ICPD (International Conference on Population and Development) in 1994 and the International Women's Conference in Beijing in 1995, yet the same level of assistance was not sustained in subsequent years. This further reinforces the sense of insecurity regarding the sustainability of initiatives relying on foreign aid and raises questions over long-term sustainability.

There has been a conspicuous change in the discourse of many foreign donors operating in Egypt, with many claiming to support gender equity instead of women's equality. This "engendering" of the foreign donors' agendas has often not gone beyond the discourse or official policy agenda level, with a few exceptions. Many projects that

claim to support gender equity and empowerment are in essence no more than projects addressing women's needs in the typical Women in Development (WID) framework. Many of the projects that claim to be gendered, for example, focus exclusively on addressing women's need for capital (income-generating projects) or reproductive health needs (rarely dealing with men or issues of power hierarchy).

On the whole, foreign aid's impact on women in Egypt has been mixed. On the one hand, foreign aid has played a role in keeping women's equality high on the Egyptian government's agenda. It also continues to play an instrumental role in the formation and survival of many Egyptian organizations working on women's issues. On the other hand, it has not been without controversy. Questions regarding agenda setting, the sustainability of initiatives relying on foreign funding, and the extent to which foreign aid helps to contribute to genuine, long-term social change in favor of gender equity continue to cloud debates regarding the role of foreign aid in enhancing Egyptian women's position.

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MARIZ TADROS

Iran

In 1966, women's associations throughout Iran united under the leadership of Princess Ashraf to form the Iranian Women's Organzation (IWO). By 1970, over 30 women's groups were affiliated, many of which were linked to international organizations, including the World Health Organization and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, the World Bank). Most of the membership of IWO was drawn from Tehran and the larger cities. The organization, refraining from politics, promoted the rights and status of women, using women's skills in all economic fields, encouraging women to pursue academic interests, and advising the government on matters affecting the role of women in society.

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) also began providing assistance to women by the 1970s and sponsored international aid to Iranian women in such areas as family planning and reproductive health. Women were also the primary beneficiaries of aid in the form of microfinance, and the promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment.

International aid to women in Iran was temporarily suspended during the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the start of the eight-year Iran–Iraq War (1980–8). By the end of the 1980s, international aid organizations resumed their support for women by focusing on the population explosion that began after 1976.

In the 1990s, the Islamic Republic of Iran established the Women's Bureau. Soon after, United Nations agencies began assisting in the formation of women's non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The United Nations also promoted Iran's participation in international conferences, including the Beijing Conference for Women, and was an advocate for incorporating gender-based rights into Iranian national policies.

Starting in the 1990s, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) played an active role in encouraging girls' education and preventing early marriages and unwanted pregnancies through counseling. UNICEF also sponsored the Community Centered Capacity Development (CCCD) project to improve women's negotiation skills, increase their self-confidence, and promote their personal development. UNICEF has also supported advocacy efforts in Iran for the ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

The majority of international aid to women consists of family planning and reproductive health projects. UNFPA, for example, has assisted the ministry of health in developing a training program for routine maternal delivery services and high-risk pregnancy care. UNFPA has also sponsored two Safe Motherhood Posts around Sistan and Baluchestan to reduce high-risk home deliveries.

Since 1990, UNFPA has provided resources to the government in training 7,000 rural midwives, in addition to providing for a gender-sensitive training based on the "Gender and Reproductive Health Manual" developed jointly in 2002 by Iran's Centre for Women's Participation (CWP) and AIDOS (Italy).

Aid from the World Health Organization (WHO), IBRD, and UNICEF has helped to strengthen the Government's Women Health Volunteer Program, which began in the early

1990s. Today, the program has over 40,000 volunteers across Iran and trains women in basic sanitation and hygiene related to mother and child health, immunization, family planning, and occupational health.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has also assisted Iran achieve its Millennium Development Goals in special relation to women. It has supported programs that provide mothers with training in breastfeeding, along with the promotion of access to safe, clean deliveries and emergency obstetric care.

More recently, UNFPA established a fund in cooperation with CWP to launch a pilot income-generation scheme for many poor village women across Iran. Through a revolving fund system, women heads of household have been entitled to receive loans to engage in sewing, animal husbandry, and carpet weaving. UNFPA has also worked with the government's Literacy Movement Organization in a joint project that combines literacy training and skills development with reproductive health education. After completing the co-sponsored training, women receive seed money to begin the activities in which they have received training.

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Geoffrey Gresh

Turkey

Beginning in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States was one of the first countries to sponsor programs that trained female educators and nurses throughout Turkey. A decade later, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and Access to Voluntary and Safe Contraception (AVSC) International (today EngenderHealth) were some of the first international aid organizations that developed programs specifically for Turkish women. USAID funded the first projects for family planning and birth control services in collaboration with the ministry of health by the mid-1960s.

Starting in the 1970s, USAID aligned with numerous international aid agencies to achieve its reproductive health/family planning (RH/FP) program goals. In the 1980s, however, USAID financial support to Turkey did not permit sponsorship of family planning clinics or programs that advised or acknowledged the option of abortion (also known as the Mexico City Policy).

In 1974, the ministry of health signed a major agreement with UNFPA, providing Turkey with US$10 million over five years to focus on the integration of family planning into maternal and child health services. By 1975, USAID and AVSC International began similar programs to lower fertility rates, increase access to contraception, reduce the number of unintended pregnancies, and support family planning activities.

During the same period, AVSC International backed the efforts of the Turkish Fertility and Infertility Society and the Turkish Family Planning Association to increase awareness of sterilization as a contraceptive option.

In 1991, USAID and AVSC International sponsored the first pilot program for post-abortion and family planning services at a women's research hospital in Ankara. The pilot program succeeded and spread to 24 other clinics across Turkey, including 14 in Istanbul. Simultaneously, AVSC International worked to expand postpartum and post-abortion family planning services across Turkey.

In 1992, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) initiated its assistance to women by working with the government of Turkey to implement the National Program for the Enhancement of Women in Development, in addition to allocating resources for the foundation of the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women. Additional projects by UNDP in the 1990s included the Local Agenda 21 (LA-21) Project that focused on gender empowerment and greater participation of women in local

government. UNDP also funded and collaborated with the women's NGO Uçan Süpürge (Flying Broom), a women's organization devoted to increasing communication among women's organizations and initiatives, and raising public awareness about gender issues in Turkey.

The Turkish NGO, Foundation for the Support of Women's Work (KEDV), has also received international aid from such organizations as the Global Fund for Women (United States) and the Bernard van Leer Foundation (the Netherlands) to support low income women's groups in Turkey and to improve the quality of women's lives. International aid arriving to KEDV has assisted in opening 15 women and children centers in Istanbul, the Marmara earthquake region, and southeastern Turkey. KEDV also received a grant and loan in 2002 from Catholic Relief Services to establish the first microfinance institution in Turkey, Maya Enterprise for Microfinance. Since its recent inception, Maya has targeted low-income women with previously established micro-businesses, such as small-scale trading in markets and home-based production.

Since 2002, USAID has closed its mission in Turkey making it possible for the European Commission (EC) to fund RH/FP projects. The EC initiated a comprehensive reproductive health assistance program in Turkey through the European Union's Reproductive Health and Gender Program. Currently, the EC and UNFPA are working with the ministry of health to ensure continued funding for Turkey's RH program. The EC has also collaborated with the Turkish NGO, Mother Child Education Foundation (ACEV), to sponsor programs such as its Sexual Health-Reproductive Health and Women's Rights Literacy Project, and the Integrating Gender into Development Cooperation Project.

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Geoffrey Gresh

Economics: Global Markets

Turkey

The integration of women in Turkey into global markets is a reflection of their productive activities and is shaped under the influence of gender roles and relations prevailing in Turkish society. From the early days of the Republic, women were granted their legal rights by the governing elite committed to the goals of modernization and Westernization. However, the reforms remained largely formal, especially in rural areas, and class-biased, primarily benefiting urban bourgeois women (Kandiyoti 1989). The liberation of women by the Republican legal reforms has not been reflected in women's economic activities or in radical transformations in gender relations that shape women's integration into global markets. A closer look at women's economic activities reveals that, except for a small number of women who engage in professional activities, women work as either unpaid family workers in rural areas or as informal laborers in urban areas. The majority of urban women are registered as housewives, accounting for almost 80 percent of women of working age (SIS 2004).

Turkey's economic integration into world markets has taken place largely at the level of exporting labor intensive products. Thus, the share of garments and textiles in total exports was 36 percent in 2003 (SIS 2004); that sector employs the highest number of women in the manufacturing sector, and women comprise around 45 percent of that industry's total workforce (SIS 2004). However, the real number of women working in the industry is much higher due to the high degree of informalization and the inaccuracy of available data. Recent research into Istanbul's garment industry shows that informal work of low-income urban women is an essential factor for Turkey's integration into global markets. The garment industry is based on small-scale sweatshops located in neighborhoods in Istanbul, easily utilizing women as informal laborers or home-based piece-workers. Women join the production, usually run as family-owned ateliers, not as workers but as mothers, daughters, wives, and neighbors. The nature of the production integrates women's labor into global markets but also renders their involvement informal, invisible, and temporary (Dedeoglu forthcoming).

The invisibility of women's economic activities and the restriction of these activities to a number of precarious and informal jobs are the result of prevailing gender relations as they affect the forms and conditions under which women integrate into labor markets. An examination of gender relations in Turkey reveals that women try to expand their leverage and power position through expressing their roles as mothers and wives. Women manipulate gender relations in order to provide long-term security and respectability. Thus, marriage and children are the main assets that grant women the power of exercising and manipulating gender ideologies for their own benefit (Kandiyoti 1988). This is the only arena where they can effectively negotiate with their husbands, fathers, and other members of their family and community. However, this does not necessarily mean that the domestic sphere is free from conflict; it is indeed a place where women are subjected to exploitation and physical and psychological violence. Women strategically struggle to gain power in the domestic and public sphere by enforcing existing gender roles and ideologies (Dedeoglu 2002). They face a constant and conscious struggle to maximize outcomes within their given environment. This system leads women to conceptualize their paid work as an addition to their main duty of motherhood and wifehood. This is also why they prefer to engage in home-based informal and temporary activities, which make it easier for them to juggle domestic roles with income generation.

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Saniye Dedeoglu

Economics: Industrial Labor

Egypt

In this entry, industrial labor refers to workers defined by the International Labour Organization as comprising the industrial sector such as mining and quarrying (including oil production), manufacturing, construction, and public utilities (electricity, gas, and water). The entry reviews the developments in the status and condition of women working in the industrial sector in Egypt in relation to men, within a rapidly changing economic and political context. In Egypt, the urban working class emerged at the end of the nineteenth century. However, industrialization expanded slowly such that by the beginning of the twentieth century, wage workers constituted only a minority of the labor force, which was largely concentrated in the manufacturing, construction, and transport industries. It was only at the end of the 1930s that a large wage-earning labor force working in factories began to emerge (Beinin and Lockman 1998, 5, 24). Women constituted a small percentage of the overall industrial wage labor, and they tended to be concentrated in low skilled, low wage jobs in the new factories, earning a daily wage rate far below that of their male counterparts (Beinin and Lockman 1998, 45).

Egypt's pursuit of a policy geared toward import-substitution through intensive industrialization in the 1950s and 1960s involved the mobilization of women for the national economic development project. While the overall percentage of women in the labor force in general remained modest (amounting to less than 7 percent in the 1970s), the promulgation of gender-equitable legislation, the universalization of education, and the pursuit of an equal wage labor policy made way for more space for women's participation in the labor force (Beinin 2001, 152). The government became the principle employer for both men and women, and although women occupied mainly clerical positions, they were also employed in state-owned industrial sector enterprises, which were predominantly based in the capital city, Cairo.

The labor force in Egypt has always been gendered, in terms of first, the types of occupations that have been accessible to women and second, the high concentration of women in particular jobs. Women have had restricted and sometimes closed access to employment as workers for machine and power plant operations, as petrol refining workers, metal refining workers, machinery producers, and in wood making, electricity repairing, painting, and metal processing. This closure was sometimes justified on the basis of the need for men's physical strength (to manage heavy machinery, and the like); in other instances, social customs, mores, and traditions emphasizing the inappropriateness of women's engagement in certain economic activities governed the division of labor between the genders.

The second manifestation of the gendered nature of the industrial labor force relates to the conspicuous feminization of certain industries. The latest labor force survey (2003) indicates that 43 percent of female workers in the industrial sector work are employed in textiles and garments, 14 percent in food processing, and another 13 percent in the pharmaceutical industries. The disproportionate presence of female workers in labor intensive manufacturing industries is particularly striking; for example, women represent 60 percent of the total number of workers in the Nasr Company for Textiles and almost 50 percent of the workers in the pharmaceutical industries. An examination of the industries in which women were predominantly employed at the beginning of the twentieth century would reveal a very similar employment pattern.

In the 1970s, the Egyptian government started to liberalize its economy under the Infitah (or Open Door) policy and in 1991 the government adopted an economic reform and structural adjustment program. Under adjustment, the private sector was supposed to become the driving engine force of the economy instead of the public sector, public sector enterprises were to be privatized, and an official policy of promoting growth in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, was to be enforced (Assaad 2000, 3).

As the public sector was the principle non-agricultural employer, both men and women were negatively affected by the privatization policy. However, policies such as the early retirement scheme, which was aimed at getting rid of "excess labor," targeted women in particular by allowing them to retire at a younger age than their male counterparts (45 compared to 50) and in some cases actively coercing/pressuring them to retire as soon as they reach the required age. The encouragement

of female industrial workers to retire early diminished the benefits and entitlements that they would have accrued had they continued to work until the conventional retirement age. In 1994, the Egyptian government established 16 holding companies to replace the public sector in ownership and management. Women make up 12 percent of the total workforce for the 16 holding companies. Of women workers, 62 percent are employed in 6 agriculture and agribusiness holding companies (out of the total of 16 holding companies); 42 percent of women workers in the holding companies are employed in 3 other holding companies comprising spinning and weaving, cotton and international trade, and textile manufacturing.

Moreover, the decrease in employment opportunities in the public sector for female industrial laborers was not compensated for by an increase in jobs created in the industrial private sector. The limitations encountered by females in the industrial sector cannot be strictly attributed to a lack of demand for female industrial labor. There are several gender-specific obstacles to women's participation in private sector led industrial activity. First, many private sector industries established their factories and enterprises on the outskirts of the city, to benefit from the tax concessions on investing in desert land. Women are significantly more constrained in their mobility than males in commuting to these locations on a daily basis, especially if they are married and have children (Assaad 2000, 20) Second, although there were high hopes that Egypt would see a boom in labor intensive, export-oriented industries, as in Tunisia and Morocco, this has not materialized. There has been a relatively limited growth of such industries, although manufacturing continues to be an important source of employment for industrial labor workers, both men and women.

Distribution of economic activity according to gender suggests that manufacturing is the fourth economic activity with the highest percentage of females: 8.7 percent of females are working in the manufacturing sector (following agriculture 31.9 percent, education 22.3 percent, public defense 12.24 percent). For male workers, the first employment providing sector is also agriculture at 27.1 percent, followed by wholesale and retail trade and repairing 13.6 percent, manufacturing 12.8 percent, and finally public defense 10.4 percent (SRC 2004). Another important factor inhibiting female industrial labor workers' participation in private sector led industries is the poor quality of education and training (if any) that they receive, providing them with minimal or no marketable skills.

Further, industrial labor workers, both men and women, have witnessed a marked deterioration in working conditions and an erosion of their benefits in the new market-led economy. For example, it has been observed that workers in non-agricultural employment (including those in the industrial sector) were having to work longer hours in 1998 compared to 1988 (Amin and al-Bassusi 2003, 16). Workers also enjoy fewer social benefits and have experienced a reduction in real wages (Kogali 2000, 17)

Moreover, it is more difficult to enforce gender equitable labor legislation in the private sector than in the public. In the fast growing informal sector, the predicament of female industrial workers is worse than for their counterparts in the formal sector; job security is minimal and there is no social insurance or benefits.

Prospects of advancing the rights of female industrial labor workers through trade union activity are at best modest. First, female representation in trade unions is mostly low. Second, trade union activity in general is greatly curbed by government surveillance. While each economic activity has its own trade union (textiles trade union, chemical industries trade union, and so on), all trade unions come under the umbrella of the General Federation of Trade Unions. The federation has been co-opted by the government since the 1950s, its president is officially appointed, and it rarely takes a position antagonistic to the government.

In retrospect, women's experience working in the industrial sector has been mixed. On the one hand, it opened new space for them (albeit not in all industrial sectors), allowed them to acquire new skills and most importantly, provided them with a means to earn an independent income. On the other hand, women's representation in leadership roles either within these industrial sector enterprises or their trade unions was minimal. Further, their engagement in industrial employment did not alter their traditional gendered roles as mothers and wives responsible for the maintenance of the household, which meant that women were doubly burdened by their work and home responsibilities. This dilemma is likely to intensify in the near future in the light of the current labor law, which secures women fewer rights than its predecessor and has met with relaxed implementation in the private sector.

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Mariz Tadros

The Ottoman Empire

Women in the Ottoman Empire had always worked. But the nature of their labors changed over the course of the nineteenth century with the introduction of industrial factories and culture. While there were many social and cultural ramifications from this, two emerge as the most notable. Working outside the realm of the family allowed women to establish relatively independent social networks and concomitant identities as workers. Moreover, their employment inside factories provided them with remuneration in cash and not in kind. This brief entry provides an overview of the entrance of women into industrial labor and some of its impacts on the Ottoman Empire.

Spinning yarn and weaving carpets and textiles are among the main industries that had employed women from Aleppo to Salonica and from Erzurum to Izmir even before the nineteenth century. Yet, this work was piece-work and performed either at home or in small workshops located within villages or towns. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman textile industry was forced to adapt to increasing pressure from competition by factory produced British and European textiles. For example, while in the 1840s cotton cloth imports in the Ottoman Empire stood at some 4,100 tons, by 1909 they had risen over tenfold to 49,000 tons, undercutting locally produced goods. Thus, in the city of Aleppo the number of weavers went from somewhere between 16,000 and 20,000 weavers at the beginning of the nineteenth century to only 2,000 just a few decades later. In Bursa, silk reeling factories began to close their factories in 1863, and all the silk mills in Izmir closed down during the 1860s. In Salonica and Mount Lebanon, silk mills were in decline by the 1870s and 1880s respectively. While the fate and fortune of textile mills in the Ottoman Empire changed repeatedly across time and regions, the overall trend was that European products were undercutting Ottoman industry.

Those manufacturers who survived did so through a multitude of methods. One of the most common and effective of these was to reduce wages primarily through the employment of girls and women. Thus, the silk mills in the city of Bursa (which had a population of about 70,000 in 1863) employed close to 5,800 women. In Mount Lebanon 12,000 out of the total 14,000 workers in silk factories were women, and this in a population that did not exceed 100,000. By 1910 the Oriental Carpet Manufacturers were employing close to 50,000 women knotters in Anatolia. While this was not a universally employed strategy, it was widespread. There were women workers ranging from young orphaned girls to married women; Jewish, Armenian, Sunni Muslim, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic women were employed in these factories. A sample of the wages of these "factory girls" explains their ubiquity. The daily wage of a woman silk reeler in Mount Lebanon was about one-fourth that of her French counterpart, or about 1.4 piasters per day. Moreover, her wage was one-fifth of the wages a male Lebanese worker earned. In Sivas the carpet industry was able to reduce wages for its women knotters to one-fourth those of only a decade before. In addition to low wages, and in the absence of laws regulating industrial labor, Ottoman industrialists were able to extract more production from their workers. Instead of the 10-hour workday common in France, women workers in the Ottoman Empire worked around 14 hours during the summer, and close to 10 in the winter. Moreover, the working conditions under which they labored were by all accounts unhealthy in terms of the overcrowded nature of the factories, lack of proper ventilation, and the absence of sufficient breaks between long hours of work, among other things.

In part, this ability to exploit workers – especially women – derived from the infusion of patriarchal hierarchy and mechanisms into the factory system. Yet, ironically, the same factories provided women with implicit and explicit opportunities to challenge gender roles. Before factories, women worked within the rubric of the family and village, next to male kin. However, in factories women worked side-by-side with men (and women) who were not related to them. In various places such as Bursa, Salonica, and Mount Lebanon this resulted in immense social pressure on the women – who

became known pejoratively as "factory girls" – and their families. The perceived threat to social mores was real enough that it generated a variety of religious interventions. In Mount Lebanon, the Maronite church attempted to prohibit young women from working in silk factories. In Bursa, the Pope supposedly had to issue a special decree affirming the morality of factory work in order to facilitate the employment of Christian Armenian women. Muslim *ʿulamāʾ* issued fatwas in the mid-1850s permitting the employment of women in factories.

Factories also provided an arena where young working women could challenge male authority – albeit outside their family – without fearing extreme social reprimands. This was manifested most publicly through strikes. In 1839, women workers in Slevne went on strike against the new machines that were brought into the factory and which they feared would replace them. Some ten years later and for similar reasons women factory workers in Samakov went on strike, and in 1861 women and men strikers burnt down a factory in Bursa. In 1908, women tobacco workers in one French-owned factory in Lebanon went on strike to demand better pay and more vacation time; after a week they won all their demands.

Finally, work in factories gave women regular wages. While most of the cash was given to the family, the fact remains that the salaries provided an increasingly critical element for the economic survival of families. As families became dependent on the cash that women workers brought in, the individual worth of that labor became starkly obvious. If this did not translate into economic independence of women, it still gave them a greater measure of control over their own lives. In Lebanon, for example, by the end of the nineteenth century women factory workers were keeping most of their wages for themselves, which they then used to purchase gold and other precious items for their dowry. Anecdotally, some women saved enough of their wages to elope with a husband of their choice. Others appear to have used their income to buy their way to new lives in the cities or even overseas.

Aside from the immediate impact of industrial labor on women's lives, there is no doubt that their participation in that work opened new venues for subsequent generations to challenge and reformulate gender roles.

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Akram Fouad Khater

South Asia

Commentators often characterize the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan as possessing peculiarly intractable formations of patriarchy (Bannerjee 2002). Such understandings are reinforced by the region's persistently skewed sex ratios. Embedded gender discrimination is reproduced throughout the life-cycle – in women's unequal access to health care, education, and nutrition, as well as in unequal access to employment opportunities. Indeed, South Asia as a region records one of the lowest shares of women in both labor force and employment, a figure attributed to the persistence of patriarchal structures (Mahbub ul Haq Development Centre 2004, 80).

Nevertheless, it is not possible to posit a simple relationship between a "generic" South Asian patriarchy and women's experience of industrial labor. In the first place, considerable differences exist within and among South Asian countries in terms of women's labor force participation rates (LFPR). Pakistan has an exceptionally low female LFPR at 15.4 percent. The LFPR is almost four times higher in Bangladesh at 57.2 percent. Indeed, the latter has highest female LFPR of any Muslim majority nation. Indian women's participation is around 43.5 percent. It follows that religion per se does not provide a useful indicator of women's entry into wage labor, industrial or otherwise.

Divergences among South Asian countries may be better understood in relation to specific socio-cultural and political factors. In Pakistan, they are likely related to extreme forms of "feudalism" and practices of seclusion that produce highly segregated divisions of labor and that exclude women from wage work. Official state ideology toward women may be implicated as well. In Bangladesh, economic and social policies have made critical interventions in the last two decades: concerted efforts by the state and international financial institutions to deploy women's labor market

potential are reflected in women's high employment statistics, especially in the export economy. The size and tremendous diversity of the Indian economy make it difficult to generalize about trends.

Since the 1980s, globalization processes have intimately shaped livelihood prospects in South Asia, as elsewhere. Deepening trade liberalization and the corresponding reorganization of production and labor regimes have transformed social relations and the division of labor. On the one hand agricultural labor, especially women's labor, has frequently been displaced, pushing women increasingly into other sectors of the economy. On the other, the turn toward export production and free trade regimes has led to an expansion of women's work opportunities in emerging industrial domains.

As in East and Southeast Asia, women's labor features disproportionately in export-oriented manufacturing, especially in textile and clothing. In the last 25 years Bangladesh has experienced a tremendous expansion of female industrial labor in apparel production for export: women account for up to 90 percent of the labor force according to some estimates. Women are increasingly employed in the pharmaceutical, ceramics, and electronics industries. In Pakistan, the textile and clothing sector is the largest employer of female workers in manufacturing: an estimated 30 percent of the workforce is female compared to a national average of 15 percent (Siegman 2004, 1). Despite some counter-examples, large-scale feminization of industrial labor appears to be absent in India (Bannerjee 2002).

The demand for women workers, often to the exclusion of men, comes at a high cost. Conventional explanations point to low labor costs as the reason for women's predominance in certain industries. In addition, the preference for women's labor is often attributed to women's inherent biological suitability for assembly line production. Feminist scholars have criticized this line of argument, noting that the process of global restructuring has cheapened women's labor. Industries do not seek out women because female labor is inherently cheaper. Women are incorporated into capitalist production regimes through the invocation and reproduction of particular constructions of femininity. It is only when women's work is constructed as secondary and supplemental to family subsistence that female workers can be paid less than their male counterparts.

The global trend toward the casualization of labor – more temporary, short-term employment with few benefits and no job security – undermines already harsh working conditions. Predictably, women workers are worse off than their male colleagues. They face intense discrimination with respect to wages, working conditions and occupational status (Ahmad and Ahmad n.d.). The Pakistani case is typical. In the garment industry, relative female employment in specific units such as stitching is considerably higher than the average 30 percent of women in general, up to 75 percent of the workforce in some sections (Siegman 2004). The majority of workers in these stitching units are employed via subcontractors and paid on a piece rate. Such conditions of work, especially the lack of job security, render workers more vulnerable to exploitation, sexual and otherwise (Siddiqi 2004, Hisam 2004).

The frequently contradictory experience of industrial labor shapes new and sometimes fractured subjectivities. The ability to generate income may well lead to increased bargaining power within the household and so to some degree of economic and personal autonomy (Kabeer 2000, Kibria 1995). Women may have more say in their choice of marriage partners or in household decision-making and investment strategies. The process of work itself – including increased mobility and social exposure – enhances confidence and allows for the possibility of social identities other than those of mother, wife, or daughter. If consumption is any indicator of agency, then the colorfully made up young girls sighted in urban markets in Bangladesh are certainly on the road to emancipation.

Yet this recasting of social identity is always in tension with constructions of women as primarily sexual beings. This is because work "is grounded in sexual identity, in concrete definitions of femininity, masculinity and heterosexuality" (Mohanty 2003, 149). On the shop floor, factory workers encounter surveillance and discipline of a highly personalized nature. Research shows that in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka definitions of the good woman and good worker frequently merge (Siddiqi 1996). Managers typically draw on discourses of appropriate feminine behavior to discipline labor: the docile, submissive woman who does not talk back is rewarded while the more assertive and outspoken worker is likely to be punished through sexual stigmatization.

The sexual disciplining of women workers does not end at the factory door. Across South Asia, to varying degrees, male honor is intimately linked to female sexuality and respectability. Among other things, respectability turns on maintaining locally

specific spatial codes of deportment. Entry into the conventionally male and potentially dangerous space of the street therefore carries considerable risk to family and individual honor. Some women respond by internalizing the disciplinary regime they find; they do so by particularized interpretations of modesty and of purdah, by covering their heads or donning a *burqa'* for the first time, to announce their respectability, or even by recasting the factory as a safe and domesticated space for women's work (Siddiqi 1996). They submit to a regime of self-regulation similar to the kind found among Malaysian factory workers (Ong 1987). Other women resist through open militancy or indirectly through flaunting their "immodest" deportment.

The visibility of female factory workers, especially in Bangladesh and Pakistan where respectable women have traditionally been absent from public spaces, disrupts and challenges existing codes of mobility, respectability, and sexuality. In Bangladesh, the street is an especially perilous space because of a longstanding cultural association between factory work and sex work. This renders garment workers, who are easily recognizable, particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment in public places.

In the production of national statistics, aggregate data are not compiled with reference to religion – or social identities other than gender. Therefore statistics on industrial labor from India do not provide any sense of Muslim women's employment levels, despite a large and regionally diverse Muslim population. In contrast, figures from Muslim majority Bangladesh and Pakistan offer some idea of Muslim women's participation in the formal economy, even as they flatten out other differences among women.

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DINA M. SIDDIQI

Turkey

There has been a steady decline in female labor force participation in Turkey mainly due to the substantial changes in agriculture, resulting in rural–urban migration and the withdrawal of women from traditional agricultural activities in which they formerly engaged. Migrant women in cities mostly expanded their labor as housewives. The decline in the participation of women in the labor force has been greater than that of men since the mid-1950s. Female labor force participation was 72 per cent in 1955 and it declined to 25.5 per cent in 2005. This is clearly an indication of a massive withdrawal of women from economic life.

Despite the restructuring of the Turkish economy over the past 20 years, which has brought a reduction in the rural labor force, a considerable number of women are still employed in agriculture. In the first quarter of 2005, 51.3 percent of women were working in this field. For the same year, only 14.8 percent of women were employed in industry and 33.6 percent in the service sector (SIS 2005a). A clearer picture emerges when the female labor force participation in urban areas is examined. In 2004, the distribution of female labor in urban sectors shows that only 12 percent work in agricultural activities, 27 percent in industry, and 60 percent in services (SIS 2005b). Growth in the service sector was mainly due to considerable decreases in the importance of the manufacturing

sector and also to the expansion and changing nature of more specialized industrial or business services.

In 2004, women accounted for only 16 percent of the total employment in industrial sectors. Gender specific data on the distribution of female labor force in the different sub-sectors show that in 2001, 59.5 percent of women employed in manufacturing were active in the textile and clothing industry, 14.4 percent of them were employed in the food industry, and 12.2 percent were engaged in manufacturing of metal products, machinery, and equipment (SIS 2005c). Jobs in the textile and clothing and food industries are labor intensive and carried out by women who are ready to accept lower wages and marginal protection (Eraydın and Erendil 1999, 264). In the textile and clothing sector, small size and unregistered firms operate side by side with large clothing firms. There are also industrial workshops located in and/or near the residential districts rather than in industrial zones. Working conditions and wages drastically differ between these firms. Employers also prefer to use home-workers under the pressure of highly competitive market conditions. They thus avoid legal regulations such as social security benefits and other costs associated with legal rights.

Women in the food industry work both as regular and seasonal employees. Although the jobs in this sector are considered simple and repetitive, working conditions of women are hard (Koray 1999, 76). Medium and large factories provide their workers with reasonable working conditions and social security. However, noise, dust, heat, inadequate ventilation, sitting or standing still for long hours in the same position, chronic physical exhaustion, and lack of safety measures are characteristic of the many small establishments in this sector. Turnover is high among women workers and the majority of them quit jobs before being entitled to pension.

Segregation by job status is a common feature of textiles and food sectors, where women are dominant. They are mostly employed as unskilled workers and doing regular office work. Their representation is very low at the high technical personnel level. They also are not usually employed as high level administrators (Kasnakoğlu and Dikbayır 1995, 4).

In both sectors, women workers' wages are lower than men's and employers find numerous ways of circumventing the laws enacted to ensure gender equality and to prevent gender discrimination in the workplace (Ecevit 1991, 72).

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Yildiz Ecevit

Economics: Informal Sector

Egypt

Workers have been engaged in the informal sector in Egypt for several decades, but since Egypt's adoption of an economic liberalization program, and especially since the espousal of an economic reform and structural adjustment program in 1991, the informal sector has expanded considerably. Because of a decline in employment opportunities in the public sector and limited opportunities in the private sector, the informal sector has become a refuge for many workers.

By 1998, 69 percent of new workers had been drawn into informal employment and only 19 percent into formal public jobs, and the percentage is likely to have increased since then (Moktar and Wahba 2002, 135). Millions of workers are engaged in informal activities, even if they hold formal employment positions. The significance of this sector for income generation for millions of Egyptians cannot be underestimated, a fact that has been confirmed by community-level studies conducted in Cairo. Diane Singerman (1999), for example, noted that in a poor, popular suburb of Cairo, two thirds of the community were supported by the informal economy in either primary, secondary, or tertiary economic activities. Most of them worked as sales, service, or production workers.

The growth of the informal sector has also been gendered: for example, 3.1 million women work in the informal sector, representing 31 percent of total female employment, in comparison with 6.29 million men, who represent 43 percent of the total men employed (UNIFEM 2005). Women have also witnessed the largest increase in participation in informal activities (10 percent compared to 5 percent for men) (Moktar and Wahba 2002, 145). Since the economic reform and structural adjustment program had a particularly negative impact on the opportunities available for educated women, and given their restricted access to the formal private sector, by the end of the 1990s the informal sector was becoming an important provider of employment for female university graduates (El-Mahdi 2002, 105).

The informal sector, however, has also absorbed numbers of women workers with lower or nonexistent educational attainment levels. In general, informal workers are more evenly distributed among different types of activities, with a more pronounced role in manufacturing, construction, trade, and service activities (El-Mahdi 2002, 108). Wholesale and retail activities absorbed about 41 percent of the informal employment, followed by building and construction, then manufacturing and transport (El Ehwany and El Laithy 2005). Female informal workers are particularly focused in manufacturing activities, although they are also active in the service sector.

Women working in the informal sector are involved in a diverse set of activities that vary in renumerative and social value. In general, there is an almost equal distribution of workers operating outside establishments (48.5 percent) and those working inside establishments (51.5 percent) in the informal sector (El Ehwany and El Laithy 2005). However, it seems that many women opt to work outside establishments to gain flexibility in working hours and conditions.

In general, wages in the informal sector in Egypt tend to be lower than in the formal sector; for example, the fraction of informal workers in the lowest wage category per day was double that of the formal sector. Within the informal sector, Egyptian women tend to be at the lower end of the wage scale. In addition to the increased likelihood of poorer wages, the informal sector in Egypt also offers little in terms of job security or medical and life insurance. One study found that nearly 29 percent of female informal workers were employed on a temporary basis (El-Mahdi 2002). Women's conditions in the informal sector, however, vary significantly depending on occupation. Women selling groceries from home, for example, enjoy the advantage of being able to balance domestic duties with income generation. However, those working in informal manufacturing workshops or industrial factories often work long hours, enjoy no medical or life insurance or pension, and are often fired in case of incapacity to work. The remuneration is often modest, and working hours and conditions difficult. Women working as fruit/vegetable/food sellers, although they have flexible working hours, are also vulnerable to police harassment and sometimes extortion from street thugs as well as the police.

Public perception of women working in the informal sector tends to vary depending on

occupation. Some activities, such as tailoring clothes from home or selling vegetables or groceries, are more socially acceptable than, for example, working as domestics or janitors. Many women (an unestimated number since they are not in the official registration) work as domestics in homes either regularly or irregularly. The renumeration depends on the type of household they are working for, and the type of domestic service rendered: for example, as little as LE5 (less than $1) for cleaning a stairway to more if they are working daily or weekly in someone's home (ranging from LE20 a day to LE600 a month). The social stigma, however, is overwhelming, even for the poorest. Often women have to conceal from their neighbors and community, and sometimes even from their husbands and families, the fact that they are working as domestics. Moreover, the labor law does not protect women who work as domestics.

The income women earn in informal activities is essential for basic survival, and sometimes for important life events, such as the marriage of a daughter or son, or the enrollment of a child at school. Other than the economic returns of work, women's work, even if informal, plays another important role: namely, the acquisition of social capital in the form of social networks and connections. Some are horizontal, in the form of friendships with other women in a similar predicament, and some are patron–client relations, such as with the employer in a domestic setting. Both become important assets in the survival safety net.

On the whole, while the informal sector has served an instrumental role in creating jobs and income-generating opportunities for millions of Egyptian women, thereby representing an important source of income, it has nonetheless put them in a vulnerable position, denying a significant proportion of women a sense of job security, medical and life insurance, or the prospect of long-term career advancement. One of the major obstacles to advancing the interests and rights of women working in the informal sector is the absence of collective movements and organizations to represent their interests.

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Mariz Tadros

Iran

According to the official data, less than 10 percent of the urban female population of ten years and older has been active in the labor force during the post-revolutionary period (Markaz-i Āmār 2003, 88). Many researchers, however, believe that the data underestimate female participation and suggest the existence of a large informal market (Kār 1994, Mahīmīnī and Ṣāliḥī 1999, Moghadam 2001, Muḥsinī 1999, Raʿnānī 2001, Shaditalab 2002, 2003). The paucity of research on the subject does not allow for an estimation of the extent of undercounting. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests the prevalence of an informal market in types of activities that are in conformity with the findings of other developing countries: poor unskilled and newly rural urban migrants in traditional weaving, sewing, and food processing activities; in services such as cleaning, home care, childcare, and beauty; and in a growing unskilled market in light modern manufacturing such as pharmaceutical, assembly, and packaging. Labor may be piece-work or subcontracted at home, or performed in small workshops. There is also a growing presence of women in retail, some of whom may be informal family workers. Compared to other developing countries, however, women do not seem to have a significant presence amongst street vendors or vegetable sellers, an aspect that may be attributed to cultural characteristics. Additionally, researchers on other developing countries generally equate informal with poor unskilled women who are unable to join the formal modern economy. The evidence for Iran, however, suggests the existence of a large educated middle and upper income female informal economy. While this type of labor market may exist elsewhere but has not been explored, in post-revolutionary Iran social and ideological factors appear to be important contributors to its prevalence.

According to one survey (Raʿnānī 2001), the combined informal male and female figures may account for up to 50 percent of the total active labor, with a rising female share. Anecdotal information concerning informal female labor can be found in studies that focus on conditions of poor

unskilled working women, women's credit, and women's social insurance. In a sample survey of 1,400 women, Shaditalab (2002) found that 12 percent of the employed were informal workers. In another study (2003) she found that 30 percent of working women lacked any form of social insurance, which implies that they were largely informal workers. It has been well documented that the share of formal female factory workers has substantially declined since the Revolution (Moghadam 2000). Initially, ideological factors prompted the decline, and subsequently, the cost factors associated with regulations concerning maternity leave and daycare facilities. These regulations do not apply to small workshops and lower wages have prompted workshops in textiles, food processing, pharmaceuticals, toys, packaging, assembly, and other light industrial operations to increase reliance on women. Logically, the official data should show higher participation rates in small workshops. But the 1996 census data show a larger female blue-collar share in total in large factories, 5.6 percent, than in the total production workers, 4.3 percent (Muḥsinī 1999). Thus many workers in small workshops are informal.

In the official surveys, a production worker is defined as a person who works within the physical confines of a factory or a workshop. Thus a growing number of women who because of childcare or transportation prefer to work at home are not included. These women are likely to describe themselves as homemakers in the national surveys. Some of these home-working activities involve traditional carpet and kilim weaving and food processing activities from home. Home-based subcontracted and piece-work activities are also growing in clothing, packaging, and assembly, and light manufacturing industries such as toys and electrical goods. In these industries often experienced factory workers act as middlemen/women and subcontractors, provide the inputs to home-workers, and collect the processed product (Muḥsinī 1999). Sometimes there is a vertical and/or horizontal chain of contractors and subcontractors leading all the way to bazaar merchants. Some of the contractors or workshop owners may themselves be informal female workers (Mahīmīnī and Ṣāliḥī 1999).

A study of a sample of 350 working-age women in the affluent northern part of Tehran showed that 94 percent of the women worked. Financial independence was the most frequently stated reason for working. Contribution to the family income, and personal career fulfillment were the second most important cited reasons. About 12 percent of the women were the primary family breadwinners. The average personal income of the women was more than twice the national urban average. Only 9 percent of the women lacked a high school diploma, and 50 percent had bachelor, masters, or doctoral degrees. About 33 percent of the working women, or 53 percent of those working in the private sector, described themselves as full-time homemakers in the national surveys. Many informal workers were educated: 32 percent had bachelors or masters degrees, 22 percent post-high school and 28 percent high school diplomas; about 58 percent worked full time and 39 percent half time. When asked why they did not declare their employment, 53 percent cited social and ideological factors as the primary, and 33 percent as the secondary reasons for not declaring. Other factors such as licensing and tax evasion were also significant primary and secondary reasons. These women performed a wide range of professional and service activities. About 80 percent worked from home; word of mouth was their most important marketing tool. The most common obstacles to career advancement cited were child raising, housework, and social and ideological problems. In summary, these findings suggest the existence of a significant white-collar informal female labor market in Iran (Moghadam 2001).

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Fatemeh Moghadam

North Africa

Women's work in the informal sector in North Africa is an essential, although often seriously underestimated, portion of the region's economy. By definition, the informal sector is that part of the economy that is neither measured nor regulated by the government or other official institutions. Informal sector activities, therefore, are generally unseen, sometimes illegal, and rarely accurately represented in statistical studies. Complicating the issue in North Africa are religious and cultural norms that define many of the economic activities undertaken by Muslim women in the home as non-work.

The importance of understanding Maghribi women's informal economic activities becomes clear when these are placed in contrast to women's formal economic participation. Statistically, women in North Africa (and the Middle East in general) have the lowest rates of formal economic participation in the world. Only 14–22 percent of all women in North Africa work in the formal labor market. Algeria reports one of the world's lowest rates at 4 percent; Tunisia and Morocco have somewhat higher rates, hovering around 30 percent in recent years.

These statistics seriously underestimate women's economic activities, however. Although exact data on informal labor force participation are difficult to procure, Charmes (2004, 173) estimates that in the 1990s, 43.4 percent of the non-agricultural labor force in North Africa was in the informal sector. More significantly, women form 27.3 percent of this self-employed non-agricultural informal labor force.

Because of the cultural and religious norms emphasizing woman's role in the home, much of Muslim North African women's economic labor is undertaken away from public view. By conducting their work within the female domestic domain, women can observe norms of modesty while taking care of children and their household duties. Furthermore, many Muslim men still consider the job of breadwinner a male responsibility. In order to save face for their husbands, women frequently label the work they do as a hobby or say they are doing it for a little pocket money. By defining their earnings as insignificant, women are able to keep their own money separate from the household budget. Typically this hidden income is then saved to purchase items for the children – such as new shoes or schoolbooks – or otherwise unaffordable luxury goods such as a refrigerator or stove.

Women's tradition of engaging in economic activities based within the home has a long historical precedent in the Maghrib. For centuries, cities across the region were famed for skilled female handicraft production in family ateliers. The blankets and weaving of Tlemcen in Algeria, the carpets of Kairouan in Tunisia, and the embroidery of Salé in Morocco are renowned. Likewise, in rural areas women have long played a central role in processing and preparing agricultural and animal products: assisting in the harvest; cleaning and preparing produce for the market; pickling olives and drying peppers; and selling eggs and vegetables from their kitchen gardens. Nomadic women, such as the Kabyle of Algeria and the Berbers in Morocco, are famed throughout the region for their wool products and weaving.

With the arrival of the French colonists and North Africa's subsequent entry into the global economy, many of women's traditional handicrafts died as a result of unequal competition with products from foreign markets. In recent years, government intervention has revitalized some of these crafts, encouraging women to produce rugs, pottery, blankets, and embroidery more suited to modern tastes (and the tourist market) using newer materials and colors. In addition, other non-traditional home-based handicrafts have made an appearance catering more directly to the world market. Knitting machines have become popular, given the fairly low overhead investment and skill required in comparison to traditional weaving and rug looms. Piece-work – assembling pieces of clothing or goods at home for large corporations – is increasingly common, particularly in Morocco.

Women's role in agricultural production has also changed in recent years. Although machines have reduced some of women's labor, out-migration of men in search of work in urban areas and Europe has resulted in a greater percentage of agricultural labor falling to women in rural areas. At the same time, many rural women have migrated to the cities with their husbands and male relatives. Illiterate and without skills, many of these rural women have translated their food production skills into a new context: preparing traditional foods such as *tabuna*, couscous, dried peppers, and pastries to be sold in the market by their husbands or sons. Others have taken on domestic service as maids and cooks.

Interestingly, due to the Muslim separation of the sexes, North African women have always worked in cultural and religious jobs barred to men. Maghribi women have specialized as midwives,

soothsayers, and healers, providing medical care to women whose norms of modesty prohibit them from revealing their bodies to a man. Within the religious-cultural life of the community, women have held jobs as *ḥanāna*s (who decorate the bride and her family with henna at weddings and other ceremonies), as *ṭabākha*s (who help in preparing special foods for weddings and religious holidays), and as singers and dancers at female events. Women have always worked in the female section of the *ḥammām* (traditional bath) and provided special beauty services such as removing bodily hair (*tunqiya*) before the wedding night. Historically, female skills, such as embroidery, necessary for a daughter to prepare her bridal trousseau or *jahāz*, were also taught by a *muʿallima* (female teacher).

With the increasing entrance of women into the formal sector as nurses and doctors, the role of female midwives and folk healers has declined somewhat in urban areas. However, many women today simply consult both, viewing the informal and formal medical systems as equally valid. European styles and customs have changed some wedding customs (for example, many young girls prefer to purchase imported items for their trousseau rather than hire a *muʿallima* to help them sew the complicated sheets and linens required). Yet in many regions, traditional practices such as henna and *tunqiya* are strongly adhered to, with specialists in these arts in high demand. In addition a modern informal female beauty industry has sprung up alongside the traditional. Women work as hairdressers, manicurists, and seamstresses from the home, creating made-to-order fashions from the latest magazines.

In the past, as today, through their work in agriculture, handicrafts, food production, and cultural and social services, North African women have long contributed to the region's informal as well as formal economy.

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North America

Gender differentiation and the informal labor market

Most approaches to the study of labor markets and economic development have neglected the importance of gender differentiation in understanding economic development and the informal labor market. In instances where gender issues have been addressed, migrant women were seen as dependent, unproductive and passive partners in the economic processes, who were to carry out their previously established roles in the family domain. In traditional economic and immigration studies, the use of gender-neutral terms such as family or migrant conceals and distorts women's participation in economic and cultural processes in the informal economy. In fact it is only recently, since the 1980s, that androcentric research has been challenged, leading to dynamic changes in how women's contributions in transnational, diaspora, and immigrant communities are studied. These feminist economic frameworks reject the dual sphere model that separates women's activities in public (paid work) and private spheres (family and domestic responsibilities) by exploring the work/family intersection (Light and Bhachu 1993, Morokvasic 1983, Phizacklea 1988).

Literature on ethnic economies addresses how immigrants could face certain disadvantages both economically and culturally in the host society because of language problems, lack of credentials, underemployment, loss of socioeconomic status, and having to confront legal and social forms of discrimination and racism. Because of a combination of these factors, immigrant groups often turn to self-employment in business endeavors in the host country. When jobs available to the immigrants in the host country are not commensurate with their pre-immigration economic and social status, many will resort to self-employment in ethnic economies. In addition to the possibility of higher earnings, some individuals prefer working in the ethnic economy because of cultural and social components of this work environment. In the ethnic economy, economic success does not require rapid acculturation. Members of these immigrant economies often maintain their languages, values, customs, and traditions in work

environments. In the ethnic economy, usage of ethnic resources serves to affirm group solidarity, through practices of employer paternalism, which emphasizes social trust and community sentiment. These sociocultural resources are a form of social capital in ethnic entrepreneurship. Many businesses, in addition to selling commodities, are also cultural transmitters in the community. Frequently these businesses cater first to ethnic clientele and then expand to include a wider market.

Little attention has been paid to the vital role of gender resources in ethnic economies. Scholars have focused on the status of women as either unpaid or underpaid family members in these small businesses. Long hours of work for family members and kin are a common phenomenon. Women's involvement in ethnic economies is often regarded as an extension of their domestic, maternal, or socially reproductive activities in the household. Having access to cheap or unpaid family labor is a critical factor in determining the economic success of these small businesses. The appropriation of unpaid women's labor is frequent in immigrant family businesses where this act is justified through domestic bonds of kinship and patriarchy. Many studies address immigrant and ethnic women's unpaid waged labor in the informal and secondary sectors of urban economies but there are far fewer studies that address women as entrepreneurs in the ethnic economy or as innovators who use their gender, class, and ethnic resources to start up businesses and introduce products and services to the ethnic economy (Light and Bhachu 1993, Dallalfar 1996, Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996).

Middle Eastern immigrants and the ethnic economy

Immigrant women from Middle Eastern cultures, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have been successful entrepreneurs in micro-enterprises in ethnic economies as well as in the informal sector that intersects with the formal economy in North America. For example, women are active participants in the Iranian ethnic economies of California, Texas, and New York in the United States as well as in Quebec and Toronto in Canada (Dallalfar 1996, Moallem 1991, Mobasher 1996). The barriers to employment for these women are different from those they faced in Iran. Here they comprise a distinct ethnic and immigrant population, where issues such as language proficiency, cultural variables and work conditions in the formal labor market, age, legal barriers to employment, and level of education interact with their class location and gender to create barriers and discrimination in finding employment in the formal labor market. These immigrant women are using the ethnic economy and the informal sector as a site for empowerment.

Women are visible in many retail and service businesses in self-employed and home operated businesses in the ethnic economy and informal sector, as chefs and pastry cooks, prepackaging herbs and selling traditional meals involving time consuming recipes; beauticians, manicurists/pedicurists; hairdressers and cosmeticians (offering henna tattooing, make-up services, hair removal techniques by thread and hot waxing, and massages); retailers of jewelry and clothing directed to co-ethnic tastes as well as dressmakers and seamstresses; domestic workers performing house cleaning, child and infant care, and elder care; fortune-tellers; language tutors for children; and florists.

There are also divorced, separated, widowed, or never married immigrant women who are sole owners and operators of small businesses, often employing other co-ethnic women in their businesses who are primary breadwinners in their households. Additionally, immigrant women who are married and whose husbands are underemployed or unemployed have also started businesses in the ethnic and informal economies. In pursuing their businesses, particularly those that cater exclusively to women, entrepreneurial women create jobs for other women who do not have earning power in the larger labor market. For example, Iranian women working outside the home, who are married and have young children, prefer hiring co-ethnic women to carry out all their domestic, culinary, and child/elder care responsibilities at home. These types of work opportunities allow women more flexibility in work schedules and are more compatible with carrying out family and domestic obligations. Data on average monthly net income are limited but Mobasher's 1996 study cites Iranian women's earnings in the $2,200–$2,500 range in Dallas, Texas. Dallalfar's 1989 study also estimates monthly net income for Iranian women working in the ethnic economy to average $2,400–$3,200 in Los Angeles, California.

Gender, class, and cultural resources in the ethnic economy

The labor-intensive character of work in the ethnic economy is well documented. Specifically, the unpaid or cheap labor of migrant women has

further gendered the ethnic economy and the profitability of these businesses is contingent on the long hours of work by women as well as men in these enterprises. Women use ethnic resources in these businesses and combine these resources with class resources to promote entrepreneurship. The accumulation of capital occurs through the use of traditional value systems embedded in cultural and social institutions, including marriage, family and kinship ties, social networks, religious networks, as well as rotating credit and loan associations.

Types of family operated businesses in the North American Iranian ethnic economy include: dry cleaning and alteration facilities, travel agencies, shoe and leather repair stores, clothing retail stores, discounted designer men and women's shoe stores, coffee and pastry stores, grocery and sandwich stores, restaurants, copy shops, photo laboratories and film processing shops, ethnic video and music shops, and cosmetics and jewelry shops. Male-dominated family-run businesses demonstrate a reliance on cultural norms that embody traditional gender role socialization and patriarchal ideologies in their control over women's labor. In these businesses (auto mechanic shops, taxi companies, automobile sales, construction companies), women are responsible for answering telephone calls, customer relations, bookkeeping, advertising, and other legal aspects of the business, yet their work is not acknowledged, often not remunerated, and they do not have much control over decision-making processes (Mobasher 1996).

More egalitarian and women-dominated family-run businesses also exist in the ethnic economy and many women view themselves as co-equal partners in these businesses, although they may be formally registered in their husbands' names. Thus, women's work as partners in family-run businesses is typically underestimated and underrecorded in official documents ranging from tax, registration, and loan forms to statistics and occupational data. The conventional assumption that has helped reproduce this invisibility of women's active role in ethnic businesses is the notion that women are unpaid helpers rather than active decision-makers as co-owners or co-managers in these enterprises (Bhachu 1986, Dallalfar 1996, Mobasher 1996, Moallem 1991). Despite their obvious contribution to family income, women are still often erroneously perceived as dependants in these ethnic enterprises, thus reinforcing stereotypes about women's marginality in them.

Among women, ethnic resource utilization is used in a variety of ways, primarily to establish and maintain clients and customers, to establish a relationship with suppliers, to create capital for the business, and to provide labor. Shared cultural practices, beliefs, and values of diasporic Middle Eastern women form the foundation of the social resources used in the ethnic economy, including the distinct role of modesty and honor in daily social relations, a strong commitment to the extended family unit, and women's primary responsibility for the socialization of children and family obligations.

Women's businesses in the informal sector are similar to men's in their reliance on family workers, labor-intensive tasks, and forming contacts beyond their own class and religious-ethnic networks. Women also use gender and cultural resources, for example engaging in a bazaar style of bargaining in their work environments, and are flexible with regard to their working hours and needs of their customers, and even delivering or going to customers' homes to provide services. In many home-operated businesses, the social visit and networking that occur are essential to the economic transaction that follows, thus merging the public and private spheres in these women's work environments. Throughout much of the Middle East, women often spend a large portion of the day in the company of other women, and emotional, social, and physical support has been institutionalized through intensive ritualized visitation patterns. These cultural and social patterns of reciprocated visitation are based on strong social networks, primarily kinship as well as friendship ties. For many immigrant women this intense, time-consuming cultural pattern abruptly ended on immigration and participating in these ethnic businesses resonates with them.

Despite diversity in types of home-operated businesses, similarities exist, such as the labor-intensive quality of the work, the exclusive operation of these businesses by women, the small space (not more than one or two rooms in their home), the cash component of the business transaction, the use of a language other than English, the relatively cheap start-up cost, ethnic and class resources to start up the business, and the vulnerable character of the business in terms of finding and maintaining clients within the ethnic economy. Family savings were often used to cover start-up costs, but women also borrowed money from their wealthier friends or kin. Many were not able to obtain loans from banks or other lending institu-

tions. In most cases, women operating businesses from their homes rely predominantly on their existing networks to attract new clients.

Women's ability to merge the economic and social spheres, particularly in family operated businesses and home operated businesses in the ethnic economy, has resulted in profitable economic enterprises with relatively low capital investment and job-training costs. Offering autonomy and flexibility, economically lucrative opportunities that allow for gendered social and cultural dynamics that reinforce ethnic solidarity, Middle Eastern women have been active partners in the ethnic division of labor in informal labor markets and economic restructuring in multicultural cities across North America. Women's economic contributions to the household have also changed gender dynamics and authority patterns in family decision-making processes.

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South Asia

In South Asian Muslim societies, the majority of women do not engage in paid employment in the formal sector, as it is both customary and a religious duty for males to provide for the family. Illiteracy, low levels of education, cultural norms, personal choice, differential ownership of land in rural areas, and discriminatory exclusion in urban areas keep those who do work largely in the informal sector. The World Bank (1989) estimates that in Karachi 68.5 percent of women are employed in the informal sector and 52.5 percent of all employed women are in home-based work. Weiss (1990) interviewed 100 women in the walled city in Lahore and found that 33 percent worked for an

income; 61 percent of these women worked in the home and the rest outside. A survey of Muslim women across India showed a workforce participation rate of 14 percent with two-thirds being self-employed in home-based work (Hassan and Menon 2004). In a survey of 102 women of the Ismaili Bohras in Mumbai city, 52 women were working. Of these, 96 percent were working from home (Ghadially 1996). Economic restructuring could result in many more workers entering the informal sector because of job losses in the formal sector.

Although gender disaggregated data of work in the informal sector are difficult to come by there are many studies that indicate the kinds of income-generating work women are engaged in, and the semi-skilled or unskilled nature of their work. Much of it is conducted in homes but some involves going to other people's homes or takes place in public spaces such as markets and construction sites. Some women participate in family business but are not paid for their labor. The nature of the activities also differs in rural and urban areas. In urban areas, women rely on traditional feminine skills such as sewing, knitting, crochet work, and quilt making. Rolling *bidis* (a kind of a cigar), food catering, *mehendi* (henna) application, and stitching footballs are also prevalent. Young women engage in tutoring school children and beautician work. Women are well known for their skills in the various embroidery crafts such as *zardozi* (rich gold and silver embroidery), *chikkan* work (chain stitch), and *phulkari* (flower working with a darn stitch placed in different directions). Others are engaged in construction work and as domestic maids. The latter work either locally or internationally; for example, women in Sri Lanka migrate to the Gulf as maids. In rural Bangladesh women sell their labor in other households, processing rice and performing other menial tasks. The return for their labor is not always cash but usually clothing, rice, or food. Women raise chickens and buy goats and cows to market the milk. Some weave baskets and mats. They may run a small shop in the home or lend rice and money for interest. Children and sometimes husbands assist the women in their work (Abdullah and Zeidenstien 1982).

In the recent past, new types of work have emerged for women. In Bangladesh, women have appeared when projects have provided opportunities for field work or to carry earth in exchange for wheat. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have opened new possibilities for women. The Grameen Bank, a village-based microfinance organization leased cellular mobile phones (village pay phones) to its successful members, creating a small army of phone-leasing women (Bayes 2000). In response to market demands younger women have skillfully adopted computers to enhance the quality of traditional embroidery crafts. Teleworking offers new possibilities for the young educated and those trained in new technologies.

Work in the informal sector serves a variety of purposes. The common purpose is economic; women's labor by and large generates a small income. Besides economic, there are various psychosocial functions these gainful activities serve. Putting their skills to good use is one of them. In the study on the Bohras, one woman said, "In school I was good at drawing so I use this skill to design dresses and *rida* [covering dress]." Women are also concerned about spending their free time in a productive manner and like the idea that work imposes discipline on them. They discover their self-worth and see themselves as active participants in the community. Women have multiple commitments and working from home facilitates the integration of these by giving women control and flexibility over their time and energy resources. Informal work serves a social function as it brings women in contact with clients who are sometimes women of their own religious community. Other effects include greater latitude in decision-making and enhancement of women's mobility. The use of ICTs has made women proud of their work and conferred some fame and prestige on them from their local community.

The importance of their earnings to total household income varies. In many cases it is fundamental to personal or family survival. Women in very poor families and who are heads of households (widowed, deserted) spend on food and other basic items such as soap. More commonly the woman's income supplements the family income. Women spend their earnings on household items such as utensils, curtains, or crockery. Many women spend their income on their children, buying toys or paying school fees and buying uniforms. In a few cases it serves to meet personal expenses or build on personal assets such as savings and purchasing ornaments. In a growing consumerist culture, the desire for more clothes, matching shoes and handbags, cosmetics, and the like must be met by women's own effort. Some women use their earnings to go on a pilgrimage, pay their college fees, buy gifts, and entertain friends. While Islam grants women rights over their property, in practice the control women have over their earnings differs across communities. In some cases in rural Bangladesh women keep

their work a secret to maintain control over their cash while among the Bohras women by and large enjoy exclusive control.

Women are aware that despite increase in demand for their products, especially following export-led growth, their wages and conditions have not improved. Attempts at organizing to increase their bargaining power is fraught with difficulties, yet these attempts do result in self-confidence and courage, public visibility, and leadership qualities. Women are aware that more than Islam, patriarchy poses difficulties for their further development. Their exploitation by middlemen and their dependence on them makes them vulnerable. The apathy of those such as government inspectors, policemen, and others who can make a difference in their lives is a telling point. Women's work in the informal sector tells a story of women changing themselves in the process of organizing, using new technologies, and catering to modern market conditions. Creation of new economic opportunities, capacity building, access to credit and development schemes, and organizing has been posited to improve their lot.

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REHANA GHADIALLY

Sub-Saharan Africa

Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, women dominate the smallest of enterprises within the informal sector, particularly those that require minimal investment. In South Africa, some 60 percent of workers in this sector are women. Their activities are generally an expansion of skills required to run a household: selling fresh or processed food including beer, producing traditional handicrafts from baskets to pottery, or commercializing services from hair-braiding, crocheting, and sewing to childcare. Women often combine a variety of enterprises, including seasonal farming, in order to provide a livelihood. These survival strategies are utilized among the poor in both rural and urban areas, though the mix of activities may differ. In many African towns, urban agriculture is an important source of income as well as of food for the family. Today, selling charcoal and imported second-hand clothes have become important activities in urban areas, as well as processing foodstuffs, such as boiling peanuts for snacks or cooking oranges or mangoes into sweets.

Unlike other parts of the world, in much of Sub-Saharan Africa the concept of separate budgets prevails; as a result, women and men maintain separate enterprises that do not overlap. Microenterprises are generally run by a woman, often with the help of her children, female relatives, or apprentices. Middle-class women, with more resources and contacts in government to ensure licensing, may purchase sewing machines and hire other women to work for them. Secluded Hausa women in northern Nigeria use sons or young daughters to market their prepared food. Most men working in the informal sector are owners or employees of small, not micro, enterprises; accordingly, their products are different: carpentry, metal work, and auto repair.

INCOME AND ITS USES

Throughout much of Sub-Saharan Africa women are expected, even required, to support their own children as well as to contribute to the household budget. In polygynous relationships, which are particularly pronounced in West Africa, younger wives may look after all the children and do domestic chores for the family while the older women farm or work in the marketplace to help support the extended household. Older wives where Islam is practiced have an added incentive to accumulate jewelry and money as a hedge against being divorced.

Women in East Africa lack much of the independence of West African women and this inhibits their ability to pursue informal sector enterprises. The custom of patrilocality, which requires a wife to move to her husband's village, isolates her from relatives who might pool efforts to increase the amount of produce grown for sale. Further, men claim that profits from their wives' labor belong to them because the produce was grown on the man's land. Yet women assume the responsibility of feeding their children. When the men use money for other purposes, many women migrate to the cities to escape male control. They become traders,

often growing produce in tiny gardens on public land. A detailed study of traders in Nairobi showed that women entered the trades later than men, supported more dependants and had less land available upon which to grow produce to sell. Half of the women headed their own households and controlled their income. A few were able to purchase a house within the municipal boundaries because civil, not customary, law prevails.

Likewise, in Dar es Salaam, women traders reported that they bought a tiny house collectively so that they could keep their material goods from the families of their husbands should they become widows. Custom gives the family the right to take the television or refrigerator from a widow's house; but ownership of goods in this communal house was conveniently masked.

Despite literature dismissing women's income as insignificant, recent studies show that women micro-entrepreneurs often support not only themselves and their children, but may provide the majority of the family's income. In South Africa, members of the Self-Employed Women's Union revealed that 75 percent were the major breadwinner although 50 percent were married. In a study in southern Senegal, 59 percent of the women street food vendors were the sole support of their families, which had an average size of 9.5 people, usually including three adults. In Dakar, Senegal, a survey found that 67 percent of the Dakar households were *de facto* headed by women even though all the women were officially married. Men have difficulty in providing for multiple wives: nearly half of all marriages in Senegal are polygynous. Men retired at 55 years from government receive pensions, but the value had become insignificant due to inflation.

Senegalese men are expected to provide the basic staple and several studies show that men indeed provided rice each month. Women's daily expenditures on food over the month equaled that of the cost of the staple, but in their own and their husbands' minds, they were merely supplying "sauce" – toppings of vegetables, occasional meat or fish, oil, salt, and other condiments – for the rice. Actual profits were in most cities lower for women, although return on their investment might equal or surpass that of men. Women tend to sell traditional foods that require their labor but little investment in new equipment or processors and so make profits by scale rather than value added pricing. Market women typically work shorter hours than men because of household responsibilities. In South Africa, 60 percent of the workers in the informal economy are women: street vendors form only a small proportion of these workers who primarily work at home. Home-based work allows women to balance their double day more easily: 21 percent of women-owned entrepreneurships in Kampala, Uganda are reported to be run from home.

Especially in times of economic stress, women and men flock to the markets to sell services, even family possessions. While the sale of crafts or the profit from services is frequently low, women's income in total may be significant because they utilize multiple strategies and combine income streams.

Sources of funds to start even the smallest enterprises may come from kin; in some urban areas, husbands may provide a subsidy for an enterprise instead of the traditional yams. Rotating credit associations are well known throughout the continent among women as a method to save money to buy a stall or a house. Other voluntary associations are likewise important for maximizing capital, such as purchasing clubs, formed to purchase in bulk, and burial societies, whereby money is set aside for burials. Prayer groups are growing in popularity, particularly among women household heads, and the social capital derived from such associations helps these micro-entrepreneurs survive.

Microcredit is slowly being introduced to Sub-Saharan Africa but has not been as widely adopted as in Asia or Latin America. While limited banking facilities are blamed in some urban areas, in East Africa the ambiguity of women's rights to what they produce discourages entrepreneurship. Women seem to prefer group activities, such as gardens, with profits spent on schools or roads that benefit the community. In a village outside Mombasa, women used microcredit to set up a village soap factory but profits were low because some women did not participate fully – the organization offering microcredit said they still had no applications for individual enterprises.

Policies toward vendors

Informal sector enterprises are widely accepted in rural areas. In contrast, in urban areas, policies of governments toward the informal sector are inconsistent and frequently contradictory. Street vendors are particularly vulnerable as are traders who crowd the entrances and aisles of permanent markets. Governments may issue permits for enterprises, then periodically destroy the carts of street vendors, arrest squatters in markets, and may even demolish small structures. Officials complain about congestion and unsanitary conditions.

Paying bribes to avoid harassment is frequent. The larger the city, the more the government strives to present a modern face to the world. Lagos officials were much more aggressive in removing market vendors than those in Nigeria's smaller provincial towns. In Nairobi, the hosting of the All Africa Games provoked the municipality to clear the streets of vendors, primarily women. In contrast, the metal artisans – all men – have received Kenyan government support in their quest to have the occupation of their market area declared legal.

New policies toward vendors are being enacted in South Africa where control of street traders has devolved to local authorities. Most of the traders involved were men who pay rent for market space. Women are less likely to sell year round and so do not apply for permits.

Microenterprise and home-based work

The category "informal sector" is amorphous. Popularized by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in the 1970s in opposition to the formal sector, both the definitions and the future of the informal sector have been the subject of intense academic debate. The boundaries of the sector are porous: the United Nations Statistics Division and ILO Bureau of Statistics considered the problem of inclusion in the background paper for the 2000 World Development Report, "Informal Sector, Poverty and Gender." Local Membership Based Organizations for the Poor (MBOP) are active at the national and city levels, prompting governments to redefine not only the sector but also the rights of workers. Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) is also working with the Economic Commission for Africa to produce estimates of the informal sector for national accounts in Sub-Saharan African countries.

Today, the interconnectedness among the spectrum of enterprises from factories to food sellers is widely accepted, especially with the growing use of subcontracting. The line between a woman sewing for a contractor and sewing for sale in the market is ambiguous. Development agencies prefer to use "micro-enterprise" and "home-based work" to categorize women's work. With population growth, increased urbanization, and unemployment, it is clear is that micro and small enterprises will continue to prosper, not disappear from the market economy.

Home-based work would seem to be clearly part of the informal sector, yet, as subcontracting of factory jobs has increased, even this category has become contested. In 1996, the ILO passed its Convention on Home Work. Delegates included representatives from labor who considered subcontracting exploitation and women's grassroots organizations who championed micro-enterprise. These delegates realized that distinctions among types of home work were fungible. HomeNet International was established with centers in the United Kingdom, India, Canada, and South Africa to support advocacy groups whose goals are to provide benefits that range from childcare, to health care, to social security for women working at home. In 1995, representatives from around the world agreed to form a similar network for street vendors; StreetNet International was launched in 2002 with its headquarters in South Africa.

WIEGO combines worker advocacy groups with scholars and development agencies. Their aim is to address "the troubling lack of recognition and support for the informal economy, especially the women who work in it, by policy makers and the international development community" and to strengthen organizing capacity and increase the visibility and voice of women in the informal economy (<www.wiego.org>).

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Irene Tinker

Turkey

Female participation in the formal labor market has been decreasing in Turkey since the 1990s because of economic stagnation. In 1990, labor force participation in the rural areas was 52 percent for women and 83 percent for men. In 2004, these figures were 30.9 percent and 71.2 percent. In the urban centers, women have only marginal opportunities to participate in the labor market and active economic life, especially in the formal, organized sector jobs (industry and services) (Ecevit 1990). The labor force participation for urban women has remained around 17 percent (for men the figure has decreased from 76.8 percent in 1990 to 68.9 percent in 2004). Hence, the male breadwinner is becoming the dominant model. Especially in a declining urban economy, men rather than women are preferred for the limited number of jobs in industry; women with low levels of education, few qualifications, and little work experience tend to turn to the informal and service sectors. Women's participation in the expanding service sector, however, has been limited to two types of work. First, jobs such as teaching, civil service, and some professions such as medical doctors, pharmacists, and lawyers, are more typical for women from middle-class families (in which a parent was also a teacher or civil servant) (Öncü 1981). Such employment requires high levels of education and professional skills (Kalaycıoğlu and Ritters-berger-Tılıç 1998). Second, they were also employed in the flexible textile industry as part-time and/or temporary workers. Especially the subcontracting nature of garment manufacture, in small workshops, gave way to informal work relations. Workers are called in when an order is placed and mostly young (15–30) female workers, who are second- and third-generation migrants, are employed (Eraydın 1998). This type of workplace usually works to order (coming from the national and/or international markets), which brings fluctuation in working hours. There are periods of intensive work, during which women have to work long hours (up to 10–12 hours a day). On the other hand, they can easily lose their jobs when the orders stop coming in. The majority of women do not have social security.

Many women are engaged in piece-work, working in their homes, which is not reflected in the statistics. Women compose 65 percent of the informal sector labor force. Most women prefer piece-work/home-working because they do not wish to leave their children alone or on the streets. Home-based work covers a variety of activities ranging from needlework, fine stitching, lace, crochet, and embroidery, to knitting socks, sweaters, and washcloths, weaving carpets and rugs, and even shoe-making. Women learn these skills in their families starting from early childhood. This practice differs regionally; thus in eastern and southeastern Anatolia, where carpet weaving is a common practice among women, needlework is rather rare. Those products are mainly sold to well-off households (accumulated as trousseaux) through a network of intermediary neighbors and relatives. Producing pickles or pastries, or breaking nuts to be sold in the marketplace is another possibility. Some women work as intermediaries for the distribution of goods rather than working as producers. Additionally, both piece-work and home-working may appear as an extension of the informal sector workshops. The textile sector creates its own piece-work network with work including sewing zippers or cleaning seams at home. Piece-work such as assembling ballpoint pens and placing screws or wires into electronic equipment are extensions of the light electronic industry completed at home.

Being employed in informal sector jobs has certain implications for women in determining their status in the family and in society at large. First, their low economic gains are considered as only a supportive contribution to the family income or to the male breadwinner's income, instead of being considered as a major or "real" income (Lubell 1991). Second, within the social and domestic spheres of women, being employed in informal sector jobs is not something which receives general approval. Hopkins's (1986) findings – although referring to the situation in Egypt – can be easily applied to Turkey. He states that a decision for a woman to work outside the house is made by the family and usually not by the individual woman herself, and it is a decision which depends on the degree of economic crisis experienced in the family, for example the death or disability of the male breadwinner, unemployment, or divorce. Thus, working in the informal sector has a different meaning for men than for women. Women primarily join this sector as a result of hardships within the family. Third, particularly younger women agree to work in low income jobs not only for economic reasons, but also to satisfy their social needs in terms of going out of the house and meeting others, thus escaping the strict social control of the private sphere. Finally, a job chosen in the informal sector is usually considered an extension of gender roles and domestic duties. This reinforces the reproduction of women's intrafamilial status even outside the house.

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Sibel Kalaycıoğlu

Economics: Islamic Banks

Overview

Islamic banking is a form of banking that is primarily based on profit and loss sharing (PLS) without the mechanism of interest. For proponents of Islamic banking, interest constitutes *ribā*, which is explicitly prohibited in the Qurʾān (2:275–8, 3:130, 4:161) and the traditions of the Prophet (*sunna*). This entry first provides an overview of Islamic banking and then comments on some areas specific to women, bearing in mind that there is very little research on the role of women in Islamic banking at this stage.

Muslim economists arguing for Islamic banking developed, from the 1960s onwards, a model of banking based on concepts drawn from texts in the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*, and past interpretations of those texts in Islamic law (*fiqh*). A fundamental principle in Islamic banking is the prohibition of *ribā* (interpreted as interest, despite differences of opinion among Muslims on this interpretation). Other founding concepts are risk-sharing; avoidance of excessive speculative risk (*gharar*); adoption of *ḥalāl* (what is permissible under Islamic law) and avoidance of *ḥarām* (what is prohibited) in all bank activities (deposits, loans, and investment); the revival of Islamic institutions such as *zakāt* and *ṣadaqa*, which aim at alleviating the suffering of the disadvantaged and marginalized in society; and an overall strong sense of social responsibility.

Apart from these ideas, a host of contracts taken over from classical Islamic law and modified to suit the needs of a modern banking system are used in Islamic banking. Some of these contracts are aimed at facilitating transactions based on PLS. These are called *muḍāraba* (profit-sharing contract under which one party provides capital and the other party labor; any profit will be divided between the two parties according to a pre-agreed ratio) and *mushāraka* (equity participation; all parties contribute to the capital and they share in the profit and loss). Other contracts are intended to facilitate the banking/investment activities of Islamic banks without the need for such PLS-based contracts as *muḍāraba* and *mushāraka*. These include *murābaḥa* (mark-up based contract; similar to trade financing), *ijāra* (leasing contract), *salam* (prepaid purchase contract), and *istiṣnāʿ* (manufacturing contract). The bank utilizes the contract of *muḍāraba* in its relationship with the "depositor" (who is effectively an investor on a *muḍāraba* basis). With third parties, the bank utilizes *muḍāraba, mushāraka, murābaḥa, ijāra, salam*, and *istiṣnāʿ*. However, the most popular contracts with the third parties are those contracts for which the return can be predetermined (unlike the PLS contracts which are seen as too risky), such as *murābaḥa, ijāra, salam*, and *istiṣnāʿ*.

Islamic banking emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s as part of the neo-revivalist-inspired Islamization project, which was particularly active then in Egypt and the Indian subcontinent. The move for Islamization was largely directed by organizations like Jamāʿat Islāmi of Pakistan, led by Mawlāna Mawdūdī (d. 1979), and in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Ḥasan al-Banna (d. 1949). In the post-Second World War period, one of the concerns of the Islamization project was to move the Muslim *umma* on from its colonial history, as well as from values and institutions of the colonial period, which were seen to be at odds with Islamic communal, political, economic, educational, and legal life. In the economic sphere, the Islamization project thus required the banking systems of Muslim states, based then on interest, to be replaced by an Islamized system, free from interest in accordance with religious teachings. Thus, in the 1960s, scholars sympathetic to the ideological orientation of the Jamāʿat Islāmi or the Muslim Brotherhood, and members of the two organizations, began to write on Islamic economics, banking, and finance. These writers (for example Abū al-Aʿlā Mawdūdī, Nejatullah Siddiqi, Aḥmad al-Najjār, and Abū al-Saʿūd, not all of them members of the organizations referred to here) were heavily influenced by classical Islamic law, what the writers considered to be just and fair at the time, and by concerns related to economic and social development.

Although some small-scale experiments with Islamic banking were conducted in the 1960s in the subcontinent, Malaysia, and also in Egypt (for example the Mit Ghamr project of Egypt), it was only in the 1970s that Islamic banks became institutions in their own right. This was largely thanks to the availability of the necessary capital in the form of petro-dollars (a result of the oil price rises of 1973–4) in oil-rich Muslim countries such as

Saudi Arabia, and to a series of decisions made by international Islamic bodies such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC, the umbrella organization whose membership covers all Muslim-majority states). One such decision was to establish the Islamic Development Bank in Jeddah in 1975 (an international bank based on the ideas of Islamic banking, funded by all OIC member countries but its largest shareholding coming from oil-producing states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya). Other banks were founded in rapid succession: the Dubai Islamic Bank (1975), Faisal Islamic Banks in various countries, Kuwait Finance House (1977), Jordan Islamic Bank (1978), and also the Al-Baraka Group based in Jeddah (1982). These banks in turn contributed to the establishment of Islamic banks in Africa, Asia, and even in Europe. Later, in Southeast Asia, Malaysia established the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (1983), and Indonesia the Bank Muamalat (1991). Most of the early Islamic banks were funded by citizens, companies, or governments of the oil-rich Gulf countries. In the 1980s, some Muslim states, such as Iran and Sudan, Islamized their entire banking sector. Now in the early twenty-first century, Islamic banks, finance companies, equity funds, and insurance (*takāful*) companies exist in most countries of the Islamic world, and even in Western countries where significant Muslim minorities exist, for example, Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami Trust (1981) in Switzerland, American Finance House – LARIBA (1987) and Failaka Investments Inc. (1996) in the United States, and the Muslim Community Cooperative of Australia (1989). From its humble beginnings in the early 1970s, Islamic banking has become a multi-billion dollar industry.

Islamic banks and women

The literature of the early days of Islamic banking (1960s and 1970s) gives no indication that the contributors had women as a specific group in mind. There is hardly any discussion of whether Islamic banking could or could not benefit women as a group that were, generally speaking, disadvantaged in most Muslim communities then. Nor was there any suggestion that women in relatively wealthy countries could be targeted in relation to specific Islamic banking products. Put simply, women were absent from the conceptualization of Islamic banking. Only much later did Islamic banks realize the importance of this sector. More specifically, when Islamic banks were established in the 1970s, most of the activities and shareholdings remained in the hands of men. While there was no official or Islamic barrier to women's participation in Islamic banking in any capacity (shareholders, managers, investors, or borrowers), it seems that their role was primarily as depositors/investors.

However, women's participation in Islamic banking is today much stronger than in the past. In countries where segregation of men and women is still the norm, such as Saudi Arabia, the role of women in Islamic banking is often acted out behind the scenes. At times, they manage their capital through companies established or managed by male relatives. Via this mechanism, women also hold shares in Islamic banks and participate in the banking business as depositors/investors or borrowers. At another level, an interesting change is taking place. Islamic banks have come to realize the potential of women's wealth and are intent on utilizing it. Several now target women as their primary customers. This is particularly true in wealthy Muslim countries such as some of the oil-producing Gulf countries, where women own a substantial amount of capital. For example, at the time of writing women in Saudi Arabia own approximately 34 percent of all private sector businesses in Riyadh and 25.6 percent in Jeddah. In Saudi Arabia, Islamic banks provide separate branches for women run by women, or separate counters for women managed by women. Bahrain now has its first Islamic bank for women, established by the Bahrain Islamic Bank. In Malaysia, there are several Islamic funds that market products for women, run by women (for instance, Hijrah Trust Management Group Berhad Malaysia). While it may be argued that this may appear to entrench segregation, it is also true that these services give women relatively easy access to an important part of business/commercial life, which further develops and strengthens their socioeconomic position.

In poorer countries, such as Bangladesh and Indonesia, women play a significant role in Islamic banking as either depositors or borrowers and sometimes as shareholders. Small-scale microfinancing is an area in which women play an active role, especially in rural areas. Women from low-income households often need small amounts of money to improve their families' social and economic circumstances. Small loans of as little as $50 (or even less) are made to women for productive purposes, for example purchasing a sewing machine, which is then used to generate additional income, or perhaps to establish a small business. Generally speaking, these small funds are provided by Islamic financial institutions without any security, ensuring that Islamic banks also play an important community role enabling women and

low-income families to move out of the poverty cycle. Successful examples of such projects exist in the Islamic banking ventures of Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Sudan.

Since the 1990s, women have thus become increasingly visible in Islamic banking and finance (in relatively rich as well as poor countries). They have been given the opportunity to manage and administer Islamic financing schemes and are often considered to be the best vehicle through which these institutions can reach an important segment of the market: women. The United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Indonesia are good examples in this regard. In Iran, also, given that the whole banking system is run on Islamic lines, the involvement of women as managers/administrators is all the more significant. Even in countries where segregation is common, the establishment of women-only banks, branches, or counters has meant that women must manage them, again improving the level of access by and control of women in these areas. However, given the lack of reliable data, it is difficult to gauge the real power and participation of women in Islamic banking and finance in most countries.

Despite some of the positive developments mentioned here, however, patriarchal views appear to persist throughout the Islamic banking movement. If Islamic banking is indeed inspired by the Islamization movements of the twentieth century, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance such movements place on a woman's role in society would be reflected in Islamic banking theory and practice. In practice, the level of involvement of women in Islamic banking varies from country to country, class to class, and according to the economic power they wield.

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Abdullah Saeed

Economics: Labor and Health

South Asia

In Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, inferior terms of women's employment perpetuate their subordination in family and society and impact their health adversely. How women are paid and valued in the fields, factories, and offices has direct bearing on women workers' status within and outside the workplace. The statistical profile of women's work in South Asia reveals a high maternal mortality rate, adverse sex ratios, low levels of literacy, the highest work participation of women in agriculture, and women's estimated earned income as less than half that of men, signifying the undervaluation and unpaid nature of women's productive economic contribution, as shown in Table 1.

Sociocultural background

Discourse on nineteenth-century social reform in South Asia highlights that both tradition governed by Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism and modernity promoted by Western liberalism have been carriers of patriarchal ideology, the former of an aggressive and the latter of a benevolent nature (Sangari and Vaid 1990).

Women from South Asia are supposed to be relatively timid, obedient, disciplined and meticulous in handling skilled, monotonous jobs, and easy to control. The New International Division of Labor intensified by globalization depends on superexploitation of poor South Asian women, especially young unmarried girls who are recruited in the Free Trade Zones (FTZs), Export Processing Zones (EPZs), and the latest, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) (Patel 2000). Married women with children are eased out of the organized sector and young, unmarried, moderately educated girls/women are recruited in the FTZs, EPZs, and SEZs.

Erosion of workers' rights

During the last two decades, in the absence of any democratic rights in stigmatized labor concentration camps, these young girls had only one way of expressing their anger, fatigue and alienation, namely mass hysteria (WLUML 2002). Now, the heads of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries are negotiating to create more and more FTZs, SEZs, and EPZs. Human and women's rights groups need to ensure that the horrible history of back-breaking, hazardous, unhealthy, highly labor intensive workload for women workers in the region is not repeated (Gupta 2001).

Occupational health and safety

Industrial pollution and occupational health risks also take a heavy toll on Asian women's reproductive health. Carcinogenic and mutagenic effects of industrial pollution, incidents such as the Bhopal Union Carbide gas tragedy, and release of radioactive nuclear waste have raised danger signals. Commercialization of forest and natural resources has enhanced rural women's plight, as they are responsible for collection of fuel, fodder, and water (WHO 2000).

In the absence of any safety net provided by the multinational and transnational corporations or governments, globalization has enhanced control over sexuality, fertility, and labor of women migrants in the region. Innocent rural girls as well as high-school educated adolescent girls are inducted into the workforce. Cross country migration of girls and women for domestic work, industrial and professional work, and services such as nursing, secretarial practice, tele-working, and business process outsourcing (BPO) has increased (Gopalan and Shiva 2000).

Migration, tourism, and vulnerability of destitute women

Mail-order brides from Asian countries are in demand in Europe so that aging patriarchs can be looked after by "docile" Asian women. Organ trade of destitute Muslim women, children, and fetuses from the poor South Asian communities has gained demonic proportions. Soft as well as hardcore pornography and cyber sexual violence are used for terrorization, humiliation, and intimidation of women and girls. Cyber stalking in the computer laboratories of offices, colleges, universities, and commercially run cyber-cafés has invited attention of the decision-makers, who are divided in their opinions. Some scholars believe that it reduces actual violence against women as people derive psychological satisfaction through voyeurism. Others see it as an extension of verbal and physical

violence. Policy interventions are needed to deal with online sexual violence. Use of SMS (Short Message Service) to send frightening text messages to girls is another important area that demands urgent attention.

Smut parties for executives of transnational and multinational corporations and indigenous corporate barons have become routine affairs, so much so that the states in the region do not take any action in spite of prima facie evidence provided by newspaper coverage (Shyam 2002).

During 1990–2005, employment of adult women decreased and employment of adolescent girls and child labor increased. Women were and are given less skilled and underpaid jobs. Budgetary cuts for daycare centers and crèches enhanced the burden of poor working women.

Determinants of women's health status

Women's health is determined by the forces working in homes, workplaces, society, and the state. According to Dr. Amartya Kumar Sen, "the burden of hardship falls disproportionately on women" through seven types of inequality: mortality (due to gender bias in health care and nutrition), natality (sex selective abortion and female infanticide), basic facility (education and skill development), special opportunity (higher education and professional training), professional (promotion), ownership (home, land, and property), and household (housework and childcare) (Sen 2001). Economic globalization has accentuated all seven types of inequalities faced by women from womb to tomb.

Urban poor women have to take two to three jobs to supplement their income to meet the basic survival needs of their family members. Floods create deaths, destruction, and epidemics. Global warming has resulted in resurgence of older epidemics such as cholera, typhoid, malaria, dengue, and hemorrhagic fever. The burgeoning sex trade has made 2 million sex-workers potential carriers of HIV, STDs, and AIDS. Moreover, women in prostitution may suffer from tuberculosis, malnutrition, malaria, and skin diseases (Fernandez and Ray 2000). At present, there is an evidence of rising HIV rates among young married women who are infected by their husbands.

Modern lifestyle and environment has increased breast and uterine cancer among Indian women. Techniques meant for detecting cancer (self-examination of breast, pap smear) are rarely used by urban poor women. As a result, detection of cancer and treatment at an early stage becomes impossible (WHO 2000).

All types of fruit are cornered by the liquor industry and alcoholism is aggressively promoted among the toiling poor. As a result, men do not contribute to daily necessities for the household. Women have to shoulder the major burden of household expenditure. Use of bio-fuels – wood, dung, crop residue – resulting in indoor air pollution takes away the lives of half a million women annually in India (WHO 2000).

Worsening socioeconomic and political situation and mental health of women

Experiences from both industrialized and developing countries have revealed that the prevalence of common mental disorders or minor psychiatric morbidity is high among the urban low income and marginalized population. Women among them are even more vulnerable. Structural adjustment programs, increasing conflict with neighboring

Table 1: Status of Women in South Asia

Indicator	Bangladesh	India	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka	South Asia
MMR*	400	540	540	340	505	505
Women as % of men	95	94	96	95	94	94
Adult literacy	30.8	46	25	29	43	43
% women in total labor force	42	32	41	29	33	33
% women in total employment	38	27	50	14	27	27
% employment in agriculture	78	78	91	66	76	76
% employment in industry	7.6	11	1	11	11	11
% employment in services	11	11.2	8	23	13	13
Women's estimated earned income as % of men's income, 2001 (US $)	56	38	60	32	50	40

*MMR = Maternal mortality rate per 10,000 live births
Source: UNDP 2003.

countries, and ongoing sectarian violence on caste, ethnicity, and communal lines within the country have put the population of India at high risk of mental illnesses. Alert India is a large non-governmental organization with 550 community workers working among the marginalized sections of Mumbai metropolis. Their women health workers found that women who have to deal with financial hardship experience tremendous stress. Multi-tasking is the name of the game. At one time women may be performing three to four types of economic activity – tailoring, assembling of electrical spare parts, packaging of medicines, food processing, and the like. Moreover, women within a given community are affected differentially depending on their place in the socioeconomic hierarchy. In this regard, female-headed households are most vulnerable to mental distress. The mental health professionals are geared only for episodic disasters and not for enduring disasters. Urban poor women have also become the victims of mental health agendas shaped by multinational pharmaceutical giants. With liberalization of economies drug cures have become established as sure cures for mental illness. The World Bank has offered a "template" for predominantly psychiatry-driven mental health services all over the world.

Conclusion

The ideologies of subordination of women and seclusion are used for super-exploitation of women as the cheapest labor in the context of the neoliberal logic of economic globalization. Neocolonial economic development demanded modernization of patriarchal methods of regulating and controlling women as against democratization of gender relations in the home and the workplace attempted by the collective struggles of the working class. As a result, women workers shoulder the double burden of wage-work/housework, the double standard of sexual morality, and carry the blame for corrupting the moral standard of society (Contractor, Madhiwalla, and Menon 2005). Careful examination of the policies of employers reveals that partnership of patriarchal state and world capitalism has emerged in such a way that it allows women a secondary place in the labor market. Non-recognition of unpaid family labor augmenting family resources has been a marked feature of the labor policies in South Asia. Women workers in the informal sector (that is, more than 90 percent of women workers in South Asia) are not paid the state stipulated minimum wages (Gupta 2001). The same logic is found in the policies of the employers and the state. Support services for working mothers in terms of maternity benefits and childcare facilities are perceived as welfare measures and philanthropic activities, and not as the rights of women workers (Center for Reproductive Rights 2004). The cultural legacy of sex segregation assails women through super-exploitation, promotion of home-based and piece-work jobs, and control over women's work and reproduction through the kinship network.

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Vibhuti Patel

Turkey

The world has entered into a restructuring process with the globalization following the crisis of capitalism in the 1970s. This process, leading to flexibility of labor markets, has pioneered the formation of new working environments, technologies, work organization, and control mechanisms. The restructuring of labor markets has brought

many problems in its wake as a result of the liberalization of capital at the international level. These problems have commonly affected the poor, women, and children.

Among the negative effects of globalization in Turkey on female labor, are unemployment, female labor not in the labor force, and underemployment. The unemployment rate among women is 9.7 percent. The unemployment rate among women living in urban areas (19.4 percent) is three times higher than rural areas (SIP 2004). There is a close relationship between unemployment and health problems. The most frequently encountered health problems among women in Turkey as a result of unemployment are stress, anxiety, hopelessness, and family conflict. In addition, a rise in stress and negative mood and self-esteem has been determined in women at higher levels than in men (Özkan 2005).

Women migrating to urban areas from rural areas following agricultural privatization and mechanization become housewives or are included in the most informal sector. Half of the individuals not in the labor force are housewives, 69.6 percent of whom live in urban areas (SIP 2003). As a consequence of the export policies in the last 20 years, the informal sector in Turkey began to develop and subcontractors began to assign work to small manufacturing units or to women in their homes. Women often consider themselves temporarily employed in business; multinational companies consider women as persons who can be paid low wages. The share of women working at home varied between 79.0 and 90.5 percent during 1989–2001. Because many types of work are not included in official statistics, it is not possible to know what jobs women perform in their homes; however, outside the home they work as maids, babysitters, and house and office cleaners. Among major hindrances encountered by such women in access to health care services, they are not registered or insured, and they receive low wages and are not compensated for work-related expenses such as lighting and heating. Moreover, working irregularly for indefinite and long periods, the lack of supervision of working conditions, and exclusion from occupational health and safety services lead to psychological problems such as stress, inability to spend time with family members, and family conflicts. In addition, every family member at home may be subject to risks related to occupational injuries and diseases (DİSK 2003, Östlin 2000). Women working at home defined their work-related health problems as musculoskeletal disorders, defects of vision, pulmonary diseases, and allergies (DİSK 2003).

Women are commonly employed in the agricultural sector as unpaid family workers (Özbay 1991). The rate of unpaid family women workers was 30.2 percent in 2003. They mostly live in rural areas (73.6 percent) and work in the agricultural sector (94.2 percent). In addition, 24.7 percent of these women are not literate (SIP 2003). Unpaid family women workers reported that they were happier (65.3 percent) and more hopeful (23.4 percent) than unemployed women and women in waged employment (SIP 2004).

One in every five women participates in the labor force in Turkey. There is a major difference in labor force participation by women between urban and rural areas, whereas the difference is less for men. In the the public sector, 3 percent of employees are women and in the private sector the figure is 16 percent. Of the total of working women, 71.2 percent are not registered in the social security system (SIP 2003).

Women in Turkey are mainly employed in agriculture (48.1 percent), service (27.5 percent), and manufacturing industries (20.5 percent). These jobs generally do not require qualifications and offer little prospect of promotion. Almost all of the women employed in the agricultural sector work in the fields while the women in the industrial sector mainly work in textiles, ready-made clothing, food manufacturing, and assembly jobs. The employment status of women is: regular employees (21.0 percent), casual employees (20.7 percent), and self-employed (13.6 percent). Women in urban areas mainly work as clerks and professionals, while in rural areas as skilled agricultural workers (SIP 2003). Nursery and secretarial work, schoolteaching, and bank clerking are accepted as jobs for women, whilst technician and driver positions are seen to be acceptable for men (Özbay 1991).

In 2003, among insured women 4,444 employment injuries, and 3 cases of occupational diseases were reported, while these figures for men were 72,204 and 437. Employment injuries are mainly encountered among women of the 18–24 age group (38.0 percent) and mainly occur in the textile, clothing and ready-made clothing, and foodstuff industries. The reasons for such employment injuries are stepping on, striking, or being struck by objects, excluding falling objects (42.6 percent), falls (14.7 percent), and accidents caused by machinery (13.1 percent). Fatal employment injuries were 15 among women and 795 among men. In 2003, no deaths occurred among women

from occupational diseases. While temporary incapacity for work due to employment injuries was 87,347 days among women, this figure was 2,014,192 days for men (SII 2003).

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Özlem Özkan

Economics: Labor Profiles

Arab States

The term labor is often used by economists, statisticians, and policymakers to describe market oriented or subsistence production. As feminists have pointed out, such definitions tend to minimize the contributions of women. This is particularly true in Arab communities, where official estimates of women's labor force participation (the number of women in the labor force divided by the number of working age women) range from 11 percent in the Occupied Palestinian Territories to 35 percent in Morocco, with an average of 28 percent (World Bank 2004).

A number of problems exist with such statistics. Firstly, women's paid employment may be underestimated, for various reasons. Women's home production of food that is sold or traded may not be recognized by a respondent as a labor contribution. Some respondents may be ashamed to admit that the household relies on female labor contributions, and thus may neglect to reveal this to data collectors. What questions are asked, and of whom, thus matters (Anker and Anker 1995).

In recent years statistical agencies in various countries have increased the number of probes in questionnaires, to correct for these problems (CAWTAR 2001), but still of concern is the fact that the official definitions of labor continue to ignore the massive non-market reproductive labor contributions that women make. Studies have shown that measures of women's employment are highly sensitive to the definition of work. Anker and Anker (1995) found that by varying the definition of labor force participation, estimates of Egyptian women's participation ranged from 6.2 to 41.3 percent. Using an even more inclusive definition of work, they found that 91 percent of women were contributing to the economy.

A second problem with labor force participation data is that these are often assumed to be a proxy for women's empowerment. Because Arab women's rates are low, analysts have assumed that women are disempowered, without exploring more complex definitions of power, or the ways in which entry into paid employment may both empower or disempower women (Olmsted 2005).

Since women's contributions are often in the reproductive sphere, feminists have long been advocating that policymakers collect time use data. These data also can help address the question of whether women are increasingly suffering from a double burden, as they continue to contribute substantial amounts of non-market reproductive labor, while increasing their contributions to paid employment. The United Nations (2004) reports that time use surveys have now been conducted in three Arab communities: Morocco, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and Oman, although published analyses of these data sets seem limited. A report by the Moroccan government (Maroc 1999) confirms that women's employment may be underestimated using standard instruments, and also that women's contributions to the non-market sphere are considerable. This report found that 71.4 percent of rural and 34.6 percent of urban women, for an overall average of 50.6 percent, were employed. The report concludes that official employment figures are underestimated by about 4.6 percent. Most of this difference is due to underestimating the participation of rural and/or illiterate women (Maroc 1999, 21). It is also noteworthy that in this report even the most conservative labor participation estimate (46 percent) is higher than the World Bank figure (35 percent).

The Moroccan data suggest that among *femmes actives*, rural women work more hours than those in urban areas. Rural *femmes actives* spend 3.25 hours on average on what the report identifies as *temps professional*, while their household contributions (*temps domestique et ménager*) account for about 4.2 hours, for an average total work day of about 7.5 hours. By contrast, among *femmes inactives* 4.5 (urban) to 5.5 (rural) hours of work are done daily, mostly under the category *temps domestique et ménager* (Maroc 1999, 36–7, tables 5 and 6), suggesting that the average working women does 2 hours more work daily. In terms of examining women's overall time use patterns, interestingly, the Morocco report does not compare women's time use to Moroccan men's, but rather to French women's; thus it is not possible to determine the relative work loads of men and women in Morocco. These numbers only provide averages, and may still underestimate the amount of work women are doing, particularly in terms of their contributions to childcare. However, in general the data suggest that even "inactive" women make

considerable economic contributions in Morocco, but that the average woman is not experiencing a severe time crunch (or double burden.)

Although considerably more research on the question of how Arab women (and men) spend their time is needed, in lieu of detailed time use analyses, certain other patterns also suggest that the double burden is not (yet) a serious problem for (most) Arab women. First, because many Arab women are not in paid employment, their work load is likely to be less heavy. Also, those who are in paid employment may be able to rely on other "non-working" female household or family members to assist them with their non-market duties.

Another factor that has probably lessened time pressure on working Arab women, especially those of the middle and upper middle classes, is the influx of female labor, particularly from Southeast and South Asia. This pattern of labor migration was first observed in the Gulf states, where large numbers of women migrated to take positions as domestic workers, providing childcare, cooking, and cleaning services in private homes. More recently this phenomenon has spread to Jordan and Lebanon. Ray Jureidini (2002) reports that by 1999, Lebanese government figures estimated that the number of Sri Lankan migrants in Lebanon was over 22,000 (with 95 percent or more being women), while the Sri Lankan embassy suggested that the number could be as high as 100,000. While immigrant women may be making it easier for some women to enter paid employment, local working-class women may find their employment options have shrunk as a result. Jureidini argues that historically, domestic service positions in Lebanon were filled by Lebanese and Palestinian women, but that these jobs are now going to more exploitable (both in terms of human rights and wages) imported laborers. In the case of Saudi Arabia, Doumato (1999) argues that despite a policy of "Saudiazation," the desire on the part of the state to continue maintaining the strictest sex segregation policies being practiced in the region, and perhaps the world, has limited women's entry into paid employment, with Saudi Arabia continuing to rely on foreign workers. The use of immigrant labor thus raises questions about class privilege both locally and globally, as well as about race, sex, and the politics of national identity in the context of increasing globalization.

Aside from the question of how they are coping with the reproductive labor responsibilities that are generally assigned to them by society, two more general questions concerning women's labor are why labor force participation rates of Arab women are so low, and how women who have entered paid employment are faring. The first question has been explored in more detail than the second.

Although it may be the case that women's participation in paid employment is underestimated, it is clear that rates in the Arab world are lower than in other regions. A number of explanations of this trend have been put forward. Factors that can explain differences in participation rates include individual characteristics such as education, marital status, number of children, age, and location (urban/rural), as well as societal and economic variables such as gender norms concerning work, macroeconomic conditions, and government policies. All of these factors may be relevant in understanding participation patterns in the region. Rising levels of education, for instance, appear to be affecting participation rates, particularly in the Gulf countries, where in most cases women's participation rates have doubled in the last 20 years. High fertility rates, which in recent years began declining (World Bank 2004), may also have kept women's unpaid work burden high, precluding their ability to participate in paid employment.

Some have focused on Islam as the main factor in explaining labor trends in the Arab world, while others, such as Papps (1993) and Olmsted (2002), have problematized this assertion. While there is some cross-country evidence that labor participation rates of women in predominantly Muslim countries are somewhat lower than in other parts of the world (Tzannatos 1999), given the variation in employment rates both within the Arab world, and across various Muslim communities more broadly, the explanatory power of religion is in fact limited.

Various studies focus on the role government policies play in shaping employment outcomes. Moghadam (1995) argues that because many Arab countries rejected export oriented strategies, women's employment options were more limited. The World Bank (2004) illustrates how various legal restrictions may limit or enhance women's access to certain jobs. For example, supportive maternity leave policies, at least on paper, may be seen as a positive step, while laws limiting the types of work women may perform have the opposite effect. Finally, particular political conditions, such as military occupation in the case of the Palestinians (Hammami 2001, Olmsted 2001), and extensive military conflict as in the case of Iraq (Al-Ali 2005) may also affect women's employment patterns.

Moghadam (2005) also points out that although women's participation rates in the Middle East

remain relatively low, women are more likely to suffer from unemployment. It is also likely that unemployment rates of women are underestimated, since women may also be underemployed or become discouraged and leave the labor market, which means that they are not included in official unemployment statistics. Underemployment occurs when an individual is unable to find work that uses his or her educational skills, or for as many hours as he or she desires. While unemployment tends to affect more educated Arab women, underemployment may affect women at all levels.

Cross-country comparisons, such as those done by Tzannatos and Moghadam, tend to focus on macroeconomic conditions and employment patterns, but a limited number of microeconomic studies are also available to examine how individual characteristics of women and households affect participation. Data from Palestine (Olmsted 2001), Jordan (Shakhatreh 1995), Egypt (Assaad and El-Hamidi 2001), and Iraq (United Nations 2005) suggest that Arab women's participation falls and then rises with increasing education, as those most likely to work include highly educated women, and illiterate women, who are often in subsistence agriculture. While married women are less likely to work than unmarried women, and Shakhetreh (1995) found that having children also decreased the likelihood of working, Olmsted (2001) and Assaad and El-Hamidi (2001) did not find that having more children necessarily decreased women's participation.

The issue of occupational segregation has also been addressed by some researchers. Anker (1998) concludes that occupational segregation is stronger in Arab countries than in other parts of the world, although more recent data reported by the World Bank (2004) suggest not only considerable variation (with Morocco being the least segregated, while Egypt is much more so), but also an overall rate of occupational segregation that is similar to other parts of the world. Tzannatos (1999) finds that segregation appears to be worsening in the Middle East and North Africa, a phenomenon he does not observe elsewhere. This trend is not entirely surprising, and may well be temporary, since the transition from lower to higher participation rates among women may initially lead to a higher concentration of women in traditionally female occupations.

While women in many countries are overrepresented in certain professional occupations, this is particularly the case in the Arab world (Anker 1998, Olmsted 2001, Nassar 2003). But whereas women in many parts of the world are often crowded into the sales sector, in the Arab world the opposite is true (Anker 1998). Within the Arab world, there is also considerable variation in employment patterns. Among Bethlehem area Palestinians for instance, women were as likely to work in sales as men, although most of these women were older and self-employed, running small shops (Olmsted 2001). And, as Moghadam (1995) points out, women's participation in manufacturing has historically been low in Arab countries, except in Morocco and Tunisia, where women are often employed in the textiles industry.

The particular ways in which occupational segregation patterns have emerged in the region can in part be explained by the relatively low labor force participation rates among less educated women, and may also be due to macroeconomic conditions. Moghadam (1995) argues that the fact that Morocco and Tunisia have historically followed more open trade policies can explain women's far higher participation in the manufacturing sector. Women's underrepresentation in sales, on the other hand, may be linked to gender norms that discourage women from having contact with strangers, as well as to policies that permit considerable in-migration.

Occupational segregation, as well as other types of discrimination, may lead to women earning lower wages than men. The World Bank (2004) reports that while the wage gap in the Middle East and North Africa is somewhat smaller than in other parts of the world, simply examining the ratio of men's to women's wages is deceptive, since working women on average have more education than working men and thus should earn more. The same study notes that women in a number of Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf) are overrepresented in the public sector, perhaps because women in public sector jobs are more likely to obtain benefits and less likely to face wage discrimination. Unfortunately, as structural adjustment policies are being put into place, which are reducing the size of the public sector, women in particular are being negatively affected.

Micro level studies that measure wage differences suggest class and education, as well as gender, play a role in determining the extent of the wage gap. Olmsted (2001) found that among Palestinian women in the West Bank the wage gap was considerably larger among less educated women, particularly those working in the textiles industry. CAWTAR (2001) reports similar findings from a study carried out in Jordan.

In conclusion, the available literature suggests that Arab women have lower labor force participa-

tion rates than women in other parts of the world, which analysts have often erroneously assumed suggests that Arab women are not contributing to the economy, or that they are disproportionately disempowered. Yet there is significant evidence that "non-working" Arab women do a considerable amount of unpaid labor and that women's employment is not always empowering. As in other parts of the world, when women enter the labor market they are likely to experience occupational segregation and lower wages. Women's work experiences vary, depending on their class, location, and other factors. Finally it should be noted that studies of Arab women's labor remain extremely limited, making most of these findings preliminary. Far more data and analysis are needed, to explore in more detail what Arab women's employment patterns and experiences are.

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Iran

Women account for 49.3 percent of the current population in Iran, but represent only 12.1 percent of the employed population (ten years and older) based on the 1996 ten-year census. In 1976, women formed13.8 percent of the employed population. In 1986, this figure declined to 8.9 percent. One reason why women may figure so little in the official statistics is that when asked women often respond first as housewives. This is despite the fact that in rural communities women's housework has traditionally included raising livestock, dairy farming, rice growing, or carpet making that contribute greatly to the income of the household even though the work is not attributed to them.

Women are employed predominantly in traditionally female jobs of education, health and social

work, textile production, and agriculture. In 1996, 77.7 percent of women were employed in these four sectors as compared to 16.6 percent of men. Of the nine major occupational groups used by the Statistical Center of Iran, the majority of employed women in 1996 fell into three groups: skilled industrial workers and related professions (31.6 percent), experts or specialists (28.0 percent), and agricultural, forestry, and fisheries (14.4 percent). Data from the past three census reports (1976–96) show the share of women in agriculture increased from 19.0 percent in 1976 to 27.9 percent in 1986, but fell in 1996 to 16.7 percent. Industrial work by women decreased from 54.5 percent in 1976 to 24.0 percent in 1986, but rose to 34.5 percent in 1996. The share of women in the service sector increased noticeably from 1976 to 1986 from 26.5 percent to 48.2 percent, then fell slightly in 1996 to 45.9 percent.

Major employment differences exist between urban and rural women (1996 census). Of employed urban women, over half were classified as specialists (46.0 percent) and law-makers/high-level managers (3.9 percent). For rural women the total percentage was 5.3. While 50.1 percent of employed rural women were classified as skilled workers or artisans, only 17.3 percent of employed urban women were. In agriculture, rural women formed 30.7 percent compared to 1.7 percent of urban women.

In the private sector, women's employment rates declined between 1976 and 1986 from 80.5 percent to 64.4 percent, while women's employment rates increased in the public sector from 19.01 to 31.39 percent. In 1996, a slightly greater percentage (55.5) of women were employed in the private sector. These women constituted a majority in agriculture (97.0 percent), skilled industrial workers (92.5 percent), unskilled workers (74.5 percent), general service/sales workers (63.8 percent), and machine operators (58.2 percent). In the public sector, the majority of women were specialists (88.9 percent), managers (82.9 percent), technicians/assistants (78.3 percent) and office workers (74.0 percent). From 1974 to 1996, the public female workforce increased the most in health from 26 percent to 42 percent and in justice from 6 percent to 27 percent, and decreased the most in trade from 27 percent to 9 percent and in higher education from 39 percent to 20 percent.

Iran has the second youngest population in the world. The population growth spurt reached its peak in 1980–5 with a fertility rate of 6.63 children per woman. The current fertility rate for 2000–5 has dropped significantly to 2.12. Because of the growth spurt, the age structure of Iran has shifted significantly. Among women, 58 percent are within the reproductive ages of 15–49 and 70 percent of the population is under the age of 30. The median age for women is 23.4.

Youth employment presents a significant challenge for the government and women represent a significant constituency. The unemployment rate for women with a high school education increased from 20 percent in 1996 to 42.2 percent in 2002 and comprises the highest unemployment rate among the different portions of the population. These figures indicate that there is a large shortage of job opportunities for young educated women that is continuing to increase. There is also a huge crisis of underemployment that is not reflected in the statistics.

The unemployment rate during 1996–2002 for urban women (ten years and older) increased from 12.5 to 28.1, while the unemployment rate for rural women decreased from 14.4 to 11.1. The unemployment rate for women particularly in rural Iran may also not accurately reflect women's working situation because many unemployed women do not take active steps to seek work. Labor statistics from Iran do not account for foreign labor from primarily Afghani and Iraqi refugees.

In urban and rural areas, the annual average income of men was 2.1 and 8.1 times the income of women respectively in 2002. The large difference in wages for female rural workers coincides with the view that rural woman's labor is mostly unpaid and seen as part of the daily household chores, from which the men later garner the income.

Men are still considered to be the primary providers in families and are given priority for jobs. Based on the 1996 census in Iran at least 8.4 percent, or one out of twelve households, however, are run by women; 31.8 percent of urban households and 38 percent of rural households run by women are single-person households. Only 18.9 percent of urban women and 26.2 percent of rural female heads of household were married according to the 1996 census. In comparison, single person households run by men were approximately 1.8 percent of households and 96.1 percent of male heads of household were married. The figures for female-headed households in which the man is still present but for all practical purposes the woman runs the household are probably even higher, but because of cultural conditions and norms the woman does not affirm herself as head as long as an adult male member is present.

The relationship of men to women in public decision-making roles reflects the patrilineal structure of Iranian society. The ratio of women employed as legislators, senior officials, and managers in 1996

was only 0.6 percent. Iran is one of the lowest ranking countries with regard to women's participation in decision-making.

With the continuing influx of women into higher education, the rise in the divorce rate, the increase in the marriage age for women, and the reduction in the fertility rate, women are placing more pressure on the government and legal system to achieve equal status for women and greater participation in the labor force. With more than 50 percent of higher education now comprised of women and only 12 percent of the current labor force, the government is trying to find more ways to integrate women and youth into its economic development plans.

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SHARON M. KARKEHABADI

Turkey

Women constitute one of the main targets of employment policy in Turkey. The State Institute of Statistics (SIS) has collected data on the economically active population since 1955 through the population census in Turkey. The analysis of the characteristics of female labor force produced in this entry is based on the population census, conducted every five years until 1990, and on household labor force statistics collected since 1966.

Women's participation in Turkey's labor force is influenced by age and region. While women's overall representation in the labor force is 26.6 percent of workers, it is 18.5 percent in urban areas and 39.0 percent in rural areas (SIS 2004a, 47, 48, 49). Women enter the labor force at age 15, peaking in the 20–24 age group at 32.3 percent (SIS 2004a, 47). In rural areas, female participation rate is over 48 percent in the 40–49 age group.

In rural areas in Turkey the age profile of women workers is a "broad inverted U" (Figure 1), which is not the case in urban areas. It is estimated that the regulation of the retirement age will increase the participation rate of women (SIS 2004a, 101).

In 2002, the mean age of women's first marriage was 23.7 years (SIS 2004b, 5). This accounts for the increase of women workers. In addition, the low level of women's education decreases their employment opportunities in the cities. Female education level has, however, positively influenced the female non-agricultural participation rate (Tansıt 2001, 20).

Housewives make up the largest group in the unpaid labor force: 51.21 percent overall, 52.69 percent in urban areas, and 47.87 percent in rural areas (SIS 2003, 56, 57, 58). This distinguishes the female from the male labor force.

The other difference is observed at the regional level. The Mediterranean region has the lowest participation rate at 20.0 percent; the Black Sea has the highest rate at 48.5 percent. Central Anatolia, Southeast Anatolia, and East Anatolia have significantly lower female participation rates than Marmara. The Aegean does not have a female participation rate significantly different from that of Marmara, however (SIS 2003, 203, 375). The female non-agricultural participation rates differ by region. Distribution of female employment by status is presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Female Employment by Status (15 years old and over)

Employment Status	Turkey %	Urban %	Rural %
Regular employee	32.27	72.42	7.26
Casual employee	5.85	9.15	3.80
Employer	0.71	1.61	0.14
Self-employed	12.15	7.44	15.10
Unpaid family worker	49.02	9.38	73.70
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source: SIS 2003, 98, 99, 100.

Female unemployment rates differ according to region, age groups, and educational status in Turkey. While the unemployment rate is 10.1 percent for females, it is higher in urban areas at 18.3 percent; in rural areas it is 4.2 percent (SIS 2003, 110, 111, 112) as shown in Figure 2. This difference is the result of women's lower education level and the inability of the economy to create jobs (Bulutay 2002, 13). In fact, 49.47 percent of unemployed women do not have high school education (SIS 2004a, 113).

Duration of unemployment is longer for women than men in Turkey; 15.84 percent of unemployed women have been out of work for more than one year and less than two years (SIS 2004a, 119).

Conclusion

The profiles of women in the Turkish labor force differ according to age and locality, the main differences being between the urban and rural areas. There are also significant regional differences in the female labor force. Women are less integrated into economic activities, and housewives comprise the largest group in the unpaid labor force.

The education level of the female population influences structural shifts. The most characteristic feature of the female labor force is the size of the unpaid sector. The inability of the economy to create jobs has a negative influence on the female participation rate.

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
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
İnci Kuzgun

Figure 1: Female Participation Rates by Age Group



Source: SIS 2003, 47, 48, 49.

Figure 2: Female Unemployment Rate by Localities and Broad Age Groups



Source: SIS 2003, 100, 111, 112.

Economics: Land Reform

Central Asia

The former USSR countries started to implement a land reform program and reform the agricultural sector in the transition period at the beginning of the 1990s. But in spite of a common Soviet period legacy, different countries of the region have chosen different routes to agrarian reform. The aggregated result of this is the appearance of clear-cut boundaries between the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries.

The differences in land reform strategies became apparent in several dimensions, all of them linked with resource privatization and reforming non-effective forms of farm organization. Allocation of the former collectivized land leads to privatization only in those countries which admit land as private property; in all other countries, such as Tajikistan, land distribution provides access to the right of use of lands which are the state's property. The procedure of land distribution in different countries of the region varies. The experience of the last decade proves the extreme importance of having clear and transparent mechanisms to provide and distribute land while carrying out any of the procedures.

All major human rights conventions include provisions relevant to women's equal rights in the land reform process. The Women's Convention and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) contain the most robust protections in this area. This is further developed in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Committee's General Recommendation on equality in marriage and family relations, where the committee calls on state parties to ensure that women are granted redistributed land on equal terms with men. To meet the obligations, governments should design specific initiatives within the land reform process to ensure women's rights are upheld, including reviewing laws and regulations for unintended discrimination against women.

Central Asian countries have ratified the main human rights treaties protecting the principle of equality and have elaborated their own strategies concerning their implementation. Kyrgyzstan is the first of the CIS countries to provide private ownership of land as a result of a nationwide referendum. Almost 2.5 million households in rural areas received land plots for private ownership. According to Article 4 of the Constitution of Kyrgyzstan, land can be of state, municipal, private, and other forms of ownership. In Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan land is basically owned by the state. The land in Tajikistan is the exclusive property of the state and the state guarantees its effective use in the interests of the people (Article 2 of the Land Code).

Despite extensive economic reforms, those living in rural areas have experienced a considerable decrease in their standard of living, with approximately 67 percent of the rural population in Kyrgyzstan and 64 percent in Tajikistan living in poverty.

Women have unequal access to economic resources, including land. Due to strong traditions and the practice of inheritance by men, women have access to land only through relationships with men, usually father or husband. Rural women are not informed of their economic rights, land use rights, or right to use of natural resources. States undertook measures to ensure the implementation of ratified human rights treaties. For instance, the government of Tajikistan formed a coordination council headed by the deputy prime minister to support UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women) project activities aimed at land rights and economic security for rural women, which formed the basis for governmental inter-agency and inter-ministerial cooperation. The coordination council supports mainstreaming gender processes into current policies and legislation regulating land reform process.

From 1 January 2005, the state statistics agency of the Republic of Tajikistan introduced gender indicators in the primary statistical forms. This was in order to receive adequate information, and to streamline primary accounting and analysis of the existing information on the land reform process, in particular on gender issues at the level of economic subjects and *jamoat*s (councils of several villages), to assess the impact on their production, availability of arable land, and the like, and to provide regular monitoring of this process.

Through joint efforts of the government and the international community working in the field of land reform in Tajikistan, and thanks to information campaigns on human/women's rights to land, the number of *dehkan* farms (private farms that

replaced the collective and state fams) headed by women increased from two to eight in 2005.

As the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and other program documents aimed at creation of new management systems, allocation of land resources, establishment of *dehkan* farms, and more progressive forms of farming do not envisage solution of gender issues, the government of Tajikistan jointly with the international community is drafting the country development strategy based on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The work on the strategy is organized through twelve working groups, including one on gender. It is important, however, to ensure gender is incorporated in the work of the other working groups. The policy priorities and financial estimates emerging from the MDG Needs Assessment are to be integrated into the revised and engendered PRSP and serve as a basis for the Medium Term Expenditure Framework designed to strengthen the link between public spending and economic policy objectives.

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VILOYAT MIRZOEVA

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria

Land reform refers to a governmental transfer of agricultural land involving state, cooperatives, or private owners. Although it covers a variety of transactions, the term is mostly used in connection with government-backed distribution of plots to landless farmers.

In the twentieth century, land reforms formed part of decolonization struggles, often carried out by socialist or communist regimes. Since the 1980s, agrarian and land reforms have been central to the neoliberal policies adopted by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, to restructure the economy of developing countries. Land reforms are meant to improve the livelihood of peasants by eliminating tenure insecurity through land titling. Despite international official legislation that defines land rights as a human right and warns against gender discrimination, land reforms in many countries have allocated property entitlements to male farmers only. The wide-ranging implications of this gender-biased tenure distribution render the debate on gender and land reform urgent, particularly in light of the current extensive pursuit of land reform in poverty-alleviation policies. Only a few women peasants, however, are taking part in the discourse, and their claims to land ownership to date have been limited.

Scholars have long debated land reform and gender. Many support women's inclusion in land-reform titling, envisaging land ownership as a means for women's economic and social empowerment. In theory, providing a subsistence base or income from rent or sale of land will enhance livelihoods, confer social status, and strengthen women's power at the community and household level. Agarwal (2003) suggests that collectives of female individual owners would free women from dependency on the household. Walker (2003), however, argues for joint ownership of property since she believes that the household is a resource for poor women. Razavi (2003) stresses the importance of understanding land ownership as a means to decrease women's economic vulnerability by creating the conditions for a diversified source of livelihood.

Whitehead and Tsikata (2003) put forward ideological arguments to criticize supporters of female property rights. While maintaining that the land question reifies private property and the market to the detriment of the commons and of alternative lifestyles, they highlight the need to tackle more urgent priorities to reduce female subordination and poverty. Jackson (2003) contends that a gendered approach to the very concepts of ownership and power shows property possession to be a male concern only (Jackson 2003). Land ownership, according to Jackson, is not always the key to women's empowerment. On the contrary, distribution of land often causes conflict and marginalizes women through disruption of traditional social structures. This argument clashes with visions of female property ownership as pre-empting conflicts and reducing domestic violence.

From the 1950s to the 1980s a number of land and agrarian reforms restructured the northeast of the Syrian Arabic Republic. The egalitarian Arabist socialism of the Baʿth Party assigned landless and dam-displaced households state land or plots expropriated from private estates (Hinnebusch 1989). After estimating the size of each private estate by including the property officially possessed by female and male members of the household, the government expropriated the land that exceeded the maximum allowed, supplied inadequate or no compensation, and assigned the new plots only to male heads of household and mainly to Arabs. By overlooking rights of use during expropriation and by excluding women, the poorest individuals, and the Kurdish minority from land assignment, the government curtailed the livelihoods of the most vulnerable sectors of society.

Supposedly informed by socialist egalitarianism and feminism, land reform benefited mainly the male powerful elites. Denied their identity as citizens, individuals, and active peasants, women were legally subsumed as "dependent" on the breadwinner; thus, as established by the Sharīʿa, they had to obey the men. Lacking the economic means to autonomy, women were less able in practice to face widowhood, divorce, abandonment, abuse, and also polygamous marriage and male migration, thus losing status in intrahousehold and community negotiations. Landlessness also meant loss of cultural belonging for many women, particularly among the minorities (Galié and Yildiz 2005).

Agrarian reform, a restructuring of the agricultural cultivation process, followed the same pattern as land reform and had similar effects on women. It centralized distribution of seeds and fertilizers, with the marketing of produce addressing official plot holders only. Without access to agricultural basics, women lost independent access to food production and control over the produce income. With the reorganization of agricultural work and the introduction of modern technologies, women's needs were ignored. Women were excluded from state credit plans, and landlessness rendered them unable to provide property as collateral for private credit. Male out-migration also increased the share of women's agricultural work without improving their rights (Rabo 1986). Increasing reliance on absent men for acquiring and marketing agricultural products further reduced their independence.

Female exclusion from tenure rights initiated by land reforms has been reproduced over the years by customary law that prevails over civil law in matters of inheritance. In 2004, only 5 percent of women owned land in Syria (Forni 2001). These same gender-discriminating inheritance patterns apply to Jordan and Lebanon, whose tenure systems were never reformed. In 2004, 7 seven percent of Lebanese landowners were women, despite the high number of female heads of households. These women have little decision-making power and are vulnerable to poverty. In Jordan, 11 per cent of women owned land, had control over it, and marketed the produce themselves.

In Iraq, the Baʿth Party implemented an agrarian reform similar in many respects to the Syrian one. A point of divergence was the Agrarian Reform Law, which gave Iraqi women the right to hold a plot of land on the same terms as men. Inheritance law furthermore used to guarantee women and men equal rights. Implementation of these rights left much to be desired, however, since Sharīʿa law prevailed over civil law. Statistics about current percentages of female holdings and studies about women's role in Iraqi agriculture are difficult to obtain due to recent events, such as the sanctions, the war, and the ongoing associated crisis.

A gender-blind land reform can inadvertently impair women's subsistence while individual or joint ownership is a means to support it. To be successful, land reform plans should be contextually specific and participatory in all stages and recognize women's active economic contribution. Implementation should include positive measures geared toward women of all ages and social status, particularly in areas where female seclusion renders women less visible and outspoken. Access to resources (such as land, water, and seeds) as well as markets and services (such as credit and childcare) – along with the creation of alternative, off-farm sources of income – should complement the land reform. Legal changes should address long-term effects, take into account local customary rules and unofficial agreements, and ease procedures to legalize female ownership.

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ALESSANDRA GALIÉ

The Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman land reform progressed rapidly after the promulgation of the Gülhane Edict in 1839. Its main concern was state land and the illegal religious endowment of state land. Such land was primarily used for grain production but its use was not always efficient. The reform aimed at establishing individual title to land and encouraging private investment in land so as to increase agricultural production and tax revenues. Land legislation continued, covering the transfer of land rights by sale, cession, and inheritance. The Land Code of 1858 was the most important of these pieces of legislation. It defined the peasant's holding of land for cultivation as a modern right of possession and codified all laws and orders issued in prior years concerning that right. In order to implement the Code's principles, the Tapu (Land Registration) Law was enacted in 1859. These two laws promoted the privatization of state land and efficient land use throughout the country.

Women's rights to state land expanded along with the reform. Before this, primogeniture had been applied to state land and women had principally enjoyed legitimate benefits of landholding only with regard to private land. In 1847, the government accepted the partition of state land by inheritance. It now descended to male and female children equally, and from a mother to her children, upon payment of a fee of 5 percent of the estimated cultivation (*tapu*) value of the land. The right to inheritance was expanded in the 1858 Code. If the landholder died without children, the land went to his father and, if the father was not alive, to his mother. The fee was reduced to the cost of land registration only. If the landholder had no children or parents, the right was transferred to his other relatives who made payment of the cultivation value. The Code admitted, by permission of a land official, the transfer of the right by sale and its use as collateral for credit, on condition that the debtor could reacquire the land when the debt was paid in full. This change was beneficial to women, since they could now acquire state land by way of inheritance or purchase. But they also incurred a burden. They were obliged to carry out continuous cultivation, and to pay taxes on the produce.

The new system brought women into the market economy. Before the reform, women earned profits from religious endowment (*vakıf*), as its designated recipient, by the purchase of an annuity (*esham*) from the government, and by entering into business partnership in tax farming. The beneficiaries were mainly the wives of high officials and notables. They were projected to earn the premium of their investment without risk of making the loss. From the 1830s on, the government confiscated the illegal endowments and placed these under direct administration. It officially abolished the practice of lifetime tax farming, by which women's profits from the partnership diminished. Sales of annuities were also terminated in the 1860s. Instead, landholding provided women with a new investment opportunity. They could earn larger profits from the commercial transfer of a title to state land. Women could also participate in the money market as lenders or borrowers, as a result of being permitted to use land as collateral.

The land reform improved the legal position of women but was insufficient to make their rights secure. The laws restricted the holder's right of decision on land use, and did not allow diversification away from subsistence farming. The risk for women of investing in order to pursue the improvement of their land's productivity was high. The costs of landholding also increased when the land's market value increased or if they were involved in land disputes raised by relatives, neighbors, and others with an interest in land based on the right of preference (*ruçhan*). The litigation was prolonged when cases were brought before the government. These often resulted in the alienation of the title in the land to the lender before it was transmitted to the heirs. These benefits and problems indicate the causes of wider distribution of wealth among women and the impoverishment of landless women after the reform.

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KEIKO KIYOTAKI

Yemen

Land reform was a major policy issue in the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). In the socially stratified system before independence from Great Britain most large agricultural holdings were owned by relatively wealthy landowners and/or rulers of mini-states. In spate (flood) irrigated areas, large landowners owned the most fertile lands. These were cultivated by poor farmers on a sharecropping or rental basis. Landowners provided seed, fertilizer, and other agricultural inputs and typically kept two-thirds or more of the agricultural produce. Most often, farmers on these holdings belonged to socially marginalized groups.

In an effort to rectify the injustices of this system, the Agrarian Reform Law was instituted in 1970 in order to "put an end to exploitation and fragmentation of land, and to set up cooperatives and state farms, encouraging collective work, equality of women in rights and obligations, strengthening the productive forces and the means of production" (quoted in Lackner 1985, 172).

In effect, this and subsequent laws established limits to the amount of land any single person or family could own. Lands owned by former rulers and elite were confiscated without compensation and redistributed among former sharecroppers who were then encouraged to form agricultural cooperatives. Small landowners were also encouraged to form cooperatives. Another form of land reform in the PDRY was the establishment of state farms cultivated by wage laborers. Beneficiaries of land redistribution were not given titles of ownership to the land until the 1980s.

Land reform empowered historically marginal groups giving them *de facto* ownership of the land they cultivated or guaranteed wages, a voice in the agricultural process, the right to vote (for women and men), and services such as schools, literacy classes for adults, and health care. Most importantly, the socialist policies of the PDRY officially erased status distinctions and dignified agricultural labor.

Like the large landowners before them, agricultural cooperatives were responsible for providing seed and other agricultural inputs and machinery. They were also responsible for marketing agricultural produce. There were many problems with agricultural cooperatives in their administration, delays in supplying inputs and repairing machinery, and difficulties in marketing produce, all of which affected women, who formed the vast majority of the agricultural labor force, as they do now. Ironically, given the PDRY's intentions and liberal family laws, the most egregious problem was the failure of the cooperative system to recognize women as heads of households. This seriously hampered women's access to agricultural inputs. Some women were trained in the use of agricultural machinery, but statistics are lacking on how many women were trained, and where they were located. Women who worked on state farms were paid in wages. These were low, but they were equal to those of men. A significant number of women students (91) were enrolled in the College of Agriculture in Aden, but the impact of their participation on women farmers is not known. There is some indication that women and men saw cooperatives and state farms as simply another landlord with patron–client relationships essentially unchanged (Seif 2003, 116).

Since the unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, most land that had been confiscated has been returned to its original owners. Its cultivators are again wage laborers without the safety nets of the socialist land reforms or even those of pre-independence Yemen. Although traditional status distinctions are still banned by the government, agricultural laborers are no longer treated with dignity as they were during the PDRY. Wages are currently so low that young people have had to drop out of school to contribute to household income through wage labor. Economic liberalization has made schools and health services less accessible to the poor. In all these cases, women have been the major victims. In Lahj the wages for women laborers in agriculture in 2001 was 150–200 YR ($0.94–$1.25) per day (Colburn 2001).

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NAJWA ADRA

Economics: Markets and Trading

Sub-Saharan Africa

There is very little in the precolonial record concerning women's trade in Sub-Saharan Africa. Studies of long distance trade rarely included women, mentioning them only in so far as they were slaves. Precolonial histories have tended to exclude such topics as market women, evidently with the assumption that women's trade is a uniquely modern phenomenon or unworthy of examination (Robertson 1997, 24). However, Sub-Saharan African women have made important contributions to all forms of trade and market activities from the precolonial period through colonialism to the present.

Women usually participated in the local market with foodstuffs obtained from their agricultural activities or from their activities in a pastoralist society (Kjærgaard 1980, 6, Robertson 1997, 25). A clear gender division of tasks and responsibilities that gave women rights to dispose of certain items also gave them the opportunity to trade with these products. In Somalia, oral sources suggest that some women accompanied caravans from the interior to the coastal towns to sell ghee, which was regarded as a women's commodity (Warsame 2004, 117). In Somalia and Kenya, women who traded did so in the absence of a husband. In Somalia they were reported to have been mostly elderly widows, while in Kenya all the women either had no husband or more commonly had husbands who died when the women were quite young leaving them with children to raise (Robertson 1997, 27).

Long distance trade closely connected East African countries with Arab trade centers and through that with the Asian and European world. Since the 1970s, at the time when the Gulf countries started to own and manage their own oil industry, the medieval trade routes have turned into conduits of labor migration. More men than women traveled for labor or for trade, while women continued to work in the local markets at home. However, research from Somalia reveals that there were quite a number of women following male relatives into the Arab world in order to trade, usually by purchasing textiles and beauty products, which they later sold either in the Arab country they went to or in Somalia. In the 1970s, women, usually those who were either divorced or widowed, would go to Aden in Yemen, which at that time was a commercial center equivalent to what Dubai is today. Women from Somalia were permitted to travel as long as they had relatives in the destination country. In Sudan, conversely, according to Victoria Bernal's research in Wad al Abbas, the women who went to the Arab world accompanied their husbands (Bernal 1994).

Today a growing number of women from Somalia and Djibouti travel regularly, primarily to Dubai, but also to other countries in the Middle East, as well as further to Asia and to Europe, in order to trade. Similarly, Margaret Snyder found that a significant number of female traders from Uganda travel the same circuits, and like the Somalis they purchase goods in order to sell from their houses, in public markets, or in their own shops (Snyder 2000, 9). A growing number of Somali women have wholesale stores in Somalia and Djibouti and quite a few have settled in the Arab world and opened shops there. However, a larger number of women still operate at the side of the formal sector.

Because many women operate in the informal sector, their commerce is not always acknowledged, especially because property, education, and labor are resources that have mainly been allocated to men (Kjærgaard 1980, 6). Yet gradually, as Sub-Saharan African societies have become more dependent on the market economy, women's unpaid labor, such as taking care of children and doing housework, has enhanced men's cash income (Snyder 2000, 2). Since the 1970s, women's crucial contribution has started to be acknowledged (Koshen 2004, 408), and more recent accounts from East Africa reveal that women from Tanzania, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya play an important part in the regional markets of today (Torkelsson 1995, Rutashobya 1998, Pitamber 1999, Snyder 2000, Koshen 2004, Warsame 2004).

In many Muslim cultures, attempts are often made to maintain separation between the sexes; this often entails attempts to exclude women from public places. The idea of women traveling alone not accompanied by a *ma ḥarām* (her husband or a non-marriageable male relative) is condemned by certain interpretations of proper Islamic social practices. While there is consensus that this accords

with the tradition of the Prophet Muḥammad, many argue that this is no longer necessary as a woman can travel safely thanks to modern technology. There are, however, a number of strategies undertaken by women in Sub-Saharan African Muslim cultures in order to continue their trade activities while conforming to their interpretations of Islamic ideals.

Eva Evers Rosander (2005) notes that for Senegalese women traveling and trading, one strategy is to blur the border between the domestic and the public spheres by avoiding public places as much as possible while residing in foreign cities. Another option is to justify their trade by referring to the Prophet Muḥammad's first wife, Khadīja, who was also a trader, and yet another tactic is to show generosity toward one's family and kin (Evers Rosander 2005, 3). Until recently, Senegalese women stayed at home while the men traveled, although pilgrimage offered women the opportunity to travel abroad. Already in the 1970s, women started to travel abroad to Morocco both as pilgrims visiting the tombs of a Sufi master and as traders importing and exporting goods (ibid., 6). As Evers Rosander states, the pilgrimage to Mecca (*ḥajj*) likewise permitted women to travel far and establish a global commercial network (ibid.). Northern Nigerian Hausa women also engage in long-distance trade while traveling on pilgrimage to Mecca, and through their accounts of the *ḥajj* and of their stay in Saudi Arabia they differentiate themselves from other Muslim Hausa women and express a sense of power and mobility (O'Brien 1999, 3).

These West African examples correspond to research undertaken in Somalia. The women traders' generosity, which is known to exceed that of men, is widely appreciated and is seen to correspond to elementary Islamic ideals. In addition, women who travel make a point out of keeping separated from the men both by action and through clothing. And, like the West African women, Somali women also trade while going to Mecca as pilgrims.

Throughout northern Nigeria, Hausa women are involved in what is labeled "hidden trade" as they establish their own business inside the household, entrepreneurship which usually begins with a woman investing a small percentage of her dowry. This is a very widespread activity: one study found that at least two-thirds of all Hausa women, including as many as *all* secluded Hausa women, engaged in household trade. Another study reported that women in seclusion were involved in the sale of 65 different products (VerEcke 1995, 64). Catherine VerEcke has observed that Fulbe women in Yola, Nigeria (in contrast to Muslim women of other ethnic groups such as their neighbors, the Hausa), see trading as shameful, and they argue that trade is not appropriate for women because men are required by Islam to support them (ibid., 72).

Similarly to the Hausa case, Somali women often sell the gold received as dowry in order to start trading. While it was generally typical for rural Somali women to participate in the public sphere, being restricted to the domestic realm was the ideal in some urban centers, such as in northwest Somalia, and many women who traded often did so within the household in order to conform to this norm (Kapteijns 1995, 256). The women who traded in the market and who were more visible would do so only after being divorced or widowed, and it was understood that they were doing so out of necessity.

In Sudan it was likewise unacceptable for a young unmarried woman to work outside the home – especially in market-selling activities that involved sitting in public places and interacting with men – although recent findings suggest that this attitude has changed following an increased need for income, especially among the poor (Pitamber 1999, 5). In Somalia and Sudan the women who are visible to men in their activities often use their clothing as a strategy to maintain the separation between the sexes. Young unmarried women, for instance, often wear a face veil while being actively engaged in trading activities.

There are both historical precedents and contemporary pressures for Sub-Saharan African women participating in the income-generating activities of local and long-distance trade. Although entry into different arenas of power has been noted, albeit unevenly, throughout the region, women generally continue to be absent from decision-making at the wider societal level. Women's positions at the family level have, however, changed as a result of the increased economic resources acquired by women as they play an increasing part in the growing informal economies of these countries.

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Rannveig Haga

Turkey

Although men dominate both small- and large-scale trade in Turkey, the development of a regional trade network extending from the former Soviet Union to the Middle East has resulted in the emergence of markets in Turkey where women are very visible and commercial transactions are intertwined with gender relations.

Increasing freedom of travel after the collapse of Communist regimes prompted the development of an informal trade in consumer goods – known as suitcase trade (*bavul ticareti*) in Turkish, and shuttle trade (*chelnochny biznes*) in Russian – between post-Soviet republics and East European countries on the one hand and Turkey on the other. Women constituted the majority of informal traders who traveled to Turkey from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; among traders from post-Soviet Muslim republics and from Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, women were also numerous. In the early years of this trade, women and men from these countries frequently visited Turkey to sell wares from their regions in marketplaces in coastal towns along the Black Sea and in Istanbul. With the rapid deterioration of the economies of these countries, the direction of the flow of goods shifted by the mid-1990s: informal traders traveled to and from Turkey to buy moderate amounts of Turkish-made textiles, garments, household goods, and packed food in order to sell back in their home towns. Although it escaped taxation and customs regulations, governments allowed this multi-billion dollar informal economy to flourish since it met consumer demands in post-Communist societies and foreign currency needs in Turkey.

In suitcase trade markets in Turkey, sellers/shopkeepers are overwhelmingly men whereas buyers are usually women. Women constitute the majority of suitcase traders for two reasons. First, in the emerging market economies of the post-Soviet republics, women were the first to be fired and last to be hired. Second, already active in the informal economy of the Soviet period, women readily took the opportunity of cross-border small-scale trade as an income earning strategy when the socialist economy collapsed. Although they entered suitcase trade from a disadvantaged position in the labor market, post-Soviet women gained an advantage in the Turkish market because of their gender. Entrepreneurship by women challenges Turkish shopkeepers' understanding of women's place in public life, but it also earns these men's respect for the hard work that cross-border informal trade requires of women. This, in turn, provides a basis on which interpersonal relations between buyers and sellers are formed. In an informal economy where enforceable trust is hard to establish, such gendered interpersonal relations provide a basis for building repeat trading patterns and long-term business relations. Many men in the suitcase trade market consider Slavic women to be physically attractive and sexually liberal, which prepares a conducive ground for consensual sexual relations between some suppliers and some traders to emerge. Romantic or sexual involvement with a Turkish supplier often gives the upper hand to a woman in bargaining for good deals and in secur-

ing purchases on credit. Conversely, such involvement may jeopardize a shopkeeper's business if he extends too much credit to a woman who might never come back to his store. Not surprisingly, friendly and intimate relations between suppliers and shoppers might intimidate Turkish wives. Although many men in the suitcase trade market – with little education and recent rural backgrounds – are against women's working outside the home, they also consider their homemaker wives to be lazy and less industrious compared to the suitcase traders.

The very reasons that give a market advantage to post-Soviet women also make them vulnerable in Turkey. Men's widely held perception that non-Muslim women are sexually liberal makes these women the target of sexual harassment in marketplaces and public spaces. Post-Soviet and East European women are particularly exposed to harassment because of the existence of prostitution by foreign women in Istanbul and along the Black Sea coast. Many women complain of sexual harassment or prejudiced behavior from men on the streets, in shops and marketplaces, and even by the police. The prejudice about "Natashas," as sex workers from post-Soviet republics are pejoratively called, holds that all women from post-Soviet republics, including suitcase traders, are prostitutes. In reality, sex work and suitcase trade are to a large extent independent activities, although the line separating the two is porous for the poorest women, who might switch between offering sexual favors for money and buying and selling wares as alternative survival strategies. The prejudice against women traders is most visible in small and conservative Black Sea towns. There, market women from the neighboring republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia are especially prone to prejudicial attitudes and behavior since they regularly travel along the coast as itinerant traders, selling cheap wares they bring from other parts of Turkey in "Russian bazaars" that were set up in the 1990s during the influx of post-Soviet visitors.

It must, however, be noted that such prejudice does not condition the transactions between Turkish suppliers and the suitcase traders in Istanbul. Knowing that a woman can easily change her business partners in a competitive market, men try to hold on to their customers through courteous and friendly behavior as explained earlier.

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Hatice Deniz Yükseker

Economics: Paid Domestic Labor

Central Arab States, Egypt, and Yemen

The geographic mobility of domestic workers is not a new phenomenon in the Middle East. Domestic slavery moved people over great distances and in many regions there are longstanding practices of rural women and children being employed as semi-bonded labor in urban areas. Contemporary globalization, however, with its tremendously increased speed of the circulation of people, goods, and images has greatly facilitated the international migration of domestic workers. The increased global commodification of caretaking has taken the form of a hierarchical chain of reproductive labor: migrant domestic workers are taking care of the children of others, while their own children are cared for by kin, affines, and local domestic workers (Parreñas 2001).

In the Middle East, migrant women predominate as paid domestic labor not only in the oil-exporting countries. As an effect of the oil-boom after 1973, in non-oil exporting countries, such as Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen, new middle classes have also emerged, often partly based on the remittances sent home from employment in the Gulf states. Although on a smaller scale than in the Gulf states, they have also started to employ migrant domestic labor, mainly from South and Southeast Asia, but also from the Horn of Africa. Rising incomes and competition for status, as well as changing family structures – with sons leaving the extended family at an earlier moment in the life cycle, removing the labor of daughters-in-law from the household – have stimulated the employment of paid domestic labor. The growth of women's education and the subsequent employment of these newly educated women in formal jobs further increased the need for paid help for housework, childcare, and elderly care. Simultaneously, poor local women have been able to leave this field of employment as other jobs, such as cleaning schools and hospitals, have become available, and there has been a turn to migrant domestic labor.

Local domestic workers

Especially in the more populous countries with a large stratum of poor people, such as Egypt and Yemen, or when state policies or war-like situations have restricted the employment of migrant domestic workers, local women still do this work. But even in these cases labor relations and work organization have changed substantially. In the Ottoman Empire domestic slavery, generally limited to the higher classes, had already faded away by the beginning of the twentieth century (Ozbay 1999). Forms of semi-bonded labor have also been transformed. Previously women's domestic labor outside their own family household was often part of patron–client relations. Girls of impoverished families were given away at a very young age as "foster daughters" to urban families, where they would work as unpaid domestics for an unspecified period of time. In other cases their families received a small yearly sum of money. Poor elderly women also worked as live-out casual labor. Nowadays girls who engage in this work are no longer "foster daughters," they receive a wage (however low), and have the possibility of changing employers. In fact, most local women no longer accept to work as live-in domestic workers; they work either as part-time day cleaners for a number of employers or as live-out domestics for one employer. Often these women were from specific ethnic and religious backgrounds or they were refugees. In Lebanon mainly Kurdish women, Shīʿī women from the marginalized areas, and Palestinian refugee women from the camps have worked as domestics; the civil war, however, limited the employment of local domestic workers, especially when this would have entailed crossing political lines (Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004). On the West Bank after 1948, working as a domestic for the urban elite was the only employment available for poor refugee women (Moors 1995). In Yemen the spread of poverty due to the forced return of migrants from Saudi Arabia in 1991 and programs of structural adjustment have pushed impoverished Yemeni women to work as domestics (Destremeau 2001) and in Egypt male Nubian migrants from Upper Egypt also worked as domestic workers until they found better forms of employment (Ahmed 2003).

In general, local women strongly dislike this kind of work because it requires them to be subservient in a highly personalized labor relation and places them in a position of strong dependency. Palestinian refugee women much preferred working as cleaners in public institutions, because there they would be treated as workers or employees rather

than as servants (Moors 1995). Because domestic work in a private household is such stigmatized work, wages may well be similar to or higher than those of secretaries in the informal sector or factory workers. Employers often complain that local women are unsuitable, too expensive, and unreliable. They argue that local domestics refuse to work as live-in (or would demand substantially higher payment), do not keep their distance (attempting to personalize their relation with employers in order to gain additional benefits), and place the needs of their own families before those of their employer. The main point seems to be that local women are less easily exploitable than foreign domestic workers as they have more resources to fall back on, such as knowledge of the language, family networks, and other forms of protection.

Some employers prefer to hire resident refugee women, especially when they are higher educated. As these women generally have few possibilities of finding employment in the formal sector, and their husbands often face even more difficulties in so doing, paid domestic labor functions as a survival strategy for them. In Egypt, for instance, employers prefer better educated Sudanese women who speak English over local domestic workers, even if they are more expensive. These refugee women themselves emphasize the temporariness of their work as domestics and keep their distance, as they see their status in Egypt as transitory (Ahmed 2003). Yet, not all refugee women are similarly sought after. Somali refugee women in Yemen, for instance, who have little education and are often employed as day workers, are amongst the worst paid (de Regt 2005).

The move toward migrant domestic workers

In many settings there has been a distinct move toward the employment of female labor migrants from Asia (the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, India) and Africa (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia) to do this work. As they may earn many times what they could make if locally employed, well-educated women also go abroad to be employed as domestic workers. In some cases there are long-standing historical connections, such as between the Horn of Africa and Yemen. In other cases a connection is actively stimulated by state policies, as in the case of the Philippines, or by recruitment agents, who may well deceive clients with respect to wage levels, conditions of employment, and even location of employment (Jaber 2005). Hence Jureidini and Moukarbel (2004, 582) use the term "contract slavery."

Employing domestic workers not only facilitates a more comfortable lifestyle, but domestic workers of a particular background also have contributed to the display of a certain identity and status. The first to employ migrant domestic women were diplomats and other foreigners in high positions and those returning from the Gulf States who were familiar with the phenomenon. Filipina domestics, amongst the first to come as migrant labor to the Middle East, are generally amongst the best paid because of their high level of education, good knowledge of English, an asset especially appreciated in households with school age children, and their modern appearance and professionalism. Yet, arguments used by employers for and against particular categories of domestic workers are often stereotypical and shift through time. Indonesian domestic workers in the Middle East, of whom there has been a recent influx, are appreciated for their obedience (in contrast to the Filipinas who are increasingly seen as too assertive) and in some circles they are preferred over other domestics because they are Muslim.

Especially in the 1990s, the number of migrant domestic workers grew very rapidly in countries such as Lebanon and Jordan. While wealthier households also employ Filipinas, some of whom were pushed out of nursing when this sector was closed to foreign labor, most of them are from Sri Lanka. In Lebanon there is also a considerable number of Ethiopians employed; in Jordan the number of Indonesian domestic workers has rapidly increased; and in Syria, one of the most recent destinations for foreign domestic workers, Indonesian women are the largest in number (Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004, IOM 2003, Jaber 2005). In Yemen, in contrast, most domestics are from the Horn of Africa, with Ethiopians as the largest group of live-in domestics (de Regt 2005).

These present-day migrant domestic workers find themselves in a very different position from women engaged in earlier forms of domestic employment before the emergence of the nation-state. In those days the presence of lower-class women – be it domestic slaves or semi-bonded labor from the rural areas – enabled women from wealthy and prominent families to maintain some measure of seclusion. More recently, migrant domestic workers find their access to public space severely restricted while their presence enables the public participation of their middle-class employers, be it through professional employment, participation in non-governmental organizations, or in visiting circles. With the emergence of the nation-state the legal position of foreign domestics has also

changed substantially. Whereas in the case of domestic slavery or bonded labor, these girls were cut off from their families of origin and integrated, even if in a subordinate position, into the household of employment, with the development of the nation-state, laws about nationality and residence make settlement by and large impossible. In fact, if the status of foreign domestic workers in terms of residency is overregulated, domestic work as a labor relation is underregulated. As a result migrant domestic workers have many obligations and very few rights. They are usually employed on temporary short-term labor contracts, need a visa sponsor (*kafīl*) who is responsible for them, and are not allowed to change employers. Most of them have their passports taken away from them, have at most one or two days off a month, work very long hours, and earn around $150 a month, with wages varying between $50 for low-paid Ethiopians in Yemen to $350 for high-paid Filipinas in Lebanon. Reports by human rights organizations have drawn attention to the wide range of forms of abuse some of them face, and have pointed to the lack of protection by local authorities, and to the limited means of intervention available to embassies interested in protecting their nationals.

The employment of migrant domestic workers has also been subject of much public debate in the countries of employment. Mothers in better-off households have been blamed for neglecting their offspring and poor local women have been targeted for refusing to engage in this line of work (UNIFEM 2000). Domestics have been seen as endangering the integrity of the Arab or Muslim family. Whereas such debates employ stereotypical notions about domestics, simultaneously migrant domestic workers have gained an increasing public presence (Moors et al. 2005). For domestics the private house of the employer is the site of employment; in order to find some privacy they need to leave the house. It is true that the possibility of leaving the house is in itself often an arena of contestation between employers and domestic workers; even if they have a day off, they still usually need the permission of their employers to leave the house. This is more than simply complying with local norms of gender segregation. Employers fear losing control over their domestics, as contact with others may be a source of knowledge (about wage levels, other forms of employment, and so on) or may function as a support network that may ultimately encourage and enable them to ask for more pay and other benefits, or to leave their jobs altogether. Yet, in spite of their limited freedom of movement and the very restrictive state policies, migrant domestics have become increasingly visible in public through their presence at market areas, church compounds, and voluntary associations. As a next step in their migration project some domestic workers have started to work as freelance live-out domestics, in spite of the fact that this is usually illegal. As such, they participate actively in the development of new communities in the central Arab states.

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ANNELIES MOORS

The Gulf and Saudi Arabia

Domestic workers – or "servants of globalization" as portrayed in the growing literature on "global domestics" – are usually mobilized to the Gulf region from countries such as India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Vietnam, among others.

They are mostly poor young women (aged 18–45), who are economically forced to leave their homes, families, and, at times, their children because of extreme poverty (resulting from the unequal distribution of global wealth) and look for work in other countries. They are hired on a two-year contract basis with very low salaries (around $200 per month), which makes the trade in domestics a booming business. This global phenomenon, taking place under the rising conditions of transnationalism, has a particular impact in the Gulf, whereby domestic workers are not always seen as domestic helpers in as much as they are considered part of a larger demographic imbalance in this region.

Domestic workers (mostly women) in the Gulf region represent an average of 8 to 10 percent of the whole population – a peculiar reality due to their large numbers, which cut across lines of class and ethnicity. Drivers, gardeners, and cooks may also be considered under the category of domestic workers, yet are treated differently in terms of payment and hours of work. The increase in domestic workers in the Gulf was triggered by two global phenomena: reliance on oil and the feminization of migration. In the 1970s, the booming price of oil (an increase of 400 percent) bestowed poor Gulf countries with overnight riches, and states like the UAE (United Arab Emirates) today rate among the wealthiest in the world. The resultant sudden alteration in lifestyles (from traditional to modern) and changing family scenarios (an increasing number of nuclear families) could only be sustained by domestic helpers.

Domestic workers in the Gulf region play multifaceted roles. They ease the structural changes within their hosts' families while carrying out demanding "women's work" or "dirty work," which does not befit the rising status of women in the Gulf. The constant availability and affordability of domestic workers has also enabled the successful participation of the region's middle- and upper-class women in public life.

Statistics on domestic workers, as with other figures on foreign labor, are not easy to find. Such statistics are treated as an internal security issue because of the increasing demographic imbalance favoring non-nationals over nationals. International agencies (the World Trade Organization and the International Labour Organization) have, however, called for more transparency on labor issues, rights, and social realities. A recent study released by the ministers of social affairs in the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) countries estimated that the number of illegal domestic workers in the region could be as high as an alarming 2 million. Together with legal domestic workers, the total number could reach 3.5 million of a total population of 33 million (including 11 million expatriates). Available national figures vary from 812,000 to 900,000 domestics in Saudi Arabia; 450,000 to 650,000 in the UAE; 400,000 to 500,000 in Kuwait; and 66,000 to 80,000 in Bahrain.

The nationalities of expatriate domestic workers have been changing steadily. Historically, until the early 1950s, slave trading existed in the Gulf because of pilgrimage and previous urban settlements. With the establishment of monarchies and until the early 1980s, most domestics were brought in from India, Pakistan, and Baluchistan. By the mid-1980s, most of the supply of domestics was from the Philippines, though Indians were still favored in the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Sri Lankan domestic helpers also started arriving in the mid-1980s and continue to do so in large numbers mainly because of relatively low salary expectations and recruitment costs. In countries such as Saudi Arabia, however, most domestics today are from Indonesia, chiefly because of an Indonesian trend to visit the Muslim holy sites. Nowadays, most Indonesians start work in Saudi Arabia and later move on to other countries in the Gulf. Despite stories in the media of ill treatment and deaths, Indonesians are still among the most preferred, after Filipinos, due to their modern outlook, cleanliness, and religion (Islam).

Working conditions of domestics in the six Gulf countries are similar in terms of the denial of status as workers covered by labor laws. Officially they are termed servants in all GCC countries. Servants get no days off and are under the sponsorship of their employers (*kafīl*), who retain their passports and are considered responsible if the servant absconds. The monthly salary often varies from $150 to $250, according to the country of origin and the goodwill of the employer. Other benefits, such as tips, phone calls to their home country, gifts, and shipment of cargo, also vary according to employers. Even though the treatment of domestic workers varies from house to house, a servant's reported daily routine indicates long and exploitative hours of work with days starting at 6:30 a.m. and ending around 10:30 p.m., with a break of just one or two hours in between. Last but not least, an average of 5 to 10 per cent of all domestics working in the Gulf – around 30,000 – complain of serious verbal and physical abuse. Sexual abuse has also been reported, and trafficking for prostitution is rampant among the women from the rural areas of South India and Bangladesh.

Local media coverage of domestic workers has always been negative. It either blames the victims (the workers) for their crimes and ill treatment of children, or criticizes national women employers for their reliance on domestics. Reports on abuse, harsh treatment, trafficking, absconding workers, and deception are also constantly found, which are usually sensational and rarely give voice to the problems faced by the domestics themselves. A general policy of hushing up such stories has also been enforced by denying domestic workers the right to unionize or conduct public gatherings or protests. In fact, only in Kuwait and Bahrain has there been among national activists a critical and human rights discourse supporting domestic workers. Recent international pressures, however, have led the GCC General Secretary to announce the publication of a yearly human rights report starting in 2006, which will cover all Gulf countries and be prepared with the active contribution of nongovernmental organizations.

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Rima Sabban

South Asia

South Asia has a long tradition of paid domestic labor. The tradition lies within its ancient feudal society and has been sustained today by a combination of surviving feudalism, especially in the

rural areas, and the industrialization and modernization that has spawned a new urban middle class that is willing to pay for domestic service. Paid domestic labor is usually carried out by women, often from a rural background, and includes typically female gendered activities such as childcare, cooking, cleaning, washing, taking care of the elderly, and even attending to home gardens and poultry.

Broadly speaking, paid domestic labor in South Asia can be divided into two categories based on the spatial location of employment: local employment within South Asia and migratory employment both within the region and outside. Local employment within South Asia is influenced by vestiges of precolonial feudalism where the landless lived off the land of the landed by providing gendered servitude. In this mostly agrarian society women provided domestic services to the landowners while the men tended the land, grew the crops, and looked after the cattle. In today's society, however, vestiges of colonialism, industrialization, and capitalization have led to an increasing urban middle class that can afford and create a demand for paid domestic labor.

The most prevalent form of paid domestic labor in South Asia is that of women who have migrated from a rural to urban space and have entered part-time, live-out domestic work (Raghuram 1999). This model of gendered labor, which is very popular in India, is also becoming increasingly so in the rest of South Asia. Part-time domestic labor has become more widespread because it has come to be dominated by women who have families and other reproductive responsibilities that they have to take care of in their own homes. This has been punctuated by the competition for urban space amongst employers and high rates of inflation that have employers preferring to hire live-out domestics. Thus an increasing number of those engaged in paid domestic labor are drawn from a migrant population who live in the slums and shanty towns within close proximity to major urban centers (Raghuram 1999). While live-in paid domestic labor is still popular in much of South Asia, it usually involves the employment of unmarried, divorced, or older women who migrate in a typical rural to urban pattern to live in with their employer. In countries such as Sri Lanka, however, where an increasing number of house owning urbanites are moving into apartments and condominiums, the once dominant tradition of live-in domestics is fast waning in favor of live-outs. Wages are usually paid by the day or the month and are a little higher than those paid for a live-in. This is a reflection of the high cost of basics such as food, clothing, and shelter required to maintain a live-in domestic.

One of the most important recent developments affecting the paid domestic labor market in the region has been the emergence of the oil-rich states in the Middle East as a major destination for paid domestic labor from South Asia. This introduced a large-scale foreign migratory process into the paid domestic labor market of South Asia. The petroleum prosperity enjoyed by many of the countries of the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and other oil producing countries of the Persian Gulf, and the commerce it fostered, created a large wealthy class who wished and could afford to hire foreign domestic labor (Ismail and Momsen 1997). The lack of interest amongst Arab women in filling these posts led to a large demand for help that was eagerly met by women of South Asia whose labor was cheap, and who were reasonably well trained and easily accessible.

This "Middle East factor" both challenged and enriched the arena of women and paid domestic labor in South Asia. It provided relatively well paid opportunities for gendered employment and facilitated the migration of females who had hitherto, in many cases, never worked or traveled abroad. Unlike the women who migrated from a rural to urban setting, the women who chose to migrate abroad, left their homes, husbands, and children to work away from their country while the men, many of whom were unemployed, subsisted on the wages of their wives or daughters (Ismail 1999, Samarasinghe 1998). These developments challenged traditions of gendered spatial mobility, the value of gendered activities such as domestic labor, and a host of other gender ideologies, images, and roles for both men and women. They also transformed the economic structure within many rural households with women emerging as the dominant breadwinners. These developments profoundly affected the status of these women, especially in terms of their gendered roles and perceptions as daughters, wives, and mothers.

The Middle East factor also highlights the role of religion in paid domestic labor. While religion plays almost no part in the employment of paid domestic labor within South Asia, the Middle Eastern employers, being predominantly Muslims themselves, maintain a preference for Muslim domestic labor by paying higher wages and easing travel restrictions (Ismail and Momsen 1997). These high wages attract many Muslim women from South Asia who would otherwise never venture out to work,

especially to a foreign country. Given the strong patriarchal controls on female mobility in South Asia, especially amongst the Muslim communities, this opportunity to enhance the household economic status on the back of a woman presents an interesting gender quagmire that is finally traversed by reconciling the spatial migration of Muslim women in search of employment overseas with the fact that this migration is to Muslim countries, thereby legitimizing the whole process in the minds of many (Ismail 1999, Ismail and Momsen 1997). Migrant paid domestic labor from South Asia is, however, not limited to the Middle East. Singapore, Italy, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Greece also employ significant numbers of South Asian domestics (Momsen 1999, Samarasinghe 1998), although in these cases religion is of very little or no consequence.

Paid domestic labor in South Asia has undergone many changes in recent years. Locally, paid domestic labor typically involves the migration of gendered labor from rural to urban areas. In this scenario wages are usually low, as is the status of the employee. Thanks to the Middle East factor, however, wages have risen in the home country and local employers have now to compete with better paying foreign employers, thus raising the bargaining power of domestic laborers within their home country. This has led to somewhat better working conditions, especially in the urban areas, a shift to part-time employment where the domestic does not sleep in but travels daily to work (Raghuram 1999), and an overall increase in status and appreciation for domestic services.

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Munira Ismail

Southeast Asia

"Keeping servants [as] a way of life" (Hansen 2000, 283) has had a long tradition in much of Southeast Asia. In as much as employing servants was an ostentatious symbol of conspicuous consumption and "a marker of the 'middle-class aristocratic' lifestyle" during colonial days (Stoler 1996, 91), it remains an important signifier of middle-class status in many societies in modern Southeast Asia (Chin 2005, Huang and Yeoh 1998). Other features of paid domestic service in Southeast Asia have also persisted from colonial times to the present. It continues to be "a highly personalized and often contested arena" (Adams and Dickey 2000, 2) characterized by an uneasy relationship between employer and servant of domination, consent, and resistance, in which inequalities along many axes – including nationality, race/ethnicity, class, gender, and religion – are brought to bear. Additionally, the paradoxical nature of paid domestic service – the social and ideological distance between servants and the families versus the intimate contact and physical proximity such work requires – has also largely endured to the present day.

Domestic service in pre-independent Southeast Asia

Much has been written about domestic service in the colonies of the Netherlands Indies (currently Indonesia) and Malaya (currently Malaysia and Singapore) which today have majority or large Muslim populations (see, for example, Butcher 1979, Locher-Scholten 2000, Stoler 1996). In these colonies, it was the norm for local aristocrats and wealthier households as well as members of the colonial powers to employ domestic servants, both male and female, in their households. Many of the domestics in the Netherlands Indies were indigenous (presumably Muslim) men and women from the rural areas. For example, at the start of the twentieth century, a typical European household in the Netherlands Indies required at minimum, a houseboy (*jongos*), a housemaid or nursemaid (*babu*), and a boy for the horses and the garden (*kebun*); those who could afford it also had a cook (*kokki*), someone for sewing (*jahit*) and washing, and a coachman (and later on, a driver) (Locher-Scholten 2000, 89). Domestic workers in British Malaya were also drawn from migrant groups and included Hylam cooks and houseboys, nannies from India (*ayah*) and China (*amah*), Indian water carriers and washermen (*dhobi*), Boyanese and

Malay carriage drivers and, after the 1930s, young Chinese girls for general housework (*mui tsai*) (Butcher 1979, Chin 2005).

For Dutch and British colonial families in Southeast Asia, domestic servants were considered indispensable, and many households employed them despite dire economic circumstances and deep-rooted xenophobic anxieties associated with their potentially corruptive influences. Beyond the likelihood of Asian domestic servants bringing disease into the home, being privy to family secrets, and stealing employers' valuables, a particularly latent fear of European employers – clearly reflecting the contemptuous superiority and racialized construction of the unknown "Other" by the colonials – was that of moral and cultural contamination of European children raised by native Indian or Chinese nannies, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Thus, domestic servants were generally regarded with some ambivalence. For example, although female Indonesian servants in the Netherlands Indies were praised for their skills, compliance, and modesty, they were also perceived as dirty, lazy, and unreliable (Locher-Stolten 2000, 95). (This is very similar to the way Indonesian domestic workers are perceived by their employers in households across Singapore and Malaysia today) (Chin 2005, Huang and Yeoh 1998). Overall, however, there appeared to be no apparent preference for or avoidance of "native" workers of any particular gender, race, or religion.

This, however, began to change toward the middle of the twentieth century. The case of British Malaya is illustrative: women began to be preferred over men by the 1930s when male domestic workers demanded higher wages and rest days (Chin 1995) and, over time, domestic service in Southeast Asia has become a "female occupation." Industrialization – which caused a decline in paid domestic work as women were attracted to the prestige of employment in the formal sphere while creating an expanded middle class requiring such workers – wrought further changes to the patterns of demand and supply of paid domestic service in many Southeast Asian countries. Not least among these changes is the rise of Indonesia as the key supplier of Muslim domestic workers across the world in response to global economic restructuring.

Southeast Asian women as transnational domestic workers today

Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War epoch represents an important arena for the emergence of new forms of global migration streams (a significant proportion unregulated and undocumented) with a growing ethnic diversification of international labor markets (Castles and Miller 1998). Global economic restructuring has led to an intensifying crisis in the reproductive sphere in the region's industrialized countries, resulting in a shift in reproductive work from the household to the market, and generating an increasing gender-specific demand for women to cross international borders to become transnational domestic workers. At the same time, several governments in Southeast Asia have encouraged the out-migration of their nationals as a way of generating national income (primarily from remittances). The flow of women from the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Myanmar to work as paid domestic workers in the higher-growth economies of Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei within the region, as well as beyond, to East Asia (especially Hong Kong and Taiwan) and the Middle East (Huang and Yeoh 1998), constitutes one of the most remarkable of these migrations today. Unlike in the colonial period, much of this movement is not only temporary but also almost completely feminized.

In Southeast Asia, although the Philippines is the frontrunner in terms of the export of domestic workers to a global market (Asis 2005), Indonesia represents by far the largest source of women migrants from Muslim communities in the market for transnational domestic service. While there is a long tradition of Indonesian women migrating to the cities within the country to work as domestic servants, the international movement of these women beyond national borders is a relatively new phenomenon. Beginning with a small group of women sent to Saudi Arabia as domestic servants using *ḥajj* visas in 1977, this migration stream to the Middle East (primarily Saudi Arabia but also the United Arab Emirates) increased rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s to over half a million female migrant workers in the 1994–9 period (Hugo 2005). As part of its national plans (1999–2004) in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis, the Indonesian government doubled its target for the number of overseas contract workers, confirming its interest in increasing the flow of foreign exchange earnings provided by these workers (Silvey 2004).

While official Indonesian gender ideology valorizes women primarily as wives and mothers, female migrant workers who seek domestic work in the Middle East occupy an occupational niche which is amenable to being discursively drawn upon as adding human resources to the country's development while remaining consistent with

Islamic norms (Robinson 2000, 254). Domestic work is not only "naturally" suited to women, but it is assumed that Indonesian female-citizens would be "safe" and "protected" working in countries bound by Islamic values (Robinson 2000). The opportunity for the women to make the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca is an added incentive.

From the 1990s, Indonesian domestic workers began departing for a wider range of destinations in Asia, with the largest outflow being to neighboring Malaysia (mainly undocumented) and Singapore (where nine-tenths of Indonesian labor migrants are female domestic workers) (Hugo 2005). In Malaysia, with its majority Muslim population, the reason for an overwhelming preponderance of Indonesian women among its foreign domestic worker population (over 233,000 in 2003) can possibly be found in the religious and cultural proximities the two countries share (Chin 2005). This may also apply to the middle-class Malay Muslim minority in Singapore. Yet, as Chin (2005) argues, the cultural-religious justification is superseded by an economic explanation: Indonesian women are popular even with non-Muslim employers as they are the least expensive to employ among foreign domestic workers of different nationalities, and have the least bargaining power with respect to conditions of work. Indeed, it is not uncommon for employment agencies to demand that Muslim Indonesian domestic workers forgo the five daily prayers and fasting during the ninth month of the Muslim calendar (two of the five pillars of Islam that are incumbent on a practicing Muslim), or agree to handling forbidden food items such as pork, to secure their marketability among non-Muslim employers in Singapore (Abdul Rahman et al. 2005). In Malaysia, a proposed regulation in 2003 to prohibit non-Muslim employers from employing Muslim domestic workers in order to safeguard the workers' rights to Islamic practices met with vehement protest from employment agencies and employers and was withdrawn two months later (Chin 2005).

Islam, civil society, and women's agency

Activism to safeguard the rights of transnational domestic workers in Southeast Asia is subsumed under the banner of various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on social justice, human rights, and labor issues. These NGOs exist in countries of both origin and destination (some even forming transnational alliances), with their vibrancy and focus depending largely on each state's tolerance for civil society.

Although the Philippines has the largest number of NGOs working on migrant workers' issues (including transnational domestic workers) in a country of origin (Asis 1998), NGOs' voices in Indonesia have become increasingly loud in championing the rights of transnational domestic workers after the fall of Suharto in 1998 (Hugo 2005). The conservative views toward civil society of the governments of Malaysia and Singapore, two main destinations for transnational domestic workers in Southeast Asia, led NGO groups in these countries to focus more on service delivery than on advocacy (Abdul Rahman et al. 2005, Chin 2005). In Thailand, where most migrant domestic workers comprise undocumented women migrants from Myanmar, there seems to be an absence of NGOs in catering to their needs and championing their rights (Toyota 2005).

In receiving countries, religious institutions often play an especially active role in addressing the concerns of transnational domestic workers. For example, in Singapore, Christian and Catholic groups actively provide space for social, religious, and skill enhancement activities catering to the predominantly Catholic Filipino domestic workers and, to a smaller extent, Christian Indonesian and Sri Lankan workers (Yeoh and Huang 1999, Gonzales 1998). The increasing predominance of Muslim Indonesian migrant domestic workers in Singapore has spurred mosques in the country to also become more proactive in providing protection for these women, an Islamic obligation.

More specifically, the Sultan Mosque, the oldest mosque in Singapore, became the first religious institution to offer Muslim domestic workers a space to conduct activities on their rest days on a regular basis (Abdul Rahman 2003, 187). Given that the language of instruction is Malay, all of the domestic workers participating in the mosque's activities are from Indonesia. The mosque aims to strengthen the spirituality of the Muslim women and provide them with practical skills to tackle the pressures of homesickness, difficult employers, and temptation by men while away from the protective environment of their families. The Muslim Converts' Association of Singapore (Darul Arqam), a multi-lingual Islamic institution, organizes monthly educational talks for a small group of Muslim Filipino migrant workers – most of whom are domestic workers – alongside similar talks in Bahasa Indonesia for Indonesian domestic workers. Although similar initiatives can be expected in Malaysia, being a majority Muslim country, to date there appear to be no secondary records of mosques or other Islamic groups providing

such services for the large population of Muslim Indonesian migrant workers in the country.

Some Muslim transnational domestic workers also see the importance of adhering to Islamic principles as a strategy to survive in host societies. For example, a small group of Indonesian women migrants in Singapore began proactively encouraging their peers to embrace the image of pious and submissive Muslim women through the activities of the Sultan Mosque with the objective of countering negative perceptions and stereotypes of their identities as an inferior migrant "Other" in the host society (Abdul Rahman 2003). Similar initiatives amongst Muslim Indonesian transnational domestic workers have also been observed in Hong Kong (Forum Komunikasi Mu'Minat Peduli Umat 2004).

The shared Muslim identity between Muslim Indonesian migrant domestic workers in societies with a significant Muslim community may be advantageous to the former. The motivation to observe the Islamic obligation of offering protection to Muslim women (especially widows) and to help them access *ḥalāl* (permissible according to Islam) means of earning a living encouraged some Muslim employment agents in Singapore to help individual Indonesian migrant domestic workers secure employment contracts with more preferred terms of employment and to escape abusive situations (Abdul Rahman 2005). However, a shared Muslim identity does not always offer a lifeline or guarantee protection. For example, Muslim employers and labor recruiting agents in Malaysia and Singapore have also been found guilty of abusing and exploiting fellow Muslim domestic workers from Indonesia and depriving them of their rights to perform their Islamic obligation of praying and fasting (Human Rights Watch 2004). As such, there seems to be an "apparent failure of Islamic norms to operate across national boundaries, while still within the bounds of the *ummat* Islam" (Robinson 2000, 267). This shows that cultural differences regarding the status of women also shape the treatment of Muslim transnational domestic workers in Southeast Asia and elsewhere.

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Turkey

In Turkey, women's employment cannot be thought of separately from family. This is because, starting from the decision to work, all stages of women's employment are interwoven with family relations and domestic responsibilities (Dubetsky 1977, Abadan-Unat 1981). Paid domestic work is a type of informal sector employment mainly for women who have a low level of education and skills and who agree to a low status and income, without any social insurance, in order to make a contribution to the household budget when necessary (Eser 1997). In the face of the lack of separate official registration of female employees in Turkey and since general statistics usually refer only to male household heads (DGSPW 2004) it is impossible to determine the size of female labor in paid domestic work. Its informal character is reflected in all aspects of this type of work, from finding the job through relatives' help, to employer–employee relations based on fictive kinship, to a priori determination of wages between neighbors and acquantices, to job saticfaction based on paternalist relations between the employee and the employer, to flexible work schedules of long hours, and to the variable nature in the standards of work between different households. It is a kind of work which can be understood as an extension of the low socioeconomic status of women in society and also its traditional gender roles (Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç 1998, 2001). The casual nature of this job makes it easily exchangeable and easy to quit, which makes it attractive to women of poor households who want to have this kind of employment only when there is a need for cash in the household. It is also a common route for employment for rural to urban migrant women with no professional skills or educational background.

Domestic work was common in Turkish households from Ottoman times. However, till the late 1960s, it was mainly performed by adopted children who were also used as domestic servants (Özbay 1999, 2002). After the 1970s, with the rise of rural migration to the large metropolitan cities of Turkey, the form of domestic labor changed and daily servants were employed mainly for cleaning, cooking, and childcare in middle-class households, especially when both partners are employed.

Large-scale internal migration flows during the last four decades resulted in a complex encounter between rural and urban cultural spheres in the metropolitan areas. These migratory movements had major consequences of social, political, cultural, and economic dimensions. Not only have work relations been affected, but also gender roles and identity formations (ethnic, class, religious, and political) were reshaped within the process of migration. The cultural complexity manifests itself in the case of paid domestic workers in the discrepancy between their world-views, lifestyles, attitudes, behaviors, norms, values, and belief systems and those of their middle-class employers. In this context, the case of paid domestic workers and their female employers should be studied with specific attention to the major discourses of modernity versus traditionality in the contemporary social-political life of Turkey.

Despite the fact that this type of female employment is increasing, there exist very limited research and information on paid domestic work in Turkey. A qualitative study is by Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç (1995) in Ankara, based on a representatively selected sample of 151 paid female domestic workers and their female employers. The research pointed to the fact that the perceived social standing of the domestic workers themselves is not shaped with material aspirations (status, wealth, lifestyles, or the well furnished houses of their employers) but more with the cultural, educational, and social achievements of their employers. Although they defined their status identity in the social hierarchy on the basis of a clear social origin, namely being a villager, in contrast to their employers whose urban social origins remained less clearly identified, they thought that they lost out in society not because of their rural origins but because of their lack of education. Domestic work merges cultural, and especially religious, values and expectations of rural women with the modern conception of work: the employer will treat them, "like a family member or kin – almost a kind of pseudo-kin"; "a decent Muslim woman cleans her own house and looks after her own kids, hence, cleaning another person's house is accepted as degrading. But if the job is done according to the criteria for cleanliness in Islam, then it is acceptable"; "the relationship is based on trust"; "if the employer is protecting her employee in line with the advices of the Muslim religion," then this work can be accepted by women and their social environment.

In a society where the state social security provisions are only limited, such informal sector jobs are not only considered to be a means of earning an income, but may also be a means toward solving a wide range of social, economic, and bureaucratic problems confronted by paid domestic workers and their families. In fact, in such a society informal work relations, paternalism, and a strategy of fictive kin relationship built with the employers may

provide alternative mechanisms of protection. Hence, women in such jobs develop a sense of identity and self esteem in work within the continuum of modernity–traditionality (Kalaycıoğlu and Rittersberger-Tılıç 2001).

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Sibel Kalaycıoğlu

Economics: Pastoral Economics

Arab States (excepting North Africa)

This entry is concerned with women, gender, and pastoral economies before modernization. In research between 1971 and 2005 in southern Syria, eastern and central southern Jordan, northern Saudi Arabia, southeastern Oman, and the northern United Arab Emirates (UAE), with tribal people who traditionally lived from various sorts of pastoralism, or combined animal keeping with mountain arable farming, oasis farming, or fishing, the authors found that livelihood and profits depended on the complementary activities of men and women in ownership, investment, and labor; that relations between men and women were as partners, sharing risks and returns; men and women had some specific roles, but in extreme emergencies, these roles could be fulfilled by the other. In these Arab tribal groups, men operate within known male descent kinship groups; women, because they do not appear in genealogies and because they remain members of their natal group throughout their lives, enable men to elide the formal theory of descent with the realities of practical economics and politics (Lancaster 1981, 15–23, 58–72, 156–62). The Rwala Beduin, and both men and women, agreed that this was so. Recent work in Ras al-Khaimah (UAE) and the region corroborates this (Lancaster and Lancaster forthcoming); the structural position of women enabled the functioning of all social life, while their actual work, owned assets, knowledge, and information networks were crucial to the three generation working groups that were the basic economic units of all societies in the Arabian peninsula. A domestic group is "a dynamic unit towards which converge resources originating from a variety of sectors, procured and organized by mobile individuals belonging to a parental group whose dimensions and composition are not definable a priori" (Fabietti 1991, 242).

Pastoralism is often assumed to represent the only option for the inhabitants of particular environments, but for its practioners pastoralism enabled them to live a morally good life. A good life, an honorable life, rested on being autonomous, responsible for oneself, and independent; living from animals far from towns achieved this. At the same time, members of pastoral domestic groups were linked to urban centers, supplying animals for riding, carrying, agricultural work, meat, dairy products, wool, hair, and skins. The market, or exchange, bound together urban, agricultural, and pastoral production and distribution. Pastoralists identified their economic activities from their main source of profits (Birks 1977, Chatty 1996, 83–7, Cole 1975, 108, Lancaster 1981, 99, 139ff., Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 202–3, 212–14). People talk as if men owned most of the animals and other possessions but, in reality, ownership was complex. Most items were subject to claims on them by members of the domestic unit. Women owned property in their own right, from inheritances, gifts, and their own efforts and disposed of it as they chose, but usually with regard to the long-term interests of their domestic groups.

Before nation-states provided security, camel herding groups provided it to sheep herding groups and traders, craft producers, parts of villages and towns in oases and the countryside, and markets. *Khūwa* (brotherhood) was the main system in the north of the peninsula (Lancaster 1981, 121–4, Lancaster and Lancaster 1997, 1999, 75–7); *kafīla* (guaranty), *wajh* (face, honor), and *rafīq* (companion) further south (al-Torki and Cole 1989, 73, Bujra 1971, Cole 1975, 108) and in the north. These institutionalized contractual processes kept the peace. Thus goods and services were distributed around a region between groups with different productive strategies, enabling trade through regions and between pastoralists and urban traders.

Since pastoral environments were variable, mobility and flexibility were essential. Each domestic group had access to a series of seasonal (summer, winter and early spring, and autumn) preferred bases in areas owned by tribal sections. Grazing and water were unevenly dispersed, grazing animals and collecting water for them was labor-intensive. Herd management was a constant juggling of known grazing and water sources, costs, labor, and access along wider domestic networks.

Members of pastoral domestic groups emphasized each had a core livelihood from camels, sheep, or goats, but engaged in secondary enterprises. A Rwala explained:

> Firstly, I make sure I can support my immediate family . . . This is possible because we have animals, land, and shares in various enterprises . . . In the past, these

> were things like raiding, providing security, trading . . . now, small businesses, trading, urban land, employment, or pensions. We didn't see our resources as permanent capital . . . Resources here have always been uncertain, so we look for core security and then we hedge. We aren't so concerned with owning things outright, what we are concerned about is being able to use resources on which we have claims. We are all members of families who all have some sorts of assets, there is nobody with nothing. Someone might lose his animals or his land, but in a while he or his children will have something else. Members of his wider family and his wife's family . . ., members of their communities and . . . networks would help them. This is why we put so much importance on being a good person, having a good reputation. Wealth is as much in reputation as a good person and in social relationships as in goods and money.

Camels, sheep, and goats each provided basic food and some raw materials, and surpluses to exchange or sell for other supplies and to fulfil social obligations. Camel herding families lived from the milk, and from grain and dates obtained from agriculturalists by exchange, protection contracts, or purchase. Most camel herders made income from renting baggage camels and riding animals to traders' caravans or pilgrimage organizers, selling animals for agricultural work or meat (al-Torki and Cole 1989, 71–2, Doughty 1936, i, 335–7, Musil 1928, 270, 348–9), and/or caring for baggage or riding camels of urban owners (Musil 1928, 312). Some, mostly young men from poor families, worked as herders or guards. A few, like Shararat and many Omani camel herders, sold breeding and riding camels, and processed some camel milk into storable dairy products. Women of camel herding families exchanged camel hair and woven camel hair bags, camel trappings, and rugs with traders from desert fringe villages for cloth, scent, and cheap jewelry (Musil 1928, 142), as well as clarified butter and goat hair. Earlier, collecting plant materials for urban industries and seasonal foods was important for many herding domestic groups in areas of Syria, Jordan, the Hijaz, and Oman.

Families living from sheep and goats usually specialized in meat or dairy products for the market; wool was an extra. Caring for sheep of urban or village owners was and is important for many Syrian tribal sheep-herding families, with a variety of contracts, and linked to barley cultivation and market conditions (Burckhardt 1831, 17–18, Musil 1927, 391, Thoumin 1936, 150–4). Some sheep flocks, owned by camel herding families as investments, are looked after by sheep and goat herding relations or by employed herders from Syria, Jordan, and Iraq.

Goats were the main herd animal only in mountainous areas, such as the *ḥarra* of southern Syria, Jordan, and the Hijaz, the mountains of western Jordan, and Oman. Goat herding families (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 230–3) lived from their milk, dairy products, wild foods, and meat, obtaining grain and/or dates and other goods by share working agricultural land seasonally, and/or by exchanging or selling young male goats; dairy products such as clarified butter, cheeses, and dried yogurt; and goat-hair for the commercial tent-cloth factories of many Syrian and Iraqi towns and villages (Jabbur 1995, 245–52, Musil 1928, 61).

Gender was important in the construction and management of pastoral domestic groups, and in the division of work. People talk as if the senior man took all decisions. He was indeed the one ultimately responsible for the defense, maintenance, and well-being of the unit and its assets. He was its spokesman, but he could achieve nothing without consensus between participating members. Women and younger men expressed their opinions, information, and concerns, from which, with his own information and knowledge, he developed his strategy for herd management and each member's responsibilities.

In camel herding domestic groups over the peninsula, in general younger men herded, taking the animals to grazing and water, and guarding them from wild animals and raiders. Women of these groups maintained the household and its animals. Teenage girls herded the milk camels, milked and watered them, and cleaned out wells. Women with small children and elderly women worked around the tent, collecting water and firewood or camel dung as fuel. Working with camels required more than one woman or girl, so herding and watering were sociable activities (Chatty 1986, 105), as was virtually all work done by women and girls. The women prepared the food eaten by the household. Surplus milk was made into yogurt and dried. Women and girls pounded grain and made bread or boiled it. Women collected seasonal wild foods, from which they obtained sweet syrups, oils, and flours. Men slaughtered camels, sheep, or goats for meat; women cooked it and rendered fat for storage. They tanned camel and goat skins, making water troughs, large water bags, bags for storing fat and dates and for souring milk and making butter. They made their riding litters from desert woods. They collected camel wool and sheared goats, spinning and weaving hair and wool into tent-cloth, dividing curtains, camel trappings, bags, and rugs. (Early twentieth-century photographs of herding women invariably show women and girls spinning, whatever the subject). The tent, its furnishings, and

maintenance were the senior woman's responsibility. Rwala women said that ideally, a tent had a roof of goat hair (the most waterproof) but walls of camel hair (warmer and lighter to handle); but some tents were all camel hair and many were all goat hair depending on what was available and affordable and what time the women had. Most years, the tent was taken to pieces and resewn in late summer, with new strips along the center of the roof. Women took down and erected tents, packed tents and household belongings, and led the baggage camels. They sewed clothes for themselves and their children. Women had a knowledge of childbirth, how to mend sprains and set simple broken bones, and of medicinal herbs which they collected. Child rearing was the responsibility of both parents; while fathers took over sons as they grew older, the influence of mothers was recognized to be crucial (Lancaster 1981, 66–70).

On occasion, women acted like men. Women were known to have defended the herds and tents from raiders using tent poles as weapons, and one woman recovered the camels she should have been left by raiders by raiding them back. In the distant past, the prettiest girl from the shaykhly family led warriors into battle, seated in a special litter, with a chosen troop of fighters accompanied by girls seated on riding camels who encourage them, followed by women threatening to beat to death anyone who flees (Musil 1928, 540–1, 571–4). Musil also wrote about a shaykh's daughter who was instrumental in making peace between warring tribes (Musil 1928, 54–6). Women from leading families were often consulted by other women about disputes and problems, and settled disputes by mediation. Women protected women and men if there were no men present, but handed the protected man over to a senior man when possible.

Women had visitors – their male and female relations, small traders, and women traveling to their relations or seeking protection – and had their own knowledge of grazing places and water catchments from before they were married, from former neighbors, and from stories and poems. Women thus increased the information available to the household. In private, men often consulted the women about important economic and political matters. Most significantly, women provided the networks of marriage that brought some men closer and distanced others; such networks provided options over a wide region especially when such marriages were reinforced over the generations (Lancaster 1981, 58–72).

Sheep herding domestic groups similarly divided up responsibilities and work by gender. The senior man decided how to manage the herd. Herders were senior men, young men, or girls. Before the flock returned, women and girls put out and filled drinking troughs. They collected firewood, made bread or other grain based food, looked after the tent, watched over very young and weaned lambs, and cared for sick or uninjured animals. In addition, they processed milk into fresh butter, yogurt, and sometimes cheese, and dried these for sale later. As women processed all milk into dairy products, and owned some of the sheep and goats who provided the milk, they took outright a proportion of the proceeds when the products were sold by the senior man or by themselves to traders. Sometimes, both men and women worked as harvesters. Women spun and wove, and made quilts and cushions in the summer.

Among goat herding mountain households, women herded and watered animals, collected water, milked, made butter, cheese, and yogurt, ground grain and made bread, erected and took down the tent, and spun and wove goat hair into tent cloth, sacks, rugs, and bags. They cared for the children and the old, collected medicinal herbs, helped with childbirth, and set bones. They collected up manure from the goat pens, took it to fields and gardens, and spread it on the land. They sowed, planted, and weeded, and harvested grain, lentils, vegetables, tobacco, and fruits. They made storage bins for grains, legumes, dried figs, and grapes. In Oman and the UAE, collection and sale of honey by men and of firewood by men or women were important for many goat herding households.

To sum up, premodern pastoral economies were successful in providing pastoral livelihood, and made major contributions to the wealth of the region as a whole through the interlinking by exchange, trade, transporting, and providing security of desert, mountain, countryside, villages, and towns. Gender difference in the organization of pastoral economies was noticeable; men were more visible than women. The structure of economic (and jural and political) life, in which men were spokesmen for domestic groups, active in defense of group assets, and in general dealt with outsiders whether these were traders, urban merchants, agents of central government, or seekers of protection or share contracts, meant men operated at a distance from the tent and, at the tent, with outsiders. Women were concerned with the tent, the day-to-day care of household members and animals, and production for livelihood, stores, and for trade, and so were less visible but as essential. They were also concerned with the bringing up of children, and the maintenance of family honor and

reputation; Rwala state that honor comes through women, and thus the much higher vengeance taken for the killing of a woman. Both sexes knew their willing participation and investment in ownership and labor were essential for the maintenance and future of the domestic group.

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WILLIAM LANCASTER AND FIDELITY LANCASTER

Central Asia

There has not been a specific study or report devoted to the involvement, contribution, or role of women in pastoral economies of Central Asia. Existing literature regarding the overall contribution of Central Asian women to the region's economy focuses on the sufferings of women in what is seen as a backward territory. Much of such work merely supports the Bolshevik campaign for the emancipation of Muslim women during the early Soviet period. The Turkmens, Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks, and Kazakhs of Central Asia were partly the subject of that campaign. Pastoral nomads of the Central Asian region also include Kazakhs in Xinjiang, China. During the early Soviet period, more than 700,000 nomadic and seminomadic pastoralist households existed in Central Asia. Some 70 percent of this number consisted of Kazakhs.

Nomads inhabit various regions with different climatic and geographic peculiarities. Turkmens live in the southern dry desert area, the Kyrgyz on the eastern plateaus of the Tianshan range, and the Kazakhs in the vast northern steppe as well as on the Chinese part of the Tianshan, Tarbagatay, and Altay mountains. All these followed a nomadic lifestyle and economy until the beginning of the Soviet period, except the Kazakhs living within the borders of China who continued their nomadic lifestyle well into the mid-twentieth century. There are some remnants of pastoral nomadism among the Kazakhs of China, even if for reasons of show. Prior to the twentieth century, seminomadism and pastoral nomadism existed in Central Asia for centuries. Tribal organization took place mostly among the relatively self-sufficient pastoral nomadic communities, whose societal structure was based around the kinship unit.

Male and female roles were differentiated but female inferiority was less pronounced among Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies than their sedentary neighbors. Polygamy was more common among the rich. Nomadic life gave women freedom of movement. They were also able to participate in social gatherings alongside men. Gender segregation, seclusion, and veiling were not practiced by Kazakh and Kyrgyz women. Particularly young

Kazakh women used to enjoy youth gatherings organized among nearby *avul*s (smallest community) at night and were able to meet the opposite sex. However, a young girl was free to mix with the opposite sex only as far as feminine modesty and family honor permitted.

Central Asian transhumance routes followed a vertical pattern particularly among the Kazakhs living in mountainous areas in Xinjiang. Historical records of transhumance indicate that routes between summer and winter pasturelands ranged from 3,500 to 4,000 kilometers in the sixteenth century, meaning that routes of the Kazakhs went from one end of Kazakh land to the other. Transhumance pastoralists usually traveled to cool highland valleys in the summer (*jaylav* in Kazakh, *yayla* or *yaylak* in other Turkic languages) and to warmer lowland valleys in the winter (*qistav* in Kazakh, *kishtoo* in Kyrgyz).

A nomadic woman was the lifetime supporter of the men in the family. The survival of a pastoral nomadic society was maintained by women's work. The house of the pastoral nomadic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz was a felt tent (*uy*) and the interior skeleton of this practical dwelling was formed from wood strips, made by professional men. An *uy* was constructed in such a way that it was not very difficult for two or three women to disassemble it in a hurry and set it up again very quickly. The Turkmen tradition resembled those of the Middle Eastern and Turkish Yoruk Turkmen style.

The most important tasks of pastoral women were to prepare and preserve food for immediate and later consumption. Meat and milk products were the basic food. Particularly smoked, dried meat and sausages from sheep and horse flesh were favorite and precious foods among pastoral nomads.

Women in pastoral economies spun the wool, mixed it with leather strips and prepared the most vital tool of the pastoral nomad, strong rope. They processed animal hides and fur and made the necessary clothing for the whole family, from hats to shoes. The clothing was particularly useful in protecting the family from harsh winter weather. Thus it was not very common for pastoral nomads to sell all the hides they owned. Women took pride in beautifying their houses and the clothing of family members. Wool, hides, and processed dairy products were not prepared as trading commodities but rather primarily for family consumption.

The division of labor gave the nomadic man responsibility for herding, slaughtering, and selling animals. Women did almost all of the housework. They processed milk into butter, cheese, cheese curds, yoghurt (*qatik*), and *ayran* (watery yoghurt). Women did the cooking, weaving, and childcare. They pounded grain, sometimes with the help of young boys. They spun wool to make it into felt and other materials, and prepared decorative leather, cloth, and felt hangings for the house. Felt-making was done collectively by men and women; they beat the wool to make it finer for processing. Fetching water or gathering firewood or dung cakes was done by women, boys, and girls.

Although the Sharīʿa allows half of a man's share to a woman in inheritance rights, Kazakh women were not given a share at all, other than a felt tent, a trousseau, two to five horses and camels, and some jewelry and clothing when they married. Women did not own herds. When their husbands died, ownership of the property in the form of herding either remained in the family, if the woman chose not to remarry, or passed to a male relative of the husband. If a widow was young, she was required to marry a male in the same tribe according to the levirate rules.

Sedentarization and collectivization campaigns in the Soviet Union and in the Chinese Communist era obliged nomads to adapt themselves to the new system. At present, nomadic life of Central Asians is almost non-existent on a mass scale. The effects of the state control changed social and economic life. Decreasing pasturelands and weakening of pastoralism have had negative effects on the environmental, national, and cultural identity of Central Asian nomads, particularly in the twentieth century. Pastoral nomads within Chinese territory are only kept as a tourist attraction in the high mountains in Xinjiang.

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Meryem Hakim

Economics: Professional Occupations

Turkey

The position of women professionals in contemporary Turkey can be traced back to the early years of the Republic (founded in 1923), which instituted a series of social, political, linguistic, and economic reforms, centered on values of secularism, nationalism, and modernism, and tried to incorporate Westernization into society. The Kemalist principles of the new state assigned an important part to women in the modernization project and women's progress was interpreted as a significant measure of success in reaching modernity (Arat 1999).

One main dimension of the modernization of women in the Turkish Republic is their widespread access to education in general and their public visibility, particularly in professions that require high levels of education and credentials. The impact of the reforms, in terms of women's representation in professions, has been significant among middle- and upper-class families in urban areas, though they have been largely excluded from strategic and executive posts.

The percentage of Turkish women in professions achieved by education is high even in comparison to industrialized Western societies. Furthermore, there is an upward trend in women's participation rates in most professions where women are underrepresented. For example, in 1973–4 female students constituted 17.5 percent of enrolled students in medical schools and 9.7 percent in engineering schools; by 2001–2, this rate had increased to 40.3 percent and 20.3 percent, respectively (Tan 1979, ÖSYM 2002).

Considering employment in some prestigious professions in Turkey, 60 percent of pharmacists, 19 percent of physicians, 30 percent of dentists, 34 percent of lawyers, and 23 percent of professors are women (Koray 1991, Gürüz 2001; statistics refer to 2001 for professors and to 1990 for the other professions).

Over the years, a remarkable increase has been seen in the number of female graduates, especially in health sciences such as dentistry and pharmacology, yet fields like mathematics and technical and natural sciences remain male dominated (SIS 2003, ÖSYM 2005).

The success of women in most professions is not reflected in the same proportions in decision-making positions, as there are only 8 women per 100 men in management (SIS 1990) and this ratio decreases sharply higher up the hierarchy. In the public sector, while women's representation at supervisory levels was 37.1 percent, it fell to 7.6 percent for general managers, and 2.1 percent for general secretaries of ministries.

Table 1. Women in Managerial Positions in Some Occupations in the Public Sector

Positions	Women	Men	% Women
Chief Ambassador	8	179	4.3
Ambassador	8	30	21.1
Governor and Assistant Governor	0	573	0.0
District Manager	7	714	1.0
Rector	3	76	3.8
Dean	49	451	9.8

Source: GDSPW 2001

As shown in Table 1, there are few women in strategic administrative posts in the public sector. For example, the ratio of women among chief ambassadors is 4.3 percent, 3.8 percent among rectors, while there are no women assigned to the positions of governors and assistant governors.

Similarly, in the private sector, several studies portray a sharp decline in the proportion of women in executive positions. Research conducted between the 1970s and the 1990s in both manufacturing and service sectors indicate that women constitute only 4 percent of top managers (Kabasakal, Boyacıgiller, and Erden 1994, Özbaşar and Aksan 1976, Tabak 1989).

In general, professional women's associations in Turkey focus on charity work and improving the rights of women in economic, legal, and social arenas, and struggle against patriarchy (*Directory of women's associations in Turkey* 2004). Women's voices in solving the problems of female professionals and developing their standing in the professional arena are very weak in Turkey, where the existence of the glass ceiling phenomenon seems to be a reality for women. Looking to the future, in order to improve the standing of women in professions, there is a need to improve the education levels of women from all backgrounds and voice the problems and opportunities that they face in professional life.

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Hayat Kabasakal and Idil V. Evcimen

Economics: Sex Workers

The Caucasus

The dramatic increase in local and transnational sex work corresponds to growing impoverishment of the female population due to political and economic restructuring following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh, in particular, led to intensified cross-border movements and exacerbated the general level of poverty with thousands of internally displaced persons. Although it is commonly held throughout the Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan that economic difficulties are the primary reason for engagement in sex work, some have argued that only those with low moral values end up as prostitutes. Azerbaijan, with its rich oil reserves and cosmopolitan capital, has long been a site of bustling nightlife with large numbers of foreign males, yet it is not a significant venue for sex tourism (unlike Moldova, for example). The women working in Baku's upscale bars are predominantly ethnic Russians with an urban background, whereas the majority of young Azeri women who travel abroad for sex work have rural roots and little or no higher education. The most common destination countries are Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In reports published by various international bodies, such as the International Organization for Immigration (IOM), women who discuss their involvement in sex work generally deny prior knowledge of their future occupation as sex laborers. Yet in other contexts where they are treated not as victims but as economic migrants they describe the conditions under which they made such choices. The complex and varied nature of the recruitment mechanism – which includes elements of persuasion and coercion – is exemplified by the market in the UAE, where trafficking involves Azeri girls as young as 15. In this instance individuals from Azerbaijan usually function as intermediaries by providing contacts and sponsors in the UAE. Women who work in UAE hotels have limited access to their personal papers and earnings, yet many of them still manage to send money to their families while hiding the nature of their work. Those women who work in the border towns of Turkey and in Istanbul find it easier to obtain a Turkish visa and then stay on in the country illegally. Despite being branded with the label of "Natasha" (Turkish neologism for a prostitute from the former Soviet Union), non-blonde-looking Azeri women often avoid harassment on the streets by wearing certain types of clothes, although they are sometimes verbally abused by Turkish men who remind them of their Muslim background.

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Hülya Demirdirek

Central Asia

In Central Asian countries sex work is not explicitly prohibited by criminal codes, which are largely based on the Soviet-era criminal code and are thus analogous. However, activities related to sex work such as involving others in sex work, solicitation, pimping, maintaining brothels, and producing and distributing pornographic materials are criminalized. While there certainly was a sex industry during the Soviet period, for most of it officials denied its existence. With the beginning of perestroika the authorities began to acknowledge its presence and made it an administrative offense in 1987. Sex work still remains an administrative offense in some Central Asian countries.

The sex industry in Central Asia has increased significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to widespread poverty, unemployment, a drastic deterioration of the social protection system, and the decline in women's social status that followed the disintegration of the USSR. Many sex workers in Central Asia come from impoverished

rural families unable to cope with economic shifts following the dissolution of the collective farms. As the economic situation continues to decline, more and more men lose their jobs, plunging into alcoholism and abuse at home. Many underage sex workers are often runaways from alcoholic/violent parents or from orphanages.

Muslim societies of Central Asia are traditional to varying degrees – Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are considered more liberal, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan more conservative. In all countries of the region sex work is socially stigmatized. Negative societal attitudes to sex work place blame on sex workers and rarely on the circumstances that propel them into the industry. In rural areas, a woman known to have been a sex worker is often rejected by her community and ostracized.

Trafficking in women

Since the end of the Cold War, as borders have become more open and more people, especially women, have become economically vulnerable, a new phenomenon of trafficking in persons for sexual exploitation has emerged in Central Asia. Human trafficking is a very lucrative enterprise, said to generate US$ 7–12 billion annually to traffickers worldwide. While some men and boys are trafficked abroad for sexual exploitation, most of those trafficked are women. Many underage girls are also trafficked out of Central Asia, and often their virginity is sold to a client at a premium.

Major destination countries for Central Asian women trafficked abroad include the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and Israel. Exact statistical data on the numbers of women trafficked abroad are not available due to the secretive nature of this phenomenon but the preliminary estimates suggest that up to 10,000 persons are trafficked abroad from the region every year. The largest destination country for women trafficked from this region is the UAE, 85 percent of whose population consists of foreign nationals. This suggests a strong link between a large presence of male migrants in the country and a demand for sexual services that is addressed by scores of foreign women trafficked into the country. Uzbekistan, being the most populous country in the region with a population of over 26 million, is reportedly the largest country of origin in Central Asia for women trafficked abroad. Both Muslim and non-Muslim women (mostly of Slavic origin) are trafficked from Central Asia. In the study of human trafficking from Tajikistan, it was noted that the incidence of trafficking in women was more acute among respondents of Slavic origin. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, almost half of the women trafficked abroad were of Slavic origin.

Women become victims of trafficking due to poverty, unemployment, low social status of women in their home countries, lack of knowledge about women's rights and about legal instruments designed to ensure respect for those rights, lack of opportunities and prospects for the future, and, in many cases, an idealistic view of the Western world and the wealthier countries in general. Widespread corruption makes it possible for traffickers to transport, sell, buy, and abuse women. Typically, women are deceived by their traffickers who offer them well-paid jobs as au pairs, nannies, domestic workers, dancers, or models overseas. The majority of the women do not realize they will be forced into sex work when accepting lucrative job offers abroad. Once in the destination country, women find themselves in debt bondage where they are told by traffickers they must work without wages until they repay their purchase price and/or travel expenses. Traffickers usually confiscate women's passports, leaving them undocumented in a foreign country. Employers also maintain their power to "resell" indebted women into renewed levels of debt. In some cases, women find that their debts only increase and can never be fully repaid.

International trafficking in Central Asian women for sexual exploitation is controlled by organized criminal groups with connections to corrupt government officials. These criminals threaten trafficked women into submission, and those who do not obey the rules are treated very severely. Many women are kept in squalid conditions in a state of virtual house arrest and are transported to and from work only. Even when women have relative freedom of movement, fear of the organized criminal groups that trafficked them, their illegal immigration status, inability to speak the local language, lack of documents, and fear of being arrested, mistreated, and deported keep them from seeking help from the local law enforcement authorities.

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Saltanat Sulaimanova

Egypt

Commercial sex work/prostitution (*daʿāra*) in Egypt can be characterized as largely consisting of female workers and male clients and mostly concentrated in urban centers. Male and child sex work also exists in the Egyptian sex industry but on a relatively very small scale and it is especially concealed. Commercial sex workers/prostitutes (*daʿirāt*) mainly include Egyptian, Eastern European, and other immigrant women, such as asylum seekers (for example Sudanese, Somalis, Ethiopians) who largely resort to this work as a result of economic desperation and/or as victims of sex trafficking. Historical literature suggests that commercial sex workers in Egypt have been stratified by social class and ethnicity. These trends persist in contemporary structures of this trade as reflected in pay scales that provide higher compensation for women of privileged ethnic groups (European, Middle Eastern) and those who work in upscale establishments. Lower-class sex workers are generally comprised of urban poor, rural-to-urban migrants, and Sub-Saharan African immigrants who solicit their work in low-end pubs, dance clubs, and from the streets. The scope of commercial sex work in Egypt is difficult to assess and has scarcely been studied. Yet, the trade is known throughout the region to exist in Egypt, particularly in Cairo, serving Egyptian and foreign clients.

Commercial sex business, or the network of prostitution (*shabakāt al-daʿāra*), in Egypt includes organized and informal networks and operates from a range of hotels, rented or furnished apartments (*shuqaq mafrūsha*, also known as suspect apartments, *shuqaq mashbūha*), houseboats, and solicitation by sex workers also occurs in various renowned streets. There are marked seasonal trends for sex tourists. In particular, the annual influx of especially male visitors to Egypt from the Gulf countries during the summer months provides a significant group of high paying clients for sex workers. Brokers, including internationally connected pimps and madams, facilitate this trade in Egypt as part of the global phenomenon of the traffic in women. Some transactions operate via a supposed Islamic cover of a secret marriage contract (*jawaz al-ʿurfī*) which is generally made without witnesses and typically ends in divorce after the closure of an encounter or relationship. Islamic scholars are at a consensus in denouncing this use of *jawaz al-ʿurfī*.

In addition to what thus far seems to be relatively small-scale sex trafficking within and to Egypt, Egypt is also considered a significant transit country for women and girls, trafficked largely from Eastern Europe, into Israel for forced prostitution. In 2004, Egypt ratified the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. Accordingly, the Egyptian government prohibits sex trafficking and penalizes all parties involved in the entry of an individual into Egypt for the purpose of sex work. Egypt has also started to monitor the activities of recruitment agencies more closely and passed a new law in November 2002 which requires immigration agencies to be operated solely by Egyptians (Calundruccio 2005).

As a woman's honor and that of her family are strongly attached to her chastity in all sectors of Egyptian society, there is a heavy social stigma attached to any non-marital sexual activity. Accordingly, social recognition of a commercial sex worker's identity dramatically hinders her potential to marry and has long lasting consequences for her social position. In Egypt, as in many societies, blame and stigma are attributed much more to female commercial sex workers than to their male clients. A profane term used in colloquial Egyptian Arabic, *sharmūṭa*, makes ambiguous the distinction between a woman who performs commercial sex work for financial benefit or for personal pleasure.

Although in existence long before the British occupation, prostitution was codified and legalized in 1882 for the first time in Egyptian history under British rule. Comprehensive laws governing practices around prostitution were established, including the issuing of licenses and the provincial designation of brothel locations, until its official abolition in 1949. Thus, in addition to established Islamic and Christian rulings in Egypt, commercial sex work has since been prohibited by state law. Egyptian sex workers are penalized by imprisonment when identified by law enforcement. Foreign sex workers are largely not subject to the same penalty unless they are illegal residents, in which case they are subject to imprisonment and/or deportation. Clients and all others involved with the facilitation of commercial sex work are also penalized by a fine and imprisonment for a period of one to seven years.

In addition to social stigma and legal penalties, commercial sex workers in Egypt, as elsewhere, confront the risk of exposure to sexually transmitted infections (STIs) as well as abusive clients or brokers. The lack of adequate public education on safe sex practices in Egypt and throughout much of the region results in deficient condom use in commercial sex transactions, particularly among Egyptian sex workers and clients. In a study among asylum seekers who resorted to commercial sex work, sex workers spoke of the difficulties of negotiating condom use, especially with Egyptian clients (Budiani 2005). Further research is required to assess acts of abuse of commercial sex workers in Egypt and the region, the extent to which domestic servants are used for sexual exploitation (Mattar and Borkholder 2002), and conditions of alleged sex workers within Egyptian prisons.

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Debra Budiani

Iran: Early Modern (up to ca. 1900)

Prostitution in premodern and early modern Iran was widespread, although how widespread is difficult to say because the issue is complicated by the absence of a clear distinction between outright prostitution and the widely practiced institution of temporary marriage, *mutʿa*. Sex work ranged from sophisticated courtesans charging their elite clients astronomical sums to receive them in their lavish mansions or riding to their clients' homes accompanied by servants, to street walkers made available by female brokers in market squares, to destitute women offering their services in hovels on the beach of Persian Gulf ports.

The information available for Safavid Iran centers on seventeenth-century Isfahan, the capital, which, according to various contemporary observers, was home to an estimated 12,000 to 14,000 public women – a staggering number given a maximum population of 500,000. Conspicuously present in the porticos around the royal square, they were concentrated in a district with a large number of caravanserais located east of the royal square. Many of these women belonged to the religious minorities, although Muslim prostitutes were common as well. Western observers often ascribed the large number to the loose morals of Iranians, but more compelling reasons were the permissibility of temporary marriage, and the plight of women repudiated by their husbands in a society of easy and frequent divorce.

Sex workers operated in provincial cities as well, albeit proportionally in smaller numbers than in Isfahan. Prostitution in rural areas was rare, aside from the caravanserais lining the roads outside the cities, where women catered to the sexual needs of travelers. An exception was the Susmani tribe in Kurdistan, who were known as gypsies and whose women performed as dancers and singers and had a reputation for a casual attitude toward sex. Prostitution in general was closely related to public singing and dancing; woman dancers and jugglers commonly performed at the banquets and dinners of the elite. Men of power and prestige, including the shah himself, all employed a troupe of female dancers.

The reaction by state and clergy was marked by pragmatism tinged with some ambivalence. In Safavid Iran, prostitution was not just plied in the open, but institutionalized; it was regulated and taxed by the state. Religious authorities acquiesced in the practice and participated in it themselves. Prohibitive measures against it were undertaken only when it grew into a public nuisance under a zealous grand vizier or a particularly pious shah. But enforcement was typically half-hearted and short-lived.

This pragmatic approach continued beyond the fall of the Safavids. Karīm Khān Zand in the 1770s settled a large number of prostitutes in Shiraz to accommodate his soldiers, and the Qājārs, acceding to power at the turn of the nineteenth century, retained the registration and taxation of prostitutes. Thus in Yazd in the 1870s, 500 prostitutes were registered and paid taxes. Despite the strictness of social control mechanisms, opportunities

for prostitution among the higher classes were facilitated by the existence of matchmakers, mostly older women, and eunuchs, who were able to operate in relative freedom under the cloak of safeguarding their womenfolk. Occasionally "modernizing" measures were taken against the practice. Thus in 1871 prostitutes in Tehran were apprehended and put in rehabilitation centers. More common was traditional connivance, however. The establishment of a "modern" police force in Tehran in the 1880s brought little change in the practice of officials extracting money in return for allowing women to pursue their trade. Prostitutes would be expelled from Tehran and allowed to return upon making a payment to the city's Italian chief of police. Low-ranking clergy continued to be involved in the sex trade as well, providing it with a veneer of legality.

Pederasty, *bachah-bāzī* or *shāhid-bāzī*, has a long pedigree in Iranian history and was rife as well into modern times. Until the onset of modernity, homosexual love was deemed quite acceptable as long as it was practiced by an older man with young, beardless boys. Persian literature is full of ambiguity in this regard, and seems to reflect real-life conditions in many cases. In Safavid times sex trafficking in Georgian boys is recorded and young male singers and performers, often Georgians as well, were available to men for sexual favors. It is clear that, throughout early modern times, homosexual practices were common at the royal court.

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RUDI MATTHEE

Iran: Modern

Sex worker – *rūspī* in Persian – culturally designates a scandalous woman. *Rūspī* is a short form of *rūspīd* (white face), a paradoxical teaser used for a woman of ill repute (Dihkhudā 1984, 8: 10898).

In Qājār Iran some women were involved in prostitution, wine selling, and drug selling. At the beginning of the Pahlavī dynasty, the state began to pay more attention to problems of urban prostitution and special quarters were established in major cities. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, prostitution houses were demolished, but with no planning for rehabilitation programs. Sex workers were thus scattered throughout the country.

In Tehran, the central location for sex workers was called Shahr-i naw (New Town), sometimes referred to as Qalʿah (the Fortress). This old quarter was first established in the Muḥammad ʿAlī Shāh Qājār era (1908–9) outside Tehran's city gates. Initially designated as a place to which criminals were banished, over time it became a refuge for drug addicts and sex workers and became known as Maḥallah-i Qājār (Qājār Quarter).

In the early days of Rizā Shāh's regime, more state control over this area was established, in part as the government became concerned with eradication and prevention of syphilis. It was in this period of state-supervised construction of housing and living amenities for sex-workers that the quarter was renamed Shahr-i naw. Over time, Shahr-i naw developed subsections, often socially and economically differentiated by the status of sex workers and their clientele.

In the immediate aftermath of the Islamic Revolution of 1979, this neighborhood was eradicated and a number of women, known as top bosses of sex workers, were publicly executed. Harsh measures were taken to eradicate sex work altogether. Despite extreme social surveillance in the first decade after the revolution, the authorities did not succeed.

There are no definite data on numbers of sex workers. Most surveys are undertaken in Tehran. The government has established a number of rehabilitation houses for arrested sex workers, who spend between six months and a year in these houses. They are first quarantined for three weeks, and then sent to undergo rehabilitation programs. Despite such efforts, it is estimated that 50 percent of women go back to sex work after completion of the rehabilitation period.

Although many surveys emphasize economic poverty as a key factor in pushing women to sex work, others have indicated that women turn to sex work for a variety of reasons and from different classes. Newspaper reports provide anecdotal data on the age of entry into sex work (62 percent between 13 and 20 years), their mode of entry (78

percent introduced by a close relative, such as father or mother; 12.2 percent by a partner), marital status (43.7 percent had married under 13; 88 percent under 18 years of age), levels of education (78.2 percent had middle and elementary education), and childhood abuse (60 percent had experienced abuse, with 70 percent of abuse coming from fathers and stepfathers). Another report indicated that inappropriate marriage could be a factor in attracting women to sex work: 35.4 percent had experienced a forced marriage. The same report indicated 22.5 percent had experienced sexual abuse at some time, with the majority around the age of 5 and from their close relatives, and 72.1 percent sustained violence from their husbands.

More recently, because of concern with the spread of HIV/AIDS through this vulnerable group, the government briefly proposed a plan for supervision of sex work through what were named Khānah-i ʿifāf (Houses of Chastity). The idea was to use the practice of temporary marriage to bring sex work under Islamic control. The proposal raised great controversy and was eventually abandoned.

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Kamiar Alaei, Rouzbeh Jahangiri, and Arash Alaei

Israel

Cultural and religious norms kept prostitution a localized and relatively small phenomenon in Israel until rapid globalization during the 1990s facilitated the trafficking of persons. Initially viewed by government authorities as an immigration problem, prostitution is now gaining recognition as a global human rights issue that is an integral part of the international organized crime network.

The history of ancient Greece and Rome demonstrates that prostitution was well known in Mediterranean cultures. Discussions in the Bible and Qur'ān also point to prostitution as an issue familiar to Middle Eastern societies, though not one that was condoned. In the early 1900s, brothels existed under the Ottoman Empire that were not closed under the new British Mandate following the First World War. In the 1930s, prostitution became even more visible because of the increased military forces stationed in the area to deal with Arab and Jewish unrest.

During the Second World War, Tel Aviv became a place of recreation for the Allied forces. Prostitution subsequently moved from the outskirts to central Tel Aviv and became more widespread, despite occasional closings of brothels, which were illegal under the Mandate. The end of the Second World War and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 brought successive waves of immigration to Israel, and poverty led some of the immigrant women and girls to prostitution (Ben Ami 2004). Current economic problems in Israel, including high unemployment and the difficulty of supporting a family on low wages, are also leading increasing numbers of local women as well as young girls and boys (sometimes with encouragement from their parents) to prostitution. Moreover, it is occurring within all religious and ethnic communities.

Since the early 1990s, as a result of social and political changes associated with the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the more general influence of globalization, Israel has become a destination for the international trafficking of women for the purpose of prostitution. Women were the first to lose jobs during these years of upheaval; desperately poor, many are unemployed or underemployed and single mothers. Substance abuse and family violence are also common problems. The women originate from the countries of the former Soviet Union, primarily Moldova, Russia, the Ukraine and, increasingly, Uzbekistan (Levenkron and Dahan 2003). Because the trafficking industry is directly connected to organized crime, statistics are difficult to verify; however, a Knesset report estimates that the number of women trafficked into Israel annually is about 3,000, with traffickers earning approximately US$1 billion dollars per year (Lutzky 2002).

The system of trafficking is highly organized and profitable at every level of the operation. Women are recruited in their country of origin, and fewer than 10 percent are estimated to have been involved in prostitution prior to recruitment (Levenkron and Dahan 2003). According to

another study, about a third of the women are promised employment and financial security as waitresses, nannies, and cleaners. A majority of the women, however, testify that they knew that they were to be employed in the sex trade but were unaware that the working conditions amounted to slavery and that there would not be an opportunity to make a set amount of money in Israel so that they could then return to their homes (Ben Ami 2004). The women are provided with forged documents, intended to prevent deportation and to protect the trafficker from arrest. If the women are identified in their documents as Jewish, and if these documents are accepted by government authorities, the women are eligible under Israeli law for citizenship.

Some women are brought directly into Israel through air or seaports, but most enter overland from Egypt. Beduin smugglers, linked by ties of kinship and economic interests that span the border, bring the trafficked women across the Egyptian Sinai into Israel. Viewed as "fair game," the women are raped, sometimes repeatedly, by the smugglers. The 156-mile Sinai border is not fortified, and there is minimal coordinated effort between the Israeli and Egyptian armies. About $1,000 is paid to the smugglers for each woman brought across the border, and if the smuggler is not paid, the woman will be kept as a guarantee for the debt (Levenkron and Dahan 2003).

Some women are sold to traffickers in their countries of origin. Others are sold upon arrival in Israel, in auctions to the highest bidder. In these auctions, women are made to stand naked and are evaluated as merchandise. The amount paid varies from $5,000 to $10,000 and will be determined by age, appearance, and the quality of the forged documents (Levenkron and Dahan 2003). Upon completion of the sale, many women are raped, which is justified as "trying out the merchandise," "teaching prostitution," or exercising "right of ownership." Women are also traded by traffickers and sometimes stolen by one syndicate and resold to another. The women must then pay off the debt owed to the trafficker for being brought into Israel and the cost of their "acquisition." Although this debt can often be paid off in a month or even a week of work, accumulating interest fees and charges for daily expenses keep the women perpetually in debt. Women are often resold to new pimps when they are close to paying their debt, so a new debt is incurred.

Trafficked women report being forced to work up to 20 hours a day, with an average workday of 13 hours (Levenkron and Dahan 2003). Passports are usually withheld, depriving the women of their identities and freedom of movement, including a means to escape. Punishments such as withholding food and physical violence are used to keep the women powerless. Violence, however, is used selectively in order to reduce the incidence of scars and bruises, which make the women less profitable as prostitutes. Intimidation alone is usually effective. Threats to sell a woman to an even worse place or threats against her family in her home country are believable due to the international framework of the trafficking network. A woman is often too frightened to go the police because of the trafficker's boasts of strong connections to the police establishment, language and cultural barriers, and fear of deportation to her home country, where she may face social condemnation as well as a crime syndicate demanding repayment of the incurred debt.

Not much was done to combat the trafficking of women in Israel until the publication of the *Trafficking in Persons Report* (TIP), prepared by the United States Department of State in 2001, which placed Israel in the Tier 3 category. Tier 3 defines a country as not meeting minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and not making significant efforts to do so. Threatened with economic sanctions if the problem was not addressed seriously, Israel instigated major changes. Significantly, the police opened a new investigative unit dedicated to the problem, and the number of police files increased dramatically. Brothels have been closed, and the government has established a shelter for rehabilitation and a call-in hotline. Local non-governmental organizations have been active in providing medical, legal, and psychological services, as well as outreach to sex workers and training to government agencies working in the field.

To build cases for prosecution, the Israeli government is now making a connection between prostitution and organized crime as well as related industries such as money laundering. These improvements helped bring Israel to Tier 2 in the 2005 TIP report. In Israel, prostitution is not considered an offense although the actions associated with procurement are illegal. Trafficking in persons was unaddressed as a legal issue until a new landmark bill classified trafficking of women as a felony. If the crime is committed in the context of a criminal organization, the sentence can double. Additional legislation concerns minimum sentencing guidelines. Other proposed bills concern legal assistance to trafficked persons and monetary restitution.

Still, some prevailing cultural norms view trafficking and prostitution with a certain amount of inevitability. This is demonstrated by public perceptions that trafficking in women is linked to a lack of morality rather than human rights. Another indicator of cultural acceptance is the range of clientele, which spans both the Arab and Jewish communities, religious and secular. Occasionally, the male migrant labor force (originating from many countries, including China, the Philippines, Romania, and Turkey) is blamed as the reason for the large sex industry, but testimony from sex workers contradicts this claim (Levenkron and Dahan 2003). Economic issues are also a consideration. For example, media organizations make a great deal of money from advertisements offering sex-related escort services. Government attitudes until recently acknowledged the situation of trafficked women but only as part of an illegal immigration problem, not as a human rights issue. Finally there are the perspectives of the trafficked women themselves as well as local Israelis working as prostitutes. Trafficked women feel trapped by debt, lack language fluency, experience physical and psychological intimidation, suspect cooperation between police and pimps (which is sometimes supported by personal experience), and fear deportation and difficult or dangerous circumstances in their homelands. Also trapped by economic circumstance, drug addiction, and the web of organized crime, local women and young men working as prostitutes face some of the same difficulties.

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Martha Kruger

Sub-Saharan Africa

Regional cultural diversity makes it difficult to generalize about Sub-Saharan African beliefs and customs concerning sex work and non-marital sexual relations, especially informal sex work. However, there are some commonalities, especially the distinction made between informal sex work and commercial sex work. Different religious and cultural belief systems associated with sexuality and sexual relations account for the range of attitudes toward women involved in sex work.

Informal sexual exchanges are ambiguous in nature, in that sexual exchanges are not always purely financial (for example, they may involve gift giving) and may last for a night or may continue into an extended relationship. In informal "transactional" exchanges, the participants are not necessarily constructed as prostitutes or clients, but rather as girlfriends or boyfriends. As a result, the exchange of material goods or gifts for sex may not involve a predetermined payment. Engagement in commercial sex work is more closely associated with customary practices of the Western sex industry. Commercial sex workers generally restrict their services to monetary transactions and are perceived by informal sex workers as engaging in solicitation methods (for example, tight clothes, streetwalking) characteristic of Western prostitutes. Consequently, women often approach informal sexual exchanges and commercial sex work differently. Unlike the passive victims they perceive commercial sex workers to be, women engaging in informal sexual exchanges may view their actions as a means to access power and resources that challenge traditional patriarchal structures. Scholars suggest that the expansion of commercial sex work as well as certain sexual deviances in Africa were due to European colonization of the region.

Historical development of prostitution

Understanding of the historical background of present-day prostitution is built primarily upon descriptions and accounts offered by European travelers. The history of West African prostitution has been less thoroughly researched than its eastern and southern African counterparts. However, it is evident that institutionalized prostitution spread

out over the whole of Africa at about the same pace despite cultural differences between peoples and regions.

As early as the seventeenth century, when European merchant ships anchored regularly along the Guinea coast on their way around Africa, it was reported that women were sent out to merchant ships as symbols of hospitality. Women did not sell sex, but provided gratification to those on board while the chief conducted business. Around 1700, the Dutch East India Company established a large house of female sex slaves in Cape Town, primarily for its own employees. The women in the house were hardly prostitutes, in the sense that they were slaves and did not receive payment. However, when there was a surplus of women, the house made a profit by allowing customers – sailors and local residents – to pay for services. Throughout the eighteenth century, as Europeans explored the interior of Africa, they observed "free women" who offered themselves sexually to whomever they wanted. These women were often well-dressed, self-assured, and could negotiate the prices for their services. The colonization of Sub-Saharan Africa led to an increasingly cash-based economy where sex could be bought like any other commodity. Prostitution followed the expansion of colonial administrations. Historically, prostitution was clustered around areas of increased trade and transport and in areas with increased numbers of migrant male laborers, railway personnel, and soldiers.

Luise White's account of the development of prostitution in colonial Nairobi demonstrates a strategic response by women to the twin catastrophes of famine and empire. In local societies that practiced bride-price through payments in cattle and where daughter marriages were important sources of a man's accumulation of property and power, the cattle epidemics that swept Kenya in the last decades of the nineteenth century proved to be devastating when coupled with famine, failed rains, smallpox, and impending colonial conquest. Working prostitutes became Kenya's "urban pioneers," as they were among the first residents to live year-round in the new colonial city (White 1990).

Consequently, three forms of professional sex work emerged in Nairobi: *watembezi* prostitutes offered brief sexual services along the streets; *malaya* prostitutes offered more prolonged, indoor domestic and sexual services; and *wazi-wazi* prostitutes invited clients by sitting in front of their homes and aggressively calling out their prices. A woman's ability to work within the home or on the street spoke not of her self-respect or moral values, but of her access to property and housing, the most widespread form of prostitution being the one-night home visit. Moreover, many women consciously took control of their lives and advantage of social opportunities. If they owned property, women often designated female heirs in a rejection of traditional patrilineage. In fact, many women deliberately converted to Islam, which allowed them to own and sell their dwellings (White 1990).

The First World War gave prostitution another boost, particularly in East Africa, where the war had the greatest impact. British East Africa became an expanding colony with its largest city, Nairobi, in a state of constant growth. The ratio of men to women was soon ten to one in the African population, with similar significant deficiencies in the numbers of women among Europeans and East Indians. During the Second World War both demand and supply increased rapidly. The better class of prostitute could earn more than a dock worker or a clerk. In Tanzania, many of the women served as nursemaids (Swahili *ayah*s) by day. Some prostitutes were among the most educated and affluent citizens of Dar es Salaam. The capital had a well-organized trade and its red-light district was almost exclusively dominated by Haya women. These women helped alleviate their fathers' suffering finances during the Great Depression and were seen as dutiful daughters. Their *grande madame* would later become an active member of the key political party during the national independence movement.

The nature of the profession – and its requirement that most women detach themselves from their natal settlements – freed women from male domination and encouraged them to move out of their villages (which were not always welcoming to returning sex workers). During the colonial period, most women in Sub-Saharan Africa were confined almost entirely to the agricultural sector. Other than those few who received Western education and thus access to the wage labor market, most lacked the start-up capital to establish themselves in business in urban areas. Social histories of East Africa have convincingly demonstrated the importance of prostitution in enabling women to accumulate capital and move into the informal economy. In Nairobi, for example, prostitution was a major vehicle for women's achievement of upward social and economic mobility. Women engaged in the sex industry were able to generate higher incomes than the average male African laborer. Prostitutes became the first African women in Kenya to own property and buy or build their

own urban homes. Further evidence shows prostitution serving as a lucrative form of employment in the new European colonial cities. Almost all the women worked for themselves with very few middlemen demanding a share of profits. Women amassed considerable economic and thus political power. For example, with the introduction of party politics to Nigeria in 1950, prostitutes in the Muslim Hausa "Sabo" settlement at Ibadan joined and voiced their opinions in the two major southern Nigerian parties. In contrast to housewives excluded from public life, prostitutes were politically active, registering their names on voters' lists and casting their votes in key pre-independence federal, regional, and municipal elections.

However, those who chose prostitution as an actual means of making money were soon to be outnumbered by those who were driven to it by poverty, for whom it was a means of survival. Prostitution in Sub-Saharan Africa increased over the years, especially throughout the twentieth century as postcolonial economies were unable to provide for their citizens because of inherited weak infrastructures, civil conflicts, poor governance, corruption, environmental disasters, and overstressed public services. For example, Addis Ababa experienced an astonishing growth in modern subsistence prostitution; in the 30 years after 1938 (that is, the three decades after Italy occupied the Ethiopian capital), the number of prostitutes increased from under 2,000 to about 80,000. Of these, 40 percent gave unemployment as their reason for entering prostitution, while 30 percent attributed it to divorce. This rise in prostitution was mirrored across Sub-Saharan Africa but women, including many more young girls, were now earning less than their predecessors as their increased numbers reduced individual profits.

The current reality behind the sex trade

For many women, work in the sex trade is the financial reality behind life as single, divorced, or widowed mothers. In the new context of the worsening economic situation throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, women have become more dependent on their own personal resources, including their sexuality. Sex work exists in many forms – home, hotel, bar, and brothel based – and is generally characterized by a certain informality and fluidity. In Sub-Saharan Africa, many women move in and out of informal and formal sex work; some women identify their involvement as full-time, others see sexual transactions as a part-time job, yet others refuse to recognize the connection between transaction and the sexual outcomes of their relationships. Informal sex workers commonly help their families financially or become household heads. Seen as economically instrumental, the work of informal sex workers is usually known to family members. Also common to the region is the heterosexual nature of sex work, with men buying and women supplying.

Transactional sex is common among adolescent women in the 15–19 age group where their partners are six or ten years older, a pattern that is sometimes referred to as the "sugar daddy syndrome." Factors influencing young women's decisions to engage in transactional sex include financial motivations ranging from economic survival to desire for status and possessions. In some cases, there is implicit parental pressure to solicit funds to finance education-related expenses. Power imbalances in cross-generational sexual relationships presuppose serious repercussions for the negotiating ability of young women to use contraceptives and to avoid the transmission of sexually transmitted infections. A recent examination of factors influencing transactional sex among adolescents in twelve Sub-Saharan African countries found that religion played a role in the likelihood of an adolescent participating in transactional sex. In more than half of the countries, young Muslim women were less likely to be involved in transactional sex than women practicing other religions (Chatterji et al. 2004).

There has been growing concern over the disparity of HIV/AIDS infection levels between men and women in may parts of Africa, especially in adolescents where many more girls than young males are infected. Studies suggest that while wider sociocultural and economic constraints have rendered girls and young women less powerful in their relations with older men, these females also learn that sexuality and fertility are resources that have value on the sexual exchange market.

Politics, religion, and sex

Historians and policymakers are not alone in noting the increasing incidence of commercial sex trade in the region. Among others, Islamic leaders have voiced negative opinions about the profession, which is prohibited by the religion. For example, in Tanzania's semiautonomous island of Zanzibar, which has a predominantly Muslim population, religious leaders have publicly denounced increased venues of alcohol sale, such as pubs, and rising incidence of transactional sex as having

contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS. However, in some instances, as illustrated later, religious leaders have been open to working with governments to promote educational prevention campaigns that target sex workers.

It is difficult to assess the legality of the sex trade throughout Sub-Saharan African countries. While illegal in the majority of them, the sex trade is silently tolerated by many governments, including those in predominantly Muslim countries. Among countries with significant Muslim populations, two stand out as having taken proactive and unique approaches to address HIV/AIDS. In both Senegal and Uganda, government leaders and policymakers have actively engaged key religious leaders and religious groups – primarily Muslim and Roman Catholic – in endorsing a unified message to help combat HIV/AIDS through behavioral changes and contraceptive use.

For example, Senegal marketed condoms at lowered prices and promoted universal sex education in schools and among high-risk groups such as prostitutes and men in the army. In 1969, it had become the only Sub-Saharan African country to legalize the practices and registration of sex trade workers. Female sex workers must register, carry cards, and have regular medical exams at designated health centers. However, aiding or abetting a woman to enter prostitution, living off the earnings of a prostitute, or running a brothel remain illegal. Often, where sex trade is illegal, as in the case of Kenya, the law is based on a legal double standard and penalizes women (or men) selling sex, but does not punish the client for buying. In many instances, sex workers are forced into having sex with local law enforcement officers in exchange for protection from aggressive clients, fines, or imprisonment.

A recent study of 60 registered sex workers in Dakar, Senegal revealed that 76.7 percent identified themselves as Muslim. Interestingly, many of these women actively practiced their faith and acknowledged their profession as necessary to make a living. Many claimed they prayed for forgiveness and intended to leave the profession once they had saved enough money or had found a suitable husband or provider (Homaifar and Wasik 2005).

Sex workers have also become more vocal as an advocacy group for each other. Non-governmental organizations such as AWA (the Association for Women at risk from AIDS) in Senegal and SWAA (the Society for Women against AIDS in Africa) distribute literature and condoms as well as providing sexual and reproductive health education to sex workers.

Sexual trafficking of women and children

A combination of deepening poverty, famine, deteriorating living conditions, persistent unemployment, armed conflicts, weak governments, and rural–urban migration has made women and children in Sub-Saharan Africa progressively more susceptible to trafficking for sexual exploitation and domestic labor. Poverty in rural areas has exacerbated the living situations of families. Many families give their children to traffickers under the assumption that their children will be provided with an opportunity to secure education, jobs, and better lives.

In West Africa, the main countries involved in trafficking are Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Women from war-torn Liberia and Sierra Leone are forced into prostitution in Mali, just as local women are trafficked to Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and France. In East Africa, young girls and women are abducted from conflict zones such as Somalia and forced to become sex slaves to rebel commanders or affluent men in Sudan and the Gulf states. In Kenya, Japanese businessmen operate syndicates that are lucrative for the local sex industry. They are responsible for trafficking young girls to Europe and bringing young girls from South Asia. Ethiopia is a source of women trafficked to Lebanon and the Gulf States. Trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation is a critical problem in southern Africa, especially in Mozambique, Malawi, and South Africa. South Africa is a major destination for regional and extra-regional trafficking activities. Women are moved through the network of refugees resident in South Africa, and trafficked from Thailand, China, and Eastern Europe to South Africa. Women and children are trafficked to Europe (especially Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands) for commercial sex. Children are similarly moved in connection with domestic labor, sexual exploitation, and pornography. National leaders and politicians are increasingly paying attention to human trafficking, in part as a result of the intensive advocacy by non-governmental organizations working in the area and increased recent media coverage of incidents of trafficking and repatriation of trafficked persons.

Somewhat surprising is the increasingly instrumental role of women as traffickers of women and children. Organized syndicates, truck drivers, foreign businessmen and women working in partnerships comprise a large demographic of those in the trafficking trade. In Mozambique, traffickers are mainly local women in partnerships with

compatriots and South African men who aid in the transport of women and children. Victims trafficked from Malawi are often recruited by Malawian businesswomen, who collaborate with long-distance truck drivers to recruit local victims with offers of marriage, study, or employment in South Africa.

Sexual exploitation of children

Commercial exploitation of children in the region cannot be analyzed in isolation from the broader issues of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation. Child sexual exploitation exists in many forms – mainly child prostitution, child pornography, sale and trafficking in children – and has become a serious problem. It is also clear that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is both a cause and consequence of sexual exploitation of children in the region. Children orphaned by HIV/AIDS often resort to prostitution as a means of supporting themselves and their younger siblings. A misperception that having sexual intercourse with young girls diminishes the risk of contracting HIV/AIDS has increased the demand for young sex workers.

Child pornography has been found to be widespread and often linked to sex tourism in the coastal towns of Kenya and Tanzania as well as the major tourist destinations of South Africa. Tourists in southern Africa from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom use gifts and cash to lure underage young boys and girls who reside at tourist spots into pornographic sex acts. Revenue from films, videotapes, and pictures is used deceptively to convince parents to allow children to be taken abroad for employment or education. Once abroad, children usually end up as sex slaves to traffickers or are distributed to pedophile networks. The production of child pornography in most countries within the eastern and southern African region is not well documented and pornographic materials are thought to originate mainly from abroad. As child pornography and its exposure of children has been banned in most countries within the east and southern African region, the practice now goes on clandestinely.

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Nazaneen Homaifar

Economics: Small Businesses

Egypt

This entry is about the nature of women's involvement in small businesses in the Egyptian context. Since Egypt adopted an economic liberalization policy in the 1970s, the government has espoused a policy of promoting private sector activity, and in particular entrepreneurial activity. There are no available gender disaggregated data on the percentage of men's versus women's businesses. While women are visible in assisting in running or managing certain types of business, it is likely that the number of formally registered businesses are disproportionately owned by men. This assumption is based on the prevalence of certain sociocultural values and perceptions relating to gender roles, discussed later. Similarly, there are no comprehensive nationwide data describing the profile of women owners of small businesses. However, a study of Egyptian businesswomen in general (Nasser et al. 1999) suggests that they tend to be in the older age group: 34.6 percent of businesswomen are in the age bracket 55–60, another 23 percent are in the age group 40–5. This relatively late entry into the business sector is incongruent with women's economic activity in Egypt, which tends to reach its peak in the 15–25 age group. Nasser et al. (1999) suggest this is explained by the fact that to start a business, capital, connections, experience, and talents are needed. Moreover, the majority of women in business surveyed in the study (89.3 percent) tend to have a university or above university education. Approximately a quarter of the women in the sample were engaged in production activities, while an equal number (22.6 percent) ran businesses relating to trade or advertisement. Production-related businesses include planting and agriculture, the food industry, and ready-made clothes. The overwhelming majority of businesswomen in the sample (67.9 percent) relied on self-finance for supporting their businesses.

That women self-finance their businesses is compatible with available information from some of the largest non-governmental organizations (NGOs) providing credit in Egypt, where the vast majority of individual loan recipients for small businesses (as opposed to group lending for micro-activities) under their programs tend to be men. For example, the Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services, one of the largest NGOs operating in Egypt in the area of enterprise development, has two programs, one for group lending for very small loans intended for women managing micro income generating projects and the other for entrepreneurs managing existing enterprises who wish to access an individual loan (whose value is much larger than that offered under the group lending scheme) for their small businesses. Women feature prominently in the group lending scheme yet do not constitute even 20 percent as recipients of the individual loan scheme for small businesses. This suggests that women are deeply involved in micro-entrepreneurial activities, especially in the informal sector, managing cottage industries as well as small income-generating projects. However, they feature less prominently as leaders and owners of small businesses. There seems to be a glass ceiling preventing women from transforming their micro-enterprise activity into a small business. Some of the difficulties they face in scaling up their economic activities have to do with lack of business experience on how to expand; other difficulties stem from their lack of confidence in their ability to grow. This is partly influenced by internalized social values of what women can and should aspire to do as entrepreneurs.

The prevalent sociocultural values inherent in Egyptian society for the most part suppose that if the husband is present, he would be recognized as the owner and manager of the business, and if the wife should play any role, it would be that of his helper. This attitude is likely to be shared by the majority of men and women who find it easier to envision men in leadership positions rather than women, although it is likely to be more prevalent among the poor than among the upper echelons of Egyptian society, where women have traditionally enjoyed a great deal of independence in running their own business affairs. In general, it becomes more socially acceptable for women to be seen as owners and managers of businesses in situations where households are female-headed. Such salient and deep cultural values regarding women's role and the gendered division of labor considered to be the norm in running businesses can be considered as one of the major impediments to women's parity with men as business owners and managers.

Another important gender-specific impediment is

the social value system, which defines the types of business that are appropriate or inappropriate for women's involvement. For example, it is considered socially inappropriate for women to run or engage in certain types of small business, such as running a coffee shop or selling car accessories. More socially acceptable types of business for women include selling clothes, hairdressing, or running a grocery shop. This kind of gendered categorization of types of business where women's involvement is either accepted or rejected is confining in the kind of economic activity in which they can engage, and in their ability to respond to market signals about the kind of entrepreneurial activity that is in demand. Moreover, poor women who have no previous experience working in the marketplace and are attempting to establish new businesses often complain that they must take the "personal safety factor" into consideration. Some types of business which involve harsh competition in the marketplace may be shunned by women because they may expose them to physical and verbal harassment and jeopardize their social position or standing in the community, in a society where women are vulnerable to having their personal or social reputation dishonored or tainted.

The legal environment in which small businesses operate also represents an obstacle to women wishing to engage in this type of activity, although it also affects men. The majority (80 percent) of small and micro businesses thriving in Egypt are in the informal sector; most entrepreneurs have no legal difficulties in establishing their own informal business. However, if entrepreneurs wish to transform their businesses into the formal sector, they face innumerable legal and logistic obstacles. The process of registration as a formal enterprise/business is bureaucratic, burdensome, and tainted with corruption.

Support networks for women owners of small businesses are being slowly formed, although they are far from representing any collective movement or pressure group that could influence the policy level vis-à-vis enhancing women's opportunities in small businesses or even altering community perception about their leadership in this sector. To date, there have been more than 20 businesswomen's associations established in Egypt (Nasser et al. 1999); the first one was set up in 1995. Most of these businesswomen's associations seek to cater to the interests of women on a governorate level (for example, Alexandria Women's Business Association, Assiut Women's Business Association, Menya Business Women's Association). These women's business associations mostly provide consultation, technical, and legal services for businesswomen. Some also provide access to credit and a few are engaged in advocacy on behalf of the interests of businesswomen in general.

On the whole, while women have historically played an active role in assisting in the running of small businesses, their leadership of small businesses in terms of their ownership or their recognition as formal managers of such enterprises seems to be less prominent. The absence of gender segregated data on the nature and extent of women and men's involvement in small businesses means it is difficult to draw a conclusive picture. However, it seems that sociocultural perceptions determining gender roles in society represent a significant impediment to women's ability to emerge as leaders in this sector. Other impediments include lack of training and difficulties in marketing, as well as the overall legal environment in which small businesses operate.

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MARIZ TADROS

Iran

During the last decades, Iranian women's educational rate has increased greatly; at the beginning of the twenty-first century 75.2 percent of Iranian women are literate. The employment rate in formal sectors has not kept pace. Women's participation in the small business sector is in part a response to this disparity.

Small businesses constitute a major part of Iran's economy. Their contribution to GNP (gross national product) is low in comparison to other countries. For example, in Singapore 94 percent of industrial units are small businesses contributing 59 percent of GNP. In Malaysia comparable figures are 92.6 percent and 52 percent. However in Iran small businesses make up 92 percent of the economy but their contribution to GNP is just 25 percent.

Women are mostly employed in these kinds of businesses: 29.2 percent of women are in agricultural small industries, 26.6 percent in

manufacturing, 22.5 percent in educational enterprises, and 6.9 percent in health care.

One reason for the low GNP contribution is the wage-gap. The gap between men and women's income in Iran is very high. The ratio of women's to men's income in Iran is 0.29; comparable figures for Kuwait, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan are 0.34, 0.51, 0.38, and 0.33 respectively.

Many Iranian women are family workers, especially in traditional small businesses where they receive little or no payment; the rate has changed very slowly.

There are many definitions for small business, differing from one country to another. The criteria include employment size, capital size, scale of production, and type of technology.

In Iran, the number of personnel is used for categorization. Businesses that have between 5 and 50 employees are defined as small. They can be further divided into ancillary businesses (companies that are part of the supply chain of large companies), small-scale manufacturers, and tiny businesses (fewer than 5 employees). There is also a division between urban and village small businesses and traditional industries. Most Iranian women are in agriculture and village industries, education, and health care.

The cooperative sector in the Iranian economy has an important role but women's participation here is minimal, though growing. The percentage of women members in the cooperative companies is very low.

Table 1. Unpaid Family Workers by Gender

Year	Men (%)	Women (%)
1997	4.14	32.2
1998	5.13	37.13
1999	5.52	34.68
2000	5.23	31.86
2001	5.11	33.04
2002	5.1	35.8
2003	3.9	29.9

Table 2. Number of Cooperative Companies Established by Women in Iran

Year	Cooperative Companies Established by Women
1998	624
1999	469
2000	929
2001	1,124
2002	1,793

Table 3. Women Members in Cooperative Companies

Year	Number of Cooperative Companies	Women Members (%)
1998	2,278	0.06
1999	2,483	0.06
2000	4,123	0.10
2001	4,783	0.12
2002	6,854	0.17
2003	7,155	0.18
2004	7,188	0.18
2005 (prediction)	4,937	0.12
Total	39,801	1.00

Conclusion

The low rate of productivity of women's contribution to GNP through the small businesses sector in Iran is a result of different factors. Culture is the main factor. Women have secondary roles in economic areas, because the dominant masculine culture does not allow them to reach and stay in managerial and strategic positions. This attitude toward women keeps their salaries very low in comparison with men. It also results in gender segregation according to type of business. Often Iranian women choose a business that they can own directly and exclusively. This poses special problems. The first and most important problem is financial, because of high rates of interest in Iranian banks and the difficulties of raising capital; another problem is marketing; and finally such businesses usually do not have good management.

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Turkey

People born in rural areas generally work in agriculture or in their family business. Similarly, small urban businesses are generally passed on from generation to generation. It is therefore useful to compare the employment of the female labor force in small or family businesses in urban areas with those in rural areas.

In rural areas, men are usually self-employed small proprietors while women are largely unpaid family workers in agricultural production. Additionally, women use their domestic skills to earn money for their families as cooks, seamstresses, or craftswomen producing goods for sale at local markets. Women also work for small-scale family businesses. However, they usually do not have any right or control over family income, assets, or property. Even the idea of women operating a personal account is something unusual, because it denotes women's independence and presents a challenge to male power. Nevertheless, when they are older and become grandmothers, they often have a kind of authority over younger male and female members of the family and gain respect, so that they are excused from housework and their comments on family issues are welcomed. However, this relative power within the family only concerns social relations and does not extend to financial matters (Elmas 2004, 19).

In urban areas the labor force participation rates in 2003 were 68.4 percent for men and 18.6 percent for women (Elmas 2004, 9). The increasing level of education among women has led to increasing participation in the labor force, in decision-making and in socioeconomic status. Women with little education who possess family businesses generally prefer to work in them. Within this group, two different categories of family business can be defined: the first category consists of firms in which the family members are unpaid workers, and in which role differentiation and the participation in decision-making are arranged according to informal family relationships. These firms are generally founded by the internal rural–urban migrants. The second category consists of firms which are founded by second-generation urbanized people who have been living in cities for a long time. The women who work in this kind of firm are generally paid workers. They are single and their social status is higher than the other workers. However, these women do not participate in the decision-making process effectively and, like their counterparts in the first type of business, they have no social security arrangements (TC Başbakanlık KSSGM 1999a, 207).

The Turkish labor market has some peculiar characteristics relative to the other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. In general, female and male participation rates for Turkey are higher in rural than in urban areas (Kasnakoğlu 2000, 78) and the definition of a small-scale business in Turkey is different from other OECD countries' definitions. There are other definitions peculiar to Turkey. However the definitions of business size used by the Teşvik Yasası (regulations aimed at encouraging small to medium sized enterprises in less developed regions) are pervasively accepted among scientists. Teşvik Yasası categorizes businesses according the number of workers they employ: those with 1–9 workers are termed micro-scale firms, those with 10–49 workers are termed small-scale firms, and those employing 50–249

Table 1. Numbers of Workers by Gender and Sector, 2004

Sector	1–9 Workers		10–49 Workers		50–249 Workers	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
1 Agriculture	1,218	9,088	3,390	17,411	8,379	39,094
2 Mining	960	12,965	1,721	25,097	1,218	27,135
3 Energy	954	12,477	1,741	24,841	2,522	43,898
4 Manufacturing industry	68,559	330,675	111,795	426,529	120,901	381,104
5 Construction	16,401	204,183	16,226	197,567	11,665	141,431
6 Tourism	12,574	66,969	15,517	73,149	13,565	67,653
7 Transportation and Communication	10,137	59,972	11,577	72,731	8,215	55,961
8 Other service sectors	55,348	240,174	52,299	205,117	40,242	134,659
Total	166,151	936,503	214,266	1,042,442	206,707	891,935

Source: TC Ministry of Labour and Social Security 2004, 142.

workers are termed middle-scale firms. In Table 1, the number of registered workers in each category of firm is recorded by gender and sector.

According to Table 1, in the agriculture sector the number of paid female employees increases with the scale of firm. However, the employment of paid women workers in small-scale firms in the service sector is more than in the other scales of firm. In the manufacturing industries, the increasing scale of firms is associated with increasing numbers of female workers. It is noted that the majority of Turkish women are employed in service sectors.

Strikingly, 71.9 percent of the female economically active population was not in the labor force at all. These women are housewives and unpaid family workers. Approximately three-quarters of the total female workforce in Turkey are employed as unpaid family workers (TÜSİAD 2000, 145). Much research suggests that while the contribution to the economy of production at home is growing in many other countries, it contributes little to the production process in Turkey. Firms in Turkey prefer to use home production only at times of high demand when factory capacity is exceeded (TC Başbakanlık KSSGM 1999a, 191). The reasons why home production is not common are summarized as follows: workers do not prefer it as the payments are very low and there is no social security; and employers do not prefer it as the monitoring and control of work is not easy. However, women home-workers are generally seen in the production of handmade accessories, embroidery, and in the textile sector. Hence, it is not surprising that in Turkey women entrepreneurs in small-scale firms are generally found in the textile sector (TC Başbakanlık KSSGM 1999a, 190). Statistics relating to women employed informally in Turkey are not available. However, much local research suggests that the employment rate in the informal sector is countinously increasing (TC Başbakanlık KSSGM 1999b, 29).

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Economics: Social and Welfare Policies

Central Arab States and North Africa

Social welfare programs in the Arab world have undergone a considerable transformation, due to both internal and external pressures to reform. In the early postcolonial period, programs were often universal (in the sense that they were entitlements available to all citizens, rather than targeting specific categories of individuals), and designed and implemented to provide support to the patriarchal family. Women were rarely directly targeted by these policies, although they did benefit from many programs because of their universal structure. Pressure to reform began in the 1980s, with the introduction of structural adjustment policies and budgetary reforms. As policies initiated in the 1960s continue to be dismantled in a range of countries, at various rates, and in differing ways, often to be replaced by programs that fit more into the neoliberal vision of the world, it is far from clear how women have fared and are likely to fare in the near future.

Policies initiated as Arab countries began achieving their independence include land reform, controls on prices, as well as public spending on health and education. In Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen, governments set prices on basic commodities such as bread, cooking oil, and sugar, as well as on some occasions on rents and petroleum. Spending on education was also considerable. While the Arab governments have been committed to improving educational outcomes and providing other types of basic economic support to their populations, some of the largest portions of their budgets go toward buying arms (World Bank 1995).

Another major aspect of the social contract as envisaged by many Arabs was that the state would ensure that all citizens could be employed (World Bank 2004b). As a result, large government sectors were created, and various types of employment guarantees were both articulated in legal documents and put into practice. In Egypt and Iraq, for instance, laws were passed guaranteeing college graduates employment (World Bank 2004b, Al-Ali 2005). Egypt later expanded this program to cover high school graduates and military conscripts. Employment guarantees, while in theory universal, and intended to encourage educational attainment, were in reality primarily a subsidy to the middle and upper classes, who were far more likely to be able to complete the necessary educational requirements. Doubtless these programs were intended to provide support to male household heads, but many women benefited from the employment guarantee policy, since women, for a variety of reasons, preferred public sector employment to working in the private sphere. Thus, while overall labor force participation rates of women have remained low in the Arab world, their participation rate in the public sector is high (World Bank 2004a). One reason that women have preferred the public sector is that while the legal structure in most Arab countries provides generous maternity leave benefits to women (14 weeks of paid leave on average) (World Bank 2004a), private sector firms have often found ways of avoiding providing these benefits (CAWTAR 2001).

Although a few programs were also created to target particularly vulnerable economic groups, these programs tended to be small compared to spending on employment and food subsidies (World Bank 2002). Targeted programs also tended to define economic vulnerability very narrowly, focusing on widows and orphans. Divorced or abandoned women, and their children, as well as the elderly, were generally not defined as vulnerable, as it was assumed they were being taken care of within the extended family structure.

While programs that directly targeted the poor were not widespread, some analysts have argued that policies were effective at keeping down poverty rates (Adams and Page 2003, World Bank 2002). Relative to the level of economic development, the region has the lowest poverty rates globally, and government programs introduced in the postcolonial period likely played a role in this outcome.

As Bush (2004) points out, this finding raises questions about how pressure to introduce neoliberal reforms and dismantle various programs, which began in the 1980s, is likely to affect poverty. The degree to which countries have introduced reforms has varied, and the impact of these changes by sex has not been studied extensively. While Jordan, Algeria, and Yemen have eliminated their food subsidy programs completely and replaced them with targeted programs, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia were still subsidizing food in 2000,

although the amount of government resources being devoted to these programs has declined considerably (World Bank 2002). The situation in conflict ridden regions, such as Iraq and the Occupied Territories of Palestine, is rather different. Because economic conditions have worsened considerably in these areas, food aid has played an increasingly vital role in recent years in maintaining consumption levels (Olmsted forthcoming).

While spending on food assistance has declined in most countries, the amount of funds going toward publicly provided pensions has risen considerably. Government spending on education also remains high, representing 2.5 percent (Lebanon) to 7 percent (Yemen) of gross domestic product, with an average of about 6 percent (World Bank 2002).

Few studies provide a detailed examination of the differential impact of either the early programs or the changes in spending due to neoliberal reforms on men and women. The data suggest that early spending on education has benefited women, whose literacy rates have risen faster than in other parts of the world, as well as the men in the region (not entirely surpisingly, as they started at a lower level). Similar patterns have also been observed in health outcomes, although Yount (2001) argues that while the gap between female and male mortality dropped in the 1980s, health spending could have been better targeted to reach females. Moghadam (2005) and others have remarked on the fact that because of their higher dependency on public sector employment, women may be particularly vulnerable to intitiatives that involve government downsizing. Olmsted (2005a) argues that Arab pension schemes are not particularly favorable to women, since they tend to cover formal sector employees, and women's participation in the paid labor force in most of the region remains very low, with their participation in the formal sector being even lower. Some widows, though, do receive survivor benefits (usually less than what their husbands receive), based on their husbands' employment histories.

Olmsted (2005b) also speculates about the possibility that food subsidies may have particularly benefited females. Research from other regions suggests that when households are more resource constrained, girls and women tend to be more likely to be deprived of food and other resources. If the same is true of Arab households, then universal food subsidies will in fact benefit female household members more than males.

Although the region has undergone massive reforms in the area of social programs, few studies have examined the gendering of these changes. Far more research addressing this question is needed, and the initiation of various gender budgeting projects, recommended by Esim (2002), will further this goal considerably.

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JENNIFER C. OLMSTED

The Gulf

Because women are not seen as the main economic providers in the Gulf region, state policies on women and work, along with labor laws, often

allow sex discrimination; moreover, social welfare systems do not give men and women equal access to welfare benefits. This lack of equal rights and access to state resources often results in second-class citizenship for women (Kandiyoti 1994).

Female employment in Gulf states is low due to the complex interaction of such factors as the oil-based political economy, patriarchal family structures, state policies, and a reliance on imported labor. Capital-intensive industrialization based on oil requires a minimal use of labor, which also limits opportunities for women. Higher wages available to male workers during the oil boom led to women's low rates of employment and discouraged women from seeking jobs, because they allowed the continuance of societal norms of segregation based on a man's ability to support a woman economically. This reinforced what Moghadam (2003, 41) calls the "patriarchal gender contract," which is the "agreement that men are the breadwinners and are responsible for financially maintaining their wives, children, and elderly parents, and that women are wives, homemakers, mothers and caregivers." This implicit agreement justifies men's control of the economic and political spheres while relegating women to the private family sphere. Moreover, patriarchal interpretations of Islamic teachings on complementary gender roles further legitimize the contract (Moghadam 2003).

Dependence on imported workers also contributes to low female employment in the Gulf. These workers make it unnecessary for female nationals to take jobs that are not considered "prestigious" or "suitable" (Doumato 2001, Chatty 2000). Despite policies to nationalize the labor force (Doumato 2001, 1999, Chatty 2000, Seikaly 1994), it is unclear whether jobs currently held by expatriates will be available or considered "appropriate" for female nationals (Chatty 2000, Doumato 1999). In Bahrain, the training of women for positions held by foreigners has been selective and limited. Women remain segregated in female-dominated occupations such as teaching, nursing, and secretarial, while more specialized and technical professions are typically reserved for men (Seikaly 1994).

In Oman it appears that the boundaries of acceptable employment for women are being extended gradually. Unskilled labor, such as cleaning in private homes or businesses, was typically performed by workers from South Asia, but economic necessity and policies encouraging the nationalization of the labor force are pushing women, mainly those who are illiterate and rural, to take such unskilled positions. This is not occurring, however, in large numbers (Chatty 2000), and it remains to be seen whether replacing guest workers with Gulf nationals will change norms of "cultural acceptability" that can increase women's labor force participation.

State policies also reinforce the patriarchal gender contract. In Saudi Arabia, the political economy, strict interpretations of Islam, extended-family norms and values, and the power of the al-Saud ruling family influence state policies that promote traditional family structures and require sex segregation in education and employment, thus limiting women's access to paid work. Advanced education is also not encouraged for women, who represent only 10 percent of the workforce, primarily in teaching and health care (Moghadam 2003, Doumato 2001, 1999).

The other Gulf states have attempted to modernize while maintaining "tradition," thus producing ambiguous roles for women (Tétreault 2001, Seikaly 1994). Oil wealth has enabled the Gulf to provide generous welfare benefits to its citizens (Khalaf 1992), with women taking advantage of the fairly equitable distribution of education and health care services (Salloum 2003, Tétreault 2001, Chatty 2000, Seikaly 1994). Government-provided maternity leave and daycare facilities allow women to balance paid work with motherhood, thereby promoting women's employment and lessening reliance on foreign workers (al-Mughni and Tétreault 2000, Seikaly 1994).

Women's labor force participation has slowly increased in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, where women constitute 20 to 36 percent of the workforce in community, social, and personal services, mostly in the public sector (Moghadam 2003). At the same time, due to their small citizen populations, these same states have adopted policies aimed at increasing birth rates. In Kuwait, for example, the government gives financial incentives promoting large families, such as monthly allowances for each child, housing loans, and government housing for middle- and low-income families (al-Mughni and Tétreault 2000). Thus, state welfare benefits also reinforce the "patriarchal gender contract."

The family instead of the individual is the basic unit of society in this region, which privileges males over females within the family (al-Mughni and Tétreault 2000, Joseph 1996). Rights to state benefits are often dependent on family membership, and women access the state through their ties to men (Joseph 1996). In Kuwait, the state's welfare system is geared to meet the needs of low- and middle-income families headed by men. Benefits

such as housing, rent and utility subsidies, low-interest loans for building homes, and child allowances support men who have families. Working women and those married to non-Kuwaitis do not have direct access to these benefits, if they have access at all (al-Mughni and Tétreault 2000).

Defining women as dependants of men through marriage or descent releases the state from direct responsibility to female citizens. But women's increasing education, employment, political rights, and activism may push Gulf states toward gender equality in citizenship rights.

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HELEN MARY RIZZO

Turkey

When the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, the state, although entirely paternalistic, nonetheless supported women's participation in social life as a symbol of modernization. After the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, this symbolic place of woman lost its importance. However, limited union and social security rights were recognized in this period. With the constitution of 1961, the attribute "social" was added to other attributes of the state, and social and economic rights were recognized; but the state failed to pass the characteristics of a rudimentary welfare state. In this whole period, a combination of modernization and secularization measures within a patriarchal culture created a mixed and varied picture for women. In the Labor Laws of the period, although there were general rules which forbade gender discrimination and provided the principle of equal pay for equal work, and specific regulations to protect maternity rights, neither an increase in the participation of women as wage-earners nor supportive services for women were achieved. With the intensification of the global economy after the 1980s, Turkey retreated even further from any semblance of a welfare state. However, the ratification of Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the rise of the feminist movement encouraged new national agendas and led to the enactment of some new laws. One might call them, at best, liberal-benevolent (Koray 2005, 411), and woman's secondary status still prevails despite some positive legal arrangements.

The area in which women are most disadvantaged is the labor market. Women with high school and especially university education are significantly more likely to find remunerative work and are reasonably well represented in medicine, law, banking, and education. But to understand why most women either do not work or work in poorly paid jobs, we must look at the proportions of women who have access to education. Briefly, although in principle education is free of charge, the approximate ratio of public education expenditure to GNP and to state budget is 2 percent and 10 percent respectively. Traditional values dictate that when there is a cost for education, as there is more often than not, boys are almost always favored over girls. As late as 2002, 14.6 percent of women were illiterate. School enrollment falls for girls and increases for boys at the higher levels of education. The difference in the school enrollment between girls and boys increases in the later stages of education; in the 2003/4 academic year, high school and university enrollment of girls (71 percent and 20 percent respectively) were lower than for boys (95 percent and 27 percent) (DİE 2004b, 103).

Not surprisingly, almost 50 percent of all women in employment work as unpaid family members, and only 38 percent work as wage earners, and most of them in small enterprises in the informal sector, which do not provide social security (DİE 2003, 65–6). Nonetheless, according to a study of the slums of Istanbul, women provide 75 percent

of household income (*Radikal* 2004). There are, of course, important differences in the work profile between urban and rural women. In cities, young mothers with a working life must depend on families to do the child-rearing. In the process of migration to cities, family and relatives help newcomers to find housing and jobs. But some surveys propose that the aggravation of economic conditions and loosening of traditional ties reduce the family solidarity (Buğra and Keyder 2003). For this reason, at the same time that social sensitivity to women increases, the state's negligence of social problems requires that women themselves struggle to make their needs known.

The new Labor Law forbids gender discrimination in labor relations and remuneration (Labor Law 2003/4857, Article 5) and provides maternity benefits. Wage earning women (workers or civil servants) have maternity leave of 8 weeks before birth and 8 weeks after it, 1.5 hours a day rest period for suckling for 12 months, and leave without pay for 6 months, if they so choose. The Labor Law of 2003 for the first time included sexual harassment and specified it as a fair cause for the abrogation of a labor contract. Furthermore, firms who employ between 100 and 150 females have to open a suckling room, and firms that have more than 150 female employees have to open a daycare center. But in an economy which is dominated by small enterprises this last ruling does not mean much for female workers.

The unemployment rate, which is around 10 percent in general, reached 18 percent among women between 15 and 24 years old, and 28 percent among university graduate women in the same age group (DİE 2004a, 17). The unemployment insurance, which came into force in 2002, requires working and paying premiums for a certain period for eligibility, and is thus ineffective, especially for young unemployed.

While the social security system was from its foundation divided into three institutions according to the status of employees, on 13 April 2006 a new law (the Law of Social Security Organization) assembled the whole system under one organization. Additionally, with the acceptance of the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Act on 19 April 2006, the conditions for the acquisition of retirement and health insurance became harder, parallel with the neoliberal mentality and policies of the state. Because women work either in family without payment, or in informal sectors, the number of women encompassed by the social security system is limited; only 1.6 million of 11 million active insurees are women.

Some schemes are developed for people outside social security. These are old age pay for desolate and destitute people over 65 (law dated 1976) and in kind and in cash benefits provided by Social Services and Child Protection Institution (established in 1983); Social Aid and Solidarity Foundations (established in 1986); and the Green Card (law dated 1992), which is given to people who cannot pay for medical care, though the proportion of women among the beneficiaries is not known. The income of female breadwinner families is about half of the income of male breadwinner counterparts (DGSPW-UN 1999). In that sense, it is possible to claim that poverty affects women more adversely. While social services and policies of the state retreat in the liberalization process, voluntary aid through non-governmental organizations such as communities and foundations are being emphasized. This tendency has especially negative repercussions for women who need state support and social protection.

In summary, because the welfare state is rudimentary and economic conditions are unstable, family remains the main source of social support and welfare for almost everybody. Family still provides care of children, the elderly, the sick, and the disabled. Although these famliy ties are still functional and some legal amendments have been achieved, the essential need of women in Turkey is an integrative approach related to all human rights and an effort to improve the social dimensions of the state in order to attain some concrete reforms (Koray 2004, 260).

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Meryem Koray

Economics: Traditional Professions

Arab States

The broad range of traditional female professions is discussed here in the light of the conflict between a gender ideology that excluded women from the labor market, and the economic needs and wishes of widows, divorcees, or married women who were not sufficiently provided for by a male relative. The pervasive upper- and middle-class ideology that Arab Muslim women should not work outside the home for reasons of modesty, honor, and status, had a large impact on the volume, profitability, and social recognition of the traditional professions of women. The maintenance of a system of female seclusion and segregation between the sexes on the one hand required and facilitated the services of female professionals, and on the other hand made these very professionals who transgressed the gender norms disreputable.

Several traditional professions build on skills women had developed in their role as housekeeper, wife, and mother. In the past, rural women usually knew how to spin and weave wool for tents, bags, blankets, clothes, or carpets, how to produce mats or storage baskets from alfa grass or palm fronds, or how to make pottery. Urban middle- and upper-class women were often trained in more refined crafts such as weaving linen and silk cloth, sewing, or embroidering with precious metals spun into thread. Such skills could be put to use to earn income by working from home as weaver (*nassāja*), potter (*khazzāfa*), or needle worker (*khayyāṭa*), or by training young girls in such handicrafts as teacher (*muʿallima*). Being an extension of women's productive work for the family, and performed within the domestic sphere with a multiplicity of other activities, such professions have largely remained invisible (Clancy-Smith 1999). Women's dependency on men to obtain raw resources and to market their craft products outside the local or kin group limited the economic and social returns to be gained from this activity, although some women gained regional respect for their high quality work. Only poor and low-status women would sell cooked food or home-produced craft products on the streets (Boddy 1989).

Whether a craft was female or male varied with time and place and could change over time. Colonialism, industrialization, and tourism have led to a further masculinization of these crafts and a general decline of independent female artisans with the transformation into factory work. New initiatives, such as Women Weavers Online or the Palestine Costume Archive, aim to conserve traditional female crafts of carpet making and embroidery and to enable the artisans to regain and extend direct market control. But at present it is difficult to compete with the weaving done by machines, or by children working in industrial sweatshops.

Household skills can be used to work as a servant (*khaddāma*). But only destitute, lower-class women take on such a disreputable job. Rich families in the Middle East prefer to hire live-in servants from Asia nowadays. Serving as a maid is preferably phrased in kinship terms to make it somewhat more respectable. In the Maghrib, orphan or poor girls were often taken in as foster daughters by (distant) relatives to provide domestic labor in return for bed, board, and a small trousseau at marriage. In a similar way, wealthier women would provide a safety net for their poorer friends who temporarily needed money by letting them do occasional tasks in return for food or other support (Maher 1976). By saying that they were "helping friends" the economic nature of the relationship is disguised. In the Algerian countryside, the helping hands of a *fattāla* (roller of couscous) were desired to process the winter stock and grind, roll, and dry the harvested grain as couscous, or to cook at weddings and other large celebrations (Jansen 1987, 207).

Close to the home and the female domain are also the professions dealing with women's bodies. Wet nursing was allowed and practiced in Islamic countries, but not so extensively as in Europe, as it created a milk kinship tie with between wet nurse (*murḍiʿa*) and child. The wet nurse was seen to transmit her own physical, moral, and mental traits, and therefore should possess the characteristics of some ideal type of mother (Giladi 1999, 54–62). As a profession it has disappeared. The traditional midwife, in Egypt called *dāya* (Fahmy 1998), in the Maghrib *qābila* (Mathieu and Maneville 1952, Bossaller 2004), usually learned her skills from an expert female relative. She assisted not only in childbirth, but could also provide herbal, manual, or magical remedies against minor reproductive ailments, to prevent conception, or to induce an abortion. Her help was also

sought in virginity rituals and for proving virginity before marriage. Midwives were asked as expert witnesses in court on matters involving the female body. They could function as coroners when asked to inspect female victims' bodies for signs of violence, and their views could be decisive in confirming cases of "sleeping children" in North Africa (Jansen 2000). Traditional midwives were needed and respected for their knowledge, courage, and competence, but have at the same time been criticized for their ignorance and unhygienic treatment of infants and mothers, for performing dangerous forms of genital cutting and deflowering of girls and brides, for assisting in illegal abortions, or for not reporting births to the authorities (Giladi 1992, Fahmy 1998). Since the 1830s, all Arab states have tried to replace them with medically trained personnel. Yet, neither the disqualification and stigmatization, nor the competition by modern, trained and licensed midwives, has as yet led to the disappearance of traditional midwives. In many of the Arab countries they still conduct a large part of the deliveries among the rural and urban poor, for which they are rewarded in money or in kind.

In a similar way, female practitioners of spiritist and/or natural medicine have not disappeared, despite widespread critique and condemnation. Under a variety of names, such as *shuwwāfa* in Morocco, or the more respectful *shaykha* in Sudan and Egypt, several kinds of spiritual diviners and healers exist who can diagnose or control spirit possession. They have learned from their own possession experiences and/or from an established curer, usually a close maternal kinswoman, how to identify, call, and soothe different spirits in a *zār* ritual for women who consult her (Boddy 1989, Gaudry 1928, Goichon 1927, 1929, Morsy 1993, Rausch 2000, Westermarck 1926). Saintly descendants are considered to possess *baraka*, which they can bestow on clients through laying on of hands, by writing protective and therapeutic amulets, or by praying over the afflicted (Inhorn 1994). Other healers cure by more natural means such as by applying herbs, massages, cauterization, pressure, or heat. Healers may refer to their religious standing, or their knowledge of healing acquired from abroad, to gain legitimacy and respect, yet their authority is often doubted and their craft disqualified as malevolent magic or sorcery, as can be seen in the use of the pejorative professional name of *saḥḥāra* (sorcerer) rather than the respectful *lalla* or *shaykha*. Some healers indeed do not hesitate to use occult divinatory ways and black magic in response to their clients' demand for help with marital conflict, unemployment, financial distress, or isolation and loneliness. A powerful sorcerer is feared as she can make an adulterous husband impotent or a jealous mother-in-law sick (Jansen 1987). The diffuseness of this category of professionals increases the suspicion surrounding them, yet they continue to draw customers. Rather than accepting only ritual gifts to appease the spirits, diviners, healers, and sorcerers now set the monetary amount to be paid, with some allowance made for the financial situation of the client and the illicitness and detestability of the acts requested (Rausch 2000, 90). Inhorn calculated that Egyptian spiritual healers receive between $4 and $100 for their services (Inhorn 1994, 105).

A few women were remunerated for religious teaching or leading religious rituals. A North African *muqaddima* taught and led a Sufi women's group. Her function was similar to that of the present-day Algerian *faqīrāt* who mediate between believers and saints by collecting offerings for the saints or by singing religious songs at mourning, healing, and possession rituals in return for food and payment (Jansen 1987). Out of respect for their purity and religious knowledge, they were at times asked to act as as *ghassāla* (washer of the dead). In the Algerian Mzab, this profession was for a long time monopolized by a small group of women who maintained strong control over other women's behavior by giving or denying them their final ablutions (Goichon 1927, 1931, Jansen 1987). Washing the dead is sometimes combined with wailing for the dead. A wailing woman (*bākiya*) intensifies and dramatizes mourning by improvising moving poems about the lost loved one, setting the example for bodily expressions of grief, but also restraining others from mutilating themselves in their sorrow. Extreme expressions of sorrow, however, are more and more considered backward and not religious, which led to a near disappearance of this profession. A more permanent profession is to be guardian of the tomb of a famous saint and as such recipient of both spiritual respect and material gifts, which may include part of the religious tax (Gaudry 1928, 236). In all cases, payment should be refused for such religious services as a sign of purity and religious ascetism, but in many instances rewards will be forced upon these female guardians. In Egypt and other North African countries where saint veneration remains strong, these women continue to be needed. Officials tend to give these functions to handicapped or otherwise distressed women who cannot easily find a job in the labor market.

The Prophet's first wife, Khadīja bint Khuwaylid, set an example for female traders, yet very little is

known about Arab women who have been active in the market. Casual selling and barter by women of goods brought home by pilgrims, migrants, or visitors is very common and can easily be transformed into a real profession when needed or desired. The relative invisibility of peddlers, petty traders, and brokers is one reason why they are underresearched, and why we know very little about their number, property, or actual economic turnover. A female trader (*dallāla*) can do her work quite unobtrusively. In Algeria in the 1980s, the elderly veiled ladies who visited houses with a small bundle tied in a scarf in which they carried samples of soap, (second hand) clothes, exquisite perfumes, nightgowns or other merchandise, could hardly be distinguished from other guests. They easily made repeat visits for the preferred size or color, or invited potential buyers to the stores in their own homes. Against a prefixed percentage of the price or an unknown cut, they also mediated between sellers and buyers. They could find a customer for the piece of furniture, the valuable gold chain, or the costly dress a woman wanted to sell, or search in their network for an item she wanted to obtain (Jansen 1987).

A *dallāla* with an extensive social network and access to many houses is also well equipped to function as a matchmaker (*khātiba*), as Lane observed in nineteenth-century Cairo (Lane 1981). In this case, the broker would be commanded to look for a suitable bride. Some brokers combined this with a small renting agency for the costly paraphernalia of marriage. Others evolved into moneylenders or trustworthy keepers of savings, or kept jewelry in pawn for women (Mundy 1995). Female trading and brokerage is facilitated by gender segregation as well as the legal and social recognition that women retain their own property in marriage, obtained as marriage payment (*mahr*) from their husband, as inheritance from their parents, or saved from their income or the household money. Women can better keep control over their property and withstand male efforts to usurp financial control by spending or saving their money through other women. Globalization, migration, and increased mobility in general have led to more women than before being able to visit markets abroad and to participate in legal or illegal trade. Many Moroccan female *trabendistes* (smugglers) regularly cross the border into the free trade zones of Melilla and Ceuta to obtain cheap goods to resell at home. Recently, many Tunisian "suitcase traders" travel between Mediterranean markets with trade goods. Cut loose from the patriarchal universe from which they come, and faced with economic crisis and unemployment in their home countries, these modern nomads eke out a modest and lonely living (Peraldi 2005).

In the service sector, a variety of professions developed from dressing and beautifying the bride and her guests. The seamstress (*khayyāta*) sews the dresses for her dowry; the hairdresser (*muzayyina*) does her hair and make-up; and the washers and scrubbers in the bathhouse (*ghassāla* and *ḥakkāka*) and the masseuse (*ṭayyāba*) prepare the bride for her wedding night. The latter will also provide massages to women with body aches and pregnancy pains, or who need ritual closure of their womb after giving birth (Jansen 1987). Some women specialize in applying decorative henna patterns for ritual occasions, while others provide music and dancing. In the Yemeni town of ʿAmran, the *muzayyina* would combine most of these functions. She would prepare and beautify the bride but also cook the broad beans, invite the guests, announce and present the gifts, entertain with drums, and do the singing. Although some of these tasks are no longer performed, she still functions as a well-paid mistress of ceremony for the wedding (Dorsky 1987, 37, 108–23). Many of these professionals are losing terrain to well educated, better trained, and formally employed younger women working in clothing factories, beauty and massage parlors, or hair salons.

Entertainers have a low social standing, but in degrees. Some singers (*mughanniyāt*), like the Algerian *maddāḥa*, or the Tunisian and Egyptian *ʿawālim,* may receive some respect because they sing religious or serious songs, but musicians who use male instruments like the flute, singers of sexually allusive songs, or girls who sing and dance for men, or in public places like the street or coffee and wine houses (*shaykha*, *ghāziya*), are seen as shameless (Jansen 1987, Lengel 2000). The latter are closely associated with prostitution and society seldom agrees with the self-perceptions of the performers that it is "a trade like any other" (Van Nieuwkerk 1995). Entertainers are not only paid by the family who has invited them, but also by the guests for whom they sing and dance on command and compose laudatory songs in a competitive atmosphere. This enables a skillful singer or dancer to make good money, but for those who try to behave more decently and perform only at weddings, their activity is limited to the wedding season (Virolle 1995).

The oldest profession, whose practitioners are called *al-nisāʾ al-mashhūra* (women of ill-repute) or more pejoratively *qaḥba* (whore) or *fāḥisha* (harlot), has largely been ignored by gender scholars.

Prostitution is often legally banned, severely punished by family members, condemned by Islamic law and feminists, and at times designated as immoral behavior imported from the decadent West or practiced mainly by Asian or Eastern European immigrants, but it has far from disappeared. At present, Saudi Arabian men, rather than Gustave Flaubert, seek their Kuchuk Hanem in Egypt. One can meet the Egyptian prostitute Firdaws in Nawal El Saadawi's *Woman at Point Zero* (1983), and Iranian ones in the documentary by Nahid Persson, *Prostitution behind the Veil* (2004). Colonial powers such as France contributed to state control of prostitution in Algeria and Egypt, and ordered studies of the phenomenon, mainly out of fear for the health effects for their soldiers (Potier 1955, Fahmy 2002). According to Gaudry, in the early twentieth century, among the Berber Chaouia of the Algerian Aurès, young widows and divorcees would experience a period of freedom before their next marriage. In this period, they were allowed sexual and gender liberties, they talked and played freely with men in return for gifts, traveled, and at times took on male jobs. These *ʿazriyāt* (free women, courtesans) entertained with dance and music at celebrations and functioned as hostesses for passing strangers. Some remarried, others stayed in this profession, enjoying their social and economic independence. Unlike the professional prostitutes from the Ouled Nail tribe, they were not marginalized (Gaudry 1928, 121–7, 1961, 197–206). In the same vein, modern prostitution is not only one of the few opportunities for poor, uneducated women to earn a living, but also a way to make fast money and to have the freedom to smoke, drink, flirt, joke, travel, and control their own money and sexuality (Jansen 1987, 160–89). Retired prostitutes may run a brothel, whether or not state-approved, or work as an informal procurer (*shikkāma*).

A last way to survive is by becoming a beggar (*mutasawwila*), or more pejoratively *shaḥḥādha*. This shameful activity is seldom seen as a profession, yet it takes skill to soften people's hearts with flowery compliments and proper references to the Islamic virtue of generosity, or to find the best times and places to beg.

Economically speaking, it was always difficult for a woman to make a living for herself and her children in any of these professions, unless she was a very skilled artisan, a much-admired singer or courtesan, or a powerful sorcerer. It was therefore not uncommon to combine activities, to switch temporarily from one profession to another, and to pool resources with other women. Remuneration was partly in kind, and often adapted to the financial situation of the client. All traditional female professions suffered in varying degrees from marginalization and social condemnation depending on the degree to which dominant norms of gender, seclusion, and segregation were violated. Most respectable were those professionals who stayed close to the home and to domestic female roles, such as artisans working mainly for an additional income for their family. In many instances, professionals as well as their clients try to conform to gender norms by denying the economic nature of their relation, for instance by working only for women, by not using the name of the profession, or by claiming that the work is not done for money but as a friendly gift or for religious merit (Jansen 2004). Those who openly flaunt the gender norms and transgress into public space (entertainers, beggars), apply malevolent magic against husbands (sorcerers), or have intimate contact with unrelated men (prostitutes) can make more profit but at a large social cost.

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Willy Jansen

Turkey

It could be posited that women are gatekeepers of the rites of passage in traditional societies. Nonetheless, feminist research is necessary to write the history of women in traditional professions such as healers, midwives, matchmakers, storytellers, lament singers, and fortune tellers.

Traditional healing combined both medicine and magic: the *kurşun dokücü* women had small pieces of lead heated in small pots and poured the liquified lead into a pot filled with cold water. This took place above the body of the sick person, who would be covered in a blanket during this process. According to the form the lead piece took, the healer would find out about the possible illness. Additionally, women called *üfürükçü*, literally meaning women who blow their breath out onto the ill person after reciting sacred words, were believed to be endowed with supernatural healing powers. We are informed that the *kırbacı* women would help children with diarrhea and swollen bellies and that women specialized in injection (*aşıcı*) and in preparing medicine (*ilaççı*) (Saygılıgil 2001).

One of the oldest and most important traditional healing institutions is *ocak*, literally meaning hearth. Hearth also means home, family, genealogy, and families who specialized in healing. Although the *ocakçı* could be a man, the majority of the *ocakçıs* were women; they made amulets and talismans against the evil eye, and healed people through special stones and burning special oils. These women mastered women's reproductive health and infant health. Tradition was maintained through *el verme* (passing the hand) from one generation to the next, to those who had faith in the practice. However, with the advent of formal medicine and government-appointed midwives and doctors the *ocakçı*s were afraid to continue to practice (Turşucu 2004, 28–32).

We know of *hekime*s, female doctors in the sixteenth century in the Ottoman Empire (Saygılıgil 2001). However, medical nursing did not emerge until the nineteenth century, after which a juxtaposition of modern medicine and folk medicine took place; men were associated with the former and women with the latter. Among women's professions, traditional midwives were labeled old wives and were marginalized (Saygılıgil 2001, 130–1, 139, 147), although government midwives deliver babies in the same way as traditional midwives and provide prenatal care (Delaney 1991, 55, 61).

Lament singing is perhaps the most common performance art for women; they improvised laments within the context of a ritual on the spot (Boratav 1982, 25). The lament singers could do this without payment, or in exchange for money or other goods. In villages, female lament singers would sing individually or in groups (Elçin 1990, 4–5, Boratav 1982, 12).

Women's creative expressiveness is also observed in folk-tales. While the minstrel genre (both epic and romance) is considered to be male, folk-tales are seen within the female domain. In contrast, *aşık*s are minstrels who sing traditional heroic poetry and the role of *aşık* is most often assumed by a man. Even the Arabic grammar of the word denotes an active lover as opposed to a passive beloved, or *maşuk*. There were, however, female *aşık*s in the Ottoman Empire; the nation-building process of the Turkish Republic had a particular compassion for the female *aşık*s, perceiving them as the strong women of Turkey in the public sphere. The female *aşık*s became active agents for protest 40–50 years ago. Women's role as *aşık* could be taken both as subversion of traditional gender roles and an assertive claim on the route to women's creativity.

In traditional village weddings, gypsies usually play the drum (*delbek*) as they are less connected with Islamic culture. Female gypsy musicians in Turkey possess the status of professional musicians (Ziegler 1990, 88). Contrary to the view of certain scholars regarding traditional weddings, that "even today it is unusual for woman to play an instrument" (Reinhard 1990, 102), many women players and singers are important social actors.

As marriage is considered to be within the realm

of the private, women are supposed help to form a new family. It is considered women's ability to collect information for the prospective bride and groom, thus to make a match for them. It is not manly to concern oneself with such personal details (Sirman 1991, 206–7). In each community, rural or urban, particular women are in charge of matchmaking (Erdentuğ 1969). One of the most crucial practices is *dünürcülük*, which literally means "in-law making," or *görücülük*, the act of seeing prospective brides. *Görücülük* involves several women from the family of the man who wants to marry; relatives and neighbors visit the home of the prospective bride and reveal their intention of formal proposition. Although traditional matchmakers still exist, numerous Internet sites, private companies, and newspapers make a considerable amount of money through matchmaking. The Islamic websites discuss the importance of *dünürcülük*, mostly asserting that a good and practising Muslim girl is important for a successful marriage.

Fortune tellers are usually gypsies, implying a social hierarchy with respect to both ethnicity and class. Gypsies are usually known by their ability for singing, playing musical instruments, and fortune telling. There has been a popularization of fortune telling, with large numbers of female astrologers or mediums who talk about fate for a great sum of money.

In concert with rural–urban migration since the 1950s, women have become domestic workers, including cleaners and caretakers. Usually, a doorman is assigned to each apartment building. Either their wives or women from the *gecekondu*, roughly translated as squatter houses, come to clean once a week. Turkish women as well as women from the former Soviet Union (especially Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), Romania, and Moldova, have entered informal work as a result of transnational migration. Nowadays, babysitters and caretakers either come and go on a daily basis, or stay with families for free boarding and meals.

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Hande A. Birkalan-Gedik

Economics: World Markets

The Ottoman Empire

Ottomans participated in international trade virtually from the start, and Ottoman women were involved in it throughout – as producers and consumers, financiers and landladies, dealers and commodities.

One of the principal Ottoman exports, starting as early as the fourteenth century, was silk, chiefly produced in Bursa and shipped to such markets as the Balkans, Hungary, and Muscovy. Although raw silk was initially imported from Persia, wartime disruptions during the sixteenth century resulted in extensive local silkworm cultivation as well. Silk production was mainly a domestic industry, and women were involved in many of its phases. For example, a 1678 survey reveals that at least 150 of 299 spinning wheels in Bursa and surrounding villages were owned and/or operated by women (Gerber 1988, 86). Another luxury fabric that the Ottomans exported, and for which they possessed virtually a world monopoly in the sixteenth century, was mohair. Produced from angora goats, this fabric was exported to Venice and Poland, and later also to England. A tax document dated 1590 records that there were 621 mohair looms in Ankara (Ergenç 1975); moreover, workshops were usually situated within residential buildings – as attested by the fact that they were seldom mentioned among the shops of Ankara's business district (*çarşı*) (Faroqhi 1985) – suggesting that women took an active part in weaving the fabric. Busbecq and Dernschwam, who visited the area in 1555, both noted in their travelogues that it was local women who spun mohair yarn (Busbecq 1927, 46, Dernschwam 1923, 186). Indeed, when British and Dutch traders bought up all the goat hair on the market in 1690, depriving local artisans of raw material, riots erupted with such ferocity that special judges had to be dispatched from the capital to quell them, and an edict was issued to "the ladies of Ankara" appealing for calm during the proceedings (G. Ökçün in Ergenç 1975). Next to the delicate nature of the work, the fact that silk and mohair spinning were seasonal occupations is likely the chief reason for the heavy involvement of women in these industries. Some of the necessary capital, such as the cost of a mohair loom, was quite modest (Faroqhi 1985), so that a considerable number of women had no difficulty investing in the technology needed to become productive. They acted as independent contractors in a "putting-out system," wherein merchants supplied them with raw materials and took charge of marketing the finished product. This system was very widespread in many branches of the Ottoman economy, and drew significantly upon female labor.

Another sector in which women were very active was the production of wool and woolens in the Balkans. During the fifteenth century, wool had been imported from Italy and Flanders; in the sixteenth century, Iberian Jews recently resettled in Salonica were charged by the Ottoman government with manufacturing woolens for the janissary corps (Faroqhi 1994), an early example of import-substitution industrialization. The production of woolens in Salonica during this period was very much based on home work, with the strong involvement of women (Nehama 1935, 127). In the early seventeenth century, however, the Levant Company began to dump cheap English woolens on the Ottoman market, in part in order to raise cash to finance monopolistic trade ventures in Britain. This led to the collapse of woolen production in Salonica (Braude 1979); the consequences of this collapse for the women involved in the industry remain to be studied. Woolens were also produced in large quantities in other parts of the Balkans, notably in Filibe (Plovdiv) and its environs, where seasonal work by women also played an important role. These textiles were exported to markets as farflung as France and India, and the growing demand led to the spread of woolen production throughout the area; moreover, the industry remained healthy well into the nineteenth century, despite foreign competition (Todorov 1967/8). Besides cloth and knitwear, wool yarn was used in weaving carpets, which are known to have been exported to Europe from very early on – as evidenced, for example, by their depiction in Flemish painting. Although women are known to have been very active in carpet weaving in later times, information is lacking as to the earlier periods. On the other hand, it is known that many embroiderers were women (see Fig. 2), and their work was much sought after in the Balkans, Hungary, and elsewhere during the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries (Helmecke 1993). This was one of several areas in which guilds appealed to the government to protect their monopoly against incursions by unskilled workers, notably women. For instance, an imperial edict dated 1744 cites guildsmen as complaining that "plain and coarse cloth is taken by draftsmen (*musavvir*) to women in their homes, who are made to embroider flowers by imitative needlework, thus discrediting our craft" (Kal'a 1997a, 31–32; also 37–8, 149–50, 331–2). Whether these women were truly unskilled, or falsely accused to eliminate competition, is unclear.

While textiles constituted the Ottoman Empire's principal manufactured exports, large quantities of certain raw materials were also exported – increasingly through the port of Izmir. Though the government frequently prohibited the exportation of staple goods such as cotton (needed to weave sailcloth) and foodstuffs (needed to provision the capital and the rest of the domain), these measures were unevenly enforced, and smuggling was always rife. Venetian, Ragusan, English, and Dutch traders actively pursued opportunities arising in European markets. In the mid-sixteenth century, for example, Latin vessels carried away grains from the Aegean coast to compensate for shortages in Italy; toward the end of the century, "the trickle became a torrent" as crop failures and famines in Europe led to significant importation of Ottoman grains and dried fruits (Goffman 1990, 36–45). Very little is known about the farming of grains at the time, and even less about women's role in it. Certainly later evidence would suggest that female labor must have been crucial; however, information is lacking as to women's participation in agriculture in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, and anachronistic projections of later data could be invalid.

In terms of production and trade, cotton was the second most important sector in the Ottoman economy after grains. Processed cotton was exported early on to Black Sea and Danube ports, but the most significant quantities to be exported were of raw cotton, particularly in the eighteenth century (İnalcık 1979/80). By 1788, cotton held a 72 percent share in total Ottoman exports (Frangakis-Syrett 1998). Once again, firm information about cotton cultivation during the earliest periods is unavailable (Faroqhi 1979); however, it is known that by the eighteenth century, Western Anatolian cotton was produced in small family holdings or larger plantations (*çiftlik*) under the control of rural notables (*ayan*), and that the preeminence of small family holdings increased after central authority was reasserted in the nineteenth century and rural notables lost their power (Frangakis-Syrett 1998); this would suggest that women took an active role in cotton production at least from the eighteenth century on.

Regarding commerce, the practice of seclusion limited women's mobility, and while lower-class women used this to their advantage, by functioning as purveyors of goods (some of which were imported) to harems, well-to-do women were seldom able to travel and personally engage in trade. However, they could, and did, participate in commerce as financiers. Court records and probate inventories contain many instances of women investing in foreign trade. When a Bursa merchant dealing in Persian silks died in 1636, five of the eight creditors who sued his estate were women (Gerber 1988, 118). This was by no means an isolated case. In a common arrangement known as *muḍārebe*, one partner – often a woman – would provide financing, and the other, generally a man, labor (Jennings 1973, 1975). In eighteenth-century Aleppo, a hub of foreign trade both eastern and western, women "figured prominently among the suppliers of credit. They made deals with borrowers outside the family circle, secured their loans, drew up contracts, and sued in court to protect their rights. Women from wealthy families possessed considerable savings to invest. . . . Men accepted them as guarantors for loans and sought them out for their own funds. In moneylending, women found one accessible avenue for investment and a good source of income. Their activated savings, in the form of credit, thus circulated in various sectors of the economy" (Marcus 1989, 187–8). In nineteenth-century Egypt, wealthy women were involved in commerce with Asia and Africa, investing in the sea trade of spices and the caravan slave trade (Tucker 1985, 83).

Another way in which women investors participated in foreign trade was as owners of the means of production and of commercial real estate. In Ottoman society, many crafts were regulated by guilds, which controlled the number of licences to practice (*gedik*) (Akarlı 1985/6, 2004). By the eighteenth century, such licences, and the associated tools and wherewithal, had become hereditary as private property (İnalcık 2000, 158). While most guilds were closed to women, craftsmen's female descendants who inherited tools and licences sometimes rented them out to other craftsmen (Marsot 1995, 109, Marcus 1989, 164–5, 178–9). Whether through inheritance or by purchase, women also sometimes owned other property critical to export industries. A court case

from Bursa reveals that in 1656, a water mill, the principal form of (non-human) power used in the silk industry there, was owned by a woman (Gerber 1988, 77). Shops where goods were manufactured or traded were also sometimes owned by women, who often invested in them as rental property. In Aleppo, for example, women made up fully one-third of the buyers of commercial real estate in 1750–1; furthermore, the deeds indicate that many of the commercial properties that women sold had originally come into their possession by way of purchase (Marcus 1989, 191–2). Finally, by far the largest number of rented shops in most Ottoman cities were owned by pious foundations (*vakıf/waqf*), some of which had been endowed by women. Thus, a 1604 record shows that three Sarajevo sisters had donated three shops, and another woman two (Filan forthcoming). More than half the pious foundations established in Aleppo between 1770 and 1840 were endowed by women, and one-fifth of these consisted exclusively of commercial property (Meriwether 1997).

All this is not to say that women never personally engaged in trade. A Bursa woman who died in 1682 had been involved in a large number of loans as both debtor and creditor, suggesting that she had been active in business; another who died in 1674 must have "engaged in large-scale trade in textiles," for her estate included "huge quantities" of wool and other fabrics (Gerber 1980). One of the most important businesses in which women partook as dealers was the slave trade. Numerous official documents refer to both accredited (*defterlü ve kefillü*) and non-accredited female slave dealers, the latter invariably accused of immorality and malpractice (Erdem 1996, 33–9, Kal'a 1997b, 92–3, Zilfi 2000). In 1641, the slave dealers' guild in Istanbul included 33 men and 8 women (Erdem 1996, 37). After slave markets were closed and the slave trade officially banned by imperial edicts starting in 1847, an informal human commerce took hold in which women played an important role. British consular sources indicate that 14 out of 42 slave dealers in Istanbul during 1881–4 were women (Toledano 1982, 59). The composer and poetess Leylâ Saz, who grew up in the imperial palace of Çırağan in Istanbul, describes how very young Circassian girls would be purchased by wealthy ladies "for lucre and speculation," and, it must be added, social network building; they would be trained and resold, through female slave dealers, to other prominent Ottoman households – a practice which, she notes, was common and "not something to make one blush" ([Saz] 1925, 58–64).

Women also figured in foreign trade as commodities, for many slaves bought and sold in the Ottoman Empire were female. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottomans and neighboring principalities exported (either for ransom or for sale) captives acquired in battle or through raids, to such destinations as Genoa, Venice, and Egypt; likewise, captured Turks were sold at various slave markets by Latin and other traders (Fleet 1999, 37–58). Although conquest initially satisfied demand for servile labor, with the decline of the empire's military fortunes, slaves were increasingly bought and imported from East Africa, particularly Nubia and Sudan, and the Northern Caucasus, particularly Circassia and Georgia (Toledano 1982, 14–54). Female slaves were largely used for domestic work, and, in rare instances, in agriculture and manufacture (for example silk in Bursa). Manumission after a certain number of years of service was widespread, as was intermarriage (particularly between free men and slave women); as a result, foreign-born slaves were usually integrated into Ottoman society within a generation or two.

We also find Ottoman women, of course, as consumers of foreign goods. In the absence of archaeological evidence, it is difficult to determine exactly what the common people consumed (Carroll 2000). Only indirectly is it possible to infer – from such data as customs records – that, for example, imported Indian cotton fabrics were widely used at all levels of Ottoman society during the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries (İnalcık 1979/80), and Venetian soap as early as the fourteenth (Fleet 1999, 24). On the other hand, available information on the middle and upper classes shows that consumption was not only geared toward satisfying basic necessities, but also establishing class distinctions and even ethnic identities. Thus, starting in the mid-eighteenth century, elite women in Walachia and Moldavia increasingly used Western European (especially French) clothes and fashion accessories, household items, and luxury goods to construct both individual and collective – proto-national – identities; in this, moreover, they differed from elite men who, due in part to their participation in the Ottoman imperial administration, retained "traditional" patterns of dress and consumption for some time longer (Jianu forthcoming). During the same period, it became common for the sisters and daughters of sultans to move out of the historic peninsula of Istanbul and into palatial residences along the

Bosphorus where, through displays of conspicuous consumption, they bolstered the monarch's prestige at a time when military charismatic legitimation had ceased to be effective; luxury textiles and garments, clocks, mirrors, silver and crystal vessels, and other imported goods played a key role in this display (Artan 1993). It has also been suggested that the consumption of goods imported from Europe was instrumental in the self-fashioning of a nascent, ethnically-differentiated urban middle class (Göçek 1996), although an analysis of how this process may have been gendered remains to be undertaken. The Ottoman government tried, through the periodic imposition of sumptuary laws, to control sartorial transgressions (often using imported fabrics) on the part of religious groups and social classes, as well as women. Thus, a 1206/1792 edict that forbade the wearing of women's overcoats (*ferâce*) made of Ankara camlet recalled that an earlier edict had similarly prohibited British camlet, because "being excessively fine, other clothes worn by a woman underneath it can be discerned from the outside" (Altınay 1932, 4).

Finally, until feminist theoretical interventions in recent decades, it was seldom acknowledged that the production and reproduction of the working class involves a significant unmeasured and difficult to quantify component, in the form of unremunerated productive and reproductive activities by family members, principally women. Yet, as early as 1839–40, Mikhail Petrovich Vronchenko wrote that since all surplus was expropriated from Ottoman craftsmen, some "barely manage to survive with the help of the labor of their families, who either work the land or otherwise lighten the task of the head of the household in procuring the means of subsistence" ([Vronchenko] 1839–40, ii, 282). While specifics are lacking as to the value of the contribution of domestic labor to goods exported by the Ottoman Empire, it is crucial not to lose sight of this element as a vitally important open problem in economic historiography.

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İRVİN CEMİL SCHİCK AND NİLÜFER A. İSVAN

Education: Colonial

Azerbaijan

After the consolidation and expansion of Russia's dominant position in northeastern Europe by Peter the Great, Russia began to expand its rule over what is now Azerbaijan. Beginning in 1737, Russia entered into series of political and military arrangements with the king of Persia and the heads of Central Asian provinces. In 1812, under what became known as the Gulistan Treaty, half of Azerbaijan seceded to Russia.

The occupation of Azerbaijan by the Russians caused a major crisis for the Azeri population. For the first time, Azerbaijan was occupied by a foreign power that differed not only in culture and custom but also in religion. To the average Azeri, the Russians were a Christian, Slavic power, which threatened their very existence. Hence all attempts would be made to preserve Azeri cultural and religious identity. Azeri women would continue to be segregated from society, particularly one that was occupied by an alien culture.

The Russians, on the other hand, were also weary of Islam and Azerbaijan's non-Slavic cultural practices. But in an effort to prevent religious and social uprisings, the Russians made numerous concessions to the Azeris, including lack of interference in social and religious customs of the country. The religious ulema, for example, continued to be the dominant body governing the social and religious practices of the society, including marriage, death, and education. In the case of education, the schools continued to be headed by Islamic teachers and Islam was the main source of education. As a result of this arrangement, Azeri woman remained barred from the educational opportunities offered to her male counterpart, since her main contribution to society was still viewed as being a wife and a mother.

Yet, despite this environment, a major event provided an opportunity for women to challenge the traditional attitude. The emergence of the Azeri oil industry not only gave birth to a new class of elites but also to an intelligentsia which saw female emancipation, particularly through education, as a prerequisite for modernization.

By the mid-nineteenth century, influenced by Russia and Europe, a new wealthy elite and an emerging intellectual movement began to call for greater social rights for women, particularly in the area of education. Their activism was initially successful. Local organizations funded and directed by wealthy Azeris established educational institutions where both men and women were encourgaed to attend. Around the late 1860s, with the assistance of private funds, the first girls' high school opened in Baku. Within a decade or so, more secular schools began to appear in the capital. Against the objections of the ulema, in 1908 an oil baron opened the first all-girls' non-secular school in Baku. The call for female education also began to be supported by the press who viewed education as a necessary tool for modernization.

Yet, despite these opportunities, the Azeri female population remained largely illiterate because not only were these changes geared toward a specific sector of the society but ancient cultural and religious beliefs also continued to dominate concerning women. Societal pressures continued to exclude women from education but also prevented them from achieving mere literacy. As a result, it was another two decades or more, not until the establishment of the Soviet policy of mandatory female education, before the women of Azerbaijan gained access to the educational sphere.

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Mitra Raheb

Egypt

Despite the fact that colonial administrators utilized the condition of women as a justification for the occupation, government education for girls did not improve with the arrival of the British in 1882. The British restricted access to education for both boys and girls by increasing fees and drastically reducing the number of subsidized positions, by creating a two-tiered educational system, and by altering the curriculum in the schools. With respect to boys' education, these changes consolidated a hegemonic bloc between large landowners and the British. A final complicating factor was the existence of foreigners and missionaries in Egypt who also created schools for girls.

Islam as a religion encourages learning from all adherents, and during the classical period it remained the prerogative of those who had the time, the money, and the ability to pursue it. Small schools (*kuttab*s) for both Muslims and Copts were theoretically open to boys and girls. These schools provided religious instruction and sometimes reading and writing. While the vast majority of Egyptians received little education, women of the upper classes might receive an education at home that would also include needlework or embroidery.

The origins of the modern educational system in Egypt date back to the reign of Muḥammad ʿAlī (r. 1805–48), who needed to train officers, engineers, and doctors. He created a School of Midwifery in 1832 to train women as doctors. Not many women were interested in this vocation, and the school's small population was filled by women with few options in life, for example orphans or slaves. After the establishment of the Treaty of Balta Liman and the subsequent changes in Egypt's economy, many schools were closed. Egypt became a supplier of raw cotton to the British. The changed economic situation encouraged many Europeans to migrate to Egypt. Missionaries now came in larger numbers and were linked to the new class of foreign entrepreneurs. Foreigners built educational institutions for themselves, as well as schools to spread proper Christianity to Egypt's Muslims, Copts, and Jews. Governmental expansion of education began again under the Khedive Ismāʿīl (r. 1863–79), who not only restored many of the schools created by his grandfather, but opened new schools, including Egypt's first and second primary schools for girls in 1873 and 1875. The curriculum was meant to attract students from all classes with language, music, and art for the upper classes and needlework and home economics for the lower classes. Furthermore, it included the history and geography of Egypt. Nevertheless, the mission of female education was not clear. Was the goal to provide female workers to serve the state, to provide vocational training for women of the lower classes, or to make women better wives, mothers, and citizens? The abolition of the slave trade in 1877, Ismāʿīl's deposition in 1879, and the arrival of the British in 1882 only made matters more complicated.

Egypt's first High Commissioner was Lord Cromer, who had first arrived in Egypt as Commissioner of the Caisse de la Dette Publique (1877–9). His chief aim was to restore Egypt to financial solvency. Education would be a primary arena for cost-cutting measures. He created a two-tier education system that based its upper tier upon the existing network of "modern" schools and a lower tier based upon the foundation of the old *kuttab* network. The curriculum was restricted to include only the essentials of reading, writing, and simple mathematics. Other subjects, including foreign languages, were prohibited. To encourage female matriculation, some schools were given double subsidies for girls.

The most important act of the new system was to introduce and expand fees in the upper tier. Cromer linked willingness to pay with the development of national character. In other words, citizens who would pay school fees would gain an appreciation for education and its necessity in building a modern nation. Since access to the higher tier of education meant access to positions in government, both the wealthy Ottoman-Egyptian elite and the British administration desired restricting boys' access to the upper tier. The livelihood of the elite depended upon the sale of cotton to the British, and the latter required this cotton to supply its textile industry, which in turn sold its products around the world. Despite this cooperation, male nationalists utilized the issue of education to advance the cause of Egyptian independence.

The story of female education was much more complicated. Upper-class Egyptians did not intend their daughters' education to serve vocational purposes, nor did they want their daughters associating with unsuitable females. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of government education was to create teachers and doctors, as well as to provide a vocation for the deserving poor: orphans, blind, deaf, and others. Meanwhile, Cromer proclaimed that the lowly position of women in Egypt hindered its development and that education was the "obvious remedy."

Cromer revamped the curriculum and instruction by reducing the significance of the French and Turkish languages and replacing Egyptian/Arab

history and geography with the history and geography of the British Empire. Cromer's departure in 1907, his replacement by Sir Eldon Gorst, and Saʿd Zaghlūl's tenure as minister of education greatly improved the situation with respect to the curriculum and in creating more free slots for future teachers. Nevertheless, the purpose of government-sponsored female education remained murky. Elite males tended to believe that all female education needed to have practical home economics at its core, while women of the upper classes felt that such training was unnecessary. The mainstream and women's presses frequently covered the issue of girls' education. While there was unanimity over the need for education, the nature of that education remained hotly contested. Due to the vocational nature of government schooling, many upper middle- and upper-class Egyptians sent their daughters to missionary schools, arousing great criticism from the press. Despite changes in the curriculum to restore Arabic, religion, and indigenous history, there were always shortages of trained Egyptian female teachers.

After Egypt's partial independence in 1922, Egypt's politicians then became responsible for the system they had both criticized and created. To satisfy public opinion, primary education became free and compulsory in 1925, although the country lacked the resources, teachers, and facilities to implement this plan.

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Mona Russell

North Africa

Formal education in North Africa before the 1830 French conquest of Algeria was a masculine sphere, characterized by a network of largely urban Muslim and Jewish primary (*kuttāb* and *midrash*) and some secondary schools. Educated women existed, but tended to be the beneficiaries of private lessons in wealthy homes. The conquerors changed this landscape by seizing the pious endowments (*ḥubus*, French *habous*) that had supported the *kuttāb*s, which in turn encouraged various European groups to step in and take advantage of the resultant cultural devastation. Missionaries, foreign consuls, the French-Jewish advocacy group known as the Alliance israélite universelle (AIU), and later, the French Republic, all opened schools, sometimes targeting their efforts at indigenous girls. Nevertheless, various colonial dynamics discouraged female education, and at the time of independence, female illiteracy was over 98 percent in Algeria, and over 96 percent in Morocco and Tunisia. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the importance of women's education in the highly gendered arena of colonial power struggles.

Initially, it was Europe's imperial rivalries that fueled most educational initiatives directed toward North African girls. The (French) Sisters of Saint Joseph, for example, established a girls' school in Tunis in 1843, while the Italian consulate, also hoping to extend its influence in North Africa, established another in 1855. In Algeria, French military authorities quickly chose to subsidize the endeavors of Madame Allix-Luce and Madame Barroil, two European women who taught girls sewing and French in the 1850s. Official intervention led to the establishment of French-Arabic schools for Muslim girls in several Algerian cities. Within several decades, however, they had all been transformed into *écoles-ouvroirs* (roughly, school-workshops) devoted entirely to domestic arts. The French Cardinal Lavigerie, who cloaked his missionary organizations, the Pères Blancs and Soeurs Blanches, in the language of national grandeur, helped educate small numbers of orphaned Kabyle girls. He later went to Tunis to help check Italian influence. Even before Gallicizing indigenous Jews became official policy, the Frenchwoman Heloïse Hartoch established a Jewish girls' school in Algiers in 1837, and a comparable institution opened in Oran in 1852. The AIU, meanwhile, also followed imperial power: its first school for girls opened in Tétuan in 1868, soon after Morocco's defeat against Spain.

The rise of the Third Republic (1870–1940) in France ushered in the first consistent reforms favoring indigenous education, but dynamics on the ground in the colonies dramatically limited

indigenous girls' access to schooling. Despite official policy, colonists often voted down funds for Arab schools, while many girls' parents had their own fears about proselytism, moral corruption, and public shame. Successful schools tended to avoid dependence on municipal budgets while boasting a strategic *raison d'être*. The AIU, for example, opened an indigenous Jewish girls' school in Tunis in 1882, where the birth of the French protectorate (1881) did little to ease French fears about Italian influence. In addition to Italian settlers, the local Jewish community itself had an established and influential Italian-speaking (Livornese) component. The "Italian Peril" also fueled official French support for Chrarlotte Eigenschenk who established a school for Muslim girls in Tunis, the l'École Louise-Renée Millet, in 1900. Still, 99 percent of Tunisian Muslim and Jewish women were illiterate in 1900, and in Algeria in 1914, no more than 3,992 Muslim girls (about 0.8 percent of those eligible) were attending the 16 French schools open to them in Algeria.

It is tempting to ascribe miserable female literacy rates to the budgetary racism and indigenous patriarchal traditionalism of the *colons*, but there was more to the picture. The AIU's schools in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, for example, were frequently well-attended (if not mobbed), while the Muslim Millet School in Tunis consistently maintained high enrollments. If some parents refused to send their daughters to public school, it should be borne in mind that the Republic's educational reforms were explicitly justified as an effort to "*conquerir par l'école*," meaning to conquer the hearts and minds of the colonized by means of the school. In contrast, the successful Millet school in Tunis coupled approval by respected imams with funding by the administration of *ḥubus* land, thus isolating it somewhat from the *colons*. The AIU similarly secured the approval of the local rabbinate before opening a school in a given city, while obtaining support from philanthropists, the city's Jewish notables, and its own membership. In other words, girls' education was not necessarily anathema when schools bowed to local norms.

Furthermore, successful girls' schools could be rigorous, including secular and religious studies along with the more predictable training in skills judged gender-appropriate by schoolmasters. The Millet school's library, for example, featured a range of "feminine" titles on hygiene, travel narratives, and morality literature, and in 1903 the AIU specifically instructed its teachers to instill "certain special qualities . . . in the young girls: gentleness, modesty, simplicity of dress, the desire to shine through something other than a ridiculous display of jewelry and trinkets." However, if AIU schools devoted between seven and ten hours a week to sewing, female students also spent eight to nine hours a week studying French, and several hours each to Hebrew, a third language, Biblical history and religious instruction, Jewish history, arithmetic, natural sciences, history, and geography. Muslim girls in the Millet school studied the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and the Arabic language, as well as secular topics such as mathematics, science, and French. Clearly, by the end of the nineteenth century, many North Africans were willing to send their daughter to schools teaching them subjects previously seen as suitable for boys.

French colonialism's slow death over the middle decades of the twentieth century coincided with a change in many North Africans' attitude as to what kind of education was appropriate for girls. Many French teachers, despite being employees of the government, vocalized their disagreements with colonial policy. This allowed many North Africans to see French schools and teachers independently of the official racism of the French administration. Meanwhile, indigenous nationalists and Islamic reformists began arguing that educated Muslim women could be better guardians and transmitters of traditions and values. ʿAbd al-Hamid Ben Badis, the Islamic reformer and founder of the Association of Algerian Ulama in 1931, opened a modern girls' school himself as early as 1919. By 1955, reformists had opened 181 Islamic schools teaching a total of 40,000 Muslim boys and girls. In 1944, France responded to an increasingly vocal Muslim intelligentsia with promises to build tens of thousands of classrooms, and in 1949 France finally eliminated segregated schooling. Even with some reformists warning that girls should not attend French schools for fear of assimilation, female school attendance rose exponentially in North Africa during the 1950s and early 1960s. The decades since independence have witnessed rising literacy throughout the Maghrib, but also the enactment of highly discriminatory family codes in Algeria and Morocco.

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Joshua Schreier

Education: Colonial and Missionary

Sub-Saharan Africa: West Africa

Christian missionaries introduced Western education as early as the 1850s in West Africa. Access was first made available to boys, and only later to girls when it was realized that the education of women was an obvious bridge to evangelizing the home and remolding society along Christian principles. The main mission societies were drawn from evangelical groups throughout Europe and North America and represented a range of Roman Catholic and Protestant denominations. Missionary and colonial efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa were often interdependent, especially during the early colonial period before serious motivational and philosophical differences put the two sets of Westerners increasingly at odds. In addition, variations existed in colonial attitudes toward Christian mission educational efforts. This was especially true when missionaries came from countries other than that of the colonial power.

The educational efforts of Western missionaries soon created a labor pool of literate men. The curriculum for boys focused on literacy, natural sciences, agriculture, and bookkeeping, with some vocational and industrial training. This schooling was essential for boys to assume their future prosteylzing roles, take up jobs as clerks, interpreters, and support staff in the colonial administrations, and participate in the new cash economy. However, the establishment of girls' education during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was much less straightforward.

Initially, the goal was to create future housewives who embodied Christian virtues, especially monogamy, and would replicate these values in their children, or to provide good domestic servants capable of serving in expatriate households. Girls' education was distinguishably different from boys' in its focus on the domestic sciences. They were taught needlework, dressmaking, cookery, religious instruction, drawing, singing, childcare, and basic reading, writing, and arithmetic. But as the demands for professionals such as nurses, typists, and secretaries increased in the colonies, women's education expanded to include secondary training for these occupations, which were then recast as female-appropriate. Even so, it was generally expected that after graduation from secondary schools, girls would only work for a few years before marriage. The majority of them apprenticed as governesses, cooks, housekeepers, and nurses; however, some girls did work outside the domestic sphere as teachers and were praised for sharing their Christian training with younger girls, but invariably they also left soon to marry (Mann 1985, 26).

After the Berlin Conference of 1884/5 when Africa was partitioned among the European powers, the French, British, Portuguese, and other colonizers set out to establish control over their respective regions. This was an uneven process, taking decades longer in some areas and involving the making and breaking of colonial policies in others. In the early years, the French and British imperial powers left the Christian mission schools largely to their own devices. Then as part of their goal to create "Black Frenchmen," the French decided to more directly control their subjects' education and took over most mission schools between 1903 and 1924. The British, on the other hand, continued their cost saving approach, which included being supportive of Christian missionary efforts. By the turn of the century, they provided limited funding to schools in exchange for occasional inspections, the adoption of an approved curriculum, and the use of certificated teachers. Yet although their general approaches to education in their colonies were quite different, both France and Great Britain were to make very similar choices and compromises in their efforts to establish Western-style education in Muslim areas.

Literacy-based education in West Africa had, in fact, started generations earlier with the arrival of Islam from the north, which promoted literacy in Arabic as well as gender differentiation in religious instruction. The real competition with the Christian mission schools came from Muslim educational institutions active in the region. There were three stages at the Islamic schools: the elementary stage, known as the *zongkarim* or *makarantan alo*, where children memorized the Arabic alphabet and verses of the Qur'ān. Then there was the advanced stage, the *makarantan ilm*, or *bangsim-karim* where specialized subjects such as law, theology, and Arabic literature were

taught, and finally the highest level, where a select few boys would be sent to North Africa or the Middle East for further studies. Girls' formal education was featured only at the elementary stage and only for a minority.

British colonial attitudes toward missionaries were likewise pragmatic. While in Sierra Leone they restricted Muslim missionaries from operating in the (Christian) Liberated African Villages in favor of the Church Missionary Society, in northern Nigeria and Ghana it was the Christian missions that were barred from operating in Muslim areas for risk of alienating local authorities. But Muslim families continued to support Islamic education, resolutely keeping their children out of colonial schools and preventing these regions from keeping pace with the educational successes of largely southern areas until the British incorporated some Islamic institutions of learning into the colonial education system. In return, the Christian missions were allowed to gradually establish schools in the Muslim north – that is, in countries that are now Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana – and this led to acceptance of Western education, at least by some segments of society.

In 1929, the Emir of Katsina in northern Nigeria sponsored an early primary school for girls in response to the perceived encroachment of Western-style education. It was run from his palace, partly to encourage attendance and partly to ensure that the girls' modesty was protected in keeping with Hausa Muslim cultural norms of seclusion (Pittin 1990, 9). Those who were admitted into the Katsina Palace girls' school either came from the aristocracy or were associated with it. They included girls from aristocratic homes as well as the daughters of ex-slaves and servants. In 1931, the palace school had a female enrollment of 61, about half of whom came from families resident at the emir's compound and the other half from the households of his most senior aristocracy. The curriculum focused largely on domestic subjects in order to prepare girls to be wives but also included some rudimentary Islamic religious studies. The Katsina Palace girls' school collapsed in 1938 due to a loss of enrollments that was precipitated by British authorities moving it out of the emir's compound, ostensibly to make it accessible to the daughters of commoners. But then it failed to attract anyone; most of the old students could not stay to complete, and the fortunate few who did finish could not find jobs in the new male-dominated cash economy.

In Sierra Leone, the situation was a little different; the renowned Afro-Caribbean educator, Dr. Edward Blyden, was appointed Director of Muslim Education to implement the Mohammedan Education Ordinance of 1902, which consisted largely of teaching English and Western subjects to Muslim youth in Freetown, and this proved very successful. However, the French administration had come to distrust the Qur'ānic schools as the Ahmadiyya and other Muslim brotherhoods became more powerful in the urban centers of countries such as Senegal and Mauritania and, in 1921, established their alternative Muslim school system, the *médersa*s. The *médersa*s provided French education under the guise of the study of Arabic (Brenner 2001, 42). All other forms of Qur'ānic education were considered religiously biased and not eligible for subvention. These schools were to train men who would take leadership positions and be sympathetic to the French. The new policy enabled the French to diminish the influence that the brotherhoods and important Muslim families had over the local population, but even further limited the role of women.

By 1960, when the majority of West African countries became independent, the average ratio of school enrollment was 48 percent for males and 22 percent for females (Odaga and Heneveld 1995, 78). Despite access to at least minimal education in both the French and the British systems, most girls were not attending school, either not enrolling at all or dropping out early to farm, help with family domestic work, or to marry. Of those very few women who did complete their secondary schooling through either missionary or colonial schools, many became teachers at the primary level. To them was passed the tremendous challenge of increasing the participation of girls in the new national school systems and of raising the overall literacy rates of all citizens.

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Abdulai Iddrisu

Education: Missionary

Arab States (excepting Sudan and North Africa)

Missionary schools played a significant role in the education of women and girls in the Arab countries from around 1830 until the 1950s. State-sponsored female education did not develop until the mid-nineteenth century and, then, institutions were few and far between. However, during this same period, the Arab countries, most of which were ruled by the Ottoman Empire, were the targets of myriad – mostly Christian – European and American missionary projects, which focused much of their energies on educational activity. The missionaries became frustrated at their inability to convert the population – particularly Muslims – to Christianity. During Ottoman rule, which ended in 1918, it was illegal for Muslims to convert, and for non-Muslims to proselytize Muslims. Muslim and Jewish missions in the Arab countries were scarce; their aim was less to convert non-Muslims and non-Jews, but rather to defend their faiths against Christian missionaries.

Christian missionaries thus perceived education as an alternate and indirect form of proselytization, and a means of spreading the gospel to reach the young and vulnerable, who were more susceptible to the religious message. Gender was a crucial component in this strategy. Girls or young women, as the mothers of the future, would play a seminal role in imparting religious values and education to their children (the thinking went). Sometimes their education was perceived by the missionaries as more important than boys' and young men's. Socialization of young women was an important part of the early curricula, which stressed acquisition of domestic skills and inculcation of Christian values oriented toward the establishment of "Christian homes." In some cases, this objective was considered so crucial that missions prioritized the establishment and maintenance of girls' schools over boys'. For instance, the Friends' Mission in Ramallah, Palestine, established a girls' school (in 1889) before the founding of a boys' school (1901). The missionaries also professed shock at what they perceived to be the low and "degraded" position of women in Arab societies, and therefore envisioned part of their task to be elevating women through education.

Many missionaries were ill-educated about the societies into which they intruded, and did not initially understand the immense changes many Arab countries were undergoing, particularly in the nineteenth century, when they arrived in the region. Missions tapped into a growing, existent desire in the area for education. The popularity of their schools often highlighted local dissatisfaction with, and the deficiencies of, state-sponsored educational systems. Before independence, the situation was complicated by the role played by educational systems run by colonial European powers, particularly during the interwar years. Mandatory-run educational institutions did not respond to popular demand, especially in the area of female education. In Palestine, for example, demand for places at the only government sponsored secondary school for girls, the Women's Training Center, continually exceeded supply during the British Mandate period. Nor did the European colonial governments devise educational systems that catered to the interests of the local population, attempting instead to create curricula and schools which served colonial interests. The British and French mandate governments in Palestine, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Syria "saw education primarily as a vehicle to cultivate loyal cadres in the state bureaucracy" (Thompson 2000, 78). The local population envisioned education as the key to economic opportunity, security, and social mobility. Increasingly, parents desired these for their daughters; in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many clamored for the availability of female education. In time, the missions fueled this desire. The demand for female education intensified the need for more female teachers, the production of which increasingly became the goal of mission schools.

As a result, many of those who could afford it sent their daughters to mission-run schools. In rural areas during the nineteenth century, often these mission-run schools were the only institutions which offered female education. Initially, most of the students were Christian. In Ottoman Lebanon, the Protestant missions ended up seeking converts among indigenous Christians, particularly non-Catholic sects, since Muslims were off-bounds, and the Catholics had schools of their own run by Catholic missionaries and orders (mostly French and Italian), and local Catholic groups. In Egypt,

which saw the establishment of numerous girls' schools by American Presbyterians, the British Church Missionary Society, Dutch Reform and other Protestant missions, most of the few converts came from the Coptic Orthodox community. Palestine had schools run by Russian Orthodox, particularly in towns with high concentrations of Christians. Yet increasingly, Muslim and Jewish girls also began to attend Christian-run schools, particularly beginning in the early twentieth century. Parents' and girls' desire for education overcame their objections to exposure to Christian teachings. Muslim parents approved the strictness and sex segregation of Catholic institutions run by nuns, and sought the ostensibly superior education provided in other mission schools.

Although over time the education provided in the mission schools became more secular, academic, and even professionally oriented – including sciences, languages, sports, and other extracurricular activities – the mission schools never divested themselves of their religious content. The schools had frequent religious services, which were often compulsory for all students, regardless of their individual religious status. The religious orientation of the teachers, administrators, and staff permeated almost all activities in the schools. Students' responses to the religious message varied. Muslim and Jewish students resisted it – sometimes together – as was the case at the American Junior College for Women in Beirut in 1936, when they went on a "non-participation" strike against compulsory religious services (Fleischmann 2002, 418).

One of the more distinctive contributions of missionary educators was the establishment of colleges for women. In Cairo, the American College for Girls (initially a secondary school) was established in 1910. Egypt also had a women's affiliate of Assiut College. In Beirut, the first college level institution for women, the American Junior College, opened in 1924, becoming a four-year college in 1950. Because, for a time, it was one of the only colleges for women "south of Istanbul and east of Cairo" (Roberts 1958, 3), it attracted young women not only from other Arab countries, but also from Iran, and even the Balkan states. Most public universities and colleges in Arab countries did not admit women, except on a limited basis, until the 1950s. Other missions focused on vocational training for poorer girls, as was the case with the Kaiserswerth Deaconesses, who "aimed at providing girls from the lower classes, of all denominations, with a basic industrial training to enable them to provide financially for their families" (Murre-van den Berg, 109).

The legacy of missionary schools and colleges for women is by all accounts mixed. Today most have devolved to local, indigenous groups; become state or public institutions; or in some cases, were closed because of changing political circumstances in the post-independence period. Most of these developments took place during the 1950s. A number still have foreign staff, funds and direction, but without the goal of proselytization. In Egypt, various schools were nationalized during the Nasser era. For the most part, the former mission schools are no longer "missionary" but rather, denominational. Little to no proselytization takes place.

Some women who attended the institutions have fond memories of the "fellowship," friendships and intellectual stimulation that came from attending college in an atmosphere that, in cases, promoted liberal Western ideas and non-sectarian interaction among students from diverse religious and ethnic backgrounds. At higher level institutions young women experienced a certain liberation through attending college in urban areas, and by being allowed a modicum of mobility and exposure to different influences than was the case in their home towns, villages, and cities (Salah 1992). Other students resented the narrow, rigidly enforced religiosity and conservatism of the missionaries; condescension and racism permeated some schools' environments. The schools' histories are varied, as they, like their host societies, were affected by disparate personalities, personnel, and social and political changes.

Mission institutions were part of educational landscapes that were fragmented by the existence of myriad public, religious, and private institutions at the expense of strong national school systems. This may have contributed to sectarianism, and/or diffused national unity in some of the Arab countries. Ultimately, the missions educated only a small, elite segment of young women in the Arab countries, but this group, many of whom became educators themselves, often exercised a disproportionate amount of influence in their own societies as an effect of their educations in mission schools. Many became active in various sectors, including education, politics, the arts, and sciences.

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North Africa

This entry surveys missionary activity in Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco from 1830 to the postcolonial period. Despite the critical importance of missionaries to European imperialism, the history of foreign missions – whether Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish – remains relatively unknown. Nevertheless, recent work, such as Karima Direche-Slimani's study (2004) of conversion among the Algerian Kabyles, has expanded knowledge of missionary work in that region and its influence upon women. Scholarly research does exist on the Alliance israélite universelle (AIU), the Paris-based secular Jewish missionary organization especially active in North Africa from the 1860s on. Indeed, we know more about the AIU in Morocco, for example, than we do about Christian missions there.

Compared to Anglo-American Protestant missions or the AIU, French, Italian, and Spanish Catholic missionaries were by far the most numerous in the Maghrib and exerted the most profound impact. Relationships between missionaries and French imperial ambitions in North Africa were complicated; missions often maintained contradictory relations with local colonial administrators, or precolonial governments, as well as with the French state. As life-long celibates and desexed females, Catholic sisters' sexually ambiguous status conferred upon them a freedom of movement and access to extended families and households that male missionaries and colonial officials never enjoyed. Catholic and Protestant missionary women established girls' schools, women's clinics, and orphanages. Home visits to Muslim or Jewish families represented another significant undertaking; frequently missionary women were the only Europeans with whom indigenous women interacted. Celibate female missionaries provided North African women with an alternative role model – one outside the bounds of marriage and family. Some missionaries transgressed gender boundaries by living and working alone or by traveling unaccompanied by men. However, it is difficult to measure the repercussions of these transgressive activities in the realms of women and gender, given the present state of research.

Catholics and Protestants were not the only missionaries to arrive in North Africa in the nineteenth century. The origins of the AIU lie in the creation of the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews in 1808, launched to convert Jews worldwide; in part to offset these efforts, the AIU was established several decades later. Inspired by the notion of France's civilizing mission, the AIU created a network of private, largely secular primary schools that introduced modern French ideas in the realm of social, political, and cultural life and organization in the boys' curriculum, thus reproducing gendered boundaries in learning and knowledge. Western culture and a modern interpretation of Judaism informed their pedagogy, not traditional Jewish learning. Modeled upon the French primary school system, the AIU's curriculum included French language instruction, arithmetic, natural science, geography, and local history. AIU teachers, all Europeans at first, included some women who were trained in pedagogy and used modern textbooks, which constituted a revolutionary break for Jews in North Africa or the Middle East in terms of learning and schooling.

Algeria

The first missionaries came to Algeria soon after the 1830 French invasion. Among the earliest were the Sisters of Saint Joseph de l'Apparition (SSJ) founded by a French woman, Emilie de Vialar (1797–1856). A teaching and charitable order inspired by Catholic reform in France, the SSJ created schools, hospitals, and orphanages in Algiers, Bône, and Constantine between 1835 and 1839. In a sense, they followed in the wake of the French

army as it conquered eastern Algeria; the sisters dispensed social services that the French military was unable or unwilling to provide to Algerian Muslim and Jewish communities as well as European civilians. The sisters, numbering about 40 women, were officially expelled from Algeria in 1843 after a bitter disagreement between de Vialar and the new bishop of Algiers, Antoine-Adolphe Dupuch. This incident reveals how politically fraught relationships between colonial authorities and missionaries could be – conflicts erupted between male clergy and female religious as well as between colonial officials and missionary societies. After their expulsion from French Algeria, other Catholic female orders immediately replaced the SSJ, such as the Sisters of Charity. The Jesuits were present in the Kabylia from the 1840s on. On the one hand, the female missionaries unwittingly helped to stabilize France's military occupation of Algeria by providing health and social services to the army and European settlers as well as to the indigenous population. On the other, they opposed organized prostitution, such as the military brothels, which recruited indigent Arab or Berber women. During the terrible famine of 1867–8, the missionaries took in thousands of orphaned girls who would have otherwise ended up as prostitutes.

The turning point in colonial proselytizing came with Charles Lavigerie's (1825–92) appointment in 1867 as archbishop of Algiers. Lavigerie, founder of the White Fathers and the Sisters of Our Lady of African Missions, initiated an intense conversion campaign in the Kabylia since he wrongly believed that the Berbers retained elements of their ancient Christian belief and thus were more amenable to conversion. By 1927 there were some nine girls' schools run by the White Fathers and Sisters throughout the Kabylia; their pupils (and converts) were often orphans without extended kin – for example, the writer, Fadhma Amrouche (1883–1967), who was educated by the sisters, converted, and married off to another Kabyle convert. While conversions from Islam were relatively few, Catholic missionaries attempted to create "Christian French families" by arranging marriages for converts as part of their proselytizing program. Thus, they greatly interfered in the intimate realms of family and marriage.

Finally, British Protestant missionaries began to proselytize among the Berbers in the 1860s, with little success, and used Algeria as a base from which to expand into Morocco. The AIU was also active in the country from its inception, establishing first boys' primary schools and slightly later girls' schools.

Tunisia

Precolonial Tunisia contrasts with Algeria. Ahmad Bey (r. 1837–55), of the ruling Husaynid dynasty (ca. 1750–1956), offered the Sisters of St. Joseph a haven in his kingdom after their 1843 banishment from Algeria. This event – a double expulsion by the Catholic hierarchy and the colonial state – resulted in the creation of the first modern girls' schools in Tunisia during the 1840s; Ahmad Bey even gave the Sisters a state-owned building for their educational activities, although the first pupils were mainly Mediterranean Catholics. The Sisters of St. Joseph flourished in precolonial Tunisia, employing the country as a base for further missionary expansion throughout the Mediterranean world and Ottoman Empire. By 1900, Tunisia counted some twelve Catholic female orders and five male orders, including the White Fathers and White Sisters. Italian Catholic orders, already present in Tunisia, increased in number during the nineteenth century, and taught some Jewish pupils.

Most Catholic missionary work was in education and public health; the vast majority of their flock was drawn from the thousands of Catholic Mediterranean peoples residing in Tunisia. After the First World War, a few Muslim families enrolled daughters in Catholic girls' schools because of the quality of education and all-female teaching staff. The Tunisian nationalist, Nabiha Ben Miled (1919–), was sent to the Sisters of St. Joseph primary school by her father, a Muslim, since he believed in female education and the school was located close to the family's home; in 1936, Ben Miled joined the Union musulman des femmes de Tunisie. Under the French Protectorate, the White Fathers founded a research institute, the Institut des belles lettres arabes, devoted to the history and culture of Tunisia and North Africa. One can posit that, paradoxically, both modern girls' education – in Ben Miled's case – and the institute were key elements in the emergence of Tunisian nationalism. As was true in Algeria, the Anglo-American Protestant missions exerted very little influence in Tunisia. On the other hand, AIU was quite successful in establishing schools and other institutions; one of Tunisia's leading Francophone novelists, Albert Memmi, studied at an AIU school in Tunis.

Morocco

Since the seventeenth century, a handful of Spanish Franciscans had resided in Tangier where they ministered to Catholic captives. As Morocco was forcibly opened up after 1860, French Catholic missionaries arrived. A French diplomat

brought in six Catholic nuns, ostensibly to work at the Tangier European hospital but in reality to counter the Spanish Catholic monopoly on missions. By the late 1860s, Archbishop Lavigerie's spiritual crusade extended into Morocco. In 1881, the North Africa Mission of the British and Foreign Bible Society organized a Tangier branch, and in 1895, three American evangelists, representing the Gospel Missionary Union of Kansas, set up a mission used for expansion elsewhere in the country. By 1900, mission stations had been established all over Morocco. Whether Catholic or Protestant, the missionaries either encountered utter indifference or overt hostility from the Muslim population. And while female Protestant missionary wives, sometimes dressed in native clothing, made home visits to women in Muslim households, they made no headway in converting the Moroccans. Finally, the first AIU school for girls opened in Tangier in 1866 and enrolled 60 students who were mainly taught needlework and Hebrew with history and geography added later. Opposition to this institution by the local Jewish community was mainly based on objections informed by gender ideologies.

The legacy of missionary work is very equivocal indeed. Despite their relatively small numbers and numerically insignificant conversions, the missionaries exerted a considerable impact. Clearly, the missions were embroiled from the start in Great Power rivalry over North Africa and their presence only rendered those rivalries more bitter. At times, this led to outbreaks of violence; for example, the great 1871 revolt in Algeria may have been partly due to overly zealous missionary activity in the Kabylia. If modern health and educational institutions were established where they had not existed previously, still female missionaries generally taught European middle-class domestic and gender ideologies to their pupils. In Tunisia, where missionaries were not associated with military invasion and occupation, as was the case in Algeria, the organization of modern girls' primary schooling by the Catholic sisters may have ultimately legitimated formal, modern girls' schooling. The fact that the White Fathers' institute operates even today in Tunis and that Catholic orders are still present provides evidence of Tunisia's comparatively different experience with missionaries. However, in promoting conversion from Islam to Christianity, missionary activity provoked cultural alienation and deep communal divisions, as was manifestly seen among Algeria's Berber populations. In sum, since female and male missionaries tended to focus upon the "ills" of the Muslim family, largely due in their view to Islam and polygamy, they failed to extend their critique of indigenous patriarchal relations to the gendered oppression and exploitation of colonial regimes.

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JULIA CLANCY-SMITH

The Ottoman Empire, Nineteenth Century

Female education was a major element of the global missionary endeavor of the nineteenth century. Scholarship has emphasized the educational projects of the Protestant interdenominational American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) among the Christians of the Orthodox Churches. Missions of the American Presbyterian and Methodist Churches also operated girls' schools, as did several British and German organizations. Catholic missions supported by the Propagation de la foi and the Oeuvre des écoles de l'Orient and Jewish missions of the Alliance israélite universelle expanded after the Crimean War (1853–6).

Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish missions operated extensive educational networks, chiefly in the eastern Mediterranean, Anatolia, and the Balkans. In 1909, in Anatolia alone, the ABCFM operated 337 schools with a student enrollment of 20,014 (Stone 1976). In that same year, Alliance operations throughout the empire included 149 schools with an enrollment of 41,000 students (Rodrigue 1993). By 1914, more than 100,000 students had studied in the 500 (mostly mission) French schools in the empire (Burrows 1986). The number of girls who attended these schools is in the tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands.

Missionary organizations promoted two key ideas about female education. First, education of

girls was important because, as mothers, women shaped the moral, spiritual, and intellectual environment of the home and society. To become good mothers, therefore, girls needed to be educated in the teachings of their faith and in basic educational precepts. Second, as the school was a modern tool for reforming society, and as women were ideally suited to teach young children, girls should be trained as teachers who would contribute to the moral reform of their religious communities.

The first permanent ABCFM school for girls in Ottoman domains was established in Beirut in 1835. Missionaries later established high schools and seminaries modeled on Mount Holyoke Female Seminary, the innovative institution for higher education for girls founded by Mary Lyon in South Hadley, Massachusetts in 1837. The most prominent of these schools, founded in the Ottoman capital in 1872, evolved in 1889 into the American College for Girls in Istanbul. All ABCFM schools provided instruction in the local vernacular (Arabic, Armenian, Greek, Bulgarian) and provided a basic education in reading, writing, arithmetic, singing, sewing, and Bible study. Geography, algebra, and sciences were added at higher levels. The American College for Girls provided college-level education in English. While the majority of its students were Armenian, Bulgarian, and Greek Christians, its most prominent Muslim student, Halide Edib, graduated in 1901.

Several orders of French nuns organized Catholic education for girls. Most notably the Filles de la charité de Saint Vincent de Paul (Istanbul, 1840), the Soeurs de Saint-Joseph de l'apparition (Beirut and Istanbul, 1848), and the Soeurs de Nazareth (Nazareth, 1854) operated schools and orphanages predominantly in Syria, Mount Lebanon, Palestine, Anatolia, and Rumelia (Bulgaria). The history of their work is only now beginning to be explored.

The Alliance israélite universelle, founded in Paris in 1860, was an integral part of the Jewish enlightenment (*haskalah*). Instruction at Alliance schools was provided in French, and the curriculum included Biblical history and religious instruction, Jewish history, Hebrew, French, arithmetic, geography, history, sciences, calligraphy, singing, drawing, and physical education. In addition, girls learned to sew. Promising Jewish girls and boys were sent to Paris to train as teachers at the Ecole normale israélite orientale, where they obtained a diploma (*brevet supérieur*) required by all elementary school teachers in France. After training they were assigned as Alliance teachers, though not necessarily to their homelands.

According to historian Selim Deringil (1998), mission schools filled a vacuum left by the inadequacy of Ottoman education. In the mid-nineteenth century, in some parts of the Ottoman Empire, girls received basic literacy training in community schools attached to churches and mosques, and elite families provided tutors at home. Thus, while mission schools did not initiate the idea of female education in Ottoman domains, they did advance modern ideas about higher education for women and acted as catalysts in many communities to improve the level of education available to girls. Moreover, in their schools and through their popular press, missionaries promoted the idea that women had a contribution to make to their communities as mothers and teachers. Just how these ideas were interpreted by Ottoman women is a question that requires research.

Deringil (1998) also argued that Ottoman statesmen perceived missionary efforts to educate non-Muslims as attempts to undermine state legitimacy; hence late-nineteenth century Ottoman educational reforms were in part a response to this perception. Thus, while mission schools acted as agents of cultural transformation, to what extent they contributed to women's participation in expressions of increasing ethnic and religious nationalisms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is also a topic deserving of research.

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Sudan

Most studies of missionary activity in Sudan focus on the country's southern region where large-scale Christian conversion occurred during the twentieth century. However, during the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period (1898–1956), two Protestant missions, the British Church Missionary Society (CMS) and the American Presbyterians, were active in the predominantly Muslim communities of northern Sudan. The history of Christian missions in Islamic northern Sudan has received little attention for four reasons: first, missionaries gained only a handful of Muslim converts; second, British authorities officially forbade Christian missionaries from proselytizing among Muslims so that evangelization was largely covert; third, historians have relied primarily on British official records to construct Sudanese history and have overlooked mission archives; and fourth, missionaries catered primarily to Muslim girls and women, or to young men of the urban lower classes, thus rendering their work largely invisible in a country where elite Arabic-speaking Muslim men have monopolized political power and historians' attention. In fact, British and American missionaries exerted important influences on northern Sudanese Muslim society by providing many of the earliest girls' schools and women's health care facilities in the region and by contributing to changes in local attitudes toward gender roles and relations.

Before the twentieth century, Sudanese Muslim girls had sometimes learned to memorize the Qurʾān in village schools called *khalwa*s. Yet few girls reached the stage where they could read and write, while advanced formal schooling for girls was unknown. Here, then, was the major contribution that British and American missionaries made: beginning in 1902, they opened schools for girls where they taught reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as skills such as needlework and baby care, which they described as female arts. At the same time, they taught the Bible and tried to spread Christian ideas. In northern Sudanese society the CMS and American Presbyterian missions were able to develop girls' schools in this way because they had female missionaries to run them; that is, they preserved, or reworked, local customs of sex segregation. In 1907, the Sudanese Muslim merchant-turned-educator, Bābikr Badrī – a man still hailed today in northern Sudan as the "father of girls' education" – followed the cue of the missions by opening the first Sudanese Muslim girls' school in the town of Rufāʾa. Bābikr Badrī's school taught reading, writing, arithmetic, and needlework. Historians frequently describe the girls' schools of the Christian missionaries and of Bābikr Badrī as "modern": their mere existence and their gendered curricular assumptions made them new. That is, in a departure from traditional Sudanese Islamic learning, their curricula reflected the belief that boys and girls should learn different subjects and that girls' education should aim to cultivate girls as better wives and mothers, using needlework in particular as a route to female refinement.

After 1900, British and American missionaries also opened women's health clinics as vehicles for evangelization. It appears that missionaries helped to draw the attention of British authorities to the local custom of radical female genital cutting (often called *al-khitān al-firʿawnī* [Pharaonic circumcision] or infibulation), which had profound consequences for women's health, particularly during childbirth and postpartum recovery. Missionaries also launched some of the earliest initiatives to train Muslim women as nurses. Their combined efforts led to growing popular demand for girls' schools and women's clinics and prompted British colonial authorities to establish government girls' schools, a women teachers' college, and a midwifery training school in the 1920s.

In published histories of the Sudanese women's movement, Sudanese Muslim women have offered different assessments of the Christian missionaries. Writing in 1990, Sūsān Salīm Ismāʿīl castigated Christian missionaries for trying to convert Muslim girls. She suggested, too, that a heated bout of anti-missionary activism, arising in 1946 in response to a case of attempted Muslim conversion, galvanized Sudanese Muslim women to form the Sudanese Women's Union or SWU (the major Sudanese feminist organization of the mid-to-late twentieth century). By contrast, writing in 1997, Nafīsa Kāmil (herself a mission school graduate and a mother of 16 who became the first Sudanese woman journalist) praised Christian missionaries for broadening Muslim women's professional and educational horizons and for educating the early leaders of the Sudanese women's movement. Nafīsa Kāmil also noted that missionary schools inspired the

formation of a local system of "Needlework Homes" (*buyūt al-khiyāṭa*) – grassroots, non-elite finishing schools – that flourished in the second quarter of the twentieth century and that trained urban northern Sudanese girls in preparation for married life. Writing in 1986, Haga Kashif Badri offered a mixed assessment of the missionary impact. On the one hand, she argued, Christian missionaries were cultural agents of imperialism who exacerbated national divisions through their work in southern Sudan. But on the other hand, she averred, missionaries were educators who opened doors of learning to Sudanese Muslim women and thereby helped them to assume more productive roles within society. These interpretations converge insofar as they suggest that, regardless of their evangelical motives or intentions, and perhaps even while sharpening Muslim consciousness around them, Christian missionaries ultimately empowered Muslim women in northern Sudan.

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Heather J. Sharkey

Education: (Early through Late) Modern

Afghanistan

Prior to 1900, schools in Afghanistan were religious and did not teach secular subjects. Students were taught by mullahs (Muslim clergy) in local mosques. The first school for girls in Afghanistan was opened in 1924 and primary education became free and compulsory by law for all children in 1931 (Kurian 1988, Sassani 1961). In spite of the new law, few schools opened in Afghanistan and most were in urban areas. Few girls enrolled in school and most female school students were urban. Children who did attend school were taught in the style of the mosque schools through dictation and rote memorization. They lacked books and teaching materials. In 1959, only 14,036 girls were in schools and only 224 of those girls were from rural areas (Sassani 1961). Poor enrollment for girls related in part to the lack of female teachers and the strong preference, especially in villages, that girls learn from female teachers.

The Soviet invasion in 1979 resulted in a prolonged war, millions of refugees fleeing the country, huge casualties, and destruction of buildings including schools. Forced Soviet education programs made Afghans suspicious of all foreign education programs, including those offered by international non-governmental organizations in refugee camps. As Afghans united in jihad against the Soviets, many women and girls were isolated in their homes and unable to participate in educational programs. This situation was due in part to fundamentalist interpretations of the tradition of purdah (separation of males and females) as well as concerns about the safety of women and girls in the violent, volatile environment of Afghanistan and refugee camps. By 1980, 89 percent of Afghans 25 years and older had no formal schooling (World Education Forum 2000). In 1988, only 19 percent of Afghan females were enrolled in primary school (Kurian 1988). The Taliban, who took control of Afghanistan in the 1990s, passed laws prohibiting girls from attending school. By 1999, humanitarian agencies operated almost all of the 446 secret girls' schools that existed in Afghanistan (Callaghan 2002). These schools were the only access girls had to education during this time.

Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, a devastated Afghanistan has been struggling to establish a peaceful, self-governing state. This impoverished nation lacks schools, books, teachers, and teacher training facilities. The traditional curriculum and teaching methods are not suited to the provision of quality education for Afghan children. Women and older girls who want to catch up on years of missed schooling are not admitted to government schools because they are too old or married. Additionally, the Soviet and Taliban legacy of suspicion and skewed interpretations of Islam continue to prevent females from accessing education. Education for women and girls is crucial to a peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan. Teacher training that promotes the use of interactive, student-centered teaching is needed, especially for female teachers. Also needed are education programs that respect Afghan cultural preferences regarding female education and programs that target women and older girls who are not served by the current fledgling educational system.

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Sakena Yacoobi

Azerbaijan

During its occupation, the Soviet regime saw the eradication of religious and nationalistic tendencies as a necessary measure to create Soviet society. To achieve its objective, it relied on several structures, including education. These structures would not only create the needed educated labor force, but one that was also less susceptible to religious and ethnic influence.

For the Soviet regime education became a window through which socialist values and goals would be taught and then passed on from one generation to the next. Yet illiteracy was prevalent

throughout the region, including the Azeri Muslim female population. To deal with the problem adequately, the state initiated several measures that would eliminate illiteracy throughout the region. The first measure entailed setting up temporary schools in any place possible, including railway cars and factories, to teach reading and writing to adults. Next the state replaced all religious schools with state-run ones and called for mandatory schooling for girls and boys, a policy that was resisted by many sectors of Muslim society. The state also involved organizations such as the Young Communist League in improving literacy among the Muslim population. Finally, the number of higher learning institutions and teacher colleges was increased, in order to provide greater educational opportunities for everyone.

By the early 1960s, the campaign had been so successful that illiteracy was virtually eliminated, and in its place a new, educated, urbanized society with access to higher education and employment opportunities had been established. Data from the 1930s till the 1970s, for example, indicate that the proportion of Muslim women in higher education rose 10 times, compared to 5.6 for men (Lapidus 1972, 159).

Yet the same data also demonstrate that the number of girls graduating from high school far exceeded the number of females graduating from college – thereby indicating that the higher the level of education, the lower the number and percentage of female students. This arrangement was sustained by the type of employment available to women once their education was complete. By directing the Azeri female population to "feminine" types of employment, the regime regenerated the continuation of a genderized form of education.

Nonetheless, in Azerbaijan expanding educational opportunities remained an integral part of the society's social structure, as more and more education came to be perceived as a key to unlock the door to economic opportunities. It also became a valuable status symbol for both men and women because it raised the status not only of a girl, but also of her future husband, since he had been able to obtain an educated, thus valuable, woman as a wife. For the Soviet regime, however, educated individuals provided other benefits. An educated labor force would carry out tasks that were essential in building a socialist nation, and would also be less prone to religious and traditional aspects of culture. Hence, Soviet education policies worked well for the regime and reasonably well for its female Muslim population, because, as education gained greater support among the Muslim population, the regime was able to create a Soviet educated labor force.

Female Azeri education in post-Soviet times

During Soviet times, the system provided free and compulsory primary and secondary education, as well as stipends and free room and board for university students. With the economic aftermath of independence the educational system changed dramatically. In the case of Azerbaijan, a newly independent Muslim nation, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict further exacerbated the situation when the fleeing of hundreds of thousands of refugees to larger cities led to greater economic constraint on an already over-burdened educational system.

Because of these economic conditions, the Soviet successor state was no longer able to provide free and adequate education and, as a result, for the first time in 70 years Azeri parents became responsible for their children's education. In primary, secondary, and specialized secondary education, for example, parents were compelled to buy books at prices they could barely afford and contribute goods and cash in order to keep the schools open.

In the upper level educational institutions the situation was no better. Because of the lack of funds, students were either no longer given stipends or they were given an amount so minimal that parents had to provide additional support for their living expenses. Financial resources, however, were only one of the problems facing students. Because of lack of funding the number of teachers decreased throughout all the countries. In some of the former republics dire economic conditions resulted in the reduction of the number of teachers, which compelled those remaining to teach several different subjects at different levels, and even outright bribery by some teachers. In many instances, students found themselves contributing to the corruptive atmosphere in order to remain in the educational system.

In addition, education continued to be generally gender-differentiated as women continued to make up the greater share of students in the fields of science, humanities, and law. Thus low wages, lack of government support for the school system, corruption and the legacy of the Soviet school system further reinforced the Soviet mentality regarding gender education.

The aftermath of independence, however, affected the rural communities the most, particularly the female population. Some parents were not financially capable of providing an education for all their children. Some also needed their children's assistance

in providing additional income either by selling goods in the market or helping around the farm. Economic desperation, coupled with a belief that a boy would grow up to be the main provider, resulted in some rural families choosing a male's education over a female's. The number of female Azeri students in secondary schooling decreased from 89,000 in 1990 to 80,000 in 1995. It is, however, important to point out that male preference was not always the reason behind a parent's decision to terminate a girl's schooling. The drop in female enrollment did not imply that girls were barred from obtaining a certain level of education. Rather, dire economic conditions prevented some Azeri women from achieving their full educational potential. Girls not only continued to generally receive a standard type of education but the society as a whole took whatever measures necessary to ensure the continued education of its women.

With continual social support for education, however, came the society's unwritten rules and regulations. As in the past, female enrollment decreased as the level of education increased. In the 1990s, more than 70 percent of female students continued to the secondary level of education. That number decreased to 60 percent when it came to enrollment in institutions of higher learning.

Today in Azerbaijan, female education continues to be gender-oriented; women continue to prepare for occupations that are viewed as more appropriate for women by traditional culture, such as medicine and teaching.

Independence made a strong imprint on the educational system of Azerbaijan. Budget cuts, shrinkage of quality education at affordable prices, and difficult living conditions led to a system that differs from the Soviet era. Yet these problems have not altered the population's perspectives on the need for female education, even though it continues to be gender-oriented. The population of Azerbaijan still regards education as a necessity for women because it will increase their ability to care for themselves in a financial emergency and, perhaps even more importantly, they will be much more marketable as brides. People generally believe that an educated girl will not only be able to get a better job, but also a better husband. Hence, the view that women should be provided with the opportunity for education not only demonstrates cultural support for female education, but also the role that cultural attitudes play in sustaining a particular belief. This is evident in the continued presence of women in educational institutions and in occupations that continue to be occupied predominantly by women.

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MITRA RAHEB

Central Asia

Central Asian society between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries was a mix of settled farmers, oasis town-dwellers, and pastoral nomads. Central Asian economies were based on agriculture, herding, small-scale manufacturing, and trade. Very few people, male or female, needed to know how to

read, write, or do more than basic arithmetic. The high culture of the elite in the cities of Bukhara, Kokand, Samarkand, and Khiva was based on that of Persia, which meant that while most inhabitants of Central Asia spoke Turkic languages, most written poetry, religious texts, and court documents were in Persian or (less often) Arabic. Below the elite level learning was passed on orally, with an emphasis on the ability to recite from memory the appropriate prayers or poems at the appropriate times.

Girls had access to basic and occasionally higher education, although they did not learn advanced Islamic law or commentaries. Mohlar oiim Nodira (1792–1842), wife of the khan of Kokand, and Uvaisii (ca. 1779–1845) and Dilshod (ca. 1801–1905) from the same region, wrote *ghazal*s and other poetry in Chaghatai Turkic and Persian. Dilshod also wrote a memoir in which she discussed her 51 years teaching hundreds of girls to be literate, "of whom close to one-quarter had a talent for poetry; they were intelligent girls" (Dilshod 1994). Their poetry reflected thorough knowledge of Persian and Turkic literature, and contained suggestions of their desire to know and be known by the larger world.

Education in the elementary *maktab* was similar enough for girls and boys below the age of puberty that they could study together, although the norm was to have sex-segregated schools. Children generally sat in the *maktab* for five years. When the future educational reformer Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954) was sent to the village boys' school at the age of six, his parents were so appalled at how little he had learned after one year that they sent him to a more orderly girls' school run by the wife of a mosque official. In both schools children began with reciting the names of the letters of the alphabet until they had memorized them, then recited from collections of short Qurʾānic verses and instructions on ritual and prayer. Texts in Arabic or Persian were not translated, however, and teachers were not concerned with making sure that children understood what they were saying. Eventually children learned selections from Persian and Turkic poetry, but they learned by reciting along with the teacher as she pointed to the words. Aini recalled in his memoirs that he could "read" any poem he had learned in school no matter how bad the handwriting, but was dumbstruck in front of texts he had never seen before. After learning the required books, the most promising boys might go on to the higher *madrasa* (seminary), but girls ended their formal education at this point.

Despite the limitations of this curriculum, some girls did discover how to read and write. When the English traveler Annette Meakin visited Russian Turkestan in the late 1890s, many of the upper-class women she met had not only gone to school but had continued to study even after marriage. Meakin visited a school in Samarkand run by the mother of the chief *qazi*'s wife. The teacher came from a line of learned women, and was also the daughter of a *mulla*. She told Meakin (through a Tatar interpreter) that she had spent much of her life reading poetry and secular books, and demonstrated that she could write as well as read original prose. When she turned 51, however, she decided that it was proper for a woman of her station to read only religious literature. Later, in the city of Marghelan, Meakin encountered two ladies who entertained her with a sort of choral reading from a book that she found shockingly immoral.

These anecdotes suggest a low but widespread level of education among Sart women (a name for settled Turks and Tajiks), with some women of the upper classes able to achieve true literacy. It also appears that the respected status of teacher was maintained as a kind of family property. Female teachers, called *otin* in the Ferghana region and *khalfa* or *bibi khalifa* further west, were regarded as suitable wives for *qazi*s or *mulla*s, creating a small class of educated families. *Otin*s passed their knowledge and their schools from mother to daughter, or to an especially bright student if there were no daughters.

The nomadic Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen tribes who wintered near towns sent some of their children to *maktab*s, but appear to have had little use for further education.

Women's education under colonial rule

The Russian military began to encroach into the northern steppe territories of the Little and Middle Kazakh Hordes in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Russia conquered the lands of the Great Horde by the 1840s, and overran the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand in the 1860s. During that long period of time, Russia's policies regarding missionaries and schools changed a great deal. Converting Muslim subjects to Russian Orthodoxy had never been a consistent priority with the tsars, and in 1788 Catherine the Great abandoned the effort in favor of incorporating a Muslim clerical establishment into her state apparatus. Initially the government encouraged Kazan Tatars to establish mosques and schools among the Kazakhs, who were regarded as pagans with a light dusting of Islam, in hopes of civilizing them. A few Orthodox

missionaries also set up Turkic-language Russian schools for the nomads, but the creator of the Russian-native school system himself did not encourage them. By the 1860s, Tatar schools were spreading Islam so successfully in the steppe that state officials became alarmed. When Russia conquered Central Asia, with its deeply conservative *madrasa*s, it was feared that Tatar missionaries would foster a pan-Islamic resistance to Russian rule while Christian missionaries would antagonize the population. Therefore the military governors-general over the region barred all missionary activity, including schools. The nominally independent emir of Bukhara and khan of Khiva also refused entry to missionaries.

In the 1870s, officials established the first Russian-native schools in Turkestan, which taught basic literacy and arithmetic, Russian, and the standard *maktab* curriculum; by 1909, there were 98 of these schools in the province. Over 20 years only a handful of girls studied in them, however, in contrast to an estimated 10,000 students in *otin* schools in 1908. The census of 1897 showed that, with substantial regional variations, 2–10 percent of Turkestani women were literate in their own language and barely 1 percent were literate in Russian. In the western Kazakh steppe, officials moved to counter Tatar influence by bringing Kazakhs into Russian schools, including 10 girls in 1888; that number increased to 52 by 1897. The girls were taught Russian and domestic skills, but were not pressured to convert. There were only a few Russian-native schools in the northern and eastern steppes; fewer than 1 percent of their pupils were Kazakh girls. Russian schools in the Transcaspian (Turkmen) district were concentrated in the capital city, Ashghabat, and were unavailable to the nomads.

Two catalysts began to change the situation in 1905: the Jadid Muslim educational reform movement and the free press unleashed by the Russian revolution of that year. The Jadid movement, started by Ottoman-influenced Tatars in the 1880s, emphasized phonetic reading and basic sciences over recitation. The first Jadid schools opened in Turkestan in 1893. The Jadids favored education for women, although with the limited aim of training enlightened mothers to raise a new generation of Muslim patriots. Reform-minded Tatar women in Turkestan and Bukhara established several new schools for girls and wrote about the dark ignorance of their Central Asian sisters in the women's serials *Suyum Bika* and *Alem-i-Nisvan*. At least one woman in Kokand agreed with them, writing a passionate letter to *Alem-i-Nisvan* in 1906 lamenting the illiteracy and oppression of Sart women and calling on them to send their children to the Tatar schools. However, Tatars regarded Central Asians as culturally backward, which Central Asians found annoying. The two groups did not work closely together. Central Asians were also more conservative regarding women's rights than were the Tatars, and up to 1917 few families sent their daughters to the new schools, although Central Asian Jadids did run several schools for girls.

Women's education in Soviet Central Asia

After the 1917–21 revolutions and civil war the Bolsheviks made educating the Russian and non-Russian "backward masses" a high priority, but their ambitions far outstripped their resources. In Central Asia the traditional, Jadid, and Russian-Soviet school systems coexisted into the late 1920s because the new state did not have the money, personnel, or textbooks to create the centralized but multi-lingual system it desired. Of the roughly 2,000 Uzbek secular teachers available in 1927, only 5 percent had studied beyond elementary school. The academy for training women teachers, the Bilim Yurt (Knowledge House) in Tashkent, graduated 14 certified teachers in 1926 out of 600 enrolled students. In 1930 the Soviet Union passed a "Universal Compulsory Primary Education" decree, which went into effect in Uzbekistan in 1931–2. However, the state only started to implement universal education in Turkmenistan in 1939–40, and in Tajikistan in 1949–50. The promise of universal education could not be fulfilled in any of the republics until sometime in the 1960s.

Soviet policies frequently worked at cross-purposes to each other. Soviet law gave all children the right to an education in their own language. Even small minority groups, such as Uyghur girls in the Bishkek region, had dedicated schools. But in the 1920s the state created the new republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and in the 1930s Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and gave each republic an artificially distinct language. The Soviets also changed the alphabets those languages were written in three times between 1923 and 1941, even as they promoted "liquidation of illiteracy" campaigns. These upheavals threw education into a chaotic situation that would not stabilize until after the Second World War.

Girls' education was an important component in the Soviets' campaign to liberate Muslim women from *ḥijāb*, child marriage, polygyny, and social seclusion. Communist activists, of whom only a small percentage were Central Asian, set up

women's clubs, or in the Kazakh steppes Red Yurts, to teach basic literacy and Communist ideology. The Commissariat of Enlightenment printed large runs of primary readers that emphasized the importance of girls' education. The state made it a crime to prevent a woman from attending school. The party intended to completely overturn traditional Central Asian society within a few years, and was frustrated when rapid shock tactics inspired more resistance than gratitude. Literacy activists in Turkmen villages could not get women to attend classes because there was no childcare, or simply no time. In Tajikistan women protested against a factory daycare facility that they feared would "turn their children into Russians" (Shukurova 1961). Everywhere families, even those active in the government, withdrew their daughters from school at puberty to marry, both because that was traditional and because there were few economic and social alternatives. Sometimes the daughters protested bitterly, but they had little leverage. There was also widespread violence: men destroyed schools rather than let their daughters attend, or assaulted and murdered girls and women.

In 1926–7 fewer than 1 percent of Turkmen girls attended school; by 1930 the figure for rural girls had risen to 9 percent. In 1927–8 Uzbek girls made up 26.1 percent of the urban school population and 11.5 percent of the rural school population. By 1938–9 these figures had risen to 42.7 percent of the urban school population and 41.7 percent of the rural. Still, in the late 1950s collective farm directors were not afraid to say openly that they saw no point in sending girls to school. In 1953, Tajikistan reported that girls made up 45 percent of fourth-graders, but only 19 percent of eighth–tenth-graders. These data do not reflect the total number of school age children in any given population. While Central Asian literacy levels did rise in the early Soviet period, girls still lagged behind boys.

Despite the enormity of the task and devastations like the purges (which destroyed the Jadids and most other Central Asian intellectuals) slow but steady educational progress continued. Even during the Second World War, new teachers' academies were built throughout Uzbekistan, which attracted mostly women. Teachers who had themselves attended school beyond the seventh grade were still unusual into the 1960s, however. The 1950s saw campaigns to build schools and reinforce compulsory primary education, especially for girls. The Soviet Union abolished sex-segregated schools in 1954. The state also improved compulsory instruction in Russian, which was the gate into higher education for all non-Russian children.

In 1958, Nikita Khrushchev began a far-reaching school reform program, which included special budgets for science laboratories and elite schools for arts and athletics as well as technical schools for children of factory workers and collective farmers. This reform, in conjunction with the spread of after-school clubs and Young Pioneer summer camps, pulled more Central Asian girls into systematic education than ever before. They studied mathematics and science, Russian and local languages and literatures, history, and European and Central Asian arts. Children spent a lot of time memorizing facts, but they also discussed readings, drew pictures and maps, built models, and watched movies or film strips if available. Schools sponsored clubs such as the "Young Historians," which constructed exhibits on historical events and wrote newspapers to be posted on walls. Pedagogical publications frequently printed photographs of girls using scientific equipment and reading books, although the frequency did not reflect reality. The curriculum was designed to produce modern Soviet children who were fluent in Russian and their native languages, had rejected religious superstition in favor of science, and took pride in native and Russian artists.

As in other colonized cultures, girls experienced more pressure than boys to conform with Soviet and traditional mores simultaneously. Women had to play a doubled gender role: as trained practical workers who had internalized Communist values and as soft wives and mothers who tended their families in accordance with both Russian and Central Asian expectations, which supported and contradicted each other in complicated ways. In schools and summer camps Uzbek girls played basketball and ran track in shorts and enjoyed "we love books" festivals, while also learning "traditional" (Sovietized) dance and music. Women became doctors, but were still expected to center their lives on marriage and children. Both Russian and Central Asian custom discouraged women from asserting themselves in the public sphere, even as girls helped produce school museum exhibits on women's heroic role in defending "the fatherland" against Arab invaders in the eighth century and anti-Soviet guerillas in the twentieth. As the percentage of women in higher education peaked in the 1970s and 1980s Moscow's enforcement of gender equity waned, and women found themselves increasingly blocked from the more prestigious occupations.

Kazakh and Kyrgyz families were more likely to send their daughters to university than were the Uzbeks or Tajiks. Beyond ethnic history, class

became the key determinant in what kind of education a girl received. Most Central Asians worked in collectivized agriculture, including the forcibly sedentarized nomads. Rural schools were dedicated to agricultural and mechanical training, and usually had the poorest resources and the least-qualified staff. They frequently could not teach required subjects due to shortages of textbooks. Few rural children learned enough Russian to enter a university even if their families were willing. Soviet cultural power was weak in the countryside. Polygyny and underage marriage never entirely died out, and the problem of girls leaving school at puberty was never solved. In the mid-1980s there was an outbreak of rural Uzbek girls setting themselves on fire, apparently to protest at their restricted lives, although the exact causes and severity of the problem have never been clear.

Workers' children attended schools with a vocational focus. These had better resources, but the children spent part of their day doing factory work. In 1964, tenth-grader Mavjuda Rasuleva of Andijon got her picture in the *Teachers' Newspaper* for stitching 120 percent of her quota for *doppa*s, traditional Uzbek hats. Under Uzbekistan's cotton monoculture urban and rural children alike were pressed into picking cotton by hand, a burden that fell disproportionately on women and girls. A woman who had grown up in Chimkent, Kazakhstan and then moved to Tashkent for medical school in the late 1960s was surprised at how lax Uzbek school standards were, and blamed it on the fact that students had to pick cotton three to five months a year. Children of the political, cultural, and economic elites generally escaped this forced labor and, not coincidentally, received the best educations with the best resources.

Despite the inequalities in the late Soviet system, elementary education was indeed close to universal, and girls in cities and towns received a rigorous education that could match the best in the world. Fourteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Central Asian parents look on their school years as a lost golden age, and fear for the future of their own children.

Post-Soviet Central Asia: decline and corruption

The Communist Party destroyed the Muslim schools, and several generations of clergy and teachers with them, but never eradicated Islam's cultural power. The *otin*s, who had been derided by Communists and Jadids alike as ignorant women peddling superstition, were protected enough by this contempt to survive and continue teaching. By the 1970s they were being studied as repositories of folklore, and after 1991 resumed a more public role. They may be the only teachers whose place in life has improved, however.

The Central Asian republics did not choose independence – it happened to them when the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991. The governing elites changed their parties' names and stayed in power except in Tajikistan, which collapsed into civil war in 1992. The other republics have drifted into varying degrees of authoritarian nationalism, marked by increasing corruption and economic degradation. Education has suffered accordingly.

The roots of the problem are poverty and political choices over how to allocate scarce resources. The former Soviet countries needed to rewrite textbooks and update pedagogical methods, for which they received significant international help. Nonetheless, while UNICEF (the United Nations Children's Fund) reported in 2002 that the population of school age children in Uzbekistan was roughly 6.3 million, new history textbooks have been printed in inadequate runs of 20,000 to 200,000. The Asian Development Bank has sponsored textbook rental plans to try to make up for the shortfall, but they have not yet entirely succeeded. Teacher salaries are low, the equivalent of $30 a month. Low pay and poor conditions have driven many experienced male teachers from the profession. Many schools can no longer teach all of their required subjects for lack of personnel. While being a teacher commanded respect in the Soviet Union, the job has become a low-skill ghetto for neighborhood women who have only a temporary commitment. As one relatively affluent mother told this writer, when parents in her neighborhood find a good teacher they pool their own funds to supplement her salary so that she will stay at the school.

The Uzbek government's educational reform programs tend to look better on paper than in reality. In 1997, the Uzbek parliament passed a "National Skills Formation Directive" that divided school structure into nine years of compulsory education followed by a variety of elective technical colleges or liberal arts lyceums. At the end of nine years students are examined in Uzbek and Russian, mathematics, sciences, Uzbek history, physical fitness, and a subject called "Concepts of national independence and the foundations of spirituality." Many urban schools also teach English or other foreign languages. Only one-third of Uzbek students continue through the eleventh grade.

Inadequate textbooks, teachers, and school facilities, especially in the countryside where 70 percent of the Uzbek population still lives, create a barrier that prevents many children from advancing to higher education. The government provides free books and warm clothing to poor students, but this cannot compensate for all of the deficiencies in the system. UNICEF's survey also found that 60 percent of Uzbek schools do not have toilets or running water. In April 2005, the ministry of education decreed that teachers must wear uniforms approved by (and purchased from) their school management. The decree included a ban on makeup and jewelry, and was ostensibly to enforce standards of modesty. However, the uniforms can cost two-thirds of a teacher's monthly salary, leading to protests and more teachers quitting their jobs. The reasons for this action remain unclear.

Children of the elites can still get an excellent education. Those who attend advanced humanities lyceums or the specialized arts and sports schools that remain from Soviet times have access not only to the best teachers and materials, but to computers and the Internet as well. In addition to the traditional subjects, lyceum students study English, world history, and electives like Chaghatai Turkic. In 2002–3 they began to learn about AIDS, a growing problem in Uzbekistan. Proportionately fewer girls than boys attend these schools and other higher educational institutions.

Corruption has become a large problem throughout the educational system. Parents must pay under-the-table fees to enroll students in kindergartens and schools that are ostensibly free, and buy gifts, really salary supplements, for teachers. At higher levels students from wealthy families can buy places in a university and grades for classes, while doing minimal studying. Since 1997, entrance to university has been determined by a brutal set of examinations in history, literature, mathematics, physics, and other topics. The history test alone consists of 848 multiple choice questions. Even the top lyceum students would struggle with this material, but students with money do not need to – they can just buy an answer key for 100,000 *so'm* (equivalent to $100, well beyond the reach of most Uzbeks). One newspaper reported that during the 2002 examinations half the students in a testing auditorium were openly using the crib sheets.

Poor but bright students are all but locked out of higher education, and even those who do make it through have trouble finding employment afterwards. As in many developing countries more than half of Uzbekistan's population is under the age of 25, but most of those young people are not able to find ways to realize their ambitions. Young Uzbeks with a good education are trying to enroll in European or North American universities, from which they would not be likely to return.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (before the March 2005 revolution) updated their curricula but otherwise maintained the Soviet system intact. Their schools have been in better condition than those of the other republics, but lack of state funds and low teacher salaries have also caused a decline in quality.

The situation in Turkmenistan is considerably worse. President-for-Life Saparmurat Niyazov reduced compulsory education to nine years and then gutted the remaining schools by firing 12,000 teachers and dropping humanities subjects in favor of memorizing his own *Rukhnama* (Book of the soul) and learning vocational and technical skills.

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Shoshana Keller

Great Britain

Introduction

Muslim women and girls are largely invisible in the vast research literature on schooling in Western Europe. The research on girls, gender, and education tends to treat girls as a homogeneous group, acknowledging minority ethnic students but often failing to consider the wide range of socioeconomic, cultural, and religious differences among minority ethnic girls and young women. When data are available about different ethnic groupings, the categorization is often by family country of origin; we can only infer religious tradition or affiliation from categories such as Bangladeshi or Pakistani heritage. Most of the research literature and professional guidance available to schools addresses Muslim students as a whole, failing to discuss the specific needs and experiences of female students and sometimes generalizing from the experiences of male students. In England, there are no educational policies to deal with increased hostility toward young Muslims (Tomlinson 2005). It has been argued that the failure of successive governments to develop a curriculum for a multiethnic society has contributed to an increase in racism and xenophobia in Britain (Osler and Morrison 2001, Tomlinson 2005).

Britain is among a number of European nations which became increasingly diverse in the period following the Second World War, when large numbers of individuals from former colonies in Asia and the Caribbean migrated in order to improve their economic status. From the late 1950s, these migrants included significant numbers of Muslim men from Pakistan, and later from Bangladesh, often intending to spend just a few years in Britain before returning home to settle with their families. Although the 1950s and 1960s marked a time of full employment, migrant workers were vulnerable to exploitation; racism effectively operated to deskill and segregate many of them into low-paid work. In 1962, the Conservative government passed the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, designed to reduce the annual number of new arrivals, by restricting entry to those with employment vouchers (offers of employment). From this period, a number of the men began sending for their families, realizing that their long-term futures were likely to be in Britain. In 1968, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was hurriedly pushed through parliament to prevent free entry into Britain of Kenyan Asians who were British passport holders, following their threatened expulsion from Kenya. A number of Kenyan Asians who eventually settled in Britain were Muslims.

Problems of racism and racist violence were often explained in terms of the migrants, and their numbers in the country. This question of numbers was also reflected in discussions of education policy, where *numbers* of black and minority ethnic students were seen to constitute a problem. The Immigration Act of 1971, which came into force in 1973, brought an end to all primary immigration and further restricted the entry of dependants. The Race Relations Act 1968 was the first piece of anti-discrimination legislation which applied to education. It was further strengthened by the Race Relations Act 1976. This entry focuses on the period of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when concerns were developing among educationalists and within communities about the education of minority ethnic children, including those of Muslim backgrounds. It was not until the publication of the Swann Report (Department of Education and Science 1985) that there was any real official acknowledgment of the ways in which the school system was failing these groups of young people.

Educational performance

In a number of Western European countries there is growing awareness of an attainment gap between national and local average school performance and the performance of students from specific minority groups. In France, for example, there is a tendency for this attainment gap to be explained more or less exclusively in terms of social class. In England there are no national data cross-tabulating educational attainment with religious affiliation, but two under-attaining groups, those of Pakistani/Kashmiri heritage and those of Bangladeshi heritage, make up two-thirds of the 1.6 million Muslims in Britain (ONS 2003).

British Muslim girls of Pakistani and Bangladeshi descent are closing the gap between their school performance and that of white British girls. Whereas in the mid-1990s both girls and boys from Bangladeshi families were the most likely group to leave school without any educational qualifications (Gillborn 1997, Arnot et al. 1998), by 2004, 55.2 percent of Bangladeshi girls achieved more than 5 A–C grades at GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) examinations aged 16 as did 52.1 percent of Pakistani girls, compared with 57.3 percent of white British girls. British Muslim girls are outperforming both British Muslim boys (41 percent of Bangladeshi boys and 38.8 percent of Pakistani boys achieved these grades) and white British boys (44.3 percent) (DfES 2005). Very little is known of the school attainment of the remaining third of British Muslim students, who are drawn from a range of ethnic groups and regions, including India (especially Gujarat), Turkey, North Africa, and the Middle East.

Career aspirations

A study in Scotland, which set out to investigate why South Asian women were underrepresented in the workforce during the 1980s, examined the career aspirations of girls from a range of religious traditions, including Islam. The study suggested that their range of career aspirations was as broad as that of their white female counterparts and that parental influences played a part in decision-making for both white and South Asian girls. The study concluded that assumptions made about South Asian girls by teachers and careers advisers, together with concerns about *izzat** meant that that they were often denied access to particular careers and to financial independence (Thornley and Siann 1991). Research with adolescent Muslim girls in England (British born and/or brought up in Britain), their parents and teachers, found that parents sought careers for their daughters that would not jeopardize the girls' safety or reputation in any way. The study noted that parental attitudes to women's employment varied among families, and sometimes within them. Teachers sometimes assumed that for these girls marriage and a career were mutually exclusive, while the young women and their parents sought to avoid careers that might involve them in un-Islamic activities (Basit 1996).

Education, religion, and family

Research into the schooling and family values of British Muslim girls suggests that a number of girls and young women are subject to the stereotyped judgments of their teachers, who misinterpret religious-cultural values and assume girls experience an oppressive home culture, when parents are, in fact, seeking to protect their children from racism and violence to which ethnic minorities are especially vulnerable. The research suggests that parents exert influence over their daughters through a subtle mixture of freedom and control. Daughters engage in a process of negotiation, while being cognizant of the concept of family honor, tending to refrain from activities that could jeopardize it.

There has been very little research on the relationships between education authorities and Muslim families in enabling the education of young Muslim women in Great Britain, even though blame for problems relating to the education of daughters is regularly located within their families. Basit (1997a) concludes that one of the major difficulties arising in schools is the failure of education systems and individual teachers to recognize both the dynamic and varied family experiences of young Muslim women and to accept that family values are themselves subject to change and development as Muslim families find a way of resolving ideas facing them within British society.

The degree to which families support their daughters' education is likely to depend on a number of factors, including the sensitivity of public school systems to the religious and cultural needs of Muslim girls; opportunities to engage in further and higher education in the locality; parents' own educational backgrounds and experiences; and specific cultural factors. There is growing evidence of increased participation in higher education among young Muslim women, which suggests that increasing numbers of families are recognizing the cultural value which Islam accords education, including girls' education.

Islamic schools

The role of faith schools, and particularly Islamic schools, within the state system of education has

provoked much debate in Western Europe, particularly in countries such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which have a tradition of public funding of faith-based education. Much of the public controversy about Islamic schools has focused on the degree to which they enable girls to play a full role within society, although the research evidence suggests that parents select faith schools with the intention of promoting a holistic approach to their education, so that their daughters will have the opportunity to situate learning about faith and moral issues within a comprehensive learning program, rather than face conflicts between what is taught at school and what is what is taught at home or in a supplementary school (Osler and Hussain 1995, 2005).

In 1998, the Islamic Primary School in London and Al-Furqan School in Birmingham – both girls' schools – became the first two Islamic schools in Britain to receive public funding. The Labour government's more recent commitment to expanding the number of faith schools has proved more controversial. Some of the opposition comes from those opposed to the public funding of any faith schools, whether these be Christian, Jewish, Islamic, Sikh, or any other religion. Those who adopt this line and who argue for an exclusively secular system rarely address the practical issues arising from the long-standing engagement of Christian denominations in the history of mass-schooling in Britain. Publicly-funded faith schools are all required to comply with the requirements of the national curriculum. Any privately-run Islamic school that follows the national curriculum and can demonstrate that it meets a range of agreed standards can apply to join the public school system. This is an attractive option for many schools that are struggling to survive and which are dependent on donations and on student fees.

Islamophobia

Increasingly, the literature on Muslim students and schooling in Western Europe emphasizes that young women and men are being educated in a context where Islamophobia appears to be on the increase. Research by both academics and educational practitioners suggests how educational policymakers and school leaders might respond to challenge Islamophobia as a form of racism (Van Driel 2004). Some of the issues that schools are urged to address are: the media association between Islam and terrorism; recognition that faith plays a important part in the world-view of many young people of Muslim heritage; recognition within school curricula of the achievements of Islamic civilizations; under-attainment of Muslim pupils within many Western European education systems; debate about what it means to be a European Muslim; and effective partnerships between mainstream and Islamic supplementary schools (Coles 2004).

These debates are being led by Muslim educators, from a range of cultural backgrounds, including women and men of Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and East African heritage and others who are converts to Islam. As particular populations become more established, so individuals have sought to influence local education policies and practices, as elected members of local councils and as members of school governing bodies. British schools in visibly multicultural areas have attempted, over the period since the 1970s, to broaden their curricula in response to the cultural needs of students, but many Muslims feel that there has been less sensitivity to specific religious needs. Following the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s, many European Muslim students arrived as refugees in Britain. Processes of globalization mean that today's Muslim population in Britain is extremely diverse, leading to further debates about how schools can respond to students' specific religious needs and how these might be identified among Muslims of different cultural backgrounds.

* *Izzat* is an Urdu term, which can mean different things depending on context. The most common meanings are honor, prestige, modesty, virtue, respect (Basit 1997a).

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Audrey Osler

Indonesia

This entry discusses the education of women in Indonesia, focusing on the modern era (from the nineteenth century) and on education provided by the state. After a slow start, by the end of the twentieth century Indonesia, the largest Islamic society in the world, had succeeded in providing relatively equal and universal access to education at primary and lower secondary levels of schooling. Much remains to be done at higher levels in a country that is geographically dispersed and ethnically very diverse, and still predominantly rural and relatively poor. Moreover, concern is only just beginning to be focused on the content of education, including its gender bias.

Premodern education

When in the seventeenth century the Dutch began to colonize the territory now known as Indonesia, education of children there occurred mainly within the family and, for some boys, within religious institutions. Waves of world religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity) reached the shores of the archipelago from about the fifth century onwards, bringing with them the teaching of sacred texts. Thus the Balinese taught the reading and writing of Hindu texts, while in most other regions Islam gradually displaced or overlaid earlier Hindu and Buddhist learning, and Christian missionaries spread their teachings in a few pockets of the archipelago. Because reliable data are lacking, the extent of literacy is not known. Although formal schooling was reserved for boys, it seems that many girls learned to read and write at home, mainly in local languages and for social and business purposes (many women were traders). Many Muslim parents considered it desirable for daughters to be taught to recite the Qur'ān in Arabic, but their main education was in skills such as weaving, cooking, childcare, trading, and farming, in preparation for an early marriage.

Colonial education

Modern-style schooling, providing secular instruction, did not really begin until the nineteenth century when the Dutch, having occupied most of the archipelago, introduced schools primarily to train men for colonial administration. The government funded a few schools in urban areas, mostly in Java, the main center of population, teaching in Dutch and in Malay, the lingua franca of the archipelago. Institutions were also opened to train men as doctors and women as midwives and nurses. In addition Western education was offered in some private schools, including those established by missions. Most children attending these modern schools were from European or Eurasian families, who wanted their children educated in the Dutch fashion. Few Indonesian parents considered it desirable to send their daughters to school, considering the cost, traditional objections to the mixing of the sexes, and the lack of employment opportunities for educated women. At the end of the nineteenth century there were only about 15,000 Indonesian girls in Western-style schools, about one-sixth of the total Indonesian pupils, in a population of some 30 million people at that time (van Bemmelen 1982, 27).

The real expansion of modern education dates from the early twentieth century, promoted by the official adoption of the so-called Ethical Policy in 1901, whereby the Dutch recognized an obligation to improve the standard of living of their colonial subjects. The number and range of government-funded schools were greatly increased, although they still offered education to only a small minority of the population: the main beneficiaries remained Europeans. The introduction of vernacular language schools for Chinese- and Malay-speaking children, however, extended access at least to pri-

mary schooling. Under the influence of Western education, Islamic schools too were being transformed during the early twentieth century to take on more secular teaching such as basic mathematics and literacy in non-Arabic languages such as Malay.

During the early decades of the twentieth century the state school system was racially streamed, consisting of schools based on the Netherlands curriculum intended for European children, separate schools using the Dutch medium for Chinese and "Native" children, vernacular schools (teaching in, for example, Malay, Balinese, or Javanese) for village children, and linkage schools to enable Indonesian children to learn Dutch in preparation for attending secondary schools and tertiary institutions where all teaching was in that language. The colonial system of formal education was thus highly fragmented and not well articulated, so that it was difficult for a child who attended a village school, where the teaching medium was in the vernacular, to access higher levels of education. Not surprisingly, such schooling continued to be dominated by European and Eurasian offspring. The 1930 census showed that more than 92 percent of adult Indonesians were illiterate, including almost 98 percent of women. Little advanced education was available and some Indonesians, including a few women, attended universities in the Netherlands.

A major influence in colonial education policy at the beginning of the century was J. H. Abendanon (1852–1925), the colonial Director of Education. Both he and his wife, Rosa Abendanon (1857–1944), befriended the young aristocratic Javanese woman, Raden Ajeng Kartini whose educational ambitions they encouraged. Kartini (1879–1904) had benefited from Dutch elementary schooling but was unable to go further because of parental disapproval. Her impassioned plea for education for girls won wide sympathy when Dutch friends arranged for the posthumous publication of her letters in 1911. Like most other Indonesians of that period, Kartini's parents preferred separate rather than coeducational schooling for their daughters, but the Dutch authorities were reluctant to fund such schools. It took private initiatives by Dutch and Indonesian educationalists to establish schools for girls. Thus the Dutch founded schools named in honor of Kartini, and Indonesian women such as Rohana Kudus (1884–1972), Dewi Sartika (1884–1947) and Rahmah El Yunusiyyah (1900–69) set up their own schools for girls. As more Indonesian parents, and those of immigrant ethnic minorities such as Arabs and Chinese, came increasingly to accept mixed primary schools, the numbers of girls at government-funded schools rose dramatically in the colonial period. In 1939, about 62,000 Indonesian girls attended schools and higher education institutions (most of them state-funded). However, this constituted less than a quarter of the total number of Indonesians enrolled, at a time when the colony's population stood at 60 million (van Bemmelen 1982, 185, 204).

Although access to modern education was very limited, it had a radical effect on many girls. The best-known example is undoubtedly Kartini, but the women who founded the new women's organizations of the early twentieth century are also evidence of the impact of the ideas imbibed in school. Teaching embodied Western middle-class notions about femininity that meshed with well-entrenched upper-class Javanese views that the inherent nature of women (*kodrat*) was different from that of men: in particular they were destined for motherhood. Yet Western schooling exposed Indonesian girls to a range of ideas that often challenged what they learnt at home, encouraging an independent, questioning attitude to life that inspired many women to take up non-traditional activities, such as joining modern social and nationalist organizations.

During the period of Japanese occupation (1942–5) funding for education shrank, but important changes were made affecting the future of the education system. Determined to erase the Dutch colonial influence, the Japanese abolished the teaching of the Dutch language and instead promoted Bahasa Indonesia, an extension of Malay that the Indonesian nationalist movement had adopted as the national, unifying language. Its continued universal use created uniformity and greater ease of access to higher levels of education than during Dutch rule.

Education since independence

The new republican government formed after the declaration of independence in August 1945 was strongly committed to mass education, at least at the primary level. At that time it was estimated that fewer than half the children of primary school age were enrolled (Oey-Gardiner 1997, 140). In line with the constitution, which rejected the notion of an Islamic state, governments since 1945 have also chosen a secular state education system, although the state does extensively subsidize religious schools that conform to its criteria.

For some years, as the republic struggled against Dutch efforts to re-establish their control, little could be done about education, but once the transfer of sovereignty took place in 1949 a rapid expansion of the schooling system occurred. The history

of education since then has been one of increasing access to schooling and literacy more generally, for both sexes. The education system consists of six years of primary school for children from seven years of age and two secondary levels of three years each – junior and senior. Higher education is offered in universities, technical institutes, and a range of other award-granting institutions. Beyond the primary level, the demand for education has far outstripped the ability of the state system to meet it, with the result that in the 1990s there were more students at private secondary schools and universities than at public-funded ones, although many private establishments were state-subsidized. Many private educational institutions are religious-based, mostly Islamic.

Indonesian governments have been strongly committed to equality in education. The emphasis at first was on universal primary schooling, which was only achieved in practice by the end of the 1980s after the bounty of the oil boom in the 1970s expanded government resources. Until then it had not been possible for schools to be built and staffed in the many remote rural areas of Indonesia. Foreign aid, readily available since the inception of the New Order, has also helped to expand educational spending. By the mid-1990s, when the population of Indonesia had reached 200 million, 95 percent of children of primary school age were enrolled at school (UNDP 2001, 176). Although in 1990 the government adopted a policy of nine years compulsory universal education by the year 2005, the timetable will not be achieved; even when the new goal was announced, about a third of children did not complete primary school. Retention rates decline still further at secondary level and rapidly thereafter. Only about 10 percent of young people attended higher education in the early 1990s.

Apart from regular schooling, governments have attempted to encourage adult literacy by other means, including intensive campaigns and "packages" of teaching materials for people who cannot or choose not to attend schools. This is in recognition of the fact that child labor continues to be widespread in Indonesia and that poverty, distance, parental preference, and perceptions about the lack of relevance of schooling still keep many children out of school. Technology has extended the opportunities for people to learn outside the classroom. While consumption of the printed word remains low, first radio, then television, and now computers have increased access to new ideas and skills, although only the first two are as yet widespread. An Open University, making use of new technology, was started in 1995.

As far as gender differences in access to education are concerned, the point of divergence has been when primary school graduates have to transfer to junior secondary schools, a shift that for rural families may require sending their children by bus into town or even finding accommodation at a distance from home. At this stage some parents still consider this undesirable for their daughters, and the expense of schooling, although low, is an obstacle in what remains a poor country. Given the need to choose, sons get priority. It should be remembered that formal education supplements, but may also conflict with, instruction within the home, where girls are still taught to take a greater share of household chores than boys. Moreover, even with the same level of education, men earn more than women (Oey-Gardiner 1997, 151–2). At secondary and tertiary levels of education, where the proportion of children at school drops considerably, girls lag behind boys. The ratio of girls to boys at primary level in the 1990s was around 93 percent, dropping to 87 percent at lower secondary and 85 percent at higher secondary schools (Oey-Gardiner 1997, 147). The drop-out rate is highest among the poor and in rural areas. Although around 93 percent of girls are enrolled in primary school, still only 8 percent of girls reached the tertiary level in the 1990s compared with 15 percent of boys (UNDP 2001, 221).

Access to education has always been an important topic in Indonesia, including its gender aspects, particularly since the international attention fostered by the United Nations Decade for Women (1975–85). Less scrutiny has been given to the content or methods of education. The general quality of the education system has, however, frequently been criticized. In part this has been the result of low per capita expenditure on education, but it was also a consequence of tight control exerted by the New Order regime, involving prescribed textbooks, rote-learning and centralized examinations, and centralized appointment of teaching staff. Although at higher levels of the system increasingly students were taught in private institutions because government-funded schools could not meet demand, most private schools were also subject to strict government supervision. As a result, there was increased uniformity in the content and and pedagogy of Indonesian education. Although justified in the name of equality and national unity, this system has been regressive in a number of ways. For instance, ethnic traditions have been suppressed as

Chinese minorities and regional groups have been forced to comply with Jakarta's standards.

Until recently, the gendered content of educational policy was not subject to critical scrutiny, partly because of the priority given to making schooling more accessible for girls, partly because of the New Order government's well-known suppression of criticism, and partly because the gender bias built into the education system reflects conservative values endemic in Indonesian society. Gender bias had been built into the system first by the Dutch and subsequently by policymakers such as Ki Hajar Dewantara (1889–1959) who was the first minister of education in the independent Republic of Indonesia and a long-standing educational advisor. Other prominent educationists had also taught or been educated in Taman Siswa schools. From the 1920s Dewantara and his wife (Nyi Hajar Dewantara, 1890–1972) developed the Taman Siswa system of secular nationalist education, which has strongly influenced education thinking in Indonesia. The couple had received teacher training in the Netherlands when Dewantara was exiled from 1913 to 1919 for nationalist political activities. Incorporating Javanese, Islamic, Indian, and European educational ideas, Taman Siswa pedagogy encouraged the education of girls but retained some conservative assumptions about gender differences, justified by reference to *kodrat* and reflected in rules such as those pertaining to subjects, sports, and comportment deemed suitable for boys and girls. Girls were considered to have a stronger moral sensibility than boys and to be destined for motherhood. These ideas, already incorporated into the education system, were not challenged by the New Order regime. Hence textbooks tended to depict women and girls in stereotyped nurturing, child-rearing, and domestic roles while boys and men dominated the public sphere. Continuing a practice started in the colonial era, some secondary schools were also designated to specialize in home economics; they were attended exclusively by girls, just as the technical schools that taught trades were the preserve of boys. (The vast majority of secondary school pupils, however, have always attended schools with a general curriculum.) Amongst teaching staff, women are concentrated at the lower levels.

The fact that Indonesian governments have promoted secular education has caused little friction with devout Muslims, since Islam in Indonesia is tolerant and the values of state education have generally been acceptable to most Muslims. On gender issues, although the notion of *kodrat* accords with Indonesian Islam, there was conflict when the wearing of Islamic head-coverings by girls was forbidden in state schools in 1982. In this case opposition from Islamic organizations led to the withdrawal of that prohibition a decade later.

Current concerns

The Asian financial crisis of 1998 caused great concern about access to education in Indonesia, as government funding shrank and parents took their children out of school to reduce costs and contribute to family income. There is some evidence that girls were more affected than were boys by these events. More positively, the democratization of Indonesia since the end of the New Order in 1998 has enabled fresh approaches to thinking about education. The highly centralized, rote-learning system is being dismantled and more attention is being paid to the content of education. For instance, the National Human Rights Commission and women's organizations recently criticized sex-stereotyping in school texts and the tendency of girls to take up a limited range of subjects, particularly at higher levels, thus limiting their career options (National Human Rights Commission 2001). There is a clear connection between lower levels and kinds of education that girls receive and the fact that they are employed in less remunerative jobs.

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Susan Blackburn

Iran

The twentieth century was an era of expanding educational opportunity for women in Iran. Previously, and throughout most of the modern period, whatever formal education was available was afforded primarily to males, in anticipation of their adult roles as their families' breadwinners, spokespersons, and political representatives. In Iran, as elsewhere, the gradual extension of schooling to girls was accompanied by sometimes small but still significant changes in adult women's economic and political roles and hence in the cultural conception of gender. This is a link well appreciated by the earliest promoters of women's education, by the Pahlavi shahs, and by religious authorities, both before and after the establishment of an Islamic republican government.

Despite weaknesses and inconsistencies in the statistical data, the overall picture is clear:

1. Enrollment at all levels increased continuously over the century, to over 16 million in elementary and secondary schools in 1996.
2. The female proportion of the total enrollment increased consistently, to approximately 48 percent of elementary and secondary enrollment in 1996.
3. An increasing proportion of the school age population, female as well as male, has attended school; 90 percent of girls aged 6–9 and 83 percent of girls aged 10–14 were enrolled in school in 1996, compared to 93 percent and 91 percent for boys of the same age groups.
4. An increasing proportion of the population, both male and female, has been classified as literate, rising to 74 percent of the female population age 6 and above in 1996 and 85 percent of the male population.
5. The gap between male and female literacy rates and male and female school enrollment has declined.

These trends have characterized rural as well as urban Iran (Mehran 1999, 206, Aghajanian 1992, 47), less economically developed as well as more economically developed provinces, and less Persian (as measured by language ability) as well as more Persian provinces (Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1992, 25, 28–9).

Until the late nineteenth century, schooling in Iran was provided by the religious establishment and was largely limited to males. The first modern schools, based on European models, were established by missionaries, attended primarily by non-Muslims, and intended almost exclusively for boys. Only in 1906 was a missionary school established for girls that admitted Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Beginning in 1890, a few public elementary schools were established in Iran, and the first public elementary school for girls opened in 1897–8.

As the twentieth century dawned, calls were increasingly made for the establishment of non-missionary schools and the extension of modern education to a larger proportion of the Iranian population. The women's movement of the Constitutional Revolution period (1906–11) through the end of the Qajar era (1925) was particularly active in promoting women's education, and a number of girls' schools were established, some by women individually or collectively. The Supplementary Constitutional Law of 1907 and the Fundamental Law of Education of 1911 established the basis for government-supported universal public education, and in 1918 the government established ten primary schools for girls and opened a teacher training college for women.

Both Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925–79), and his son Mohammad Reza Shah were firm believers in the power of education to shape society. They supported universal education as a means of promoting the economic development of the country, fostering a more unified national culture, and enhancing political support for their rule. Both encouraged the Westernization of many aspects of Iranian culture, including

gender roles, and both used formal education to this end.

Formal education for both boys and girls expanded considerably under the watch of Reza Shah (1925–41). Besides promoting elementary and secondary education for girls, Reza Shah initiated adult literacy programs for women as well as men and ensured that the University of Tehran admitted female students only one year after it opened in 1935. Elementary and secondary education and female enrollment expanded even more dramatically under Mohammad Reza Shah, supported in part through oil wealth. To speed the expansion of education in rural areas, Mohammad Reza Shah established the Literacy Corps in 1963 as an alternative to ordinary military service, and in 1968 a parallel women's Literacy Corps was established. In addition, adult literacy education for women as well as men was reinforced, and technical and vocational secondary schools were established, including a few for females.

Both the Pahlavi shahs used educational institutions to promote an increased public role for women, the desegregation of public spaces, and the unveiling of women. Female teachers were encouraged or required to unveil; coeducational schools were established; textbooks portrayed a desegregated social sphere; and the curriculum was largely the same for boys and girls. Under the leadership of women of the royal family, the women's movement of the Pahlavi era worked to promote women's education, through lectures and publications, literacy classes, and vocational training for women. Women also supported education for women through the parliament, once they were extended the vote and the right to run for office in 1963; Farroukhru Parsa, one of the first women elected to parliament, became minister of education in 1968 and the first woman in Iran to hold a cabinet position.

From the Qajar era through the 1970s, the establishment of modern schools, whether for boys or girls, and the extension of modern education to an ever larger proportion of the population was opposed by many Muslim religious authorities. They rightly perceived this as a threat to the monopoly they had held on education, as an attempt to undermine their power in society, and as an effort to Westernize the country. When religious authorities came to power in 1979, they did not dismantle the system of modern education they had inherited, however. Rather, they sought to reform it so that it would support their values and vision for Iran. Like the Pahlavi shahs, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who became the first ruling *faqīh* (supreme jurisprudent), the final authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran, believed in the power of education to transform society.

Girls and women were not neglected in the educational programs of the Islamic Republic. Female enrollment continued to expand, and the Literacy Movement of Iran has been concerned largely with women. The educational reforms introduced by the Islamic Republican government, including sex segregation in virtually all schools and literacy classes, modest dress requirements for teachers and students, religious vetting of teachers, and curricular changes promoting Islamic values, have in some ways facilitated the expansion of women's education. Conservative parents are more comfortable sending their daughters to school, and adult women face less opposition from the men of their family to their participation in literacy classes. The need for female personnel for sex-segregated institutions has also encouraged the growth of teacher education for women and the advancement of females into administrative positions.

Is the purpose of female education to prepare young women for the workforce, or to prepare them to become better housewives and mothers? This was debated by educationists in the Pahlavi era and by religious authorities in the Islamic Republic. Most schools for girls in all eras did prepare them for higher education, but some also included practical subjects such as housekeeping and childcare. The small differences in curricula that have existed have also been directed toward preparing women for domestic roles, and technical-vocational education has shown pronounced gender differences, with virtually no girls in the agricultural and technical branches.

The expansion of female education has not led to a comparable increase in economic activity for women in Iran (never more than 15 percent for women aged 10 and over). While women with college degrees have a high economic activity rate (78 percent), only 16.7 percent of women with secondary diplomas were economically active in 1996, compared with 79.8 percent of men with secondary diplomas (Mehryar et al. 2004, 198). Nevertheless, the existence of some educated women employed in many spheres has helped to change the definition of women's roles, particularly when compared with the early twentieth century. In addition, the expansion of female education has contributed to the rising age at first marriage for women, which tends to increase young women's power in the family.

While in every generation proponents of education, and especially women's education, have been

disappointed with the pace of change, formal education has increasingly become a part of most women's lives in Iran, as elsewhere.

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PATRICIA J. HIGGINS

North America

As the education of Muslims, male and female, in North America is a relatively new field, scholars have had some difficulty in researching it and in citing sources and footnotes. A trickle of scholarship on the subject has been of some help, but researchers have had to supplement it with anecdotal material. Undoubtedly, as interest in Islam continues to rise following 11 September 2001, more formal and comprehensive studies will be undertaken, necessitating updates of this entry.

Muslim educators in North America note little difference in the education of girls and boys at the K–12 level (from kindergarten to grade 12, ages 6 through 18). Schooling in the United States and Canada is compulsory through high school, but that aside, education is considered a key duty in Islam for both genders, and it is particularly important among immigrants, many of whom come in search of better education opportunities for themselves and their children. Although educators could cite no studies on the subject, they note no gender discrepancy in graduation rates and patterns of school leaving. They emphasized that girls' education is valued in most Muslim societies around the world, and that Taliban-like restrictions are the exception. However, they do note a higher percentage of girls in North America attending full-day Islamic school – up to 60 to 65 percent are girls, and the percentage rises in the high school grades. This is generally attributed to both a greater desire on the part of parents to protect girls from social pressures in the general population and also a fear that in public or non-Islamic schools, girls wearing headscarves could be singled out for more harassment or discrimination than boys, who are assumed to fit in better. The question of whether the gender discrepancy in enrollment has to do with higher educational aspirations for boys among parents who believe that public schools offer higher quality education was disputed by some educators, but others agreed it might be the case.

No study has counted the number of Muslim students in North America and where they attend school, but educators estimate that 90 to 95 percent of Muslims of K–12 age (boys and girls) attend public schools in the United States; in Canada the number is 85 to 89 percent. Some receive no formal Islamic education outside the home, but many attend weekend Islamic schools and after-school programs, usually held in mosques or Islamic centers. These teach basic Islamic principles, Qur'ān study, and Arabic or other languages such as Urdu or Farsi. Educators report a balanced gender distribution among these schools. They are attended mostly by children who attend public or other non-Islamic schools either because there are no nearby Islamic schools or because the available Islamic schools are seen by their parents as too expensive or not academically rigorous enough.

There are over 235 full-day Islamic schools in the United States, enrolling an estimated 35,000 to 45,000 students, and over 50 schools in Canada. In the United States, 1 to 2 percent of Muslim children attend full-day Islamic schools. The number of full-day Islamic schools has been steadily increasing, especially in recent years, but all are relatively new. Most were established within the last ten years (a 1987 tally counted 50 schools in the United States).

Some of the oldest schools date to the late 1970s. In the 1970s and 1980s, as more Muslims moved to the United States but before the proliferation of Islamic schools, some Muslims sent their daughters to full-day Catholic schools. These were seen to offer a similar protection from social ills that Islamic schools are seen to offer now.

The biggest clusters of Islamic schools are in areas with the largest, oldest, and best-established Muslim populations, such as the New York/New Jersey area and Chicago. Many have Arabic names evoking desired goals, such as Al Noor (Light) and Al Iman (Faith). Most students who attend them have one or two immigrant parents, and these tend to be highly educated, as United States and Canadian immigration requirements favor more educated immigrants. Most schools have not been in existence long enough to note whether their graduates send their own children to Islamic schools. Since 11 September 2001, Islamic schools in the United States have seen a surge in enrollment of girls and boys, as parents and children cite increased hostility and harassment at public or other schools. Enrollment in Canada did not change significantly after 11 September 2001.

Very few full-day Islamic schools in North America are single sex. Although many educators cite that as an ideal, it is generally impractical because of the cost of running two schools. Some schools segregate genders within the school, or divide classrooms by gender; others only segregate classes such as physical education or health. They do not tend to have as wide a range of electives and extracurricular activities as public schools. In the United States, the schools depend primarily on tuition fees and fundraising in their local areas, as well as some grants. In Canada, the government provides a percentage of the schools' budgets; depending on the province, this percentage can be fairly high (over 50 percent).

Most Islamic schools end in the 8th grade; 10 to 15 percent are K–12; some end in the 6th grade; and a few are high schools only. Some start in the lower grades and then "grow up," adding a grade each year. Between 30 and 40 percent have state accreditation, and around 20 percent more are working toward it. The better established schools tend to have higher standards regarding teacher requirements, better reputations as college or high school preparatory programs, and higher college acceptance rates. In the United States, Islamic schools apply for accreditation in the same way as other private schools do, from either the state or, in states that do not offer it, through private organizations. In Canada, Muslim schools apply for certification from the Board of Education. While there has been talk of establishing an additional system for Islamic accreditation, some Muslim educators have dismissed this as problematic because of the vast range of viewpoints and ideologies and expected lack of consensus on what qualification standards would be used.

Islamic schools tend to open in areas with a large enough Muslim population to support them. Their curriculum generally follows that of local public schools, with additional instruction in Qur'ānic memorization and recitation, basic Islamic beliefs and practices, and language instruction (usually Arabic, but also Farsi and Urdu). No standard curriculum has been devised for these additional courses, though educators agree that curricula produced abroad in Muslim countries are not ideal or relevant for students in North America, and in recent years have been working on original curricula better suited to them. How best to do this has provoked an ongoing discussion. Some educators focus solely on these additional courses, while others promote the idea of revising all curricula including core areas like mathematics, science, and literature to follow the concept of *tawḥīd*, or holistic approach, in which all subjects are infused with Islamic methods and philosophy, and where students are taught to use Islamic principles in negotiating life in a secular or non-Muslim world.

The Iqra' International Education Foundation, based in Illinois, has written some textbooks on Islamic studies for North American schools. The organization is also trying to start an online distance learning Islamic school, but the plan has so far not been implemented because of lack of funds for the staff required for such a project.

Muslims in the United States have started a few charter schools, that is, alternative K–12 schools receiving public monies. As they are state-funded, they cannot teach religion, but they can teach courses such as ethics, Arabic, and Middle Eastern and Islamic history. The school building in such schools can be used for religious instruction after school. These schools tend to be largely attended by immigrants or children of immigrants, whereas the Sister Clara Muhammad schools are a network of schools started by the Nation of Islam in the 1930s to educate primarily children of African American Muslims.

A growing number of Muslim parents in the United States are choosing to home school their children, especially since 11 September 2001. Fewer choose this option in Canada. Muslim home

schoolers cite the same reasons as non-Muslim home schoolers, for example better academic standards, more desirable educational theories, more flexibility, and emphasis on religious observance. In addition, many who choose this option do so because of a dearth of Islamic schools in their area. Most Islamic schools are not equipped to deal with children who have learning disabilities, so parents of such children may choose to home school. Home schooling is legal in all 50 United States and Canada, but different rules apply in different states. Initially home schooling was undertaken mostly by American-born Muslims, because they tended to know the system and were more likely to know that home schooling was an option, but now more immigrant parents are seeking information about it. Internet resources, such as <www.muslimhomeschool.com>, provide a range of information for parents. Here, as in the other forms of Islamic education, the genders are balanced; once parents commit to home schooling for one child, girl or boy, those parents will generally provide it for all their children.

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The Ottoman Empire

This entry discusses the development of female education in the Ottoman Empire during the early modern and modern periods. Prior to the nineteenth century female education belonged to the realm of the Islamic establishment, whereas the development of girls' schools after 1858 was promoted by the secular authority.

EARLY MODERN PERIOD (FOURTEENTH–EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES)

Islam does not prohibit female education. However, restrictions imposed on women concerning their role in public life rendered female attendance at religious colleges (*medrese*s) meaningless. There are no data about the existence of female students in Ottoman *medrese*s, and in practice formal education for women remained confined to elementary-level Qur'ān schools. These were mostly financed by pious foundations.

At Qur'ān schools (*mahalle mektebi*) girls together with boys learned the precepts of Islam, and read and memorized the Qur'ān. If the religious instructor (*hoca*) required pupils to do additional reading, graduates of these schools could acquire a basic level of literacy. Traditionally a significant proportion of urban girls attended these schools. The upper age limit for coeducation was around the age of ten.

There were elementary schools for girls only, directed by female teachers (*hoca hanım*). At these schools, graduates of Qur'ān schools as well as adult women could further their religious knowledge by reading various catechisms or popular Sufi texts, develop their calligraphic skills, and even sometimes learn to play musical instruments. Wealthy women made generous donations to support these schools.

Sufi orders such as the Mevlevis and the Nakşibendis offered women the opportunity to concentrate on Persian language and the works of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi. The Mevlevis even allowed women with profound Sufi education to perform the *sema* (whirling dance during mystic ecstasy) and to rise in Sufi ranks to the level of *halife* (assistant to the shaykh).

Opportunity for education also existed within certain urban households. Daughters of high-level ulema in particular enjoyed the readings of classical Islamic texts and Ottoman court poetry. Numerous pre-nineteenth century female poets originated from ulema families.

MODERN PERIOD (NINETEENTH–TWENTIETH CENTURIES)

Nineteenth century reforms and the project to establish a modern state and society led the Ottoman administration to intervene in women's issues, until then purely a matter of Islamic law. The aim to prevent abortion and ensure demographic growth resulted in the establishment of the first professional establishment for women, the School for Midwifery (Istanbul, 1842). In 1858, the first public schools (*rüşdiye mektebi*) for girls were set up to offer education above the level of Qur'ān schools. The curriculum consisted of reading and writing, mathematics, geography, ethics, calligraphy, catechism, recitation of the Qur'ān, and

courses on sewing and embroidery. The Regulation of Public Education (1869) for the first time issued stipulations concerning the expansion of schools for girls. Accordingly, primary schools for girls were to be set up in each town quarter, and female *rüşdiye* schools in each provincial capital.

The necessity to train female instructors for *rüşdiye* schools resulted in the foundation of the Teacher's Seminary for Women (Darülmuallimat, 1870). This institution was the first fully-fledged professional school for girls. Some graduates of the seminary, preferring other careers, became editors, journalists, and publishers, and emerged as promoters of women's rights.

Until 1876 there was no significant increase in the number of female *rüşdiye* schools within the empire. In Istanbul there were nine female *rüşdiye* schools, and outside the capital only the provincial towns of Salonica, Larissa, and Khanea had female *rüşdiye* schools. During the autocratic rule of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) female education began to expand at the provincial level. Toward 1907, government primary schools (*ibtidai*) for girls existed in most provinces, with the exception of Baghdad, Mosul, Hijaz, and Yemen. Around the same time female *rüşdiye* schools were reported for provincial capitals such as Adana, Aleppo, Ankara, Baghdad, Beirut, Bitlis, Bitola, Bursa, Chios, Damascus, Diyarbakir, Edirne, Erzurum, Harput, Janina, Kastamonu, Konya, Limnos, Rhodes, Sivas, Skopje, Trabzon, and Van, as well as some smaller towns in the Balkans and Anatolia.

One major problem of female schools was the shortage of skilled female instructors, particularly in provincial schools. This shortage was overcome to some extent either by engaging educated wives of local civil and military officials as teachers, or by hiring female graduates of missionary schools. Those belonging to the latter group were mainly non-Muslim women.

Another category of female schools to emerge during the reign of Abdülhamid II was industrial schools for girls (*kız sanayi mektebi*). These schools aimed at developing manual skills of girls for the textile and tobacco industries. In 1890, there were three industrial schools for girls in Istanbul, and similar schools for girls existed in Kastamonu, Shkoder, and Tripolis (Libya).

The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 opened new educational opportunities for women. Not only did female primary and *rüşdiye* schools continue to expand, but a first proper gymnasium for girls (*idadi*) was opened in Istanbul in 1911. In 1915, a University for Women (İnas Darülfünunu) with faculties for literature, mathematics, and physics began to operate. Earlier, in 1914, the Women's School of Fine Arts (İnas Sanayi-i Nefise Mektebi) admitted its first students. This school consisted of two sections, one for painting and one for sculpture.

In 1920, the University for Women merged with the University of Istanbul; thus coeducation of male and female students became possible. But it was not until the republican era that coeducation became the norm in Turkish education.

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SELÇUK AKŞIN SOMEL

Yemen

Since the time of its ancient civilizations, such as the Himyarite kingdom and the Sabaean civilization (ninth century B.C.E.), Yemen has witnessed famous women who played significant roles and are still role models for Yemeni women today. Examples include the Queen of Sheba, who ruled the Sabaean civilization, and Queen Arwa in the period of early Islam, who established many schools and mosques with religious schools.

In North Yemen during the Imamate rule and prior to the revolution in 1962, the only education for girls was at Islamic schools, or in mosques where the Qur'ān was studied and memorized along with basic reading and writing skills for boys and a few girls. Elite families would hire educated women to teach the the Qur'ān and the basics of reading and writing to women in the family. A school was founded in Taiz city in the 1930s, and in the colonial south (held by the British for 129 years, from 1839 to 1967), Britain opened the first school for the sons of chiefs in the 1930s. But more elementary schools were established by the colonial government or Yemeni endowment societies, encouraging female enrollment. Imam Ahmed (r. 1948–62) started a girls' school in 1950 that was run by Palestinian teachers, and two secondary

girls' schools functioned in Aden city. This education was only accessible, however, for a few city people, so by the time of independence about 90 percent of the people were illiterate.

The establishment of an educational system for girls really began in the 1970s for both parts of Yemen, after the revolution in 1962 in the northern part, Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) and after independence in 1967 in the southern part, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Many single-sex schools for girls and coeducational schools were built in various villages through local initiatives or governmental efforts. During the time of the YAR and PDRY, dramatic progress was made in education for both sexes where budgets and resources were allocated to improve education. By the academic year 1988/9, girls represented 23 percent of students in primary education in YAR and 33 percent in PDRY.

The civil war between North and South Yemen during the 1970s adversely affected educational progress in border areas where villages were destroyed and evacuated following heavy and violent military activities. Prior to unification in 1990, the two parts of Yemen were separate countries with different political ideologies that shaped their educational philosophies. Education in North Yemen followed a conservative Islamic approach; its system consisted of six primary years followed by three preparatory years and three years of secondary schooling. South Yemen was a Marxist state which followed a different educational system comprising eight primary years followed by four years of secondary school.

In 1990, the two states merged and declared the unification of the Republic of Yemen (ROY). Article 54 in the Constitution stipulates that "education is a right for all citizens," and the state secures this right through the construction of schools and other educational and cultural institutions. As a result of unification, the two systems of public education were integrated into one system based on an educational ladder of nine years in basic education and three years in secondary education.

During recent years, government policy has begun to place more emphasis on the inclusion of women and has recognized the need to make room for their participation and integration in the process of development and democratization. Two women were appointed as ministers in high-ranking positions. However, women are not given a real opportunity to share in decision-making regarding educational policies and strategies for women.

Efforts have been exerted by the government during the last decade to expand educational coverage in Yemen and to reduce the gap in education between girls and boys. There was an overall increase of 16.3 percent in enrollment in basic education between the 2000/1 and 2003/4 school years. However, the fast growth of population (a growth rate of 3.02 percent) has led to a rapid and steady increase in school age children. Approximately 46 percent of children eligible for education countrywide are therefore not in school, and in rural areas the rate for girls is as high as 71 percent.

Overall, girls accounted for only 38.9 percent of children enrolled in basic education in 2003/4 (63 girls for every 100 boys), and by the ninth class, only 44 girls were enrolled for every 100 boys. These statistics reflect a high dropout rate for girls. With such current enrollment rates, it is not surprising that illiteracy is high in Yemen, estimated at 47 percent of the population aged ten and above. The percentage of girls in secondary education is only 29.3 percent, and at the tertiary level, 25.6 percent.

In many verses of the Holy Qur'ān as well as in the *ḥadīth*, Islam calls for educating males and females equally and makes education a duty for both sexes. Moreover, many studies in Yemen have indicated that Yemeni parents are not against women's education. However, because of the failure to provide privacy for women in educational places (single-sex classes and female teachers), many families prefer not to send their girls to school. Furthermore, a number of socioeconomic and cultural constraints account for the significantly low enrollment rate of females in basic education: high fertility rates (where the population requiring basic education is growing faster than the education infrastructure); high poverty rate (45 percent of the population are poor); and other problems of infrastructure and services, such as access (roads and transport) due to the widely scattered population and the indirect costs of schooling (though education is free, the costs of such things as books, uniforms, and transport are too high for poor families).

Another factor is the Yemeni family organization, in which family members assume specific roles. This is especially important in rural areas, where family organization is based on a system of clear division of labor according to gender and age. Because women's traditional roles are related to the care and upbringing of the family, tasks assigned to girls are considered part of their socialization, enabling them to shoulder their roles effectively in the service of the families of their future husbands. Girls' education, though seen as useful, is therefore

often not highly valued. This attitude, in addition to the early age of marriage for girls, explains their high dropout rate.

A number of government policies, strategy statements, and special programs to develop girls' education exist, such as the National Girls' Education Strategy, enacted in Yemen in 1998. This program was widened and embedded in the national Basic Education Development Strategy in 2002, which includes girls' education as one of its main components. Key strategies were to provide and support female teachers in rural areas, construct suitable school buildings, and create an appropriate curriculum to fit the requirements of the local environment. The problem lies in the constraints and barriers encountered in the process of translating such policies and strategies into action. Despite steady construction of new schools and increased numbers of classes, which have improved overall enrollment proportionally more among girls than among boys, the gap is nevertheless still there.

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Sabria Mohammed Al-Thawr

Education: National Curricula

The Gulf and Saudi Arabia

Public schools in the Gulf states are segregated by gender starting from first grade. This segregation stems from religious imperative and social convention. Girls wear a school uniform at all public school levels and in Saudi Arabia they are also required to wear a black veil and a black gown (*ʿabāya*) from the age of twelve. The Saudi national religious curriculum reinforces the wearing of *ḥijāb*. In the other Gulf states, the Islamic studies curricula instruct students to wear modest clothes. It has been optional for women to wear *ḥijāb* to school and in public ever since a group of women in Bahrain and Kuwait burnt their veils in the 1950s as a sign of liberation. Whether or not a woman wears *ḥijāb* depends on how she is raised by her family.

Educational options for boys and girls are almost identical, yet areas of study vary slightly: girls take home economics in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; Saudi girls do not take physical education classes at all.

School textbooks for all grade levels and most subject areas are locally produced. English language series such as Horizon and Crescent are used. Curriculum units at the ministries of education form committees for writing, reviewing, and trying out the textbooks. Male and female college professors, school supervisors, and teachers for given subjects are selected. They collectively write the textbooks based on the general guidelines and objectives set by the curriculum unit. In most Gulf states, curriculum committee members consist of educators from Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan as well as local educators. In Saudi Arabia committee members are all Saudi and for some subject areas, including English, the authors are exclusively female.

Although boys and girls study the same material, the school textbooks are male-centered quantitatively and qualitatively. Examples of male leaders, poets, writers, artists, doctors, scientists, inventors, and rulers who lived in ancient and modern times are given. Women are mainly presented as mothers and home-makers, even in English books. Men are presented as supporters of the family, whereas women are respected, protected, and supported by men. Saudi religion courses cover women's rights as mothers and wives, their rights in inheritance, marriage, and divorce, the duties of husbands and wives, child custody and child support, foster children, *ḥijāb*, obedience, and other such matters. The students study early well-known female Muslim figures such as ʿĀ'isha, Khadīja, Asmā', and al-Khansā'. Many other prominent female figures in Islamic history and pioneer women in the twentieth century are ignored, especially in the Saudi textbooks. Although many Gulf women work as professors, doctors, writers, journalists, researchers, administrators, and social workers, among other professions, and there are examples of regionally and internationally active women, the textbooks do not impart an image of women as economically and socially active individuals; rather they depict them as committed to their basic role as mothers and caregivers.

Some female college students, researchers, and instructors surveyed indicated that the school curricula make female students feel that a man has a dominant role in society; women are pictured as being different from men physically, intellectually, and emotionally and their primary role is to raise children and take care of the family. However, many believe that the school curricula, including religion courses, have little effect on forming women's personality, attitudes, and views and defining their future role and even their decision to wear *ḥijāb*, as the material studied is theoretical and the information is only memorized to pass examinations and get good grades. The school curricula do not help male or female students develop the administrative, technical, and technological skills that prepare them for their future careers in a high-tech age. Nor do they engage in analytical thinking, dialogue, or self-expression.

Protests by female writers against the marginalization of women in the curriculum are very common in today's Gulf media. Calls are commonly heard for women to have the opportunity to learn to apply knowledge and acquire practical skills related to their future careers, and for the establishment of new college programs related to women's needs and jobs required by the labor market, such as Sharīʿa and law, medical technology, medical physics, clinical biochemistry, Islamic economics, and electrical and electronic engineering. Since there is a vital need for local females to replace foreign workers, there is a demand for the creation of

new jobs for women in the labor market, which is also segregated by gender in Saudi Arabia. Women activists are demanding a more active role in civil society and in the development process.

Although female education in the Gulf states started only a few decades ago, the number of females graduating from high school and college surpasses that of males. More senior jobs are being occupied by women but there is still more to be achieved academically and professionally.

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REIMA AL-JARF

Iran

National primary education was first proposed in the Constitution of 1907. The first public schools for girls, however, did not open until 1918. During the Pahlavi era (1925–79), the modern national education system developed, based originally on the French model. As in France, it was a highly centralized system and continues to be so today. The ministry of education creates a national curriculum for primary through secondary education. Compulsory primary education was established by law in 1943. Currently, education is compulsory through the age of 14.

The public education system during the Pahlavi era was secular. The primary objective was to train Iranians for professional occupations in management, administration, teaching, and science. Reza Shah encouraged the education of women and reformed the dress code in public schools. In 1934, he ordered women teachers and students to appear unveiled in school.

In 1979, with the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the state began a major revision of the entire educational system. Ayatollah Khomeini declared an Islamic Cultural Revolution to Islamicize education in Iran and purge the educational system of any opposition. Schools were temporarily closed. Teachers who were considered un-Islamic were fired or forced to retire. Textbooks were examined for un-Islamic thought and illustrations. Pictures of women in Western dress were covered at first and later removed or changed to reflect Islamic dress. The official school uniform for females became a long dark, loose-fitting smock with long sleeves, dark pants, dark socks or stockings, and a large hood that covers the head, hair, and shoulders. Iranian history was rewritten to glorify Islam as the liberator of the people and condemn the monarchs as oppressors. Schools were segregated. Female teachers and administrators were assigned to girls' schools and male teachers and administrators to boys' schools. Some subjects were initially limited to males only (such as agriculture, geology, and accounting), and married women were excluded from ordinary high schools.

Since the mid-1990s, all areas of study are officially open to women and girls, but facilities are often unequal. The current system of education is oriented to technical/vocational training.

Textbooks are national, and state produced. Very little has changed in the textbooks since the Revolution except for replacing or removing un-Islamic ideas and illustrations and rewriting Iranian history to promote Islam over Persian culture. According to one study, only 10 percent of the texts are completely new. Textbooks for boys and girls are the same, but illustrations of boys and girls in textbooks generally differ, encouraging boys to pursue technical vocations while girls are seen occupied with household chores, childcare, or handicrafts. Despite recent proposals to revise the textbooks to reflect the role of women in the workforce, little change has occurred.

Courses at the primary level stress Persian language, science, and mathematics. Since the 1979 Revolution, older students' studies also contain Islamic religious studies, which include classes on the Qurʾān and Arabic language. At the middle school or guidance level religious content is doubled from the primary level. Islamic religious studies at the high school level take up approximately one third of the curriculum. Instruction is given in Farsi.

Students take five years of elementary school, ages 6 to 11. Then they spend three years in guidance (middle) school, ages 11 to 14. In order to proceed to secondary school, students must pass a regional examination. Secondary school is for three years. It is divided into two main branches, academic/general and technical/vocational. The academic branch includes literature and culture, socioeconomics, physics, mathematics, and experimental sciences. The technical/vocational branch includes technical studies, business/vocational, and agriculture. Students are directed to a specific area of study determined by aptitude tests, interests, and previous grades. If eligible, they may take one year of pre-university to prepare for the very competitive national entrance examination for admission to universities. The grading system is based on a scale of 0 to 20. Scores below 10 are failing. Promotion is based on annual examinations.

Sports for women were almost banned after the 1979 Revolution, but women's continuing objections to inequities in sports and education has led to adjustments in the Islamic government's position. Today sports are seen as a viable and necessary function for women and girls' physical and mental health. The attitude today is "a healthy mind in a healthy body." Still, most girls' schools do not have suitable sports facilities and the 1996 budget devoted to women's sports was one-tenth of that devoted to men's.

Reproductive health (family planning) education began in 1967 with the "Tehran Declaration"; it was dismantled after the 1979 Revolution because initial Islamic governmental policy did not consider population growth a problem. However, in 2000, because of the rapid population increase and the demands associated with it on development efforts and the youthful population structure (approximately half of the population is under the age of 20), the government reintroduced reproductive health education in the school curriculum as way to control the fertility rate. The current program is being implemented in guidance and secondary schools.

The national curriculum allows teachers little room to introduce issues of local concern or interest. Teachers are primarily seen as tools. While women comprise almost half of those employed in the field of education and the majority of teachers, they have little role in decision-making. Learning is based primarily on rote memorization and not on analytical or critical thinking.

A nationwide system of education was not achieved during the Pahlavi era. In 1972, public schooling was available to about 80 percent of school age children. Currently, the primary enrollment rate is over 90 percent and the secondary enrollment rate more than 75 percent.

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SHARON M. KARKEHABADI

North Africa

In 857, Fatima al-Fihriya founded the oldest university in the Muslim world and one of its most prestigious religious institutions: the Qarawiyin in Fez. This initiative indicates women's keen understanding of the unique value Islam places on the production and pursuit of knowledge. However, it was over ten centuries before the first group of Moroccan women would graduate from the Qarawiyin in 1947.

On the eve of the national independence of North African countries, over 90 percent of the female population was illiterate. Enormous strides have been made in educating women, although the educational gap between men and women is still challenging in countries where overall illiteracy is high. In 2000, 62 percent of Moroccan men were literate compared to only 36 percent women. In Algeria, the rate was 76 percent for men and 57 for women, in Tunisia 81 for men and 61 for women, and in Libya 91 for men and 68 for women.

Islamic religious education is mandatory in the national curricula of these countries. A 2002 study reveals that the first six years of primary schooling

devote a total of 660 hours to the teaching of religious subjects in Morocco (nearly 12 percent of the total teaching time), 270 hours in Algeria (5.6 percent), and 285 hours in Tunisia (5.8 percent).

Just as access to education has been delayed for Muslim women in these countries, so has their participation in the educational commissions and national ministries in charge of designing national curricula, textbooks, and pedagogical activities. National curricula have been framed by patriarchal values that produce and reproduce stereotypes about men's and women's capabilities and roles.

Thus, where men are depicted in textbooks as cognitively sophisticated, skilled, competent, and creative, women are overrepresented as the nurturing and assisting mother, nurse, factory worker, carpet weaver, or farm worker. They are rarely credited with their achievements or contributions to the economic, sociocultural and political development of their countries since good citizenship and leadership are usually depicted as masculine traits. Leisure is often presented through a biased lens: men are recognized for their sporting attainments in national and international events, women are more likely to be seen as singers and dancers – activities that are culturally contested and stigmatized.

Women activists from North Africa have been critical of the role played by national curricula in institutionalizing stereotypes and creating confusion in the cognitive map of children. Biased school images and discourses, they demonstrate, are out of step with women's realities and delay the promotion of democratic values and practices. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been pressing ministries of national education to produce more gender-equitable curricula and allow civil society organizations greater participation in the decision-making processes related to educational matters. They have also been sensitizing parents and parents' associations to the importance of monitoring curricula and school activities by joining school committees and councils.

The content of national curricula has increasingly become the site of competing ideologies and reform agendas. On the one hand, national ministries of education seem to favor a greater modernization of school curricula by prioritizing science, technology, and cultural openness. Their aim is to meet the demands of the current global order while marginalizing the mounting pressures and presence of Islamist groups. The Moroccan education ministry, for instance, has recently suggested abolishing Islamic subjects from high school syllabuses, limiting religious teaching to literary sections. Though not implemented, the suggestion sparked staunch criticism from Islamist groups one year after Moroccan King Mohamed VI called for reforming Islamic studies curricula to protect Moroccan youth against extremism.

Islamist groups, however, strive for a greater "re-Islamization" of schools by reforming school curricula, administrations, and all pedagogical matters. The perspective is motivated by an orthodox rereading of religion that promises to "cleanse" national curricula and teaching practices of foreign influences – read feminist and Western.

Women's groups press for the elimination of dominant gender discrimination in school texts, hiring practices, and promotion policies. National and regional NGOs as well as human rights activists qualify gender stereotyping as violence against women – a conclusion reached by a network of women's associations in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, Collectif 95.

Under mounting national and international pressures, governments have started responding in varying degrees to the issue of gender equity. In Morocco, recent educational reforms have included the teaching of civic principles and democratic values in national curricula. Although the focus is not specifically on gender equality, courses introduce students to general ideas of tolerance, accountability, and human and civil rights.

The Tunisian government announced that sexual stereotypes were eliminated from school textbooks under the 1991 education reform. This entails teaching human rights principles and revising textbooks to expunge them of stereotypical images and discourses that offend women. These efforts were praised in 1995 by the monitoring committee of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Algeria's second report on the implementation of CEDAW underlines that under the impetus of the 1999 educational reform, the revision of textbooks was begun to eliminate discriminatory images, and texts deemed too biased were even discarded. However, the CEDAW monitoring committee recommends greater engagement from the ministry to remove the still prevalent discriminatory aspects of texts.

Although little emphasis has been put thus far on gender discrimination in physical education, there seems to be a growing awareness among Arab women's organizations of the linkages between sports and development of girls' capabilities and self-esteem. The sports association of

Arab women organized its first seminar in Cairo in 2003: it called for a safe and supportive environment for girls by eliminating all forms of harassment, abuse, and violence. However, among the nine countries represented, none were from North Africa.

In brief, while North African countries recognize that education of both girls and boys is a development imperative, they are challenged to demonstrate in action that the democratization of educational sites and activities is an equally important imperative.

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Turkey

The purpose of this entry is to give a brief overview of the national curriculum in Turkey and how it relates to gender. After the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the educational system was quickly centralized. The 1924 Law for the Unification of Education placed all educational institutions under the control of the ministry of education and imposed nationwide, uniform curricula, which aimed at generating Turkish citizens with a strong national consciousness, belief in positivism and the scientific method, and a secular world-view. The Kemalist regime advocated gender equality, made five-year primary education compulsory for both sexes, and established coeducational schools. The state did not subscribe to any biological theories like those developed in Europe to justify female inferiority and intellectual weakness (Kabasakal Arat 2003, 66, n. 10). Women who had the means to pursue their education at higher levels could do so without encountering any official barriers. Due to the official ban on veiling in schools, however, veiled students found it more difficult to pursue their education.

Despite the official commitment to gender equality, the curriculum and the textbooks did not reflect a gender-neutral picture. During the early years of the Republic, girls and boys were separated in some classes in coeducational middle and high schools. For instance, physical education and military instruction were first assigned to boys. While boys were taught military instruction, given extra time for science laboratories, or instructed in several crafts such as bookbinding, woodworking, and paper marbling, girls were instructed in feminine skills such as sewing, home economics, embroidery, and childcare (Arat 1998, 161). Motherhood and raising children scientifically were presented as women's national duty.

Today, although there is no sex-based segregation of classes and the curriculum is the same for girls as it is for boys, the content of school textbooks is still gender biased. In her analysis of primary school textbooks, Firdevs Gümüşoğlu (1998) found that the textbooks of the years between 1928 and 1945 emphasized the ideal of gender equality and women's public visibility much more than the textbooks of the later periods. In many school textbooks, traditional gender roles are not questioned but reinforced. Women are depicted as acquiescent and benevolent mothers who take care of the children and do the housework and men appear as the breadwinners and decision-makers of the household. As female children help their mother in housework, male children help their father outside the home (Gümüşoğlu 1998). Secondary and high school textbooks make almost no reference to women and gender issues. For instance, in Turkish language and literature classes works of female authors are ignored (TÜSIAD 2000). Although a major restructuring in the educational system took

place in 1997 when compulsory primary education was increased from five to eight years, this did not lead to the development of a more gender sensitive curriculum. The transition to eight-year compulsory schooling, however, increased girls' enrollment rates considerably, especially in rural areas (UNICEF 2003).

The centralized curriculum in Turkey did not preclude the establishment of alternative educational institutions and curricula. The most important of these are *imam hatip* high schools, which train students for religious careers. Part of the curriculum of these schools resembles the regular curriculum, with classes in Turkish language and literature and natural and social sciences. The other half of the curriculum is based on courses in Arabic language and Islam. Female enrollment rates in *imam hatip* high schools are increasing steadily because of their virtuous reputation among conservative circles. While these schools are criticized for conflicting with the secular principles of the Republic and reproducing gender segregation and discrimination, it is also argued that they positively influence women's education through their high levels of success in university entrance examinations (Acar and Ayata 2002).

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Senem Aslan

Yemen

National ideologies in Yemen take elements from pre-Islamic, Islamic, Arab, and Third-World revolutionary sources and, while the country was still divided, from the strenuous efforts to unify the two parts (*shaṭrayn*) of the Yemeni homeland (*waṭan*). With a past in the ancient kingdoms of Maʿin, Saba, and Himyar, two peculiarly Yemeni objections prevail, namely to anything that comes from Saudi Arabia and, second, for ideas of the *jāhiliyya* (alleged period of ignorance preceding the rise of Islam). In the Yemeni national imaginary, two female rulers stand out: Queen Bilqīs of Saba and the medieval ruler Queen Arwa.

Yemeni unification in 1990 put together two countries with different pasts. While North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic, YAR) came out of a thousand-year-old imamate, which had undergone unsuccessful Ottoman attempts at control and formed a nation-state in 1969 after a decade of war between royalists and republicans, South Yemen (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY) grew in 1967 out of the British colony of Aden and its surrounding emirates and sultanates as an outcome of an anti-colonial and anti-feudal struggle.

National rhetoric came to flavor political life in the 1930s. Aden was then the center of political activity against both the imamate in the north and the European colonizer in the south. *Shabāb*, young men of literature and political activism, were influenced by the Arab Awakening, and books by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Rashīd Riḍā, and Muḥammad ʿAbduh. Contacts with Iraq, Syria, and Egypt became lively. The Woman Question, however, was not part of the nationalist rhetoric at this early stage. In one of the early documents, the *Sacred National Pact*, issued by northern liberation forces in the late 1940s, citizen rights were demanded only for male members of society.

While the northern nationalist activism increasingly turned for assistance from Nasser's Egypt, in the south socialism competed with liberal and leftist ideologies. Liberal voices gained a platform in *Fatāt al-Jazīra*, the first Arab language newspaper to start in Aden in 1940. A critical issue was *inḥiṭāṭ al-marʾa* (women's inferiority). A column devoted to female readers, *Nufsnā al-halwa!* (Our beautiful half!) instructed women on questions of hygiene and modern home technologies but also on women's welfare activities. The newspaper carved a role for women in a modernizing Yemen. Such voices, however, were not allowed in the British controlled educational system that slowly started to admit girls up to the secondary level of education.

More radical voices for women's emancipation came along in the 1950s in the south and found a place in the male-dominated national liberation struggle. When South Yemen gained its independence by 1967, women's rights were inscribed in the

national charter. Throughout the PDRY, *taḥrīr al-mar'a* (emancipation of women) formed part of government agenda with gains in women's access to education, work, and health care. Such ideas were incorporated in the national educational curriculum, too, to support women's entry "alongside her brother in all fields of life," as it was put.

In the north, two major nationalist projects competed. Technocrat-military rulers of Sanʿa promoted modernization that left women under the care of the family. The mighty tribal areas had their own idea of nationhood. As the tribal *qaṣīda*, which manifests in poetry the noblest features of tribal ideology, expressed it, "O son of Yemen, if you keep your door locked, neither idolaters nor adulterers will enter" (Caton 1990, 227). The nation of the *qabīlī* (tribesman) is constituted out of men able to protect their homeland from foreign influences whenever deviation from ancient visions that embed Islam with tribal custom (*ʿurf*) is considered. Under male custody, women do not have any direct role in this nation of Sons of Yemen. School textbooks in the north, however, emphasized an intangible people without tribal or other sociohistorical characteristics. In contrast to that, a text book from 1987 on the subject of national education for the third class in primary school, mentions women in reference to the Declaration of Human Rights as equal to men (Republic of Yemen 1987, 93).

In the post-unification nation-building process, the two parts of the country have been paralleled and women's accomplishments in the south scaled down to match the modest achievements of the north. A textbook from 1999 on national education for the fifth primary class presents the historical national heroes of Yemen. The only female character among the five presented, Khawla bint al-Azūr, is depicted in a warrior's costume fighting the Romans alongside men in medieval Iraq. Only one is Yemeni, the poet Muḥammad al-Zubayrī. Women's rights' activists in Aden criticized the choice of Khawla as a destructive character.

In national education classes, children also learn about men's and women's rights in the family. These are established in reference to the Qurʾān. Single sentences cut from Sūras Nisāʾ, Baqara, and Ṭalāq state that men are a degree above women and establish the man as the provider and woman the provided for (Republic of Yemen 2005).

In a study conducted by the Women's Studies Centre in Aden University on how women are presented in school textbooks, a grim image emerges. Books on national education favor men in discussing matters of public life such as administration, professional life, and religion while bringing women to the fore mainly in reference to the family. In the study, textbook texts and pictures were analyzed for their gender content (Women's Research and Training Centre 2004, 19, 48).

Nationalistic posters in the north have depicted female members of society wrapped into their cloaks whenever visible while in the south woman became manifest among the toiling masses as the ally of the working-class male. Occasionally she was dressed as a tiller with a sickle in her hand. After Yemeni unification, this bare-headed woman disappeared from school books, election posters, and other government pictorial imagery, to be replaced by a woman dressed in *ḥijāb*, that is, the woman in public symbolizes no attributes other than Islam.

During the PDRY, the government supported women's sports in schools, making volleyball and table tennis teams win regional championships. Following unification, women athletes were left without official backing. They emerged again by the 2000s, now with an Islamic coating alongside the earlier southern experiences, with activities taking place, among others, under the Islamic Union for Sports and Woman. However, schools no longer support women athletes.

In a country with very high illiteracy, radio acts as a channel for national education. Among the popular radio characters are Musʿid and Musʿida, a married couple in a comedy program. In the episode that coincided with the eleventh anniversary of unification, the clever wife utters: "But what's the point in all these wonderful building and development achievements when Yemen is split in two – the father's in Mukalla with his sons in Saʿda. One brother's in Aden and the other's in Sanʿa. One cousin's in Taʿizz and his cousins are in Abyan, Dālaʿ and Radfān" (Watson et al. 2002).

From the beginning of radio broadcasting in Yemen, female voices were heard on air. Later on female television presenters became national icons mirroring women's public roles. With unification the best elements of Aden TV moved to work in Sanʿa television and, as a source of national pride for southerners, some of the Adeni presenters continued to appear on air without a headscarf. For women activists, it was a question of Yemeni women's national image as part of building a modern nation.

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Susanne Dahlgren

Education: Post-Secondary

Egypt

Several autobiographies of Egyptian intellectuals describe their confusion at what seems to be a peculiar scene of the 1930s: the presence – for the first time – of female students on the campus. This scene raised concerns about the legitimacy of their presence in that particular space and doubtful questions about the genuine "feminine nature" of these newcomers and their values. Three decades later, with the establishment of free higher education in 1961, this scene was no longer peculiar and had become a normal facet of daily life. The 1952 Revolution promoted a model for the modern society where young, educated females and males contribute equally to the battle against poverty, ignorance, and disease. Nowadays, the path to post-secondary education for women involves new issues, not those of the 1930s. While some of these issues relate to general access to education, its symbolic and material value, other issues question the gender dimension.

According to available data, female university graduates represented – in the mid 1990s – some 3.8 percent of the Egyptian population aged over 10 years, compared to 7.2 percent for males, while university graduate females and males constituted together 5.5 percent of the total population over 10 years of age (CAPMAS 1996). The percentage of females enrolled in higher education of the corresponding female age group rose from 3.3 percent to 9.2 percent between 1960 and 1990, reaching 23.4 percent in 1996/7. The percentage of female students in state universities increased during the 1990s at rates higher than the rate of total enrollment. Accordingly, the share of females in total enrollment increased. At the undergraduate level, the share of female students out of the total percentage of students increased from 35.4 percent in 1991/2 to 40.4 percent in 1996/7. For some experts these figures suggest that, at this level of education, the male/female gap appears to be increasingly regressing. However, the share of female students is usually lower in fields of physical sciences than in social sciences. For the latter group, this share increased from 37 percent in 1991/2 to 42 percent in 1996/7, while the corresponding ratios for the faculties of physical sciences were 32 percent and 35 percent. Enrollment in university education raises issues about the socioeconomic relevancy of degrees obtained. The rates of above secondary school level female participation in economic activities were estimated as 67.1 percent and 73.8 percent for university level, compared to 88.1 and 90.1 percent for men of the same educational level. The percentage of male university graduates working for the government or for the public sector is 67.8 percent, and 85.7 percent for female graduates. While it is possible to attribute this percentage of female employment in the government and public sectors to shorter working hours and guaranteed social benefits, in spite of poor salaries, evidence indicates that women are facing difficulties in private sector recruitment and are more subject to unemployment. In general, women are more affected by the social implications of economic structural adjustment policies since the 1990s. Unemployed women with secondary education and a university degree constitute 23.53 percent and 13.99 percent of the total female labor force, compared to 7.95 percent and 6.87 percent for male equivalent categories (UNDP 1998/9). The privatization of higher education may contribute to the devaluation of free education; job market preferences are in favor of the so-called distinguished private universities, and widen the gap among higher-educated females. Apart from preparing women for higher education and giving them access to the work market, the campus is in itself significant in terms of women's access to public space; this seems particularly relevant for provincial universities. Here as elsewhere, what a campus means socially and politically ranges from a myriad of small shops and coffeehouses, to political demonstrations. In the rather conservative south of Egypt, higher education means stronger visibility in the public space for female students. In general, universities provide privileged spaces where men meet with women, and where demonstrations and collective expression of discontent are allowed. Fashion – Western dress versus Islamic veil – creates an arena for confrontation and cohabitation. Major Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brothers are not against female access to higher education. They are merely trying to Islamize campus and public spheres: Muslim sisters now have

their own strictly women's political demonstrations and sit-ins. Opposition to female higher education comes from conventional conservatism, which relies on the Islamic religious discourse to advocate for the exclusion of females and their confinement to the traditional roles of the private space. However, it is rather risky to attribute socioeconomic justifications rather than religious/moral ones in explaining families' attitudes toward female higher education within the less educated and less affluent social groups. Evidence also shows that higher education has been effective in delaying girls' age of marriage as well as the first pregnancy. Moreover, criteria set for the ideal spouse are changing since an educated girl feels that she should marry someone who is at least as educated as she is, if not more so.

Yet, women's social destinies are not confined by their access to higher education. Educational capital is connected to other social resources. It should not be assumed that women's autonomy is granted by higher education. For some women, higher education represents an expected and normal step in their lives, but for the majority of them, higher education is still a high cost investment, if not a dream. Focusing on the role of the campus in changing a young woman's life should not lead us to neglect the disadvantaged rural areas, as well as some urban and semi-urban settings. Here, the population is still far from benefiting from adequate basic services, especially in education, health, and sanitation. And even if free educational services are said to be available, at some levels of poverty people still do not benefit from it. In this respect, and despite the expansion of higher education and the growing numbers of university students, Egypt still maintains the social contrasts that oppose illiterates to highly educated graduates.

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Iman Farag

Great Britain

There is relatively little known about the post-school educational experiences of Muslim women in the West, relating either to Muslim women in the university sector (higher education) or in vocational training and further education, as has been observed by a number of writers (for example Ahmad 2001). This lack of research is matched by difficulties in interpreting statistical data, since the data which are available, for example from the United Kingdom Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA) of the Labour Force Survey, record entry into higher education by ethnicity, and we must use the categories "Pakistani" and "Bangladeshi" – two communities which are predominantly Muslim and from which the greater number of British-born Muslims are drawn – as proxies for a much more diverse grouping of British Muslims. Much of the earlier analysis of access to higher education by ethnicity does not explore gender differences.

Statistics on women in higher education

Statistics from the Labour Force Survey and from higher education institutions reveal there is a notable increase in the uptake of higher education among young women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage in Great Britain. Admission to higher education cannot be considered in isolation from previous school experience, as Taylor (1993) observes, since access is determined by the set of qualifications secured during the processes of schooling. Previous academic performance is, however, only part of the explanation for ethnic differences in access to higher education. Modood and Shiner (1994) note that prior academic performance did not explain why Pakistani applicants were less likely than their white peers to be admitted to more prestigious universities. They were more likely than their white peers to be admitted to less prestigious institutions, but this was not a significant factor when other variables, including applicants' social class and the type of school they attended were taken into consideration.

Since the indications are that until recently, British South Asian Muslim women (like their male peers) often were disadvantaged during the pro-cesses of schooling, they were consequently underrepresented in the higher education sector. The recent increase in participation thus reflects a trend among these young women to overcome previous disadvantage. Modood et al. (1997) note

that both Bangladeshi and, especially, Pakistani women are well represented at degree level, despite the fact that young women from these groups are among those possessing the fewest qualifications overall.

Data on ethnic (but not religious) identity of university applicants to British universities have been kept since 1990, in response to concerns about discriminatory processes. From this period it has been clear that minority ethnic students are more likely to apply to and to be offered places in the newer (less prestigious) institutions than in higher ranking and traditional universities, where higher entry grades are usually required. In 1990, women from all ethnic groups were underrepresented in relation to men from the same group. The indications are also that the gender gap in terms of access to higher education is closing within these communities (Dale et al. 2002).

Research into the class destinations of British graduates suggests that women of Pakistani heritage (a largely Muslim grouping) have poor chances of achieving professional and managerial occupations compared with their white female peers, experiencing what is described as an "ethnic penalty" (Cheung and Heath 1993).

Further education and vocational training

Research into routes into post-secondary education and employment for young women of Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage in Great Britain shows that those entering further education are more likely to be retaking examinations normally taken at the end of compulsory schooling, rather than studying for higher level examinations which will give them access into higher education (Dale et al. 2002).

A study of the vocational training experiences of young British Muslim women of South Asian heritage found at the point of leaving school they possessed no clear information about available opportunities in further education or training. There was some ambivalence among the women to the training on offer, with a number noting that while the college-based elements of their course were interesting, these were not always matched with satisfactory work placements. Most rejected the idea of single-sex training schemes, pointing out that Muslim communities were not invariably opposed to mixed-sex schemes, although some suggested that such schemes would meet the needs of those women whose families might otherwise discourage or prevent their participation. They were particularly keen to avoid training which was exclusively Asian or Muslim in its target groups. Regardless of parents' background (rural/urban) the women taking part in the schemes generally noted the overwhelming support of their parents for their educational aspirations (Brah and Shaw 1992). The research suggests the need for access routes to be made into higher education from vocational training schemes.

The experiences of women in higher education

A survey of religious diversity in British universities shows that Muslim students represent one of the largest non-Christian groups on campus, with distinct needs and concerns (Gilliat-Ray 1999).

Ahmad (2001), in her study of the motivating factors of British South Asian young Muslim women in higher education, includes the expectation of social mobility; high aspirations within migrant families; a need to overcome racial discrimination by securing high levels of education and qualifications; and a desire to ensure future economic security. Such motivational factors were often supported by siblings who had succeeded in higher education, a desire for a better quality of life than that experienced by migrant parents, and a sense of personal achievement. These factors are supported by research by Osler (1997, 2003), who studied the life histories of a number of Muslim women undergraduate students, trainee teachers, and experienced teachers whose experiences of higher education dated from the 1970s through to the 1990s; there was a considerable diversity of experience among those who took part in the study.

Parental perspectives

Parents who were aware of difficulties their children were likely to encounter in the labor market were very keen for them to enhance their qualifications. Some young people felt that the extra pressure of young women to uphold family honor and the restrictions on freedom that are sometimes imposed mean that young women may be more likely to focus on their studies than their brothers. Parents recognized the importance of education for both boys and girls, and while responsibility for providing for the extended family was located with boys, this did not devalue the importance of girls' education (Dale et al. 2002).

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Audrey Osler

Iran and Afghanistan

In Iran and Afghanistan there were few educational institutions for either men or women in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, especially at the post-secondary level (Menashri 1992). When institutions of higher education expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, following government and international support, social norms confined women to marriage and motherhood and denied them education, especially post-secondary education. Yet women, at least in Iran, follow the global pattern of increased access to higher education among all social classes. Given the aspirations of Afghan women, one would expect something similar in Afghanistan.

Iran

The first modern university in Iran was founded in Tehran in 1934. After the Second World War, increasing oil revenues led to a marked increase in the number of universities. By 1979 there were 24 semi-private or government funded universities in Tehran and the provincial capitals. In addition, private junior and senior colleges had mushroomed in Tehran in response to the demand among young Iranians, whose proportions in the population were increasing. Higher education had become and is still very prestigious in Iran, although education, especially in non-medical and engineering fields, does not guarantee a high income. In the fall of 1979, 104,400 students – only 10 percent fewer than the total of high school graduates – were registered in Iran's universities. Of these 32,345 or 30 percent were female. Women's representation would be somewhat greater if women registered in private female colleges were to be included. But even 30 percent is impressive, considering high school attendance of females compared to males. According to the 1976 census only 26 percent of high school age girls were registered in high schools, compared to 47.5 percent for males (Aghajanian 1994).

Secondary education was poorly developed in rural areas. Some villages had elementary schools, but most students had to travel to cities or larger villages for high school. Families normally allowed only male children to commute to secondary school. Only 6.7 percent of eligible rural females attended high school in 1976. After the age of 15, a girl was considered old enough to stay home and prepare for marriage. Few girls who left high school to marry ever returned to school. The majority of females in post-secondary education reflected the attitudes of their modern, urban middle-class families; they were the children of the elites.

In the early 1980s, high school attendance of both males and females fell (Aghajanian 1994). According to the 1986 census, about 40 percent of eligible males attended high school in 1986 compared to 47.5 percent in 1976. For girls the 1986 rate was 24.6 compared to 25.8 in 1976. The decline was much more pronounced in rural areas where male and female attendance dropped to a new low of 10.3 and 2.7 percent respectively. This was probably a consequence of the closing of post-secondary institutions for three years beginning in June 1980. When they reopened in December 1982, they slowly readmitted students mainly in medical and allied health areas where the need was urgent. To be admitted students had to demonstrate knowledge of Islam and evidence of commitment to the Islamic Republic (Mackey 1996). This enforced cultural-political conformity discouraged many young people, especially young females. When Iranian universities reopened fully, women

were admitted in traditional sex-segregated fields and barred from male-dominated occupations (Higgins and Shoar-Ghaffari 1994). But soon pragmatism overtook ideology.

While discouraging policies persisted until the early 1980s, post-secondary educational attainment of Iranian women is exceptional. Iranian women below age 35 are almost 100 percent literate. The rate of high school attendance among women has increased to about 75 per cent (Population Reference Bureau 2004) and parents, especially in urban areas, consider a high school diploma for women to be the norm (Aghajanian et al. 2003). Among the 739,233 high school graduates in June 2004, 433,516 or more than 58 percent were female (Iran Statistical Center 2004). Starting in 2001, more women than men have been admitted to public universities (Iran Statistical Center 2004). By 2003, 54 percent of the successful applicants taking the university entrance exam were female. This pattern is replicated in the private university system where of 257,793 students who passed the entrance exam, 131,501 were female. Iranian women are represented in all areas of studies including medicine, sciences, and engineering, where they are now a strong presence. In the 2003/4 academic year female students' share of seats in medicine, sciences, and engineering was 67, 64, or 20 percent (Iran Statistical Center 2004).

Afghanistan

Higher education was relatively well developed in Afghanistan by 1978. The first college of medicine opened in Kabul in 1932 and by 1946 other faculties had been added to form Kabul University; women were admitted in 1960 (Sassani 1961, AllRefer.com 2005). Since the invasion of the Soviet army and subsequent ongoing war and destruction, the status of women has deteriorated, including their access to post-secondary education. Even when the institutions of higher education were fully functional, the number of females in post-secondary education was very limited. For example, the average number of female university students in the 1970s was about 664 per year and among women 25 years and older only 0.6 percent had some post-secondary education (Emadi 2002, Tables 2.5 and 2.6). War and local conflicts, refugee exodus, scarcity of teachers, and legal obstacles kept women from attending school in the last two decades, mainly during the Taliban era. Since the fall of Taliban strong international support has emerged for educational development and for women's education in particular (Bene 2002). Women's access to educational resources has already increased. There are, however, no baseline data for measuring future changes. Scattered data suggest that about 15 to 21 percent of students in major universities are female (Zulfacar 2002). The share of women in teacher training programs is about 47 percent. Given the lack of formal sources, it is very difficult to predict the educational attainment of women in Afghanistan in the near future.

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Akbar Aghajanian

Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Iraq

Of the five countries covered here, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine have made the greatest strides in higher education for women. In Jordan, in the year 2000, more females (73,000) than males (69,000) enrolled in tertiary education, and the female to male ratio, or Gender Parity Index for Gross Enrollment Ratio (GPI) was 1.14. Lebanon showed a similar reversal of the classical gender gap. There were 69,600 girls compared to 64,500 boys enrolled on the tertiary level, and the GPI was 1.09. The Palestinian Autonomous Territories closely followed its neighbors. In 2000, 47 percent of the 80,500 students in universities and colleges were female; the break-even point was reached in 2002/3 when the GPI jumped to 1.04 (UNESCO 2004, 352, World Bank 2004, 34, UNESCO 2004,

2005). Thus in these countries girls have reached equality with boys in entering higher education, although the female share is somewhat enhanced because more males than females study abroad (Jansen forthcoming).

Syria and Iraq clearly lag behind their neighbors. Recent information from the Syrian Arab Republic is lacking. Given the low secondary enrollment rate of 41 percent in 2000, and that girls lag 10 percent behind boys, female entrance into tertiary education must make up a smaller share (World Bank 2004, 31–3). In 1990, the GPI was 0.67 (UNESCO 2004, 352). The Gulf Wars (1980–8 and 1990–1) in Iraq were detrimental to any schooling of youngsters, but in particular girls. According to Moghadam (1993, 128), in 1988, tertiary enrollment of females as a percentage of males was 64 percent. By the year 2000, this had declined to 51.5 percent and a GPI of 0.54 (UNESCO 2004, 352).

Unfortunately, many girls do not complete higher education, due to marriage, cost limitations, parental preference to spend limited resources on boys, and gender norms. For Iraq, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Jordan, the female completion rate is less than half that of men (World Bank 2004, 36). In Palestine this situation is reversed, as many young men do not complete their education for political reasons.

Several processes influenced the accessibility of higher education for girls. Important was the concerted effort of the Jordanian and Lebanese governments and Palestinian non-governmental organizations to expand educational facilities in the last decades, an effort which Syria and Iraq were less willing or able to undertake. In exchange for loans for educational development, the World Bank insisted on liberalization of the educational market, which contributed to the substantial privatization of higher education. In Jordan, this privatization on the one hand opened up educational opportunities because of the higher density of universities and the lower entrance requirements in the private sector. On the other hand, the higher costs restricted participation of students from poor families, in particular daughters (Jansen forthcoming). In the West Bank and Gaza, the ten Palestinian universities founded since 1972 were considered breeding grounds for Palestinian nationalism, and as such shut down by the Israelis with the outbreak of the first intifada in 1987, only to recommence their activities after the Oslo Accords in 1993 (Bruhn 2002, 6–7). Nationalism and the recognition of the value of education by Palestinians in the diaspora impacted positively on girls' education.

In Lebanon, as later in Jordan, the privatization of higher education built on Christian missionary educational activity, which explicitly targeted women (Graham-Brown 1988, Jansen 1996). In the 1990s, the Islamic resurgence provided an extra impetus as several Islamic educational institutions were established (Roald 1994). This turned out to be a mixed blessing for girls. It created new opportunities for some girls, because these higher institutions forestalled objections from conservative parents by providing a gender-segregated and controlled environment, a gender appropriate curriculum, and scholarships for poor students (Jansen forthcoming). However, it also meant that girls were now more subjected to a gender ideology in which woman's first role was that of mother and wife, safely secluded in the home. Yet this discursive denial of the emancipative potential of education does not prevent many students from becoming more than just pious wives and mothers. As professional educators, doctors, or engineers they may contribute to gender changes in the future.

The connection between university education and employment is rather weak for Arab women (Akkari 2004, 148). Despite the increase in education, the labor participation of women remains low. The economic decline in the 1980s and 1990s meant that there was only a weak pull from the labor market. University education is seen as a protection against the high risk of unemployment or a prerequisite for a better-remunerated job, but it has this effect less often for women than for men. Unemployment figures for university-educated women are higher than for any other category of women (and of men), although highly educated women do work more than less educated women (Jansen forthcoming). In general, Arab women are not educated for employment but for social reasons. Education increases their status and that of their family and their marriage chances, and improves their roles as mothers and educators. Women themselves value it as a form of freedom and self-expression.

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Willy Jansen

Southeast Europe

The development of women's higher education in Southeast Europe was dependent on a number of factors. One issue was that the female population in Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and Greece was smaller than the male population at the start of the twentieth century, and only during the 1920s did they become equal. Another factor was that matrimony curbed women's education. Marriage was virtually mandatory for both Balkan Christian and Muslim women who married early, by the age of 25, and they gave birth to many children, starting as early as during the first year of marriage.

Continuing patriarchal preconceptions that worked against provision of women's education included beliefs that it was needless, because it hindered girls' agricultural labor; it was shameful, because educated women were considered to be immoral; and it was pernicious, because it diverted women from the family. Normative emphases of family cohesiveness opposed the higher education of young girls because it required them to reside away from kin control and support in foreign towns or countries. After the eighteenth-century lease relationships had affected the Balkan economy, there was an increasing need for women's labor. In contrast, the social and political reforms in Austria and Ottoman Turkey during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created institutions that required qualified personnel. Compulsory primary education was introduced (Austria 1776, Ottoman Turkey 1846) and girls' schools were founded awarding a range of levels of academic attainment. Curricula included subjects from all religions, and patterns of modern education were imported.

The educational measures enacted by local nation-states in the nineteenth century were a continuation of this policy. They introduced compulsory and free primary education (Greece 1834, Serbia 1863, Romania 1864, Montenegro and Bulgaria 1879), organized and centralized unified systems of state education, and initiated processes of the mass eradication of illiteracy. The percentage of literate women accordingly grew exponentially, particularly at the beginning of the twentieth century (Greece 20.2 percent, Romania 10 percent, Serbia 7.4 percent, and Bulgaria 5.5 percent). The literacy of women town dwellers was greater than that of women village dwellers, that of women Christians greater than that of Muslim women, that of Roman Catholic and Protestant women greater than that of Orthodox Christian women, and that of Jewish and Armenian women greater than that of the remaining nationalities. In fact, for Jewish and (predominantly Christian) Armenian women, literacy approached 100 percent.

The national states of the Balkans undertook complex reforms for girls' education. But the compulsory girls' primary education was not effective because it encountered opposition on the part of parents as well as the municipal and religious authorities. The structuring of the basic and secondary women's schools was made difficult, in spite of the special legislation on the issue (Serbia 1886, Greece 1889, Montenegro 1890, Bulgaria 1895). Secondary girls' schools were fewer in number than boys', they were attended by a limited number of students, they had a shorter duration and a more limited curriculum, and were generally oriented to training housewives and future mothers. Therefore, women's diplomas were not equal to men's and girls were generally blocked from having access to secondary schools.

The problems of girls' higher education in Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and later on in Turkey, were to provoke feminist campaigns headed by women teachers and intellectuals. They placed demands before their governments for quality secondary education and increased access for women to high schools. These actions renewed public debates on women's education and by the 1940s and 1950s, they gained the support of men who pointed out the need for enlightened mothers to raise their children and to contribute to the nation as a whole. In the next few decades, more women became involved in the discussions and they proclaimed education as their natural right, and as an opportunity for achieving economic independence and for demonstrating their intellectual capabilities. Feminism in the Balkans derived its educa-

tional ideas from a variety of sources, including the French and German women's movements, the ideals of social democracy, and the ideology of Russian populism. Much of the debate on higher women's education was conducted in the women's press and became a reason for the creation of educational unions and for the submission of subscription lists to local parliaments, governments, and university authorities.

However, since the Balkan states were each too weak financially to have more than one or two national high schools, no women's universities were created although mixed gender instruction was initiated at rather an early stage. The exception to this rule was the Special Women's Department in Istanbul University, which was in operation from 1915 to 1920. Until access by women to national high schools was completed, state reforms brought the level of girls' schools to that of boys. In addition, some women were granted scholarships for study abroad.

The old stereotypes regarding women's education were preserved in Balkan universities for a long time. Initially, women were only allowed to enrol as auditors, after they had passed their matriculation exams in boys' secondary schools (Belgrade 1871, Yash and Bucharest 1894, Zagreb 1895). Later on, full-time women students were admitted, but only by special permission (Belgrade 1891) or at a flat rate (Sofia and Zagreb 1901). Quotas for some fields of study, traditionally deemed "male," such as theology, the law, or agriculture, were introduced. University women were oriented toward acceptable "female" specializations, such as literature, education, pharmacy, and pediatrics. They rarely completed their education with scientific degrees higher than *licence* or masters. Even after women had successfully negotiated the obstacles of patriarchal educational systems, some authorities refused to recognize their medical doctors' university diplomas (in Croatia by 1902) and lawyers' university diplomas (in Bulgaria by 1945).

The admission of women to special colleges in the arts and polytechnic schools was likewise a slow process. Early examples were with national academies of arts (Istanbul 1877, Sofia 1896, Athens 1901, Zagreb 1907), which separated students into either independent women's schools of arts (for example Istanbul) or into girls' departments (for example Athens and Bucharest). Even in these cases, women artists were denied access to the full training program and mixed classes; in addition, their colleagues often protested against them.

By about the middle of the twentieth century, women in Southeast Europe had obtained wide access to a broad range of local institutions of higher education, including trade, financial, sports, arts, and musical, as well as polytechnics, universities, and others. In practice there were no limitations on their origin, class, nationality, or religion although the anti-Semitic measures in Romania and Bulgaria during the Second World War constituted an exception. By 1919, female students were drawn mainly from the towns, but after democratization occurred, more women from rural as well as more peripheral regions were enrolled. The percentage of women in higher educational institutions increased overall (for example, from 3 percent in 1919 to 20 percent in 1939 in Lyubljana, Slovenia), with some variation in individual countries (Bulgaria 21 percent, Serbia 10 percent, Turkey 9.8 percent).

Due to the difficulties of access at local universities as well as the absence of some specialties and faculties, many women from Southeast Europe continued their training abroad. They funded such education at their own expense or with scholarships provided by state programs, foundations, institutions, and private persons. Bulgarian, Serbian, and Romanian women predominated in this practice and Greek women were the smallest group to follow this pattern. While Turkish women came from elite, wealthy backgrounds, Bulgarian and Serbian women tended to be the children of intellectuals, office workers, and entrepreneurs. Preferred countries for international study included Switzerland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Belgium, Italy, and Russia. The specialties of medicine, pharmacy, engineering, architecture, music, and the fine arts were the most attractive for further study. Women generally made pragmatic decisions in choosing their professions, geared to the possibilities of professional advancement but also cognizant of the ongoing difficulties of overcoming older stereotypes and attitudes.

Opportunities in higher education opened again for Eastern European women during the Cold War period of 1947 to 1989 (precisely when depended on specific regional dynamics). Drastic changes had been imposed in Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania in the wake of the Soviet totalitarian system and its educational model. The universities were no longer autonomous, higher education institutions were state-owned and had a central managing body, the academic syllabi and curricula were unified, and Marxist ideology reigned. These Communist regimes eliminated illiteracy, democratized secondary and post-secondary education, increased the number of post-secondary schools

and program subjects, and introduced new forms of training such as evening courses and part-time study. Greece and Turkey, except for several periods, preserved their democratic system. Both countries also preserved liberal principles and objectives of education, the autonomy of separate universities, and pluralism in the curricula and the methods of teaching. In the 1950s, the two countries were granted educational support by the United States (guest lecturers, equipment, appliances) and Western Europe (admission to European universities).

Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989, many countries – especially Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and Moldova – modernized their national systems of higher education. New objectives and priorities were introduced stressing social, national, and religious values. In order to achieve these goals, horizontal and vertical decentralization was launched, the quality of education was significantly improved, and an increasing number of of students were exposed to new ideas and subject matters at universities abroad.

During the second half of the twentieth century, formal barriers were removed and women could legally access the universities on an equal basis with men. Their admission now depended entirely on their performance in secondary schools and in the national examinations. Less easily removed were hindrances due to poverty (for example in Albania), difficulties blocking completion of primary education, including a ban on women wearing the headscarf at school (as was the case in Turkey from the 1980s to the 1990s), and the persistence of gender-based quotas for separate program subjects (especially in Bulgaria). Still, higher education for women benefited from improvements in the average level of literacy and the fact that almost all girls attended secondary schools. These improvements had been spurred by social emancipation; accelerated social and economic modernization; the successful integration of the Muslim minority (in Bulgaria); a number of key legislative amendments (Bulgaria 1947, 1958, 1990; Romania 1978, 1995; Albania 1994, 1999; Greece 1978, 1982; Turkey 1954); and national constitutional changes targeting social and educational policies.

During the second half of the twentieth century, there were increasing numbers of women graduates from higher educational programs. Women were enrolled in all subject areas, including medicine, agriculture, commerce, technology, economics, and the military. However, problems such as unstable economies and ingrained patriarchal structures (in Albania, Moldova, and Macedonia) or Muslim religion (in Turkey) still continue to negatively impact women's educational achievements. The professional opportunities for women graduates

Table 1: Percentage of Overall Enrollment among Female Students (1990s)

	Albania	Bulgaria	Croatia	Greece	Moldova	Romania	Turkey	Slovenia	Macedonia	Yugoslavia
total 1990	7.4	32.6		35.8		9.3	9.0	27.7	17.7	19.4
total 1996	14.0	51.6	29.1	46.3	29.2	24.3	15.2	41.3	21.7	24.4
1st level, 1996		75.0	37.0			71.0	45.0	49.0	46.0	49.0
2nd level, 1996		60.0	55.0			50.0	36.0	58.0	55.0	55.0

Source: UNESCO 2000, 158–9.

Table 2: Percentage of Women Students in Secondary Schools (1950–1990)

	Albania	Bulgaria	Greece	Romania	Turkey	Slovenia
1950						32.0
1956		32.8				
1961	16.6	45.3	23.0			
1969	32.5	6.9	30.9			
1975		53.6	38.7			
1980		53.2				54.0
1985	46.4	53.0				
1990		60.8				56.0

Sources: OECD 1960, 299, 1970, 372; Republic of Bulgaria 1960, 299; 1970, 372; 1990, 346; Jogan 2004, 3.

Table 3: Percentage of Women Students by Field of Study (2000)

	Albania	Bulgaria	Croatia	Moldova	Romania	Turkey	Slovenia	Macedonia	Yugoslavia
education	82	80	81	81	88	42	80	86	71
humanities	70	72	70	48	65	47	71	71	76
law, social sciences	47	66	63	50	58	37	63	60	60
natural and agrarian sciences, engineering	45	46	27	37	34	29	30	36	37
medical sciences	63	70	69	77	74	64	76	70	68
gender segregation index	13	12	20	18	13	6	16	15	15

Source: UNESCO 2000, 162–3.

who continue to specialize in "female appropriate" disciplines remain limited to fields with low social prestige and payment rates (such as education and social work). In addition, they are subjected to discriminatory practices when hired at work or progressing up the hierarchy, and often their work conflicts with family-related issues.

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Turkey

Modern Turkish higher education started in 1924 with the eradication of the religious education of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (CEPES 1990, Hatipoğlu 2000). *Medrese*s, religious colleges, were replaced by contemporary secular universities and the use of Arabic and Persian by the Latin alphabet as the medium of written and oral communication. Today, Turkish higher education is coeducational and consists of all tertiary institutions with a minimum duration of two years (T.C. Yuksekogretim Kurulu n.d.a, n.d.b). There are 53 public and 23 private universities, all regulated by the Higher Education Council (HEC). The curriculum is standardized and there are certain courses, such as Turkish language, that are compulsory for all students across institutions for at least two semesters. There are some key challenges faced by all students, for example access to higher education. However, the focus in this entry is the challenges faced by women in Turkish higher education.

The first of these is the discouragement of women's attendance in higher education. Scholars explain that insufficient job opportunities for women, higher education costs, and patriarchal beliefs that higher education does not contribute much to women's lives have a negative impact on the participation of Turkish women in higher education (Demiray and Curabay 2005). Especially in rural areas, women become unpaid family laborers or are forced to marry at young ages instead of being encouraged to go to university. Even though female participation in higher education has increased dramatically over the decades, it still trails that of men. Furthermore, females underperform in comparison to males when it comes to graduation rates. According to the State Institute of Statistics data, a comparison of male and female students' attendance and graduation numbers in academic years 1940/1, 2001/2 is as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Male and Female Undergraduate Students' Attendance and Graduation Numbers

	Academic Year 1940/1		Academic Year 2001/2	
	M	F	M	F
new admissions	2,645	880	262,703	192,782
enrollment	10,456	2,655	983,564	694,372
graduates	1,357	354	165,127	121,413

Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry State Institute of Statistics

A second gender-related issue is that women are less represented in some areas of study as compared to others (Demiray and Curabay 2005). According to 2001/2 HEC data, the number of female students is higher than that of males in the areas of language and literature, health sciences, and arts, which are traditionally considered "women's jobs" (Demiray and Curabay 2005). On the other hand, the number of female students is much lower than that of males in the areas of technical sciences, agriculture, and forestry, which are considered "men's jobs." The distribution of males and females among subject fields is as shown in Table 2:

Table 2: Percentage of Male and Female Students among Fields of Study

Field of Study	% Female	% Male
Language & Literature	60.9	39.1
Math. & Natural Sciences	44.5	55.5
Health Sciences	56.5	43.5
Social Sciences	42.5	57.5
Applied Social Sciences	45.5	54.5
Technical Sciences	22.7	77.3
Agriculture & Forestry	29.5	70.5
Arts	53.6	46.4
AVERAGE	42.6	57.4

Source: T.C. Yuksekogretim Kurulu n.d.a

The final challenge for women in higher education is the issue of the headscarf. Literature indicates that female university students with veils are not allowed to enroll, enter campuses, attend classes, or sit examinations (Altintaş 2002, Human Rights Watch 2004). They need to take their scarves off to attend post-secondary institutions to receive higher education. This seems to create tensions within the context of tertiary education (Human Rights Watch 2004). On the one hand, policymakers maintain that the scarf is a symbol of extreme political Islam that threatens the secular nature of Turkey and that covered students are trying to make a political statement. On the other hand, female students with veils claim that they wear the scarf because of their religious beliefs. They also report that because their access to higher education has been denied, their hopes for a future career have been terminated. Those who can afford to may go abroad, but others do not have this option. The headscarf issue is still hotly debated in the Turkish higher education system.

It is important to overcome these challenges so that females have equal access to higher education, and women can participate more fully as citizens in the Turkish society and economy.

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Fatma Nevra Seggie

Education: Premodern, Pre-Nineteenth Century

Afghanistan

Prior to the foundation of a modern Afghan state (ca. 1747), a variety of dynasties ruled traditional Afghan territories and lands, which extended into Iran, Central Asia, and India. The Umayyad and ʿAbbasid caliphs controlled the area through their governors based in Marv up until 820 C.E. The Tahirids (821–73 C.E.) and Saffarids (867–908 C.E.) ruled from Nishapur (near modern day Mashhad), the Samanids (819–1005 C.E.) from Bukhara, the Ghaznavids (977–1186 C.E.) from Ghazna and Lahore and the Timurids (1370–1506 C.E.) from Herat. Bābur, the first Mughal emperor (1483–1530), ruled from Kabul. Typically, rulers married to establish firm political alliances. As a result, the wives of rulers came from a wide spectrum of ethnic groups and regions.

The premodern age was one in which literacy and formal education were almost exclusively limited to the elite. There is only the briefest of information on the education of women. Many women could read and write. Elite women were taught reading and writing, calligraphy, and how to compose letters. Education often took place in the home or at the court and was conducted by private tutors. These private tutors were hired to educate female students either individually or in groups. Female relatives of scholars were exceptions. They were often able to attend classes held in the houses where the scholars lived. For the most part, girls were not sent to the mosque schools (*kuttāb*) with the boys. If they were, they were taught separately in special classes. *Madrasa*s (law schools) were often funded by women, and also sometimes served as places of instruction for the female elite.

The education of women was limited to royal families, the highborn, and to those related to scholars or the secretarial (civil servant) class. Unfortunately, little has been written about women's education but there are accounts of women scholars, teachers, and transmitters of knowledge. One early example is Rabīʿa Quzdarī, one of the earliest poetesses to write in both Arabic and Persian. Her father was an Arab governor of Balkh. She serves as an example of an independent woman but she was truly an exception. In the field of religious traditions, Karīma bint Aḥmad of Marv was a major source of *ḥadīth* for Bukhārī's *Ṣaḥīḥ*.

Slave girls were in a very different situation. Some were given specialized instruction in grammar, poetry, singing, and social etiquette. The training and education that they received made them much more valuable. For example, the price of a skilled female slave could be as high as 40,000 dinars compared with 300 dinars for an uneducated male slave.

Islam allowed women equality in religion. As a result of this women were able to be actively involved in religious studies and religious observances and rituals related to folk cults, pilgrimages, and shrines. Female mystics are frequently mentioned within the literature of Sufism. Some of these women were single but there are also numerous references to married couples in which partners were both mystics. Royal women were especially active in funding and founding *madrasa*s, *khānqāh*s (Sufi retreats), mosques, and shrines and also made pilgrimages to Mecca and numerous other shrines.

After the advent of the Mongols (post 1258), there is more information. Mongol and Turkic women traditionally managed the affairs of their households in the absence of their husbands and were in charge of overseeing production and obtaining food and clothing. High-ranking Mongol women often assumed military and governmental responsibilities upon the death of their husbands. Additionally they acted as regents until a new successor could be chosen. Also according to the *yasa* (the Mongol law code), men were encouraged to seek and take advice from their wives. Very often elite women acted as "foster-mothers" in charge of the upbringing of princes and princesses as well.

Timurid Herat served as a high point in the position and activities of women in society. During the Timurid and Safavid periods numerous women wielded enormous political clout. We know that sixteenth-century Herat served as a model for cultural lifestyles. The *Javāhir al-ʿajāyib*, written by Sulṭān Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad Haravī Fakhrī (fl. 1551–5) in the mid-sixteenth century, is a rare work in that it is completely devoted to writings about famous women. Some 30 women are represented and samples of their poetry given. From this work we are able to gain information on women as a segment of the literary, administrative, religious, and political elites. Women participated in intellectual and social activities, sometimes in

mixed company, during the Timurid, Uzbek, and Safavid eras.

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MARK DAVID LUCE

Central Asia

In premodern Central Asia women's education took diverse forms and was not confined to formal religious training. Despite the presence of well-educated, learned, and cultivated women in the historical sources, specific references to women's education are scant and scattered. Much has to be inferred. Only a small minority of the population studied in *madrasa*s or other formal institutions. This was especially true for women. While women were frequently involved in the charitable activities related to such institutions and had established *waqf*s for *madrasa*s, there is hardly any reference to women receiving education in *madrasa*s or teaching at such institutions. Both men and women usually received their initial education at home and later in informal settings such as the homes of their teachers.

Women received their basic education mainly from family members. While some premodern religious and literary thinkers stressed the importance of women's education, they placed responsibility for it on close relatives such as fathers and husbands. For example, in *Qutadghu Bilig*, the twelfth-century mirror for princes, while advising segregation of the sexes, the author nevertheless urges fathers to educate both their sons and their daughters.

Because women usually received their basic education at home from their kinsfolk, women from the families of religious-literary circles in urban areas had greater access to literary education than women in rural and nomadic environments. Many of the prominent learned women mentioned in historical texts belonged to royal or scholarly and intellectual families in urban centers. They likely took part in the literary and teaching circles that took place in the private houses of such families. For example, according to *Javāhir al-ʿajāyib*, a sixteenth-century anthology of women poets written in Herat, most women poets belonged to the families of scholarly or royal background. Among them were relatives of prominent *ʿulamāʾ* and Sufis, including a daughter of the *qaḍī* of Samarkand, and Moghul Khānim, a wife of Shibānī Khān. These women wrote poetry and engaged in literary exchanges and seem to have played an important role in the region's intellectual and cultural scene.

From the available sources, it appears that women's education was not entirely restricted to urban upper strata of society or strictly to home schooling. Some women from more modest backgrounds studied with teachers outside their immediate family and attended Qur'ānic schools or *maktab*s located either in mosques or in the private houses of teachers. It seems likely that both boys and girls attended these schools where they received elementary Islamic education as well as training in etiquette and poetry.

There are references to female teachers who taught both boys and girls until they reached the age of puberty. Indeed, Central Asia has a long tradition of female teachers known as *atun* or *bibiatun* who were responsible for the religious education of both boys and girls. The collection of legal documents known as *Majmūʿa-yi vasāyik* (Collected documents) from late sixteenth-century Samarkand includes several contracts entrusting children, both male and female, to female teachers for the purposes of education. One of these documents, dated 1590 C.E., refers to a man who entrusted his daughter to a woman named Agha Māhim to be "trained with motherly love and educated in faith and Islam."

The education of women from ruling families was shaped by indigenous understandings of family loyalty and dynastic rule. The education of both men and women within such families was geared to create a common dynastic culture. Women played a major role in this system. The educational system of the Timurid dynasty, in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for example, emphasized the role of the ruler's senior wife, who was usually from the lineage of Chingiz Khān, as motherly educator. Timurid rulers had numerous wives and consorts by whom they had children. However, it was not the biological mothers of the royal children, but rather the senior wives who were responsible for their upbringing and education. As the senior female members of the dynasty, they knew the customs and ways of the family and were charged with transmitting them to the children. For example, Tīmūr's senior wife Sarāy Mulk Khānim, who was of Chingizid origin, became a "foster mother" to several of Tīmūr's descendants by other wives. The Timurid custom of entrusting the care and education of many sons and daughters to the senior wife was designed to promote family cohesion and prevent birth mothers from supporting their own

children as candidates for the throne. Such a system also corresponded to the notion of age hierarchy prevalent among Turco-Mongol tribal societies. As senior members of the family, older women had a good deal of authority over family affairs, including the upbringing of children.

Throughout the medieval period royal women received education in literature, art, and religious studies, as well as horse riding and archery. There are numerous references to royal women who were well versed in poetry and other areas. They knew how to write and corresponded with both their family members and their spiritual mentors. For example, according to another sixteenth-century source *Tārīkh-i Rashīdī*, Khānzāde Begim, the sister of Bābur, wrote a letter to her Sufi mentor; however the author does not fail to mention that he corrected her writing. Bābur's daughter, Gulbadan Begum, was the author of the famous text *Humāyūnnāmah*.

Royal women were involved in the establishment of several *madrasas* and *waqfs* supporting them. They were also actively engaged in the administration and management of pious endowments. Several Timurid as well as Shibanid-Uzbek women were closely associated with such institutions. Miḥr Sulṭān Khānim, daughter-in-law of Shibānī Khān is known to have established *waqf*s for two *madrasa*s in Samarkand and was in charge of their management.

A great deal of information about women's education can be found in the writings of Dilshod, who lived in Kokand in the nineteenth century. Coming from a modest background, she became a teacher and educated more than 200 girls who later played important roles in the literary and educational life of Central Asia in the nineteenth century. Dilshod describes the close ties which emerged between a teacher and her female students. Her writings show that many characteristics of medieval education – especially the importance of a close personal relationship between teacher and student – continued right up until the modern period.

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Nurten Kilic-Schubel

Morocco

Women in premodern Morocco have left relatively little trace of their presence in the extant textual sources: dynastic chronicles, biographical dictionaries, religio-legal materials, government records, and the accounts of European consuls, merchants, and physicians. Moreover, references to women are expressed in the male voice, giving us little insight into how women themselves perceived their world. One reason for the paucity of material written by and about women was the low female literacy rate, but this was exacerbated by normative urban male perceptions that women should not participate in the public sphere and that it impinged on male honor to discuss female relatives. The only aspects of female activity that could be mentioned with propriety were lineage, childbearing, and religiosity. Europeans were not constrained by indigenous social mores but their comments on women remain those of outsiders with limited access to and understanding of Moroccan society. Court records, however, give additional information about female property holding, inheritance, commercial activity, and marital rights and indicate that women could be assertive and independent.

The position of women was also affected by whether they were freeborn or slaves. In Morocco, the freeborn (*aḥrār*) majority claimed Arab, Andalusi, or Berber origin while slaves (*ʿabīd*) were perceived to be of Sub-Saharan African or European origin. However, the line between slavery and freedom was very fine. Free girls and women were frequently the victims of kidnapping and illegal sale and, in times of famine and dearth, men sometimes resorted to selling their wives or daugh-

ters (Ennaji 1999, 71–86). One source of power for a free woman was her lineage and therefore the political alliance that she represented. Her relatives were known as *akhwāl* (maternal uncles) and they could be an important source of political support. Such support was not mediated exclusively through men but via women themselves as various myths in a fourteenth-century chronicle, the *Rawḍ al-qirṭās*, suggest. One such story recounts how the ancestor of the Zanata, Barr, fled from Arabia to North Africa on the prompting of his wife, Albaʾ, who had been warned by her mother-in-law, Yarigh, that Barr's cousins were jealous of his marriage and desired to kill him (Ibn Abī Zarʿ 1999, 366). Another story recounts how ʿAtika, a high status free woman married to the ruler of Fes, took action when an uprising against her husband occurred by warning him of the danger and sending a letter to her father, asking him to quell the insurrection (Ibn Abī Zarʿ 1999, 93–4).

A seventeenth-century source describes the political activity of Khunatha bint Bakkār al-Maghrāwī, one of the wives of the sultan, Mawlāy Ismāʿīl, who assisted her son's rise to power by opening the palace gates to his supporters in the army (Cigar 1981, 62). Women also exerted influence in the realm of foreign and commercial affairs. In 1182–3/1769, a Swedish envoy gained access to the sultan through the support of his chief wife, Fatima (Høst 1998, 52). Although it can be argued that such interventions were the exception rather than the rule, they are not presented by Moroccan authors as unusual.

The other areas of acceptable and thus recorded female activity were religious learning and piety, and charitable benefactions. Women played an important religious role as soothsayers (*kāhināt*) in pre-Islamic North Africa, and retained aspects of that role into the Islamic era. The *Rawḍ al-qirṭās*, for instance, contains an intriguing reference to a heterodox third/ninth-century Berber "prophet," Hamīm, who instructed his followers to recite a prayer formula which expressed belief in his father and paternal aunt, Talit, as well as himself (Ibn Abī Zarʿ 1999, 122). Al-Bakrī adds that Hamīm had a sister who was also a soothsayer whom the tribe relied upon in times of war and hardship. Ibn Tūmart, the founder of the sixth/twelfth-century Almohad movement, also depended greatly on his sister, Zaynab, the sole woman in the circle of advisors around him (Ibn Khaldūn 1959, viii, 472). The founding of the two great mosques of Fes was also attributed to women of religious learning and wealth.

It is thus evident that women were respected for their wisdom and knowledge and could be well-educated. However, they had to acquire their learning within the confines of the home and were dependent upon their male relatives to teach them or appoint suitable tutors, usually black eunuchs. Male religious scholars and mystics would, on occasion, educated their daughters to very high levels but the opportunities for them to apply their knowledge in the public sphere were limited. Khunatha bint Bakkār, the seventeenth-century royal wife mentioned earlier, is described as a *faqīha*, a legal scholar. It is likely that she was educated by her father, an eminent shaykh. She, in turn, took responsibility for educating her grandson, the future sultan, Muḥammad b. ʿAbd Allāh whom she also took on pilgrimage to Mecca in 1133–4/1730–2 (Cigar 1981, 71). Later, Muḥammad showed some interest in the literacy of women in his harem: he proudly presented one young wife, the daughter of the Pasha of Rabat, to the Danish envoy, Aereboe, in 1192/1778 as his "secretary" and asked her to write a short note for the envoy (Høst 1998, 97). Some slave women were also highly educated, usually in the performing and literary arts, although references to such women are scanty by the nineteenth century (Ennaji 1999, 13).

Although a small number of girls did attend elementary Qurʾān schools, female education remained informal and private well into the twentieth century, despite the steady modernization of education for boys. The first modern Moroccan schools were opened by the Alliance israélite universelle for Jewish children in the 1860s. Similar schools were provided for Muslim boys after the establishment of the French protectorate in 1912. When Moroccan reformers opened Muslim free schools in the 1920s these also catered for boys rather than girls (Damis 1973, 29). It was not until the 1930s and 1940s that schools began to open for girls (ibid., 328).

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Amira K. Bennison

Sub-Saharan Africa: West Africa

This entry addresses premodern, pre-nineteenth-century women's education in Sub-Saharan Africa by discussing the educational philosophy and practices of a Fulbe Sufi community in the Sahel, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. The Fulbe are one of West Africa's most populous ethnic nations, living in a region from The Gambia and Senegal in the west to Cameroon in the east. They are best known as cattle herders although some clans keep only sheep and goats while others have lived in urban areas for generations. The Fulbe were prominent in spreading Islam in West Africa, beginning in the Guinea/Senegal region and then moving eastward in a pattern that often combined the outmigration of small family groups with later jihadic activity. One such clan, known as the Toronkawa, migrated from Futa Toro in what is now Senegal. They eventually settled in the semi-desert Sahel in the borderland area separating present-day Nigeria from Niger.

Muhammadu Fodio, a ninth-generation descendant of Musa Jokolo who first settled the area in about 1450, married his cousin Hauwa, a teacher, and made his home at Degel, a place lived in by scholars who spent their lives in pursuit of Islamic learning. They belonged to the Sufi Qadiriyya brotherhood and lived lives of utmost simplicity in small houses, the remnants of which can still be seen.

The scholars, men and women, with their shared interest in books and learning maintained links with other Sufis including the Kunta family in Timbuktu (in present-day Mali) and Shaikh Jibril who lived in a desert area north of Agadez (in present-day Niger). Of Degel scholars who journeyed to Mecca most returned, including Muhammadu b. Raji who passed on his knowledge to up and coming students at Degel, among whom was Usuman, known as Shehu dan Fodio, born to Muhammad Fodio and Hauwa in 1754 and who later founded the Sokoto Caliphate. The Shehu is important in the context of women's education for two reasons: he set out his ideas in books which survive and we know the histories of his daughters.

As a young man Shehu dan Fodio spoke to the pastoralists, saying men should relate to their wives with propriety and fairness, not repression and domination. He listed what they should and should not do in a very specific manner. In an untitled poem he said, "Some men do not teach their wives nor do they allow them to be educated. This stems from ignorance and shows they do not know the teachings of the Prophet."

In a later work in Arabic, *Nurul al-Bab*, he addressed those who could read in that language, the larger Islamic community of believers, and the *ʿulamāʾ*. In a famous passage he said,

> Most of our educated men leave their daughters and their captives morally abandoned like beasts without teaching them what Allah prescribes should be taught them, and without instructing them in the articles of the Law which concerns them. Thus they leave them ignorant of the rules regarding ablutions, prayer, fasting, business dealings which they may have to fulfil and which Allah commands they should be taught. This is a very serious mistake and a forbidden innovation in Islamic practice.
>
> Men treat these beings like household implements which become broken after long use and which are then thrown on the dung heap. I am astounded . . . to instruct one's wives and daughters and captives is a positive duty.

The Shehu, drawing on his own experience of growing up in a scholarly household and with a clear perception of what was proper, gave his daughters a very thorough education. They studied the same books that he had. We know this because a list of his teachers, the subjects he covered, and the books involved are known, and we have a collection of his daughters' works.

For example, as a student he read the *Mukhtaṣar* of Khalil b. Isḥāq with his uncle, a book of 61 chapters dealing with ritual, personal law, marriage and divorce, apostasy, and other topics. His eldest daughter Hadija (b. 1788) in due course translated the book into Fulfulde (the Fulbe language) and wrote her own commentary on the text.

There were no differences between what girls and boys were taught. The Qurʾān, *tafsīr*, Arabic grammar, prosody, *ḥadīth*, and *fiqh* were at the heart of the curriculum for girls as well as boys.

Women taught the women, girls, and little boys. The most famous of all the women teachers, Asma'u b. Shehu (1793–1864), has left for us a short but valuable account of the women she said she "wanted to be united with in the next world." In an appendix of 14 verses attached to her poem "Sufi Women," which is linked to the classical work *Sifat al-ṣafwa* by Ibn al-Jawzī, she said that if one took into account those who had already died, "more than 100 women in the Shehu's community

had committed the Qur'ān to memory and never tired of preaching the righteous faith." Among those whom Asma'u singled out were women like the Imam's daughter, Yar Hindu, "who was diligent in sorting disputes," Joda Kawuuri "the Qur'ānic scholar who used her scholarship everywhere," and "the teacher of women, Ḥabība, a woman of great presence who was most revered."

Women went for instruction to the homes of the senior women teachers. During the Shehu's lifetime his compound would have been the main focus of activity and it is fortunate that there has been no break in the tradition of women going to the house in Sokoto where he spent his last few years and where he is buried. After his death each of his widows continued to occupy her own *daki* (room) and to teach as she always had. When death came a successor was chosen from among close blood relatives of the deceased. The new person took over the role of chief teacher in that particular *daki* and the methods she used to teach her students were the same as before. Innovation was not valued.

Mature students read texts aloud to the teacher and listened attentively to comments and criticisms. Some works, because of their conciseness, could only be understood by means of explanations, which sometimes were available from the teacher herself but more often came from authentic and scholarly commentaries. From among the most earnest students sooner or later a possible successor would emerge. Early in the twenty-first century, in the *daki* of the Shehu's widow, Aisha, the present author met a 50-year-old lady sitting at the feet of the chief teacher. "I have already been designated as her successor," she said, nodding at the smiling teacher, "Aisha who first lived here lies just outside that doorway. And all those who followed her are nearby. Nothing has changed. This is what we do and it is the same as they did."

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Jean Boyd

Education: Vocational

Iran

The period between the latter part of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century witnessed the primary attempts at Westernization and secularization of the Iranian education system (Nassehy 1979, 41, Banani 1961, 86). An important effect of Western influence on Iranian education was the introduction of vocational-technical schools, mostly by foreign missions, from 1906 onward (Maviddat 2001, 50). Until 1953, however, enrollment in these schools was confined to men. In this year a group of American advisors visited Iran to study the Iranian secondary education structure and curriculum, and propose measures to improve it (Hendershot 1975, 117). Their criticism of the school system, added to industry's discontent over the low economic productivity and lack of "proper" attitudes and habits of work on the part of the Iranian workforce, led to the creation of vocational-technical schools on a large scale, under the names of *amūzishgāh* and *hunaristān* (Nassehy 1979, 61–4). A decade later, the number of females enrolled in these schools jumped tenfold and continued growing until the advent of the 1979 Revolution.

After the 1979 Revolution the number of students enrolled in vocational and technical schools dropped sharply to nearly half the previous level. The decline took place for both genders and continued until a decade later. The reason for this sharp decline may be partly attributed to the post-revolutionary chaos, the negative attitude of youth toward these schools (both before and after the Revolution), and to the Iran–Iraq War, which disrupted the growth of industry, leaving the graduates of vocational and technical schools unemployed (Nassehy 1979, Sikhāvat 1998, 132–3).

During the 1992/3 academic year, a new program of vocational education called *kārdānish* (work knowledge) was added to the secondary school curriculum, which provided pupils with the option of choosing the vocational rather than the general track. The *kārdānish* program begins in the second year of high school and continues through the third year. The pupils enrolled in this curriculum graduate from high school at the end of the third year – as do those enrolled in the general track – and have the option of going to work as skilled workers, or studying another year in the pre-university program and then going to university after passing the entrance exam.

During the 2003/4 academic year, there were a total of 486,502 men and 301,568 women enrolled in the *kārdānish* and technical-vocational schools managed by the ministry of labor and social affairs but the number of women enrolled in the general track was around 30 percent higher than men. These figures clearly demonstrate women's preference for the general track as opposed to vocational and technical programs.

There are 41 fields in the *kārdānish* curriculum, three of which are confined to women, namely home management, nursery school teaching, and fashion design and sewing. As for the remaining fields, even though there is no official ban on women's participation in the more technical fields, they are discouraged from selecting fields involving the operation of heavy machinery and farming equipment. Consequently, male students are able to enroll in 36 different fields as opposed to 21 for women.

Technical and vocational schools operating under the auspices of the Technical and Vocational Training Organization (TVTO) vary in fields of training as well as means and methods of teaching. Aside from providing vocational training in institutions, the TVTO also makes vocational training available to those living in remote areas through mobile educational teams. Each team is comprised of one or more teachers in various fields, and the equipment necessary for the training programs. The TVTO also provides training in diverse locations, including in public vocational schools, on the job, in centers adjacent to factories, in military compounds, and in private institutions. In 2003, there were 549 vocational centers throughout Iran, of which 268 were confined to women, 181 to men, and 100 centers were shared by both genders. The only fields in which women outnumber the men are administrative services, making of handicrafts, textile production, fashion design and sewing, information technology, and commerce and finance. In contrast, there are no women in fields such as metallurgy, welding, automechanics, electricity, and repair of agricultural machinery.

A study conducted in 1997 in Tehran portrays a bleak picture of the effectiveness of vocational schools, especially for women. The reasons cited are: undesirability and insecurity of the workplace, unconventional methods of recruitment, and the unavailability of work in their fields (Sikhāvat 1998, 128–9).

There are also non-governmental organizations and charity organizations, which provide limited vocational training for women to access jobs, especially those who are heads of their households. However, as far as the author is aware, no data on the results of their training programs are available so far.

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GUITTY NASSEHY TABRIZI

North America

The experience of Muslim women in North America with regard to vocational education is largely unstudied. However, a few preliminary themes are drawn out in this entry, based on a review of vocational education in North America and a review of the available data on the employment and educational characteristics of Muslim women.

WOMEN AND VOCATIONAL EDUCATION IN NORTH AMERICA

In the United States and Canada, vocational education has historically been seen as a preparatory training for skilled workers requiring less than baccalaureate education. It was stigmatized as education for less desirable labor in a manufacturing and resource-based economy that was largely filled by pre-trained immigrants. However in the emerging context of the "New Economy" centered on technology development, knowledge production, and information management, vocational education has become increasingly associated with continuous education and training in adult years necessary to compete in a fast-paced and ever evolving world. Vocational education in the new context is celebrated as a broader and critical facet of the New Economy (National Center for Education Statistics 2000).

In the earlier context, vocational education for women concentrated on preparation for labor in the home and in traditionally female-concentrated employments such as in clerical, childcare, and lower health fields. With the increased involvement of women in the labor force beginning in the 1960s, and the implementation of a number of governmental and social initiatives to involve women in non-traditional employment, the notion of female equality in educational and employment opportunity has been proclaimed. Consequently, the discourse on vocational education in the context of the New Economy has tended to ignore issues of gender (Eyre, Lovell, and Smith 2003).

Feminist critics have argued that inequality remains a feature of women's experience of paid labor and enterprise and work-related learning and education. Entrenched role expectations and unequal social structures impede women's prospects for employment equity. Women continue to supply the bulk of domestic labor, remain largely segregated in traditionally female employments, earn lesser incomes than male counterparts, have their skills and knowledge undervalued relative to men, have less opportunity to participate in the continuous learning model of vocational education, and benefit less from continuous learning opportunities in which they do participate (Fenwick 2004).

EDUCATIONAL AND EMPLOYMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF MUSLIM WOMEN

The Muslim population of North America is overwhelmingly the result of waves of immigration coming from many Muslim-majority countries beginning in the 1960s and accelerating throughout the century. Muslim women are part of fast emerging, ethnically and racially diverse immigrant communities. Census data about religion is not collected in the United States but in Canada, information on religion has historically been noted as part of the national census and some information on

Muslim women's employment and educational experience has been gathered (Hamdani 2004). Canadian census data will therefore be relied upon to provide some picture of the wider North American situation.

Canadian census data from 2001 indicate that Muslim women tend to be more highly educated than non-Muslim women with almost one in three having university education as compared to one in five for all Canadian women. Muslim women specialize in science and engineering fields proportionately more than other women, suggesting that the cultural constraints preventing female entry into these disciplines is less prevalent in Muslim immigrant contexts.

While Muslim women in Canada are relatively highly educated, particularly in fields valued by the New Economy, it is clear that this has not translated to greater participation in the labor market. Less than half of eligible Muslim women participate in the labor force compared to over 60 percent as the national average. In addition, most employment found by Muslim women tended to be temporary, casual or part time. The unemployment rate for Muslim women stood at 16.5 percent compared to the national average of 7.2 percent for all women. It is also notable that employed Muslim women tended not to be working in occupations relating to their training. Clerical, sales, and cashier jobs rank at the top (all of which are based on easily transferable skills), with none of the top seven occupations correlating with a dominantly professional component (Hamdani 2004).

The underemployment of Muslim women in the paid labor force despite their relatively high educational levels can be attributed to a number of factors. First, immigrant skills and credentials have not been easily recognized, making transition to North American employment difficult. Second, cultural pressures to perform childcare responsibilities and other domestic labor are strong in immigrant Muslim families, yet in North America, women often lack access to the childcare resources of their extended families. Census data reveal that most Muslim women are married and live in nuclear or small extended family contexts where the economic demand to seek employment often competes with traditional role expectations leaving them in a difficult situation, especially when they find themselves cast as the primary upholders of cultural and religious values. Lastly, Muslim women face outside discrimination common to many visible minority immigrant women (Galabuzi 2001). Recent studies have indicated that Muslim women who wear headscarves and other distinctive forms of dress face added discrimination in gaining employment (Persad 2002).

Preliminary themes in vocational education

While many have not been involved in paid labor for various reasons, it is clear that a large number of Muslim women do participate and seek out educational initiatives to upgrade skills and knowledge to enhance employment prospects. As an indication of this it is notable that Canadian census data indicate that proportionately twice as many adult Muslim women over the age of 25 were attending some form of schooling compared to all other women in 2001. There may be many reasons for this, perhaps related to immigration transition issues and greater emphasis on education in some cultural communities.

New immigrants have access to a number of government sponsored employment support services geared primarily to those with English language needs, and to the less educated and less skilled. In Canada, government funding supports a range of general settlement and employment programs operated by social service and nonprofit organizations. Programs specifically for women and youth represent a significant proportion of these activities. These programs do not target ethnic or religious communities but, in many cases, they end up being virtually ethnic-specific services, clustering where immigrant groups concentrate. While some Muslim ethnic community organizations, such as those of Somali, Pakistani, or Arab groups, provide such services, very few religious institutions do so. Religious institutions such as Islamic centers, mosques, and full-time day schools are the most widespread and developed institutions found in the Muslim community in North America, but these have focused almost entirely on providing for the religious needs of Muslim families and the educational needs of children.

It is too early to assess the success of vocational educational experiences for Muslim women in North America. No direct research has been conducted to confirm the presence of barriers identified by the literature that impede women's access to vocational education in general, although it can be conjectured that these barriers are likely to be more intensely experienced by immigrant women. In addition, the increased presence of more acculturated North American raised Muslim women may significantly alter these educational and employment patterns over time.

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SHAHEEN AZMI

Turkey

Vocational education for women in Turkey had a modest beginning, with evening vocational and arts schools for women established in 1932. These were followed by home arts and sewing courses for women in 1938 (UNDP 1999). Although the status of women in Turkey has advanced considerably over time, and much progress has been achieved in narrowing the educational gender gap, the female labor force still remains at a disadvantage. Only in 1990 did the constitutional court annul the law (Article 159 of the Civil Code) on spousal permission for women to work. But the main obstacles standing in the way of women acquiring appropriate job skills, securing long-term employment, and achieving career advancement, are not so much the established law and official occupational guidelines as the gender discrepancies in culture, religion, customs, and traditions.

Most notably, segregation of boys and girls in the vocational education system, under current sociocultural constraints and dominant role modelings, produces gender-biased patterns. Vocational secondary education includes technical training schools for boys and domestic science schools for girls. There are also auxiliary schools for health care, agriculture and husbandry, commerce and tourism, secretarial skills, local administration, culinary arts, and religion (*imam hatip okullari*), which generally appeal to one sex or are gender-segregated. While about one-quarter of vocational and technical secondary schools, mainly commerce and tourism schools, are gender neutral, about one-third are designated as girls' schools, offering training primarily in occupations which traditionally have attracted women, but also more recently programs for the industrial and service sectors, such as travel and tourism, textile design, electronics, office management, secretarial training, and computers. On the other hand, boys' vocational schools offer training in typically male-dominated professions such as mining, cast metal works, factory manufacturing, and construction. Within the non-formal education system, gender segregation is also widespread, with boys exclusively enrolled in Apprenticeship Training Centers and girls enrolled in Girls' Applied Craft Schools (International Women's Rights Action Watch 2003).

At present, various vocational training courses and programs exist for women and girls who have never enrolled in formal education or left school prematurely, but the institutional efforts by the ministry of education has its limits due to the deep-rooted sociocultural environment that neither values the economic contributions of women vis-à-vis men nor encourages women to work outside the home. For instance, in the case of female laborers who have insufficient education or professional skills, they are subject to working in family workshops with male relatives controlling the women's earnings, where a woman may not be paid at all, since her work is regarded as a part of family effort. These practices that belong to the informal economic sector involve subcontracting by larger enterprises prevalent in the areas that cover carpet and rug weaving, handloom weaving, lace making, crocheting, tailoring, souvenirs, and food production, where informal workshops circumvent regulations to recruit women who may have difficulty working outside their community.

The ongoing gender segregation of vocational education in Turkey reflects a persistent and widespread view that many occupations are gender-specific. As a result, women are commonly employed in such sectors that are socially accepted as areas appropriate for women. But they seldom rise to the positions of power where women take part in the decision-making processes (International Women's Rights Action Watch 2003). Notwithstanding the increasingly high proportion of female professionals in the industrial and service sectors, women still mostly occupy positions in the lower ranks of each profession, the lack of appropriate training being the greatest constraint on their advancement.

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Soon-Yong Pak

Western Europe

This entry summarizes the participation of Muslim minorities, in particular, Muslim women, in education and employment in Western Europe and explores some modern state-initiated and NGO-sponsored training programs and initiatives designed to facilitate and integrate Muslim women into labor markets.

Numerous research studies and reports show that migrants and minorities across the European Union (EU) experience much higher levels of unemployment than nationals (EUMC 2000, 2003, Liegl, Perchinig, and Weyss 2004, Münz 2004, Crul and Vemeulen 2003, Rudiger and Spencer 2003, Vertovec and Peach 1997, Modood 1997, Fetzer and Sopher 2005). European Commission based initiatives such as the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and the Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN) arising from the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), highlight widespread racial and religious discrimination against migrant workers, especially those from Muslim backgrounds.

Assumptions that earlier migrants were essentially temporary residents in Europe meant that policies designed to assist their integration were initially limited. However, the integration into labor markets of "third-country nationals" newly arriving is an issue of increasing significance for the EU. In response, several EU member states, such as Austria (where the majority of migrants are of Turkish Muslim origin) and Denmark (where Muslims make up 4 percent of the population and come largely from Turkey, North Africa, Pakistan, and the Middle East), have introduced compulsory "integration contracts" or programs, which can include courses from civic education to language training (Grünell and van het Kaar 2003, Münz 2004).

Participation in the labor market is widely believed to be one of the key sites of social integration. The European Employment Strategy includes National Action Plans for Employment concerned with integration into labor markets and the right to receive training (Liegl, Perchinig, and Weyss 2004). There is, however, a distinct lack of published literature on training and vocational education programs aimed at integrating specifically Muslim women into labor markets, leaving us to extrapolate from the available literature on Muslim minorities in respective EU states.

Despite a range of educational and employment policies across Europe, such as the apprenticeship schemes found in Germany and Austria, which ease transitions to the labor market, and less specific measures exemplified in France, second-generation Muslims, and Turkish youth in particular, suffer from marked degrees of discrimination and disadvantage (Crul and Vemeulen 2003). Targeted labor market policies aimed at integrating migrant youth found in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden have also failed to make significant progress at integrating Muslim youth into labor markets (ibid.).

Country-specific accounts highlight how women from migrant backgrounds, especially Muslims, not only experience higher levels of unemployment but also are less likely than their male counterparts to participate in further and higher education (for examples from the United Kingdom, see Ahmad, Modood, and Lissenburgh 2003; for France, see Simon 2003; for Germany, see Worbs 2003; for Austria, see Herzog-Punzenberger 2003).

In Germany and Austria, where Muslim migrants are mostly Turkish and Moroccan, the majority of Turkish young people enter apprenticeship schemes, which enable them to work and study and gain vocational qualifications and experience. Turkish young women were more likely to participate in these vocational programs, preferring courses in hairdressing (Herzog-Punzenberger 2003, Worbs 2003) but were also likely to drop out to marry or work, whilst Moroccan young women preferred academic courses and were better represented in higher education (Crul and Vemeulen 2003). Studies in other parts of Europe would appear to support this finding, which suggests that more research is needed into exploring the diversity of Muslim women's responses to labor market participation and to avoid reductionist explanatory frameworks.

France's secular, civic framework, with its policy of ethnocentric assimilationism, requires citizens to relinquish ethnic and religious affiliations in the public sphere, most controversially exhibited in its ban of the *ḥijāb* in schools. The lack of culturally-specific education or employment policies and discrimination has contributed to high levels of unemployment amongst second-generation Muslims (who are mostly Algerian, other North African, and

Turkish in origin). Women of Turkish origin are particularly disadvantaged, often leaving school with few qualifications (Simon 2003, Rudiger and Spencer 2003, Fetzer and Sopher 2005). The introduction of "adaptation" classes to account for non-French speaking students negatively affects access to baccalaureate degrees and leaves students with lower degrees (Simon 2003).

Reasons for low economic activity and lack of participation in further and higher education amongst settled Muslim women migrants across Europe are complex and varied. Access to education for many Muslim women across Western Europe remains constrained by factors such as lack of knowledge of training and educational programs, lack of confidence, language constraints, individual and family-based reasons, and structural factors such as lack of directed resources for training programs, social disadvantage, racial and religious discrimination, stereotypes about Muslim women, economic deprivation, and failure to accommodate religious sensitivities such as dress code. Some areas of work (such as serving alcohol in bar or restaurant work, for example) may also be deemed inappropriate for practicing Muslim women (Bemelmans and Freitas 2001, Ahmad, Modood, and Lissenburgh 2003). Residence status and the recognition of existing diplomas or degrees are additional concerns.

Although there is an absence of European-wide targets and benchmarks designed to challenge racial and religious discrimination and allow for comparisons, there are some areas of good practice at national levels (Liegl, Perchinig, and Weyss 2004). For example, in the United Kingdom, the "New Deal," set up in 2001, represents a significant labor market program that offers education, training, and other forms of support aimed at integrating disadvantaged groups into the labor market while remaining sensitive to regional economies through the setting up of localized partnerships (UK National Action Plans for Employment 2001–2004, cited in Liegl, Perchinig, and Weyss 2004). A Strategy Unit report that highlighted "ethnic penalties" in employment especially toward Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (2003), led to the creation of the Ethnic Minority Employment Task Force (EMETF), a government-led initiative to address such discrepancies. It stressed the need for research on English language provision, and support for Learning and Skills Councils and apprenticeships (EMETF Annual Report 2004).

The European Social Fund, through various projects administered by national employment agencies, has initiated a number of vocational training programs designed to address inequalities in the labor market and equip individuals with necessary skills for future employment. Some of its funds are specifically targeted at the integration of women and ethnic minorities into the workforce. It relies on NGOs lobbying governments to allocate funding toward anti-discrimination measures (Liegl, Perchinig, and Weyss 2004).

A more significant measure designed to combat discrimination in the labor market, is the EQUAL-Program (2001–6); this is the main tool through which NGOs can apply for funding. It acts to bring together government organizations, businesses, Social Partners and NGOs in projects to emphasize transnational cooperation and good practice. One of its key fields is positive action aimed at improving the employment prospects of migrants.

Although Muslim migrants across Europe continue to experience widespread discrimination in education and labor markets, efforts to develop and implement legislation to challenge racial and religious discrimination should offer some protection against systematic discrimination. However, the limited literature on existing projects designed to facilitate Muslim women's economic participation, and the diversity in attitudes toward employment, points to a need for more evaluative research.

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Fauzia Ahmad

Education: Women's Religious

Arab States (excepting the Gulf and North Africa)

Women's religious education in Arab countries encompasses a broad variety of forms and settings. For Muslim women, educational exposure occurs in formal, state-accredited institutions as well as sessions (*ḥalaqāt*) in mosques and homes. It also occurs at all levels, from primary education to higher, more specialized training in the classical Muslim sciences. Likewise, religious education of Christian Arab women occurs in multiple settings and at various levels, from private, parochial schools to churches or monasteries. Due to space limitations and the scarcity of published research on Christian women's religious education, this overview focuses on Muslim women.

Historical sources from the earliest period of Islam attest to women's active engagement in spheres of religious learning. ʿĀ'isha bint Abī Bakr (d. 678), the Prophet Muḥammad's favored wife, is perhaps the best known of early Muslim women to have been a prodigious seeker and disseminator of religious learning. She is, however, one of many Muslim women who excelled in various subjects including *ḥadīth* transmission, Islamic law, Qur'ānic exegesis, and Sufism. Biographical dictionaries and chronicles indicate that women throughout Islamic history were tutored in the religious sciences in formal as well as informal settings.

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the topic of women's education was integral to Arab nationalist discourse as a critical component of the revival and reform of Arab and Muslim civilization. Prominent thinkers including Muḥammad Abduh (d. 1905), his student Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935), and Qāsim Amīn (d. 1908), the author of the highly publicized tract *Taḥrīr al-mar'a* (The emancipation of women), strongly advocated greater educational opportunities for women, in both the secular and religious realms. Their campaigns, however, were not aimed at reformulating or rethinking traditional gender roles. Rather, they focused on the necessity of educating women who would then be able to impart religious wisdom and cultural identity to the next generation. Thus women were a vehicle for the realization of nationalist aspirations. In this vein, several Arab women rose to prominence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for their knowledge of various aspects of religious sciences and for their advocacy of women's rights based on Islamic principles. These include women who are prominently identified with nationalism and early feminist movements such as ʿĀ'isha al-Taymūriyya (d. 1902), Malak Ḥifnī Nāsif (d. 1918), ʿĀ'isha bint ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (Bint al-Shāṭī) (d. 1998), and Zaynab al-Ghazālī (d. 2005).

In the modern period, educational systems created in the process of nation-state formation in the Arab world mandated compulsory education for boys and girls at the primary and secondary levels in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and the Occupied Territories of Palestine. Generally, religious education is a required component of the national curriculum and consists of learning the fundamentals of Muslim belief and practice. Thus, many Arab children are exposed to basic Islamic tenets and history through the filters of state-controlled curricula created and supervised by national ministries of education. Modern Islamic revivalist literature, however, often decries the "secularization" of Islamic education and its diluted presentation within the public school system.

In addition to state sponsored education, there are extensive networks of private schools, which have proliferated as a result of diverse factors including the rise of Islamic revivalist movements and negative local reactions to the secularizing effects of the national school system. Such schools, known as *madrasa* (pl. *madāris*) and *kuttāb* (pl. *katātīb*), enact traditional pedagogy and focus on imparting rudimentary, rote religious learning at the primary or secondary levels. Situated in urban and rural areas, these schools are usually accessible to girls only at the primary levels, and are likely to have higher enrollments of boys overall.

This gender discrepancy is acutely reflected in higher levels of religious education for girls. For example, al-Azhar University in Cairo, a bastion of Sunnī religious learning and authority, began enrolling women in its newly inaugurated College of Women in the 1970s. However, the female population of al-Azhar remains small, and overall quality of instruction offered to women lags far behind that of men. Women, moreover, who do acquire higher Islamic education are still denied membership in the prominent Islamic Research Council which has often spoken as an authoritative voice for Sunnī Islam. Nevertheless, women are making

progress as authorities in Islamic law and are sought out for their legal edicts (*fatwā*, pl. *fatāwā*) in other capacities.

Assemblies (*ḥalaqāt*) in private homes and mosques remain among the most vibrant and popular settings for the transmission of religious knowledge among women in the Arab world. Their popularity has grown with the spread of the Islamic revivalist movements of the 1980s and 1990s. These assemblies focus on the teaching of Qur'ān, *ḥadīth*, and Islamic law by female scholars to female students and help account for the spread of Islamic revivalism and Islamically-oriented feminism among the middle- and upper-class elite of the Arab world.

Women's religious education in the Arab world, therefore, is a dynamic and evolving sphere for women's activity and participation. While female religious authorities are known to have existed throughout Muslim history, the modern period is witnessing a historically unprecedented attempt on the part of women to engage as creative agents in the formulation and articulation of Islamic law and religious thought, especially as they pertain to gender roles. The field of Muslim women's studies would benefit greatly from microstudies, which analyze such movements and which can provide empirical data on women's religious education in the various Arab nations.

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Asma Sayeed

Central Asia

Introduction

Islam in Central Asia dates back to the ninth-century Arab invasion and has been an integral part of society ever since. Long before the Soviet era, Central Asian cities were renowned as centers of Muslim scholarship. Folk traditions, customs, and Islamic practices were inextricably intermingled (Akiner 2003), and while formal Islamic institutions and practices were eliminated under Soviet rule (1920–91), informal practices, such as praying at clandestine prayer houses and worshipping at shrines, continued (Tazmini 2001). Women were active in keeping these informal aspects of Islam alive. By the 1980s, Islam had become more a marker of cultural and ethnic identity than an active spiritual commitment. Reinstating Islamic values as a guiding social ethic became an important element of the nation-building projects of the newly independent Central Asian republics. This also contributed to redefining the parameters of gender relations (Akiner 1997). Today, religious activity in the daily life of women and the population in general is on the rise (Heyat 2004). This entry explores the transmission of information about religious traditions in the female domain of the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The term "religious education" refers to any activity undertaken to transmit religious culture, formally through educational and religious institutions, or informally through families, religious communities, the mass media, and other aspects of the social environment.

Formal religious education

Basic Islamic principles are taught in public schools in Turkmenistan. While religious (Islamic) education is not compulsory at either the primary or secondary school level in the other Central Asian Republics (Tazmini 2001), history of religions courses are offered to all public secondary school students in these countries.

Over the past decade, the *madrasa* (Islamic secondary school) has become a source of religious education for both boys and girls. After completing their compulsory education, girls can attend a women's *madrasa* or the women's section of a men's *madrasa*. These are generally supported by a *waqf* (religious endowment) or the Muslim community and provide free education. Instruction is given in Arabic script, ritual prayer, and religious observance. After four years, *madrasa* graduates receive diplomas or certificates allowing them to become *mudarrisāt* (*madrasa* teachers), work as translators or missionaries, or teach Islam to neighborhood girls (Saktanber and Baykal 2000).

Turkey's Religious Affairs Foundation has established secondary and higher education institutions (theology high schools and faculties of theology)

for both male and female students in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan that combine theology and humanities. Although relatively few, some students are sent to Islamic universities in Turkey, Egypt, and other Middle Eastern countries for further training. The Nurculuk sect has also established private secondary schools in Central Asian countries that teach Islamic values and lifestyles through behavioral patterns of teachers and administrators; magazines, books, and television channels; and extracurricular contacts (Engin-Demir, Balci, and Akkök 2000).

Informal religious education

Central Asian women mainly acquire religious information as part of their gender socialization in a lifelong process of informal education. The family is a major source of religious information for young girls in Central Asia. By observing religous rites, mothers – even more so, grandmothers – act as important role models. Although girls have no direct contact with the mosque, they receive religious information from the mosque through their male family members (Poliakov 1992, 69), thus giving fathers and grandfathers a role in the religious education of girls.

Throughout Central Asia, a woman who is deeply respected in her community plays the role of *otincha* (Uzbek). Referred to by other names as well, including *bibiotun* (Tajik), the *otincha* is versed in Arabic, can read religious texts, strictly follows Islamic regulations, and is responsible for overseeing all of the female rituals in the local community. As a rule, the *otincha* instructs family members on the appropriate rites and behavior associated with mourning and conducts religious recitations and prayers at weddings and funerals (Alimova and Azimova 1999). Furthermore, by teaching "proper behavior" to one or two (rarely, three) neighborhood girls, the *otincha* acts as a conduit of tradition between generations (Wilcke 2005).

A woman who has returned from *ḥajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) is also considered to possess certain moral and educational obligations, such as familiarizing young women with the teachings of Islam and encouraging modest dress and behavior and the veiling of women. *Madrasa* graduates and *mullah*s (women who can read the Qur'ān) also teach Islam to girls in their neighborhood. In Kyrgyzstan, shamans, generally known as *bakshi* or *tabib* (Persian, doctor) also play a role in the religious education of women. Consulted mostly by women with physical, psychological, or social problems, shamans perform healing and fortune-telling rituals within an Islamic religious context (Heyat 2004).

Another major source of religious knowledge for Central Asian women is the *mazar*, or pilgrimage site, which may be a grave, cemetery, burial ground, cave, spring, rock, tree, or other marker. Visiting a *mazar* is very much a female activity, begun by girls during their school years, and is often undertaken with the aim of fulfilling a wish or securing recovery from an illness. The range of activities that takes place as part of the visit – sacrificing a sheep, cooking a meal, and socializing with close family and friends – gives the *mazar* an informal sanctity (Bellér-Hann 2005). *Mazar*s often have their own watchmen, shaykhs, who are extremely influential in inculcating religious values in the Central Asian population, especially women.

Other sources of religious information to emerge largely in the post-Soviet era are the mass media – books written for both women and men or for women only, programs on Islam broadcast on local radio and television, and recordings of Qur'ānic recitations. Non-governmental organizations also organize religious classes, given by women, designed to promote Islamic education and religious knowledge among women and young girls (Heyat 2004). Moreover, foreign Islamist groups conduct missionary activities such as organizing communities, holding discussions with students, conducting religious seminars, and sending local citizens overseas for religious education. Some of these groups operate clandestinely or semi-clandestinely.

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Cennet Engin Demir

Jamaica*

Introduction

Far from the centers of Islamic cultures, Muslim women in Jamaica attired in the *ḥijāb* symbolize their Islamic faith and their loyalty to Islamic values in the midst of Western cultures with multidenominational Christian churches in every neighborhood facing a bar or a tavern. Although invisible in number, their uniqueness in dress and behavioral patterns raise the curiosity of onlookers about Islam. To these Muslim women, Islam has been the answer to their search for The Truth – a wholesome way of life, (re)connecting them with the Creator and the humanity. Upon them rests a great responsibility: to establish the *dīn* of Allah, that is, the Islamic way of life, within their households so that their succeeding generations, they believe, will not falter and wither away into the *jāhiliyya* society of Jamaica, characterized by irreligious and ungodly actions of adultery, promiscuity and unchastity, gambling, alcohol drinking, and violent crime.

Jamaica, the largest Caribbean Commonwealth island, currently has approximately 4,500 Muslims forming 0.15 percent of the estimated total population of 2.6 million. While 75 percent of the Muslims in Jamaica are of African origin and have reverted to Islam since the 1960s, Muslims from South Asia constitute about 12 percent and the rest are expatriates. The country's motto, "Out of Many, One People," embraces the Jamaican Muslim community (*umma*) under the broad spectrum of its historical diversity. Christianity is acknowledged as the most important part of the national religious heritage. Although the Muslim community remains constitutionally unrecognized, the guarantee of freedom of worship and the democratic nature of the government have allowed the continuity and growth of Islam in Jamaica.

The advent of Islam

Islam first made its appearance in Jamaica and the Caribbean with Columbus's discovery entourage, which included Moorish mariners from Andalusian Spain. Subsequently, enslaved Spanish Moors and Muslims from West Africa were imported into the region to work on plantations. Forced sexual encounters and rape by European plantation masters, together with the policy of Christian proselytizing and forceful baptism, made the transmission of Islam virtually impossible to the descendents of the enslaved Muslims.

However, religious continuity was evidenced among enslaved runaways, known as Maroons. The illustrious military feats among the historical Muslim Maroons were legendary and culminated in forcing the powerful British forces to sue for peace in 1739. Vestiges of Islamic practices abound throughout the island, for example, the Islamic greeting "as-salām ʿalaykum" (peace be upon you) is still commonly heard in many of the present-day Maroon communities. This splendorous heritage serves as a source of pride and inspiration to all contemporary Jamaican Muslims to maintain their Islamic identity and to convey the eternal message of Islam to their fellow citizens.

Following the abolition of slavery in 1838, Islam was reintroduced into the region under the indentureship program, whereby Indian Muslims came to the Caribbean. Institutionalization of Islam in Jamaica began with the Indian Muslims when they formally built two mosques (*masājid*) in the mid-1950s as centers for congregational prayers and for other social, educational, and religious activities.

The Islamic Council and Muslim women

The Islamic Council, which functions from the Central Masjid located in Kingston, is run by an elected consultative body (*shūra*) and coordinates activities of 13 other *masājid* located throughout the island. The *shūra* has two representatives from each *masjid* and has various working committees such as Education and Da'wah, Social Welfare, and Women and Childcare. The council attempts to bring the *umma* together through its annual general meeting, religious festivities such as Eid-ul-Fitr and Eid-ul-Adha, seminars, and periodic camps. Although the leadership of the *umma* is in the hands of men, Muslim women, who form a miniscule 30 percent, are in charge of almost all social and welfare activities. They are the chefs for the delicacies prepared for festive occasions and are the fundraisers and the organizers for recreational out-

ings. The *shūra* recognizes the Muslim Sisters' organization, which meets once a month to discuss issues facing them such as financial and medical problems. They also chart out plans for social events such as the annual barbeque, Parent-Teacher Day, and Parent-Children Day at the two Islamic basic schools run by the Sisters. The Sisters also play a leading role in arranging wedding ceremonies of Muslim couples, which are generally held on *masājid* premises.

The Islamic Council of Jamaica is responding to the perceived urgency of imparting Islamic education to new converts. It also recognizes the Islamic commitment to equality of educational opportunity and the empowerment of women through engagement in gainful work in the wider society. Like most of the male members of the *umma*, women are also largely from the underclass and the underprivileged and generally lack the higher education and technical skills required for white-collar jobs. However, these women have a large responsibility for the education and continuity of their children's initial religious education and for creating righteous generations reflecting the characteristics of faithfulness and truthfulness to Allah and His Messenger, the Prophet Muḥammad (saw). As role models for younger Muslims in a society that has a high rate of promiscuity and teenage pregnancy, these women are informal educators in Islamic etiquette (*adab*) and their lifestyles exemplify the practical application of the Islamic principles and practices at home. Daily *taʿlīm* (Islamic teaching) sessions for children, known as home study circles, are held at home where parents give young girls and boys lessons on reading the Holy Qur'ān and performing the prayers. Bedtime rhymes are often short *sūrāt* (chapters) from the Holy Qur'ān.

The leadership of the Islamic Council adheres to a Muslim woman's right to a comprehensive education. Muslim women attend the weekly study circle sessions held at the *masājid* in Arabic and English Qur'ānic studies. Many older Muslim women learn to read the Holy Qur'ān by using transliterated text. Children's attendance at *taʿlīm* sessions offered at the *masājid* is as high as 80 percent. The Central Masjid houses a library on Islamic studies for the benefit of the *umma* as well as the general public. The Da'wah activities carried out by both men and women include lectures at educational institutions, participation at interreligious seminars, and weekly radio programs on Islam. Periodic retreats, organized by the Islamic Council, create a sense of Islamic unity and equality by bringing Muslim men, women, and children together to learn about Islam and to observe its practices such as prayers, obligatory washing, dietary principles, and Islamic etiquette in an Islamic setting, detached from the larger non-Islamic society during national Christmas and Easter holidays. Outdoor and indoor games for youth and children, documentaries on Islamic culture, and reading are some of the other social activities. Men and women share all work at the camp.

Higher learning is open to all but, in contradiction to Islamic principles, religious teaching is mainly confined to Muslim men who are often sent on scholarships to Trinidad, Guyana, or Saudi Arabia. However, young Muslim women in Jamaica have surpassed their male counterparts in non-religious fields of knowledge. This reflects Jamaican society in general where women have excelled in academic studies and currently are in the majority at tertiary institutions such as the University of the West Indies, Mona, Jamaica campus. The acquisition of knowledge and education by young Muslim women will not only ensure the continuity and development of this nascent Muslim community but also will enable the *umma* to compete within the larger society for expression of its moral values and economic well-being, social upliftment, and political representation for its members. Young Muslim women with their university education are often called upon by the Muslim male leadership to assist them in representing Jamaican Muslims at regional conferences and at the Jamaican parliament and to voice Islamic positions on homosexuality, HIV/AIDS prevention, infidelity, the institution of family, crime, and social justice. Muslim women, both young and old, have aptly adhered to the saying of the Prophet Muḥammad: "To educate a woman is to educate a nation, and to educate a man is to educate an individual."

* This entry is based on interviews carried out at the different *masājid*, primarily interviews with Muslim women and girls. The author regularly visits the *masājid* throughout the island and consults Muslim men and women, young and old in her present research on the Muslim *umma* in Jamaica.

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Sultana Afroz

The Ottoman Empire

Throughout the Ottoman Empire, the vast majority of women's religious education took place informally in the home. This domestic religious inculcation differed dramatically from elite male religious education and generally did not involve reading written texts or school instruction. Rather, women's religious knowledge was accumulated through the performance of domestic ritual and quotidian practice which ordered gender, space, and time. The observation and performance of household rituals and routines represents the way in which most boys as well as girls first absorbed the rhythms and belief structures of their religions. Just as this dominant form of religious transmission is often dismissed by or invisible to male religious elites, it has left little trace in texts, and the few references we have come in the form of childhood images of mothers and grandmothers in memoirs. Nevertheless, this mode of informal domestic transmission of the accumulated practical tradition was inscribed in bodies and buildings and domestic traditions – in the fleeting gestures, motions, murmurs of women's spirituality, in styles of dress and sexual hygiene and home economy, in the organization of houses and shrines.

The memoirs of the late Ottoman and later Turkish writer Halide Edib provide the best sense of childhood absorption of religious tradition, while also providing insight into an elite family's formal religious education practice. Her earliest memories of childhood include being treated for shock and lethargy by Qur'ān recitation, a servant who would not let an unclean dog into her room because she prayed five times a day, watching her grandmother prepare sweets for Ramadan, visiting her former wet nurse whose kin relation was established by virtue of the Islamic interpretation of the milk bond, visiting the Suleimaniyya mosque with the women of her household during Ramadan, hosting Ramadan breakfasts, the special foods of Bayram, and watching wedding and funeral preparations.

Exceptions to the rule of informal inculcation certainly existed in the form of women whose learning was acknowledged by the religious establishment, but more often than not these women were the daughters of male scholars or mystics whose domestic education included limited access to the high tradition, as in the case of the twentieth-century female Sufi Fatima al-Yashrutiyya. We have some evidence of poor and rural girls attending the *kuttāb* with their brothers or in disguise like the young Umm Kulthūm in rural Egypt. These two examples date from the early twentieth century, but similar examples may have occurred particularly in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Even in the earliest Ottoman centuries, however, elite households may have tutored girls at home alongside their brothers. And we have documentation of the appointment of female headmistresses to girl's schools in eighteenth-century Morea (the region in which the Greek independence movement would first emerge decades later).

The Tanzimat reforms at the end of the nineteenth century, spurred on by European missionary discourses and schools in Ottoman territory, resulted in the first systemic attempts to educate girls. In 1869, the Maarif-i Umumiye Nizamnamesi (Public Education Bill) paved the way for girls' primary education by calling for girls between the ages of six and eleven to attend school, and towns to support schools for Muslims and non-Muslims with funds from charitable societies. The 1876 Constitution also required that girls be schooled, but like the Public Education Bill it had no funding or enforcement mechanism. Basic religious education, along with vocational and literacy skills, was part of the state project of producing Ottoman citizens among Muslims and minorities alike and was often opposed by religious elites.

In addition to providing a sense of the domestic transmission of religion which children in most Ottoman households would have experienced,

Edib provides insight into the more formal education that elite families provided their daughters as well as their sons in the 1880s and 1890s. She describes the *başmanlık* or initiation of children – boys and specifically girls as well – into the culture of learning.

> Little children in Turkey started to school in those days with a pretty ceremony. A little girl was dressed in silk covered with jewels, and a gold-embroidered bag with an alphabet inside, was hung round her neck with a gold-tassled cord. She sat in an open carriage with a damask silk cushion at her feet. All the little pupils of the school walked in procession after the carriage, forming two long tails on either side. The older ones were the hymn-singers, usually singing the very popular hymn, "The rivers of paradise, as they flow, murmur Allah, Allah, The angels in paradise as they walk sing Allah, Allah." At the end of each stanza hundreds of little throats shouted, "Amin, Amin."
>
> They went through several streets in this way, drawing into the procession the children and waifs from the quarters they passed through until they reached the school. In the school the new pupil knelt on her damask cushion before a square table, facing the teacher. Kissing the hand of the instructor, she repeated the alphabet after her. Some sweet dish would be served to the children, and each child received a bright new coin given by the parents of the pupil to be. After this sort of consecration, the little one went every day to school, fetched by the *kalfa*, an attendant who went from one house to another collecting the children from the different houses.

Edib notes that these rituals could be as expensive and competitive as weddings and that the most well-to-do parents sponsored poor children's initiations and continuing education along with their own childrens'. Interestingly, Edib cites her grandmother's disdainful claim that in her day, girls' education in the Qur'ān started at age three rather than age seven, and that seven-year-old girls from elite families would already have memorized the Qur'ān.

Edib describes her own commencement of religious education:

> The *başmanlık* too in my case was not to be the usual one. There was to be a big dinner at home for the men, and the ceremony was to take place at home after the night prayers. Granny . . . could not bear to have me begin my reading of the holy Qur'ān in a blue serge dress. I remember well the champagne-colored silk frock with lovely patterns on in, and the soft silk veil of the same color, that she got for me instead . . . I walked to the large hall where everyone had assembled for the ceremony. A young boy changed the Qur'ān while our *hoca* sat by the low table swaying himself to its rhythm . . . I had at the same time to kneel and to repeat the first letters of the alphabet, frightened to death at the sound of my own voice. As I rose I forgot to kiss the hand of the *hoca*, and some tender voice whispered behind me "Kiss the *hoca*'s hand." . . . My lessons took place in the same room in the *selamlık*, before the same table and in the same kneeling attitude as at the *başmanlık*. My teacher, who was a regular schoolmaster and busy with his own school in the daytime, could only come to our house in the evenings. Two candles therefore were placed on the table and burned under green shades, while I struggled with the Arabic writing of the holy book. Of course it was difficult to go on without understanding the meaning of the words one read, but the musical sound of it all was some compensation.

This elaborate ritual, the kneeling posture and submissiveness of the student indicate that even after the attempt to regularize and rationalize schooling, it carried a ritual style and meaning.

But prior to the Tanzimat, the missionary school movement, Muslim, Jewish, and Christian girls throughout the empire would have learned the ritual attitudes of hygiene, prayer, and fasting by observing and imitating their female relatives' work and worship. Ottoman Jewish girls participated in Sabbath candle lightings and Passover cleanings; Christian girls retraced the paths from home to church, revering icons and crossing themselves. In Muslim households daily prayers, annual Ramadan fasting, and the constraints of modesty were embodied religious practices. Marriage, childbirth, healing rituals, female-only religious ceremonies (such as *mawlid*s in celebration of the Prophet Muḥammad's birth), death, and mourning would have provided occasions for the girls of the household to watch their elders pray, invoke, appeal, clean, recite, emote, and restrain themselves. In time, they would "naturally" participate and step into the familiar embodied roles of responsible adult women.

While not generally described in texts, the traditional practices of women were inscribed fleetingly on their bodies in the modest dress of *ḥijāb* and in the practice of menstrual and sexual hygiene, and in the maintenance of the house – whether the gendered *haramlık* and *selamlık* of elite Ottoman Muslim households or the ritual organization of the Jewish household and calendar by its women. The comings and going to mass, communion in Eastern Christianity, and to saints' shrines by Shīʿī and some Sufi women and the range of comportments, recitations, routes, and clothing associated with these movements would have – like the Islamic call to prayer, *adhān* – shaped and flavored the transmission of religious tradition alongside the scholarly tradition.

Interestingly, the domestic transmission of religion between women, while imbuing religion with lived and embodied intensity, pragmatism, and diversity, probably worked to make it a conservative social force. Women's domestic practice was more concerned with maintenance and stability, repetition and ritual, preserving the clear boundaries

between the genders, and the sacred and the profane than with interpretation and debate.

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LEILA HUDSON

South Asia

Religious education refers to both formal and informal ways in which Muslim girls and women are schooled in religious knowledge in South Asia. This entry looks at the manner in which this religious knowledge is imparted and to whom, as well as the content of religious instruction in its historical and contemporary contexts in South Asia. There is considerable literature on Muslim women and education in general in the subcontinent, but very little comparative research on their religious education specifically.

During the medieval period, in Muslim society in India, elementary education was considered necessary for all Muslim children, both girls and boys, as a way to inculcate the faith and moral teachings of Islam. It was primarily religious in nature. There were two types of educational institutions, the *makhtab* and the *madrassa*. The *makhtab* was an elementary school, usually coeducational, which children began at seven years of age. They were taught rudimentary Arabic and Persian, some grammar, composition, and writing letters. At the *madrassa*, which was more advanced and an institution for higher learning, courses included jurisprudence, Islam, history, philosophy, logic, Arabic and Persian language, medicine, Qur'ān, and *ḥadīth*. The early sultans set up special *madrassa*s for women at their courts during the Mughal period, and Mughal nobles followed this example by setting up similar *madrassa*s for women from their families on their personal estates (Chakraborty 2001, 77). However, education for Muslim women, of any kind, was still a rarity, even among the upper classes.

In the nineteenth century, religious education for Muslim women in India consisted primarily of private female tutors at home teaching them to memorize the Qur'ān, since seclusion was a common practice among the upper classes. Most women were not literate, and those who were belonged to the upper classes. They were only literate to the extent of reading the Qur'ān in Arabic and having basic writing skills. The female religious teachers who taught the Qur'ān were called *ustani*s. They were usually the widows, wives, or daughters of male religious teachers or *maulvi*s. A system of private patronage by Muslim families funded this style of religious education, particularly in the form of family-run Islamic charitable endowments. However, as British colonial regulation of these endowments increased in the late nineteenth century, patronage declined, along with the availability of *ustani*s to teach Muslim girls how to read the Qur'ān (Minault 1998, 21–3).

In general, orthodox Muslim opinion in the nineteenth century did not view education for Muslim women favorably because it would entail their coming out of seclusion. But there were still a few primary schools set up for Muslim girls by Muslim women, which included religious instruction along with basic literacy for all students. In 1873, the first school for Muslim girls was founded by a Muslim Bengali woman, in what is present-day Bangladesh. It was based on funding raised solely by a Muslim woman, Faizunnessa Chowdhury, as opposed to being based on government patronage or funding by wealthy Muslim men (Chakraborty 2001, 91).

An 1845 government report also indicates the existence of six Muslim girls' schools in Delhi, which were run by Punjabi women for the daughters of wealthy Muslim merchant families. The enrollment was a total of 46 students, and the curriculum consisted of memorizing the Qur'ān (Minault 1998, 23).

The British government was also involved in creating girls' schools with separate curricula that would be appropriate for Muslim girls. In 1907, the British director of public instructions proposed a separate syllabus, which included separate religious instruction for Shī'ī and Sunnī Muslim girls, along with needlework classes, health and hygiene, enough arithmetic to manage household finances, and general history and geography (Chakraborty 2001, 87). What is important to note is that religious topics were included alongside basic domestic skills and basic literacy courses for Muslim girls.

As religious education for Muslim women and girls began to take more formal shape in the late nineteenth century on the Indian subcontinent, the

content of this education also became more explicitly focused on achieving certain aims. Whereas previously memorizing the Qur'ān and knowing how to perform religious practices such as prayer and fasting was deemed sufficient for Muslim girls, now there was a greater focus on linking religious knowledge with gendered social roles and responsibilities. In other words, religious knowledge was expanded to include all the spheres of a woman's life.

One of the best-known books on this topic, which is still available today, was originally published in 1905. It is Maulana Ashraf ʿAli Thanawi's *Bihishti Zewar* (Heavenly ornaments). Maulana Thanawi was a religious scholar from the Deobandi theological school who wrote this book in the 1890s in response to a larger public debate about Muslim cultural and social reform in British India and the role of Muslim women within it. The book was meant to be a primer for all "respectable" Muslim women of the upper classes, to give them correct religious knowledge and practice as well as an understanding of their domestic roles in a hierarchical family and social structure. Some of the key themes stressed in Thanawi's book were piety, good conduct, civility, decorum, obedience, self-control, discipline, how to run a household efficiently, and how to maintain social relationships with various classes of people in the social hierarchy (Metcalf 1983, 20–1).

Thanawi's model for Muslim women's religious education is very narrow in its idealization of a Muslim woman who is subordinate in status to men, is religiously orthodox in practice and knowledge, and is self-controlled and a disciplined homemaker. It is important to contextualize it in terms of the social and historical conditions within which it came about, namely the Muslim reformist movement under British colonial rule in India (Metcalf 1983, 1990). The efforts of Muslim reformers during that time period focused on defining the community's changing identity and public role, including education and the role of Muslim women. These two points became fused together in the focus on the religious education of Muslim women.

The themes related in *Bihishti Zewar* are important because they continue to inform contemporary understandings of appropriate religious education for Muslim women in South Asia. An examination of an Islamic syllabus for girls being taught in *madrassa*s in rural western Uttar Pradesh in India shows a similar emphasis on orthodox religious practice with domestic socialization as the ideal for Muslim girls to work toward (Jeffrey, Jeffrey, and Jeffrey 2004). For example, the syllabus includes stories about Muslim women from early Islamic history, including the Prophet's (pbuh) wife, ʿĀ'isha, who serve as role models highlighting the importance of "correct" Islamic behavior for women (ibid., 4).

While it is problematic to view Muslim women as mere objects in a larger historical, social, and cultural discourse, it is also important to keep in mind that practice often differs from theoretical ideals. In this case, while formal religious education did come to stress a narrow, normative view, the diversity in actual, lived experiences of Muslim women in South Asia is an important counterpoint and remains to be explored in further detail.

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UZMA JAMIL

Turkey

An increasing number of religious educational opportunities for women have emerged during the Turkish Republic, including mandatory public school classes on religion and ethics, Qur'ān courses, as well as advanced degrees in traditional Islamic fields and sociological studies of religion.

Optional religion classes in the fourth and fifth grades of primary school for girls (and boys) began in 1949. The same classes came into effect for the first two grades of middle school students in 1956. After the 1980 military coup, religious culture and ethics courses became mandatory for all students, female and male. These classes briefly introduce non-Muslim faith traditions and then focus on teaching the basics of Sunnī Islam as interpreted by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet).

Attending Qur'ān courses over holidays, especially during the summer, has become a tradition for Turkish girls. Female participation in Qur'ān courses far exceeds that of males and has steadily

increased since 1980. While Qur'ān courses vary in format, content, and duration, they primarily teach the memorization of certain prayers and Qur'ānic verses as well as the ability to pronounce the Arabic script. Qur'ān courses often constitute the first form of religious education for girls outside the family.

Female students gained the right to attend *imam hatip* vocational schools in 1976. These schools were initially created to educate religious personnel for mosques and the state religious bureaucracy, occupations that were traditionally reserved for males. However, *imam hatip* schools became *de facto* a parallel school system for families that wanted to provide a more comprehensive religious education in a conservative social environment. *İmam hatip* schools allow girls to wear headscarves, a right they do not have in other high schools. The curriculum includes courses on the Qur'ān, Arabic language, *ʿaqā'id, kalām, fiqh, tafsīr, ḥadīth, siyar*, and history of religions.

The Turkish Republic opened a higher religious studies institution, the Faculty of Divinity (Ilahiyat) in Ankara in 1950. Of the 80 students who enrolled in the school in its first semester, 22 were female. In the first graduating class of 1953, 9 women received degrees – nearly one-fourth of all graduates. While the Ankara Ilahiyat included courses on *tafsīr, hadīth*, and other traditional subjects, it was and is primarily an intellectual center for the sociological and historical study of religion. Since 1950, many more Ilahiyat branches have been opened in various cities and female enrollment has increased to around one-third of all students.

The Alevi-Bektaşi communities of Turkey largely oppose mandatory religious education because these courses teach the basics of Sunnī belief and practice, while neglecting other interpretations of Islam. Alevi-Bektaşi girls and women have long pursued religious education within their own communities through spiritual discourses (*sohbet*), folklore, and music. Since the early 1990s, they have participated in programs sponsored by Alevi foundations including seminars, reading groups, dance and music lessons, as well as interactive dialogues with Alevi spiritual leaders. The various Sufi orders of Turkey educate female members through *sohbet*, reading groups, and traditional Islamic studies in various combinations. Groups linked to the teachings of Said Nursi primarily study Nursi's writings and the Qur'ān in small reading circles.

In recent years, the Diyanet has created educational programs for mature women taught by female employees of the ministry. The number of programs for women is increasing along with the demand for women's greater participation in religious leadership positions. In 2003, women were appointed for the first time to lead pilgrims on the *ḥajj*. In 2004, the Diyanet added 150 women preachers (*wāʿiz*) to educate and minister to women, bringing the total number in the country to 400.

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M. BRETT WILSON

United States: African American Muslims

INTRODUCTION

Where, in what manner, and under whose direction the education of African American Muslim girls and boys would occur emerged as both a private *and* a political issue as early as the 1930s when leaders of the original Nation of Islam (NOI)[1] clashed with public officials in the city of Detroit, Michigan. Following the directives of their leaders and their shared disenchantment with a public school curriculum they believed to be heavily influenced by racist ideologies that denied the humanity and historical contributions of black people, members of the newly organized "Lost-Found Nation of Islam in the Wilderness of North America," withdrew their children from the local educational system and began to home school them. One of the earliest instructors who also defied local authorities was Clara Muhammad, wife of Elijah Muhammad, architect of the movement that would transform the lives of tens of thousands of African Americans. By the 1960s, this home schooling effort evolved into the "University of Islam," and by the mid-1970s, into a nationwide network of day and weekend schools known today as the Clara Muhammad Schools (although some high schools are named in honor of Elijah's son and successor, W. D. Mohammed), whose benefits included a new sense of personal empowerment, a rigorous call to disci-

pline, an emphasis on family structure and values, and a clear standard of moral behavior. For young African American Muslim girls, Clara Muhammad Schools, along with similar Islamic schools in the United States, provide an empowering educational environment that relieves them of being viewed as "curiosities" because of their dress, holidays, and religious practices. In an environment in which they are not "the Other," Muslim girls avoid being singled out on matters of religion and race and are less likely to experience feelings of isolation.

Origins of education systems for African American Muslims

The year 1932 unveiled a series of events that illustrated why women were attracted to the patriarchal structure of the NOI, while also finding an environment that afforded them a tangible sense of their own agency, womanhood, and an affirming educational space for their daughters and sons. Throughout the United States, no curriculum within the public educational system placed black people at the center of civilization, provided positive images of black family or communal life, or pointed to the significant contributions made by Americans of African ancestry. The few textbooks or teaching lessons that intentionally featured black people served only to extend negative stereotypes and foster black self-hate. Moreover, the larger society – in this case, inclusive of members of predominantly Christian black communities – routinely reacted negatively to this new religious subculture. Their lack of acceptance filtered into student and teacher attitudes toward young members of the NOI.

This was the atmosphere in which W. D. Fard, the movement's founder, began to encourage his followers to withdrawal their children from the public school system of those he called the "white devils" and instruct them in a home school environment. Elijah and Clara, also distrustful of the public school curriculum that promoted the culture of whites and reflected "lies" about blacks, complied. They envisioned an educational institution that would represent a counter discourse on black inferiority and promote the NOI as a historically black religious movement. Clara and most of her Muslim sisters possessed little formal education themselves. Still, they were familiar enough with processes for values and knowledge production to struggle to build independent religious educational structures as one means of wrestling control of the minds of their children from the public school system and simultaneously helping to preserve the religious identity of their offspring. Consequently, the six children of Clara and Elijah became the first students in the newly formed "University of Islam," operating from the home of its first instructor, Clara Muhammad. In actuality, the "university" was an elementary and secondary school with curriculum that matched the general education subjects taught in adjacent public schools, but which also featured lessons in what they understood to be Islamic studies and black history. Initially it was not a gender-segregated environment because all the students were members of the same primary or extended family. As other families enrolled, however, girls would sit on one side of the room, boys on the other. The goal was to form a school site inside each Temple (now mosque) location. By investing her talents, energy, and faith in this endeavor, Clara's work mirrored the slogan of the National Association of Colored Women: "lifting as we climb." It was within the original NOI that she and other Muslim women would respond to their marginalization by the larger society, carve out space in which they could direct their activist consciousness, and mirror Muslim womanhood for their daughters.

Two years later, in 1934, a court order to close the home schooling project and the arrest of Elijah along with 13 teachers and administrators led to a public protest march on police headquarters in Detroit. The presence of independent educational systems developed to address the cultural and religious heritage of students was not unusual, and discontent with public education was shared by a number of minority groups in the United States. For example, Roman Catholic schools in America began in the nineteenth century in response to Protestant domination of the public schools and Catholic church leaders developed a plan to build a school in every parish. While the NOI endeavor did not attract harassment from such racist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, as the Roman Catholic Church did in 1920, government pressure against the assembly of NOI members was mounting; thus, building code violations were cited at meeting locations, negative reports were in the press, and there were accusations of the movement's "cult-like" status. Moreover, home schooling was still illegal in Detroit in 1934. Such realities complicated the efforts of an organization that could not always rely on landlords to renew leases on property in which classes were conducted.

The budget was low and supplies were scarce at Clara's school, compelling this woman, affectionately considered the mother of the NOI in North America, to call upon her creativity to enhance the learning of her students. Daily, Clara's youngsters

gathered around the dining room table, pencils in hand, awaiting instructions from their teacher – a woman who never advanced beyond the seventh or eighth grade herself – who would write out their spelling and reading assignments on pieces of lined paper. Clara's own ideas, beliefs and family history as well as Fard's teachings became sentences to be copied, word groups to be memorized, paragraphs that helped develop penmanship. While textbooks were not available initially, subjects still included basics, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, as well as the history of the founding of the NOI and rebuttals of erroneous myths about the origins of black people. Within their own educational system, a new history was being taught that placed black people at the center of civilization and made them feel good about themselves. Mohammed, Clara's fifth son and her husband's successor, characterized their lessons this way: "It was a curriculum that made a point of ignoring world history as we know it and United States history as we know it. And we learned to think, to have our own thoughts. She'd ask questions and sought our opinions."

The "university" in twenty-first-century America

For more than 30 years the University of Islam succeeded in providing African American children with a world-view that promoted self-knowledge, self-reliance, and self-discipline. After Mohammed succeeded his father as leader of the original NOI in 1975, he renamed the educational enterprise the Clara Muhammad Schools in honor of his mother. In a series of reorganizations, Mohammed guided the original NOI onto a path of traditional Islam and its supporters came to be known as the American Society of Muslims.[2]

Today, each of the more than 60 educational units nationwide under Mohammed's leadership is affiliated with a local mosque community. Through the years, these institutions have been joined by dozens more founded by other American Muslim organizations. Contemporary Clara Muhammad Schools strive to create a spiritual educational experience that is also relevant to young Muslims growing up in a secular society, an important dimension as the schools teach Muslim and non-Muslim youth. Many students consistently receive academic achievements awards; for example, the Clara Muhammad School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was the overall first-place winner at the 2005 Academic Olympics sponsored by Marquette University. The holistic education students receive was promoted on National Public Radio (NPR) a year later, when the female varsity basketball team at W. D. Mohammed High School in Atlanta, Georgia, advanced to postseason play for the first time.

These institutions are among approximately 200 around the United States that comprise a national network of Islamic schools where students at the elementary and high school levels follow a curriculum of standard academics regulated by educational board guidelines in addition to studies in Arabic, the Qur'ān, and Islam. Learning in an Islamic environment, students may convey the peace of Allah hundreds of times day as they greet each other with "As-salām ʿalaykum." They begin each day with assembly, pray five times daily, and wear uniforms, including a head covering for female students. They must also adhere to strict regulations, which for some young girls means not wearing make-up or nail polish. Girls benefit from interaction with African American Muslim women role models, the freedom and creativity of participation in local cheerleading squads, the intellectual growth of engagement in college preparatory courses, and the emotional support of being around educators who celebrate their gender as well as their African American heritage.

Some schools in the network are private, dependent upon tuition fees and contributions from parents as well as community fundraising events. Other schools receive government funding as "choice" schools and are awarded government vouchers, which means that these schools are open to families that are more culturally, economically, and religiously diverse. In 2005, several Clara Muhammad Schools demonstrated their Muslim charitable values and opened their doors to primarily African American students who were victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Islamic schools are flourishing and expanding throughout the United States. In the process, they are strongly influencing the religious education and identity formation of African American Muslim girls and boys. Students are exposed to educators who reinforce their Islamic identity, faith, and values, and model before them how one can be American *and* Muslim.

1. In contrast to the "contemporary" Nation of Islam led by Minister Louis Farrakhan, the "original" NOI was formed in the 1930s by W. D. Fard. Under the leadership of The Honorable Elijah Muhammad, Fard's architect, the "original" NOI commanded a membership estimated to be between 50,000 and 100,000 during its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. At the death of Muhammad, his son Mohammed guided the movement onto the path of orthodox or mainstream Islam, and today is the leader of the single largest indigenous group of American Muslims.

2. Mohammed's ministry is called The Mosque Cares.

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DEBRA MUBASHSHIR MAJEED

Western Europe

Contrary to what many people may have expected, European Muslims or Muslims settled in Europe did not lose their interest in religious education because of their integration in Europe. Quite the opposite is true. Parents are genuinely keen on transmitting their frame of references about faith and Muslim identity to their children. And many young people want to have access to at least some knowledge of Islam in order to act as good Muslims in their daily life and in concrete cases where they do not know exactly how to proceed (Cherribi 2003).

As far as Muslim women are concerned, they are more and more interested in the religious content of Islam and have access to it in many different ways. Some of them, even if they still are a small minority, become spiritual leaders in their communities, which is a highly interesting phenomenon.

Religious education usually takes place within associations, mosques, or Islamic cultural centers, which organize weekly classes where women are generally taught by men, but sometimes also by women who are qualified in Islamic religious matters. Obviously, the ways Muslims have settled in the various European countries lead to very different scenarios. In Spain, for example, the associative network is as yet incipient and there are only four mosques in the whole country, apart from the small oratories. This means that women's religious education is in no way firmly established, in spite of a growing demand. The only exceptions are Ceuta and Melilla (the two Spanish cities in North Africa) where there is a native Muslim population supported by a vast network of associations and mosques that more and more frequently set up religious education classes for women (Martin-Muñoz 2003).

The situation also depends on the way the teaching of Islam is integrated, or not, in the national school systems. In the Netherlands, Islamic schools are part of the education system, and these schools teach, among other topics, religion, as well as transmitting moral values that are close to those passed on by parents themselves. The majority of Muslim children, though, do not go to Islamic schools; 55 percent go to public schools and 39 percent go to private non-Muslim schools (Landman 2001). In Spain, where religion can be chosen as an option within the public school system, the teaching of Islam is now possible in schools where at least ten Muslim pupils are registered.

But access to religious schooling nowadays is not restricted to a traditional transmission model. This goes along with the recent developments at work within the Muslim community in Europe, which is currently going through a process of great diversification and fragmentation on the interpretation of Islam. In this respect, access to education for vast segments of the Muslim population and the development of new communication technologies (such as the Internet, but also satellite television and videocassettes) intensified transnational communication and access to religious information; all of which accounts for the circulation of different interpretations of Islam and the strong presence of new leaders who convey their own normative patterns on Islam. All the subjects that have to do with the renovation and reinterpretation of Islam have come from the elite and "insiders." This creates a kind of metalanguage that belongs to a vast social majority and encompasses not only Europe but the Muslim world at large (Anderson 2003). Because of this development, there exists now a large market of affordable texts that have to do with religious training. Classic texts of Islamic thinking are also being republished and edited in new formats that are easier to access and understand for the majority of people. These are hybrid forms of religious knowledge that combine canonic sources and comments on extremely mundane events of day-to-day modern life (Mahmood 2005). These new communication channels mean that it is now possible to acquire knowledge about Islam in totally different ways, with a wide public circulation that is open in particular to young women. In the case of Spain, where the opportunity for religious education for women is scant, women find their own ways, either via satellite television where some channels are entirely dedicated to religious training, or through meetings organized in private houses or civic centers in which debates around religious matters are led by women who act as moderators.

There has been a dynamic evolution of Muslim women who take an active role in handing down religious education. Women have traditionally been excluded from institutional bodies dedicated to religious training. They now express a growing

interest in such knowledge and want to hold responsible positions in Islamic religious education. Their integration in Islamic institutions and universities in fields such as Sharīʿa (Islamic law) and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) is an ongoing process. Mostly, these women are active within Muslim organizations and mosques, under male authority. Their work generally has to do with teaching, preaching, and organizing collective prayers for women's associations (Abou El Fadl 2001). In Germany, for example, all Turkish associations have a female teacher who has received religious training, and even if their positions vary, their knowledge of Islam gives them enough authority to be entrusted with various responsibilities, education being their main task.

However, some women also take initiatives in order to act outside the official circuits that are controlled by men. Even if they still represent a minority, some women have started questioning the main features of traditional religious education and the dominating position of men. They are active outside established networks, organize conferences, and set up religious education classes, which creates more competition and diversity in the educational sector. In France, in the aftermath of 11 September 2001, and during the conflict about wearing the veil, some young Muslim women, frustrated by their marginal position in Islamic institutions or associations, show a growing interest in religious studies and training in Islamic centers, and are now much more active in associations such as Etudiants musulmans de France and Jeunes Musulmans de France (Boubekeur 2004).

Two interesting initiatives have been undertaken by the new generation of Muslim women born in Germany. These women have emerged from the traditional community system and have started their own production of Islamic thinking with their own training courses and educational material. The Zentrum für Islamische Frauenforschung has set up working groups for a new interpretation and a new reading of the Qur'ān, from a women's perspective. The Islamische Pädagogische Dienst publishes new didactic material and organizes Islamic training for mosques and public schools, introducing a modern reading of Islam. They are active in the industrial regions around Bonn and Cologne (Jonker 2003). Clearly, these innovative developments are a challenge to the domination of male authority that has always controlled the fields of education and the transmission of Islamic knowledge. They are as a result exposed to widespread opposition, but at the same time their very existence proves that new dynamics are underway, placing education in all its aspects at the heart of the present debate and of the process of change. This highly interesting process concerns the globalization of the new communication technologies and the access of a new generation to a free public sphere in which they can openly debate women's leadership and question men's authority.

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Gema Martín-Muñoz

Environment

Overview

Growing interest in women's role in environmental issues in the Islamic world is closely linked to the environmental debates in the West. Reflecting this fact, this entry traces significant environmental frameworks in the West first, followed by Islamic views about the role of women in environmental protection and environmental protection practice in the Islamic world.

Scientific forestry to sustainable development

The early twentieth century was the age of science and progress. Progressivism was believed to bring an end to material scarcity, which would eventually bring an end to ongoing conflicts among people over increasingly competitive resources (Nelson 1999). It thus became an ultimate goal for the state to control, maximize, and conserve resources deriving from nature. Nature was to be perceived as wild and hence needed to be tamed to serve human beings properly. Scientific forestry is the management of forests based on scientific knowledge. It was the method used to investigate principles of physical properties of nature (Seager 1993, 241). Human progress was measured by the degree of control over nature and the ability to turn it into a manageable environment (Macnaghten and Urry 1998). The origins of scientific forestry go back to Germany and France in the early eighteenth century. The University of Freiburg began to offer the first forestry training program in 1787, followed by other German universities. France created its first national school of forestry in Nancy in 1824. Scientific forest service also developed swiftly in the United States. The United States Department of Agriculture Forest Service, created by Gifford Pinchot, became an example of legitimate state forest management in modern times (Peluso 1992, 7).

The significance of the establishment of scientific forestry in the Western world is that it affected resource management policies of developing countries. Colonial officers attended forestry training programs and formed the basis of the forestry management policies. After independence many countries inherited these policies as for a long time scientific knowledge was regarded as neutral and true, excluding forest users from decision-making processes. Compared with scientific knowledge, indigenous knowledge of forestry was considered primitive and backward, and therefore irrelevant in a modern world.

Despite the expectations from and trust in scientific knowledge, scientific forestry caused rapid deforestation and environmental degradation. The realization in the 1960s that scientific forestry knowledge was fragmental and caused much environmental degradation and deforestation has led to the onset of new environmental movements in Europe and North America. Such movements were inspired by "deep ecology" and "ecofeminism theory." Both of them began to be presented as alternative perspectives for environmental action in the 1970s. Arne Naess, a Norwegian philosopher, once the chair of Norway Greenpeace, is known to be an advocate of such concepts. Deep ecology challenges the dominant paradigm of Western thought, which puts human beings at the center of everything. Deep ecology emphasizes the shift from humancentrism to biocentrism, particularly highlighting humanity's oneness with nature. This represents a ground-breaking shift from the previously dominant perspective on the position of human beings against nature. It is in this context that women's relations with nature has received much attention.

Ecofeminism emerged in North America and Europe and is based on the premise that women have a close relationship to nature as actual or potential childbearers (Buckingham 2004, 147). Ecofeminists affirm the continuity between the mothering behavior of women and the archetypal nurturer, Mother Earth, while criticizing the role of men who have exploited women and the environment. Associations between women and nature have triggered debates about universal cultural symbolism of gender representations by which women are linked to nature while men are linked to culture (Ortner 1974). The validity of this universal link between women and nature has received much criticism as the nature/culture thesis is based on a particularly modern, Western view (Strathern 1980).

Growing concerns about the ecology in the West led to the birth of the concept of sustainable development in the early 1980s. Soon it became a dominant operational concept at international organizations such as the World Bank, whose role

is to deal with issues relating to economic development and environmental protection. Sustainable development was thus introduced with the assumption that it is possible simultaneously to achieve ongoing economic growth, environmental protection, and equity in resource access. However, serious concerns have been raised, since in reality priority has been given to development over the environment. Furthermore, the concept assumes that Western economy and development should be sustained at the expense of the poor developing countries (Banerjee 2003). In practice, the sustainable development discourse has put blame on irrational behavior of the poor in the developing countries as a major cause of environmental destruction and accused them of lack of environmental consciousness. Slash and burn has been singled out in many countries as a primitive and backward farming methodology.

Women's role in achieving development is also underscored. Many women in the developing countries are targeted as objects to be acted upon through the international agencies and the state. A case study of Bangladeshi women who refused to use an energy-saving cooking method reveals the fact that government-imposed new cooking stoves resulted in greater dependence of women upon men and denied women the chance to participate in environmental movements (Mannan 1996).

Environment and women in the Islamic world

The ethical interpretation of sustainable development began to receive scholarly attention in the 1980s. Concerns to overcome the global environmental crisis have highlighted the potential contributions of religions as the foundation of ethics of sustainable development. A series of publications exploring the link between the religious tradition and environmental concerns began to come out in the 1980s. Engel and Engel (1990) focused on the agenda of sustainable development and brought together authors working in the field of environmental ethics and development from various perspectives of religion and philosophy.

One of the most comprehensive research projects on the issue of ethics of world religions concerning environment has been led by the Center for the Study of World Religions at Harvard University. The center organized a series of conferences entitled Religions of the World and Ecology, between 1996 and 1998, which involved the direct participation and collaboration of some 700 scholars, religious leaders, and environmental specialists from around the world (<http://www.hds.harvard.edu/cswr/research/ecology/index.html>). The religious-ethical frameworks on the matter of environment covered Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, Hinduism, indigenous traditions, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Taoism, and Jainism. The outcome of this research has been published as a series, Religions of the World and Ecology. The Institute for Socio-Legal Studies in Bihar in India shares a similar academic interest with the Center for the Study of World Religions in exploring the link between world religions and the ecology, and has published a monograph with a concise bibliography on the world religions (Narayan and Kumar 2003).

The articulation of an Islamic environmental ethics that responds to the call of global environmental concern is relatively new (Foltz et al. 2003, xxxviii). Seyyed Hossein Nasr (2003) is the most prominent Muslim scholar who has highlighted the spiritual dimension of the environmental crisis. Fazlun Khalid and Joanne O'Brien (1992) give one of the earliest responses from Muslim scholars on environmental crises, followed by Akhtaruddin Ahmed (1997), Harfiyah Abde Haleem (1998), and Mawil Izzi Dien (2000). An edited volume by Foltz, Denny, and Baharuddin (2003) is an outcome of the Harvard study, which explores the link between Islamic ethics and the environment.

How does Islam define the relationship between men and the environment? According to Deen (1990), a leading scholar on Islamic environmental ethics, the main reasons for protecting the environment found in Islamic legal and ethical reasons include:

1. The environment is God's creation.
2. The environment also praises God as human beings do.
3. God's creatures deserve protection.
4. Protecting God's creatures is good.
5. Islamic environmental ethics is based on justice and equity.
6. The balance of the universe should be maintained.
7. The environment should be preserved for future generations.
8. Only human beings can perform to protect the environment.

Despite this holistic ethical foundation of Islam, the reality is that Islamic philosophers, theologians, and laypersons have focused exclusively on the relationship between Allah and human beings, just like the Western progressivists. This attitude among Muslims has led to serious environmental degradation caused by their pursuit of development and economic growth (Foltz 2003, 257).

The causes of the environmental problems in Islamic countries may also be attributed to the process whereby the relationship between women and the earth has been severed. Medieval Sufis such as Rūmī, Nasafī, and Ibn ʿArabī found a close relationship between women and earth as sustenance (Aftab 2001, 146–7). A Pakistani ecofeminist, Tahera Aftab (ibid., 143) highlights that the original Qurʾānic perspective of woman is of a viceregent (*khalīfa*) on earth. Nonetheless, the close relationship between women and the earth was disrupted through the interpretations of the role of women in traditional sources by male scholars. One such example is found in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī's (d. 1274 C.E.) *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī*, which states that "women's position is subject to the fulfillment of men's need" (ibid., 148). Similar remarks are made in the writings of Niẓām al-Mulk, who wrote that "women are incapable of making correct decisions" (ibid., 149). Such patriarchal interpretations have thus downgraded the position of women and dissociated them from the original task of the viceregent on earth. Patriarchal textual interpretations have also restricted women's activities and have led to the commodification of women and land. Currently these traditional patriarchal textual interpretations are critically challenged by an Indian liberalism activist, Asghar Ali Engineer (1992) and Muslim female scholars such as Asma Barlas (2002) and Fatima Mernissi (1991), who are trying to find gender equality in the interpretations of texts.

It should be noted that the actual degree of restriction and dissociation between women and land varies across cultures. This is because the state law, customary law, and the Islamic Sharīʿa coexist, offering various legal sources available for interpretation. Even within Islamic schools located in one country, as exemplified by Hooker's study (2003) on Indonesia, the legal basis is not unitary. As a result women's rights, including inheritance of land, vary significantly depending on the locations.

In core Islamic areas of Northern Africa and the Middle East, family succession laws follow the Sharīʿa norms. Generally speaking, under the Sharīʿa women's inheritance share is half that of men's in a similar position. Data on women's ownership of land are limited but women's ownership of land is very rare across the region. Women own only 4.9 percent of land in the United Arab Emirates and 0.4 percent in Oman (FAO 2002). Berbers in Morocco usually evade the Islamic law of inheritance of land for women (Maher 1974, 193). Customary laws in Tunisia operate to exclude women who marry outside the clan from land inheritance, as such practice is regarded as an offence to their male family members (Ferchiou 1985, quoted in FAO 2002). Sharīʿa norms similar to those of the Middle East are incorporated into statutory law in Pakistan, but in some areas women are excluded from inheritance and landed property by the customary law as women are seen to pass the property of their father to their husband's alien family (Ali 1994, quoted in Aftab 2001). A similar practice operates among patrilineal Muslim Indians whose agricultural land is governed by customary, not Sharīʿa law (Agarwal 1994).

In comparison, women in Southeast Asia tend to have egalitarian positions in general (Errington 1990). Even in highly Islamic areas of Southeast Asia, including North Sumatra, the practice of customary law and the interpretations of Islamic law tend to favor women's rights. An example is found in North Aceh, where customary law takes precedence over Islamic law by which women are guaranteed to inherit the land and house which belong to the family (Siapno 2002, 68) and men do not dispute this practice (Siegel 1969, 53). A neighboring ethnic community, Gayo in North Sumatra, transfers the ancestral land to whichever children remain affiliated with the ancestral village after marriage (Bowen 2003, 70). However more women marry out of the village, losing the right to inherit the land. This brings women more frequently to the Islamic court to claim land rights that customary law does not permit. The Islamic court decision generally tends to favor women's claims against those of men (ibid., 87). This example challenges the perceived view of Sharīʿa being oppressive toward women's rights.

Another good example of women's strong link with land in Southeast Asia comes from the matrilineal societies of Minangkabau of West Sumatra and Negeri Sembilan of Malaysia. Due to the matrilineal customary law, ancestral property such as houses and land tend to be inherited by women (Benda-Beckman 1979, Peletz 1988, 1996). In the case of Muslims in the Philippines, the Code of Muslim Personal Laws functions partly as the sources of governance whereby wives need the consent of their husband to acquire property and to use land during marriage, and inherit half of the share inherited by a man in a similar succession position. In practice, however, Muslim women have lesser rights and hardly own land independently (Judd and Dulnuan 2001, quoted in FAO 2002).

The United Nations adopted the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, which was then ratified by member states. This legislation has had some

impact in overturning discriminatory customary inheritance law in various countries; however, the degree of the impact deriving from the international convention varies depending on the particular internal situation of each country (FAO 2003).

Islamic environmentalism and women's participation

Now let us analyze how Islam has responded to the global environmental crisis. Facing the environmental crisis, Islamic intellectuals argued that the origins of the environmental degradation and resource depletion derived from Western modeled, human-centered, money-driven development (Khalid 2003, 301). They insist that the key to solving this situation lies in the implementation of an Islamic economic system using traditional Islamic resource management systems (Hamed 2003, 409). However, in practice, the majority of the environmental government agencies in Muslim countries are following Western models of environmental protection policies as demonstrated in Pakistan. Iran is the only country where Islam is claimed as the basis for environmental ethics. For example, Iran's 1979 constitution has an article prohibiting all activities which may cause irreversible damage to the environment and the government is committed to implement the principle of sustainable development as outlined at the Rio Earth Summit (Foltz 2003).

Women's responses to environmental movements vary significantly, depending on location. This is because women's mobilization occurs in reaction to, and is facilitated by, the existing preconditions which are universal and structural but also historically and culturally specific (Al-Ali 2002, Ray and Korteweg 1999, 52–3).

There are two trends with regard to women's participation. First, in core Muslim countries such as Egypt and Turkey where women's movements and political mobilization have been strong, there has been little evidence that women play an active role in environmental matters. Historically, women's rights have been among the dominant concerns of Muslim Egyptian women. They have been struggling to achieve gender equality amidst the patriarchal nationalism and the return of religious extremism in Egypt (Al-Ali 2002, Tallawy 1997). This particular historical process explains the centrality of women's rights in the agenda of the Egyptian women's movement. As a result, women's role in environmental management in these countries has not been highlighted.

Second, public awareness of women's active participation in environmental issues is relatively new in many countries and owes much to the Beijing Platform of Action in 1995. It is an influential document as it has identified women as necessary actors for achieving sustainable development successfully. Women are closely associated with environmental management and are expected to take an active role in decision-making relating to environmental issues. Within this context, women's reproductive health and population control have been singled out as being closely linked to environmental issues. For example, in Iran the Department of the Environment has set an ambitious target to reduce the country's birthrate and couples wishing to marry must first pass a family planning course (Foliz 2001, 156).

In the case of Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, the issue of women's reproductive health is the main agenda for women's organizations, some of which are in fact organizations of public servants' wives. The regulated population growth has been identified as one of the important conditions in achieving economic and social development in Indonesia and the state pays much attention to family planning programs. Women have been strongly encouraged to participate in family planning in order, as good citizens, to control their fertility (Robinson 2000, 149).

Muslim organizations are also prone to follow such national concerns. Indonesia's two large Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, both organizations have closely affiliated Islamic women's organizations (NU has Muslimat and Fatayat, and Muhammadiyah is linked to Aisyiyah). Fatayat is an organization with 6 million members, especially for young Muslim women, with its focus on providing reproductive health information in collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund and the Ford Foundation (Marcoes 2002, 193).

The involvement of women in environmental issues is foremost in evidence in Iran. The reason for active participation is attributed to various factors. The pollution level of the capital, Tehran, has been very high. The Beijing Platform significantly raised public environmental awareness and the government has encouraged women to participate in environmental issues (Foliz 2001). As a result, Iranian women have been actively involved in both government agencies and non-governmental organization (NGOs) aimed at protecting the environment in Iran. For instance, an anti-desertification planting project has been undertaken by a rural women's group in the province of Yazd since 1970 (Foliz 2001). President Khatami appointed an Iranian feminist, Massomeh Ebtekar, as vice-president

of Iran as well as the head of the Department of the Environment where she oversees Iran's NGOs on environmental issues (<www.elaw.org/news/ebulletin/text.asp?id=889>). The Department of the Environment also focuses on providing education on sustainable development, and Rural Women's Cooperatives and Young Rural Girls' Clubs have been successfully mobilized in this task.

Growing public concerns in environmental issues are clearly shown by the rapid growth of the number of environmental NGOs in Iran. In 1990 there were no environmental NGOs in Iran, but in 2001 there were reportedly 233 (<http://www.elaw.org/news/advocate/default.asp?article=679>). Among these NGOs, some are specially for women's environmental activism. For instance, organizations such as the Society of Iranian Women for Sustainable Development and the Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution are directly aimed at educating Iranian women concerning environmental matters (<http://www.irib.ir/worldservice/zanan/78.htm>). Victoria Jamali heads the Women's Society Against Environmental Pollution, set up in 1993, and is an assistant professor in the Graduate program of Environment at the University of Tehran, which she launched with her colleagues (<http://www.elaw.org/news/ebulletin/text.asp?id=889>). Another group, the Children's Book Council of Iran, produces educational materials on environmental issues for children (Foliz 2001).

The powerful involvement of women in environmental issues could be seen as a contrast to strongly controlled women's movements concerned with gender issues in Iran. But the successful mobilization of women in environmental matters may be attributable to the fact that in big cities like Tehran the schools have to close as a result of autumn air inversions and the level of pollution is often extremely high. Tehran has nearly 2 million cars which are over 20 years old and use leaded gasoline, resulting in a massive volume of carbon monoxide emission (<www.eia.doe.gov>). Furthermore, biodiversity unique to Iran, including the Caspian Sea, has been acutely threatened. In such a context environmental issues are closely associated with family health issues where women's involvement is crucial. Iran's country profile submitted to the Johannesburg Summit in 2002 shows that in many areas environmental issues still remain unreported. However, the government has put an emphasis on integrating environment and development in decision-making and education.

In summary, women's participation in environmental issues in the Islamic world is strongly linked to reproductive health issues, responding to the focus of the state and the international organizations on sustainable development.

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Minako Sakai

Environment: Change and Natural Resource Extraction

Egypt

In Egypt the overwhelming majority of the population lives in the Nile Valley. Rural occupations are almost entirely devoted to agriculture, whether in the "old lands" of the traditional valley or in the "new lands" reclaimed from the desert. Over half the population is urban. The forms of environmental change are the issues of living in a crowded urban environment or in dense villages, combined with the increased use of chemicals in agriculture and in daily life. These forms of pollution include air, water, and noise pollution, inadequate solid and liquid waste disposal, and the general effects of overcrowding. The problems interconnect: burning solid waste aggravates air pollution. Other environmental problems in Egypt include protection of wild life (especially the coral reefs and other marine wild life) and the overall water supply.

There seems no reason to think that exposure to environmental pollution is gender-specific, except insofar as certain male-dominated jobs in hazardous areas (for example, a lead factory) are concerned. Life at home and in the streets touches everyone. Exposure to agricultural chemicals also affects men, women, and children. Consistent with this, the differences in attitudes toward this pollution along gender lines are modest. In a survey conducted in 1997, 55 percent of men thought that men suffered more from pollution, and 60 percent of women thought that women did. Although men were somewhat more optimistic about their health, the striking difference is by education: reporting of headaches, sleeplessness, and serious disease went down as educational level increased. Women are particularly likely to fear the results of pollution on the health of their children. On the other hand, males and females agreed on the ranking of serious threats: first air, then water, finally noise. Males and females differ in how they would seek help and remediation. Women articulated the notion that this was men's work, and men, accepting this, seemed to have a better idea of what to do – although by far the most common answer for all was that "no one can help." Despite this pessimism, women are often involved in neighborhood efforts to raise money to solve environmental problems, and they do not hesitate to raise these issues when they think they see government officials (El Ramly 2000, Hopkins, Mehanna, and el-Haggar 2001).

In many parts of Egypt, household water is in short supply. In the urban areas, growing population outstrips the water and sewage systems (Nadim 1979), and in the rural areas piped water is not always available. Under these circumstances, women manage the household use of water, for drinking, cooking, washing, and so on. They ensure that water is not discarded as long as it has a use, and they discard it so as not to inconvenience their neighbors (that is, they do not throw it in front of another's house). In the rural areas, women may still take their washing to the canal so as not to overburden the household water supply and produce too much waste water (El-Katsha et al. 1989). On the whole, Egypt does not have a psychology of water shortage, though experts anticipate one, and if that happens these water management skills will be crucial.

There are populations of "rag pickers" (*zabbalīn*) in the bigger cities of Egypt. Predominantly Christian, they live in specialized neighborhoods, somewhat separate from the rest of the population, because their business makes them undesirable neighbors. The men from these communities collect solid waste from the city and haul it to their communities where the women and girls sort the waste for sale to recyclers. The organic waste is fed to pigs, goats, and other animals, which are also eventually sold to butchers. Here the men handle the external relations (collecting and reselling) while the women handle the sorting, work that can be done as an extension of the household. There are health and environmental hazards from both these activities (Assaad and Garas 1993, Volpi and Abdel Motaal 1996).

In agricultural areas, both chemical fertilizers and pesticides are used, and they present a hazard to those who work in, or even live near, the fields. Pesticides are sometimes spread by crop-dusting airplanes, which hardly ensures precision in application. Schistosomiasis (bilharzia) is another environmental problem that is widespread in the rural areas and affects both men and women who come into contact with water (men from agriculture and women from washing in the canals; see El-Katsha and Watts 2002). In this irrigated landscape, water is hard to avoid.

The mining and oil industries in Egypt are handled well away from the populated areas, and through corporations whose employees are men. Most Egyptians who are in contact with the marine wildlife and coral reefs are also men: boat operators, hotel owners, park rangers, and others.

As part of the general population, women and men suffer the effects of environmental degradation similarly. Children, whose small size and curiosity makes them more vulnerable, suffer the most.

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NICHOLAS S. HOPKINS

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria

This entry addresses the role of women, cultural traditions, and religious teachings in the environmental issues facing Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. All four countries suffer from water shortages (Saab 1998), soil erosion, loss of vegetation cover and cultivable land, declining biodiversity, deforestation, air pollution, and contamination of coastal areas and marine life. In addition, the mismanagement of resources and development projects, urban sprawl, population increase, and difficulties in implementing sound policies for managing waste problems exacerbate already existing problems (Jabbra 1997, MOA 2003). Wars in Iraq and Lebanon have brought on additional irrevocable devastation to the environment and infrastructure. In Lebanon, sewer systems and potable water networks were compromised (Haddad 2004, UNEP 2003); coastal and marine life were greatly affected when about 15,800 barrels of European industrial waste and 20 containers of highly toxic wastes were dumped on the Lebanese shores (Greenpeace 1995); in Iraq, heavy use of depleted uranium caused environmental contamination whose levels are still to be determined (UNEP 2003).

Water shortages and loss of cultivable land impose a major threat to food security in these countries. Water scarcity is caused by long periods of drought, salinization of water tables, overpumping of ground water, and mismanagement of run-off water. Soil and water quality are also affected by contamination caused by chemicals in fertilizers, weapons materials, and waste from hospitals and industrial dumping. Declines in fauna and flora, loss of biodiversity, and damage to marine life are caused by both pollution and desertification. The desertification process, soil erosion, and water scarcity leave the soil and water susceptible to salinization and nutrient loss. In addition, water quality affects soil fertility.

Existing environmental problems are accelerated by intensive agriculture and grand-scale development projects. For example, Euphrates development projects in both Turkey and Syria have contributed to the degradation of water quality and the soil that is washed downstream in both Syria and Iraq (Jabbra 1997). Development projects in Iraq have disturbed the unique ecosystem of the marshes in the south where 90 percent of the wetlands were lost. Currently there is an international effort, funded mainly by Japan, to rehabilitate these marshes (UNEP 2001, 2004).

Such factors transform cultivable land into dry, infertile land, as is the case of the *bādiya* region of Syria, Jordan, and other areas in Lebanon. Cultivable land loss due to urban sprawl is especially apparent in Al-Ghouta, near Damascus, and in many Lebanese cities and towns, where 88 percent of the population lives; in Lebanon the urbanization level is expected to reach 93.5 percent by 2025 (MOA 2003).

Major environmental problems in these areas could be remedied by better agricultural management, including agricultural zoning, land conservation and reserves, recycling, hunting and fishing laws, better irrigation management, and practices to avoid salinization and overpumping of ground water. For example, desertification and salinization problems could be alleviated by using proper irrigation techniques and by such innovative methods as the use of organic fertilizers. The International Center for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARDA) has already applied such methods successfully in Syria (Christiansen and Manners 1995, Saab 2004).

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria have already established several land reserves to protect the soil

and preserve the biodiversity of these areas. Both governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in cooperation with various regional and international organizations, have also begun to launch environmental awareness campaigns, establish laws, and devise programs to prevent further deterioration of their natural resources. They are party to agreements and efforts made by regional (Arab and Mediterranean) and international organizations to combat desertification, including the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (ENB 2005).[1] Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon became part of this agreement. They have developed strategies and national action programs related to Agenda 21 to support environmental programs that benefit local communities and women.[2] Jordan's and Lebanon's reports refer to the important role the NGOs are playing in supporting these plans (Syria 2002, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 2002, MOA 2002, CoDel 2005). Environmental issues have become essential features in major newspapers, radio and television programs that show documentaries, and special reports dealing with the environment.

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria have set up joint committees to cooperate and exchange information. Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan also have joint projects, such as the one launched in 2005 with support from the European Union and the UNDP to deal with waste resulting from olive pressing (SMAP-RMS 2005).[3]

Growing interest in environmental issues reflects an ongoing social transformation as well as an expression of cultural traditions. Love and appreciation of nature are embedded in the cultural life and daily activities of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Cultural traditions and religious teachings, including popular understandings of Christianity and Islam, regard natural resources with great respect. They are considered blessed gifts from God that should not be wasted. The glorious beauty of nature, its wrath, and the remarkable precision of the universe prove God's existence, greatness, power, and wisdom. These are traditional themes in Judaism and Christianity, as well as Islam (Pope John Paul II 1990, Rockefeller and Elder 1992). Another theme is the belief that God entrusted man with the stewardship of this world (Pope John Paul II 1990, Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Bartholomew I 2002, Sadar 1984).

The Qur'ān emphasizes the great value of nature and living things. Many of its verses refer to the natural world as a sign and a reminder of God's power and his love for man – for it is a gift from Him: Qaf, 50:9; He Frowned, 80:19; Thunder, 13:03, 04; The Bee, 16:68–69 (Dawood 1997). Other Qur'ānic verses have similar messages (Sartawi 1999).

Though these beliefs and values have deep roots in the cultures of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, these traditions are often not followed due to negligence, lack of awareness, irresponsibility, dismissive attitudes, or hardship and poverty. However, women's activism in NGOs or their initiatives in the environmental field indicate that environmental issues are of great concern to women. Their activism reflects both the cultural and religious traditions that support concern for the environment as well as the power of education and the impact of global knowledge gained via the Internet and satellites.

Women in these mixed urbanized and agrarian societies participate in all aspects of seasonal community life: sowing, ploughing, picking fruit, or harvesting the crops. Women are responsible for securing and preparing the year's staple supply of ingredients for Middle Eastern cuisine. For example, during the olive season, which takes place in October, women pick olives and sort them according to their intended use: to be pressed for oil or preserved as cured black or green olives.[4] Women utilize the oil of the lower quality olives (*jirjār*) and the second pressing of olive oil waste (*jift*) to make soap. They also use the *jift* as fuel. Since women are the household managers, they use their resources efficiently and wisely; nothing useful goes to waste. This practical efficiency may also reflect the religious belief that squandering resources is considered *ḥaram* (sinful), for they are gifts from God. Most women in rural areas also have great knowledge of the fields and plants, which they collect to use in salads or for medicinal purposes. In earlier periods, some women acted as midwives and used herbal medicine or Arab medicine: for example, thyme was used for high blood pressure, mint and anise teas for upset stomach.

While modernization and urbanization, which are attracting more women to the cities, is increasingly helping them achieve higher education, better positions, and more political power,[5] they are also uprooting them from their rural regions and taking them away from their heritage of intimate knowledge of their local herbs and plants. This process has led to the loss of traditional environmental knowledge and skills that used to be held and transmitted most specifically by women.

Women in their various positions in society play an important role in supporting environmental issues. In addition to conserving resources

(including energy and water) in their roles as household managers, they are keenly interested in providing safe environments for their families. They also have the opportunity, as educators or mothers, to introduce their children or students to sound environmental practices. Environmental policy planning should recognize women's roles, encourage their activism, and help keep them up to date with developments in the environmental field.

The environmental movement is gaining ground in this region as a result of increased awareness, growing social support, and better cooperation with NGOs and international organizations; however, funding remains a problem that hinders the implementation of environmental policies. Furthermore, while environmental activism could benefit from political activism, in a region charged with political tensions, the environmental movement has to navigate its way carefully amidst political currents and turbulences; otherwise, the environmental cause could be hijacked by politicians and its goals lost and undermined by political interests.

Notes

1. "The UN Convention to Combat Desertification is the centerpiece in the international community's efforts to combat desertification and land degradation. The CCD was adopted on 17 June 1994, entered into force on 26 December 1996, and currently has 191 parties" (ENB 2005).

2. "Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organizations of the United Nations System, Governments, and Major Groups in every area in which humans impact on the environment" (UNDSD 2004).

3. SMAP is the Euro-Mediterranean Framework Programme for policy and funding orientation aimed at promoting sustainable development and supporting high-priority environment-related activities. It was launched in November 1997 during the Euro-Mediterranean Helsinki Conference. The SMAP Regional Management and Support Unit was set up in February 2003 to strengthen SMAP.

4. In Lebanon, "according to United Nations projections, women comprised 40.7% of the agricultural labour force in 1990. However, rural women have had to become the main contributors to agricultural production, from planting to marketing, due both to extensive male migration to urban areas and to increasing widowhood as a result of war. More than 10% of rural households were headed by women in 1987" (FAO 1995b).

5. Women as a working or political force were not collectively recognized, as their efforts were taken for granted. In the last two decades there has been a more conscious effort to include women. In Jordan, a women's department was established at the ministry of social development in 1980. The General Federation of Iraqi Women was established in 1969 (FAO 1995a).

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Gloria Saliba

Palestine

While Palestine's soils, water resources, and agricultural products are necessary for survival and social cohesion, they do not generate contemporary wealth in the same way as would, for example, oil, gas, timber, minerals, and (semi-)precious stones or metals. From before the sixteenth century to the present, settlements historically combining Muslims, Christians, and Jews – as well as the nomadic settlements of the Beduin – have partly relied on income independent of the resource base, for example travel and tourism, land and sea trade, transport of people and goods, services, handicrafts, textiles, manufacturing, telecommunications, and remittances. Resource extraction has been mainly shaped by agriculture, construction, and water supply, with the unfulfilled potential for more lucrative enterprises such as mineral extraction from the Dead Sea, offshore oil extraction, and pharmaceutical production from algae, minerals, and agricultural resources.

Agriculture

From Ottoman times until the present, agriculture has been a mix of grains, livestock, and tree and field crops. The full range is too large to mention, but includes sesame, sorghum, chick-peas, vegetables, thyme and other herbs, spices, cotton, dye, linen, rice, pharmaceuticals, indigo, and silk (Huetteroth and Abdelfattah 1977, 71–91). The staple food for the villages and towns was wheat, grown more intensively in the plains and traded for olive oil from the hillsides (ibid. 84). Barley was grown for livestock and in times of need. Due to its drought resistance, it was especially grown in the southern region of Gaza (at the time, "Gaza" referred to the area from the coast to al-Khalil [Hebron] and south into the Naqab [Negev] desert) (ibid.). Domesticated animals were used for labor, meat, milk, or leather, and included cattle, oxen, camels (dromedaries), horses, donkeys, goats, sheep, and poultry (ibid., 90, 91). When Kurdish and Turkmen nomadic tribes lived in the Hula basin (Galilee area), water buffalo were also kept (ibid., 48). Offshore, lake, and river fishing still take place, and bees remain to this day a source of mountain and plains honey.

Little documentation exists as to women's specific historical role in agriculture; however, current practices appear to reflect long-standing tradition. Palestinian women undertake the labor-intensive task of preserving food in order to keep stocks of seasonal products all year round. They make jams of apricot, grape, plum, peach, *safarjal* (quince), and *khushkhāsh* (Seville oranges). They pickle cucumbers, cauliflower, cabbage, carrots, hot peppers, green peppers, turnip, grape leaves, and *maqdus* (baby eggplant). Fruits, nuts, and legumes are dried, including apricots, grapes, plums, peaches, apples, almonds, chick-peas, lentils, and other legumes. Refrigerators enable fresh vegetables to be frozen for consumption off-season, or for ease of preparation when cooking large meals. This is especially true of difficult-to-prepare vegetables, such as artichoke and *ʿaqqūb* (thistle), or for high-consumption fruits and vegetables, such as tomatoes and lemons. Cheese from cows, sheep, or goats is boiled with *miska* (gum Arabic) and *maḥlab* (Mahaleb cherry) and kept in brine all year round. Other long-lasting dairy products include *kishk* (dried yoghurt), *makhīḍ* (yogurt drink) and *lebne* (strained yogurt).

While these practices still continue, some have become nearly obsolete. Grain milling, for example, was previously done by women by hand. Women turned grain into flour, then baked the bread. Nowadays, bread is usually purchased from a bakery, usually employing men, and usually using flour imported through Israeli marketers. Apple vinegar is bought rather than made, as are rosewater and orange blossom water. So also is the traditional sweet, *qamar eddin*, made from apricots boiled and dried into strips.

Food production is increasingly a form of coping at bare subsistence levels. Women stockpile food in anticipation of renewed invasions and curfews, and food and water security are not currently present. For these as well as economic reasons, women in many areas grow as much of their food needs as possible (field visit 24 June 2004). Fruit and vegetable preserves are now a last resort for economic welfare, rather than a traditional household commodity. In places where Israeli restrictions on movement prevent women farmers from reaching markets, their produce spoils without being sold. For that reason, when women are forbidden from traveling outside their villages, preserves are now made in an attempt to keep products for later market (field visit 27 June 2004). Agricultural vendors until recently have more often been rural women (*fallāḥāt*) than men. At present, most *fallāḥāt* remain the vendors of traditional products such as vine leaves, thyme, baby eggplant, olives, and the like, while vendors of Israeli and illegal settlement products are mainly men, for interrelated reasons of Israeli military occupation, poverty levels, and agriculture and labor markets.

Whether or not women work on agricultural land (including home gardens and orchards) is determined by a host of factors. To keep land in the family, a common practice was to bequeath it to a daughter who would marry a relative (Hendy personal communication). She may then choose to work on the land, otherwise the husband or outside laborers may tend it. She may also choose not to inherit or to sell her inheritance. If the husband owns the land, for a wife to work on the land is seen as somewhat shameful (ibid.). However, in harvest season, entire families join to work: women and men, elderly and young. In general, the cultural practices of the family also play a part: if the family is *fallāḥī* (agricultural), they are more likely to tend to their land than if they are *madanī* (urban).

If they are *badw* (Beduin), they are likely to raise *ghanam* (goats and/or sheep) and will not necessarily own land as individual families. Traditionally, the husband would raise the livestock and shear them, and the wife would milk them and make cheese or other dairy products, as well as making *bisāṭāt* (rugs), tents, or clothing from the wool (Huetteroth and Abdelfattah 1977, 81). The wife would do most of the marketing: whereas the husband might sell livestock only, the wife would usually market livestock as well as the various products. When Israeli employment was available to certain individuals (usually men, discussed later) women's role in agriculture expanded, making them responsible for what were previously men's and women's roles. This, however, was conditional on land availability. Under Israeli occupation, the Israeli military authorities expropriated many Beduin lands. After 1994, the Palestinian National Authority nationalized then privatized many of the remaining Beduin lands, such as those in the Gaza Strip (ibid). For both these reasons, Beduin lands are decreasing and with them the possibility of pursuing a Beduin lifestyle.

Fruit trees are a staple and an export: the coastal area is known for its citrus plantations; apricots distinguish the region from the Gulf and northern Africa; and recent irrigated palm and banana plantations cover the Jordan Valley. Tree crops also include almonds, carob for syrup, vines for grapes, raisins, leaves, wine, and *dibs* (grape syrup historically used as a sugar substitute), and most importantly, olives (Hendy personal communication). Traditional olive tree products – in addition to the Palestinian staple foods of olives and oil – include olive soap, olivewood carvings, olive cuttings to feed livestock, and olive mulch used to heat homes at night and in winter (field visit 2005).

In the 1999/2000 agricultural year, olive trees accounted for 4.6 percent of GDP, 15–20 percent of agricultural output, 51 percent of cultivated areas in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and 78.5 percent of the fruit trees in the area (Alwazir 2002). The trees preserved almost 936,000 dunums (a dunum is 1,000 square meters) (ibid). Olive trees are traditionally classified as planted in Roman or Ottoman times (the Ottoman archives refer to trees as planted by either Romans or Muslims) (Hutteroth and Abdelfattah 1977, 69), meaning that some contemporary Palestinian olive trees are 1,500 years old. The trees' life cycles, growing less than two feet per year and not producing fruit for the first 10–12 years, partially define community and individual lives. They mark times of birth and death: trees are planted in celebration and memoriam; they determine times of marriage: income is available at harvest time; and they strengthen family ties: women send olive oil and olives to relatives in the diaspora (Juma'a interview 2004). Farmer women and men

liken their trees to children and grandchildren being raised, and to companions in whom to confide (Alwazir 2002).

From September 2000 to April 2005, 441,661 olive trees were uprooted by the Israeli army and settlers, amounting to $17,363,592 of losses (YMCA 2005). Approximately three times as many other kinds of trees were also uprooted (ibid). Apart from the environmental, economic, cultural, and emotional damage, such practices are also illegal, contravening the 1954 Paris Protocols, the Hague Convention, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Alwazir 2002).

Resource extraction for industry

Agricultural patterns partly defined settlement and nomadic patterns, and until recent times, these patterns remained fairly constant (Hutteroth and Abdelfattah 1977, 88). Recent changes are due to mass expulsions of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967, and population control techniques: enclosure zones (where Palestinians are not allowed out), closed zones (where Palestinians are not allowed to return), and geographically circumscribed personal identification cards (by which Palestinians' daily activities are severely confined). These techniques, while used most notably in the "enclosure period" of 1948–66 and the two intifadas, were intensified in the "peace" decade of the 1990s (it was in this period, for example, that movement to and from the Gaza Strip was reduced from thousands of travelers to a handful of individuals per day). The impact of recent events, from 1948 until the present, has been profound in terms of resource extraction.

Construction of housing, infrastructure, commercial operations, and public facilities now drives a host of industries, including the major extraction activities of stone quarrying and cement production. These use open-pit methods, usually criticized for transforming the landscape, for dangerous working conditions, and for generating a dust that covers everything in the vicinity, including home interiors (DWRC 1996). The quarries generate large revenues for a small number of Palestinian and Israeli companies, and their products are in constant demand both for Palestinian and Israeli building, including illegal settlements, roads, and the Apartheid Wall. West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians working for Israelis are mainly employed in construction and agriculture, although some blue-collar work is available, such as waste collection, caretaking, gardening, street cleaning, and restaurant dishwashing. As such, Palestinian women workers are virtually confined to caretaking work, and constitute only a small percentage of Palestinians working in Israeli illegal settlements and cities. This is in stark contrast to their former position of majority employment in Palestinian agriculture, with a variety of choices available to them as landowners.

Water

Palestinian water resources expropriated in 1948 and 1967 are under Israeli control, distributed by the company Mekorot. Traditional water collection methods, involving a social network primarily of women, have now largely been replaced (Naguib 2003). Water restrictions factor strongly also in the recent, rapid constriction of Palestinian agriculture (Byrne 1994, 54–7). Palestinian water allocation is less than one seventh that of Israelis and settlers: 8.2 percent versus 57.1 percent of the basin's 2.8 bcm (billion cubic meters) per year (Rabi 2005). Given the erratic and unequal provision of piped water, the ratio is often worse in areas such as the southern and rural West Bank. In 1987, the Israeli government "administering" Gaza (and extracting its water) predicted the freshwater supply would be exhausted in 20 years (Roy 1995, 164). Wells now bring brackish water, and reduced pressure has allowed seawater intrusion. Chloride levels soar above World Health Organization levels, as do nitrate levels from agricultural chemicals and wastewater. In the West Bank, the building of the Apartheid Wall solidifies water control, as fertile land and groundwater resources are expropriated militarily and infrastructurally for use by mono-religious and exclusive Israeli settlements and highways. Although declared illegal in 2004 by the International Court of Justice, wall construction continued and now includes guarded watchtowers, surveillance cameras, electrified fences, and sand paths to track footprints (Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign 2005).

Water shortage and poor water quality affect daily life. Women run up to their roofs to ensure that piped water – when it flows – flows into storage tanks, kept for days of shortage. Weddings, engagements, graduations, funerals, Easter, Eid, Christmas, and all other occasions and gatherings are liable to run the stored water dry, so serving food and hosting guests become arduous chores involving buckets of water from neighbors, if neighbors' tanks have not run dry. Walking to open water sources is onerous for the healthy, let alone the elderly or the pregnant women who find themselves undertaking the task. The quality of such

water sources is so poor that in Hebron, kerosene treatment was preferred to drinking the water untreated (Qumsieh n.d.). When the Israeli army invaded Palestinian towns and villages in 2002, women in Ramallah "rationed the orange juice" and drank water from the rooftop drains to stay alive (Giacaman personal communication). Forbidden to leave their homes and with water supplies cut by the military, their eyes were red from lack of water, and showers were an ill-afforded luxury (Alayyan 2002).

General population health suffers with poor water quality. Women care for those who fall ill from water-borne and water-washed illnesses, as well as those affected by the chemicals in the water. Kidney disease, for example, is abnormally high in the Gaza Strip, directly correlated to salinity levels. Cases of the rare "blue-baby" disease (metheglobenemia) are testament to nitrate levels in the area.

Summary

Resource extraction in Palestine, never a heavily prosperous but always a socially crucial category of activities, is now constricted such that reliance on non-resource-based activities is necessary, and those without access to alternative income fall below the poverty line. This has personal consequences for women's, men's, and children's health and well-being. Funds to treat and prevent illness are unavailable; malnutrition is increasingly documented by local and international organizations; and daily life is increasingly enclosed into confined spaces. Once prosperous, land-owning, and self-sufficient families are now reliant on food aid from agencies such as the World Food Programme. In a longer-term, more historical perspective, the connections between women and natural resources are being severed. As one woman remarked in a Jerusalem village deprived of all its land by the Apartheid Wall (see Fig. 3), "when we're upset – we go and spend time in our land" (field visit 27 June 2004). With the expropriation of land and water, and the prohibition on travel to markets and workplaces, such activities will no longer be possible.

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Nadia Abu-Zahra

Sub-Saharan Africa

Women and gender issues relate to environment change and natural resource extraction depending on both the geographical setting – semi-arid, humid, and forest, as well as environmental zones with great mineral wealth – and people's beliefs and cultural practices surrounding resource use. Sub-Saharan Africa has great geographical, socioeconomic and religious diversities. The predominantly Muslim countries (where Muslims form over 50 percent of the population) are Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Niger, Chad, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and the eastern parts of Kenya and Tanzania. In countries such as Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi, there are significant Muslim minorities, between 25 and 45 percent of the total population. Islamic beliefs are integrated in people's lives; however, some Muslim practices are in conflict with pre-Islamic ones with regard to the environment.

Environment change and natural resource extraction are part of the main environmental challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. They cannot be analyzed without taking account of their postcolonial social and political contexts, which are all too often characterized by civil wars, conflicts over natural resources, religious conflicts, HIV/AIDS, and

diseases related to altered environments and illegal exploitation of resources (Yngstrom 1994).

The main debates have been about Sub-Saharan African women's roles in environment, the way their environmental concerns are linked with development issues, and the consideration of gender and power relations in shaping their access to and control over resources. Although there have not been explicit connections made between Islam, gender, and the environment in these studies, it is important to note that the analyses have been mainly in those Sub-Saharan African countries that are predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities and where gender relations and natural resource use are informed by Islamic cultures and practices.

In the early 1980s, the issue of environment change in Sub-Saharan Africa emerged in scholarly, including feminist, discourses because of the severe food shortages and famines between 1968 and 1973 that prevailed in Ethiopia, Sudan, the Sahel, and southern Africa (Leacock 1981). The main discussions to emerge about gender and environment change included the impacts of desertification and deforestation on women, especially those from the Sahel, and the coping strategies they developed; the impacts of large-scale climate change on local water and wood supplies where women have the primary collecting responsibilities; and the social aspects of climate change (Monimart 1989, Groen 1988/9).

More recently, the ongoing effects of natural resource extraction, such as gold mining, oil extraction, strip mining, quarrying, and timbering on African women have started to be of scholarly interest but still have not reached the forefront of research. The many civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa caused in part by attempts to control wealth from rich natural resources have eroded and violated women's rights and brought natural resource extraction problems into focus for African and international feminists.

During the last two decades, Muslim pastoral communities in Sub-Saharan Africa have been particularly affected by the ecological crisis. In much of Mauritania, where Islam is the state religion, in northern Nigeria and Niger, where the Hausa people are Muslim, and among the Ahamda of central Sudan who are a Muslim, Arabic-speaking people, pastoralism has long provided a successful adaptation to an environment that is mainly desert, dry and hot. The climate change and ecological constraints, exacerbated by human interference, have made the zones more arid and have increased both transhumance and sedentarization. This crisis has increased women's marginalization and the negative impact of socioeconomic change. Local sources of clean water and fuel that were once plentiful are now scarce and require more time and physical effort to gather.

The Sudan war that broke out in 1983 and has since ravaged the Darfur communities was caused in large part by efforts by corrupt politicians and businessmen to control Darfur's oilfields. The result has been a catastrophic loss of life and land, with hundreds of thousands of people becoming refugees and many women becoming heads of household as their husbands are killed or fighting. Sudan is a predominantly Muslim nation, although different forms of Islam are followed, and religion has at times been used as justification for this conflict where countless Muslim and non-Muslim Sudanese women have become refugees, persecuted and abused because of their gender

Recent civil conflicts in the West African nations of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Ivory Coast have negatively impacted the crucial upper Guinea forest environment. The armed conflicts throughout the region have encouraged illegal and unsustainable resource extraction by international commercial logging firms and local warlords to fuel the war. Men and women have been affected through displacement, mass out-migration, and inter community conflicts. The environment is further harmed by refugees who resort to destructive use of land, water, plants, and wildlife.

Sub-Saharan African women have been increasingly organized in many ways to fight against environmental degradation from climate change, develop coping strategies for disasters, and to resist and challenge harmful and unsustained natural resource extraction.

For example, the Green Belt movement, under the leadership of Wangari Maathai (who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2004), has planted nearly 30 million trees throughout Kenya for environmental conservation since 1977. This Kenyan non-governmental organization has helped rural women to reclaim their rights to land, fostered community empowerment, and trained representatives from 15 other African countries. Since 2002, there have been a number of protests by Nigerian women and local groups such as the NDWJ (Niger Delta Women for Justice) against multi-national oil corporations operating in the impoverished but oil-rich Niger Delta region (Turner and Brownhill 2003). Critical to their agenda have been concerns over environmental

pollution such as gas flaring, polluted water, and constant oil spills, as well as the destruction of the flora and fauna of the delta's extensive wetlands.

Although significant work has begun on gender, environment change, and natural resource extraction, the lack of focus and documentation on Islamic cultures and on gender relations in Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan Africa reveals that some crucial aspects have not yet been acknowledged. Neglecting Muslim African women's culturally informed interactions with their environments is not just an oversight; it also opens feminist environmental interpretations to criticisms of generalization and marginalization. Sub-Saharan African women are not one homogeneous group; they are defined and shaped by their local cultural, social, and economic contexts, including religious beliefs.

Given that many of Africa's poorest of the poor are Muslim women living in geographically marginal areas of Sub-Saharan Africa it is significant to examine what their unique environmental challenges are and how positive religious and cultural values, such as an emphasis on education, the importance of charity, and the celebration of nature in the Qur'ān, might be advantageous in addressing environmental change.

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Solange Bandiaky

Turkey

In many respects, Turkey is unexceptional in terms of relationships between women, gender relations, and environmental change and natural resource extraction. For instance, evidence from Turkey is suggestive of ways that women's societal and work roles condition women's interest in differentiated effects of, and responses to, natural resource issues. Specifically, women's roles with respect to food preparation, caring for sick family members, or gathering fresh water for home use are central to the ways that resource uses and conditions affect women's roles, attitudes, and knowledge about the environment. Women globally have often been central to environment-related activism, such as toxic waste movements (Brown and Ferguson 1995). Evidence from Turkey similarly suggests that women are increasingly active in environmental movements, including protests against oil leakages around Mersin (Flying Broom 2004), campaigns against charcoal in Hatay (Flying Broom 2003), and urban recycling efforts (Özkan 2004). Similarly, research on environmental attitudes in Turkey also reflects broader observed trends with respect to gender-differentiated concern for environmental challenges. For example, work done with school children in Ankara by Tuncer et al. (2005) suggests school type and gender were the most significant factors influencing environmental attitudes, with girls much more likely than boys to demonstrate environmental concern. Of interest for this entry, the authors also argue that environmental attitudes and understanding are importantly and directly tied to educational levels of the children's mothers. As Bord and O'Connor (1997) suggest, gender differences with respect to environmental attitudes are likely to be based on perceived risk, rather than differences in environmental sensibilities per se.

While examples from Turkey seem to reflect broader trends, there are aspects of the history and geography of Turkey that make several issues particularly salient and worth highlighting, including some recent issues that have importantly marked the Turkish sociopolitical landscape. In biophysical terms, future climate change could intensify experiences with drought and desertification that have been important features of Turkish landscape history. Economically, as Turkey remains heavily agricultural and semi-industrialized, future environmental changes may prove to be particularly important. Heavily agricultural economies are thought to be more vulnerable to future climate changes, for instance with changing patterns of precipitation and temperature altering crop potential and productivity (and thus affecting livelihoods and economic stability generally), and also with respect to technological and institutional capacity needed to respond to such changes (see Anand 2004 for general discussion, and Karaer and Gürlük 2003 for a similar discussion related to the ways that environmental degradation may have negative

effects for productive resources in developing countries). With reliance on certain crops in particular (for example, cotton represents a significant portion of Turkey's agricultural output), climate change also has the potential to aggravate agro-ecological and pollution issues already in evidence, for instance desertification and salinization (see Çullu et al. 2002 for discussion of salinization in the Harran plain of Turkey's southeast).

Several contentious environmental debates that have emerged in Turkey over the past several decades are also of interest in that they relate to sociopolitical inequalities and difference, as well as shifting state-society relations, even though these have not yet all been analyzed specifically from a gender perspective. For instance, protests against dam building have emphasized sociopolitical difference and identity with respect to Alevi and Kurdish identity and activism, while controversies related to the Forest Ministry in the 1990s have challenged the authority of developers and businesses, as well as the ways that state agents may cater to such interests (selections in Adaman and Arsel 2005). In the case of protests against gold mining in Bergama, villagers have asserted their right to be involved in decision-making that affects their locality, and have also mounted an express challenge to state agency decisions through the courts (Çoban 2004 discusses the general contours of the movement, and raises some issues related to women's interest in associated degradation, for instance, with women expressing concern related to sickness from contamination, and linking exposure at the mining site to miscarriages). Work by Murat Arsel (2005) has also highlighted some gender dimensions of the Bergama movement. He argues that women became increasingly involved in activism for strategic reasons, to show greater strength in numbers, to attract media attention, and to dampen violent crackdowns against the protestors. As women became more involved, however, Arsel reports that they achieved other gains in their households and communities, from enhanced confidence from being able to share their opinions, to increased mobility as they traveled outside their villages to attend protests. As one of Arsel's female informants noted, "When journalists and people like you are coming to ask us [the women] our opinions all the time, how can they say we don't know anything?"

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Leila M. Harris

Environment: Environmental Organizations

Arab States

Little to no research has been done on the topic of gender and environmental organizations in Arab states, and therefore the extent of women's participation or leadership in these organizations cannot be stated with certainty. In addition, while trends may be suggested, no evidence has been gathered to definitively identify the kinds of work in which women are engaging most, or the positions most typically occupied by women. No anthropological research has addressed the questions of women's and men's relative well-being and experiences within these organizations. Nor have children's gendered experiences been researched. Lastly, no work has been done on relationships between gender and approaches, beliefs, methods, effects, impact, achievements, or philosophies of environmental organizations in Arab states.

Despite lack of research, evidence of women's extensive involvement in these organizations is easy to find. Women's participation and leadership varies more between sectors than between countries, and is to an understandable extent linked to hiring practices. The presence of a gender policy in hiring seems to be the most influential factor in increasing women's employment in the environmental field. Academic qualifications are unlikely to be an obstacle specific to women; they are more affected by class, with gender effects perhaps increasing as socioeconomic status decreases. Academic background does play a role, however, in the sense that female students, from an early age, are encouraged to study arts subjects: social sciences and humanities (Giacaman, personal communication). While women may be highly educated, the proportion that focuses on the sciences is relatively small (although growing). This is not unique to Arab states, but it does act as an obstacle to high-ranking employment of women in the environmental sector in these states. In addition to educational background, gender differences in contacts and experience may make employment more difficult for women.

Lastly, a lack of flexible employment policies decreases opportunities for women to enter the labor force while raising children. For example, if school hours end early, while working hours extend late, women are faced with conflicting demands on their time (Giacaman, personal communication). Part-time work opportunities and "flexi time" working hours would likely bring many women into the workforce, and allow them to raise families and pursue a career simultaneously.

Governmental organizations

The governmental sector in environmental management seems to employ women in almost as many numbers as men, but not in the highest-ranking positions.

This is true also in many other fields, even where women comprise the majority. In health, for instance, the labor force is composed mostly of women (nurses and others), yet the highest-ranking positions are invariably those of men (Giacaman, personal communication). The single exception can be found in the social services sector (ibid.).

Most Arab states have their own ministries of environment, although each portfolio may include additional elements. For most ministries, staff lists are not available; however, some generalizations on women's involvement can be made based on international conference attendance. At the 2004 Euro-Mediterranean conference of the 35 Water General Directors, for example, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia were the only Arab states to have one woman each among their teams. At the Arab Water Council's first meeting, 15 Arab states sent two to three delegates each; none were women. The only country to involve women as delegates was the hosting country, Egypt, which had 315 delegates in total. Similarly, in the International Conference on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (INECE) hosted by Morocco in 2005, three of Morocco's 15 delegates were women – and only two of these were from the ministry of environment. All other countries sent men, with the exception of Algeria and Tunisia, which sent one woman each. Tunisia's only woman delegate was a consultant for an international fund for animal welfare, not a government member.

The disproportionate number of male delegates to conferences can perhaps be attributed to the presumption that conferences are benefits to be enjoyed by high-ranking members of an organization, despite the fact that conference

contents and themes may be more pertinent to an organization's employees (Giacaman, personal communication).

Regional associations, as well as conferences, also reflect poor representation. For example, all representatives of the Oman-based Middle East Desalination Research Center are men, with one exception prior to 2002: the Egyptian Director of the Research Institute for Groundwater under the Ministry of Public Works and Water (also acting as head of the Water Resources and Environment Department in Egypt). She is one of few leading women in the water sector in Egypt; the Egyptian National Water Research Center's Chairperson is also a woman. Other regional associations are too numerous to analyze in similar detail; to simplify analysis somewhat, organizations are grouped below according to their main activity.

Conservation

For at least three decades, governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have promoted conservation in Arab states. In 1971, for instance, the Tunisian Association for the Protection of Nature and the Environment (ATPNE) began its work with local communities, and especially rural women, in agriculture, biodiversity, forests, animal protection, and pollution prevention. Individual NGOs such as ATPNE also act as representatives for international wildlife organizations. BirdLife International has seven affiliates in the Gulf and Levant; Friends of the Earth International has affiliates in Tunisia and Palestine; and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has 55 affiliates – from both government and NGOs – in 15 Arab states. Regional umbrella groups also work toward conservation, like the over 100-member Arab Network for Environment and Development (RAED).

Women's involvement in conservation NGOs is sometimes the result of targeted funding initiatives. In Jordan, the Arab Women's Organization was granted US $50,000 to develop an online forum for NGOs working in sustainable development, and to manage a natural forest in Madaba. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which provided the funding (the Global Environment Facility for Small Grants), states on its website that 34 percent of its projects were implemented by women's NGOs and 11 percent by youth NGOs, thereby indicating a deliberate policy to promote women's participation.

Nevertheless, women sometimes lead conservation projects and NGOs without a specific directive from funders. For example, the deputy chairperson of the Syrian Environment Association (SEA) is a woman. SEA provides environmental awareness training to children, and in 2004 launched a recycling campaign among 540 schoolchildren in the old city of Damascus.

Technology

Some organizations combine conservation activities, like those of SEA, with an emphasis on technology. For instance, GreenLine, a Lebanon-based NGO, has technology-oriented projects in organic farming, integrated pest management, poultry composting, school gardens, tree adoption, reforestation, school nutrition, solid waste management, and sustainable land transport. Simultaneously, they pursue conservation measures such as green/protected areas (versus coastal privatization), hunting legislation, ecotourism, forest fire prevention, quarry regulation, toxic waste import restrictions, and wildlife protection (such as the pine moth and sea turtles). GreenLine is comprised of both women and men, and while without a specific gender hiring policy, is open to volunteers and applicants of all backgrounds.

A similarly mandated NGO in Palestine, Ma'an, "strongly upholds the principle of equal employment opportunity and encourages women to apply for job vacancies" (Ma'an 2006). Since its founding in 1989, Ma'an has trained over 18,000 women and over 14,000 men in environmental and socioeconomic skills and knowledge.

At the other end of the environmental spectrum are the NGOs that focus solely on technology, such as the Tunis International Center for Environmental Technologies, or the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research. The Egypt-based Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe (CEDARE) runs several technology-oriented programs, such as an "e-Learning Training Programme for Integrated [Mediterranean] Coastal Zone Management," promotion of "e-Environment Best Practices" at the 2005 World Summit on Information Society, a geographic information system (GIS) for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and a regional conference on "Energy for Sustainable Development." And in the Gulf, the Bahrain-based Water Sciences and Technology Association is a union of Bahraini, Kuwaiti, Omani, Qatari, Saudi Arabian, and United Arab Emirates representatives. The board is comprised of eleven members, all men, plus newsletter writers and producers.

Taking a comparative look at involvement and leadership in the fields of conservation and

technology, women are seen to play strong roles in community-based approaches favoring education and work with children, such as the SEA project cited earlier. Their presence is relatively absent, however, on the advisory boards of transnational, semi-private sector initiatives such as the Water Sciences and Technology Association. For a variety of reasons – ranging from academic streaming at an early age into the social sciences and humanities, to barriers to advancement in the work world, to existing inequalities in economic resources and networks – the end result is that women are rarely, if at all, decision-makers or investors in high-tech research and development initiatives. This is not unlike the situation of cutting-edge industries worldwide, but it has the potential to be altered, not least through encouraging and supporting all individuals – women and men – to pursue the studies and career of their choice, without stigma or social conditioning. Neither NGOs nor government organizations have addressed this issue in Arab states, although perhaps the environmental education programs of today may bring about unforeseen changes in the future.

Relations between sectors

Governmental and non-governmental sectors often work together on other issues related to the environmental sector. Ministries sometimes make funding available to smaller projects. For example, when Egypt passed a law to restructure its ministry of environment in 1994, it also created a regulatory agency and environmental protection fund of about $250,000, effective from the year 2000. Despite this cooperation, NGOs at times level criticism at one another and at funding agencies for duplicating efforts and increasing expenditures. A single law and manual for environmental impact assessment, for example, was criticized for its cost (US $600,000) and its repetition (Saab 2000). Available funding for environmental issues, some say, creates a market for grassroots environmental experts, who are neither necessarily grassroots nor expert (ibid.). One Lebanese NGO writes, "reports and conferences become an established goal, in isolation from a clear plan and accountability, with each report suggesting a further report, and each conference recommending a follow-up conference" (ibid.).

Various United Nations (UN) bodies that provide funding include their programs for environment (UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme), development (UNDP, United Nations Development Programme), and sustainable development. Conventions and projects address desertification, water, climate change, sustainable development (SDNP, Sustainable Development Networking Programme), environmental education, and technical assistance (METAP, Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program). Other funds pass through the European Union and international development agencies, such as the Global Environment Fund (GEF), and the IUCN-based Convention on Wetlands. Since the UN does not consider Palestine a country, it is excluded from most of these programs, although occasionally added as the "18th project" in addition to the 17 Arab states. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), for example, lists on its website Arab states that do and do not submit reports; Palestine is on neither list.

Human rights and community involvement in environmental decision-making

This relates to perhaps the least addressed issue among environmental organizations in Arab states. A leading Lebanese environmental critic suggested that the environmental sector has detracted attention from issues of structural global inequality in the fields of finance and the economy (Saab 2000). His comments highlight the noticeable omission of social justice and equity from many environmental organizations' agendas. The only organization to mention health and sanitation, for example, is the Palestinian Environmental NGOs Network (PENGON), formed in 2001 during the second intifada. Some members are conservation organizations, as in other Arab states; yet the diverse membership also includes a municipality, university institutes, environmental advocacy groups, and NGOs from the agricultural, cultural, and health sectors. Women occupy prominent positions in all these member organizations, although only in women's organizations do they also occupy the highest positions.

According to its website, PENGON aims "to ensure that the Palestinian environment is dealt with within the context of the Occupation," and that environmental efforts "work hand-in-hand with social justice causes while integrating social, economic and cultural rights as a part of environmental protection and defense." PENGON's mandate covers land defense, agriculture, water, rural issues, sustainable development, cultural heritage, health and sanitation, biodiversity, human rights, and community participation. Its activities focus on raising international awareness, south–south cooperation, and advocacy and mobilization.

Media and the environment

While not strictly considered environmental organizations, mainstream media outlets are often in the lead in awareness raising and advocacy. Some publications focus exclusively on the environment, such as Arab Eco News, Environment Now (Egypt), and *Montada Elbiah* (Environment Forum), published by the RAED network of NGOs. Perhaps the most prominent environmental publication in the Middle East is a print magazine called *al-Bīʿa wa-al-tanmiya* (Environment and development). The managing editor (deputy to the editor-in-chief) is a woman. The magazine is affiliated with a Lebanese environmental NGO called MECTAT (Middle East Centre for the Transfer of Appropriate Technology). MECTAT was established in 1982 by a consulting firm on environmental design, technology, and awareness, specializing in waste management, renewable energy, clean production, organic farming, sustainable agriculture, small-scale food processing and preservation, development of fresh water resources, and habitation. MECTAT's work, with over 150 NGOs and agencies across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe, helped launch the magazine as a leading source of environmental information.

A sample edition (see Fig. 4 for image of cover) includes articles on incinerators, Syrian investment in the environment, geographic technologies, soil engineering, monuments preservation, hiking, penguins, a photo contest, green industries in the Far East, a regional IUCN conference, and environmental legislation in the United Arab Emirates. Regular columns look at world news, recent publications, and upcoming events. Some articles focus on child-rearing, and are not exclusively directed at women, while others engage in issues of women's participation in decision-making in development projects, for example. The magazine on the whole writes in an inclusive style on all topics: architecture, ozone, recycling, wildlife, plants, natural medicine, consumer tips, and the like.

Conclusions

To summarize, women in environmental organizations seem to be found primarily in technical, rather than leadership, positions. The academic streaming of women into arts studies results in their relative exclusion from science-oriented positions in environmental organizations and, in particular, from the relatively lucrative fields of high technology innovation.

Conferences – even those that are relatively gender-balanced – nevertheless illustrate a disparity among high-ranking delegates. Most women are employed as accountants, educators, researchers, receptionists, field staff, and engineers (civil, hydrological, computer, environmental, and so on); positions on the executive and on advisory boards are more rarely filled by women. Women's contributions are apparent in implementing projects, chairing workshops, conducting fieldwork, producing reports, and the majority of organizations' activities. The one exception appears to be their relative lack of inclusion in financial decision-making.

The Arab states nevertheless form a region that illustrates the power of women's involvement in environmental issues, and their positive effects on community mobilization. Those states with higher proportions of women employed in the environmental sector seem to be the same states leading in environmental issues, with a more active populace striving for more sustainable means of urban living. In addition, those with higher women's involvement are also more balanced in their philosophy and focus, looking not only at nature as a separate entity, but at complex nature–society interactions and especially issues of inequality and social justice. While these initial observations are based provisionally on anecdotal information, such avenues of inquiry remain open for future research.

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Nadia Abu-Zahra

Environment: Water and Pollution

Arab States

Hagar, the wife of the prophet Abraham, was stranded with her infant son Ishmael in a waterless and hot desert area in today's Mecca. As she was praying and anxiously looking for nourishment for herself and her son between the hills of Safa and Marwah, God caused the spring of Zamzam to be formed. Hagar tried to wall in its water with sand and stones, a divine incident commemorated in a ritual during every Muslim's pilgrimage. Water from Zamzam is available for worshippers in the Masjid al-Ḥaram in Mecca and the Masjid al-Nabawī in Medina. This ancient narrative of hope points to the critical role of women in conserving and managing water resources.

Historically, women have been the principal collectors, users, and managers of water in the household. They select water sources on the basis of their perceptions of water quantity and quality and of the time and effort required to access them. Influenced by factors such as societal norms and educational level, these perceptions and decisions determine the quality of water in the home and where it is used.

The Arab world is largely located in an arid to semi-arid region of the world characterized by low and variable rainfall; high evaporation rates, especially during summer; and limited renewable water resources. While representing 10 percent of the world's total surface area and 5 percent of its total population, the countries of the Arab world contain only 1 percent of the world's renewable water resources. With the exception of Lebanon, parts of Sudan, and Iraq, the Arab world has a significant deficit of fresh water.

Early in the twenty-first century, the 300 million inhabitants of the Arab world were experiencing an annual population growth rate of about 3 percent, which is almost twice that of the world average (1.7 percent). The number of Arab countries that were water-scarce in 1955 rose early in this century from three (Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait) to eleven (Algeria, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen).

The naturally occurring shortages are exacerbated by global warming and excessive industrial and agricultural pollution of surface water and aquifers. The consumption of fresh water and the production of waste water have been increasing at a much faster rate than that of population growth. To meet the food needs of the growing population across the Arab world, farmers have been cultivating land more intensively through the increased use of agricultural chemicals. Between the early 1980s and 2000, the World Resources Institute reports that fertilizer use increased by about 50 percent in Lebanon, Jordan, and Oman, and by around 30 percent in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. These chemicals get washed into surface or ground waters, making them unfit for human consumption. Women in poorer countries and rural areas, or those who are illiterate, unknowingly use contaminated water for washing or cooking, hence exposing themselves and their children to adverse health effects.

As active farmers, many women come into contact with a variety of agricultural chemicals, such as pesticides and fertilizers, during ploughing, planting, and harvesting. Women wash clothing polluted with such chemicals or use containers contaminated with them to transport water and food. This aggravates the exposure of family members to poisonous residues during food preparation and also affects women's and children's health during pregnancy and breastfeeding.

Deforestation in countries such as Syria, Sudan, and Morocco diminishes the land's capacity to intercept, hold, and transmit precipitation. Unable to absorb rainfall, deforested areas become sources of surface water runoff that can trigger flash floods. Deforestation also lessens atmospheric moisture, which decreases precipitation levels and the overall water balance.

The rate of water withdrawal often exceeds the rate of natural recharge of aquifers. This has been the case in countries such as the Arab Gulf states, Palestine, Jordan, Libya, and Algeria. This overextraction induces salt water intrusion into aquifers, which limits their utility and may damage them. When water is scarce or its quality is degraded, women and young girls must travel farther to find clean water. Because of deforestation in Sudan, one-third of a woman's daily calorie intake is expended while seeking and

carrying water from rivers and other water sources (Nierenberg 2002).

The majority of the Arab world's poor are women. The planned privatization of water resources in some countries would impact them the most because inadequate access to water would greatly increase women's burdens as caregivers and household and economic providers, further exacerbating gender inequity (WEDO 2003).

The degradation of natural resources increases the risks of environmental displacement and often results in the establishment of chaotic urban settlements. Pollution levels become compounded by the minimal infrastructure and overcrowding in these settlements. For example, the potentially blinding eye infection trachoma is caused and spread by the lack of clean water supplies and unsafe sanitation conditions, and the disease affects women two to three times more than men. Environmental protection and pollution control are thus primary concerns for women.

Voluntary migration normally starts with the man of the house leaving to find better employment opportunities. By default, women become heads of households, which reinforces their dependence on access to natural resources.

Violence, wars, and political instability also adversely affect the quantity and quality of available water. For example, West Bank Palestinians are prevented by Israeli occupation authorities from drilling a sufficient number of deep wells to meet their basic water requirements. The war to liberate Kuwait (1991) resulted in deliberate and accidental spilling of huge amounts of oil that polluted freshwater aquifers and marine waters. Those who live in politically unstable regions and/or under a weak system of governance suffer from substandard water quality resulting from too poor or total lack of monitoring of water sources.

The agricultural sector is by far the largest consumer of water in the Arab world. Some countries use up to 85 percent of their water for irrigation. The more arid a country is, the higher the volume of water that it allocates to agriculture. Egypt and most Arab Gulf states are among the few countries in the world whose agriculture is solely reliant on irrigation because precipitation is infrequent and too meager to support rainfed farming.

Some ancient irrigation systems used in the Arabian Peninsula are sustainable. These include the *aflāj* in Oman and the United Arab Emirates, which tap groundwater or springs that are recharged by runoff from mountains, and spate irrigation in Yemen, which captures *wādi* flow during the infrequent runoff events. The overpumping of ground water is rendering many *aflāj* dysfunctional following the lowering of water tables.

Irrigation technologies adopted in Arab countries are gradually becoming more efficient and saved water is often directed to rapidly growing urban centers. If women's productive and reproductive activities were to be considered in the scheduling of farm water delivery, irrigation could become much more efficient, thus benefiting households and the larger community. The participation of women in the planning, financing, and maintenance of a water project is therefore a significant cause of its success and sustainability (WHO and UNICEF 2005).

Empowering women is a way of alleviating pressures on water systems, and including women in the decision-making process at the village or household levels is critical to the maintenance of irrigation systems. However, women often face a cultural glass ceiling that limits or prevents their participation in decision-making. Another challenge is rooted in the significant difference between colloquial and formal Arabic, which makes informational announcements or educational media broadcasts about agricultural chemicals incomprehensible to the huge number of unschooled mothers and farmers. Education for women is thus another means of empowerment. Educated women, for example, have fewer children and make more informed decisions about the management and quality of water.

Having overcome the overwhelming adversity that confronted her, Hagar is a beacon of hope for Muslim women today.

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Hussein A. Amery

Central Asia

This entry focuses on women's share in water management in Central Asia. Recent water reforms stress the participation of all stakeholders, but despite the big role they play in water provision and use, women are still excluded from decision-making regarding water.

Water is a precious resource in Central Asia, which is characterized by a mostly arid climate and highly unequal patterns of water distribution and use, but also by the highest rate of water withdrawal per person worldwide (Smith 1999, WWF 2004). Since the break-up of the Soviet Union and the decline of industrial production, the region's major water user, the agricultural sector, which discharges large amounts of pesticides and fertilizers, has also become the main water polluter.

Regardless of high use rates, the main problem in Central Asia is not so much an absolute or hydrologically founded deficit as it is poor management, water pollution, and deficient infrastructure. As a consequence, regional and seasonal water scarcity occur regularly even in upstream countries with abundant water resources such as Kyrgyzstan. This underscores the central relevance of decision-making and water distribution. Most Central Asian countries have responded by embarking on water sector reforms, introducing, among other things, stakeholder participation.

Since the end of the 1990s, Water User Associations (WUAs) have been established in most parts of Central Asia to manage drinking and irrigation water. The aim of the associations is to decentralize water management and increase participation by involving all users in local decision-making and water allocation. This provides chances for women to make themselves heard and become involved in decision-making, but also to receive training on water use and pollution.

Women's role in water use

Women have various roles associated with both domestic and productive water use. Apart from handling most water-consuming household tasks, it is mainly the duty of women to provide drinking water and water the cattle. Women are in charge of large parts of agricultural work and are responsible for garden plots, contributing to cash crop production and securing subsistence. Fulfilling these roles often proves difficult as a result of lack of voice and infrastructure. Adequate drinking water and sanitation is not ensured in many parts of Central Asia. Only about half of the rural population has access to sanitation, two-thirds to improved water resources (author's own calculation, after World Bank 2005). Irrigation infrastructure is often broken down. As a result, women have to carry huge amounts of water from rivers, central taps in the streets, or neighboring villages. In rural areas many women are forced to fall back on water from irrigation and even drainage canals, which are often polluted with fertilizers and pesticides. Poor water quality fosters the spread of gastrointestinal diseases, typhus, hepatitis, and malaria, and it also contributes to diseases such as anemia, which mainly affect women (WHO 2005).

Women's participation in decision-making

Notwithstanding women's role in water use, their share in water-related decision-making is marginal. Despite the former Soviet influence, traditional thinking and role models prevail and have even gained in importance in recent years, especially in rural areas (Freitag-Wilminghaus 2005, 2–3, LaFont 2001). Traditionally, women were not involved in water issues and water management in Central Asia. Many role models have changed since Soviet days, but perceptions of both women and men concerning water management remain conservative, excluding women from this vital aspect of life. "It is a shame for a woman to [. . .] care about the watering. It is the father who talks to the *murab* [water master, also a male dominated job] and cares about the watering together with his sons" – a common sentiment (Herrfahrdt et al. 2005).

Traditional perceptions of gender roles in water management are also reflected in the work of newly established WUAs, even though one of their aims is to involve all water users. WUA staff and membership are male-dominated. Even in the north of Kyrgyzstan, which was highly influenced by Soviet values and ideologies, the share of female WUA managers is below 5 percent (Herrfahrdt et al. 2005). WUA membership is mostly connected to land ownership, operation of farm businesses, and heading of households. Since land and water rights are assigned to men and farm heads are usually men, the only women members are widows. Decisions are left to men even by women themselves, who note that water is no business for women: "Women often say: 'Water is up to men'", as a donor representative put it (Herrfahrdt et al. 2005). This attitude also hampers women's participation in the training on sustainable water and land use provided by WUAs.

Today, women's influence in decision-making is at best indirect. There are hints that men discuss farming issues with their wives (TES 2005). Nevertheless, garden plots, which are highly important for subsistence and almost exclusively cultivated by women, are usually not considered in decisions on water distribution and planning because their cultivators are not regarded as eligible WUA members. As a consequence, water theft and damage to canals stemming from illicit water removal are common. Women in particular are involved in these practices since they have no other means to water their garden plots. Being excluded from decision-making, women have to help themselves. In this way they contribute to the further deterioration of infrastructure and weaken the reliability of water distribution. This in turn exacerbates ecological problems such as waterlogging.

Conclusion

Women in Central Asia play a major role in many aspects of water use and bear most of the workload associated with water provision. Nevertheless, women have no voice in the management of this precious resource. Women are systematically disadvantaged in water distribution and water-related decision-making. When WUAs were established, women had a chance to enhance their participation and become involved in decision-making. But old stereotypes and gender roles still persist, and water management decisions are preferably assigned to men. This practice is not actively contested either by donors or by women. Neither legislation nor donor projects contain any specific regulations concerning women and water-related decision-making. As the main cultivators of garden plots, women should be granted water and land rights as well as WUA membership in order to enable them to communicate their needs in WUA assemblies and as staff members. Neglecting women's water needs is not only in contradiction to state-of-the-art water management approaches and reforms aiming at participation of all stakeholders. In some cases it even contributes to the deterioration of infrastructure and exacerbates ecological problems. In the future, governments as well as donors and researchers should give special attention to the involvement of women, not only as WUA members but also as WUA staff, with a view to coming to grips with these problems.

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Turkey

The third principle adopted at the 1992 Dublin conference on Water and Environment states that "women play a central role in the provision, management and safeguarding of water" (see Bennett 2005 for discussion). Women in Turkey are no exception. Highlighting some of the particular matters of interest for gender and water in the Turkish context, this entry details issues related to water pollution and health, daily access and work practices, as well as activism and water management. The account begins with a broad discussion of pollution important for women and gender issues in Turkey.

With respect to pollution generally, a range of issues clearly affect women's health and societal roles (for example, care for sick children). With respect to reproductive health, Turkey is known as the site of the most notorious outbreak of HCB (Hexachlorobenzene) contamination in the 1950s. Women tested at that time showed elevated levels in breast milk (as high as 2,000 times average levels), and follow-up work 20–30 years later showed persistent elevated levels among exposed women (NRDC 2001).

Turkey faces serious sanitation issues, contamination from dumping in nearby water bodies (Turkey is surrounded by water to the north, west, and south), as well as pollution problems from industrial and other wastes. For example, water pollution in and around Istanbul is severe, with

sewerage from this growing city of over 10 million inhabitants affecting water quality in the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara. This and other types of pollution are of particular concern given rapid rural to urban migration, and rise of squatter settlements in most of Turkey's major cities, resulting in considerable infrastructural challenges (for example lack of green space, waste disposal, and noise and air pollution are also of considerable concern, particularly in Turkey's urban areas; see Yilmaz 2005 for a study of environmental attitudes and particularly noise pollution in Erzurum. Ethelson 1994 also notes for Istanbul that sulfur dioxide levels are considered "unsafe"). Also of interest, cross-national comparisons of attitudes for environmental protection show Turkish citizens to strongly approve of the ecology movement – 52 percent, just above Switzerland and the United States, but less than Bulgaria (76 percent) and Brazil (82 percent) – and importantly, Turkish residents demonstrate comparatively high willingness to sacrifice to achieve environmental aims, such as willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent pollution (Ingelhart 1995).

Recent research has highlighted the importance of changing water uses for women's and men's work practices, linking water issues to broader sociocultural associations, for example norms related to femininity and masculinity. Along these lines, Harris (2006) has highlighted the ways that transition to irrigated agriculture in Turkey's southeast entails renegotiations of gender roles in the household and community, linking women's changing work practices to issues of prestige and status. Harris concludes that while transition to irrigation reproduces long-standing gender (and ethnic) hierarchies in the Harran plain, cropping and other changes with irrigated agriculture also produce new constraints and opportunities for men and women in the region (forging renegotiations of associations with gender or ethnicity generally). For instance, irrigation has extended men's sociospatial spheres of access and influence (for example, with higher incomes and greater ease of travel to cities), and in a relative sense has further limited women's mobility, status, and engagement (with increasing demand for women's work for agricultural harvest, and diminished ability of women to contribute directly to household needs through wool or yogurt production). Other research has considered women's access to water for domestic needs, and has found a decrease in time required to access water in recently irrigated areas (Kalaycioğlu 2004) as state efforts have focused on improved provision of drinking water in addition to irrigation infrastructure.

With respect to activism and management related to water and pollution issues, Turkey again provides several interesting examples. For instance, women along the Mediterranean coast made the news in 2001 when they initiated a sex boycott to protest at the lack of running water in their villages. Soon after the boycott was called, the government agreed to provide pipes for a water system (*Turkish Daily News* 2001; interestingly a sex boycott was also called by women contesting gold mining and pollution in Bergama in an effort to encourage greater participation among husbands). Women protesters have been particularly active against other types of water-related pollution (such as against oil leakages along the Black Sea coast, Flying Broom 2004). With respect to water management, work by Harris (2005) in southeastern Turkey has demonstrated that attempts by the Turkish state to promote participatory water management through the establishment of irrigation associations (*sulama birliği*) have proceeded with significant exclusions of women, landless farmers, and other less powerful actors in newly irrigated areas.

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Information Technologies

Overview

Information technologies (IT) including but not limited to computers, modems, the Internet, fax machines, pagers, mobile phones, and satellite television are supporting new forms of communication and human interaction worldwide. Countries with Muslim majority populations, especially Malaysia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates, are actively building information societies, and transitioning to new knowledge economies. Each of these countries is also working to ensure that women have equal access to IT. As statistics suggest, however, access to IT is growing more slowly in some parts of the Islamic World (Africa and the Middle East) than anywhere else in the world. Moreover, women in the Middle East and Africa are some of the most marginalized from IT worldwide. These stark differences in the diffusion and use of IT are creating a (gendered) digital divide within the Muslim world. A recent UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) *Arab Human Development Report* argues that access to communications and IT is key to economic and human development (<www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr>). Moreover, failing to provide women easy and equal access to IT can slow the development and progress of society as a whole. The ITU (International Telecommunications Union) observes that society as a whole will benefit from providing women equal access to communications services (<www.itu.org/gender/index.html>). This is due to the fact that the communications and IT sector has become one of the fastest growing areas of the world economy, and women still face many barriers to participating fully in it. The ITU, the UNDP, and governments throughout the Muslim world are working to create telecommunications policies and human resource development programs targeted at women, with the hopes of working to alleviate the poverty of women and their families, and to add to the pool of talent that will be needed in the new information society.

The following analysis provides some basic data on women's access to IT in the Muslim world, discusses some important ways in which Muslim women are using IT, and also discusses some ways in which policymakers and non-governmental organizations are working to deploy IT in Muslim societies in more inclusive, gendered, and culturally sensitive ways.

Facts and figures

One problem in trying to understand women's access to IT is that we rarely find data disaggregated by gender for the developing world, where

Table 1: Basic IT and Gender Indicators, Select Muslim Majority Countries (2000–2)

Country	Female Youth (15–24) Illiteracy %	Internet Users as % of Pop.	Females as % of Workforce	TVs per 1,000	Radios per 1,000	Fax per 1,000	Mobile Phones per 1,000	PCs per 1,000	Female Illiteracy 15 yrs and older %
Bahrain	1.4	40	21	472	580	—	300	385	17.4
Egypt	37	0.85	30	119	317	0.5	1	9.1	79
Indonesia	2.9	2	41	68	155	0.9	5	8.2	18
Iran	8	—	27	71	263	—	6	32	31
Jordan	0.7	4	25	82	271	8.6	12	8.7	16
Kuwait	6.8	9.5	31	550	678	28	138	105	20
Malaysia	2.3	25	38	172	434	7	99	59	17
Morocco	42	1.3	35	115	247	0.7	4	2.5	64
Pakistan	58	0.85	29	22	94	1.9	1	3.9	72
Saudi Arabia	10	3	16	262	321	—	31	50	33
Tunisia	11	4	32	100	224	3.1	4	15	39
Turkey	6	3.7	38	178	330	1.7	53	23	24
United Arab Emirates	6	37	15	134	355	21	210	106	21

Sources: UNESCO 2002, ITU 2005, World Bank 2005, and CIA 2005.

most Muslims live. In part, this is because women are not viewed as a significant target audience for IT based advertising, so marketing firms are not generating data on women's IT preferences in the region as, for example, Nielson Ratings is doing for the United States and Europe <www.nielsen-netratings.com>. Another factor is that women are a small portion of IT users in the developing world, so statistics about their use are considered marginal. For example, in the Middle East, as of 2000, women are said to constitute only 6 percent of all Internet users in the region (Hafkin and Taggart 2001, 1). Women are less likely than men to have technical and computing skills. The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement found that worldwide, men outnumbered women 3 to 1 in those planning a career in computer and information sciences (United Nations 2000, 98). Moreover, boys are more likely than girls to be provided with access to a family computer at home, and boys are more likely than girls to integrate IT into their play, whether electronic games or computers. These access issues are also made more pronounced by issues of literacy. Women make up 50 percent of illiterates in the Arab world. In South and Southeast Asia, where the majority of the world's Muslims live, literacy rates for women are much higher, and positively correlate with access to IT. In Egypt, by contrast, illiteracy among women aged 25 and older is nearly 80 percent. Similarly, fewer than 1 percent of women in Egypt, or the population in general, have regular access to IT. These statistics seem to confirm an observation made by the prime minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, that there is no rich country that is information poor, and no poor country that is information rich. Poverty and a lack of access to IT are mutually reinforcing, and form increasing challenges for women. Of the world's poor, 70 percent are women, and most of the benefits of the information revolution have bypassed women outside Europe and North America.

For the information rich countries, data for connectivity look impressive. For example, more than 70 percent of Swedes are Internet users. There is a personal computer for every two Singaporeans. In the United States, two-thirds of the population are on-line. If income is considered, connectivity increases. For example, in the United States, nearly 90 percent of all households with an income of $75,000 or more are connected to the Internet. On the other hand, for information poor countries, many of which have Muslim majority populations, figures for connectivity are lackluster. Only one in every 150 people in Africa uses the Internet. Inconsistent access to electricity in Africa is also a major barrier to Internet use outside the major cities. Telephones remain a luxury, with nearly 83 countries still having only 10 lines per 100 inhabitants. In 61 countries, less than 1 percent of the population has access to the Internet. The UNDP estimates that only 1 percent of the world's population is part of the knowledge economy that IT is helping to build and sustain. Moreover, nearly 4 billion people worldwide lack access to IT. When gender is added as a factor, then the global digital divide is even more pronounced.

Manuel Castells (2000, 7) has argued that access to IT largely shapes a country's destiny. The same can be true for individuals. In fact, the UNDP ranks access to IT (or lack thereof) the third most pressing concern facing women today worldwide. The first two concerns are poverty and violence. Some argue that all three can be solved by enhancing female access to IT, using the Grameen Bank microcredit project as a case in point. Through microcredit loans to village women in Bangladesh, women were given access to mobile phones, which they would use to provide telecommunications to the entire village. The phone became a profitable microenterprise, the village was given access to telecommunications services, and the place of women within public life was transformed as a result. Founder of the Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus, observes that strategies aimed at making IT a force for poverty reduction can make our future a poverty free world (Yunus 2001, 4). This is only true, however, if women are included, for as the UNDP *Arab Human Development Report* observes, development not engendered is endangered (<www.undp.org/rbas/ahdr>). In Grameen's case, 95 percent of all borrowers are female (<www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.html>).

Muslim women with IT access

Women with access to IT in Muslim majority countries, or any country, tend to be already part of the privileged class. They tend to have college degrees, to be between the ages of 18 and 35, to be fluent in English, to live in urban areas, to be from the middle to upper class, to have a computer at home, and to have had some training either at school or at work in IT applications. Within the cosmopolitan elite, gender seems to be less significant a variable in determining access. For example, surveys of college students at Kuwait university have found that women are just as

likely as men, if not more likely, to use the Internet and to major in engineering. One survey found that nearly 55 percent of women surveyed considered the Internet a hobby (Wheeler 1998, 363). Moreover, the School of Engineering at Kuwait University had to raise the test scores required for entrance for female candidates to give men a chance for entrance. Similarly, in Egypt, a Ministry of Communication and Information Technology employee observed that he had a hard time finding qualified male applicants for jobs which only a man could fill, such as those that required setting up telecenters in remote locations. Such employees would need to travel often at night and to carry heavy equipment, activities in his view not appropriate for a woman. Similarly, the explanation provided by the university for raising female entrance requirements was a concern with regard to a potential lack of sufficient female employment in engineering post-graduation. These examples suggest that gender still matters in the information age, especially in the Muslim world where there are still strong cultural and religious influences on gender and work, in both public and private life.

Perhaps because gender still holds such sway as a variable in social organization in the Muslim world, IT has been a useful tool for those women in the region with access. In the conservative Gulf countries, where social norms discourage the interaction of the sexes apart from relatives and family members, women have used IT to advance in business, to organize election campaigns, to create female owned and operated businesses such as Internet cafés and training centers, and for educational purposes. In cyberspace, we can see Muslim women designing their own electronic communities, selling *ḥalāl* cosmetics, and seeking religious advice for problems such as sexual satisfaction within marriage, dating, homosexuality, and masturbation, subjects which prove taboo otherwise. Thus, cyberspace offers Muslim women opportunities for activism, education, employment, and entertainment. The Islamic women's website Islamic Garden summarizes the importance of the Internet for Muslim women when it observes:

> Muslims have benefited nicely from the fruits of the Internet as it has become possible to provide and receive Islamic education with ease . . . Muslim women in particular are coming together on the Internet and creating cyber-sisterhood unimaginable just 5 years ago. Sisters everywhere from the US to Japan are networking to provide one another with encouragement and resources in areas as diverse as infertility, wearing the niqab (face veil) with confidence and finding the best Islamic web sites for children. They are studying together, discussing together, and generally using the Internet to make their voices heard in a society which has often been too quick to judge what it means to be a Muslim woman. Many women have made their own websites and thus have opened up a world of information to curious non-Muslims who may have not have previously had a glimpse into the Islamic lifestyle from the "inside." As Islam continues to be the fastest growing religion in the West and in the US in particular, the Internet is certain to play an ever-expanding role in peoples' decisions to convert. At the minimum, many wrong ideas about Islam have been refuted on the Internet, and people are beginning to realize that Islam does not reject the use of modern technology such as the computer (<www.islamicgarden.com>).

Increasing access

While IT offers women in the Muslim world great opportunities for growth and development of their societies, the digital age has yet to encompass and impact the lives of the masses. Governments throughout the Muslim world, understanding the potential of IT to stimulate economic growth and human development within their countries, are working with international aid organizations to build more inclusive IT infrastructures, especially in rural and/or impoverished communities, and especially for women. For example, Egypt's Technology Access Community Centers (TACC), with pilot programs in Sharqiyya, Zagazig, and Siwa, sponsored in part by the UNDP, have targeted special courses for women (<www.tacc.egnet.net>) and free Internet access and training for the poor. Sean Osner, a UNDP employee who was instrumental in setting up the TACC projects in Egypt, notes, "One of the things we designed the community centers for was to help the local women find markets in other parts of the world for their products" (Trombly 2000). Similarly, the government of Jordan is working with the UNDP to develop Community Knowledge Centers located in poor neighborhoods throughout the country. One goal of the project is to train women in the use of computers and the Internet to develop skills and opportunities for building a knowledge economy in Jordan. As Queen Rania of Jordan notes, "it is important for women to make use of the latest technology, particularly the Internet, to reshape their lives" (Husseini 2002). While this revolution in technology and social practice continues to unfold, Muslim women worldwide will be afforded new opportunities for personal and community development especially as more projects are specifically designed to meet their needs and life situations.

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DEBORAH L. WHEELER

Migration: Asylum

Overview*

Refugee law and political asylum

Refugee law grants protection to a subset of persons who have fled human rights abuses – those who, according to the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, have departed their country of citizenship or last habitual residence and who are unwilling or unable to avail themselves of their home country's protection "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion." Thus, refugee law provides surrogate national protection to individuals when their states have failed to fulfill fundamental obligations. As several jurisdictions now recognize in defining the concept of "persecution," the nature of those obligations is determined by international human rights standards. And under specified circumstances, refugee law provides enforceable remedies, including most prominently political asylum, for individuals facing human rights abuses.

The plight of female refugees

According to the World Refugee Survey, women constitute half the world's refugees (a large fraction of these coming from Islamic regions) but historically the world's refugee law regimes have poorly accommodated women's claims to political asylum and other forms of safe haven. Women's eligibility for refugee status (and, hence, for political asylum) has proven problematic, owing not to the asylum and refugee law's legal categories per se, but to the incomplete and gendered interpretation of refugee law by existing structures. Refugee legal scholar Helen Crawley (2001), for example, has noted refugee/asylum law's failure to acknowledge and respond to the "gendering of politics and of women's relationship to the state."

Asylum law's gender conundrum

"Gender" in the international asylum/human rights context refers, generally, to socially constructed notions of femininity and masculinity, including traditional and emerging assignment of roles and division of labor between men and women, and the resulting power disparities that shape and define women's identities and status within societies. But simply adding gender or sex to the asylum regime's current enumerated grounds of persecution (race, religion, nationality, political opinion, and social group) would not solve this problem; nor would it necessarily address cases where the harm feared (legally, an element of "persecution") is unique to, or disproportionately affects, women.

Gender asylum law

One progressive legal trend of recent decades that holds promise for Muslim and other women facing persecution is the refugee regime's development of a "gender asylum law," which evades some of the traditional hurdles to women's eligibility for refugee status. This trend has taken the form, principally, of administrative guidance and political asylum adjudications drawing on the law of international human rights, that comprise an emerging jurisprudence supporting the grant of political asylum or other safe haven to persecuted persons (principally women) on gender-based rationales.

More generally, "gender asylum law," is the recognition of, and providing of legal redress for, multifarious forms of violence against women within mainstream human rights norms and the categories of refugee and asylum law. Jurisprudentially, the law's development in this area has been marked by the incorporation of a human rights framework into the body of refugee law. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, asylum practitioners, and refugee activists consciously have built gender asylum law on the edifice of international women's human rights law and the work of the international women's human rights movement. For reasons that are as much strategic as principled, they have argued that, in order to respond to women's experiences, refugee law needs to evolve through a process of interpretation, rather than be amended to incorporate new gender-specific provisions. Gender asylum law has also been a catalyst for the articulation and acceptance of the human rights paradigm in several key legal cases and acceptance of that paradigm as precedent.

Muslim women refugees in particular may benefit from the growing legal harmonization between the human rights regime (created to monitor and

deter abuse) and the refugee regime (created to provide surrogate state protection to qualifying people who are able to cross borders), because their claims for safe haven frequently draw on gender asylum law's interpretive guidance and emerging theories. These developments can be best illustrated with examples from three important areas addressed by gender asylum law: 1. sexual violence, including rape, as persecution; 2. female genital surgery (FGS) as persecution; and 3. family violence rising to the level of persecution.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence

Rape was one of the first issues affected by the articulation of the human rights paradigm within refugee law and the increased willingness to consider gender-specific abuses within the scope of persecution. Although the Canadians early acknowledged that rape should be treated as "persecution of the most vile sort," generally rape was regarded as being in the private sphere in many cases, beyond the reach of refugee law. Even cases that fitted the traditional paradigms of refugee law were being dismissed – largely because the physical harm involved was sexual and directed at a woman. For example, when a Salvadoran woman whose family was active in a cooperative movement was raped by death squads while they shouted political slogans and hacked her male relatives to death, she was deemed the victim of private violence. Similarly, a United States immigration judge denied asylum to a Haitian woman who was gang raped because of her support for the deposed president, though the ruling was eventually overturned.

Indeed, the flight of Haitian refugees to the United States during the 1970s and 1980s helped precipitate the contemporary refugee rights movement in the United States. When Haitian women fled the violence during the time of the coup, there was a network in place to hear, and bear witness and give voice to, their stories. These stories became the basis for asylum claims, resulting ultimately in several legal developments.

In 1993, scholars and advocates obtained the first administrative precedent in the United States granting asylum to a woman and recognizing rape as serious harm that could constitute persecution. The United States in 1995 issued national gender asylum guidelines, which state that "severe sexual abuse does not differ analytically from . . . other forms of physical violence that are commonly held to amount to persecution." The United States guidelines were an important development internationally, building on the precedent set by Canada.

Female genital surgery

FGS (also referred to as female circumcision or female genital mutilation, FGM) has been extensively discussed in human rights literature and elsewhere. It is a traditional practice that involves removing parts of the female genital organs and, in some cases, stitching the two sides of the vulva together, usually without anesthesia or sterilized instruments. Although FGS is a ritual practiced in many cultures and religions, it is especially well-documented in Muslim countries.

There is a growing body of law recognizing FGS as the basis for a refugee claim. Unlike international human rights jurisprudence, which has identified FGS as a human rights abuse but not necessarily a violation of core rights, several refugee decisions have linked FGS to mainstream human rights violations or serious harm within the meaning of persecution. The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada has found that the return of a woman to Somalia to face involuntary infibulation violated, for example, numerous provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, including the right to life and the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. In the United Kingdom, authorities recognize FGS as a form of torture, and some Australian case law describes it as a serious harm within the meaning of persecution, that is, an offence to human dignity.

In 1996, the United States Board of Immigration Appeals in *Matter of Kasinga* found that FGS constituted serious harm "consistent with our past definitions" of persecution, and rejected the immigration authorities' argument that in cases of cultural practices a heightened "shock the conscience" test should be applied. While suggesting there is flexibility in human rights interpretation and application within and between cultures, recent commentators and some prominent refugee decision-makers have taken a strong anti-relativist position, arguing, in the words of Professor Rodger Haines of the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority, that, "Breaches of human rights cannot be ignored, discounted, or explained away on the basis of culture, tradition or religion."

Since refugee law does not attempt to set a corrective agenda, tell countries how to act, or propose plans for eradicating particular practices, it has avoided controversies that have been most

sensitive and divisive in debates concerning FGS and cultural relativism in general. Such debates within the human rights community have on the other hand been, at times, almost immobilizing.

In the case of FGS, the human rights issues may be more clearly identified in refugee law than under the international human rights regime, whose purposes are broader and directed at fundamental change. What is significant with respect both to rape and FGS is that refugee law has identified key forms of violence against women – namely, rape/sexual violence and FGS – as core violations of their human rights. It has been able to do so by applying a human rights paradigm and building on the work of the international human rights community. Making the relationship between refugee law and human rights law explicit creates opportunities for advances within both fields, and of course creates new lines of defense for Muslim and other women who may flee persecution.

Family violence

As a matter of doctrine, both human rights law and refugee law recognize state responsibility for human rights violations by non-state actors (although there is a dissenting, minority position in refugee law). Refugee law more than international human rights law, however, has long grappled with fundamental questions of whether "persecution," which implies some failure of state protection, requires direct or indirect – or any – state complicity at all. These questions become more complex when one is faced with collapsing states or at times when there is no functioning centralized authority at all. Human rights law, which struggles with similar questions, can learn from the experience of refugee law.

An emerging body of refugee case law concerns family violence, an issue that remains at the margins of human rights law although it is the most pervasive form of violence against women. In cases of violence by husbands and male domestic partners, the question of state intervention and/or protection is especially complex due to different levels of interweaving responsibility and enabling of the "private" harm by the state.

The Convention Against Torture (CAT, or Torture Convention), which as a human rights instrument extensively addresses prevention of torture, also contains a non-return provision. Like the Refugee Convention, the CAT prohibits States Parties from returning a foreign national to a country in which he or she would face torture. The non-return obligation in the Refugee and Torture Conventions is an obvious point of contact between human rights and refugee law. Claims for protection from return to torture often go hand in hand with – or follow the denial of – claims for refugee protection and status. Torture is also an extreme example of serious harm within the meaning of persecution. For both these reasons, the human rights corpus defining torture is incorporated into refugee law.

The CAT includes a requirement of official action, consent, or acquiescence. The Committee against Torture, which monitors compliance with the Torture Convention, as well as some regional bodies, has begun exploring the boundaries of this state action requirement. In some limited instances, refugee claimants fleeing family violence have also been testing those boundaries. The United States Board of Immigration Appeals in *Matter of Kuna*, decided in 2001, granted a request for protection from return under the CAT to a woman fleeing years of violence by her husband. Her husband, who had governmental ties, had previously committed crimes with impunity. As a result, the board found state acquiescence even where the wife did not seek state protection because she reasonably believed that it would be futile. Although the relief granted initially was limited to her CAT claim, it is significant that the board found that the international legal definition of torture can, under some circumstances, include violence within the family.

Synchronicity's promise for Muslim women

As the foregoing examples illustrate, asylum law's recent major developments are increasingly drawing on the international human rights paradigm. Nevertheless, tensions continue to exist between the refugee and human rights movements. Problems of cultural relativism may lie at the heart of these conflicts. While refugee/asylum law may be formally non-intrusive and non-judgmental, it does make a determination regarding a state's willingness and ability to protect a particular citizen or resident, and in so doing lays claim to an *international* human rights standard. When the legalized refugee regime consists almost exclusively of states in the North determining refugee claims from the South, these purportedly international human rights-based judgments seem or are one-sided, patronizing, and hypocritical. This discrepancy is especially pronounced in gender persecution cases, since violence against women (including intra-family violence) is prevalent throughout the world, including the Islamic world.

Refugee law, ultimately, reflects the human rights community's own analyses of human rights conditions in various countries. It also reflects the human rights community's own tensions and dilemmas, as the FGS example illustrates. Those interested in the welfare of persecuted or oppressed women (in the Islamic world and elsewhere) may reflect that refugee law offers a particular framework to confront particular human rights issues, albeit somewhat less broadly than under the human rights regime's more ambitious framework. Refugee law does not seek to reform states and does not necessarily address root causes because its role is ultimately palliative. Moving forward in order to maximize the new synchronicity's positive impact in women's lives will require greater clarity about the differences, as well as the similarities, between these two legal regimes.

* Based on research conducted in 2002.

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Deborah E. Anker and Paul T. Lufkin

Migration: Diasporas in Muslim Societies

Turkey

Descendants of a migrant community settled outside their natal territory is an apt description of a diaspora. However, there is a difference between an immigrant group and a diaspora; the latter self-identifies as being loyal to another territory. Throughout history Turkey received immigration from every region where a Turkish/Turkic and/or Muslim population lived. Many such groups sought shelter in Turkey for different reasons. Present-day Turkey houses a large number of immigrant communities from a wide range of backgrounds and regions. Some Muslim and culturally or ethnically Turkish/Turkic groups chose to settle on Turkish territory mainly for political reasons. Turkey, for them, was culturally, religiously, ethnically, and linguistically the closest place in which they could feel at home.

Prominent political activists from the former Soviet Union emigrated to Turkey in the first quarter of the twentieth century, such as the leaders of the Musavat Party of Azerbaijan (Mehmed Emin Resulzade, Ahmed Agaoğlu), and intellectuals from the Volga Tatars (Ayaz Ishaki, Yusuf Akchura, Sadri Maksudi) and Bashkirs (Zeki Validi Togan), and the Kazakh (Mustafa Cokayoğlu) and Uzbek (Osman Kocaoğlu) regions and continued their support of women's political rights and changing status in Turkey. Other immigrants, living mostly in somewhat isolated villages and settlements, did not form a separate front within Turkish politics until the mid-twentieth century. Prominent émigré communities now in Turkey consist of Caucasians and Crimean Tatars, followed by the immigrants from the Idil-Ural region, Azerbaijan, Kirkuk (present-day Iraq), Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Turkestan (Central Asian). Their total number is about 5–10 million at most. These immigrants were permitted (between the years of 1954 and 1970) by the Turkish Republican authorities to establish a front as the Federation of Turkish Immigrant and Refugee Associations. Particularly for those bigger communities, such as the Caucasian and the Crimean immigrants, émigré nationalism turned into diaspora nationalism during the last decade of the twentieth century. The Kazakh immigrants in Turkey came from the Turkic-Chinese part of Central/Inner Asia and constitute the smallest group among the immigrant communities. They sustained certain aspects of their distinctive culture, identity, and physical appearance. As a result of their similar physical appearance, they are referred to as the "Tatars who eat horse flesh" and are often belittled.

Information related to diasporic communities from neighboring countries such as Iran during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries is difficult to trace because of the lack of publications devoted to the activities of these communities. It should also be noted that, from the Turkish point of view, emigrants from Persia can pass simply as Azeris.

The bulk of the women belonging to Muslim diasporas in Turkey seem to have remained indifferent to gender issues. There is little writing by such women. Diaspora women, however, played a role as preservers of oral culture and tradition. They continued to keep customs and traditions alive for generations. Stories, poems, proverbs, riddles, songs, and memoirs of the lost land were all subjects of conversation wherever and whenever they met. Women, as the carriers of the peculiarities of the land they left behind (*memleket*), continued to cook similar food and make similar ethnic clothes and embroidery. Thus, they prepared their offspring in Turkey for establishing closer ties with their ancestral homeland; the opportunity for this started in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Prior to this period, Kazakhs tried to establish ties with the "surrogate" parent community, Soviet Kazakhstan. Kazakh immigrants in Turkey were a group who were not subjected to Sovietization or Russification, nor to the changes inflicted upon their relatives at home and in the USSR. They generally preserved most of the older elements of their native culture. The concept of diaspora began to appear recently among Kazakh immigrants and their offspring in their private conversations as a result of the policy of the newly independent Kazakhstan, which has declared that all Kazakhs whose ancestral homeland is not within the borders of the present-day Kazakhstan should be considered as Kazakh diaspora. At present, the political and social impact of Kazakh immigrants in Turkey, let alone Kazakh women, is rather limited in comparison with other ethnic groups. Generations of Kazakh immigrants, male

and female alike, are well integrated into the Turkish community. Women and girls are free to enter the labor market and receive educational training.

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Meryem Hakım

Migration: Environmental Displacement

Egypt

Nubian displacement by governmental development intervention can be conceptualized as simply one aspect of the larger issue of displaced persons. Hansen and Oliver-Smith's *Involuntary Migration and Resettlement: Problems and Responses of Displaced People* (1982) identified displacement in the name of development as a form of violence on underprivileged populations, and these authors viewed migration as a form of social action rather than a passive reaction to events. Coining the term "environmental refugees," Hansen and Oliver-Smith also point out that droughts, famines, and other "technosocial disasters" are facilitated by hazardous environmental conditions that lead to markedly different human and material costs of disasters throughout the world. As Shami (1993) points out, women, children, and men experience displacement and resettlement differently, and the strategies they pursue also vary. Readdressing Nubians' experience in the form of a case study, Shami indicated that Nubian displacement was not a finite transition from people's homes south of Aswan. Rather, processes of displacement extend beyond the period of study, and displacement and labor migration are mutually reinforcing social events. For this reason, displacement should be considered at the household/family and community level as well as at the national level.

Egypt's development schemes to extend a public contract between the state and its citizens affected both Nubian women and men. Adherents to the Mālikī interpretation within Sunnī jurisprudence (external to the state's Ḥanafī orthodoxy that grants rights in favor of husbands and fathers), Nubians of the migrant era were divided in their attitudes toward the legitimacy of popular religious practices, such as *dhikr* and shrine visits. Fahim (1973) noted that, on completion of the first Aswan dam in 1902 and its elevations in 1912 and 1933, extended Nubian kin groups broke up in favor of nuclear families. In 1963, the Egyptian government offered resettlement to the 100,000 Nubians that the Aswan High Dam development scheme displaced. According to Fahim, resettlement acutely increased the conflict between orthodox and popular Islamic interpretations. Fernea and Kennedy (1966) note that women experienced resettlement as added labor as they rebuilt government-provided housing to meet their own aesthetic ideals, planted vegetable gardens and irrigated them illegally, and began to cultivate livestock. Government housing also promised closer supervision of wives, daughters, and property, and Nubians' new proximity to Egyptian neighbors introduced such customs as the *shabka* (wedding gift of gold jewelry), thus increasing the financial burdens incurred by men when entering marriage.

Like state development interventions that facilitate social change and gender differentiation, institutionalization of the national defense facilitates "technosocial disasters." State interventions that concentrate modernist authority render local populations vulnerable to natural occurrences that precipitate industrial-scale disasters. In 1994, official sources acknowledged that a train carrying fuel oil to a military petroleum supply depot outside Dronka (250 miles south of Cairo) derailed during Egypt's worst rainstorm in 60 years. Several fuel tanks caught fire, and as the pipes that drained them exploded, a river of burning oil entered the village (population 22,000). This flaming river (which one witness described as being "like napalm") spread to homes that the authorities claim were built illegally along the railroad tracks. Officials initially set the death toll at 240, but subsequent estimates were twice that. Many victims were asphyxiated or burnt; others were trampled during their neighbors' panicked flight. "Give me my daughter," sobbed one woman. A seasonal worker noted, "I have lost all I had in life; my four children are dead, my wife lost all her gold jewelry, and I lost my savings of 1,200 pounds." In this instance, services that the military provides the national community in the name of "security" stripped local populations of their homes and preparations for the future.

Egyptian authorities permit the hazardous conditions that exacerbate a natural disaster's effects. A 1994 conference on urban planning in Cairo noted that population increase was not accompanied by more public housing. When Egypt's 1997 census suggested that 17 percent of the population lived in informal communities (an underestimate, according to specialists), it might seem the government was not holding up its half of a social

contract that dated back to the High Dam development scheme. Located at an intersection of two geological belts, Cairo's two earthquakes (in October 1992 and September 2002) exposed the vulnerability of urban residents' housing. In the course of the first earthquake, 205 buildings collapsed, and 3,759 were damaged. As Mahdiha Mohamed, a housewife in al-Husseiniya, sniffed ironically, "[Officials] can say what they like. It's their problem if these buildings need to be strengthened or demolished. I can barely feed my children." Those left homeless by the first earthquake were relocated into nearly completed ministry of housing projects. Relocated residents experienced unpaved roads, poor garbage collection, and erratic services – all of which meant more work for women. Samah Ibrahim, 23 years old, recalls her family's new apartment: "None of us wanted to put our things away in the new place. It was in the middle of the desert. There was no running water." Relocation to new housing leaves women Samah's age with less access to higher education and health care. With poor transportation services, women of childbearing age are much more likely to give up outside employment when they find the ride to work is "too long" or "costs too much." Film-maker Samih El-Bagori set his 2000 *Ṭawābiʿ kursī fī-al-kulūb* (Earthquake mayhem) during the 1992 earthquake. By scripting the nuptials of a penniless bride past childbearing age with an elderly bridegroom beholden to his insolent mother, the film-maker raises questions regarding Egypt's postcolonial social contract.

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Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Northern United Arab Emirates (UAE)

Displacement of pastoralists occurs for many reasons, although with modernization the causes changed. Men and women's roles in accommodating displacement differed. Droughts, market shifts, feuds, and wars have all caused temporary or permanent moves. Unpredictability of resources is assumed and tribes have mechanisms to manage movement. Kinship networks, tribal alliances, contracts, and treaties were peaceful and normal methods of enabling mobility in bad years (Jaussen 1948, 117–18, Musil 1928, 47, Dickson 1949, 391ff., Lancaster and Lancaster forthcoming). Al-Juhany (1983, 125–33) recorded droughts that caused nomadic tribes to settle in pre-Wahhabi Najd and Lancaster and Lancaster (1993) discussed long droughts which, in conjunction with external political and economic events, compelled settlement by the Bani Sakhr, the Karak tribes, and the Rwala. Encroachments and raids, culminating in war, were less used but more talked about methods of managing bad years. Another cause of displacement in the premodern Arabian Peninsula was action by centralizing governments, such as the development of the Islamic state (Donner 1981); Rwala say they moved north because of the development of the Wahhabi state.

In Ras al-Khaimah, UAE (Lancaster and Lancaster forthcoming), many tribesmen pointed out that displacement was the norm, especially for trading families, in response to shifting trade conditions. They also said trading was what men did when they had no other options; if things went wrong due to misfortune or natural forces, men would go to India, East Africa, or elsewhere as small traders, while the women and children remained with their natal families. It might be asked whether this is self-help or displacement.

The literature focuses largely on men; women are rarely mentioned except indirectly as creating the links between families of different tribal sections or tribes that enabled movement from a drought stricken region to one with grazing and water. This was the reason for marriages between families of different tribes. Male tribesmen emphasized the need for long distance links for hard times, and connections through women achieved this. Although women were outside the formal genealogies they enabled

these links. In addition, women of leading families influenced political decisions; in the war between the Rwala and the Kwatzbe with some Shammar in the mid-nineteenth century, the Kwatzbe chief's daughter (and other women) sought the protection of the Rwala war-chief to ask for water; eventually she forced peace, with Kwatzbe joining the Rwala (Musil 1928, 55–6). In the 1970s, the wife and mother of a Rwala shaykh were frequently asked to comment on political and economic events by tribeswomen who then passed on opinions to their husbands as a check on other sources of information to decide whether to stay or to move.

Modernization brought other reasons for displacement, among them the loss of economic profits. The substitution of chemical products for desert and mountain plants in European glass, soap, and paint industries by the mid-nineteenth century, the decline in the demand for camels for carrying freight and for raising irrigation water during the twentieth century, and the loss of providing protection made traditional livelihoods less profitable. When new resources came, some families would decide these were better even if it meant moving away and/or settlement.

The expansion of centralizing states into the provisioning of security, combined with taxation, caused displacement in various areas of the peninsula. Lewis (1987, 25–37) describes the actions of the Ottomans from 1840 to 1900 to tax and conscript and, in the 1860s, their unsuccessful attempts with troops armed with rifles to forcibly settle various tribes in northeastern Syria. Some tribespeople in these areas already grew cereals in good seasons using their own labor or sharecropping with villagers or sheep herding tribespeople. For sheep herding families, an expansion of cereal growing did not necessitate displacement, while camel herding tribes tended to abandon former summer areas.

Increasing globalization of trade and freight, the introduction of steamships, the opening of the Suez Canal and the Hijaz Railway, and increasing European interests in the wider region, all contributed to reduce profits from pastoralism and increase tensions between the countryside and centralized government. After the First World War, the development of oil, along with the nation-states and fixed borders, became important. Many tribal families spread their options. Lewis (1987, 154) quotes a Fiḍan shaykh in 1920 saying that he supported the French and his cousins the Turks, so whoever took the area, the family would have access to the winners. The British, Hashemites, and Ibn Saʿūd controlled parts of the wider region and collected taxes at the summer watering places, the most fixed points of tribal seasonal movements. During the world depression and droughts in the 1920s and 1930s (Lewis 1987, 134–5), hardship became common. Many Bani Sakhr gave up camel herding for sheep herding, farming, and service in the Jordanian Desert Legion, thus integrating into Jordanian economic life.

Some Rwala coped with the severe 1926 drought in southern Syria by using resources in northern Saudi Arabia. Others moved into northern Syria, where excellent pastures were controlled by a tribe with whom they had numerous links through women. The Rwala regarded the 1950s droughts as the hard times that displaced them from camel herding and forced them to settle (Lancaster and Lancaster 1993). As the economic and political value of camels dropped, raiding and the camel market decreased until a family might have a herd of 200–300 when 20 were enough for livelihood. Camel herds died from want; in a drought, herders sell or dispose of as many animals as possible, but this was then impossible. A Rwaliyya recalled that her family ended the drought with eleven camels, none of which were milking or pregnant, yet none of the family starved. Most families lost 75–80 percent of their herds. In 1959, the new Baʿth party confiscated many assets of Rwala and Sbaʿa shaykhly families; almost all of these tribes went to Saudi Arabia.

Because of general hardship among herding tribes, the Saudi government recruited tribesmen for the National Guard; some already worked in the oil industry. Many tribal families, especially those with links to Syria, took up sheep herding. Others traded in whatever they heard there was a market for; smuggling goods across borders was often profitable. Most invested their profits in sheep. National governments, funded directly or indirectly by oil royalties, set up a variety of development schemes; some were for settlement and agriculture. All states abolished customary law and encouraged settlement by providing wells, schools and clinics; agriculture; and sheep herding with dry feed schemes and deep wells, not always successfully. Métral (1993) discussed changes in Palmyrena after the suppression of customary law in 1958, the departure of Sbaʿa families to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait after 1963, and the Baʿth regime's relaxation in 1973 for small town entrepreneurs – including women – who invested in barley farming, sheep rearing, and sheep trading to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. State borders and bureaucratic regulations made increasing problems for herding families (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999,

222–30) whose traditional pastures stretched between what are now separate states; many saw themselves as having to settle on tribal land and live from employment and agriculture, but most invested in sheep or goats herded by a core family with additional labor and transport by other members. The establishment of Israel in 1948 cut east–west trading and seasonal use networks used by many pastoral and agricultural groups; this loss of trade and resources increased the pressure on many to settle.

In the 1970s, the main reason for settlement was for education to ensure access to employment and pensions, which now provide the basis for most family livelihoods. Education and herding were difficult to combine (Cole 1975, 141–2), although various strategies were adopted. Parents of some children from herding families thought the local schools were unsatisfactory and moved to villages or towns with a secondary school (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 352–6). Other families were less concerned; an Umur woman remarked that all her sons would be herders, and to be successful they needed to be with the sheep in the *bādiya*, learning about the plants and animals; if not herding, they could work as lorry drivers and mechanics. To write their names and calculate numbers was enough (see also Cole 1985, 295–6). A university educated teacher in Saudi Arabia considered the life her mother had led camel herding had more purpose than her own. Others valued education for the improved employment opportunities it gave for girls as well as boys, because educated men were happier with educated wives. Parents were unhappy with the displacement of family members seeking higher education but accepted it as necessary; most took pride in their children's achievements even though their employment meant they lived far away.

Government and non-governmental organization development schemes in rural areas were often regarded with scepticism (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 373–5). A successful project was the Bani Hamida weaving project in central mountain Jordan. Women made and marketed rugs and other woven goods for income; they wove traditional rugs, but changed the shapes, sizes, patterns, and colors to appeal to tourists.

Settlement did not displace tribespeople from their traditional areas as settlements usually developed around summer water sources; people often move less within their traditional areas, particularly women who are more tied to the villages during school terms. Displacement happened because former livelihoods became unprofitable. Virtually all rural inhabitants have been affected, from camel herding tribes of the peninsula from northern Syria and Iraq to the UAE and Oman, and goat herders and farmers from west Jordan to the mountains of Oman. Most camel herding families moved to sheep herding combined with employment (Cole 1975, 158–63, Lancaster 1981, 99–112, Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 205–30). Partnerships between Syrian government agencies and foreign Arab companies allow cross-border investment and production, often in sheep or fruit and vegetables for export; these are like the multiple contracts between urban merchants, farmers, and herders that earlier drove regional economies; participants are often from the same families, and women are active participants (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 314–23). Some families in Jordan and Saudi Arabia continue to herd camels, seeing this as a good life and a reasonable living because they supply niche markets.

Many tribespeople would not describe these changes as "displacement" but "replacement" of livelihoods no longer profitable; they replaced camel herding or mountain farming by employment in security services or ministries. While some families decided not to move to, or returned from, Saudi Arabia because of restrictions on women, others consider that women can have active and fulfilling lives there. Although people have "settled," they rarely consider themselves to be *ḥaḍarī* but rather *badw*, which now has implications of "providing for oneself from one's own efforts" and involving some degree of living from animals (Lancaster and Lancaster 1999, 54–62). This is a positive interpretation of transformed conditions and indicates resilience by individuals and families.

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Sub-Saharan Africa

The overwhelming effect of environmental displacement in Islamic Sub-Saharan Africa has been in areas affected by drought, famine, and war. The main locus of this has been Sahelian Africa and the Horn of Africa, where widespread droughts and wars affected the region in the 1970s and 1980s. This trend continues today with droughts affecting countries in West Africa and with new conflicts in Sudan and the Horn of Africa.

The effects of drought on women are myriad. During periods of crisis, women are affected because they are responsible for both reproductive and productive tasks. In the reproductive sphere, women are responsible for carrying and bearing children, as well as the varied household labor tasks that provide for the family. Because women take care of children they are the ones most directly responsible for a child's nutritional status. In times of famine, women's reproductive capabilities may be reduced, an adaptive response to poor nutrition that can have adverse social repercussions. Women are also generally involved in different productive tasks in the household; they work in agriculture, either on family farms or with herds, or work in wage labor outside the home. Under situations of economic and ecological crisis this dual burden increases, as women are forced to maintain the household while finding ways of adding to family income.

Short-term migration is one of the major coping strategies for families during times of drought and famine. Women may remain behind during this period as *de facto* household heads or they may migrate in search of food relief and wage labor. When men migrate in search of work or other income, there is some evidence that it may lead to an increase in female-headed households, which can lead to a feminization of poverty and increased famine vulnerability. Whether women receive remittances often depends on the income status of the household. Men migrate in order to look for work, typically traveling far greater distances than women, but often in poorer families men do not regularly send remittances back to the family, meaning that women are entirely responsible for feeding extended, multi-generational families. Studies of northern Sudan, a Muslim majority part of Sudan, have shown that migrants from wealthier households sent remittances much more often than poorer households. Thus, migration is an important reaction to drought and famine but can be a risky strategy. Another downside of migration is that when it involves parents and children traveling together, it is often linked with increased mortality, particularly of young children, due to poor sanitation and disease.

Women play an important role in coping with the effects of drought and famine. For example, they decide whether or not to expend their energy on farming less nutritional but more resilient crops. Women are also the keepers of knowledge about collecting and processing wild famine foods, which often require elaborate preparation to rid them of their toxic qualities. In Chad, also a Muslim majority nation, for example, girls are taught how to prepare foods from lily bulbs for a yearly festival. This knowledge is useful during times of famine as this is one of the few foods that are available. In Sudan, women are responsible for processing the fruit of *Boscia senegalensis*, which must be soaked for several days before becoming edible. These foods provide a key source of nutrition during drought periods.

The individual experience of women depends on ethnicity, culture, and class. These factors intersect to determine how women are likely to experience drought and famine. The experiences of better off women during drought differ significantly from those of poorer women from the same ethnic and cultural groups. Wealthier women frequently

have assets to sell, while poorer women must rely on their ability to earn income. During a drought in western Sudan, wealthier women who had access to capital were able to continue their economic activities while poorer women could not. Knowledge is often differentiated as well. During the 1980s drought in Chad, women of higher social class had never been taught how to prepare famine foods or medicines, while poorer women were well versed in this area. This meant that in some cases poorer women and their families did better than their wealthier counterparts, who after depleting their assets had little local knowledge on which to fall back.

Culture also influences coping strategies. For example, villages in Muslim northern Sudan often have multiple ethnic groups. Women from some ethnic groups are not permitted to work outside the household because of cultural constraints, while others are. Women who have access to outside income have more options to earn cash when farming fails. In western Sudan, women from indigenous ethnic groups have few options for income generation other than agriculture. West African Hausa women, especially those of elite status, are not allowed to farm but they are encouraged to trade, albeit sometimes through intermediaries in order to maintain Muslim norms of female seclusion. Burgo women are the most active, operating small restaurants and tea stalls, often gaining significant income from these activities. Culture also influences how autonomous women can be over their own resources and to what extent they receive support from their husbands for purchasing food and other household staples as well as paying for their children's school fees and educational expenses.

Drought causes environmental displacement, but often it is war that exacerbates this. During the 1980s, wars and drought in Ethiopia led to a huge migration of refugees into Sudan. Recently, war has proved disastrous for women in Darfur, the westernmost province of Sudan. In Darfur, the droughts of the 1980s led to ongoing conflicts over natural resources, which in combination with state neglect led to an insurgency. The central government responded to the insurgency by favoring its own self-interests and empowering militias to destroy villages and harm civilians. Women have been specifically targeted during this conflict. Government sponsored militias have used gender-based violence, including rape, torture, and sexual slavery, as a main weapon of war. One of the effects of this has been displacement of people into internal refugee camps or over the border into refugee camps in Chad. Concentrating people into refugee camps leads to new forms of environmental stress and resource degradation with long-term negative political and ecological consequences. With no easy answers in sight and more than three decades of horrific disasters characterizing several Sub-Saharan African countries, the final tragedy is the displacement of international concern and aid as donor fatigue and frustration paralyze efforts at finding sustainable solutions.

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LESLIE GRAY

Turkey

The core problem in involuntary displacement is people's loss of livelihood and their potential impoverishment. When communities are forcibly displaced, the existing production systems are dismantled. Many jobs, much valuable land, trees, and other income generating assets are lost. Health care tends to deteriorate. Kinship groups and informal social networks for mutual help are scattered. Symbolic markers, such as places of prayer and ancestral graves, must be abandoned, breaking links with the past and people's cultural identity (Cernea 1997, 5–6). The most common social risks facing populations caught in forced displacement occur along several lines: landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, increased morbidity and mortality, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, and social disarticulation (Cernea 1997b).

Regarding Turkey, about 20,000 people have so far been displaced as a result of land expropriation for dam projects in the southeastern part of

Turkey (for which most of the development projects are either planned or commissioned). Data show that most of the migratory movements are directed from rural to urban areas and this also caused social and economic depressions in subject regions. According to Günes-Ayata and Ayata (1988), the eastern and southeastern regions have experienced high levels of internal migration to the larger cities because of economic insufficiency. In some provinces (especially in Diyarbakır) this migration process was strengthened in the last decades as a result of the conflict between the Turkish security forces and the separatist Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), which disrupted daily life and the infrastructure in the countryside. In the cities, many of the migrants are confronted with economic difficulties. Then child labor becomes an important strategy to deal with poverty (Smits and Gunduz-Hosgor 2003). In some cases, the mothers cannot speak Turkish at all and did not attend any formal schooling, which restricts their social life and makes them very dependent on their husbands (Aksit, Karanci, and Gunduz-Hosgor 2000). Rural to urban movement has often been the first step in a migratory pattern that has taken large numbers from eastern to western Turkey. Many of the displaced in provincial cities and towns crowd into homes of relatives, sometimes with more than 30 people residing in dwellings intended for a single family. Table 1 gives a picture of population displacement.

After displacement, women become more vulnerable. For example, language problems make access to social services for women more difficult in the subject region. A high level of unemployment, poverty, inadequate shelter, and lack of infrastructure seriously affect women's health conditions. Research carried out among displaced women revealed symptoms such as headaches, sleeping disorders, and extreme timidity. It is also reported that there was a connection between suicide attempts and feelings of isolation, despair, hopelessness, and alienation in the subject region. The motive behind the increasing suicide attempts among women was migration and its repercussions. Those who migrated to the big cities felt that they did not belong to their new habitats. It is also said that women who migrated to bigger cities believed that in their small villages they had their own identity and their own way of living. Furthermore, there were no social activities for young migrant girls and they felt the pressure of strict traditions that limited their lives.

Many women had no food and no money to feed, clothe, or educate their children. The burden of poverty and the work that had to be done for the survival of families fell most heavily on women, who themselves suffered health and other problems, particularly after migration. Women carried out most of the basic unpaid subsistence work in bearing and caring for large numbers of children, but also a substantial part of work in the

Table 1: Population Displacement, Area of Land Expropriation by Type of Resettlement

Dam	Expropriated Area (ha)	No. of Districts, Villages, Sub-Villages	Total Population Displacement	Population Opting for Government Assisted Resettlement	% of Total	Population Opting for Self Resettlement	% of Total
Ataturk	43,400	1 district, 34 villages, 85 sub-villages	55,300	2,508	5	52,792	95
Batman	2,410	17 villages	10,854	1,582	15	9,272	85
Birecik	5,030	1 district, 44 villages	31,971	6,500	20	25,471	80
Cat	1,430	7 villages, 3 sub-villages	4,000	1,965	49	2,035	51
Dicle	1,240	1 district, 19 villages	2,875	343	12	2,532	88
Karakaya	29,800	105 villages	45,000	3,999	9	41,001	91
Karkamis	1,165	1 district, 12 villages	15,000	—	—	—	—
Keban	62,000	174 villages	30,000	6,487	22	23,512	78
Kralkizi	2,085	14 villages	2,732	21	23	2,711	77
Total	193,076	4 districts, 382 villages, 88 sub-villages	197,732	23,405	13	159,326	87

Source: DSI 1999.

villages to take care of their families – and this was true for most of the women living in the development projects in affected areas. This involved growing their own and relatives' food to feed everyone, livestock management, and other work to make the land, and resources on it, productive. Women and children were also responsible for fetching water. According to Smits and Hosgor, (2003) women generally spent most of their lives within their own community without much access to the outside world. Furthermore, they carried out much of the work in crop farming, their involvement in marketing being negligible.

Sometimes, shelter became a severe problem facing women with children. Slumification became common because of inability to afford even a reasonable type of shelter. Table 2 gives a general picture of the result of displacement.

Unemployment was very common in the major provincial cities after migration. Men and boys traveled as migrant laborers to the cities in western Turkey and to Europe because of the need for extra household income, leaving women and children behind. Furthermore, since the household structure is mostly extended and patrilocal and the patriarch has full authority (the areas affected by GAP [Günedoğu Anadolu Projesi, Southeastern Anatolia Project] projects are owned largely by agas, landlords, many of them also tribal chiefs), most of the expropriation money from dams went to landlords who, by means of agribusiness, are also the main beneficiaries from irrigated land (Smits and Gunduz-Hosgor 2003).

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Suheyla Turkyilmaz

Table 2. Type of Residences Before and After Migration

Before Migration	No.	%	After Migration	No.	%
Slum	45	2.1	Rented Slum	621	29.0
Shed	27	1.3	Owner Slum	610	28.5
Detached Village House	1,682	78.6	Shed	93	4.3
Rented Apartment Flat	19	0.9	Tent	30	1.4
Owner Apartment Flat	117	5.5	Rented Apartment	386	18.0
			Owner Apartment	232	10.8
Detached House	228	10.7	Basement Floor	30	1.4
Other	21	1.0	Other	137	6.4
Total	2,139	100.0	Total	2,139	100.0

Source: Association of Migration (Goc-Der) 2002.

Migration: Internal Displacement

Central Asia

Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century countless numbers of women in Central Asia have been internally displaced for a variety of reasons, including colonization, political migration, collectivization, forced deportation, ecological degradation, ethnic conflict, and civil war. Indigenous women were particularly vulnerable to the adverse affects of internal displacement as they were ill-prepared to face the challenges of a new environment without the ties to the village community. For centuries, women in Central Asia had limited social mobility and were constrained by time-honored cultural norms and beliefs – upholding the role of wife and mother – while contact with males was strictly prohibited. Forced to leave their homes and possessions, women lost the source of their livelihood and security, their land and ties to their village.

Soviet authorities and the subsequent post-Soviet dynastic dictatorships that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union sought to accelerate industrialization and modernization through a variety of means, including colonization, political migration, collectivization, and forced deportation. In order to build new communities on a Soviet model, policy emphasized the rejection of the traditional social order and the mixing of a diverse population, which disproportionately affected women in Central Asia as it removed women from their traditional social safety net and marginalized them socially and economically.

Sovietization and internal displacement

The turn of the twentieth century brought massive internal displacement as a consequence of colonization and political migration as the Russian authorities consolidated control over Central Asia. Beginning in the 1920s, Soviet policy in Central Asia concentrated on the economic and cultural transformation using a variety of means – the emancipation of women as a way to overturn the traditional social order, the displacement and dissolution of local culture, and the forced settlement of the nomadic peoples (namely Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) – that created a large number of internally displaced people. The undermining of the traditional values and customs caused the weakening of the religious, economic, and legal ties that sustained the patterns of traditional family life.

The subsequent population migration during the Soviet period greatly affected the economic development of Central Asian republics. Soviet authorities used collectivization and forced deportation to transform the rural economy of Central Asia. The Soviet state planned and strictly controlled movement of the population as part of its modernization policy in all the Soviet republics.

The process of Sovietization sought to bring about significant changes in the lives of the women – slowly emancipating them from their traditional role as wife and mother – but the changes did not come without costs. Freed from the constraints imposed by tradition, women were disproportionately affected by economic-based internal displacement as they migrated to cities in search of work. They were thrust into the workforce alongside men, which served as a catalyst for social change in Central Asian society. Women had access to fields from which they had been excluded, such as manufacturing and industry, as well as the law and medical professions. Migration also had a social impact and became stigmatized to a degree. In urban areas, a working woman was associated with economic independence and declining fertility compared with high levels of fertility and low levels of participation in the labor force in rural areas.

Post-Soviet internal displacement in Central Asia

Internal displacement in post-Soviet Central Asia can be divided into four causal factors: social, economic, environmental, and conflict-induced. The majority of the recent internal displacement has been for economic and ecological reasons as the transition from Soviet republic to independent state was beset with problems – the dissolution of supplies, services, and trade – that had a devastating effect on the newly emerging economies. The collapse of the Soviet state meant that women were vulnerable to forced internal displacement as they have been the primary victims of the shrinking labor market.

Economic and environmental-based internal displacement

The newly independent countries of Central Asia have inherited substantial environmental and economic challenges that have created a large group of internally displaced people throughout the region. Economically, women have been the primary victims of the shrinking labor market and are particularly vulnerable as they have lost access to both the formal and informal economic networks. Economic deterioration coupled with a demographic increase has forced increasing numbers of women into the informal economy working as petty traders to help their families survive, as the transition to a market economy has been very harsh. The gross domestic product in the newly independent states of Central Asia has declined by half since the 1980s.

The major cause of environmental-based internal displacement has been man-made (desertification, soil degradation, and deforestation). Areas such as the Ferghana Valley, the Khatlon Province of southern Tajikistan and the Karakalpak Autonomous Republic of Uzbekistan are regions that are ecologically fragile, with environmental problems compounded by natural disasters. The internal displacement that has resulted from natural and human-made disasters has been instant and will take years to address given the moribund state of the economies.

Conflict-based internal displacement

In the post-Soviet era, Central Asia has seen an upsurge in conflict-induced internal displacement as well as the forcible transfer of families from disputed border regions.

The post-independence civil war in Tajikistan (1992–7) generated large numbers of internally displaced women who were forced to flee to surrounding countries as roving bands of militias specifically targeted women for rape. As many as 50,000 women were forced to flee to Afghanistan.

Border disputes in post-Soviet Central Asia have increasingly generated large numbers of internally displaced people as governments have forcibly transferred entire villages from disputed border regions. In January 2003, the government of Turkmenistan forcibly removed about 2,000 Uzbeks from the Balkan region, while in Uzbekistan the government used the armed incursions of the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan in the summers of 1999 and 2000 as a pretext to forcibly remove and relocate as many as 4,000 people from along the border with Tajikistan. Most of people who were displaced have been forced to relocate to desolate areas with little arable land. This has been particularly hard on women and children as they lost traditional social safety networks. Housed in settlements that have no reliable access to electricity, gas, or water supply, women were left alone as the men migrated to cities in search of work.

Internal displacement and human rights

Internal displacement, for various reasons, has been compounded by human rights abuses. The displaced communities have been subject to continual harassment by authorities. Villagers opposed to forced relocation were arrested and charged with attempts to undermine the state.

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Keith A. Leitich

Iran and Afghanistan

Internally displaced women are subjected to specific gender-based violence, pressures, and constraints during and after conflict.

Iran

History of internally displaced women

The Iran–Iraq war had a deep impact on Iranian families and women. Women became heads of household on a massive scale. Some women had to leave their cities for safer places and became internally displaced people. Evacuation was constant and women from rural areas close to the fighting were put under heavy stress. Public services were

devastated in combat areas and women had no access to health services or education. Some women were forced into prostitution to survive and feed their families. The warfare technologies used by the Iraqi army had a deep impact: gas, landmines, and bombs affected Iranian women in rural areas.

In April 1985, Ayatollah Khomeini gave a speech about the necessity of women's participation in the war. This gesture was symbolic: it meant Iranian women had a role to play and were regarded as citizens. In April 1986, the Revolutionary Guards Corps began to hire women, and women enrolled as soldiers, nurses, and in other military jobs.

Repatriation

After the war, the Foundation for Refugees of the Imposed War reconstructed war-torn cities and ensured the return of internally displaced people to their home towns. Many women lost their husbands during the war and were taken care of by the state thanks to the Martyrs Foundation of the Islamic Revolution. The Foundation provided basic services that made the repatriation easier. A bill concerning the status of unprotected women was enacted to improve the allowance given to widows of state employees who were killed in the war.

Other types of displacement

1. Ethnic displacement. Ethnic belonging is important in Afghanistan. The country is predominantly Muslim and each subgroup lives in a different region. There are ethnic displacements to reunite families separated by war; there are also indirect forced movements rooted in ethnic discrimination.

In Iran, the situation is the same regarding the multiplicity of ethnic and religious groups, but people move rather freely. There was a massive ethnic movement during the war with Iraq, Shīʿī Iraqis crossing the borders to reach the Arabic-speaking parts of Iran. At the same time, Iranians were fleeing from the border to seek safety among their peers. Today, the Iranian government is trying to organize a forced ethnic movement to bring Afghans back home.

2. Violence. Another cause of internal displacement in Afghanistan is violence. Afghan people fear the power of the gun and warlords so they flee to safer regions.

3. Economic displacement. Afghanistan is a very poor country and there is a waste of natural resources worsened by a severe drought. There is little food and water so people have to move to look for nourishment. The economic hardship is due to war but also to the drought and land mines that make it difficult for farmers to work. Because of the successive wars, it is hard to find work. Afghans leave in hope of a better life.

4. Ecological displacement. There is heavy ecological damage due to war and severe weather conditions. To obtain water, Afghan people have to leave.

5. Other factors. Iranians and Afghans move so as to provide a proper education for their children or even a mere chance to have a better life. Sometimes they flee because of disease. The consequences of this humanitarian situation are that Afghan internally displaced people would rather cross borders to become refugees and live in camps than stay. The situation creates potential crises such as tensions among ethnic groups over water, properties, and work. These factors hardly exist in Iran today.

Afghanistan

Internally displaced women

Internally displaced Afghan women left the rural areas devastated by war for the cities, and the bombed out cities for rural areas. Some decided to stay in Afghanistan for cultural reasons (fear of traveling alone, fear of going to countries with different cultures) but also because they were awaiting international aid or because they did not wish to move until family members returned from war. Women belonging to minorities were also aware that moving inside Afghanistan could cost them their lives because of ethnic rivalries.

Gendered violence

The gendered legal constraints that exist in time of peace become an extreme burden in time of war as women are perceived as having a lower status. Afghan women were widowed, displaced, detained, abducted, raped, executed summarily, starved, deprived of medical care, and were victims of violence. This occurred when women stayed in their hometown, sought refuge, traveled though a combat zone, or lived inside camps.

There is a major difference in how the war impacted Afghan urban women and Afghan rural women: the latter did not have the rights and opportunities of their urban sisters. Rural women also suffered because of their lower social status and the geographical isolation of villages. Women belonging to minorities are targeted not only because they are women but also because they belong to an ethnic group.

Afghan women have become heads of household: they have to provide water and food, which often

means going to the front line. Afghan women are sometimes forced to provide sexual favors to obtain food. Women are also abducted to be sold abroad in a vast trafficking network that includes prostitution and organ trafficking. Afghan women who have been sexually assaulted and forced into prostitution might face rejection later. Women also work illegally to sustain their families. Working is, however, difficult as women are rarely qualified. Some women became combatants to feed their families.

Other problems affecting women are sanitary: they have difficulties finding a shelter and having access to health and sanitation, and they depend on aid. In case of war, women and children are the first victims of starvation. Women belonging to minorities have difficulties in surviving as other groups might deny hospitality or help because of their ethnic background.

Repatriation

Afghan women are often forgotten in land redistribution and may end up homeless. They enjoy a better life in camps from the point of view of health but also regarding respect for their rights. Consequently they are not eager to go home. Others who have gained skills in camps and can now take care of their farms are now willing to go home. Afghan women have a specific gender war experience and are willing to share it but their voices are hardly heard in the reconstruction process.

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ANISSEH VAN ENGELAND

The Kurds

It is often claimed (for example Mojab 2001) that the Kurds are the world's largest stateless ethnic group. Kurdish populations are found in a contiguous area called Kurdistan that arcs across four states: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Additionally, around a million Kurdish people live in Western countries, having migrated there in the past several decades. Only Iraqi Kurds living in the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq live under Kurdish political control, but this area is not entirely sovereign and has only recently been recognized internationally.

Conflicts such as the Iran–Iraq war, the 1991 Gulf War, guerrilla campaigns by Kurds against central governments, and the attempted genocide of Iraqi Kurds by the Saddam Hussein regime have long wracked Kurdish populations and provided an impetus for many to relocate as "forced" migrants. The control of Kurdistan has been contested by non-Kurdish political powers, most notably the Ottomans and Persians prior to the First World War, and since then by Turkish, Iranian, and Arab governments as well as European colonizers and American-led coalitions. Kurds have to a lesser extent also suffered from intra-Kurdish conflict among tribes, political parties, and other groups.

By its very definition, the internally displaced person (IDP) concept as it pertains to the Kurds calls attention to the Kurds' unusual and problematic situation as ethnic minorities in each state they inhabit and as a majority in none of those states. Internal displacement as recognized by international legal and development regimes takes place inside state boundaries rather than within national territories; therefore, of the thousands of involuntarily displaced Kurdish people in and from Kurdistan, only those who have remained within state boundaries are classified as IDPs. To those who have crossed an international border, other terms, such as "refugee" and "asylum seeker," apply, even though they share much in common with Kurdish IDPs. A significant number of Kurdish IDPs are also former or future refugees or asylum seekers, such as the many displaced Kurdish people in Iraq who have returned in recent years from Iran, to where they fled and were granted refugee status in the 1970s.

The majority of Kurdish IDPs are female. There are a variety of reasons for this, the main one being that the various conflicts have engendered high male mortality rates. Men may also be absent due to their participation in combat or guerrilla activity. The information available on Kurdish IDP women varies from state to state, with a comparatively larger amount of information being available for Iraq and Turkey and much less for Syria and Iran.

Kurdish IDP women face a host of problems and challenges. If displaced without male family members, they must provide for their own and their children's subsistence – a particularly challenging task given that it is taboo in many parts of Kurdistan for a woman to engage in wage labor. IDP women are vulnerable in virtually every possible way. They face a heightened threat of violence; they are in most cases poor; most lack access to adequate health care; and they live in limbo, with an uncertain future. Their plight is often worse than that of refugees and asylum seekers because no border separates them from the persons and circumstances that prompted their displacement, and they may not be served by international agencies aiding other categories of displaced people.

Iraq

The instances and/or threats of violence that have prompted Kurdish internal displacement in Iraq are myriad, and the situation of Iraqi Kurdish IDPs is dynamic. Approximately 800,000 people, most of them Kurds, were estimated to have been displaced in northern Iraq prior to the deposing of the Iraqi government by a United States-led coalition in 2003 (Global IDP Project 2004, 1).

A report by UNCHS/Habitat (2001) lists several categories of Iraqi IDPs: those expelled from Iraqi government-controlled areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul; those displaced by conflict between the two major Iraqi Kurdish parties: the KDP (Partî Dêmokratî Kurdistan, Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the PUK (Yekîtî Nîstimanî Kurdistan, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan); those affected by conflict involving the activity of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan Worker's Party); displaced people living in *mujamat* (collective towns into which the Iraqi government had forced people to move); and others displaced/expelled for political reasons. Since the war began in 2003, Kurdish IDPs returning to Kirkuk have clashed with Arabs who were settled there at the behest of the previous government, creating a situation that remains unresolved.

In pre-occupation Iraq, the Kurdish IDP population received a great deal of attention from international agencies. For example, the World Food Programme distributed supplemental food rations to each IDP household in the Kurdish region and reported that while IDP households' food needs were met, their need for "houses, water, sanitation, . . . electricity, etc." were still acute (Global IDP Project 2004, 70, citing WFP 2001). Displaced "female-headed households" (the term used by international agencies for households without an adult male) often meet their needs through child labor (Global IDP Project 2004, 5). NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) such as Northwest Medical Teams initiated income-generation programs for women IDPs in Erbil and other cities. In the several years prior to 2003, both the KDP- and PUK-controlled administrations used funds allocated to the Kurdish region by the United Nations Oil-For-Food program to provide housing and basic services to IDPs. As the relationship between the parties has improved, many IDPs have been able to return home.

The "Anfal widows" are the Kurdish IDPs whose situation is perhaps the most dire. They are women whose husbands disappeared during the Iraqi government's 1988 campaign against the Kurds, named "Anfal" after a Qur'ānic reference to "the spoils." As many as 200,000 people perished in the Anfal, during which chemical weapons, such as mustard gas and sarin, were dropped on Kurdish communities. Thousands of people, most of them men and boys, were rounded up, shot, and buried in mass graves (McDowall 1996, 359). The Anfal widows and other poor IDP women, despite assistance from local governments, NGOs, and UN (United Nations) agencies, have been repeatedly victimized by a society that regards women who lack male household members as sexually dangerous and threatening to group honor. Barred by societal mores from holding most wage-earning jobs, some have turned to prostitution, been raped, and been victims of honor killings (Rashid 2001).

In 1991, over two million Iraqi Kurdish IDPs fled en masse toward the Turkish and Iranian borders to escape the advancing Iraqi army as the Gulf War came to a close. Most were prevented from crossing, and they suffered under inclement conditions. When the world media broadcast their plight, the United States and its allies responded with "Operation Provide Comfort," which enabled the survivors to return home. This "marked a turning point" in global IDP history "because it led to an increase of attention being paid by UN organs to the issue of internal displacement" (Phuong 2004, 7, citing UN OCHA Internal Displacement Unit 2003, 17). As a result, the UN and other international bodies now recognize internal displacement as a condition that can be as bad as or worse than that of being a refugee (Phuong 2004, 7).

Turkey

Most IDPs in Turkey are Kurdish people displaced by the war between the state military and the

PKK, a Marxist rebel movement that sought independence from the Turkish state during the 1980s and 1990s. Since then, some areas have remained unstable as remnant PKK elements and/or members of the PKK's successor organization, Kongra-Gel, continue to perpetrate the occasional attack. This campaign of violence prompted many to migrate from their villages in the southeast to cities across Turkey. Statistics on this population are a matter of guesswork. According to Human Rights Watch, over 3,000 villages were destroyed and, "according to official figures, 378,335 Kurdish villagers [were] displaced" by the mid-1990s (Human Rights Watch 2005, 5–6). Kendal Nezan, head of the Kurdish Institute in Paris, was reported in 1998 to have estimated the displaced Kurdish population of southeast Turkey to be 2.5 to 3 million, with the displaced elsewhere in the country numbering approximately 8 million, including 3 million in Istanbul (Vermot-Mangold 1998).

As in Iraq, Kurdish IDP women are especially vulnerable. Making a life for themselves and their families in the *gecekondu* (squatter) settlements surrounding Turkey's cities, they may remain a marginalized, impoverished population for decades (Wedel 2001). Forced women migrants face "male-imposed constraints on their freedom of movement" in the city to a greater degree than in villages (Yükseker 2005, 8), a condition that impairs their ability to provide for the needs of their households. Women face daunting health challenges exacerbated by poverty and cultural and linguistic marginalization, and they mourn the loss of the village lifestyle in which they were able to meet their own needs through agricultural production (Gurbey 2002).

Syria and Iran

If any Kurdish IDPs exist in Syria and Iran, they are not internationally recognized. In both countries, forced migration of Kurds does occur; however, it usually results in the migrant crossing a state border. Syria's officially recognized IDP population consists entirely of people displaced from the Golan, an area far from where most Kurds live (USCR 2004). Syria's "stateless Kurds," however, are a similarly vulnerable population. Amnesty International has estimated that "between 200,000 and 360,000 of Syria's Kurds . . . are not entitled to Syrian nationality and therefore are denied accompanying rights of nationals" (Amnesty International 2005).

Like Syria, Iran has few or no official Kurdish IDPs even though it hosts a large population of refugees from neighboring states. In a case familiar to this writer, a Kurdish woman who converted from Islam to Christianity, a crime in Iran, was assaulted by men she believed were government agents. She fled to another city, remaining there as an unofficial IDP, but she still feared the government. She then fled to the West, where she was accepted as a refugee and now lives.

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Diane E. King

Sub-Saharan Africa

Introduction

According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, internally displaced persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (UNOCHA 1998, para. 2).

In 2004, there were 13.2 million IDPs in Sub-Saharan Africa, of which between 70 and 80 percent were women and children (Global IDP Project 2005, 6). Currently, Sudan reportedly has 1.85 million IDPs, most uprooted by the conflict in the region of Darfur (IRIN 2005).

The key difference between IDPs and refugees is that unlike refugees, IDPs do not enjoy the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) because they have not crossed an international border. Since they remain within the borders of their national territories, the primary responsibility for the protection, welfare, and security needs of IDPs and internally displaced women (IDW) falls within the jurisdiction of governments. However, some African governments are notorious for transforming their responsibility to protect into an opportunity to persecute, for example by hiring militias who are armed and paid to obstruct international efforts to reach the IDPs, and who commit "extrajudicial executions, unlawful killings of civilians, torture, abductions, destruction of villages and property" (Amnesty International 2004), thereby engendering further displacements.

Gender dimensions of internal displacement

The experience of war, conflict, and ensuing displacement affects men and women differently (Gururaja 2000, 13, Fitzgerald 1998, Nyakabwa and Lavoie 1993). The gender dimensions that are of crucial concern for IDW include, first and foremost, protection from gender-based violence and its social, health, and psychosocial consequences (United Nations News Service 2005, Amnesty International 2004, Lumeya 2004, Wexley 2003, 12–13); second, ensuring that women are equal and full participants in assistance programs and policies that affect their lives (UNICEF 1998); and finally, ensuring that they have equal rights to housing and property restitution upon return (United Nations Economic and Social Council 2005).

Displacement leads to changes in gender roles, the break-up of families, and loss of social and cultural and family support systems (Amnesty International 2004, UNICEF 1998, Nyakabwa and Lavoie1993, Wexley 2003, 12). Because of their gender roles, women are expected to stay at home and look after children, the sick, the dying, and the elderly while men go off to fight on the battlegrounds. Consequently the number of female heads of households, including girls, elderly women, widows and single mothers in the context of displacement far exceeds that of male heads (Global IDP Project 2005, Turner 2000, 8, Wexley 2003, 12).

Lack of family and community protection in the context of displacement exposes women and female children to physical attacks, including gender-based violence in the form of rape, abductions, forced sexual slavery, and prostitution (Lumeya 2004, Turshen and Twagiramungu 1998, Fitzgerald 1998, Wexley 2003, Nyakabwa and Lavoie 1993). In many instances, the rape of a woman leads to family violence and, ultimately, to family breakdown as men tend to blame women who find themselves in these situations. In addition, they are at high risk of HIV infections and other STDs.

In Muslim Sub-Saharan Africa, virginity may be valued above the life of a woman in some communities. Consequently, a raped women if known cannot continue to function as a full and honored member of society and her chances of remarriage are nil for she will become a social outcast for the rest of her life (Lumeya 2004). As this survivor poignantly testifies: "after six days some of the girls were released. But the others, as young as eight years old . . . were kept there. Five to six men would rape us in rounds, one after the other for hours during six days, every night. My husband could not forgive me after this, he disowned me (Amnesty International 2004).

A recent UNICEF study based on the testimonies of IDPs revealed that "assaults on the people of Darfur, western Sudan, have resulted not only in physical injuries, but in a range of psychological traumas, including suicidal impulses and nightmares" for the affected women as well as their husbands and relatives (United Nations News Service 2005). Many IDPs in camps suffer from mental and emotional disturbances that, if untreated, have grave health, social, and economic implications for the successful reintegration of IDPs in their communities when they return or are resettled.

Prolonged displacement is another concern with gender dimensions for women. Traumatized by several months or years of displacement, women often return to communities only to find that they have been arbitrarily and unlawfully deprived of their homes and properties. In some African countries, women do not have a right to inherit land and property, and the majority lack the means to seek effective legal redress. This situation plunges them and their children into poverty and may compel them to return to a situation of displacement, thus permanently uprooting them from their societies, from family, and from kin.

International guidelines and efforts

The United Nation's *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* provide for the protection and assistance of all IDPs, including women and children (UNHCR 1998, Principle 4.2). They also emphasize the need to pay "special attention" to the health needs of IDW (ibid., Principle 19.2). Their recently proposed *Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons* (2005), currently under review by members of the United Nations' Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights for possible ratification in 2006, recognize the right of women to housing and property restitution (Principle 2.1), and equality between men and women with regard to housing, land, and property restitution (Principle 3.2).

The issue of IDPs and IDW is currently one of the more pressing humanitarian, human rights, and political and security issues facing Sub-Saharan African countries. Although the United Nations, the international community, humanitarian agencies, and the African Union have made significant progress in attempting to address the crisis of internal displacement, durable solutions for IDPs remain elusive in the context of persistent conflicts and warfare, government hostility, and in some cases outright persecution of IDPs. At present, unified measures to enforce compliance or to impose sanctions against non-compliant states are either ineffective or non-existent.

Policy recommendations

Although specific policy options vary from country to country, there are a number of general recommendations that can be made. First, at the local government and regional levels, there is a strong role for African women to play. Women leaders, ministers of gender, and local women's groups must be sensitized to the plight of IDW and encouraged to conduct fact-finding missions into the camps. Second, there is an urgent need to establish the rule of law in IDP camps and to prosecute those who perpetrate sexual and other crimes against women. Related to this is the importance of including female police and soldiers in international peacekeeping missions. Third, commitment to conducting longitudinal studies of survivors of gender-based violence after they have left the camps would not only make a valuable contribution to existing knowledge, but could also inform reintegration policies and programs and intervention strategies. Finally, there is a need to disaggregate the data in terms of single headed families, girls, the elderly, and those affected by HIV/AIDS so that appropriate programs and policies can be tailored to the specific needs of each category.

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KABAHENDA NYAKABWA

Migration: Labor and Remittances

South Asia

Introduction

South Asia is often seen as a region of promise and yet massive poverty. While it made substantial progress in terms of social indicators of development, mainly health and education, the growth of people under absolute poverty has also increased alarmingly over the last decade. Women in this region are more malnourished, less educated, and more overworked than men. They encounter more encroachment of their rights and liberties, and are more vulnerable to fall into, and remain in, poverty than men (Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre 2003). However, increasingly it is recognized that gender equality is a prerequisite to poverty alleviation and development. A rich body of empirical work (much of which is reviewed in World Bank 2001) suggests that policy impacts on poverty can be effective if they account for differences between men and women in their access to resources such as education and land, their protection under formal rights, and their performance of tasks in the labor market and at home (Fontana and Rodgers 2005). Women's greater mobility and right to safe migration, inter alia, are recommended as important tools of gender mainstreaming for achieving development effectiveness. With the exception of Sri Lanka, women's mobility is low in South Asia in general and Muslim dominated countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh in particular. Purdah and other socioreligious norms often stand in the way of women's mobility in many Muslim dominated countries. However, it is worth noting that Bangladesh is one of the few countries that experienced women's entry into the formal manufacturing sector both within the country and abroad without attaining universal primary education, despite the prevailing Muslim ethos and patriarchal values.

Data sources and organization of the entry

Taking its cue from the experiences of Bangladeshi migrant women workers in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the tracer surveys of the wives of male emigrant workers from 16 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh by the author in 2000 and 2001, this entry is about female labor migration and the consequences that flow from it. It also documents the interface between migration and empowerment to examine whether and to what extent female migrants and female custodians (wives and/or other relatives of male or female migrants who look after their children and property) have control over remittances and resources that are generated from their migration.

Consequences of women's overseas migration

A cumulative figure of the official stock of overseas migrants of Bangladesh suggests that between 1975 and mid 2001 around 3.8 million migrants went overseas of whom 80 percent went to the Middle East (Afsar 2005). Although women migrants represent around 2 to 3 percent of the total migrants, it is important to note that they migrated alone to foreign countries defying all geographical and cultural barriers that traditionally restrict women's mobility from Asian countries. Consequences of women's migration are multidimensional in nature and are too complex to put in a straightjacket. Here the concentration is on remittances and their contribution to household income and whether they help women to gain control over income and other resources, irrespective of their roles as migrants and as custodians of children and properties of male migrants in the home countries.

Contribution of remittances to household income

Expatriate women workers of the garment manufacturing sector of the UAE remitted a total of Taka 87,000 up to the time of the survey, which was equivalent to one-third of that sent by their male counterparts. Subsequently, remittances contributed 46 percent to household incomes and their income increased by 16 percent after migration occurred. Compared to a 55 percent increase in male migrants' household income where the share of remittances was two-thirds, remittances have a modest impact in determining the income of women migrants' households. A staggeringly high gender-based wage differential in the Middle East along with the recent arrival of female migrant workers (1.8 years) might have attributed to the smaller size of remittances compared to

male migrants. Note that a female ready-made garment worker earned 44 percent of the income earned by male workers in the UAE, despite having the same level of education and length of service (Afsar 2002). Moreover, repayment of loans alone took away around 40 percent from the total remittances sent back home by female migrants as opposed to 9 percent for male migrants. By contrast, male migrants' households invested 40 percent of the total remittances for productive purposes, which halved for female migrants' households. Given the recent arrival of female migrants, it could be argued that it needs time to overcome the burden of loan repayment in order to derive more benefits from remittances. However, spouses of male migrants played a vital role in making productive use of remittances. By contrast, spouses and other male members who received remittances from women migrants were not often very keen on thrift or savings and some returning migrants complained about misuse of remittances by their husbands.

Misuse of remittances by husbands was a common problem aired by women return migrants as illustrated by Hamida's case study. Hamida Begum returned from Kuwait in 1996 after two years of work as a domestic helper in a Kuwaiti family. In her own words "my unconditional trust to my husband put me in adverse situation after migration. All these years by sweat and drudge, I saved a huge sum of money equivalent to Taka 100,000 and remitted to my husband with a dream of living a life free of want and uncertainty. But my dreams faded away due to my husband's over-indulgent behavior and prodigality as he squandered away with 40 percent of the remittances leaving no savings for me. I wonder how long I have to struggle against the malignancy."

Remittances and poverty nexus

Remittances played a major role in the alleviation of poverty of migrant households and paved ways for human capital development. Estimates suggest that the proportion of migrants' households below the poverty line income declined dramatically to 8 percent after migration from 22 percent prior to migration (Afsar et al. 2000). Expenditure on food and, more particularly, on staple food had declined significantly (by 5 percent) in the post-migration period and the surplus thus released was redistributed to meet education costs, followed by health and transportation costs. Increase in education and health expenditure is considered to be a positive indicator for human capital development. Subsequently, net enrollment rate in education was higher for members of migrants' households at secondary and tertiary level (84 percent and 18 percent) than the rural average (49 percent and 11 percent), and from in-depth interviews it was found that a part of remittances had been used for children's coaching, a step toward capacity building and quality education (Afsar et al. 2000). Thus remittances contribute to poverty alleviation and income growth, and also anchor human capital building, a steady and sure step toward sustainable development, although economic impacts may vary in degree for male and female migrants.

Women's migration and empowerment

Spouses of male migrants had considerable control over the use of remittances as they took major decisions and invested them in the purchase and sale of assets, repairing the house, buying furniture, children's education, and the like. In taking these decisions, they often consulted their husbands and in a few cases their brothers. When compared with current female migrants, wives of current male migrants had greater control over remittances. Current women migrants were consulted only when remittances were used for children's education, and also with regard to borrowing.

In addition to the size of remittances, women's role and position in the family and also the composition of the family often work as intervening variables influencing women's control over remittances. Thus spouses of male migrants who were *de facto* heads of households played the most active role in this regard. Similarly, nuclear and extended types of family structure predominantly composed of wife's kin members were more favorably disposed to women's empowerment than joint and husband's kin dominated families. For example, almost 70 percent of current women migrants who took decisions were unmarried and had parents in the areas of origin. Their parents often consulted them about borrowing money and/or repairing the house. Married women were only consulted over the education of their children and they predominantly had joint and extended type of family in the area of origin. They complained about their husband's second wife and/or female relatives who often created barriers in the way of the joint decision-making process.

Concluding remarks

Rural women in Bangladesh are increasingly adopting migration as a self-help livelihood strat-

egy for poverty alleviation and betterment, notwithstanding religious and sociocultural norms and ethos. Women can earn more (three times as much in the case of manufacturing workers) than they earned prior to migration. Moreover, remittances often outweigh the cost of migration and help in direct income growth and poverty alleviation, and also in spreading education. How far women exercise control over remittances depends, inter alia, on the size of remittances, duration of migration, women's role and position in the family, and the family composition. The importance of women's migration to the family's well-being and the country's development must be recognized and integrated with the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The government should lobby at the World Trade Organization meeting with the other governments of the region for better, non-discriminatory, and safer services trade through the free flow of semi-skilled and unskilled labor.

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RITA AFSAR

Sub-Saharan Africa

After a brief overview of the history of migration, this entry focuses on contemporary patterns and the complexity of transnational linkages created through labor migration and remittances.

Migration has been a central social dynamic in Africa throughout its history. Before the twentieth century, most migrations consisted of large groups of people who moved together to establish new, whole communities (Amin 1995, 29). Migrations in the twentieth century were primarily of labor, not of peoples, due to the imposition of colonial rule and the increasing penetration of global capitalism.

Muslim communities typically found themselves in European colonies that – despite some forced labor and military conscription – were primarily interested in extracting wealth from smallholder, rural agricultural production and thus did not face massive forced migration. Men were recruited to cities to fill subaltern positions in colonial administrations. Women were expected to focus on agricultural labor. Most colonies tried to block female urban migration. This did not stop women; their "migration was self-initiated, encouraged neither by the colonizers nor by African tradition" and, after the Second World War, "Africans understood that they could no longer do without the cash from women's work in the cities" (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 75, 78). Many Muslim women migrated independently for economic reasons. By 1960, females constituted 41 percent of all migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN 2002).

CONTEMPORARY MIGRATORY PATTERNS

Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa engage in a wide range of migratory patterns, including rural–rural, rural–urban, urban–rural, and urban–urban. The first two are the most common, but this entry focuses on rural to urban migration since much less is known about inter-rural migration. The vast majority of Muslims move within the region, but increasing numbers are migrating to North Africa, Europe, and North America. In West Africa, where most Muslims in Sub-Saharan Africa live, between 1920 and 1970 the proportion of the population in the interior savannah region to that of the coastal regions went from 50:50 to 33:66 (Amin 1995, 35–6). This process primarily involved the movement of labor from Muslim-majority countries to Muslim-minority countries. Men are more likely than women to migrate internationally whereas it is common for women to move to a nearby urban area in the country of their birth (Sheldon 1996, 7).

In 1970, females constituted 42 percent of all migrants; in 1980, 44 percent; in 1990, 46 percent; and in 2000, 47 percent (UN 2002), which supports the general conclusion that urban migration is now gender-balanced throughout Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 80). Sub-Saharan African cities are generally gender balanced. However, women outnumber men in the urban

populations of a number of countries with majority or significant populations of Muslims, including Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, and Togo (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 80–1, Gugler 1989, 352). By the early 1980s, one-half of African women came to cities independently for economic reasons, whereas one-third did so for family reasons (Sheldon 1996, 8), and independent Muslim women's migration has become increasingly significant over the past 25 years.

Muslim female and male migrants – responding to economic disparity within and between African countries – share the same primary motivation: to earn money to support their families and themselves. Although female urban migrants earn lower wages and experience more unemployment than males (UNIRTIAW 2005), some have become the sole providers for their families (Vaa 1990, 180). Muslim female migrants generally work as traders in urban informal economies or in service jobs. However, it is not only the poor who migrate, but also people who are educated and have non-agricultural occupations (Vaa 1990, 179), including rapidly increasing numbers of wealthy Muslim businesswomen, thus leading to a feminization of the brain drain in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNECA 1994, 14–15, IOM 2003, 215).

The city is more than a labor market for Muslim women. Many are drawn by educational opportunities (secular and religious) and health care facilities, as well as a desire to be free "from their rural yoke" (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 83). Muslim women use rural to urban migration as recourse against forced or unhappy marriages. Single, divorced, and widowed women often occupy precarious, liminal statuses in rural communities (both their natal and husbands' villages) of Sub-Saharan Africa, inspiring many to seek more autonomous lives in urban areas. Polygyny is an important contributing factor as it can lead to a reduced marriage pool for women, and because losing a husband through death is a common experience where women are considerably younger than their husbands (Gugler and Ludwar-Ene 1995, 263).

Men migrate to earn money, and almost always desire to return home, whereas women's reasons for migrating are more complex and may at the same time be a survival strategy as well as a personal response to their social circumstances (Coquery-Vidrovitch 1997, 82). As a result of these social dynamics, women are more likely than men to settle in the city permanently (Gugler and Ludwar-Ene 1995, 263). Nevertheless, many urban migrant Muslim women remain committed to their villages, for example through sending remittances, even if they never return there to live. Living in nearby cities, they are able to regularly visit relatives and friends and attend births, marriages, and funerals in rural areas (Sheldon 1996, 7).

Remittances and transnationalism

Migratory processes entail much more than labor and money. They also create transnational social spaces involving social remittances including "flows of ideas, behaviours, identities, collective thought, and social capital between countries of origin and destination" (UNIRTIAW 2005). Monetary and social remittances offer the potential for social transformation.

Money remittances are vital to Muslim communities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Data are approximate at best as they only account for remittances transferred through official channels, and are not sex-disaggregated (UNIRTIAW 2005). Studies suggest that "informal remittances [typically hand delivered] double, and in some cases even triple the amount of migrants' [official] financial transfers" (IOM 2003, 227). Official data indicate that roughly $4 billion are remitted annually to Muslim communities in the region, and the value of remittances is growing rapidly (IOM 2003, 226). Data on countries in Sub-Saharan Africa indicate that remittances make up 2–15 percent of the gross domestic product, constitute the second highest source of external funding after foreign direct investment, and represent about 150 percent of official development assistance (UNIRTIAW 2005). In Nigeria, in recent years, the ratio of remittances to development aid is 7:1. However, remittances are highly unpredictable and volatile and the standard of deviation of the yearly average between 1980 and 1989 ranges from 17 percent to more than 100 percent (IOM 2003, 226). The similar migratory motivations of men and women noted earlier, together with a range of case studies, suggest that women send remittances at rates roughly comparable to men.

Migration has neither uniformly positive nor negative consequences for women. It can improve women's economic and social position since migrant women earn more money and provide more financial assistance to relatives than non-migrant women. In some communities, the wealth of commercial women traders has led to commensurate increases in household decision-making powers. But migration also exposes many women to abusive work conditions, trafficking, and sexual

exploitation (UNIRTIAW 2005, UNECA 1994). Specialized knowledge of agricultural techniques as well as forestry resources is transmitted by women in many areas and is threatened or lost by out-migration. For example, information about obtaining and preparing wild plants for food and medicines is dominated by Muslim women in Burkina Faso but many of these women are leaving (Coulibaly 1994, 14).

Hundreds of thousands of Muslim women whose husbands have migrated are left behind in rural areas. In some cases, women gain autonomy as household heads, but in others, absent men continue to exercise primary control over rural household resources (UNECA 1994, 37). Their workloads almost always increase, and many degenerate into poverty because they are not receiving adequate remittances. Most migrant men insist that their wives live in their own families' household, typically that of the father of the migrant who decides how to allocate money for household expenditures. The hardships of living with in-laws endured by married women with migrant husbands, including being treated disrespectfully and facing increased workloads, is a most common source of dissatisfaction that often finds expression in contemporary women's poetry and literature (Boyd-Buggs and Scott 2002).

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Scott M. Youngstedt

Turkey

Rural-to-urban labor migration has been a major phenomenon in Turkey in the past half century. The first three population censuses of the Turkish Republic in 1927, 1940, and 1950 show a steady ratio of the rural population at three-quarters of the total population; from then onwards there is a rapid decrease in the ratio of the rural population down to only one-third of the total population according to the 2000 census. Mechanization of agriculture paralleled by a rapid industrialization process in the 1950s initially triggered the flow of men to the big cities in search of work. The internal flows were amplified by external labor migration to Europe in the 1960s, the Arab countries in the 1970s, and to the Commonwealth of Independent States in the 1990s. In time, women became part of this demographic move through associational migration; rural women followed men to the urban metropolises for arranged marriages, or joined their husbands along with the children. The armed

conflict in eastern Turkey, which started in the late 1980s, also led to huge flows of families, at times of entire villages, from eastern to western Turkey for security reasons.

From a gender perspective, it could be hypothesized that such phenomenal rural-to-urban demographic transitions, and the accompanying collapse of a traditional rural system dependent on men's ownership of land, has the potential for liberation of women. This, however, is conditional upon the ability of women to move from the status of unpaid agricultural family workers to the status of paid working women with some degree of autonomy. Kandiyoti (1997) argues that in the case of Turkish women this has continued to remain merely as a potential because as women rejected their traditional duties on land and acquired some free time, rather than entering the public sphere as productive workers they turned into symbols of prestige for the men through their demonstrative consumption activities. Bennholdt-Thomsen et al. (1987) call this the "housewification" of women through migration.

Indeed, gender disaggregated labor force statistics testify that a major implication for women of the intense pattern of rural-to-urban migration has been their complete detachment from the labor process outside the home. Female labor force participation fell from a high of 72 percent in 1955 (a majority of whom consisted of unpaid rural family workers) to a low of 25 percent in 2005. The declining trend in women's labor force participation in Turkey is attributed to internal migration flows such that rural women who previously used to be unpaid agricultural family workers have become full-time housewives upon entering the city. The rural female labor force participation rate of 34.6 percent in 2005 is almost twice that of the urban rate, which is a dismal 19 percent (SIS 2005).

Qualitative field research points to two primary reasons for this negative impact of migration on women's labor force participation: the traditional sexual division of labor in the home and customary restrictions on women's freedom of mobility (İlkkaracan 1998). In regard to the first, a small village setting and farm work accommodate combination of reproductive and productive work, whereas an urban setting imposes a strict separation between the two. Moreover, the larger traditional family provides a support network for sharing childcare and housework responsibilities, while upon migration into the city with the nuclear family, women lose such support networks and become the sole providers. According to a recent field study, 80 percent of married women migrants have migrated to the city with their nuclear family only (İlkkaracan and İlkkaracan 1999). Concerning the issue of freedom of mobility in the urban context, 42 percent of migrant women report that they have to inform their husbands and get permission to go out of the home even in daytime. In a similar vein, 50 percent of non-working migrant women point out that they are prevented from working for pay by their husbands or some other male member of the family (İlkkaracan 1998).

The combination of the two reasons has led to urban migrant women's labor patterns where a majority of them do not engage in paid work. Those who do, work for pay at a younger age before marriage and childbirth on tenuous terms, and hence for the most part in informal workplaces without social security for low remuneration; or they are involved in home-based work, which has been developing in recent years. Consequently, it can be said that rural-to-urban labor migration has been a process through which women have been more strictly confined to the private sphere in the urban areas, and economically disempowered.

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İpek İlkkaracan

Migration: Muslim Diasporas

North America

The simplest meaning of diaspora, that immigrants retain collective memories of their home countries, continue to relate to them, and define their identities with respect to that relationship, applies to most Muslim immigrants in North America (although they may not have been expelled from their homelands or plan to return to them). First-generation Muslim women are charged with crucial roles in the maintenance and transmission of diasporic identity, while second-generation Muslim women tend to redefine religion and culture in their new North American homelands.

State policies and regulations partly shape Muslims' varying degrees of connection to their nations of origin. Loosened immigration restrictions in the United States and Canada in the 1960s brought increasing Muslim populations to both countries, yet the national populations and their contexts differ markedly.[1] Muslims in Canada are almost all immigrants rather than indigenous converts, while 30 to 45 percent of Muslims in the United States are converts or their descendants. The Canadian population in 1991 was 17 percent foreign-born, and the percentage was higher in cities, 35 percent in Vancouver and 40 to 42 percent in Toronto. The United States had the largest foreign-born population in the world, 19.6 million in 1991, but this figure was only 8 percent of the country's total population. The Canadian state plays a more direct role in community construction, its official policy of multiculturalism explicitly supporting the maintenance of ethnic cultures. Since Canadian Muslims must use nation of origin categories, not religious ones, to secure state funding and influence policy decisions, diasporic communities are more strongly institutionalized than those in the United States, where the state advocates pluralism but does not provide support to ethnic or national origin groups. In both countries, religious identities are seen as voluntary and individualistic, yet religious institutions benefit from certain taxation and incorporation policies if they have constitutions, governing boards, and regular elections to office. Such policies change Islamic forms and practices from those in the homelands and encourage the incorporation of women into decision-making positions in mosques and Islamic centers.

Canada's Muslim immigrants include many from India, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Syria, and, more recently, refugees from Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Somalia, and Ethiopia. South Asians (40 percent) and Arabs (20 percent) are the largest immigrant groups making up the Canadian Muslim population. The rapid influx of immigrants and refugees has produced a relatively young population with a high birthrate, and the high proportion of refugees has also produced a bipolar distribution of Canadian Muslim socioeconomic status.

Canada's Muslim minority has been concerned with gender issues ranging from the delivery of appropriate social services to the approval of spousal pensions for homosexual partners and possibly homosexual marriage. In Ontario, where more than half of Canada's Muslims reside, proposal of an Islamic law arbitration board for domestic family issues as an option for Muslims in 2005 proved controversial and was subsequently dropped. Islamic centers and mosques in Canada accommodate women by providing special areas for them and, in one Ontario case, separate gyms for boys and girls.

The United States population of Muslims is drawn from all over the world, but African Americans, South Asians, and Arabs are the largest groups, in that order. African Americans constitute some 30 to 42 percent of American Muslims, and while some argue that their arrival as slaves or their northward migration from the American south in the early twentieth century qualify them as diasporics or migrants, they are discussed here only for comparative purposes. Arab immigrants from Lebanon and Syria, only a minority of them Muslim, began arriving in the late nineteenth century. After the 1965 immigration reforms, increasing numbers of Muslims arrived, notably from South Asia (primarily India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). The post-1965 Muslim immigrants to the United States were highly educated professional people, both men and women, and tended to come in family units. These recent immigrants qualify as transnational or diasporic when political issues or marital ties continue to link them strongly to their homelands.

Muslims in North America are increasingly mobilizing along both religious and political lines. Women have played supportive roles in religious

organizations such as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) and the Islamic Circle of North America (ICNA). These two include members from Canada as well as the United States, and the ICNA is closely linked to a political party in Pakistan. In the United States, political organizations developed rapidly in the late twentieth century: the American Muslim Alliance (AMA), the American Muslim Council (AMC), the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), with the AMC most strongly connected to homeland Middle Eastern politics and therefore weakened after 11 September 2001. By the end of the twentieth century, a few women held high positions in some organizations, but first-generation men still monopolized the leadership. After 11 September 2001, these organizations all downplayed their connections to homeland politics in Pakistan, India, or the Middle East, cutting off foreign funding (AMA, MPAC) or de-emphasizing it (CAIR).

First-generation Muslims in North America generally uphold patriarchy and gender complementarity in family and community and women bear special responsibility for religious and cultural maintenance. It is not so much Islam as the rules and regulations of patrilineality and patrilocality (namely inheritance and residential patterns following the line of male descent) that distinguish Arab and many other immigrant Muslim families from mainstream North American bilateral (following both the male and female lines of descent) families. "American individualism" is interpreted as amoral egoism, a sign of family and societal breakdown, and expressions of sexuality, particularly homosexuality, arouse alarm and apprehension among many religious Muslims. Yet second-generation youth are claiming the right to individual choice with respect to marriage and even sexuality, basing these rights in Islam. Books (Safi 2003, Abdul-Ghafur 2005), articles (Naber 2005, Ali 2005, Chaudhry 2005), and novels such as *The Taqwacores* (Knight 2004) show the range of thinking among young North American Muslims.

The reinforcement of patriarchy in family and community influences marriage negotiations and gender relations within marriages, although practices vary by community. American-born Palestinian male preferences for women from the homeland, for example, left many United States-born Arab women without husbands. Contemporary marriage advertisements and matchmaking services show that many North American Muslims continue to prefer endogamous marriages (by national origin, language group, sect, or caste). This may involve bringing a bride or groom from the homeland, a practice sometimes questioned by government immigration and naturalization services. For example, United States immigration policy assumes love as the basis of marriage and requires proof that the prospective spouses are closely acquainted; special letters from religious or academic authorities can seek exceptions for transnational arranged marriages based upon marriage practices in particular communities. A study of marriages of second-generation Muslims at a Texas mosque shows movement toward an American Muslim identity rather than diasporic identities as youth make their own decisions about spouses (Al-Johar 2005).

American Muslim feminists advocate writing Islamic marriage contracts before marriage to ensure a woman's rights (in particular, specifying *mahr*, a monetary settlement to the woman enforceable in American courts) and urge mutual respect and flexibility within the family unit regarding work and domestic roles. They also counsel that divorce is acceptable in Islam. Divorce rates among Muslims in North America concern Muslim leaders, but careful studies of divorce, child custody, and inheritance issues among North American Muslims are lacking. In Islamic law, women (generally) inherit half the property inherited by men, but Muslim inheritance patterns in the United States apparently differ (Haddad and Lummis 1987, 110–12). Marriage practices in North America sometimes include teenage marriages for girls, probably for fear of daughters marrying outside the community, and parental constraints with respect to dating and marriage are stronger on daughters than on sons.

Creative and oppositional forms of acculturation are occurring among privileged Arab and South Asian Muslim youth, those who seem most adapted or assimilated, and not just among African American Muslim youth in the inner city where popular music like "Muslim rap" and hip hop flourish. A popular T-shirt sold at the 1999 ISNA conference featured the head of a young woman wearing a headscarf (*ḥijāb*) with the slogan, "It's good in the hood," an unmistakable link with urban youth culture. An "Islamic roots" or "Islam first" identity assertion can lead young women to put on the *ḥijāb*, that powerful marker of identity for Muslim women in America's public spaces, even though their mothers and grandmothers did not wear it. Other young women view the *ḥijāb* as a cultural rather than religious marker and reject it emphatically. Women's voices seem louder than young men's when it comes to subversive reinter-

pretations of their Muslim heritage (at least, more such writings have been published by young South Asian and Arab American Muslim women).

Systematic research on generational differences on gender issues among immigrant Muslims has been rare. Abdo Elkholy, comparing early twentieth-century Arab immigrants in Detroit, Michigan, and Toledo, Ohio, found that the more liberal Toledo Muslims gave leadership to the second generation more easily and mainly to young women, keeping the generations closer as both moved toward assimilation. Although Elkholy called Islam a male religion, the women in Toledo played such major roles that he attributed the establishment of a mosque to them (1966, 93, 102). Women had a significant role in mosque establishment in Detroit in the same period (Abraham 2000). "American" or "Christian" influences on mosques saw them adding social, educational, and political functions to spiritual ones.

The many Muslim immigrants arriving post-1965 seem to be embarking on this process of adaptation again. Congregational prayers at many mosques are better attended on Sundays than on the traditional Fridays, particularly by women and children, and imams spend time counseling married couples and taking on other aspects of a pastoral role. Imams newly-arrived from abroad find themselves, depending on location and congregation, expected to work with women on boards or in Islamic school positions and allow men and women to sit without a curtain separating them in the prayer room. However, women's participation in mosques has been cut back in some instances as new immigrant groups or new imams have reintroduced orthodox religious or cultural practices that constrain women again.

A survey of United States mosque representatives by Bagby, Perl, and Froehle in 2000 measured women's participation. For the Friday prayer, 78 percent of participants were men, 15 percent were women, and 7 percent were children (significantly, the survey did not ask about Sunday, the day researchers have reported women's highest attendance). In 67 percent of the mosques, women prayed behind a curtain or partition or in another room. In a similar 1994 survey, only 52 percent of the mosques reported this, so the 2000 study concluded that gender segregation was growing. In 2000, 69 percent of the mosques with a governing board allowed women to serve on the board, but women served during the five years prior to the survey on boards in only 72 percent of those mosques. In immigrant mosques, 13 percent of the Friday prayer attendees were women, while in African American mosques, 21 percent were women. Women prayed behind a curtain or in another room in 81 percent of immigrant mosques but in only 30 percent of African American mosques, and women's rates of service on governing boards were higher for African American mosques (Bagby 2001/2, 207, 216–17). African American Muslims tend to criticize immigrant practices concerning women as cultural rather than religious.

Women's services on boards and as imams are contested issues. Women participate prominently in the governing institutions and activities of the diasporic or transnational Nizari Isma'ili and Ahmadiyya sectarian movements. Among the Ithna 'Ashari Shi'a, allegiance to religious and judicial authorities (*marji'*) in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon remains strong. When closed circuit television was introduced to allow women seated separately to watch a male religious speaker, opposition in some Shi'i centers in North America was overcome by the ruling of a *marji'*. A Shi'i seminary in Medina, New York, reportedly trains female students to become prayer leaders and preachers (Sachedina 1994, 11–12).

Women are assuming increasingly influential roles in North American Muslim communities (see Haddad, Smith, and Moore 2006). Women scholars are establishing themselves in the field of jurisprudence, their work ranging from attacks on the very foundations of Islamic marriage and family law to more limited attempts to reinterpret aspects of Islamic law. Amina Wadud, an African American Muslim professor of Islamic studies, published *Qur'an and Woman* in the 1990s in several countries and languages, evidencing the global reach of the United States-based "gender jihad." North American Muslim women from many national and sectarian backgrounds are writing and acting to increase women's roles in Islam, with an early twenty-first century focus on women-led mixed-gender congregational prayers.

1. There is signicant difference between Canadian and United States official census figures with regard to defining and collecting data on factors such as ethnicity and religion. Accordingly, the statistical percentages used here are approximate. For more detailed discussion of statistical sources, see Leonard 2003.

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Karen Isaksen Leonard

South America

Contemporary Muslim communities in South America have been primarily composed of early and mid-twentieth century immigrants and their descendants from Lebanon, Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Palestine. There are, of course, significant numbers of South Asian Muslims in the circum-Caribbean nations of South America, namely Suriname and Guyana, as well as recent converts to Islam throughout the region, but these communities are not addressed in this entry (see Ahsani 1984, Bruijne 1979, Manuel 2000, Williams 1991). Rather than taking shape through their identification with a point of origin or source of authenticity in the Arab and Islamic worlds, the Muslim diaspora in South America has been produced out of the particular histories, everyday lives, and socio-cultural exchanges of Arab Muslims themselves, most visibly concentrated in Argentina and Brazil.

Arab Muslims comprised a small but significant percentage of the total number of early twentieth-century immigrant waves, estimated at between 10 and 15 percent of Middle Easterners in Argentina and Brazil. Carrying Ottoman Sultanate travel papers, Arab men and women were labeled as *turcos* and *turcas* (Turks) by South American masses and elites. By the late nineteenth century, limited numbers of mostly male immigrants attained a striking presence in peddling. Yet the *turca vendedora* (female Turk seller) was a particularly shocking sight for belle époque Argentines unaccustomed to working women, native or foreign (Bertoni 1994, 69). Like early twentieth-century pioneers, post-Second World War immigrants became store owners and small-scale industrialists. Women were crucial to such upward mobility, especially in the daily affairs of stores and households. Take, for example, a Sunni Muslim Lebanese woman who immigrated to help an older brother and his peddling coterie in Brazil in the mid-1940s (cited in Osman 1998, 51–68): "While the men would go . . . peddling," she recounts, "I would stay at home, washing, ironing, cooking, and going to the farmer's market." After marrying one of her brother's friends, she "got the taste for business" as a seamstress, making a dress for a friend who announced to other Brazilians that it was purchased *na Turca* (in the female Turk's [business]). The entrepreneur concluded: "it was like this that I got good clientele and a nickname." In the coming years, the family business expanded, and she continued to work in the clothing store, raise children, and take care of household chores. Women thus exercised central roles in family accumulation strategies, but they have been almost ignored by masculinized (and stereotypical) representations of the "Arab peddler" in South American plays, novels, and films (see Bestene 1994, Civantos 2001, Karam 2004).

In the upwardly mobile immigrant generation, women were limited to store spaces and/or home environs. Carrying out research among Alawi Syrian immigrants in the Tucumán province of Argentina, Assali found that men gained literacy in the Spanish language due to the public nature of business while women learned only how to speak, but not read or write (1989, 38–41). Yet this linguistic and spatial containment of women shifted in the second generation. In Assali's study, Argentine-born daughters and sons in immigrant families were each taught how to speak Arabic in family and religious circles – especially through reciting prayers and verses – but their mother tongue was Spanish, not Arabic. Though code-switching with Arabic continues in religious spaces, descendants have been overwhelmingly educated in public or private schools whose primary language of instruction is Spanish or Portuguese. Indicative of Christian-laden nativism in early twentieth-century South America, a Muslim female student was once deemed "heretical" by her instructors (Jozami 1996, 80–1). However, education has been used by women to practice medicine, law, and other professions in the second and third generations. Especially through educational and professional mobility, Muslim women have demonstrated an empowered but private awareness of their diasporic and religious origins.

In recreational and romantic affairs, however, women have been closely monitored. Immigrant parents granted considerable liberty to sons, but exerted far more control over daughters out of fear that they would marry outside the Muslim community. Based on a survey with 106 Middle Easterners in six provinces in Argentina, Adelouahed Akmir found that exogamy has been a privilege for "bachelors, almost never women" (1997, 90). Akmir reflected that "some Muslim women of this [second] generation" did not consider religion an obstacle in marriage, but "what truly impeded the matrimony with Christians was the wrong concept that the community formed around them (women [*sic*]), since Islam prohibits the marriage of a Muslim woman with a person of another religion." He added that some asked their non-Muslim suitors to pretend to be Muslim while others accepted the religion of their husbands and "saw themselves obligated to diminish their contacts with the Muslim community or . . . definitively cut them" (Akmir 1997, 94). Women, and not men, were thus forced to marry within the Muslim diaspora, and if doing otherwise, could risk being marginalized by patriarchal standards.

Such patriarchy has been upheld by the Brazilian state as well (see Karam 2004a, 193–5). A federal immigration official, for instance, explained that most Muslim Lebanese men are granted residency, and later citizenship, through their marriage to Brazilian-born Muslim Lebanese women. But the state official qualified that he has never personally spoken with any of these women, rather, their fathers or brothers have customarily come to speak with him about the details of a given visa application. When not obligated to wed South American-born Muslim men, women have been married to co-religionist migrants with the implicit support of Brazilian state powers (2004, 193–5).

Today, this gender hierarchy has shifted to a limited degree. Among the majority of third-generation Argentine Arabs who have wed non-Arabs, Akmir notes that there are "cases of Muslim women married, by way of civil ceremony, with members of other religions" (1997, 97). It is, however, doubtful whether exogamous Muslim women take up positions within community institutions, such as mosques, clubs, charity leagues, or schools. In Brazil, Muslim men who marry non-Muslims are welcomed and sometimes desire to participate in such entities. In addition, non-Muslim wives of Muslim men who convert to Islam are welcomed by male leaders (Karam 2004, 202–4). But this inclusion has not been afforded to Muslim women who marry non-Muslims or who reject male standards of Muslimness, such as wearing the headscarf in certain circumstances. This double standard seems unlikely to change, especially given its long history. Since the majority of Muslim immigrants since the late nineteenth century have been men, male exogamy has been endemic to South American Muslim communities, a tendency acknowledged by Muslim and non-Muslim scholars alike.

This politics of gender is evident in Muslim charity institutions founded in the first half of the twentieth century. In Brazil, the Muslim Beneficent Society was established in 1924, and began constructing South America's first mosque in 1929 (Hajjar 1985, 81–2). Only men, however, have been recognized as founding the mosque (Duoun 1944, 221–2, Delval 1992, 217–18). In Argentina, the Pan Islamic Association was founded in 1923, the Druze Society of Beneficence in 1927, and the Pan Allawite Islamic Association of Beneficence in 1929 (Bestene 1992, 119). According to an Arab-run Argentine newspaper in 1932, such entities aimed to strengthen the "union and friendship of resident Muslims in Argentina, to present a defensive front against propaganda averse to their beliefs and [to promote] the protection and assistance of

orphans, widows and all needy in their community" (Bestene 1992, 119). Such self-help organizations were useful both to new arrivals and to the upwardly mobile strategies of more established individuals in these communities.

Especially since the 1970s, numerous mosques, clubs, and centers have been established by Sunni and Shi'i Muslims in Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, often with aid from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states (Ahsani 1984, Islamic Studies Center 1992, Delval 1992, 218–32, 251–69). In these institutions, men have regularly controlled public and material affairs while women have been relegated to female departments or committees. This containment of women is evident in day-to-day affairs as well. In a country club founded by Sunni Muslim Lebanese immigrants in São Paulo, second- and third-generation women have criticized the invidious comparisons made by club members, and more specifically, the liberty given to male youth in clothing and sports while they themselves have been expected to dress and act in "modest ways" (Osman 1998, 149, 175–6, 195–6). This club, Sunni Muslim owned and operated, thus serves as a space for second- and third-generation young men to negotiate their autonomy as well as for second- and third-generation young women to be monitored and encouraged to marry within the community.

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John Tofik Karam

Sub-Saharan Africa

From "the African diaspora" to "African diasporas"

The term diaspora comes from the Greek word meaning "dispersal" and has mainly been used to indicate the settling of Jews around the world. Only in the 1950s and 1960s did the phrase "African diaspora" start to appear in scholarly and political debates, particularly in the United States, to refer to the dispersal of Africans across the world through the slave trade. The African diaspora is seen as one single diaspora and the experiences of the descendants of slavery have been interpreted mainly in terms of race. Attention may be paid to the specific experiences of enslaved women, thus linking gender and race hierarchies, but always within this overall unifying perspective. In general, Islam is not

an issue because most of the African communities affected by the slave trade had not yet been Islamized and Islam was consequently not considered as part of the authentic African cultural heritage, although this understanding has been challenged by recent scholarship (Diouf 1998, Austin 1997) as well as by historians of Islam among African Americans (Curtis 2002, Dannin 2002). In addition, for many African Americans, the concept of diaspora and its particular meaning in New World Black cultures has clear Biblical roots (Patterson and Kelley 2000).

This unifying racial perspective of the African diaspora is still strong, especially in African-American studies. It is a worthwhile perspective in the sense that it focuses on Black people's issues in the Atlantic context while stressing questions of identity and belonging. Constituent elements of a diaspora include: dispersal from a homeland; the making of a vision and a memory of that homeland; a commitment to the homeland; a desire for return; and a continuing relationship and identity with the homeland that shapes the consciousness and solidarity of the group (Safran 1991). What is problematic is that there is little attention to diversity and to new patterns and processes associated with recent migration (Koser 2003). More recently, scholars have therefore started to think about the African diaspora in the plural. This makes it possible to gain a view of the national contexts of both the host and the mother country, of issues of religion, gender, and ethnicity, and of the interplay between all these factors in molding people's diasporic identities and livelihoods.

Used this way, the diaspora perspective may enhance more current migration studies, as it stresses questions of identity and belonging, while migration studies are often very much socioeconomically oriented. In addition, migration studies tend to see the sending and the receiving context as divided entities. The term diaspora, by contrast, focuses on the link between these contexts, how people perceive this and how it influences their identity. In this way, the term "diaspora" may help to better understand people's transnationality (Mazzucato et al. 2004).

A diversity of experiences

The question as to the role and position of women in African Muslim diasporas cannot be answered in a general sense, as much depends on the form a diaspora takes. The Senegalese diaspora, for instance, is primarily a male trade and labor diaspora (cf. Cohen 1997). Senegalese started to emigrate from the 1970s onwards, first mainly to France and to a lesser extent to Germany, but in the last two decades also increasingly to Italy and Spain (Robin 1996). Migrants' attachment to their homeland is generally very strong, expressed in regular money sending and the dream of returning home after having succeeded abroad. Most migrants are from the Senegalese Mourid Sufi order and Islam is important in how migration is conceived. Mourids often portray migration as a journey to acquire knowledge and to follow in the footsteps of the order's founder Cheikh Ahmadou Bamba, who was exiled by the colonial powers. After return, building a house in Touba, the capital of Mouridism, is one of the ideals. The men often leave as unmarried youngsters but during migration marry a woman or women from home. In fact, most families want their daughters to marry an emigrant, as these men are considered to be rich and able to send money home to their own and their wife's family. The wives and children normally remain in Senegal. There is little family reunification because it is felt that before inviting his wife to join him, a man should live in decent circumstances. This is difficult as many migrants live in crowded communal houses. In addition it is feared that by letting a wife come to Europe, she will become too influenced by Western society, which is considered morally lax. Amongst Senegalese in the diaspora, images of women in Senegal are double-sided. On the one hand, there is the image of the hard-working wife who cares for her home and family, and obeys her husband even when he is far away. In Mouridism, the mother of the founder of the brotherhood, Mame Diarra Bousso, serves as an important role model. To illustrate her virtues, it is told that once she stayed up all night holding a fence because her husband had told her to hold it while he said his prayers, but forgetting her afterwards. One can easily translate this story in terms of migration: when the husband is away, the wife should still be there caring for the house and doing her tasks as she was told, even though circumstances are hard. On the other hand, there is also the image that nowadays women in Senegal, particularly in Dakar and the surrounding urban areas, are spoilt by Western influences, for example by French and Brazilian television series. Men complain that they are too demanding and that their expectations of what their husbands, sons, and brothers abroad can provide them with are too high.

Over the last five years, unmarried Senegalese girls are progressively moving independently to Europe to earn money, just like their male compatriots. The position of these women is often difficult as they not only suffer from racism and other

discrimination but are also viewed negatively by their male co-Senegalese who see them as having loose morals. They have difficulties in finding a husband and starting a family, and frequently find themselves trapped in short-term relationships without any stability, just to survive.

However, it is not unusual for Senegalese women who come to Europe, just like men, to experience a revival in their religiosity. While they took their religion and religious practices for granted in Senegal, in the diaspora they become more conscious of their religious identity and seek ways to intensify it as it also helps them to psychologically and morally face the difficulties they encounter.

The experiences of Somali women are different in many respects as they often migrate in a family setting. The Somali diaspora is an example of a refugee diaspora (Pérouse de Montclos 2003), that is, one where both economic and political reasons influenced decisions to leave (Kusow 1998). Somalis fled their country as a result of the civil war and especially after the overthrow of the dictator Barre in 1991. They mainly went to Britain and to Italy (former colonial powers), to the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, but also to the Gulf states, Asia, and Australia. They retain strong links with their homeland, both politically and economically. In their host countries, they tend to settle in urban areas with settlement patterns based on family or clan, although recently there has been a tendency toward living with the nuclear family (Pérouse de Montclos 2003). Somalis most often belong to the Qādiriyya, Aḥmadiyya, or Ṣāliḥiyya brotherhoods (Kusow 1998) but there has been a growing influence of more fundamentalist currents in Somalia over the last few years (UNIFEM 1998).

In the host countries, economic and social integration is difficult for Somali refugees because of the illegality or the precariousness of their status (they often have only a temporary status), racism, and prejudices concerning Islam. For women, however, finding work tends to be easier than for men and they also benefit more from educational opportunities. This may lead to tensions within families (Farah 2000) and eventually to divorce.

Many Somali women become more self-consciously Muslim in the West, but there is also a strong social pressure to dress and act as a "proper" Muslim. Women's veiling thus tends to become heavier than was traditional in Somalia. Properly educating one's children is perceived as a problem in a non-Islamic setting and there is a certain reluctance to send children to a Christian or secular school (Berns McGown 1999).

Processes and patterns

Experiences of African Muslim women in the diaspora are diverse, as much depends on differing factors, such as the type of diaspora, women's social and economic status, their individual characteristics, and the national context of both home and host countries. In this respect it should be stressed that African diasporas are not only to be found in the West but increasingly also in Arab and Asian countries. Some processes and patterns can, however, be distinguished, such as the fact that Muslim women in the diaspora may become more conscious of their religious identity and seek ways of enforcing this. A renewed interest in Islam may or may not coincide with more fundamentalist currents at home. Other important themes in this respect are the role of the diasporic community in controlling and molding religious behavior, and the influence of religiously and culturally informed ideal types on opportunities and possibilities for women in the diaspora. Further research is needed to answer how women make use of material, social, and cultural resources from the mother and the host countries, and how this influences their identity as well as how gender and family relations are changed by diasporic activities. Recently, the term diaspora has become fashionable among policymakers and in African government circles, eager as they are to tap the economic and political resources diasporic communities represent. It will also be important to investigate how women are perceived in these discourses and whether these enhance or restrain their opportunities.

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Mayke Kaag

Sub-Saharan Africa: The Lebanese in Sierra Leone

Lebanese merchants have settled in West Africa since the late nineteenth century, finding economic success as transient merchants throughout the region and attracted to coastal cities with developing colonial centers, railroad-driven commerce, and new opportunities for trade. Freetown, the port capital of Sierra Leone, was an early and important destination for Lebanese merchants and their families, who prospered in the colony and then in the new nation and who presently represent a small but visible community of approximately 5,000 (2002 estimate from the president of the Lebanese community). Since their first immigration, the number of Lebanese in Sierra Leone has not exceeded 30,000 and has fluctuated over time depending on periods of stability and disruption.

This entry focuses on the role of gender in the Lebanese diaspora in Sierra Leone. Lebanese comprise the largest non-African immigrant minority in the country (Leighton 1979). Early migration (ca. 1894–1910) was predominantly male and because of the lack of Lebanese women, intermarriage with Temne and Mende women was very common, resulting in a substantial number of Afro-Lebanese. Lebanese men worked in Freetown as peddlers selling corals and other small items, then progressed to street hawking, petty trade, store ownership, and retail, and rapidly established themselves as a privileged middle class.

Macmillan notes that in the 1920s, women from Lebanon accompanied their husbands to Sierra Leone, "standing the climate as well, working as hard, and trading as keenly as the men" (Macmillan 1968, 237). Archival documents of the British Colonial Office provide insight into the role of Lebanese women in Sierra Leone in the 1920s. While many were homemakers or looked after their husbands' stores, there were a few prominent businesswomen. Madam Sassen, for instance, was a very wealthy trader in cola-nuts, rice, and other foodstuffs, clothing and cotton goods, and luxury goods. Her business was a branch of a big firm, Rizk Frères, with offices in Guinea and in Europe. Sassen had wide business networks and shipped goods regionally to Freetown, Conakry, Guinea and Dakar, Senegal. She had sharp business skills that impressed British officers, and her extensive commercial experiences enabled her to make direct contacts with local chiefs and farmers.

Early migration was predominantly Christian Maronite, with family migration originating largely from the northern Lebanese town of Akkar. Many had escaped taxes and levies imposed by the declining Ottoman Empire. By the 1920s, there were a large number of Muslim Shiʿi immigrants from southern villages and towns such as ʿAin Nibl, Harees, Bint Jbeil, and Jwayyah. Later in the twentieth century, there was a smaller migration of Druze and Sunni Muslims. By the 1960s, however, it was apparent that the Shiʿi Lebanese in Sierra Leone represented the largest number of all immigrants from Lebanon. This was visible in the larger number of family stores owned by Shiʿis in Freetown's vibrant business district and in the Lebanese Embassy registry of families, although there is no official count by religion. Furthermore, there was a tendency to stress university education among Christian Lebanese families, which led to younger Lebanese Christians leaving Sierra Leone permanently to seek better prospects elsewhere, while younger Lebanese Muslims stayed on after school completion. After Sierra Leone's ten-year civil war began in 1991, many Lebanese Muslims also left Sierra Leone; many relocated to the United States where women have attained better opportunities in higher education and work than was possible in Sierra Leone.

In terms of the importance of religion within the community, Lebanese Sierra Leoneans are generally moderate and tolerant of other faith traditions, practicing their faiths in private rather than attending churches or mosques. At the Lebanese International School, Muslim children often took one religious class a week from which Christian Lebanese children were exempt. Overall, there is more solidarity among Christian and Muslim immigrants in Sierra Leone than there would be in Lebanon. They go to the same school, shops, sports club, beaches, and pools. There is no residential segregation by religion, only by wealth, in which both Christians and Muslims have equally succeeded or failed. Lebanese Christians and Muslims sustain their privileged economic status by supporting each other through cash loans, essentially using each other as banks, avoiding interest charges and slow bank transactions. Lebanese also followed

the ideological and political trends of their home: Lebanese villages, towns, politicians, and organizations heavily depend on the support of Lebanese immigrants in Sierra Leone as well as other West African countries such as Côte D'Ivoire, Nigeria, and Senegal.

After the 1920s, travel conditions improved, becoming faster with the steamship, and more affordable. At the same time, Lebanese men had accumulated sufficient wealth to travel home or send for a bride from their village or town. Marriages among Lebanese became more endogamous, which eventually led to a higher concentration of wealth among families. In contrast to major economic gains among immigrant women in industrialized nations, the migration of Lebanese entrepreneurs to Sierra Leone reproduces a patriarchal system in which women have few opportunities for economic mobility. Lebanese women have not migrated to Sierra Leone to seek work because there is little demand for outside laborers. They are not part of the decision-making process of migration, but are nonetheless powerful forces in maintaining transnational ties as well as replicating aspects of the culture of their homeland. In addition, many have made advances in the realm of small business ownership.

An abundance of local domestic workers and drivers who work for exceedingly low salaries cuts the time needed for household maintenance and child-rearing. This frees some Lebanese women to pursue entrepreneurial niches. They operate their businesses from their homes, for example hairdressing salons with regular clientele. Others are small store owners who sell items of interest to women and children, such as clothes. Some sell upholstery, curtains and fabrics. Amal, a first-generation immigrant, who got married in Lebanon and came to Sierra Leone with her husband at the age of 16, utilized her talent for design and crafts and became a freelance interior designer earning a high income. Mary, a fourth-generation Lebanese, owns a shop in Sawpit, one of the busiest commercial streets in Freetown. She used to help her husband manage the store, selling fishing items, but after he died she began to run it herself. Mary is very cordial toward her many customers, and speaks the native languages of Krio and Mende.

Rana, a second-generation small boutique owner in Sierra Leone, feels that having her own business makes life more meaningful. But she also notes "only Lebanese men sit behind desks because they know how to deal with other businessmen." Thus, when Rana opened her boutique in 2001, her husband registered the boutique and she managed the shop. If she has orders coming by ship, she knows a customs officer who brings them from the port to her shop for a charge. Likewise, if she has orders coming by plane, she asks a local airline company to deliver them to her shop for a fee. She believes that if a Lebanese businesswoman went to get her goods, the Lebanese community would disapprove.

There are also some limited possibilities for salaried work. One notable example of a woman with a salary is Najat Suleiman, who was principal of the Lebanese International School for over 30 years before her retirement to Lebanon in 1997. She made decisions at meetings with the school board, which was always comprised of Lebanese men. The Lebanese International School is a private school established in the late 1960s by members of the Lebanese immigrant community. Its initial purpose was to provide Lebanese immigrant children with a Lebanese-style curriculum taught in Arabic and English at the primary and intermediate levels. In the 1970s, the board added the term "International" to the school name to attract a broader student body and made Arabic instruction both optional and limited. Approximately 80 percent of its students are Lebanese; 16 percent are African, and the rest are children of diplomats and the staff of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Other opportunities for salaried work outside the home or family business are at foreign organizations, including the United Nations and NGOs. Such jobs have the rare distinction of being acceptable within the Lebanese community in Sierra Leone; this is because they signify status and offer much higher wages, in dollars, than other national organizations. Mariam, for instance, works for the United Nations Relief Organization as a ground hostess arranging shuttle services back and forth to the airport.

Lebanese women are not entirely powerless within the structural restraints of this gendered migration. Without them, the strength and durability of ties between home and host country would not have lasted. During the earlier migration, it seemed that Lebanese men were assimilating into African Sierra Leonean culture through intermarriages and alliances with local chiefs, and the emerging group of Afro-Lebanese. Through wealth and the ease of travel, they were able to connect with Lebanese women from their homeland and continue, over generations and, with the constant influx of first-generation immigrants, to establish Lebanese families abroad and maintain key aspects of the homeland culture. Women provided stability and security to Lebanese families in a place that remained strange to them.

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Rana, a 35-year-old second-generation small boutique owner. She is Muslim and is married with three children. Her parents originally came from ʿAin Nibl in the south of Lebanon, 27 February 2002.

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Lina Beydoun

Migration: Policies and Laws

Central Asia

The collapse of the Soviet Union brought freedom and independence to the former Soviet republics, including the Central Asian states. Among the changes that occurred as a result of this independence were population changes in each of the republics. This was due to mass migrations within and between the states. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the types of migration that were taking place in the region included "labor migration, repatriation, refugee flows, flows of internally displaced persons, return of persons belonging to formerly deported peoples, and ecological migration" (2001/2, 16). To this list we can also add family reunification, emigration for permanent residence linked with marriage, forced migration, and shuttle-trading. These types of migration can be classified as internal, external, and transit, as well as temporary and permanent migration (Sulaimanova 2004, 378).

As a result of its geographic location, being at the heart of the Silk Road, the Central Asian region witnessed many waves of migration from ancient times. However, some of the analyses of documents relevant to early migration within the Central Asian territory focus mainly on ethnic and linguistic backgrounds of migrants and omit gender (Rtveladze 2000, Hisao 2000, Beisembiev 2000). Until recently, migration research has been gender insensitive, even though women have always been a part of the migration movement. The assumption was that women were migrating only as "family followers" (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1998, 202). It was only in the 1980s that women migrants began to receive some attention from scholars in the field. Lauren Engle asserts that although "migration has been part of human experience since the beginning of recorded history," women, for the most part, have been absent from this recorded history (2004, 7). This is true for both Central Asia and the rest of the world.

Even though most of the Central Asian states have passed various types of laws and presidential decrees in regard to migration, women still do not receive special coverage in these laws. And this is the case in spite of the fact that women are becoming independent migrants and moving in their own right. The exception to this is that the governments of Central Asia are now starting to pay more attention to the issue of trafficking of women. According to the World Migration Report, trafficking is "a set of practices that go beyond the facilitation of unauthorized border crossings, where legal means may in fact be used to bring migrants into a country in order to exploit their labor" (IOM 2000, 181). The literature on trafficking indicates that this type of migration mostly occurs for purposes of sexual or labor exploitation. Trafficking of women is categorized as illegal migration. The victims are pushed into it because of the lack of job opportunities in their home country or region, poverty, and uncertainty about their future and the future of their families. They are lured through recruitment agencies that promise to find employment or permanent residence abroad. Most of the Central Asian states (information on Turkmenistan is not available) amended their criminal codes by prosecuting and penalizing trafficking crimes, and making efforts to eliminate trafficking (<http://www.state.gov/g/tip/ris/tiprpt/2004/33192.htm>). Some of the Central Asian governments are also becoming involved with the proper collection of statistics on migration where the gender of a migrant is recorded together with other information such as age, nationality, education, occupation, and marital status. This will improve the analysis of the structure of migration flows in the region. For instance, in Uzbekistan, the State Committee on Statistics and the Center for Economic Research are developing a special form which will record the sex and age of migrating people. "At present, migration registration takes into account only stocks of migration without dividing them into migration flows" (Makhmudova and Olimov 2005).

The migration trends in Central Asia can also be categorized as temporary or permanent migrations, which are both external and internal. Internal migration occurs as a result of rural–urban movements or movements from state to state. External migration is the result of the desire of migrants to move beyond the borders of their native country. This takes place for various purposes, such as family reunification, repatriation, emigration for permanent residence linked with marriage, and often with the goal of finding employment and better working conditions abroad (labor migration).

According to Zayonchkovskaya, labor migration "is the most dynamic and large-scale migration flow in the CIS" (2000, 352). IOM's "Facts and Figures" points out that there are three types of labor migration: long-term, itinerant or seasonal, and "shopping" or shuttle-trading migrants. Women make up the majority of the last category, as the great number of them travel to various countries to purchase items that will be resold in their home countries with the goal of generating a profit. Labor migration can also be categorized as legal or illegal migration. Legal labor migration is based on a set of bilateral agreements where both the receiving and sending countries follow the rules set by the national legislations. Migrants in this category are protected by laws of the countries where they work, as well as having the social and legal support of their home country. Illegal labor migration, on the other hand, does not provide these protections, as migrants do not have the necessary documents to obtain a proper registration in the country of their employment. Therefore, they are more vulnerable to exploitation by their employers.

Overall, women are overlooked in legislation on migration. Migration will continue to be an important part of the economies of the sending and receiving states. Central Asian governments will have to address in legislation the problems that migrants face and pay special attention to women as they are becoming a major group in this movement of people across borders.

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Dilchoda Berdieva

Egypt

This entry addresses Egyptian policies and laws governing migration, with brief reference to scholarship and organizations concerned with the impact of these migration policies and laws on women and gender relations. Scholarship on Egyptian migration affirms Shami's (1994, 9) point that state policies on migration have been essential elements to nation-building programs of the middle to later decades of the twentieth century. In his overview of Arab world migration, La Towsky (1984) distinguished four types that pertain to the Egyptian experience: rural–urban migration, Arab labor migration to other Arab countries, non-Arab migration to Arab states, and Arab migration to non-Arab countries. Regionally, Egypt has been a major exporter of labor to oil-producing Arab states, but this migration has been highly gendered in that migrant workers have been mainly male. The entry first discusses Egyptian emigration law, and then immigration, internal migration, and forced migration.

President Sadat's *infitāḥ* or "open door" policy first abolished exit visa requirements, facilitating the labor migration of Egyptians, professional workers as well as skilled and unskilled laborers, to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the Arab Gulf states (see Choucri 1977). Zohry (2005) and an Egyptian government sponsored study (Ministry of Manpower and Emigration Sector 2003) detailed the development of Egypt's main migration law. The 1971 Constitution Article 52 provided that "all Egyptians were granted the right to emigrate and to return home." Law no. 73, also of 1971, granted public sector and government employees the right to migrate and return to jobs within a specified amount of time. Presidential Decree 574 of 1981 established the Ministry of State of

Emigration Affairs and Egyptians Abroad in order to sponsor and manage Egyptian migrant labor, and to regulate the rights and responsibilities of Egyptian migrants. Law no. 111 of 1983 (Government of Egypt 1983) became Egypt's main migration law governing temporary and permanent emigration. In summary, its first chapter restates the right to emigrate in accordance with the constitution, and the right to retain Egyptian citizenship, and enumerates ways the state will sponsor and maintain ties with Egyptians abroad. The second and third chapters cover rules and procedures for temporary and permanent emigration. The fourth and fifth chapters cover regulations on the return of workers to public sector positions, on the tax exemption and capital investment status of migrants, and on the right of a male Egyptian migrant to confer citizenship to his minor children and sponsor citizenship applications for his foreign wife and major children.

Key scholarship on Egyptian temporary emigration by Choucri (1977), Sell (1988), Hadley (1977) and Ayubi (1983) discussed its implications for labor supply and demand, the national economy, regional politics, and the "brain drain" problem. Departing from this macro-level approach, Taylor (1984), Khafagy (1984), Brink (1991), and Singerman (1996) studied the impact of labor migration on women and gender, the household economy, and extended family relations. Tyree and Donato (1986) researched the high labor force participation rates of professional Egyptian women permanently emigrating to non-Arab states such as the United States, Australia, and Canada. Also, El-Solh (1994) studied Egyptian peasants resettled in Iraq, and viewed migrant women not just as non-working dependants but also as migrant workers in agricultural fields and produce markets.

With respect to general travel and immigration to Egypt, all foreign nationals except those from Malta and Arab countries must secure an entry visa, stamped in a passport valid for at least six months beyond the intended visit. Because of the predominance of the tourist industry in Egypt, many foreign nationals residing and working in Egypt may find it most feasible to extend their tourist visa repeatedly, for up to six months at a time, by demonstrating, as is normally required, that they have sufficient funds to support their stay and showing bank receipts to prove they have exchanged money. Otherwise, foreign nationals applying for a residency visa or work permit usually hire a facilitator or have their educational or work institution deal with the bureaucratic difficulties. The work permits granted by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration are usually valid for ten months, but then are easily renewed. As for other key policies and laws (discussed in Government of Egypt 2003), Egyptian labor regulations stipulate that foreign unskilled and semi-skilled workers must not exceed 10 percent of the total workforce, and foreign technical workers must not exceed 25 percent. The new labor law of 2003 established a comprehensive labor policy regulating Egyptian private and public employment, and the role of recruitment agencies managing labor migration in and out of Egypt.

In relation to female labor migration to Egypt, David McMurray (1999) discussed the phenomenal increase of female labor migrants from East European and Asian countries to Middle Eastern countries. Once an issue associated with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, or Lebanon, the socioeconomic implications of Asian maids have also become an issue for Cairo households. Moreover, East European, mostly Russian or Ukrainian, cabaret performers have edged Egyptian women out of the Cairo nightclub, Sinai hotel, and Nile cruise circuit. McMurray's study raised interesting implications for how these female migrants navigate Egyptian immigration law in securing residency or work permits.

Turning to internal migration and the rural migrant worker in particular, scholarship by Abu-Lughod (1964), Petersen (1971), Ibrahim (1975), and Toth (1994) have linked rural–urban migration to Egyptian development policy, assessing the feasibility of using urbanization to manage, for instance, demographic growth (rural versus urban birth rates), economic growth, and cultural change and development. Abu-Lughod (1961) reported on the impact of migration on Egyptian rural women, discussing their loss of community and freedom of movement when moving from the courtyard space of village and life among lineage kin to the isolation of apartment living and life among strangers as neighbors. Rural–urban migration aside, Zohry (2005, 20) mentioned two other internal displacements forced by Egyptian government policy: the permanent resettlement of about 120,000 Nubians following the construction of the Aswan High Dam and the mandatory evacuation of Port Said, Suez, and Ismailia as a result of Arab–Israeli wars.

As for forced migration to Egypt, a signatory of both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol for Refugees, Egypt has long allowed refugees to temporarily reside within its borders, in compliance with the international agreement not to "refoule,"

or forcibly return, refugees to their countries of origin. As stated in the Egyptian government sponsored study mentioned before, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a Refugee Unit to deal with asylum issues. The Egyptian government, however, delegates the responsibility of refugee status determination to the local office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which must process refugee claims and administer assistance to the most needy, as it has done in recent years for Sudanese asylum seekers and refugees from the Horn of Africa and West Africa. Refugees registered at the UNHCR are entitled to temporary residency and benefit from several UNHCR-sponsored humanitarian programs carried out by the local office of Caritas and other non-governmental or church-based refugee programs. The slow-moving asylum application process imposes a distressing burden on asylum-seeking women and their families who wait up to a year for their status determination interview appointment with the UNHCR and then another three to six months for the results. The Saint Bakhita Women Group Association (Catholic) and the Sudanese Refugee Mothers Union (Anglican) are just two refugee women's groups listed in Sherif and Lado's (1997) survey of organizations serving displaced Sudanese in Cairo.

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CARLA DAUGHTRY

Iran and Afghanistan

Iran's traditionally generous policies allowing for the integration of migrants into local communities earned it the reputation of being an exemplary and exceptional host. Apart from labor migration, predominantly following historical patterns of seasonal migration by young Afghan males, the bulk of immigration into Iran over the last few decades came in the form of successive waves of regional asylum seekers fleeing violence in their home countries. With one of the biggest refugee caseloads worldwide, estimated to have reached 4.5 million exiles in the 1990s, of whom over 2 million are of Afghan origin, the country's open door policies stood out in sharp contrast to the prevailing *non-entrée* international refugee regime. A closer look at Iran's policy record since 1979, however, reveals

a more nuanced picture with significant shifts in the treatment of asylum seekers over time and differential responses to inflows. The state's gradual development of a relatively sophisticated and centralized administrative structure centered around the Bureau of Alien and Foreign Immigrant Affairs (BAFIA). Its deliberate marginalization of the nongovernmental organization sector and restrictions on the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) seem to have shaped the orientation of its policies toward prevention of inflows and refugee control by the 1990s (El-Meehy 2004).

Although Iran is a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention, the absence of a national law on refugees left their rights and responsibilities vaguely defined, with assistance provided on an ad-hoc basis (UNHCR 1999, 139). In the 1980s, residency status for Afghans was conferred on demand, but their access to employment, education, and subsidies varied depending on their legal category of registration. Official status, however, became much more difficult to obtain or renew in the 1990s. Even for those with valid refugee cards, the shift in Iran's policies toward a more restrictive orientation entailed the withdrawal of subsidies on food and health care as well as denial of access to public schooling (World Food Programme 1998). The turn of the century marked BAFIA's standardization of temporary residence status for all refugees, the introduction of legal sanctions on Afghan-hiring employers as well as systematic efforts at relocating refugees to camps. Further, citing high unemployment, a new legislation known as Article 48 empowered the ministry of the interior to "expel all foreigners without work permits whose lives would not be threatened upon return to their country of origin" (USCR 2002, 2).

In Iran, as in much of the developing world, the lack of gender sensitive asylum procedures contributed to the challenges of protection for refugee women, while exposure to a different Islamic society and the state's gender blind migration policies carried serious implications for the Afghan family structure, gender ideology, and women's roles. As elaborated later, three sets of factors seem to have mediated the impact of displacement on women: their residency in camps or local communities, their legal status, and their ethnic background.

Economic as well as ideological dynamics in Iran led to fundamental shifts in the Afghan refugees' family structure. Nuclear family households were substituted for the traditional extended norm as a result of housing shortages and childbirth expenses, in addition to the difficulties of economic survival. Further, the country's "One Child is Good – Two is Enough" population control campaign encouraged Afghan women to practice birth control. In a departure from Afghan traditions linking women's social status to the number of children she bears, refugee women in Iran thus experienced an ideological shift toward the ideal of small healthy families as a Muslim responsibility (Hoodfar 2004, 153).

In the course of over two decades in diaspora, gender ideology among Afghan refugees underwent pronounced changes. Field research indicates that many prefer women to marry at an older age, when they are better prepared to deal with life's challenges, as well as be consulted in their choice of spouses (Hoodfar 2004, 154). Another significant change is in women's views on female education with the majority viewing it "as a step in becoming 'more Muslim' while freeing them from traditions that have deprived them of their Islamic rights and condemned them to follow the orders of men who claim such abeyance is in accordance with scripture and God's will" (Hoodfar 2004, 160). Indeed, Qurʾānic and literacy classes were popularly attended by females, particularly the ethnic Hazaras who, unlike the Pushtuns, did not consider enrollment in Iranian schools a threat to their cultural identity.

Lastly, the Afghan refugee community witnessed significant transformations in women's roles in the face of harsh economic conditions. Indeed, women refugees' informal cash earning activities came to constitute an important source of income, especially among city dwellers. This is the case as, unlike their male counterparts, female refugees could more easily bypass the authorities because their work typically took place in homes beyond the state's reach. While access to the labor market may not automatically translate into greater power for women within the family, it seems in this case to have afforded them greater decision-making powers over household finances (Hoodfar 2004, 162).

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ASYA EL-MEEHY

Southeast Asia

INTRODUCTION

Migration among peoples of Southeast Asia is not a recent phenomenon. Early history records a tremendous amount of trading activity in the region of the Malay Peninsula (what is now West Malaysia). The strategic position of the Peninsula in close proximity to China and India and flanked by waterways, the Straits of Malacca along its western coast, and the South China Sea along its eastern coast, led to the growth of a rich trading life and the birth of important ports. The free flow of trade brought with it a commingling of peoples from different regions, principally China and India, and also the peoples from the surrounding islands (what is now Indonesia).

Trading activity in the region appeared to have reached its zenith during the heydays of the Malacca Sultanate. The apex of the Malacca Sultanate has been recorded as a golden era in the history of the Malay archipelago. The Malacca court was known to welcome foreigners and to regard their presence with both tolerance and esteem. In particular, there did not appear to be any control over the influx of foreigners and their stay in the peninsula.

BRITISH COLONIZATION AND LABOR RECRUITMENT

Planned and systematic recruitment of foreign labor began in the 1890s, after Great Britain had successfully established its political power in the Malay Peninsula and the island of Singapore. The British colonial administration had to resort to the "importation" of foreign labor in order to speed up the economic development of the Malay States and ensure the profitability of British entrepreneurs and their investments. The Malay States were rich in natural resources but sorely lacking in the labor force with which to exploit their potential. The indigenous Malay population were involved in agriculture and fishing and did not appear to be much interested in selling their labor for wages. This was largely because the wages were too low. Therefore, there was an urgent need for a labor force able and willing to work at rates cheap enough that drove the British to embark upon a policy of actively encouraging alien immigration into Malaya (what is now West Malaysia) and Singapore (Parmer 1960, 16).

The British colonial administration employed two different methods of recruitment for the two major alien races brought in – the Indians and the Chinese. Indian laborers were recruited to work in the rubber plantations and were therefore largely unskilled. They came predominantly from South India and were brought in through a system of assisted recruitment or indenture, where they were bound by contracts to serve their employers for a fixed period. The laborer had to pay for his own passage and as this was an impossibility his passage was normally advanced and later deducted from his wages. The indentured laborer therefore began his working life under the shadow of debt and almost destitute (Saunders 1984, 174). Added to this injustice was the indignity of having to face criminal as well as civil liability for even the most trivial breaches of the contract of indenture.

Another feature of Indian indentured labor was its intended temporariness. Most of the immigrants had embarked on the journey to Malaya with the hope of making a fortune and subsequently returning home. As such, most immigrants came alone, leaving their families behind. The situation was made worse by the imbalanced sex ratio among the recruited Indian labor. The immigration pattern consisted predominantly of adult males, generally between the ages of 15 and 45. According to the census of 1891 there were 18 females per 1,000 Indian males (Saunders 1984, 163).

In contrast, the influx of Chinese laborers was mostly unassisted. Indentured or assisted emigration for Chinese laborers did not proceed on the same basis as for Indian laborers principally because the Chinese imperial government had always taken a tough stance toward the ill-treatment of its people. Emigrants embarking on their own initiative and expense could go when and where they chose, but those recruited to labor overseas and indebted for their passage had to enter into contracts in China that specified in detail such provisions as the place and length of employment; hours per day and days per year to be worked; and wages, food, lodging, and medical attendance to be provided. Indentured emigration was supervised by Chinese officials and emigration on any other terms was prohibited and punishable (Parmer 1960, 27). The Chinese imperial government therefore maintained a policy of looking after the welfare of its overseas labor.

Labor recruitment was not limited to the recruitment of Chinese and Indians. Large numbers of Javanese were brought in as coolies on government

schemes such as canal or road construction, and migration from Sumatra and other areas such as Minangkabau, Rawa, Mandailing, and Aceh was also high. The first generation clustered together in villages whose names identified them with their homeland – Kampung Jawa, Kampung Bugis, Kampung Kerinci (Andaya and Andaya 1982, 181). Although these early Javanese migrants were foreigners, the British colonial administrators tended to regard them as "Malays" due to basic similarity of appearance, the use of Malay as a common language, and the shared religion of Islam. These factors also ensured the easy absorption and assimilation of these migrants into Malay society.

Export oriented industrialization and labor migration

After independence in 1957 and particularly after 1969, Malaysia embarked upon a concerted, planned, and systematic program of economic development through import substitution industrialization and export oriented industrialization. With the opening of free trade zones to cater for increased foreign direct investment, particularly in labor intensive industries, there followed a process of rapid urbanization and rural–urban migration. This left a labor vacuum in the agricultural sector, particularly on large estates.

The success of the industrialization policy became a catalyst for the growth of other sectors, particularly construction. In the meantime, demand for domestic helpers increased. Local women who used to work as maids were attracted to the labor intensive electronic industries, which paid higher wages. At the same time, working in factories gave to these former housemaids a freedom they had never previously experienced, and this in itself became an attraction for young women to leave home for factory work. The labor vacuum in the plantation and construction sectors was filled mainly by the influx of Indonesian male workers, while the demand for domestic servants was met by Philippine and Indonesian female workers. Thus, as Malaysia and Singapore became relatively more economically advanced than their neighbors, they ended up as net labor importers while their neighbors, principally Indonesia, the Philippines, and to a certain extent Thailand, ended up being net labor exporters.

The recruitment of Indonesian labor into Malaysia is handled by recruiting agents or *tekong*s. The agents in Indonesia are responsible for providing the laborer with the requisite training and ensuring that all travel documents are prepared and in order. The agents in Malaysia shoulder the responsibility of placing the workers with their respective employers (Hadi 2000).

Entry into, and residence and employment in Malaysia are regulated by the Immigration Act 1959/63. A person who is not a citizen of Malaysia may not enter Malaysia unless he is in possession of a valid entry permit, and he may not commence employment without an employment pass issued by the controller of immigration. In an effort to combat illegal immigration and the work of syndicates responsible for the trafficking of illegal immigrants, section 55A of the Immigration Act makes it an offence for any person to be involved directly or indirectly, in conveying to Malaysia in or on any vehicle, vessel, or aircraft any person contrary to the Act. Section 55B makes it an offence to employ one or more persons who are not in possession of a valid pass.

Malaysia adopted an "open door" policy toward the flow of Indonesian labor in the 1980s, and this was in part responsible for the influx of illegal Indonesian immigrants into Malaysia. Abuses are rampant and they have a particularly devastating effect upon female workers. Many workers know nothing about their employers or their destinations upon arrival in Malaysia. Their fates therefore rest squarely with the *tekong* or agent who brought them in. Many women are not employed as housemaids but are sold into vice and made virtual prisoners by syndicates.

For those women who do become housemaids, another horror awaits them. Many have to suffer various forms of abuse and ill treatment at the hands of their employers. Non-governmental organizations in Malaysia, principally the Women's Aid Organization and Tenaganita, offer aid to abused maids by helping them to file police reports and institute criminal proceedings against their employers. The Women's Aid Organization operates a shelter for battered women and children, and has recorded some measure of success in getting the authorities to protect foreign maids who have been victims of inhuman treatment by their employers (*New Straits Times*, 8 August 1998, 15). Maid abuse cases mostly involve female Indonesian workers. There is less abuse of Filipino maids. One reason that may account for this is that the Philippine government has a clear policy of looking after the welfare of their overseas contract workers. Through the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration and legislative measures such as the

Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and the establishment of welfare and trust funds, the Philippines ensures that its migrant workers are not exploited and are able to earn a decent living. Philippines's overseas contract workers, 65 percent of whom are women, constitute a very important source of foreign exchange and have been hailed by Presidents Aquino and Ramos as "the country's new heroines" (Aguilar 2000). It has been acknowledged that without the remittances these workers send home, the government could not have managed its debt-service payments to financial landing agencies (Aguilar 2000). Their welfare and protection as overseas contract workers therefore has been accorded the due recognition and urgency it deserved.

While Malaysia has adopted an open policy toward migration, which has witnessed the influx of mostly unskilled workers in the "3-D" sectors (dangerous, dirty, and demeaning), Singapore foreign labor policy has been targeted toward the encouragement of skilled rather than unskilled workers (Hong and Gukun 1999). All foreign workers are required to take the Skill Evaluation Test, which is conducted in their home countries. Evaluation is made by a Singapore officer who travels to the particular country to conduct the test. In order to encourage employers to hire only skilled workers, employers pay a much lower levy for hiring skilled as opposed to unskilled workers. The Singapore government maintains firm control over foreign workers as its policy is linked to maintaining a high quality workforce in the country. It therefore does not encourage low skilled workers to stay on but keeps only those who are highly skilled or highly educated due to the intensely competitive economy and lack of land space.

Much of Malaysia's problem with undocumented, low skilled migrant workers and illegal labor-importing syndicates stems from the fact that, unlike Singapore, Malaysia does not have a comprehensive and systematic policy pertaining to foreign labor. Measures and policies appear to be made or announced by the government on an ad hoc basis (Kassim 1998). This is in turn compounded with less than satisfactory enforcement measures. There are initiatives to move away from being a net importer of low skilled migrant labor, to establishing a more highly skilled and highly educated workforce as Malaysia moves toward a knowledge-based economy. Migration patterns, including laws and policies, will change when both Malaysia and Singapore successfully shed their dependence on low-skilled migrant labor, and when current net labor exporters, Indonesia and the Philippines, successfully engineer their economy toward growth and the utilization of their own indigenous labor force.

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SHARIFAH SUHANAH SYED AHMAD

Western Europe

Contemporary migration to Western Europe and migrant-driven community building inside European cities has increasingly become feminized. Nevertheless, this development until now has not been adequately reflected either in national or in supranational migration policies and legal frameworks. Women from Muslim countries of origin have always been present in twentieth-century migrations toward Europe, mainly – as in the French, British, Dutch, and Spanish cases – reflecting colonial and postcolonial links and networks, but their presence has been silenced both in the host countries' policies on migration and in the emerging migrant communities themselves (Kofman et al. 2000). Post-Second World War migration to Western Europe has been dominated by labor replacement policy approaches, through which Fordist, industrial models of production have openly favored the supposedly temporary immigration of a low-skilled, young, male work force. In varying degrees, in countries such as France, Britain, Germany, the Benelux countries, and Switzerland, diverse combinations of postcolonial immigration and "guest worker" temporary migration schemes were applied until the economic crisis

of the early 1970s in order to ensure cheap labor supplies for domestic industries.

Nevertheless, this official invisibilization of migrant women represents a gendered bias. Well before family reunification programs were implemented in the 1970s, both single, independently migrating women and family members had started to settle down mainly in European cities and to enter the local labor markets above all through their service sectors. Since then, and rapidly increasing since the 1980s, migrant women have become key service providers in sectors such as domestic work, caring, nursing, and sex work. Apart from these economic activities directed toward the host society, migrant women have also developed decisive service provision tasks inside their communities, by actively engaging in so-called ethnic business, in educational, health, and religious activities, but increasingly also in associational and political participation (Vertovec and Peach 1997, Dietz and El-Shohoumi 2004).

This range of different activities, which have *de facto* been accomplished by migrant women throughout the last decades, and which have fostered and deepened a high degree of educational achievements and socioeconomic stratification among migrant women living in Europe, has been ignored by national and international migration policies. Western European migration regimes, which still oscillate between assimilationist and multiculturalist normative models, reflect two different kinds of bias, which in their combination affect migrant women. In all cases, a general, male-dominated gender bias coincides with the national legacy and tradition of dealing with diversity.

Thus, in the prototypical case of French republican assimilationism, the coincidence of privileging male industrial labor, on the one hand, and of negating any public presence and recognition of ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender-based diversity, on the other, results in a double invisibilization of migrant women. Their economic activities in the non-industrial sectors are neglected by reducing them to family reunification migrants and to housewife roles, while at the same time their migrant community development interests are limited by the official public-private divide to the family and kin realm of daily life in the migrant suburbs. This double discrimination is perceived particularly by second-generation Algerian and Moroccan women who have tried to internalize the assimilationist strategy of succeeding throughout the French public educational system and integrating into the formal service sector labor market, but who then encounter the prevailing and persistent discrimination by the host society (Freedman 2003). An overlapping and mutual reinforcing of racist, nationalist, and sexist attitudes to above all Muslim women – or women perceived as Muslim by the host society – thus often ends up limiting professional and social mobility (AlSayyad and Castells 2002). Reacting to this external discrimination, which openly contradicts the official promise of assimilation and ethnocultural neutrality, it is often upwardly oriented second- and third-generation women who rediscover and/or reinvent first national (Algerian or Moroccan), then ethnic (Arab or Tamazigh), and finally religious traits as sources of newly defined identities vis-à-vis the French nation-state and its majority society (Klein-Hessling, Nökel, and Werner 1999).

Paradoxically, similar trends are also perceivable in the opposite case, the nowadays openly multiculturalist approach promoted in the United Kingdom. Again, migrant women are perceived rather late by Fordist, male-dominated migration policies. In contrast to France, however, local community development by postcolonial first-generation migrants has been encouraged and frequently recognized. Early race relations legislation, later broadened as ethnic community participation, has opened public spaces for migrant associations, ethnic councils, and charities. Although the resulting community network is still dominated by first-generation male ethnic politicians, migrant women have successfully appropriated spaces and niches of economic and professional activities, first directed toward community services – health, education, religious instruction, and the like – but later expanding toward the local host society (Vertovec and Peach 1997, Blaschke 2004). A much richer associational life and higher professional opportunities in the United Kingdom, however, have not coincided with an overall decrease in discriminatory attitudes toward migrants and particularly migrant women. British multiculturalism has recognized diversity, but has often not empowered minority women to self-define the sources and kinds of diversity they identify with. Since the first phase of postcolonial race relations and throughout its later diversification of the race dichotomy in ethno-national terms, until its latest inclusion of religious identifications, external racialization and ethnification have persistently shaped and limited the migrant women's own identities (Nielsen 1999). The case of British multiculturalism illustrates that the empowerment of – often essentialized – migrant communities does not automatically empower migrant women. Individual and generational hybridity, which has openly emerged since the

1990s between the assimilationist pressure from society and the multiculturalist communal "identity proposals," challenges both ethnocultural and gender-based stereotypes (Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner 1999).

Until recently, in Britain as well as in France, the postcolonial nature of immigration has restricted the excluding impact of two key factors that limit migrant women's integration and/or participation in other Western European countries. But since the 1980s, citizenship and access to political rights, on the one hand, and access to the host society's national language on the other, have become major issues. In countries such as Germany and Switzerland, migration policy has been based on the so-called guest worker status, which for decades has maintained the fiction of provisional, temporary residence and of expected return. Accordingly, specific integration measures directed at guest worker families have been weak, often developed inside the industrial job environment and implemented by male dominated trade unions. In the first generation, even language courses have been limited to teaching at the predominantly male workplace. Consequently, while their husbands gained some access to the host language through their working environment and their children learned the national language at school – often complementarily invited to attend after-school mother tongue or language of origin classes in order to maintain the second generation's return options – migrant women did not gain systematic access to the host majority language (Klein-Hessling, Nökel and Werner 1999, Blaschke 2004).

Furthermore, the nationalization and naturalization laws prevailing in countries with guest worker policies have until very recently still been based not on the classical French territorial *ius solis* (access to citizenship through birth or long-term residence on French territory), but on ethnically defined *ius sanguis* (access to citizenship through descent from ethnic German couples or through in-marriage). These two factors, access to citizenship and to the host language, have been the most important obstacles that persistently deter migrants in general, but migrant women in particular (Cornelius et al. 2004). In these countries, temporary, gradual, and highly conditional rights of residence and of social and political participation have always been linked to industrial labor provided by male heads of family; independently migrating women as well as women immigrating through family reunification policies have fewer opportunities of having access to stable residence status or even to citizenship, and divorce from a guest worker resident could imply forced return.

In the 1980s, and particularly in the 1990s, the process of European Union (EU) harmonization of migration policies and legal frameworks – the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 – started to dilute some differences among nation-states in relation to border control and access to citizenship (Van Krieken 2001, Cornelius et al. 2004). Other divergences, above all in immigrant integration policies implemented by multiculturalist or assimilationist regimes, persist. Nevertheless, in all EU countries postcolonial and guest worker immigration have been officially restricted or even legally abolished. As a direct consequence, migratory flows toward Europe – which are paradoxically ever more sought for by local host economies in a context of increasing demand for cheap labor and aging host societies – have not been prevented by the emerging "Fortress Europe," but have been redirected in two ways.

On the one hand, in traditional northern European immigration countries, immigrants are forced to enter the country as asylum seekers (Jensen 2003). Asylum thus becomes a major issue in EU migration policies and in public opinion; xenophobia and racism are now directed against a supposed flood of false asylum seekers, not any longer only from postcolonial or guest worker countries of origin. Again, women are particularly discriminated against, as international, European, and national asylum legislation hardly recognizes gender-based forms of persecution. Claims based on forced marriages, female genital mutilation, and other forms of discrimination against women are seldom recognized, because persecution is supposed to be politically motivated and to be exerted by a state actor, not by a patriarchal, discriminatory society. Only recently has the EU started to urge member states to interpret gender-based persecution as part of the Geneva Convention provision of persecution of a member of a "particular social group" (Freedman 2003, Jensen 2003). On the other hand, new immigration countries and former transit countries such as Spain and Italy are developing a migration regime in which an increasing number of so-called illegal, undocumented migrants, employed above all in these countries' traditionally important informal economic sectors, are periodically and provisionally legalized through "regularization campaigns." Similarly to the forced transformation of migrants into asylum seekers in the northern countries, in these southern European countries this scheme makes migrants' lives ever more precarious, unforeseeable, and exposed to both labor exploitation and discrimination by the host society. This again affects particularly migrant women, whose main economic activities – domestic

work, seasonal agricultural labor, seasonal jobs in the tourism and hospitality sector, and sex work – are often excluded from the official regularization campaigns (Dietz and El-Shohoumi 2005).

Consequently, since the 1990s, migrant women have been actively involved in *sans-papier* movements in countries such as France, Spain, and Italy, claiming their recognition as legal subjects and as new social actors, who are now establishing or deepening contacts with host society women's movements and organizations.

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Gunther Dietz

Migration: Refugee Camps

Eastern Europe

Refugees of ethnic cleansing and war

> If one looks back in history, just about when people would be able to forget the last feud, then it starts all over again. . . . I tell you simply: we just would like to survive. We don't want to perish in this senseless mess. We hope somehow to raise our children and to find jobs and a place somewhere in this world. . . . It is horrible to be a refugee and being torn out of one's own surroundings. Where are we going to find a place where they will take us in? A place that we can once again really feel and call home?! (Huseby-Darvas 1995, 1).

The destruction of the Second Yugoslavia led to the greatest refugee crises in Europe since the Second World War (Magas 1993, 336). Most refugees were Muslim and from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. They fled villages that were being "ethnically cleansed" and cities or "safe areas" that were under siege (Weine 1999, 46–7, 54). The majority of the refugees were women and children from rural areas. Beginning in 1992, camps for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were set up in nearby Croatia and in other countries that received large numbers of refugees including Germany and Turkey. In 1999, more than a million Kosovars were forced into refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania, and further away in Western European and overseas countries. Refugee camps gave women and their families a safe place away from military aggression, but presented many challenges and uncertainties.

In the camps for refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, many refugee women were without their husbands, fathers, sons, and brothers; either they had been killed, as in the families of 7,000 Bosnian men massacred in Srebrenica, or they were expected to fight in the Bosnian army (Rieff 2002, 7). Most of the Bosnians who went to refugee camps were eventually resettled in third countries, because as the fighting continued their homes were either destroyed or occupied. In the refugee camps for Kosovars, many women were with their entire families. After NATO forces quickly pushed the Serbian troops out of Kosovo, most of the Kosovars returned to their country within days or weeks (Weine 1999, 146).

The refugee camps were administered either by the host countries or by the UNHCR, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. What distinguished these camps from camps of the past was the large presence of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who provided aid and psychosocial services to the refugees, much of which was focused on women (Ogata 2005). One of the important areas of focus dealt with the trauma suffered by refugee women.

Rape and trauma

> After all these months, I cannot get rid of the feeling of carrying some kind of invisible stamp, of being dirty, physically dirty and guilty (Drakulic 1993, 255).

Rape was systematically used as a weapon of war against Muslim women and their communities by the Serbian nationalist forces. An estimated 100,000 women from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 45,000 from Kosovo were raped. Rape was a deliberate attempt to destroy individual women, to shame their families, and to shatter the process of reproduction of generations by making them deliver "Serbian" babies (Drakulic 1993, Vranic 1996, Lopes-Cardozo et al. 2000).

Women who survived rape faced the seemingly impossible. They needed the support of their families and communities, but fear or shame made them reluctant to share their stories, even with loved ones. Western mental health trauma experts brought psychotherapy and other psychosocial services that helped some, but many refused this treatment because it did not fit with their values or way of life. Since most refugees' lives were strongly rooted in family, any help they might receive individually would be perceived as inadequate. As one woman, who denied psychiatric care, said, "I refused the doctor's help because I cannot see how they could help me, I need the understanding of my relatives" (Drakulic 1993, 256).

Refugee women did not have to survive rape to bear the emotional scars of exposure to violence and forced migration. Many lost their homes, loved ones, and property, witnessed killings, starved, and feared for their lives. As a direct result of this exposure, many suffered emotionally, with evidence of mental health consequences such as post traumatic

stress disorder and depression (Gilliland et al. 1995, 5, Weine 1999, 77). Service providers were challenged to offer mental health services that meshed with their cultures and values, such as group, family, and community level approaches. As important as it was to address their suffering, it was just as important to understand and support their strengths.

Bringing back the routines of living

> I would do anything to make some money, have something to do and begin to live my life again (Gilliland et al. 1995, 3–4).

Women in refugee camps did their best to re-establish some sense of normalcy of family life even amidst camp conditions, often living in rundown army barracks. They made space for their family and made it feel like home with doilies and photos of family members or of houses now abandoned or destroyed and attractive cutouts from magazines taped to the walls of rooms. Some were hung just above the bunk beds or single cots, so that they were visible both when one stood in front of the bed and when an individual's head was on a pillow (Huseby-Darvas 1995, 4). Women cooked, cleaned, and looked after the children and the elderly. Drinking coffee with women friends was a necessary and pleasurable staple of their daily routine, providing mutual social support as well as a simple pleasure (Gilliland et al. 1995, 5). In general, Muslim women from rural backgrounds practiced religious customs more than those from urban areas, but in the camps, while some Muslims complained of discrimination, non-Muslims took every opportunity to emphasize their ethnicity in order to distinguish themselves from Muslims (Gilliland et al. 1995, 8). Due to such relations in the camps, it may be inferred that some Muslims may have prayed in secrecy.

Changes in women's roles

> Sometimes I just want to scream or throw something, but then I don't do it. My children look to me for assurance. I have to stay strong for them (Gilliland et al. 1995, 7).

The experience of being a refugee changed gender roles and relations for many refugee women who came from traditional patriarchal families. They had to adapt to new patterns of daily life and new relationships with family members and others in the camps. Women who lost or were separated from their husbands were forced to be single heads of households (Gilliland et al. 1995, 2, 5). They experienced a level of independence that was both unfamiliar and empowering. Even those whose husbands or other male kin were with them had to adjust to altered role expectations in a new context. For example, many refugee men had no work, or were in poor physical or emotional condition and they could not fulfill their traditional role as head of household. Some responded by becoming more overtly dependent and relinquishing authority to their wives. Others responded by became excessively authoritarian, and even abusive, which created difficult situations for refugee women and their children (Gilliland et al. 1995, 6). Many refugee women were also exposed to personnel from Western liberal NGOs who brought their own values and ideas regarding proper gender roles and relations (Ogata 2005, 130). Refugee women were introduced to new ideas and possibilities about empowerment in the context of families and communities. What refugee women found useful from their new experiences would be carried into their lives after the refugee camps, creating the potential for long-term changes in – but also tensions surrounding – the status of women.

Memories and the future

> I'm struggling to forget. And I'm struggling to tell the story – so others will know (Drakulic 1993, 4).

Refugee women from the Balkans were fortunate that they did not have to remain in camps indefinitely. However, being a refugee still changed their lives forever. Some returned to their countries and some went to make new lives in exile. Regardless of where they settled, they remained obligated to the memories of their refugee experience as well as to the degree that they should transmit them to future generations. Women face the dilemma of deciding what they want young people to know and remember and what they want them to forget. It is not easy to live in possession of these memories, or to know what to do with them (Weine 1999, 77–9, 2005). Although women had faced multiple adversities, including violence, loss, and family disruption, they demonstrated resilience and strength by helping themselves, their families, and their communities to survive and begin to rebuild their lives.

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Stevan M. Weine and Natalie M. Hogan

Palestine

While books on Palestine have proliferated, few, until recently, examined women and gender in any depth. Since the 1980s, gender studies have begun to redress the asymmetries in our knowledge of Palestinian society, particularly the processes structuring relations between gender and nationalism (Fleischmann 2003, Hasso 1998, Sharoni 1995). Following the creation of the State of Israel, around 800,000 Palestinians were displaced. The majority of refugees were from rural areas and ended up in refugee camps in the border states of Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. Because of differing levels of access and political sensitivity, there is a far greater depth of research available for camps in Lebanon and the Occupied Territories than in Syria and Jordan. While certain dynamics of gender and women's experience in camp settings are subject to generalization, others are highly contextual, arising in relation to the policies of host states, and the cultural, political, and era-specific conditions of the national movement.

Fundamental to any understanding of women and gender in Palestinian society is the patriarchal structure of familial and institutional relations that privileges males and elders (Rubenberg 2001). Since most refugees displaced in 1948 were rural peasant farmers, conservative social norms prevailed in the camps. The confined space and lack of privacy, however, complicated traditional codes of gender interaction. Peasant women had often had more mobility in their villages than urban women who adhered to norms of segregation; however, this freedom of movement was challenged by the presence of strangers in close proximity. Men were categorized as productive breadwinners while women were defined by their domestic and reproductive roles. During this period women lost their former role in agricultural production and were forced into a household economy based on cash and rations.

Women have not been accorded the same political and social rights as men, preventing them from transmitting their nationality to their children should they marry non-Palestinians. This patrilineal model of political kinship also structures the United Nations Relief and Works Agency's (UNRWA) definition of who is entitled to its services, discriminating against the growing number of families of mixed parentage in camps in the diaspora (Cervenak 1994). Since refugees are often viewed with hostility by local populations and have limited state protection, the institution of the family carries additional weight in camps, providing security, but also keeping the legal and political rights of women under familial control. In these contexts of chronic poverty large families continue to be valued for financial support (Johnson 2003). Preference for sons also keeps fertility high and patriarchal norms in place as women invest more time fulfilling their domestic obligations than engaging in economic or political activity outside the home (Hammami 1997). Nevertheless, surveys conducted in camps in Lebanon found women anxious to acquire qualifications and jobs (Zakharia and Tabari 1997).

Dispossession, the dispersal of family and kin, and prolonged conflict have, however, weakened kin and patriarchal structures in some respects. Loss of property and livelihood eroded the main sources of subsistence for refugees and the capacity of men to be sole breadwinners. High unemployment in the camps, the need for women to work to supplement household income, and limited financial independence gained through UNRWA ration cards, have all diminished patriarchal control (Taraki 1997) and strained traditional gender roles, increasing the likelihood of familial tensions and domestic violence (Johnson and Kuttab 2002). While the provision of education for women in camps has given them a comparative advantage, access to professional or technical training is rare and the heavy burdens on women during times of crisis force many to marry at a younger age, leading to high dropout rates.

The rise of the national movement in the 1960s had a dramatic impact on women as the exigencies of the national struggle relaxed familial and social controls. The Resistance in Jordan (1968–70) and

Lebanon (1968–82) marked the first mass mobilization of camp women through political parties and women's organizations. Young women were mobilized into the Resistance and given political and military training, while housewives, enlisted through the General Union of Palestinian women, attended demonstrations and contributed to defending the camps throughout the Lebanese civil war (1975–90) (Sayigh 1994). The growth of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) economy and welfare services encouraged women to abandon jobs in the Lebanese sector for positions in institutions inside the camps. Women's labor and militant activities were thus seen as legitimate both for their contribution to the struggle and because gender and sexuality were brought under the purview of Resistance leaders (Peteet 1999).

Although the Resistance cultivated a national consciousness among women, feminist ideals remained subordinate to the national cause, and gender hierarchies were left intact for fear of alienating camp elders and undermining communal solidarity (Peteet 1991). The national movement introduced new constraints for women by glorifying their nurturing and reproductive roles as mothers of fighters, and encouraging women to have more children to win the "demographic war" (Abdo 1991). Associations between women and nation, continuity, and authenticity has necessarily assumed heightened political significance in exile where refugees struggle to maintain ties with their homeland (Sayigh 1996). Interestingly, however, following the PLO's departure from Lebanon in 1982 – a period in which camp women were being redomesticated – the most vocal critique of the Resistance, came from the "mothers of martyrs," who felt that the PLO had reneged on their promises to honor and support them (Peteet 1997).

Synonymous with the honor of family and nation, women's sexuality continues to be placed under close scrutiny. Given the vulnerabilities of camp life, sexual deviation by women, particularly with men outside the community, is often viewed as political *fitna* (chaos). In cases where honor has been threatened by sexual impropriety, or rape, women have been killed by relatives. Few statistics of honor killings are available for the camps because of political and social sensitivity of the topic, but also because violence against women is rarely reported to the police (Shaloub-Kervorkian 2004). Such concepts of honor and shame have been exploited by Israeli interrogators of female prisoners (Warnock 1990) and by opposing forces in Lebanon.

During the first intifada (uprising) in Gaza and the West Bank (1987–93) many camp women were mobilized by the Women's Work Committees, which were the first initiative to promote an explicitly feminist agenda and engage in sustained grassroots politicization (Abdulhadi 1998). Since camps were particularly vulnerable to attacks by Israeli forces, domestic space became a site of conflict and resistance, destabilizing gender boundaries as women hid combatants and intervened on behalf of arrested sons and husbands. Through their active roles in combating Israeli repression, camp women gained visibility and influence. The 1988 Israeli ban on the Women's Committees contributed to the decline of secularism in the camps and the ascendancy of the Islamic movement. Under the leadership of Hamas, a new political culture of austerity and modesty developed, imposing greater restrictions on women and calling on them to wear the *ḥijāb* (headscarf), transforming it from a symbol of religious piety to one of national resistance and militancy (Hammami 1990). Despite the constraints imposed by the Islamic movement, many women regard it as an empowering alternative to secular politics both in the West Bank and Gaza, where it remains a political force, and in the diaspora, where it is restricted to providing social services.

Since the 1990s women have been largely excluded from peace negotiations, and the Palestinian National Authority has proved indifferent to women's issues. In the camps women feel betrayed by the leadership, but also by the women's groups who failed to consult them when the Women's Charter (1994) was drafted (Abdo 1999). Continued Israeli occupation, the escalating violence of the second intifada in the Occupied Territories – which though popularly supported, has not had the mass participatory quality of the first – and discriminatory policies of host governments in the diaspora have curtailed the opportunities afforded to women living in camps and increased their vulnerability (Kuttab and Johnson 2000). The growing institutionalization of the women's movement through non-governmental organization programs offering "gender training" are seen by many as depoliticizing and disempowering – driven more by the agendas of foreign donors than the needs of women living in the camps (Giacaman 1999).

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Diana K. Allan

Sub-Saharan Africa: West Africa

The West African nations of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have been either embroiled in civil war or have hosted refugees produced by war since the early 1990s. When the needs of refugees began to overwhelm the capacity of their hosts, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in agreement with the hosting governments, coordinated the refugee camp construction, food assistance, and human services that continue today in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. In 2000, Guinea hosted the largest concentration of refugees on the African continent, estimated at over 400,000 (UNHCR 2000). This figure was shown to be grossly inflated after the 2000 cross-border attacks when registration of the newly displaced came up with only 191,800 persons of concern. With repatriation exercises completed for Sierra Leoneans and drawing to a close for Liberians, UNHCR's 2006 fund-raising appeal places the total number of camp-based refugees at 152,160 persons (Guinea 70,810, Liberia 51,360, Sierra Leone 30,000) (UNHCR 2006). This figure does not include internally displaced people, returnees, or asylum seekers.

Official population estimates should be regarded with skepticism, however, as the refugee registration process is fraught with error and corruption and displaced people frequently cross camp and national borders in reaction to the prevailing political climate. There are no statistics reflecting ethnicity or religion; the representation of Muslims among the larger refugee population is unknown and can only be guessed at through identifiers such as family name and region of origin and inferred via national statistics. Generalizations based on one refugee camp should be made carefully as refugee camps are not all the same: the geographic landscape is different, the international communities' roles vary, the refugees themselves have different concerns, and the power structures differ from camp to camp. This entry is based on ethnographic fieldwork among Fula Muslim refugees in Sembakounya, a refugee camp that was created in 2001 following the rebel/government raids in several border regions of Guinea, which displaced thousands of refugees and Guineans and led to the construction of new camps.

Men and women are affected differently by the services and interventions offered in refugee camps, just as they are affected differently by war. In the camp there are opportunities for employment, entrepreneurial enterprises, and formal or vocational education that may result in modification of gender roles, relationships, and religious beliefs. However, camp-related benefits do not have a unilateral effect upon all recipients. Men and women use different means to access resources and pursue livelihood activities, actively navigating the opportunities and constraints of their social worlds. While preoccupations concerning food and basic necessities are crucial aspects of day-to-day living, they are often best achieved by maximizing cultural aspects of gender roles and kin relationships in the camp context. Certain family connections are resuscitated and others let go while alternative possibilities of support are explored, such as marriage, temporary partnerships, fostering of children, trade relationships, and new employment opportunities. Many of these possibilities involve multiple

geographic settings and extended kin, signifying that the refugee camp is not the sole available resource.

For men in the camp, the presence of aid complicates authority: they are no longer perceived as the main provider for their families. The UNHCR and the international community provide a stopgap in terms of food, shelter, education, and medical attention and adopt the role of "husband" and "father" for many camp inhabitants. If men are in the camp, they are supposedly young, elderly, handicapped, or single parents, all considered to be somewhat helpless categories. For those men who do not fit into these categories, extra-camp mobility is crucial, as they supplement the minimal assistance offered in the camp with wage labor or trade in nearby communities. In the Guinean context, women and children were often sent to live in refugee camps while the men and older sons would remain to tend to what property and cattle were left.

Women are considered to be particularly vulnerable in the camp, as, for many, their husbands, fathers, brothers, or protectors may have been killed in the war, are combatants, or have been kidnapped by the rebel groups. To qualify for assistance, women are often pushed to take on identities such as "single mothers" or "war widows." In reality, women's statuses might be more ambiguous, as their spouses might be missing or living in another location with the knowledge of the woman (Hyndman 2003, 6). A single woman in the camp who fits in the vulnerable category might have a husband in Sierra Leone who supports the family or resides with some of her children; a spouse or temporary partner who lives in a different house in the camp yet contributes; a grown child overseas sending her money; or she might have five children with her in the camp without any apparent income. In each case the woman would be termed "vulnerable," but her situation would clearly vary depending on her resource constellation. Therefore, externally created categories of need such as "vulnerability" do not necessarily correspond with indigenous coping strategies.

Refugee women also use mobility – as seen through fostering of children, visits to relatives outside the camp, and relationships that allow for multiple residences – to further their life plans. For some women extra-camp ties offer opportunities in trade and commerce. Other women are creating new relationships with men and fostering their children as a different type of livelihood strategy. These relationships operate as an informal arena of exchange, dependence, and mutual assistance in which men and women meet a variety of specified needs and desires. One such relationship, "bulgur marriage," named by Muslim Sierra Leonean refugees, conflates the material and moral pressures of life in the refugee camp (Gale 2005). These temporary arrangements refer not only to the tangible resource – bulgur wheat – which is handed out by the United Nations World Food Program, but also to marriage as a social resource.

Women enter into these relationships for protection, company, and support as on their own they have fewer resources to keep them afloat. These are the connections that Jane Guyer calls "lateral" kin: relationships with lovers and ex-spouses that give a woman a network of people to call upon (Guyer 1994). Often, the bulgur marriage is not the only relationship in which they are involved; many already have a husband in their country of origin who connects them to another set of family ties and obligations. For participants, bulgur marriage is a strategy for improving their lives in the camp, which does not necessarily involve normative Islamic marital negotiations or allegiance to a new family group. The informality of bulgur marriages is also the greatest risk. Although the humanitarian system offers a set of resources outside regular community structures, religious organizations continue to provide guidance for proper conduct while in the camp. As bulgur marriages are not sanctioned by family members or camp-based community structures, such as the mosque and committee of elders, women in particular have little recourse to regain properties or argue their rights to children if a bulgur marriage goes sour. Although these moral codes describe roles, duties, and proper action, they are subject to continual negotiation and reworking. The pressures of leave-taking and reconstituting family, home, and livelihood in the refugee camp environment are manifested in the formation of complex and at times contradictory identities, new types of relationships, and the re-evaluation of cultural and individual notions that inform gender constructions and relationships.

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Lacey Andrews Gale

Sudan

While it is difficult to generalize across time, refugee populations, and regions, the lives of women refugees in Sudan have been shaped by some particularities of the Sudanese context. These have been the role of the mainstream Muslim Arab state in supporting a culturally specific morality discourse, the role of armed militias and rebel groups in feeding high levels of insecurity for women, and the role of aid agencies in framing refugee women's options in particular ways. The majority of people displaced in the region in general and Sudan in particular do not live in camps or organized settlements (Harrell-Bond 1990), but the high profile of camps for refugees and "internally displaced people,"[1] as well as the specific vulnerabilities of encamped women and girls, gives importance to camps as a particular lens through which to view the ongoing reality of forcible displacement in the region.

The extraordinary magnitude and intensity of displacement among the peoples of Sudan, often described as the largest country in Africa since its independence in 1956, confounds Sudanese assertions of national unity politically, territorially, and culturally. In the process of narrowly-defined nation-building, millions of Sudanese nationals over the last 50 years have become refugees both inside and outside Sudanese geopolitical borders (Cohen and Deng 2004). Similar processes in the Horn of Africa region, Central Africa, and West Africa have contributed hundreds of thousands more refugees to the numbers produced in Sudan itself by war, ethnicized conflict, and political and economic insecurity (USCR 2005). Historical inequalities between the Muslim Arab elite from the riverain north and peoples of the peripheral regions in the south and west have supported internal conflicts and wars for most of Sudan's independence.[2] Conflict in Sudan is characterized by a high level of violence against non-combatants and, due to fits and starts of the peace process in the civil war in the south, multiple episodes of displacement for women, men, and children. According to humanitarian agencies, women make up the majority of people displaced by conflict in this region (Cohen and Deng 2002, WCRWC 1999).

Refugee policies put into practice from the 1970s onwards by the Sudanese government have sought to contain and marginalize refugees through laws restricting movement,[3] prohibiting property ownership,[4] and limiting residency.[5] These policies have made it increasingly difficult for refugee women to pursue livelihoods. Refugee women's marginalization is reflected in and exacerbated by mainstream social practices that assign non-Muslim non-Arab women to categories of pollution, immorality, and foreignness. Though the Sharīʿa was implemented only in 1983, stereotypes of Eritrean, Ethiopian, and southern Sudanese women as threatening to the social order predate this formal declaration of Sudan as an Islamic society. Kibreab (1995) describes the tense relationship in the 1980s between Eritrean and Ethiopian refugee women and mainstream Sudanese society, which labeled these women in particular as "immoral" for brewing alcohol, engaging in prostitution, and – as a high percentage were ummarried – for having an "unacceptable" degree of autonomy. Following the Islamist coup in 1989, mass movements of Sudanese from the south relocated to encampments around Khartoum, where brewing alchohol was one major source of income for southern Sudanese women. As production and consumption of alchohol contravenes Sudanese Sharīʿa law, southern Sudanese women are deemed to threaten the social order despite the fact that most are not themselves Muslim. Sudanese refugee women engaging in market activities, *leja leja* (contract labor), and agriculture also butt against norms of gender segregation practiced by dominant mainstream Sudanese.

Women in camps and settlements of conflict zones in southern and western Sudan have been caught up in insecurity, violence, and the militarization of society. Encampment has not provided protection for women or men. Rape is both a cause

of displacement and a threat to displaced women. Prior to the January 2005 peace treaty, Sudanese women spoke of the threat of abduction by rebel soldiers for domestic or sexual servitude in the bush and of the forced conscription of their sons, brothers, and husbands (Brown et al. 2002). "The other problem women face is deserters. They can do anything and force you to sleep with them. Sometimes three or four of them one after the other" (key informant, outreach worker, quoted in Palmer 1999). The Sudanese government regularly demolishes camps for displaced Sudanese outside Khartoum. Militarized Muslim groups with the alleged support of the government have raided southern Sudanese settlements and villages, killing men and abducting women as slaves (Verney 2006). In the most recent conflict in Darfur, groups of armed men known as the Janjaweed, emerging from Muslim Arab-identified groups historically hostile to Sudanese Fur agriculturalists, have forcibly displaced entire villages with the support of the Sudanese government, killing hundreds of thousands of people and forcing 1.3 million to flee to internationally administered camps (USCR 2005). Levels of insecurity are terribly high. A woman from Kalma Camp, South Darfur, stated that "it is dangerous when we go out to collect firewood. We have been gathering in the north east of the camp, which is more dangerous than the south, but there is grass there. There are also many bandits. One time bandits chased us, took our donkeys, hurt us, we lost our shoes" (Refugees International 2006). Fur women drawing water and collecting firewood are subject to rape by Janjaweed men; Fur men have simply been killed (Verney 2006).

Hutchinson (2000) and Jok (1999) have described the effects on women of militarized and hyper-masculine social norms resulting from 40 years of war. Among Dinka and Nuer Sudanese, the ethical barriers to killing women, children, and the elderly have lapsed. Women's leadership roles have been diminished by the weight now given to military power and the encouragement by military leaders of bonding between men, de-emphasizing relationships with women and family (Hutchinson 2000).

The high profile of international humanitarian responses to ongoing crises of displacement in Sudan has created an association of camps and feeding centers with refugees. Operation Lifeline Sudan was created in 1989 to provide humanitarian relief to southern Sudanese displaced by war and affected by conflict-induced famine after frustration with fragmented and inadequate humanitarian response between 1983 and 1989. More than 40 international agencies currently provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced people in Sudan (USAID 2005). Shifts in gender relations resulting from war and displacement, however, have presented different opportunities for encamped and self-settled women. Humanitarian guidelines for both international and local agencies, including those run under the auspices of the rebel movements in the south, specify that women should participate in the planning and distribution of humanitarian aid (Cohen and Deng 2002). Many agencies promote women's participation in longer-term projects, such as literacy training, stove-building, and seedling nurseries, with the goal of providing women with more control over their livelihoods (UNHCR 1998).

Notes

1. This entry uses the term "refugee" to include all displaced Sudanese people, whether they meet international criteria for protection or not.
2. The most protracted of these conflicts has been the decades-long civil war between the Sudanese state and rebel groups in the south, which killed 2 million people, displaced 4 million people within Sudanese borders, and forced another 600,000 into the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda, Kenya, and Egypt (USCR 2005). The military coup by the National Islamic Front in 1989 compelled tens of thousands of Sudanese from the dominant Muslim Arab ethnic group to leave for the first time, although Sudanese Muslim labor migrants had been present in their millions in Arab Gulf countries and in Egypt for the previous decades. Despite the 9 January 2005 signing of a peace treaty between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement, the main rebel group fighting for power in southern Sudan, the Sudanese diaspora – although ethnically segregated in exile – now includes large communities in Australia, Canada, the United States, the Netherlands, and Finland, as well as the Arab gulf countries and Egypt. Finally, in the Darfur region, the explosion of a long-standing conflict over economic resources and political power into what many observers consider ethnic cleansing has displaced several million more Sudanese both inside Sudan and to neighboring Chad.
3. For example, the 1974 Asylum Act, which curtails movement of refugees outside official settlements.
4. Article 9 of Regulation of the Asylum Act, 1974.
5. Gaim Kibreab (forthcoming) observes, "The *raison d'être* of the limitation on freedom of movement and residence is prevention of integration of refugees into the host societies because they are accepted as temporary guests until the factors that prompt their displacement are eliminated."

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Anita Fábos

Turkey

Turkey is an unusual refugee receiving country because it does not have any refugee camps. Over the years there have been several "guesthouses" (*misafirhane*) where refugees have been accommodated. An ad hoc camp was set up in 1990–1 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to accommodate the many Iraqi Kurds who poured across the common Turkish–northern Iraqi border.

The first guesthouse was set up in the 1950s in the Istanbul neighborhood of Acibadem. It was known simply as Acibadem Misafirhanesi and accommodated political refugees from Eastern European countries. It closed down in 1991 with the end of the Cold War. At the time, little attention was paid to the issue of gender or gendering space. The guesthouse, resembling a small hotel, had individual and family rooms. Single or unaccompanied women were accommodated with other women. Similarly, men were given accommodation with men only. Bathrooms were separate and efforts were made to ensure total privacy. Over the years both men and women were in charge of the guesthouse; however, there was no noticeable difference between gender sensitivity at the guesthouse whether under female or male management. Unfortunately, no academic study has taken place of the guesthouse. Based upon the application of Turkish refugee law, all the guests have resettled to various third countries.

Other than Acibadem, a guesthouse was set up in the southeastern Turkish city of Silopi to accommodate the Iraqi Kurds arriving in great numbers across the border as a result of the Iraqi government's efforts to put down the uprising that occurred after the First Gulf War in Iraq (1990–1). The guesthouse was set up on an ad hoc basis. The Turkish government and the UNHCR were not prepared for the spontaneous arrival of what is estimated to be over 500,000 refugees. Between 1991 and 1993 the Silopi guesthouse was expanded to three separate guesthouses in three different cities in southeastern Turkey: Silopi, Kiziltepe-Diyarbakır, and Kangal. The Turkish government and the UNHCR have been extensively criticized over the years for their lack of preparation. Little consideration was given initially to gender issues, such as space. However, as the guesthouses were developed and improved, efforts were made and some sensitivity was shown. As with the Acibadem guesthouse, no study was made of the refugee guesthouses and there are no records of gender relevant policy or activity there. UNHCR staff point out that they attempted to ensure men and women had separate space but no other measures were taken at the time. The poverty and lack of development in the region appears to have affected the situation resulting in little effort being spent on the refugees, male or female. All the refugees had returned to northern Iraq by 1993 and there is no record of their whereabouts or experiences in Turkey.

A guesthouse was set up in the 1990s to accommodate higher level Iraqi military refugees. Located in the city of Yozgat and known as Yozgat Misafirhanesi, it continues to accommodate some 20 refugees at present. There are no unaccompanied or single women at the guesthouse.

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Cherie Taraghi

Migration: Refugee Education

Afghanistan

Of the restrictions imposed by the Taliban regime on Afghan women and girls, one of the most destructive was the ban on education. Afghans fled into neighboring countries, primarily Pakistan and Iran, to join refugees who had fled during the Soviet invasion and then during the civil war. At the end of 2001 there were almost 2.2 million Afghans under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Pakistan and almost 1.5 million in Iran (UNHCR 2005). The installation of the Karzai government has stimulated a large-scale repatriation, but at the end of 2003, there were still 2.9 million Afghans in Pakistan.

Although in many contexts access to education for refugee girls is limited, Afghan girls in Pakistan had far better educational opportunities than those who stayed in Afghanistan. Access to quality education is cited as one of the main incentives for Afghans to stay in exile. Even though peace is now established, and reconstruction efforts are underway, in most locations outside Kabul city, access to formal schools is very limited and especially so for girls. The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has been working with Afghans in Pakistan for 24 years, and the Female Education Program (FEP) is one of the largest education programs for Afghan women, girls, and boys. At its height in 2002, the FEP program enrolled nearly 23,000 children.

While repatriation and dwindling donor resources have caused the FEP and other programs for Afghan women and girls to downsize slightly, many refugees remain and for thousands of these children, FEP is their only option for education. As the tripartite agreement nears its end, FEP's focus is on ensuring the sustainability of education for refugees who are unable to return to Afghanistan and, for those who are able to return, the program will continue to coordinate with the ministry of education and actors in Afghanistan to ensure successful transitions into education and the teaching workforce.

Currently, the program supports 27 schools, over 15,000 students, of whom 65 percent are girls, and 537 teachers and school personnel in Peshawar and other areas of the North West Frontier Province. FEP supports 3 schools with an enrollment of over 800 students in refugee camps in Baluchistan Province. The program provides extensive training to refugee teachers, school administrators, school communities, and female health educators. While under the Taliban women in Afghanistan were banned from participating in the workforce in any capacity other than as doctors, refugee women in Pakistan have been able through such initiatives to access quality training in order to become teachers, head teachers, teacher trainers, and health educators.

FEP has strong ties with IRC Afghanistan's education program and with the Afghan ministry of education, allowing students and teachers to transition into the system when they return to Afghanistan. For example, the IRC certificates the FEP students receive are officially recognized by the ministry of education in Afghanistan, and FEP trainers are being trained in the new Teacher Education Programme (TEP) content and methodology of the ministry. Strategies have been developed to ensure that women teachers' and trainers' experiences and qualifications from FEP are recognized in Afghanistan, and that they can become leaders in educational reconstruction and development.

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Canada

Migration and the transnational flow of people across borders have led to a steady stream of immigrants and refugees to North America. As Muslim diasporas in North America have grown over the last few decades adding to the racial, ethnic, and religious pluralism of society, both public and private educational systems are slowly adapting to the needs of multiculturalism. Within this context,

Muslim girls and women face particular problems in both public and private educational sites.

In public schools, the pressures of conforming to the social and cultural norms of the school and a dominant Eurocentric society present specific challenges for immigrant and refugee Muslims girls and youth (Zine 2001). The normative social and cultural practices in public schools often run counter to Islamic practices and customs that prescribe very different modes of dress and social and gendered interaction. Following traditional Islamic conventions with respect to gender relations, for example no dating or socializing with boys, maintaining Islamic dress codes such as wearing the headscarf, and not participating in coeducational sports, places Muslim girls who are observant of these codes of behavior outside the normative school based practices. Peer pressure to conform to the conventions of majority Western popular culture often leads to a conflicting and contradictory set of expectations between home and school. Therefore, there is often a lack of cultural congruence between the values, norms, and expectations of the home and school.

Trying to conform in both contexts often results in what has been called the "split personality syndrome" where youth try to negotiate the conflicting cultural expectations of home and school (Al-Jabri 1995). This often results in a double persona: young people are forced to develop one identity to deal with peer pressure at school and another identity to appease the conflicting cultural expectations of the home and community. This situation may lead to confusion and dissonance among them and they must learn to navigate between these dual identities (Zine 2001).

Integrating the diverse cultural practices and beliefs of newcomers is a contemporary challenge within North American schools. By the age of puberty, conservative Islamic dress codes such as the wearing of the headscarf and otherwise modest attire require accommodation in physical education classes. In some cases, alternative dress codes such as long tunics and baggy pants have been allowed to replace less modest gym clothes.

Yet negative Orientalist references often associated with headscarves frequently implicate the way Muslim girls are viewed and treated within schools (Rezai-Rashti 1994). In some cases, negative stereotypes also affect the academic placement of students in non-academic secondary school streams. This is based on the misperception of some teachers or guidance counselors that Islam does not value education for girls; they are therefore often not encouraged to continue to higher education or are guided to opt for less academic streams (Zine 2001).

Cultural and religious continuity are important factors for Muslims living in diaspora (Yousif 1993). Newcomer parents who are fearful of the "de-Islamizing" forces of public schools that challenge traditional norms and values often object to their children participating in certain aspects of the school curriculum, such as music and sex education, which they feel are inappropriate according to their religious sensibilities. Some school boards, such as the Toronto District School Board, have taken these issues into account and have developed guidelines for religious accommodation that create inclusive options for Muslim students (and other faith-based communities) and allow them to participate in school programs in culturally and religiously appropriate ways.

In addition, Muslim Student Associations in high schools and universities have been active in advocating for equity and accommodation in schools. These groups also provide networks of solidarity and support for Muslim students committed to maintaining a religious lifestyle and lead to the development of Islamic subcultures in schools (Zine 2000).

Other factors, such as racism and Islamophobia, also affect the integration of Muslim immigrants and refugees into schools. The saliency of this kind of discrimination was heightened after 11 September 2001 where incidents of Islamophobia were noted across North America, including in schools (Zine 2003, 2004). The types of incident reported ranged from verbal abuse to physical threat, abuse, and the destruction of property. According to a report by the Toronto Police Services (2001), there was a 66 percent increase in hate crimes in 2001. The largest increase was against Muslims. Incidents in Toronto included physical and verbal abuse, harassment, and cars attempting to run down Muslim women as they crossed the street (Zine 2003).

The proposed banning of *ḥijāb* in a public school in Quebec is an earlier example of religiously based discrimination with potential effects upon the educational opportunities for Muslim girls. This situation arose in 1994 when 12-year-old Emilie Oimet was expelled from her school for not complying with a request to remove her headscarf. The ban received support from the largest teacher federation in Quebec, which voted in favor of keeping the headscarf out of French-Canadian schools (Lenk 2000). The principal at Emilie's school justified his decision by saying that the wearing of a distinctive sign such as the headscarf or neo-Nazi insignia

could polarize the agressivity of students (ibid.), thus equating the headscarf with fascism and invoking a discourse of fear and repression. However, Quebec's Human Rights Commission ultimately ruled that public schools could not forbid the wearing of religious headscarves.

As a result of the lack of cultural congruence and the concerns over racism and Islamophobia in public schools, many Muslim families are opting for Islamic schools. According to figures cited in Kelley (1997), there were 24 Islamic schools in Canada in 1997. Ontario had the largest number of schools (14) concentrated in one province. More recent figures from the Ontario ministry of education reported 2,240 children attending Islamic schools in 1999, but estimates from the Muslim community suggest that there are as many as 4,000 students enrolled (Scrivenor 2001). Students are often added to waiting lists from birth and some Islamic schools have waiting lists of 650 students and more. At present, in Toronto and the surrounding areas there are 18 full-time Islamic schools and a total of 35 across the province of Ontario. With the exception of one Shi'i school, all of these schools are part of the Sunni tradition in Islam.

In these traditionally gender-segregated schools, Muslim girls find on the one hand freedom from Islamophobic stereotypes, yet must deal on the other hand with patriarchal authority that places similarly limiting constructs on their identity as Muslim girls and women. Islamic dress codes and gender segregation are mandatory components of Islamic schools. Muslim girls, however, often face a double standard in comparison to boys. According to one ethnographic study of four Islamic schools in the greater Toronto area, there is greater regulation and surveillance of the activities of Muslim girls within these schools as a means of preserving their honor and the honor of the school (Zine 2004).

Traditional Islamic subjects such as Qur'ānic studies, *ḥadīth*, *fiqh*, and Arabic language are taught alongside provincially directed public school curricula, but most Islamic schools lack resources and as a result often have inexperienced teachers. Nonetheless Islamic schools remain a growing option for families who prefer a more faith-centered education and want to keep their daughters away from what they may perceive as the seductions of a culturally overly permissive society.

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Jasmin Zine

Iran

Iranian girls have better access to education in post-revolutionary Iran. The gender parity index has increased at all levels. Do female refugees have the same opportunities regarding education and vocational training? Iran hosted more than 2.55 million refugees in 2001, more refugees than any other country in the world. Women constitute 45 percent of the Afghan refugee population and 48 percent of the Iraqi refugee population.

Access to education

The Iranian government used to guarantee the right to education. By the mid-1990s, unregistered refugees lost that benefit. President Khatami decreed in 2001 that both undocumented and registered refugee children would be allowed to attend school, but local authorities ignored the presidential order. Since 2004, registered refugees have had to pay educational fees for the first time. The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) withdrew its financial support when the Iranian government promised to pay the schooling charges. However, the charges are too heavy for the Iranian government. As it is difficult for refugees to pay for school because they seldom have a job, they can only afford to send one child to school;

they usually send the boy of the family rather than the girl.

Consequently, generations of refugees have grown up with no access to basic education. This policy sends most children to the streets. That young girls do not have access to school means they will probably have to marry earlier. It also spreads illiteracy among women and uneducated girls and means that women cannot improve their social conditions. Eventually education in Iran might be the only chance for refugees either to get an education or to attend a training course, as the structures in their home countries have been destroyed. Lacking skills, most refugee children will not be able to assist in their country's reconstruction. Their ability to be involved in social and civil activities and in decision-making processes back home will be limited.

NGO-sponsored education and vocational training courses

Since the Iranian state stopped sponsoring studies for refugees, Iranian NGOs (non-governmental organizations) and foreign organizations have arranged free access to education. Informal schools have also opened their doors to children, but they can only teach the Qur'ān, not offer primary education. The Afghan community in the eastern provinces established "private" schools: children study in shifts but in difficult conditions. Parents are reluctant to send girls to an informal school that might be un-Islamic. Besides, local authorities have closed down many of these schools.

Many Iranian and international organizations try to grant primary education to refugee children. Girls are at the core of the issue as empowerment of girls through education means development for the entire community. With education, girls become more outspoken about their situation.

Some NGOs have created vocational training programs. Refugee women coming primarily from rural backgrounds have little or no education and are accustomed to work in traditional types of economic activities such as carpet weaving or animal husbandry. With vocational training women will learn new skills. It is very difficult for a female refugee to find an occupation in camps or in cities so she should be trained for an activity that will ensure her future. There are also literacy courses for female adults since empowerment is linked to a job but also to skills such as writing and reading.

The UNHCR has also created several programs to enhance the possibilities of employment, self-employment, social participation, and education. For example, many women are oriented toward teaching as their countries usually lack teachers and will welcome their skills upon their return.

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Sudan

Access to formal education in Sudan is difficult for most girls and boys and impossible for far too many. Ongoing war and conflict have diverted half of the government's budget and have led to the virtual collapse of the educational system in large swathes of the country. Following the imposition of Sharī'a law by President Nimeiri in 1983, government educational policies requiring students to be taught in Arabic and to receive Islamic religious education have been enforced, even in regional school districts where Muslims and Arabic-speaking women and men are a tiny minority. Currently, there are essentially two separate educational systems, one for areas where government control is unchallenged (mainly in the north) and one for areas where the government is fighting to gain or maintain control (southern and western provinces harboring resistance movements). In south Sudan, which has been dogged by civil war for five decades, the literacy rate for women is just 10 percent; men's literacy rate hovers around 20 percent. Compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, women and girls have lower than average primary and secondary school attendance and literacy rates (UNICEF 2006). School attendance and literacy rates are differentially gendered, with women and girls obtaining less schooling than boys and men. This is particularly the case for the 226,000 refugees in Sudan (USCR 2005) and Sudanese nationals displaced within their own country – an estimated 5 million people (Verney 2006).

Due to instability and continued conflict in the

Horn of Africa, many refugees experience multiple episodes of displacement. This is especially true for southern Sudanese repeatedly forced to relocate within the country or across borders to neighboring countries. Girl's education is low on the priority list for Sudanese struggling to survive, as illustrated by the testimony of a Sudanese mother displaced for the third time to Cairo: "Being able to live a life comes first. Now things all depend on money. I work all day, seven days a week and earn LE400. The rent is LE550. And besides someone has to take the children to school. The bad behavior of the Egyptians is dangerous. Their father has died. I am struggling to survive. My main concern at the moment is not education" (Dingemans 2002, 24). Even in relatively established settlements, such as Kakuma camp in Kenya, girls are excluded for a variety of reasons. "Sudanese girls are reportedly routinely driven out of school in the higher primary grades, often by male students in their grades who do not want girls receiving higher examination grades than they do. Others were married, often not by choice and frequently to older men" (Sommers 2001, 192). It is clear that education for girls is negatively affected by their displacement and gender norms that place women's domestic responsibilities above communal literacy.

School districts in the south of the country are characterized by an overwhelming dearth of resources broken occasionally by "isles of educational stability and opportunity" (Sommers 2005, 24), often located in refugee camps or settlements of people displaced by fighting and insecurity. Levels of school enrollment and attendance in war-torn areas are virtually zero; in one province a non-governmental organization (NGO) estimated that fewer than 1 percent of children were in school (ibid., 25). Where education for displaced Sudanese is available, it is mostly at the primary school level, of variable quality, and provided under conditions of extreme hardship. Primary schools are sponsored by churches, NGOs, and by the Sudanese government in the so-called "garrison towns." Sommers refers to an "alarmingly low level of representation of girls in school" (ibid., 17).

There is no national curriculum as such, although government schools require students to be instructed in Arabic and according to the Islamist ideology of the state; this is also the case in the government schools that provide education to displaced children living in camps around greater Khartoum. Teachers are scarce, badly paid (or not paid at all), and subject to the same forces of dislocation and disruption as their pupils. In a displaced Sudanese settlement of 7,000 in Keriwa, for example, there were 15 teachers, 9 of whom had attended some sort of training course and of whom 1 was a woman (Women's Commission 1999). Parents struggle to afford school expenses and often must choose between schooling (when it is available) and sending children out to contribute to the family's income. Girls are more often kept out of school than boys to look after small children when their mothers must earn money for the family. In a situation of ongoing war and upheaval, girls are not consulted about their goals. At Rumbek Primary School, an 18-year-old girl named Victoria Akon, described her situation: "most of my classmates were forced by their parents into early marriage. They say they were given no choice, 'but please don't be like us.' Girls of southern Sudan want to be educated and they want to be like other girls in the world, sharing and governing the country" (Dixon 2005). As with many other social services, however, education for girls and boys will continue to fall short of the hopes of refugee girls in Sudan as long as the deep inequalities that underpin war and turmoil remain.

The situation for refugees residing in Sudan – mainly from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Chad – is little better. The Sudanese government promotes spatial segregation of refugees through encampment policies and discourages the integration of refugees into Sudanese society (Kibreab forthcoming). Primary level education for refugees living in settlements and camps is provided by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, but resources for secondary education and technical and vocational training have ceased as a result of lack of funding (Bekker 2002). Sudanese refugees in other countries such as Egypt and Uganda may have access to local and privately-run schools. In the mid-1990s in Uganda, for example, there were 17,000 refugee children in school, though many of those who did not attend were older girls (EPSR 1994). In Egypt, some Sudanese refugee children had access to private (church-run) schools, but despite Egypt's obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention to accommodate refugees in state schools, in practice this is very difficult (Harrell-Bond 2005). As is the case for Sudanese displaced in Sudan, Sudanese refugees in Egypt are often unable to prioritize education. Instability, financial concerns, and the paucity of opportunities, however, lead to gendered choices that negatively affect girls. An illustration of this is provided by Dingemanns (2002) who describes the anger and sorrow of a 10-year-

old girl who was kept out of school by her working mother in order to take care of her handicapped brother.

Refugee women in Sudan recognize that their low level of literacy, lack of vocational skills, and exclusion from decision-making processes are related to the lack of educational opportunities created by long-term instability. This recognition has led to a range of projects, mostly funded by international agencies but often implemented by Sudanese NGOs. A Wau-based women's organization called WOTAP (Women Training and Promotion Society) runs skills training projects and adult education classes for women to address their concerns about being dependent upon humanitarian assistance (Women's Commission 1999, 14). The NGO GOAL Sudan has recently been commended for its Women's Literacy Programme in Displaced Communities, a community-based project that combines literacy with empowerment (UNESCO 2005).

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Anita Fábos

Turkey

Turkey retains a geographic limitation to its ratification of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, which means that only those fleeing as a consequence of events occurring in Europe can settle in Turkey on a permanent basis. All refugees entering Turkey from the Middle East, Asia, or Africa must obtain refugee status from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and a temporary residence permit (*ikamet*) from the Turkish government.

Legal status plays an important role in the attainment of education in Turkey. Although all children, regardless of their legal status have the right to attend school, families or individuals with an irregular legal status or who are still waiting for the provision of refugee status and temporary Turkish residency permit are reluctant to enroll their children or themselves in an education institutional; to do so would be to risk high level visibility.

The Turkish government has no integration or reception programs for refugees. Consequently there are no language or educational programs specifically designed for refugees. Children may attend local schools and adults, both male and female, may attend any class or program by undergoing the process undertaken by local Turkish citizens.

For families lacking legal residence permits, some informal education programs are organized by the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) Caritas International and Istanbul Inter-Parish Migration Program in the city of Istanbul, where a large majority of refugees reside. These programs focus on general education and social development for children or language training for adults. There is no specific focus on female participation or access. The NGO International Catholic Migration Commission is at the present time planning computer, Turkish language, and vocational training classes, concentrating on the needs of women, particularly the very vulnerable single mothers.

Refugee communities in other cities also arrange informal education for children. Most specifically, the Iranian Baha'i refugee community ensures the continuation of religious instruction (*golshan*

classes) for their children and youth. The Baha'i community also makes every effort to offer English and other classes to its own community. Specifically in the city of Van, the local NGO TEGV (Türkiye Eğitim Gönüllüleri Vakfı, Educational Volunteers Foundation of Turkey) offers social development and Turkish language classes to Kurdish and Iranian refugee children in an effort to help short-term integration.

With the exception of planned vocational training classes focusing on the needs of female refugees in Istanbul, no female specific or female focused education has been implemented for refugees residing in Turkey.

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CHERIE TARAGHI

Western and Northern Europe

Muslim women in western and northern Europe have different national, ethnic, and social backgrounds. Within these categorizations, they are a heterogeneous group belonging to different generations, although outsiders continue to essentialize them on the basis of their gender and their religion. Nonetheless, education is changing the image of Muslim women. As a means of equalizing differences, of providing economic independence, and of integration into mainstream society, education is a concern common to all of them, albeit to different degrees. This entry briefly outlines three main aspects.

ILLITERATE MOTHERS

Upon their arrival in western and northern Europe, a great number of first-generation immigrant Muslim women from rural backgrounds in developing countries were semi-literate and often illiterate. This does does not mean they were ignorant. They brought with them their tacit, local knowledge and the experiences they had acquired in their place of origin and adapted them to their new contexts. In addition to their original knowledge, influenced partly by their cultural traditions, the most significant conceptual toolkit these women carried with them was embodied in the Qur'ān and the teachings they derived from it. First-generation Muslim immigrant women from rural backgrounds have tended to keep strong ties with their original homelands and to recreate their networks with other women from the same community. They have continued to live within their own national, ethnic, and religious transplanted milieus and have had little contact with the new surrounding society. This has not only prompted their marginalization from the majority of the population in the host country, but has also affected the socialization of their children, especially their daughters. To remedy this situation, some countries have implemented special language, literacy, and culture classes for mothers. Further, to encourage adult women to acquire a formal education, the Scandinavian countries are introducing methods to assess non-formal learning as a basis to enter higher education. Lifelong learning programs are being elaborated and flexible educational systems developed that allow women to schedule education along with family chores and jobs.

EDUCATED DAUGHTERS

The situation is different for the second- and third-generation immigrant Muslim women. Most of them attend European state funded schools where, depending on the country, compulsory schooling lasts nine or ten years. Higher secondary school takes three to four years and is not obligatory. To this date few Islamic schools have materialized and the ones that have are private. Yet many Muslim girls in western and northern Europe follow religious teaching at the various mosques and Islamic centers. Some issues specific to Muslim girls continue to cause tensions between school authorities in western and northern Europe and local Muslim communities. In particular, those concerning mixed physical education classes and swimming, sex education lessons, avoiding school field trips and, in France, the question of the veil, have been subject to heated debates. Among the common features of educational policies that have been tried in western and northern Europe are first and second language programs for the primary and lower secondary levels. The initial reasons for such teaching were based on the belief that it would help children of immigrants to learn the language of the host country quickly and ease

their acculturation and integration. So far, the results are contested and a significant number of young people of immigrant origin are proficient in neither language. However, according to recent studies, Muslim girls of immigrant origin obtain better school results than the boys of their communities and there are higher percentages of girls pursuing higher studies than boys. Although more and more continue to tertiary studies, the majority of Muslim girls of immigrant origin choose secondary vocational schools. In northern European countries such schools include apprenticeship schemes, which provide the necessary qualifications for jobs. Those who do go on to tertiary education tend to choose studies that lead to professions in the health and social sectors, public administration, business, teaching, law, journalism, and hard sciences. Fewer opt for fine arts and the humanities.

Transforming gender roles

As in other parts of the world, education, higher education in particular, confers on Muslim women of immigrant background in western and northern Europe a different kind of status within the family, community, and society at large than they have had so far. Their authority is no longer limited to the private sphere but is being established in the public domain. The younger generations seem to prioritize education over early marriage and a growing number of educated Muslim women of immigrant origin are single. Some have, for various reasons, to assume the role of breadwinner and/or of single parent. Others leave their families to pursue their studies elsewhere or have found employment in different regions or even countries. But women's migrations include those who come unaccompanied to study in Europe and decide to stay on. Education provides Muslim women with tools to negotiate gender roles in new ways. It is especially those pursuing higher studies who are most actively involved in the process of redefining Islamic values, family and societal relations and structures. Their goal is to apply basic Islamic religious principles and juridical texts to the European context. They strive to have their religion recognized as a European faith. They are often active as members of student associations and political parties. Several are engaged in national and/or local politics. In some countries, they have gone on to be elected representatives of constituencies and members of parliament.

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Saphinaz-Amal Naguib

Migration: Refugee Regimes

Overview

If the twentieth century was the century of refugees, the Islamic world was certainly an active participant. From Turkey's expulsion of the Armenians, the forced population exchanges of Greeks and Turks, and of Muslims and Hindus during the 1948 Indian-Pakistani partition, to the expulsion of the Palestinian refugees in 1948 and 1967, to Somalis and the Sudanese in Africa, and the Afghans, Kurds, Bosnians, Kosovars, and Chechens, the Muslim world has been embroiled in waves of forced migration. Indeed, the Armenian disaster generated one of the first regional relief organizations, the Near East Relief (NER) formed in 1915 (as a successor to the American Committee for Relief in the Near East). The NER provided direct relief, medical care, feeding stations, and desert rescue convoys to pick up refugees and save them from starvation or death from exposure.

Contemporary Muslim refugee flows are among the largest in the world; in 2004, globally refugees numbered 11.5 million and internally displaced persons (IDPs) 21.3 million (USCR 2005). In the Muslim world, around 7 million people are refugees and around 9 million are IDPs. Both categories include Kurds, Palestinians, Somalis, Sudanese, Chechens, Afghanis, Darfurians, Kosovars, and Bosnians. Of these, well over half are women and children. Women flee for a variety of reasons: armed conflict, ethnic cleansing, political persecution, discrimination and, increasingly, natural disasters. The IDPs now number more than internationally recognized refugees and in terms of refugee regimes and the provisioning of aid, the distinction between them is blurring as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) increasingly provides aid for IDPs, although not protection.

In each case, Islam has played a different role according to its role in the society in question and who is delivering aid and protection. Muslim communities differ widely in their social norms of segregation, patterns of male–female interaction, family structure, women's mobility, and cultural expectations about public deportment and visibility; in addition, each Muslim society exhibits complex internal variation as well. For example, the delivery of aid and income-generating and educational projects for women faced serious obstacles in Afghan camps in Pakistan from militant Islamist groups. Among Afghans, norms of segregation and constrained mobility and visibility for women are more prominent cultural features than in other parts of the Muslim world. Foreign female aid workers, women-oriented projects, and Afghani female participants have been threatened, harassed, and assaulted. Such was not the case among Kosovar and Bosnian Muslim refugees nor has it been an issue among Palestinian refugees. Other times, refugee women have been admonished to adhere to particular understandings of Islam. Kurdish refugee women in Iran in the mid-1990s were told to cover themselves by local government officials and local Iranian women.

Refugee regime

With skills honed administering to millions of displaced persons during the Second World War, by the beginning of the 1950s an international refugee regime was easily discernable in the complex network of international organizations encompassing the UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (for Palestinian refugees) (UNRWA). The UNHCR has the authority and the institutional mandate to declare a refugee situation and coordinate and provide aid and relief. The refugee aid regime has been joined by a host of local, regional, and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) ranging from Save the Children to Catholic Charities to Doctors without Borders, the Red Crescent Societies (which are part of the ICRC), and Oxfam, among many others. In addition, Muslim aid organizations such as the Muslim Aid, Islamic Relief, and the Red Crescent Societies, among others, have long provided relief to the displaced. This refugee aid regime operates by and large in refugee camps, spaces which hold those excised from the state. While refugee camps can be conceptualized as spaces of incarceration and bureaucratic management of the displaced, they are simultaneously places where their inhabitants stamp their own imprint, crafting meaningful places; as they do so, relations between refugees and the aid regime can be tense.

As NGOs have grown in number, expertise, and global presence, they have joined with UN organizations and the ICRC to provide relief; in many cases, the UNHCR acts as an umbrella organization that funnels aid through a variety of NGOs. With a less cumbersome bureaucracy and smaller organizational structure, NGOs sometimes have more flexibility to innovate and adopt new perspectives.

Aid regimes often operated with the assumption of a universal refugee subject (see Hyndman 2000, 61, Malkki 1996) with basic human needs for protection, food, shelter, health care, and education. The discourse of the "brotherhood" of man and its associated practices became institutionalized in the structures and practices of the UNHCR (Hyndman 2000, 67). In this "liberal discourse of UN humanism" (Hyndman 2000, 68), the male was the default category; the universal refugee subject glossed over gender and cultural differences. Hyndman notes that both NGOs and the UN "produce profiles of refugee culture a priori" (2004, 193). Moreover women and children are often grouped together as if their needs were the same. Aid and relief regimes construct refugees as individuals and as a group deploying cultural categories that privilege men and marginalize women. For example, definitions of family and head of household and their subsequent role in rations distribution can have a significant impact on women's well-being; distribution of rations to male members of households in Afghani refugee camps in Pakistan meant that substantial portions of food were often diverted from women and children to support militant groups. Allocation of ration cards to an assumed male head of household may leave women and children in dire straits in the event he leaves his family or disappears. In other words, assumptions of household composition, residency, and lines of power may seriously disadvantage women.

The Palestinian case illustrates the problems associated with assumptions about refugees, gender, and family structure that often continue to the present. As the primary institution charged with responsibility for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA provides education, rations, shelter, and medical care. Families were defined as an adult male and his dependants; he was allotted a ration card that indicated his name, his village of origin, camp of residence, and the number of family members. It was assumed that the ideal patrilineal kinship system and its categories were natural occurrences (rather than particular social practices imbued with power). This meant that women's and children's relationship to the rations system was mediated through kinship with a male (Peteet 2005). To this day, Palestinian women refugees cannot transmit refugee status to their children, nor do children have rights of residency in a host country based on their mothers' status. If a Palestinian woman marries a non-Palestinian, or a non-registered Palestinian, she may retain her refugee identity card, but neither she nor her children can utilize UNRWA services (Cervenak 1994, 301–2). The consequences of this classificatory system are significant; in postwar Lebanon, refugee women married to non-registered Palestinians, or foreigners, or even to registered Palestinian refugees who then disappeared, faced great difficulty in providing their children with access to schools, medical care, rations, and the right of residency.

Until the early 1990s, the UNHCR had no official policy that recognized gender differences in the process of displacement, in camps, or in vulnerability to violence (Baines 2005, 62). The impetus for the development of gender policies and approaches grew out of a confluence of factors: increasingly refugees were women (and their children); modern forms of warfare and ethnic cleansing in national conflicts made the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol definition of a refugee* less relevant; and violence against refugee women was rampant. At the same time, in the academic arena and among international relief staff and activists, the issue of gender had been propelled to the fore. In the wake of the 1975 International Women's Year, refugee regimes' gendered perspective and approach gradually began to transform. The issue of violence against refugee women became dramatically apparent with the stories of mass rape of Vietnamese boat women in the 1980s. By the 1990s, the UNHCR and most NGOs had adopted a gendered perspective and aimed to incorporate women's issues into the mainstream of their policies and practices. This trend culminated in the formation of the Office of the Senior Coordinator for Refugee Women. At the same time, the systematic mass rape of Muslim women in Bosnia was crucial in propelling recognition of the gendered nature of wartime violence, relief, and asylum policies. Subsequently, wartime rape was deemed a war crime in international humanitarian law. The sexual violence in Bosnia prompted the development of the UNHCR guidelines on women.

Two documents, *Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women* and *UNHCR Policy on Refugee Women*, set out policy on women. The

UNHCR's adoption of a gendered perspective means "using the expertise of women and including women in central decision-making processes" (Mertus 2000, xi). It was supposed to go beyond simply adding women to the agenda by making a gendered perspective integral to decision-making and the delivery of aid. Under the new policies, women were now eligible for their own documentation, had the right to be active participants in camp management, and the "right to claim asylum independent of their husband's claims" (Baines 2005, 62). The gendered approach set out in the *Guidelines* and *UNHCR Policy* assumed two seemingly contradictory things: women are vulnerable and need special assistance and women are partners in the decision-making process and should take responsibility for defining their needs and implementing policy to promote them (Hyndman 2004, 201). Thus women can be both vulnerable when deprived of family protection and economic support networks and active participants in camp projects. More recently, building upon the People Oriented Planning, which aimed to involve refugees in planning and decision making, the UNHCR adopted the principal of community empowerment to promote sustainable return (see UNHCR 2001) and acknowledged the centrality of gender in community empowerment.

Just as refugee regimes adopted a gendered perspective and policy, a new form of intervention, with serious implications for women, is becoming evident. The end of the Cold War, Western disinterest in long-term aid, and mass displacement arising from local ethno-national conflicts and environmental disasters have fostered short-term humanitarian interventions. Hyndman writes of "an implicit assumption that intervention is short term" and thus "need not incorporate, for example, the gender or cultural politics" of the displaced (2004, 195).

Muslim aid for refugees

Islamic based organizations have been active in providing relief and development for the displaced. They take their mandate from Islam's explicit exhortations for charity and compassion and care for widows and orphans. The verse, "Whoever saved a human life should be regarded as though he had saved all mankind" (Qur'ān 5:32) guides their work. Muslim Aid was founded in 1985 in London by British Muslim organizations and has provided aid to victims of war, famine, and natural disasters in places ranging from Chechnya to Darfur, Palestine, and Afghanistan and to the victims of the tsunami in Indonesia. They have built and run Mother and Child Health centers in Somalia. Islamic Relief, an NGO founded in 1994, provides both relief and development aid. They have aid projects in Darfur, Chechnya, Gaza, and Pakistan among others. Aside from providing food, shelter, and education for the displaced, they run clinics that offer prenatal care. In addition, they have programs to train local women in midwifery and they offer counseling for rape victims. The Red Crescent Societies, the Muslim counterparts of the Red Cross Societies, have been active for decades in offering relief to the displaced. Their reproductive health care units and nutritional supplements for women and children are integral components of their approach to disaster relief.

Refugees and gender

The process of becoming and being a refugee is gendered, as is preparing for sustainable return. UNHCR projects now address the empowerment of women in refugee camps as well as their preparation for return (see UNHCR 2001). Women may be specific targets of human rights violations that spark flight and continue as they flee. In ethnic-national or sectarian conflict, their sexuality and reproductive capacity can be representative of their particular group; as such, sexual attacks are conceived as an attack on the whole group and are often used to compel mass flight. Indeed, mass rapes of Bosnian Muslim women were part of a strategy of ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces in the early 1990s. During flight and while in camps women bear the responsibility for caring for children and the elderly and carrying out domestic tasks in onerous conditions. Once in camps, they often face discrimination in the provisioning of aid and their legal status as dependants can hinder their access to aid and asylum. Protection issues have a strong sexual and gendered dimension. In refugee camps, women may be vulnerable to rape and forced prostitution. Domestic violence often increases as a result of male unemployment and the loss of masculine roles. Sustainable return requires economic preparation and planning; in preparation for a sustainable return to Kosovo, the UNHCR and some NGOs initiated a variety of projects to train Kosovar women in small business management and set up a microcredit program.

While a gendered perspective is a welcome move forward it remains a subject for continuing evaluation and critique. Adopting the category of "woman" runs the risk of overriding culturally specific gender relations in all their rich variety

and women's other lines of identity, affiliation, and loyalty to clan, ethnic group, religion, and family. In other words, gender can end up essentialized in ways that do not always serve women well. The category of "raped women" is illustrative. Protection issues are paramount for displaced women and with the mass rapes in Bosnia, the sexual assaults of women refugees in East Africa and more recently of Darfurian women, world attention turned to this issue and policies began to be implemented. Mertus notes that the first projects in Bosnia that focused on gender provided counseling and support services for "raped women." Often women avoided these because of the stigma; the name announced their status as victims (Mertus 2000, 28). She concluded that more successful counseling took place in projects designed to aid all women or members of the community. Hyndman provides a careful critique of one such UNHRC project in East Africa (2000, 77–81); in seeking aid for rape victims, the public nature of rape then stigmatized women and could lead to their banishment; in other cases, declarations of rape became a means of access to resources for the victim and her family.

An example of a project to protect women and girls from rape got underway in Dadaab camp in Kenya. The camp housed Somali women who had suffered sexual violence within and around the camp. Internally, the UNHCR trained and housed local police and located them in the camp. With the prosecution of rapists, the incidence declined significantly (Mertus 2000, 14). When women continued to be assaulted by rival clans when they left the camps to collect firewood, UNHCR worked to convince local leaders of the seriousness of sexual assault and anti-rape committees were formed. In this instance the community actively participated in tackling the problem.

Decisions about rations, or the kinds of food and goods supplied to refugees, are not always sensitive to what constitutes culturally appropriate foods, the allocation of food, and the division of labor. In some cultures, when resources are scarce, women and girls may eat last, and thus have a reduced caloric intake and a less nutritional diet (Forbes Martin 1992, 35). Hyndman (2000, 104) gives the apt example of Somali camps in Kenya where sorghum was a primary component of rations. As a labor intensive food, women had to spend many hours a day preparing it. Rice, easier to prepare, and a preferred food, was not provided as much as sorghum. Goods supplied to refugees can be culturally inappropriate as well. There were widespread complaints among displaced Bosnian and Iraqi Kurdish women when relief packages included tampons rather than the more widely used and culturally appropriate sanitary napkins.

Cooking fuel is a very serious issue for refugees in East Africa, one that intersects with a division of labor that mandates women cook and gather firewood and water, the type of food rations provided, and sexual assault. Having depleted nearby areas of wood, Sudanese and Somali women forged farther and farther from their camps for firewood. As they did so, incidents of rape rose. The provisioning of water and culturally and environmentally appropriate food rations that require less water and fuel for preparation would go a long way toward alleviating this problem. A firewood provisioning project was instituted in Kenya's Dadaab camp for displaced Somalis but Hyndman called it a "short-term effort to address a web of endemic problems in the area" (2004, 208).

The spatial layout of refugee camps can have a definite effect on women's safety and UNHCR guidelines now address this. Services such as employment centers, rations distribution sites, clinics, schools, water sources, and police may be concentrated in specific sectors of a camp, usually near the perimeter for the convenience of aid workers. When that is the case, women must walk longer distances to seek services and they may be unwilling or unable to do so. But most significant is the issue of the location of latrines. Walking to latrines located at the edge of camps after dark can be hazardous for women and young girls; incidents of rape on the way to the latrines at night are commonly reported from Somali camps. Recently, in some camps, single women and unaccompanied female minors have been housed together in the interior of the camp with latrines located nearby. These areas are often then surrounded by thorny bushes to prevent or slow down attackers. The surrounding of camps with thorn bushes is reported to have been effective in reducing the incidence of attacks in camps (Hyndman 2004, 207).

On a more positive note, education can be profoundly transformative for a refugee community, reconfiguring aspects of the gender, class, and generational order. UNRWA established free elementary and middle schools in nearly all Palestinian camps in the early 1950s. Mass education affected every area of daily life from gender relations to the organization of domestic routines to subjectivity and identity. The availability of free local schools encouraged families to educate their daughters and was pivotal in creating generations of literate women.

Asylum and gender

Until recently the majority of those seeking asylum in the United States and Europe have been men. The 1951 Convention definition of a refugee, which asylum seekers must meet, did not include gender-based forms of persecution, discrimination, or violence. As the United States stiffened the requirements for asylum seekers in the 1990s, those who entered the United States were detained in prisons until their asylum hearings. Women fleeing sexual abuse, torture, and forced female genital mutilation were among those detained.

However, asylum policies have recently begun to take into account gender-based discrimination and persecution. With UNHCR encouragement, the Convention definition clause, "membership in a particular social category," is now opening to include gender. In 1993, Canada officially became the first country to allow gendered persecution and discrimination to be used as a basis for granting asylum. The United States followed suit in 1995, although they generally grant gender-based asylum when it occurs in combination with political persecution (Mertus 2000, 89–90).

To conclude, the UNHCR and the NGOs that constitute a refugee regime are increasingly tuned into gender differences and their meaning in the aid situation but they do so "within an institutional and legal framework that situates the people it aims to assist in specific ways" (Hyndman 2004, 208). The inclusion of a gender approach still runs the risk of elevating gender above other lines of difference where it may not be appropriate to do so.

* The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as:

> "A person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution." The inclusion of "herself" and "her" is a new addition; this definition was taken from UNHCR's website. The original definition used male pronouns.

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Julie Peteet

Migration: Refugee Women's Narratives

Afghanistan

More than three million Afghans in Pakistan have constituted one of the largest caseloads of refugees in the world over the last 25 years; most of them have been women and children. The narratives of these women, who have experienced violent conflict since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which led to displacement from their homes and communities, form eloquent testimonies to the politics and social histories of these turbulent times. Islamic discourse featured strongly in the politics and ideology that fanned resistance to the occupation and subsequent internecine war (1992–5) and Taliban rule (1996–2001), and immediately affected women's lives even as they reshaped their own communities inside Pakistan.

Women agreed to share their life stories in an oral history project (1999–2000) out of a need to have their stories heard, often discussing their traumas for the first time outside the private sphere. One woman put it aptly that Afghan women were never given the authority to stop the war or talk about it. Thus the process of collecting women's narratives was also political; survivors were eager to have their voices heard if history were to be recorded with any meaning at all. These oral histories of refugee women, collected across the Afghan ethnic and linguistic communities represented in Pakistan, reveal the great power in women's work of holding family and community together in the face of seemingly greater forces of destruction.

While it appears that they were more willing to sacrifice their homes and indeed their husbands and sons to the first holy war, or *jihād*, against Soviet occupation of their homeland after 1979, there is a shared disillusionment among women across communal (Shī'ī/Sunnī) and ethnic (among refugees mainly Pashtun, followed by Uzbek, Hazara, and other) groups when they talk about the unwarranted sacrifices they have had to make subsequently because their corrupt and incapable leaders did not know how to negotiate peace amongst themselves after the *jihād* was ostensibly over. Women across class and educational backgrounds argue that if their people had been better educated and trained in the art of making peace, perhaps they could have managed to avoid the Taliban takeover and further suffering in the 1990s. Camp years in the 1980s were wasted, they say, because there was not enough education, of either sex, which could have served them well in building a future. Instead, political leaders, and even the international aid community, reinforced an Islamist and violent culture to support the *jihād* that would come to haunt women afterwards and prolong the conflict in Afghanistan.

Afghan women have had to be realistic in the face of adversity, adapting to camp life or resettlement in urban communities in Pakistan. They say that they have changed in ways they could never have imagined. For many this means they had access to urban amenities such as basic schooling and health facilities, even in refugee camps, for the first time. Women also had to cope with severe restrictions on their mobility because they were in a foreign land and bizarre religious edicts, passed by Afghan political leaders in exile, curtailed their freedom.

Women now want to protect their children from the trauma caused by conflict and loss of home. For some that means returning home as soon as possible, and for others it means staying in Pakistan so that the dream of a university education for their children can be fulfilled. With more than half of Afghan refugees today under the age of 18, the educational and employment needs of the second generation are a primary concern for women who insist on remaining practical and often reject the politics of the men in their families. Their voices also reinforce the humanist aspirations of other survivors, non-combatants, disillusioned fighters, and marginalized people in Afghanistan who wish to rebuild their society in peace.

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AYESHA KHAN

Great Britain

Refugee and exiled women writers in Britain are engaged in a cathartic process of expressing complex feelings and experiences. Originating from countries such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Kurdistan, Somalia, and Turkey, they often "write them selves" as conceptualized by Hélène Cixous. Cixous's project has special resonance for these women in exile: "She must write her self because this is the invention of a new insurgent writing which when the moment of her liberation has come, will allow her to carry out the indispensable ruptures and transformations in her history" (Cixous 1976, 250).

It might be assumed that the themes of having been persecuted in war and of displacement would preoccupy refugee women writers. However, this is rarely the case. There are patterns of clear gender differences between how women and men narrate their experiences of being victimized in war and other violent conflicts. Male writers describe very specific experiences of torture and suffering (see Langer 1998) but women are often silent, avoiding this kind of painful detail, especially in terms of articulating gender specific persecution such as rape. Expressing these issues may be even more difficult for these writers because of the cultural beliefs that are prevalent in many of the Islamic countries from which they originate, which affix family identity and honor on women and their bodies. Kosovon writer Valbona Ismaili Luta said: "Where we come from, it is better to die than to be raped." Few women have written about the mass rape in former Yugoslavia, although there were tens of thousands of victims in its campaigns where rape was a deliberate strategy.

It may be years before women refugee writers externalize the events of violence and persecution. Dealing with memories of trauma takes time; it is a sifting and purifying process in which experiences are mediated and events and feelings are reconstructed. Dina Wardi, an Israeli psychotherapist, has identified two types of memory in relation to persecution: common memory where the victim remembers the details of names, dates, and the like, and deep memory, which includes traumatic events that may remain disconnected from the conscious self for long periods (see Wardi 1992). Thus, only many years after the experience of being occupied by the Russians was the Afghan writer, Farooka Gauhari, able to describe her efforts searching for her missing husband in her book *Searching for Saleem*.

In many refugee women's narratives, the private and the internal are evoked as they remember places, images, experiences, objects, and people. Farhija Hodzic, a Bosnian poet, describes the earrings she always wears that have been in her family for generations and which symbolize the link with her lost family. Rouhi Shafii in *Scent of Saffron* describes nostalgic childhood memories of her family house and sleeping on the roof during hot nights. Women friends and relatives often populate these narratives, reflecting the separate male–female spheres of these societies, with some texts exploring the relationships, conflicts, and bonds between women.

Events and feelings relating to a collective tragedy may also be evoked. Choman Hardi from Kurdistan dedicates her poem, "The Penelopes of My Homeland" to the widows of Anfal, the large-scale genocidal attacks against Kurdish men of northern Iraq in 1988. Many women, who were in reality widows, perpetually waited in vain for the return of their husbands. In the poem, the analogy of Penelope, the wife of Odysseus, is used, with Penelope waiting for the return of her husband from the Siege of Troy and from his long wanderings:

> Years and years of silent labour
> The Penelopes of my homeland
> Wove their own and their children's shrouds
> Without a sign of Odysseus returning (Hardi 2004, 21).

In addition to the problematics of memory, remembered and repressed, and the mediation of tabooed subjects, censorship can be a serious threat to the creativity of the writer. Many of the women, in order to survive in their homelands, had to participate in self-censorship, masking their ideas in allegory and imagery, with these patterns being perpetuated by writers to some extent in their new communities. Nahid Husseini, an exiled Iranian journalist, believes that it is difficult for Iranian writers to write openly and directly in exile given that they have long been accustomed to censorship. Valbona Luta, a Kosovon writer, has explained that because of the censorship operated by the Serbs, she still finds it difficult to write openly after years of self-censorship.

Moreover, women writers in exile must struggle with the possible repercussions of their activities on family members who stayed behind. This manifests itself in caution, especially when writing about politics, and sometimes in the use of pen names. One such writer is known only as "Sheherazade." In order to retrieve her short stories from her country while a refugee in Britain, she bribed her sister, who still lived there, with gifts. Her sister then hid Sheherazade's stories in letters that she sent to Britain, a risky process that took three years. Other authors have faced their own persecution in exile, becoming the targets of threats in their new countries. An Algerian writer who had spoken out at a British conference subsequently received mysterious phone calls and death threats. A young Iranian poet, Ziba Karbassi (2005), who is perceived by some Iranians as transgressing the hegemony of taboos relating to the woman's body and emotions and who advocated women's rights through poems such as "Death by Stoning," required British police protection.

The angst of exile is a powerful factor that inspires many to write. Bosnian poet Amna Dumpor said that her anguish on fleeing Bosnia and becoming a refugee had caused her to write prolifically, to pour out her emotions "like a volcano erupting." Somali poet Anab Sheikh Abdi has hopes of one day returning to her Juba River Valley homeland and meanwhile finds it difficult to function in Britain. Feelings of disjointedness, of feeling neither here nor there, are expressed in a wide range of works. What is striking in these narratives is that there is very little sense of the place and space the refugee women currently inhabit and there are few narratives in which the characters interact with British people. Whereas the locations are British, usually London settings, the writers deploy characters who are outsiders. Rouhi Sharifian in her story "The Traveller" expresses the pain of not belonging and of dual identities through her image of a transvestite who is shunned by other passengers on a coach journey to Nottingham. Dursaliye Bedir, a Turkish writer, interestingly observes an identifiable minority, Orthodox Jewish women in Stamford Hill, London, through curious yet sympathetic eyes. In their novels and short stories two Iraqi writers in London, Haifa Zangana and Samira Al-Mana, describe the perspective of characters in exile with British spaces reinterpreted in terms of the culture of the Iraqi exile community.

In the process of "writing them selves," exiled women may participate in writing groups in their new communities. One example is the London-based organization, Exiled Writers Ink, which provides a supportive environment, writing workshops, meeting space for writers, and translation and produces the magazine *Exiled Ink* (<www.exiledwriters.co.uk>), in addition to devising collaborative productions by exiled writers (Exiled Writers Ink with Horn of Africa Women's Association 2003).

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JENNIFER LANGER

Sudan

This entry considers five types of narrative produced by Sudanese refugee women both inside and outside Sudan. While not a comprehensive survey of the variety of women's narratives, particularly those produced by women for women, men, and children in the Sudanese diaspora, two of the narrative forms are produced in participation with non-refugees for external consumption while two reflect women's representations to internal audiences. Finally, the recent international visibility of

some Sudanese women writers in a more literary genre represents a fifth type of narrative.

The most widely accessible set of refugee women's narratives is that created by journalists and humanitarian aid workers using women's testimonies of the violence and conflict that have led them to flee, their suffering in exile, and their longing for peace. Journalists have interviewed Sudanese women throughout the extraordinarily complex and lengthy war that has engulfed Sudan since the 1950s. Its reignition and expansion between 1983 and the present, causing the uprooting, suffering, and flight of millions of Sudanese and the death of at least 2 million is one of the greatest ongoing tragedies. Representations of the human costs include visual representations of women and their families in feeding centers set up under the auspices of Operation Lifeline Sudan, interviews with women by journalists, and testimonies of women and girls collected by nongovernmental organizations about their suffering. This narrative, published by Human Rights Watch (2005), captures the voice of 9-year-old Leila in a refugee camp in Darfur when asked about a drawing that she had done:

> Human Rights Watch: What is going on here?
> Leila: My hut burning after being hit by a bomb.
> Human Rights Watch: And here? [Pointing to the drawing of what looks like an upside-down woman]
> Leila: It's a woman. She is dead.
> Human Rights Watch: Why is her face colored in red?
> Leila: Oh, because she has been shot in the face.
> Human Rights Watch: What is this vehicle? Who is this in green?
> Leila: That is a tank. The man in green is a soldier (Sparrow and Bercault 2005).

A second type of narrative includes those produced by Sudanese refugee women together with researchers. These narratives are framed by the concerns of the research topic but often include women's accounts of their concerns about their lives in exile, the changes to family life, and hopes and desires for the future. Abusharaf (2001) presents the stories of eight refugees in a piece describing their reasons for leaving Sudan and changes to women's overall mobility and expectations:

> When I arrived in Canada, I realized I was not alone. I met a lot of Sudanese refugee women, many of them are unmarried, are generally young, in their thirties maybe. Like other refugee women, I can summarize my reasons for coming here: military oppression, imposition of laws that threatens me as a woman and shrinking opportunities to get ahead, have a decent life. Definitely my migration was the answer (Amna, interviewed by Abusharaf 2001).

A number of researchers in Cairo have done fieldwork with Sudanese women, in the process collating a rich account of gender, livelihood, and change for Sudanese refugees in an urban setting (Akuei 2001, Coker 2004, Curley 2003, Currie 2004, Lado 1996, Fábos 2002, and others). James Wani Lejukole (2002) has conducted research with southern Sudanese refugee women and men in Cairo, exploring gender shifts in family authority and power stemming from men's inability to find employment. Other researchers have explored refugee women's experiences in Cairo through studies of illicit economic activities such as alcohol brewing and prostitution (Curley 2003), domestic violence (Ahmed 1999), and health concerns (Coker 2004). Currie details the strategies of Sudanese women and men who approach the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for resettlement to the United States and includes many narratives describing the desperation many Sudanese feel about staying in Cairo, as in Joanne's account here:

> Most of us cannot go back to Sudan; integration in Egypt is not possible. Refugees want to get the noose out from around their neck and will go to any extreme to be added to a UNHCR recognized file. The UNHCR process is permeating our whole language and culture. Even our small children know the UNHCR terminology – Acceptance, Rejection, Addition, Appeal, Closed File, Resettlement, and how these words can affect their lives. The children know acceptance means a good thing. They know they are going to leave this country (Currie 2004, 1)

Videos prepared by Sudanese for circulation among the Sudanese refugee diaspora are another form of narrative that present women's voices as they give transnational advice and instructions to refugees resettling in Western countries. Akuei introduces us to a young woman who spoke in one of the frequent prayer services held for Sudanese on the eve of their resettlement, saying,

> This family is an example of the suffering Sudanese families. A sign of the innocent children of the Sudan, do not forget to be ambassadors of our country [*panda*] and to show the love we have for our country to the foreigners wherever we go and let us struggle for our country's sake (Akuei 2001, 4).

Sudanese refugee women's voices are also increasingly present in English and Arabic language Sudanese online forums, offering political commentary, poems, and opinion about the state of the Sudanese nation and the issues affecting women and men in the diaspora. In response to news that the Sudanese government was offering several million dollars in compensation for the Sudanese killed in Darfur, an online participant contributed this post (replicated here with original spelling):

> Now government wasting the time on offering deals which can not be accepted at this time. Musa Hilal was good in killing but not good in keeping peace. He should use his money to pay the expensive fees for lowers [lawyers] who will advocate for him in ICC. Honor and lives of darfurian are not for sale (Sara, 13 May 2005).

Other Sudanese women comment on women's position in general and in Sudanese society in particular. Several threads on the forum Sudanese On-Line discuss the problem of sexual harassment, often in the form of poems or stories. The post entitled "To a flasher" begins:

> He takes his turn round the corner
> Down the dusty road
> His feet had just began to know
> He marks his spot
> Eyes searching and finds
> – seeing me –
> his audience
> he looks around
> cautious (Maysoon, 4 March 2004).

Sudanese women have been active in the peace movement, as is reflected in this statement on the eve of the peace agreement between the Sudanese government and southern Sudanese groups:

> We are crying and requesting the international community to exert pressure and tough conditions on the Sudan government to end the war in Sudan. This war is about justice and human rights. The government of Sudan is bombing civilians, primarily women and children, yet no safe haven is created for us.
>
> We, as women, are appealing to the international community to stop the bombardment of innocent people in Southern Sudan who are defenseless women and children and the laying of landmines, the source of untold human suffering. We feel we have had enough of the refugee life. We want to go home and revive our dignity and culture and to produce food for our families (statement by Sudan Refugees Women Association in Koboko, Uganda, March 1999).

The 2000 Caine Prize for African Literature was awarded to Sudanese-born Leila Aboulela for her English-language novel *The Translator*, which was also long-listed for the Orange Prize for Fiction. She describes her experience of exile as the reason why she started writing: "I was homesick for Khartoum. People around me did not know much about Sudan or about Islam, the two things that made up my identity" (Ciabattara 2005). Her second novel, *Minaret*, is partly based on her own experience of leaving Khartoum with her family for political exile in London. Another example of autobiography in English is *Slave*, by Mende Nazer and Damien Lewis, an account of Nazer's enslavement in Sudan, following which she was taken to London to serve another Sudanese family. Nazer finally made contact with other Nuba Sudanese exiles and escaped.

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Anita Fábos

Migration: Refugees and Health

Arab States (including the Kurds)

Women and children constitute well over half of most refugee flows, and it has been estimated that 25 percent of refugee women are pregnant at any given time (Karunakara 1998). The refugee situation affects health issues on every level, causing or exacerbating physical problems, impacting access to health care, disrupting family relationships, and altering traditional health practices (Palmer and Zwi 1998). During the last decade researchers have begun to recognize and address the gendered nature of the refugee experience (Ascoly et al. 2001), and there is considerable evidence that refugee life may be inherently more "unhealthy" for women than it is for men (Boelaert et al. 1999). Reproductive health care is the most obvious example of a "gendered need" among refugee women; however, to focus on this dimension alone is to ignore important social and cultural factors in favor of the biological, obstetric definition of women's health (Muecke 1992, Wulf 1994). Restricting the analysis to objectified syndromes and symptoms obscures their relation to other measures of health and well-being, and to larger political and socioeconomic realities. In other words, refugees do not exist in a social or cultural vacuum, but rather carry with them cultural scripts and practices that provide the bases for health beliefs and practices, as well as for the experience and expression of illness and disease. The present entry focuses on the health issues of refugee women from the Arab/Muslim world, with the understanding that gender and religious/ethnic origin (as well as health) are problematic categories that must be understood first and foremost as products of culture.

While Middle Eastern/Muslim countries are not necessarily culturally homogeneous, certain shared norms and values lead to commonalities of experience among refugees from these areas, often with important implications for health. Reproductive health is of particular concern because of typically high fertility rates among these groups coupled with a lack of familiarity with reproductive health services and a reticence about discussing these issues openly, particularly with a male doctor (Al-Qudsi 2000, Allotey and Manderson 2003). There is evidence, moreover, that high fertility rates may characterize refugee communities in particular compared to settled communities. In the West Bank and Gaza, for example, refugee fertility is somewhat higher than that of non-refugees (Al-Qudsi 2000). Coupled with higher unemployment rates and lower average wages, this means that refugee women in Gaza face many more reproductive health problems and reduced access to services compared to non-refugees in their community.

Female refugees and victims of war trauma very commonly fall victim to sexual exploitation or abuse (Ascoly et al. 2000). Refugee camps in general are notorious as sites of rape and even forced prostitution of women (Elmadmad 1999). For Muslim women in particular, cultural notions of honor may cause female rape victims to be rejected by their families and communities. For example, many Kurdish refugees were placed in camps in Greece and elsewhere during the Kurdish crisis of the early 1990s. Those women who fell victim to rape were seen as responsible for their predicament (a common sentiment in Muslim societies in general) and their children were not recognized by the community. In addition to causing often insurmountable social condemnation, this situation virtually guarantees that rape victims will avoid seeking health care for rape-related trauma.

Arab/Muslim refugees who have settled in countries of final asylum may continue to face health problems originating in the nexus between gender and culture of origin. According to Elmadmad (1999), female Muslim asylum-seekers in non-Muslim host societies may, for example, be the targets of harassment because their religious identity is visible by the veil or headscarf (Kaplan and Webster 2003). Lack of acceptance by the host society can contribute to isolation and impede access to health services, as can other factors that differentially impact integration for female compared to male Muslim refugees. For example, Kurdish refugee women, particularly those from Turkey, are often illiterate, causing problems in adjustment that can contribute directly or indirectly to ill-health and poor health outcomes (Wahlbeck 1999). In addition, many refugees from Arab/Muslim countries fled from war and other ongoing political problems that continue long after resettlement, and thus continue to affect the health and coping skills of

refugee women, who may be especially concerned about family members left at home (Sondergaard et al. 2001).

Many migration-related adjustments are lived most intensely within the household and are enacted in terms of family relationships and gender roles (Matsuoka and Sorenson 1999). In the majority of the societies that produce refugees, including Arab/Muslim cultures, women have the primary responsibility for childcare, leaving them particularly vulnerable to the deprivation and insecurity inherent in situations of flight (Kaplan and Webster 2003). Once settled in the host country, women may be more isolated from the dominant culture than are men, being trapped in the home because of childcare responsibilities, cultural proscriptions against women entering public spaces, and a lack of basic education, not to mention skill in the language of the host country. A different scenario may occur when reproduction and the family become politicized in times of war and social disintegration (Awwad 2004). Among Palestinian refugees, for example, there are strong social pressures to have many children, as childbearing is viewed as a way of resisting the occupation through population pressure (Giacaman and Odeh 2002).

Although most research points to specific vulnerabilities of refugee women, there is also some evidence that the refugee experience may directly or indirectly serve to empower Arab/Muslim women and improve certain health outcomes. For example, one study suggested that female Kurdish refugees resettled in London enjoyed more social support and benefited from having "less to lose" in terms of rigid socialized gender roles compared to men (Griffiths 2001). For the same reason, Kurdish female refugees were far more likely to access, and benefit from, counseling services compared to men. To give another example, while female genital mutilation, or FGM, is not practiced in all, or even most Muslim societies, the practice of infibulation, or the most extreme form of FGM, is widespread among Arab/Muslim Sudanese. Fabos (2001) found, however, that an indirect effect of the dramatic shift in social, economic, and political circumstances among Arab Sudanese refugee women in Cairo led to increased resistance to the practice of FGM.

To effectively serve Muslim refugee women as well as refugees from other cultural groups, public health policies need to focus both on structural factors stemming from cultural notions of gender and family, and on phenomenological issues related to refugees' own experiences of health, rooted in indigenous cultural notions of self. In Arab/Muslim cultures health is often viewed in holistic terms that encompass social, emotional, and physical well-being (Coker 2005, Giacaman and Odeh 2002, Morsy 1993). For example, when asked to freely discuss health issues, Palestinian women defined health and illness not necessarily in terms of objective disease states, but as a function of the opportunity to engage in social activities or the right to make autonomous decisions about one's life in the midst of ongoing political violence (Giacaman and Odeh 2002). In other words, "health" is a multi-layered concept that is engaged with gender, culture, and refugee status not as outside influences but as interlocking parts of a whole.

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Elizabeth Coker

Iran

Iran has one of the world's largest refugee populations, comprised primarily of Afghans and Iraqis (UNHCR 2001). There have been several waves of Afghan migration to Iran, which correspond to significant political events from the late 1970s to the present. The first and largest recent wave of Afghan refugees occurred at about the same time as the influx of Iraqi refugees, around 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. A second wave corresponded with Soviet withdrawal, from 1989 to 1992 as a result of internal fighting, around 1996 with the ascension of the Taliban government, and most recently (2001 to the present) with American military activity. With the most recent exodus, though, many Afghans were not permitted into Iran and were set up in camps at the Iran–Afghan border.

Over 95 percent of Afghans living in Iran have integrated into Iranian communities, or live in their own communities within Iran's cities and villages. Unlike Pakistan, where Afghans are physically marginalized, in Iran fewer than 5 percent of Afghans live in refugee camps. Although there are weekly reports of refugees returning to Afghanistan, as of 2002 there were still an estimated 1.8–2.3 million living in Iran (UNHCR 2001). Since 2002 Iran has been working aggressively along with the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees to voluntarily repatriate all Afghans. Findings presented here are based on qualitative ethnographic research conducted in 2001, 2002, and 2004 among low-income Afghan refugees in urban and rural locations in Isfahan, Iran, and from open-ended interviews conducted in health clinics with Afghan women patients and health workers.

The different ethnic groups of Afghan refugees living in and around Isfahan include primarily Hazara, Pashtun, Tajik, and Parsi. Pashtun, Parsi, and Tajiks are primarily Sunnī Muslims; Hazara Afghans, like Iranians, are primarily Shīʿī. In Isfahan, Hazara Afghans live primarily in urban locations, while Pashtun comprise the majority in rural villages.

Afghan and Iranian health comparisons

In Afghanistan, infant mortality is at 165 children per 1,000 born, 257 out of 1,000 are likely to die before their fifth birthday, and maternal mortality is between 1,600 and 1,700 per 100,000 women. In Iran, on the other hand, infant and under 5 mortality rates are currently 28.6 and 35.6 per 1,000 births, and maternal mortality rate is 37 per 100,000 (Human Development Reports 2002). Life expectancy for men and women in Iran is 67 and 72 (WHO 2005). In Afghanistan, mortality and morbidity figures due to tuberculosis are alarmingly high, especially among women. According to some estimates, the incidence of active tuberculosis cases is 278 per 100,000 and tuberculosis mortality rates are 15,000 cases per year (Khan and Laaser 2002a, 2000b). In Iran, by contrast, the 2003 notification rate of new tuberculosis cases is 16 per 100,000 (Office of the Deputy for Social Affairs 2004). Each year in Iran, between 120 and 130 multidrug-resistant cases of tuberculosis are discovered, 50 percent of which are among non-Iranians (Office of the Deputy for Social Affairs 2004). Unlike Afghanistan, Iran's aggressive tuberculosis screening and DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short-course) program has dramatically reduced tuberculosis deaths.

Aside from the minority of Afghans who live in the few refugee camps (around 5 percent) whose health status is recorded by Red Crescent and other relief workers, record keeping on Afghan health conditions is less than accurate in Iran. Documented Afghan families who settle in a given area and are served by the local health clinic do have medical files in the clinic. However, many Afghan families are highly mobile, traveling to find work, and others are illegal. Though Afghans

seek care at local health clinics, the clinics only keep files of patients who are relatively settled and have cards documenting that they are in Iran legally. Afghan patients who are in Iran illegally may be treated, but files are not kept for them, making it difficult to assess the overall health conditions of Afghans in Iran.

Refugees and the public health system

Isfahan province has a population of approximately 4 million, distributed between 19 cities and surrounding villages. Isfahan city has a population of 1.4 million individuals, two urban health centers, and 50 health posts. Each health post serves approximately 12,500 people. Outside the urban areas, there are rural health centers to meet the health needs of every 5,000 individuals. People in more remote villages are served by the health houses (one for every 3,000 people), which are overseen by the health centers. The *behvarz* (community health worker) primarily works out of rural health centers and houses. There is on the average one *behvarz* per 1,000 people. There is also one birthing center for every 30,000 people. Services provided by health centers include: family planning and birth control (including vasectomy procedures), screening and treatment for infectious disease, occupational and environmental health, physical therapy, counseling, social work, and specialty clinics. Services are free for patients who have been referred from the health posts.

According to Iranian public health workers and officials, as well as personal observation, Afghan refugees arrive in Iran in a poor state of health. Some of the major health concerns, in both recent immigrants and those who migrated years ago, include: tuberculosis, cholera, malaria, and polio (Poureslami et al. 2004), as well as dysentery and eye diseases in children. In Isfahan province, leshimaniasis, a potentially fatal and disfiguring skin disease caused by a burrowing sand fly, is also a problem, especially in rural areas. Iranian health workers (*behvarz*), visit Afghan communities regularly to screen for and treat various infectious diseases (especially malaria and tuberculosis) and provide polio drops for all children under five. Vaccinations are provided for all children, free of charge, in local health clinics.

Although there are no data on disease rates for Afghans in Iran compared to their Iranian counterparts, it is likely that conditions in their host country are dramatically better than in Afghanistan, given their access to health services in Iran, including treatment for infectious disease and childhood immunizations.

Health care delivery and family planning

In 1989, in response to its own population explosion, Iran initiated an aggressive and extremely successful family planning campaign. Since then, the total fertility rate has dropped by more than 50 percent, from 5.5 births per woman in 1988, to below 2.8 in 1996, and 2.0 in 2000 (Abbasi-Shavazi 2002), exceeding the World Health Organization 2005 target (UNHDP 2000). Yet, in light of a declining Iranian population, health workers have been frustrated that Afghans in Iran have a much higher birthrate, and do not seem to want family planning services to the same degree that Iranians do. This has been especially frustrating for service providers who contend that too many Afghans and Afghan children place a burden on Iran's limited health resources, such as vaccinations for children.

Through the public health system, Iran provides free contraceptive services (including condoms, intrauterine devices [IUDs], birth control pills, Depo Provera injections, Norplant, tubal ligation, and vasectomy), free vaccinations for all children under five, and free screening and treatment for infectious disease in both Iranian and refugee communities. Prenatal care is not covered, however, and most Afghan women give birth at home with the assistance of an uncertified midwife, or *maman*. While most Iranian families choose to limit the number of children to two, many Afghan women are reticent to use family planning services. Iranian health workers and officials express frustration that "Afghans don't want family planning."

Afghan women living in urban areas (primarily Hazara Shīʿīs) are more likely to use contraception than their rural counterparts – usually after their fourth or fifth child – citing economic constraints, cramped living quarters, and fatigue as the main reasons behind contraceptive use. Most of these women use birth control without their husbands' knowledge, and prefer Depo Provera injections because they are undetectable. In Afghan families where couples use contraception openly it is because the husband agrees that the number of children the couple have are enough and they believe, along with their Iranian counterparts, that family planning is acceptable in Islam. Women who choose not to use birth control express fear that their husbands would take another wife if they did not continue to produce more children,

and that birth control was not consistent with their Islamic beliefs, stating: "It is up to God to determine when to give children and when to take them away."

In rural locations, especially in Pashtun communities, while some women do use contraception with or without their husbands' permission, most do not. When asked "How many children are enough?" Pashtun women and men typically respond: "Har che Khoda mikhoad" (As many as God wants). In these communities it is not uncommon for a woman in her late thirties to have up to 12 living children, as well as several who have died due to war and disease. Among Sunnī Pashtun informants there seems to be less interest in using contraception than among Shīʿī Hazaras, although there is some indication that these views are slowly changing in the younger generation. Many younger Pashtun informants are becoming educated in family planning through their village health centers and houses, as a result of the activities of rural health workers and the efforts by some Iranian physicians in rural clinics to incorporate Afghans into community health and family planning education and outreach.

Age of marriage and reproductive implications

There are dramatic differences in age of marriage and desired number of children between Afghan and Iranian women. While Iranian women in both urban and rural settings are marrying in their late teens through their twenties, it is typical for Afghan women in Iran to marry before they are 16, and sometimes before they reach adolescence. Afghan girls, particularly rural Pashtun, are also often married at a young age so that her family can collect bride-price. This practice does not occur among Iranians. Economic constraints on Afghan families thus increase the span of a girl's reproductive years and the number of children she is likely to have.

There is a marked difference in education level between Afghan and Iranian girls and young women. All Iranian women in the study were educated to at least the fifth grade, and many beyond and through university. For a variety of reasons, Afghan migrants in poorer sections of urban Isfahan have dramatically less exposure to public education than do their Iranian counterparts. For Hazara, Tajik, and Parsi groups this is considered to be a problem that is partly due to economic constraints, but also to issues of limited access. These families express their wish for their daughters to have better opportunities so that their lives wil not be *bad bakht* (miserable, unfortunate), like that of their parents. Rural Pashtun informants did not perceive lack of education to be a problem at all for their daughters, and only marginally a problem for their sons, although most sent their boys to Qu'rānic school, where they learned to read Arabic, but were not exposed to other aspects of education.

Repatriation and family planning decisions

Though some Afghans are anxious to return home, many are reticent, and express concern that their country is still not safe and that there are no opportunities for themselves or their children. Most of the Pashtun, and other Afghans living in rural areas, expressed a desire to remain in Iran, stating that Iran is their home now. Urban Afghan women were anxious to return to their country, citing their husbands' reduced employment opportunities and increased hostility toward Afghans in Iran as the main reasons. Afghan women are particularly affected by impending repatriation, and are afraid for the health and safety of their children should they return. Afghan women are also forced to make reproductive decisions based on their fear of a lack of reproductive services in Afghanistan. Several Hazara women interviewed in urban clinics decided to have their IUDs removed and scheduled tubal ligations before repatriation. They were afraid that in Afghanistan they would either get an infection from the IUD that could not be treated or that if they became pregnant they would likely die in childbirth; Afghanistan has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world (<www. unicef. org>).

Conclusion

Health conditions for Afghan families in Iran are dramatically better than the conditions in Afghanistan. Yet, the experiences of having lost several children as a result of war and disease likely still play a significant role in Afghan reluctance to utilize contraceptive services. Young women who were raised and married in Iran, and did not have the same experiences of loss as older women, still express a desire for large families. Cultural and religious beliefs emphasizing the importance of having many children play a significant role in the lack of interest in family planning programs. In Afghan communities, especially, it is important to increase access to family planning and general education among the youth, and among men in particular.

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DIANE TOBER

Turkey

Turkey retains a geographic limitation to its ratification of the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, which means that only those fleeing as a consequence of events occurring in Europe can settle in Turkey on a permanent basis. All refugees entering Turkey from the Middle East, Asia, or Africa must obtain refugee status from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a temporary residence permit (*ikamet*) from the Turkish government.

All refugees with an *ikamet* and UNHCR refugee status have access to free or partly paid medical/hospital care. With the exception of refugees living in the city of Istanbul, all refugees are responsible for getting in touch with the

UNHCR and local health authorities in order to receive health coverage when in need. Refugees living in the city of Istanbul can receive help and guidance from a refugee social services program run by the organization International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC).

Formally, there is no policy or program concerned with the specific needs of women; however, in practice, women's health needs receive priority treatment specifically in the areas of pregnancy and reproductive health. Under the ICMC social services program, female social workers work with female refugees' specific needs, enquiring about domestic violence and other physical or psychological conditions that may affect the women's well-being. All refugees are offered psychological assessments and female refugees with signs of trauma or psychological vulnerability are encouraged to receive further free psychological treatment and help.

In November 1996, the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance to Iranian Refugees (CHAIR), the International Federation of Iranian Refugees (IFIR), the Women's Committee – Turkey Branch, and the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children conducted a reproductive health needs assessment survey of 27 self-identified refugee women living in Kaysari, Turkey. Additional, qualitative information was gathered through two focus groups of another 15 refugee women and 12 refugee men. Kaysari was selected because of its large refugee population. The assessment findings revealed a shortage of access to reproductive health services because of fear, lack of Turkish language skills, insufficient information on available resources, and financial constraints, and indicated areas for advocacy and education. Conditions have improved since that time but more interest and attention is still needed.

A special women's shelter was opened by the Human Resources Development Foundation in November 2004 for female refugees and, more specifically, trafficked women. All effort is made to maintain the secrecy of the whereabouts of the shelter and to ensure the security of the women.

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Cherie Taraghi

Migration: Regional

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is distinguished by a long nomadic and tribal history that continues to affect the migration patterns of women today. In this strict Muslim and patriarchal society, Afghan men have restricted and controlled the migratory patterns of their wives and daughters for several centuries. By the mid-twentieth century nomadic groups became less prominent across Afghanistan, accounting for only one-sixth of the total population. This led to greater seclusion of women, or *purdah*, and the promotion of a more sedentary way of life.

Since the 1970s, however, Afghan women have been internally displaced across Afghanistan or forced to seek refuge in neighboring Iran or Pakistan as a result of internal war and conflict. Diverging from history, many of these women have been forced to flee alone without their husbands. By the early 1980s, approximately 3 million Afghan refugees had fled their homes, reaching 6 million by the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Women accounted for over half the refugee population, with only 20 percent of all families having a female income earner (RSP 1987, 7).

Internal conflict in the 1980s tore families apart, producing tens of thousands of widows and forcing women to seek protection with other relatives in Afghanistan or in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran.

During the years of conflict, a majority of women left Afghanistan with their families for more safety and a better livelihood. Some male Afghans also reported leaving Afghanistan with their families after 1978 in opposition to the intrusive literacy program implemented by the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to educate women. Those who fled for such reasons did not want their wives educated and forced them to leave Afghanistan. Moreover, many men believed the government was trying to undermine such important practices as *purdah* and other conservative Islamic traditions (Moghadam 2004, 454).

The provinces of Karachi (Pakistan) and Tehran (Iran) became the major destinations for female refugees and their families because of economic opportunities and national networks of relatives or friends. Men traveled to these destinations first to establish a base before sending for family. A 1991 study of refugees in Iran discovered that an estimated 21 percent of Afghans were women, as opposed to a 1999 survey that placed women refugees at 45 percent of the total refugee population. One reason contributing to this difference may have been the gradual increase in the number of wives moving to join husbands working in Iran (Azerbaijani-Moghadam 2001, 14). In Pakistan, a similar survey conducted in 1990 found that women outnumbered men by five to three, with a fifth of adult married women widowed from war casualties (Christensen 1990, 16).

In the 1980s, Iran issued special blue cards to refugees that allowed them to live and work in Iran, and access schools and health care. After 1992, the government cancelled the distribution of such cards, making new refugee arrivals illegal. Afghanis continued to flow into Iran through illegal smuggling routes in the 1990s. By 1998, an estimated 1.4 million Afghans lived in Iran, with approximately 22,000 (1.7 percent) living in refugee camps (Squire and Gerami 1998, 19). Comparatively, Pakistan had 3.5 million Afghan refugees by 2001 (Jazayery 2002, 240).

When the Mujahidin gained control of the Afghan government in 1992, some 2 million refugees returned to Afghanistan; by 1997, close to 4 million had come back from Pakistan and Iran. Outbursts of fighting between rival Mujahidin groups, however, caused fear among many refugees, which prevented them from returning, and forced more to flee. By the mid-1990s, women of rival factions to the Mujahidin were taken for ransom, either for money or forced marriages. Women were also often sold into prostitution in Pakistan.

In 1996, the Taliban came to power and issued strong edicts against women, including restricting their mobility. Women were not permitted to travel without a man's consent. In addition to one of the worst droughts in Afghanistan in 30 years, the Taliban's large-scale massacres of civilians and reported rape of women triggered large outflows of Afghans, including 1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs).

For a brief period from 1996 to 1997, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) assisted in a repatriation program for Afghan women and children, which ended when the Taliban's brutal treatment toward women increased.

Since 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban, hundreds of thousands of Afghan women have returned to Afghanistan in an attempt to resume their previous lives after more than two decades of war.

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GEOFFREY GRESH

Central Asia

The end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries witnessed what seemed to be unprecedented waves of migration into and out of the newly independent republics of Central Asia. Media reports about the politically, socially, and economically destabilizing potential of the massive movements of populations were and continue to be frequent. After decades of very limited access to Central Asian societies for Western academics, they too were attracted to what appeared to be demographic developments of previously unheard-of dimensions. What was, however, often left out of the picture in such reports was the historical dimension (including an analysis of Soviet and Russian treatments of the issue) and the wide variety in kinds of migratory movements. A thorough gendered analysis has yet to be provided for any kind of migration except sex trafficking.

There has always been a very strong migratory tradition in large parts of Central Asia, where a significant proportion of the population lived nomadic lifestyles. While some population groups lived as settled farmers and in urban conglomerates, others relied mainly on their animal herds for subsistence and followed them to various pastures, usually living in tents. There used to be a symbiotic relationship between the settled and the nomadic populations.

When Tsarist Russia began to dominate the region in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, certain demographic trends emerged: the population grew exponentially, particularly so in the urban areas, largely as a result of the immigration of Slavic peoples and the settlement of previously nomadic mountain and steppe dwellers in urban areas. Amongst Slavs, migration was gendered inasmuch as the first people to arrive were usually male administrators and the military, only much later joined by their families. These general migration trends were further strengthened during Soviet times, when "population exchanges" within the territory of the Soviet Union became part of state policies. Stalin's policy of forced migration brought large numbers of Slavs (Russian-speaking "Europeans" in local parlance) to the region, so that their proportion in some (urban) areas grew to up to 60 percent. From the 1970s onwards, some of these Slavs began to emigrate again, mainly to the "European" republics of the Soviet Union. The Soviet regime encouraged the Central Asian population to study, work, and settle in other parts of the Union, yet apparently with little success. Not only did the promised benefits not have the desired effect, but people were also not willing to tolerate the discrimination they frequently faced elsewhere, and, what is more, there was a tight system of control in place, which impeded people's free movment. Inter- as well as intra-republican migration was only possible with prior official permission or by command. People were frequently resettled *within* the region from remote areas to areas of intense industrial or agricultural production.

Since the beginning of perestroika policies in the 1980s, and particularly since independence of the Central Asian republics in 1991, this system of control has relaxed considerably and population movement has become easier. Immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and almost total collapse of the infrastructure, the main trends were toward emigration of the (Slavic) elite and migration of urban populations to the rural areas, where relatives would be engaged in subsistence farming. Thus, the degree of urbanization decreased, with an increasing part of the population (about two-thirds) living in rural areas, and the proportion of "nationals" (for example Kyrgyz in Kyrgyzstan) increasing. The trend toward urban–rural migration has reverted from the mid-1990s, as access to resources in the rural areas was

limited, former state farms had collapsed, unemployment was rampant, and significant industries lacking. Especially young men increasingly migrated to the cities, making internal migration dynamics a decidedly gender- and age-marked phenomenon. The move of "newcomers" from rural areas to the cities has historically and recently been perceived by the more "established" urban elite (mainly Slavic, but increasingly also local) as a major threat to the political, social, and economic stability of the republics. By the end of the 1990s, most regimes had reintroduced a system of registration and control over population movements. A particularly dramatic case of population movements could be observed in Tajikistan, where the civil war after independence unsettled large parts of the population: those who could left the country, others fled to the rural areas where fighting was less severe; every fifth Tajikistani became an internally displaced person. After the end of the civil war, most people returned from their respective refuges, but because of the economic impasse in the country, labor migration, especially to Russia, grew quickly.

Many of the Central Asians living elsewhere in the Soviet Union re-immigrated, and people were encouraged to move to their "national homelands," for example the Uzbeks or Tajiks living in Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan respectively. As borders between the republics had been drawn and redrawn in rather arbitrary ways by the Russians and Soviets, and movement across those borders during the Soviet time had been common and effortless, the new significance of national borders was perceived as irritating by many. This particular aspect of post-independence national boundaries had further effects on the population: access to scarce resources was increasingly granted along ethnic lines, and trade across borders (mainly by women) was severely impeded.

Labor migration and trade do, however, continue to play a vital role in people's survival and in the Central Asian economies. A significant part of the population in the Central Asian republics have migrated to other former Soviet republics, most notably amongst them Russia, but also (especially from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) Kazakhstan. In search of work, some people settle there, but most only migrate for a certain period of time, often during their twenties and thirties, frequently live in squalid conditions, and send much of their earnings to their families at home. What was furthermore established between these countries is referred to as "shuttle trade," mainly in the hands of women, who are regularly at the mercy of customs officers and border guards. The income generated through this kind of activity, like many other ways in which women have managed to earn a living since independence, is not generally appreciated, as it involves women's unprotected traveling and prolonged absences from their families. But because it is very often the sole income of a family and because men have generally been less successful in coping with the difficult situation in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the state-administered economy of Soviet times, trade on whichever scale can significantly empower women in Central Asia.

At the same time, another kind of trade has emerged, which proves decidedly destructive for women: sex trafficking. A growing number of young women are lured into migrating abroad through promises of lucrative work. Trafficking agents take advantage of the dire economic situation of the majority of people in Central Asia, attracting mainly young women through advertisements to sign up for work in Southeast Asia, the Gulf countries, or Europe. Once there, many of the women (and increasingly also children) have their passports taken away and find themselves working as prostitutes in brothels, or in another form of slavery as housemaids.

One final form of "migration" is the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca; after decades of being cut off from the rest of the Muslim world, an increasing number of pilgrims are now able to perform the *ḥajj*. Some of the better-off Central Asians fly to Saudi Arabia, yet most people take upon them the longer, more uncomfortable, but cheaper option of traveling by bus. This kind of migration continues to be marked by class and wealth, as well as by age (usually the middle aged) and gender (more frequently men).

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Julia Droeber

Iran

For centuries, tribal and nomadic tendencies have been a characteristic way of life for women and their families. In the 1920s, Reza Shah's government encouraged nomadic groups to establish permanent habitations in local communities through national land reform and economic development programs. The land reform movement later intensified under Mohammad Reza Shah, drastically affecting the role of women in a new age of industrialization and modernization. Estimates put the nomad population at 2.8 million, or 22 percent of the total population, at the start of the twentieth century. Available statistics from 1962 reported the nomadic population, including semi-settled groups, to be approximately 3 million, or 15 percent of Iran's total. The figures from 1966, however, did not include semi-settled groups and thus placed the nomadic population at about 642,000. This total, consisting of over 122,000 families, contained more men (approximately 337,000) than women (approximately 305,000).

Although male migration has been the predominant factor influencing female migration across Iran since the 1980s, migratory patterns of women have also been affected by education, marriage, employment, and warfare.

The outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War at the end of 1980 marked the beginning of an outflow of women and families from the western provinces of Iran. For eight years, the Iranian government provided shelter for the 1.5 million internally displaced Iranians. Many Iranians also fled to Turkey and Pakistan. The war had a particularly severe effect on women, killing husbands and sons, and destroying homes. When a ceasefire was finally signed in 1988, most women preferred living with their families close to urban centers that provided greater economic opportunities and social services, such as Shiraz and Tehran.

The start of the Islamic Revolution hurt Iran's economy in the 1980s and forced many families to migrate to neighboring countries, such as Turkey, or from rural to urban settings for stable work and a better quality of life. In a study conducted from 1976 to 1986 on the rural–urban migration patterns of men and women, women were slightly more mobile than men in both settings – 17 percent of women migrated to urban areas versus 16.7 percent of men; and 8.9 percent of women migrated to other rural areas as opposed to only 8.4 percent of men. The study also noted that 80 percent of the women migrants from the study were obligated to follow their parents and husbands (Hemmasi 1994, 217, 222). Strong cultural traditions tied the majority of women to their families, not permitting them to travel or migrate alone.

By the end of the 1990s, more than 60 percent of Iran's population lived in cities and towns, with a 3 percent urban growth rate and declining rural population growth (UN 2003, 27). The most favored destination for rural migrants was Tehran.

Education has also been an important determinant of female migration to Iranian cities. During the 2002/3 academic year, women's enrollment at universities surpassed that of men. The phenomenon has been greatly affected by the rise in young women migrating to big cities in pursuit of higher education and better jobs (Moghadam 2004, 262).

Migration caused by marriage has also affected a sizeable portion of Iranian women. After marriage, many women move from their family home to live with their husband and his immediate family in a different village or Iranian province.

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Geoffrey Gresh

South Africa

Background

Migration in Africa is often assumed to be predominantly a male behavior, as a result of which the study of women's migration parallel to men has

not only been underestimated but also prejudiced. Yet women have participated in various regional migration patterns found throughout the continent, although their involvement may differ in scale, duration, and motivation. One of the most important magnets for labor migration in Sub-Saharan Africa has long been South Africa; over the past decade, the region has expanded well beyond South Africa's immediate neighbors and the numbers of both women and men migrants have increased accordingly.

Until recently migrant workers from countries such as Malawi, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Mozambique to South Africa were not classed as immigrants but as temporary contract laborers with few or no rights. Since 1994 – the year of the first democratic elections – migration to South Africa, mainly to the urban centers, has been complicated by the simultaneous flow of refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented economic migrants, and trafficking in women. These migrants come from virtually every country in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although quantification of the numbers and types of migrants has been elusive, clearly noted in many of the studies is the increasing number of women migrants to South Africa. Although some research addresses the issue of migrating women, such as cross-border traders, street hawkers, and trafficked women, less is known about the specifics of migrating Muslim women. The effects, impacts, opportunities, and spaces for migrant women and their households in both places of origin and new settlement are still areas that require considerable research.

Earlier studies of migrant women in the mid 1990s show them to be married and older rather than young single women. However, a recent study (2003) by the Forced Migration Programme at the University of Witswatersrand shows that most women migrants fall into the young adults category (16–35 years). In this study among Burundian, Congolese, Angolan, Ethiopian, and Somali migrants in Johannesburg, 75 percent are young adult women, most of whom are either married or are living with a partner. Most of the women come from urban areas and have a basic education up to secondary school level. A little more than a quarter are Muslim women from Somalia; most are married, but have the least amount of formal education compared to those from Burundi and the Congo republics.

Reasons for migration and the journey south

The reasons why women migrate to South Africa are far more varied than for men. Most men, except for asylum seekers or refugees, arrive in South Africa, whether documented or undocumented, for economic reasons. Women, on the other hand, migrate in response to economic opportunities mainly in trade and informal retail activities, but also for social and reproductive reasons. Other cogent reasons for migration to South Africa have to do with seeking refuge and asylum from political instability and conflict in many countries and regions of Africa. Women in these circumstances may not always make the decision to flee, or if they do, it is made in circumstances not of their choosing. Women may acquiesce to their husband's decision to immediately flee as a result of a pressing threat to life, or follow, later, a husband or family member who has fled. Other women who may not face impending danger may visit family later. This decision is also strategic to ensure a continued stake in their place of origin. When women flee, as individuals or with children, as in the case of ethnic cleansing in the Great Lakes region, they become prone to possible abuse and trafficking.

The effect of women's differing and overlapping reasons for migration are reflected in routes taken, the traveling arrangements, and their social and economic behavior once they have arrived in South Africa. Most men chose routes and modes of transport that reflect a step-migration pattern to a range of destinations, linked into well-established social networks providing limited assistance and important information, in pursuit of employment in urban centers of Africa. Women, particularly from southern Africa, are less involved in social networks providing employment opportunities than with familial social relations and transnational trading opportunities. They are most likely to find the most direct route to where they can find their husbands, partners, or family members, to spend time with them, and to engage in informal sector opportunities and purchasing of goods to trade with on their return. Such women are more likely to enter the country legally rather than as undocumented migrant workers.

Most refugee women in the 1990s fled, with or without their families, with little foresight, following a vague route to South Africa, often through a number of refugee camps in other African countries. Today Somali women refugees are known to take the most direct bus route to South Africa via Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique. Congolese, Angolan, and Burundian refugees also use buses, via refugee camps in two or more countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. Some travel directly by plane to Johannesburg and other cities. Whatever the exact routes, extensive communication

networks between places of origin and multiple destinations have become established over the last decade or more.

The differences in routes and destination are in turn related to the decision to migrate and the logistics of travel. Most of the women migrate based on decisions taken by a male family member such as a parent, husband, or partner, and are accompanied by a male family member. For example, in the Johannesburg study of migrants mentioned earlier, most Muslim Somali women reported that they traveled to South Africa with a male family member. Other research has shown that Burundian women (some of whom are Muslims), whether as refugees or not, also traveled with male family members. An investigation into whether this is a frequent and sustained pattern for other Muslim women from Sub-Saharan Africa to South Africa seriously needs to be undertaken. In addition, the logistical support and resources for such a journey need further investigation.

Incorporation into South African society

Quantifying economic and undocumented migrants is difficult. However, refugees and asylum seekers are quantifiable. In 2001 there were 23,465 applications, rising to 142,907 in 2004, indicating both an increased demand for and a difficulty in obtaining refugee documents. Indeed, research in 2003 shows that only 11 percent of refugees received identity documents. Questions have been raised about the manner in which the Department of Home Affairs receives and treats immigrants, particularly asylum seekers and refugees, as well as accusations of receiving bribes to process documents. However, obtaining identity documents is of some importance, allowing refugees access to certain social services such as health, education for children, and employment opportunities. Refugee status does have a gendered inflection in that only about 13 percent of refugees are women, suggesting that many cease to pursue the arduous task of obtaining the necessary documents, "disappearing," becoming illegal immigrants, and adding to the growing number of undocumented economic migrants. Lack of proper documents constrains their roles as caregivers and makes pursuing livelihood strategies difficult, opening the way for exploitation.

Foreign migrants in South Africa occupy roughly the same socioeconomic position that the South African poor do, but live in the inner cities rather than dormitory townships. As accommodation costs are high for inner city apartments, sharing costs with other families and individuals becomes an important residential strategy. A complementary strategy is the development of networks along national, ethnic, and language lines. These networks provide initiation into life in South Africa, function to incorporate new migrants into their communities, and give advice on applying for documentation and on making a living. Religion, as an index of belonging, complicates these relationships. Generally, Sub-Saharan Africa migrants are thankful to be in South Africa, but guarded about their acceptance by the state and wary of their hosts' xenophobia.

The duration of women migrants' stay in South Africa differs with each category of migrant and the type of work or activities they are involved in as part of the livelihood strategies of the family or household. While for many southern African women traders the migration journeys are for short durations due to the intermittent nature of their occupations, it is unclear whether this holds true for Muslim or non-Muslim women traders from East or West Africa. If the countries in southern and eastern Africa allow for free movement of goods, services, and people as implied in the New Economic Plan for African Development (NEPAD) documents, then it is quite likely to change over the long term the unequal status of women migrants. Such a development will challenge the notion of male migrants as the main providers of household subsistence and empower women as agents of change in transnational encounters. Those women economic migrants with more long-term agendas in South Africa are a small but growing number, with fairly fixed ideas as to what they can do. Some find informal employment as itinerant street hawkers, which makes some women independent micro-entrepreneurs; others do it at the behest of husbands or male partners. Other women are employed in service industries such as hairstyling, dressmaking, and domestic work, almost always in exploitative subservient conditions. This category of work is not confined only to economic migrants, but is applicable to refugees and asylum seekers.

There is some evidence from the study by the Forced Migration Programme that the migrant Muslim women from East and Central Africa (mainly Somali and Burundian) see themselves as unemployed (50 percent), or as housewives (25 percent). The others (25 percent) are self-employed, students, or voluntary workers. Despite Muslim deference to patriarchal values, these basic statistics suggest that women would like to be active outside the home. Factors inhibiting their more active participation in the economy can be

attributed to questions of internal power dynamics within the household, family, and embedded relationships in social networks, and to external socioeconomic and political factors. A key economic limitation is the question of access to capital and investment finance for small and micro businesses in both formal and informal sectors. Refugees, recent immigrants, and undocumented economic migrants are not beneficiaries of the South African state's policy of supporting small, medium, and micro enterprises. Many Senegalese and some Congolese men are able to access social capital to begin their enterprises, but not apparently women. Rather it seems women are dependent on men to intercede on their behalf. Women do have alternatives offered by non-governmental, charity, and religious organizations. For example, the South African Muslim Zakaat Fund provides training and seed finance for small and micro enterprises for foreign Muslim migrant women. Issues concerning migrant coping strategies are being researched and will yield valuable insights into women's role and constraints in migrants' multiple livelihood strategies, including the influence of such variables as religion or patriarchy.

Given the notions of women as caregivers and custodians of the family, compounded by the inability to access appropriate permits for residence, employment, or trading from state authorities, migrant women's position is extremely vulnerable.

Conclusion

In the past, women were cast mainly as domestic and social reproductive providers subordinate to their male migrant counterparts. Today, African women's migration has multiple agendas: some continue in their familial and reproductive roles, albeit reconstituted in new settings, while others combine these with their other roles as laborers and traders in their own right. What this multiplicity of patterns and types of women migrants suggests is that Sub-Saharan women migrants, particularly Muslim women, reconstitute themselves in South Africa in order to realize various and overlapping needs and interests. This locates them in a turbulent space where nationality, ethnicity, and religious identity become both a constraint and an ensemble of resources to draw on to survive, craft a livelihood, and pursue whatever opportunities present themselves.

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SHAHID VAWDA

South Asia

Contemporary society has increasingly accepted the movement of people from one place to another and migration is no longer restricted to a certain part of the world, or a certain race, caste, or class of people. In the wake of globalization, the Third World has become a major site for aspiring migrants. In South Asia, for instance, there is an increasing incidence of migration both within and outside the region. Having become increasingly feminized, migration has now become possible even for the South Asian Muslim woman, who has overcome religious constraints and may now migrate, for reasons of poverty, in search of work, through marriage or with family, and for other motives.

In Bangladesh and Pakistan (countries with large Muslim populations), as well as in India and Sri Lanka, Muslim women constitute a large proportion of the migrant population. These women migrate either independently or as dependent migrants, within their country and the region, to countries such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, and the United States as well as the major destinations of most South Asian Muslim women, namely the Middle East and the United Kingdom.

In Pakistan, the migration of Muslim women is marked by a certain pattern: older women (45 years and above) – whether divorced, married, or single women with their family – are seen to migrate more often. The average migrant woman in Pakistan belongs to the more educated section of society and, despite various constraints, undertakes migration in search of better opportunities. Education and marital status are two important causes of migration of these Muslim women (Shah 1984).

A large number of Muslim women in Sri Lanka migrate to the Middle East in search of work because of extreme conditions of poverty and migration in this case is a survival strategy for many (Eelens and Schampers 1989). They belong to smaller households with considerable family pressure to migrate for monetary reasons; however, Muslim women are the best educated group among women migrants in Sri Lanka and their individual aspirations also account for their migration (Ismail 1999).

In Bangladesh, women migrate as a result of lack of family support and care, in the case of divorced and old women, or in order to escape conservative family settings or oppressive relationships, in addition to migrating to escape poverty and earn a livelihood. These women undertake internal migration (a large number also migrate outside the country) to work as garment workers, food processors, and housemaids. Some are forced by drought, flood, or religious/ethnic tension to move from place to place in family groups to work as agricultural laborers or on construction sites. The contribution of these women to the household needs goes unrecognized and undocumented in official statistics and their rights as women and as workers are rarely upheld and protected. In a society that does not hold women in high regard, many of these women are in an even more vulnerable position due to age and poverty. They miss out on almost all poverty alleviation initiated by governmental and non-governmental organizations as they do not fit in to the criteria for such assistance. Social and religious factors and women's subordinate status, combined with harsh economic circumstances, make the migratory experience of Bangladeshi women complex, which along with independence and opportunities, entails silent suffering (Seeley et al. 2006).

At times, migration is not the outcome of a conscious decision taken by an individual or group. Rather than being a voluntary action, in situations of war and conflict migration becomes a forced situation. For instance, in India, at the time of independence in 1947, many Muslim women were abducted in east Punjab, some of whom never returned to their native place of origin despite efforts made by the concerned governments (Major 1998). Further, young girls are often forcibly married off for money by their poor parents to rich men, resulting in a kind of forced migration. The trend is associated with the city of Hyderabad, India, where poor Muslim girls have been married off to elderly Arab shaykhs. The story of Ameena, which received huge national coverage in 1992, is a case in point (Sunder Rajan 2002).

In analyzing the various nuances of Muslim migrant women's experience it is important to understand Islam and patriarchy, which largely shape their experience, in the particular contexts within which women negotiate and reorder the social structure. The extent of freedom and power that migration may afford to these women, however, varies with time and place and the socioeconomic background of the individual.

In India, the extent of participation in agricultural activities of Muslim women, who have

migrated from rural to urban areas in Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, is determined by their class position. Although Muslim women belonging to the lower class work as cultivators or laborers, they desire to achieve economic security that would allow them to retreat to the domestic sphere, there being restrictions on their movement and activities outside the home (Singh 1984).

Muslim women, regardless of their economic status, are unable to set up an independent household without the *saya* (shadow) of a male and can only enjoy relative freedom. In Pakistani cities, for instance, wives of working-class migrants from northern Punjab do unskilled work in the informal economy or work as domestic help. This gives them greater freedom of movement and economic power. The wives of upper-class migrants, however, do not need and are not allowed to work outside. They are thus completely at the mercy of their husbands and are often no more than well-fed and well-dressed slaves (Alavi 2005).

The meaning of Islam for these immigrant women is shaped to an extent by the contexts of their country of origin and destination. For example, one study of immigrant Muslim women of Pakistani and Indian origin in Norway indicates that "Sameness Oriented Modernist" women believe that Islam confers equal rights and value on men and women, while "Society Oriented Islamists" believe that women are equal to, yet different from, men. "Family Oriented Islamists" believe that Islam accords women special rights and equal value to that of men, but also argue that societal ideals and values laid down in Islam must be upheld. "Culture Oriented Traditionalists," on the other hand, believe that women, in Islam, have some rights though they are less valued than men. They understand Islam more as a culture and tradition and strictly maintain gender segregation (Predelli 2004).

While South Asian Muslim women are guided, to a large extent, by traditional and patriarchal norms even in migration, this does not imply a complete lack of choice and agency on their part, contrary to the view, held by many, of the "oriental" Asian women as submissive, backward, and oppressed. Sri Lankan women migrants to the Middle East, for example, use Islamic symbols and circumstances of subordination to acquire freedom, social status, and religious respect, thereby developing a new understanding of Islam. The *ḥijāb* is willingly worn by these women, since it allows them greater freedom of movement in an alien land, apart from providing protection, safety, and respect, being viewed by men as the highest form of modesty. The women are thus able to earn economic as well as symbolic capital, which gives them confidence and power. By conforming to Islamic values and practices, these women represent an Islam that is both orthodox and modern and thus redefine a conservative and restrictive set of practices and identity within a modernized religious framework (Thangarajah 2004).

Sri Lankan Muslim women who migrate to the Middle East use their Islamic identity not only to get favorable travel incentives (for example, they do not need to pay the air fare and are charged a nominal fee by the recruiter), but also justify their travel to the region, which, being Islamic, is safe for them. Also, they try to gain a favored and respectable position in the employer's family by participating in religious activities that are denied to non-Muslims. They use their identity as Muslims and foreigners as it suits them best (Ismail 1999).

In an Islamic setting, while migration affords relative freedom and power to Muslim women, it also entails a social stigma since work outside the home or in the capacity of a domestic help is not seen as appropriate for a Muslim woman, especially if she is single. Nonetheless, in fulfilling their individual and family needs and aspirations, these women are careful to manipulate the rigid religious norms in such a way that they do not compromise their identity as devout and pious Muslim women, which is a significant component of their whole identity. South Asian Muslim women thus undertake migration, voluntary or otherwise, as dependent or single migrants, on a large scale, negotiating the constraining religious and patriarchal norms and redefining them in ways that support and facilitate migration.

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Meenakshi Thapan

Turkey

Turkey has become a receiver of legal and illegal migrants, particularly women, as a result of the political and economic turmoil in the regions surrounding it since the 1990s. Every year, thousands of people – mostly women – enter Turkey from post-Soviet republics and overstay their tourist visas in order to engage in informal wage work, sex work, or small-scale trade.

Women from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and the Ukraine enter Turkey in search of informal work in small-scale production (for example garments and food processing), sales assistance and interpreting, entertainment, and petty trade, and as domestic workers and caretakers in large Turkish metropolises, especially in Istanbul. Probably the most numerous and visible of these migrants are live-in caretakers and housekeepers, most of whom are Moldovan women, usually members of the Turkish-speaking Gagauz minority; and some among them are Bulgarians and Ukrainians. Some women, particularly from Romania and Moldova in the west and the Transcaucasian republics in the east, work in prostitution. In recent years, Turkey has been accused of allowing the trafficking of women from post-Communist countries to take place within its borders. Studies indicate the existence of trafficking of women as sex slaves in the country, but the government has been pressured recently to take legislative and law enforcement measures to crack down on this process. But at the same time, many women travel to Turkey to work in prostitution on their own. This is visible especially in towns in the east and along the Black Sea coast, where women from Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia travel in and out of Turkey to engage in paid sex work, as well as petty trade.

The flow of women from Moldova and other countries into Turkey shows similarities to women's migration from developing countries into Europe and North America as domestic laborers. As informal workers with expired tourist visas, women are defenseless against heavy demands on their labor by their Turkish employers. Complaints of sexual harassment by employers are sometimes expressed. Some of them married, some single mothers with children left behind, these women seek to send most of their earnings back home. This type of migration takes place either through informal agencies or personal networks, as when a young woman returns to Moldova to reunite with her child, she might send a relative or friend to Turkey to work for the same employer.

Perhaps unlike the situation of foreign domestic workers in Western countries, the daily or monthly wages Moldovan and other women receive as caretakers or housekeepers are often comparable to, and may be sometimes higher than, those of their Turkish counterparts. Some urban middle-class families prefer foreign migrant women as domestic workers because they are relatively educated and they work as "live-ins," whereas Turkish cleaning and care workers are typically rural migrants with little or no education and they prefer day work. In recent years, a small number of English-speaking Filipino nannies have also appeared in Istanbul, but this flow is limited to the upper classes and expatriate families in the city.

Given the impossibility of obtaining residence and work permits, migrant women's only option for legality in Turkey may be marriage with a Turkish citizen. Marrying a Turkish man used to allow automatic citizenship for a foreign woman; but the citizenship law was changed recently to prevent fake marriages as part of the harmonization of Turkey's citizenship legislation with that of the European Union in its bid to join the European Union.

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Hatice Deniz Yükseker

Migration: Repatriation

Turkey

In Turkey several large-scale repatriation programs have been organized, after crises have subsided, by the Turkish government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other relevant organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Human Resource Development Foundation (HRDF), and the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC). Specific examples of repatriation programs include the repatriation of Bosnians and Kosovars in the late 1990s, the repatriation of Afghanis, which continues today, and the repatriation of Iraqis, which commenced in 2003 and still continues. Individual repatriation has also been organized by the same parties sporadically when a refugee or individual has expressed the wish to return home of his or her own accord. Due to the non-existence of refugee camps in Turkey, all repatriation programs are on an individual basis. Therefore, even the larger programs are not coordinated in a manner where a number of refugees sign up and are repatriated as a group, as would happen in a camp. To date, there has been no specific focus on gender or a gender selective repatriation program.

Financial and travel support is offered to refugees willing to be repatriated and non-governmental organizations in the home country are contacted to ensure property and housing arrangements along with security conditions for the person upon return. However, there have been no programs and no specific attention has been paid to gender specific needs or interests in Turkey prior to or during the process of repatriation.

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CHERIE TARAGHI

Migration: Safe Havens

Overview

Safe havens, designated zones of refuge for internally displaced persons (IDPs), have to be contextualized in a confluence of global events, mainly the collapse of the old world order with its polarization around the superpowers. These events include new forms of warfare, the internal break-up of states, ethnic cleansing, and a growing unwillingness by states to accept refugees. Most significantly, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new form of warfare that, except for the United States occupation of Iraq, is "almost exclusively *within* the borders of states" (Cohen and Deng 1998a, 5). In this new political orbit, refugees were no longer welcomed in the West as an ideological victory over Communism. Usually established by the United States and European military forces and administered by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and a host of non-governmental organizations, safe havens crystallized as a means of preventing refugee flows, thus protecting state sovereignty while ostensibly providing relief and protection for the displaced. Clearly, a state-centric global consensus to stem cross-border flows has emerged as states close their borders to the displaced.

A central feature of preventing refugee flows (Frelick 1993, 5), safe havens joined the panoply of spatial devices, such as refugee camps, transit centers, safe towns, open-relief centers, and assembly centers, to manage displaced populations. Unlike refugee camps, their populations are internally displaced persons (IDPs). Like refugee camps, their populations are overwhelmingly women, children, and the elderly. IDPs grew from 1.2 million in 1992 to over 21.8 million in 2003 (World Refugee Survey 1993, 1), far outnumbering refugees. IDPs are those "forced to flee . . . who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border" (Cohen and Deng 1998b, 18). As IDPs grew in number, they posed a problem for the international relief community and states. Into this void, a new spatial arena emerged as an ad hoc and temporary measure of containment; these are called variously safe havens, preventive zones, United Nations-protected zones, and safe spaces, and are intended as a form of preventive protection.

Gender and safe havens

There have been vast numbers of Muslim women IDPs in Sudan, Afghanistan, Turkey, Kosovo, Cyprus, Somalia, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kurdish Iraq. Indeed, the first and best known safe havens were established for Kurdish Iraqis and Bosnian Muslims in the early 1990s, and are the focus of this entry. In both, potential receiving countries closed their borders, refusing to grant the right to asylum to over half a million Iraqi Kurds in Turkey while hundreds of thousand of Bosnian Muslims were unwelcome in Europe.

Safe havens are heavily gendered and aged (50–80 percent of the displaced in general are women and children); they contain disproportionately women, children, and the elderly who have survived intensive warfare, ethnic cleansings, and massacres. Men are either fighting, in detention, or dead, leaving women to provide and care for children and the elderly. During flight, families and communities may be separated, fracturing social support networks that women rely on in managing domesticity. Caring for the elderly and children can be emotionally and physically demanding and female-headed households are common. There is a paucity of information on women in safe havens. In part, this is because of their temporary nature, the highly charged military atmosphere in which they exist, and the dire need for immediate relief, none of which encourages intensive research. One thing is clear, however: safe havens are no guarantee of safety or protection for either women or men and the violence that circulates in them is gendered.

Iraq and Bosnia

In the wake of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the failed Kurdish uprisings, over a million Iraqi Kurds were displaced. Turkey closed its borders while Iran allowed them to enter. The humanitarian and political disaster of Kurds stranded in snow-covered mountains was televised around the world. In "Operation Provide Comfort," coalition forces (the United States, France, and Britain) established a protected zone for Kurds in northern Iraq. Aid was provided and coordinated by the UNHCR. Presented as a humanitarian gesture, in reality "Operation Provide Comfort" aimed to protect Turkey from a destabilizing mass influx of Kurds.

At the same time, safe havens can pose a challenge to state sovereignty, as in Iraq.

War broke out in Bosnia in April 1992; by 1993 six safe havens were established: Tuzla, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Sarajevo, and Zapa. The rationale was that resettling displaced Bosnian Muslims would support the Serbian policy of ethnic cleansing (in which the rape of Muslim women was a deliberate tactic of war). When besieging Serbian forces hindered the delivery of aid, the strategy expanded to include "safe corridors" for providing humanitarian assistance; thus the concept of preventive protection was replaced by the even more minimalist concept of preventive assistance (Frelick 1993, 9–10). Eventually, food and medicine were air-dropped into the safe havens. In other words, safe havens gave way to safe corridors, which in turn gave way to air drops (ibid., 10). Thus the flow of assistance and protection to those in safe havens can be even more compromised than that to refugees.

In Srebrenica, nearly 65,000 traumatized and displaced Muslims overwhelmed water and electricity resources and medical facilities. In summer 1995, although ostensibly protected by United Nations Protective Forces (UNPROFOR), Srebrenica was overrun by Serbian forces. The small Dutch battalion of peacekeepers "left town when their air cover did not arrive" (Hyndman 2000, 170). Serbian forces then proceeded to systematically massacre 8,000 men and boys. This death trap exposed safe havens as a threat to IDPs and the inability of the United Nations or allied forces to provide protection.

International aid and institutional structures

Once enclosed in an area defined as a safe haven, displaced women and their families can be protected and assisted but these are temporary measures, not solutions, and this affects the sorts of aid the displaced receive. Aid and protection are difficult to deliver because doing so runs the risk of breaching state sovereignty. Unlike long-term refugee camps, where education and rehabilitation needs are critical for repatriation, safe havens impose a very temporary sort of relief need – food, shelter, medical care, and potable water.

Safe havens have a complex institutional structure of relief and protection. Military forces often establish the safe haven, as in Iraq, providing initial aid in the form of shelter, food, and emergency medical assistance. Then multinational, or country specific, peace-keeping troops are assigned to provide protection. De facto, UNHCR's mandate now includes safe havens and IDPs and they act as the lead agency, coordinating a multitude of humanitarian organizations' relief and personnel. In Iraq, organizations included the World Food Program and the Food and Agricultural Organization. Immediate relief is not gender-specific but assumes the generic refugee who is usually a male. And when women's needs are taken into account, it can be culturally inappropriate. Delivering tampons rather than the preferred and more widely used sanitary napkins in Bosnia and Iraq is one such example.

Health care services are exceedingly overstretched in safe havens. In Gorazde and Srebrenica, services were quickly overwhelmed. Reproductive health care may be severely lacking. Women's and children's caloric intake is often dramatically decreased, putting them at risk, particularly pregnant and lactating women. In Chechnya, with over half a million internally displaced, health care is a primary concern. A study of IDPs noted "high levels of mental stress" (de Kong et al. 2004). Access to safe drinking water is often compromised, as is the provisioning of adequate food and appropriate shelter. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the massacre of husbands, fathers, and sons in Srebrenica, substantial numbers of Muslim women were left widowed and became permanent heads of households, both sources of emotional devastation and trauma. The survivors have faced the task of recovering and identifying the bodies of murdered relatives and serving as witnesses to human rights inquiries and commissions.

Safe havens pose unique protection issues. In common with refugee women, women in safe havens face the possibility of sexual assault in the prelude to displacement, during flight, and if overrun by besieging forces. Unlike refugee women who face rape and sexual extortion from guards, police, and local civilians, women in safe havens face the reality of being overrun by besieging forces or violence from their own families and communities.

In the Iraqi Kurdish autonomous zone, which started as a safe haven, a resurgence of honor killings underscored the kinds of protection issues that arise when autonomy takes hold and "tradition" is mobilized and interpreted in novel ways. The Kurdish social fabric had been stressed due to prolonged conflict and economic impoverishment led to the further commodification of women (Mojab 2004, 123). In addition, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism among some sectors of Kurdish politics fueled violence against women. In this case, violence against women from members of their own families posed a unique protection issue. As is often the case, gendered violence mobilized women

to organize, protest, publicize, and push for legal reforms to curb this practice. In 2002, two resolutions by the Kurdish regional government reformed Iraqi personal status laws to criminalize honor killings and to restrict polygamy (Mojab 2004, 128). The contradictory nature of the safe havens and the autonomy they can foster is clear in this instance: they can be empowering for women and yet constraining, violent places.

Conclusion

A rhetoric of preventing humanitarian disaster and providing aid has justified safe havens. Yet the intent to stem the tide of refugees is evident. In gendered terms, they have a mixed record – in Bosnia they were a death trap for males, casting serious doubt on their effectiveness. They left mothers and widows traumatized and responsible for supporting and caring for their families. In Iraq they were sites of increased violence against women, which prompted them to mobilize; yet they were also arenas in which legal reform and secularism vied with Islamist ideologies and practices. The Kurdish case raises the issue of whether a safe haven may be more than a temporary protective mechanism and illustrates its contradictory potential. Kurdish autonomy in the zone has led to embryonic state formation; in 1992 a regional Government of Iraqi Kurdistan was formed in the zone and a more secular legal system was being drafted. Rights for women seem more possible than in the emerging Iraqi constitution.

Safe havens can be "illusory," encouraging people to flee to them for safety; in reality, they might face even greater dangers than if they had stayed put (Cohen and Deng 1998b, 268). Yet Cohen and Deng argue that in spite of their failure to provide full-scale protection, they should not be abandoned but further developed (ibid., 283). It remains to be seen whether they will become an artefact of the 1990s or will continue in the new millennium.

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Julie Peteet

Poverty

Overview

The problem of poverty has been present in Islam since the lifetime of the Prophet Muḥammad. Many of the earliest Muslims were poor or persons regarded as dependants, such as women and slaves. The emigration of the early Muslim community from Mecca to Medina created a new group of impoverished persons as many of the Muhājirūn were obliged to leave their property behind. Although the Muhājirūn received some support from the Anṣār, a number of poor Meccans took up residence in the mosque in Medina. These "people of the portico" (*ahl la-ṣuffa*) provided a model when later Muslims adopted voluntary poverty as a fundamental tenet of Sufism. Some Meccans were unable (or claimed to be unable) to emigrate, and are referred to in the Qurʾān as "the oppressed on earth" (*al-mustaḍʿafūn fī al-arḍ*). Contemporary Muslims frequently use this term to refer to the poor and oppressed in general, and the term was used with some frequency by Iranian revolutionaries in 1979 and afterwards.

The Qurʾān makes frequent reference to the plight of the poor, orphans (including the Prophet himself), slaves, and travelers. The mandatory alms tax (*zakāt*) can be paid to eight categories of persons. Two of these categories (*al-fuqarāʾ wa-al-masākīn*) refer to paupers, although the Muslim jurists disagreed about the exact meaning of these terms. For al-Shāfiʿī and his followers, the *faqīr* was destitute, while the *miskīn* possessed some property. Abū Ḥanīfa and his followers argued the opposite. In order to avoid this dispute, medieval documents concerning endowments benefiting the poor usually mention both terms together. The legal definition for a poor person deserving of receiving alms was one whose income was insufficient to require him or her to pay *zakāt*. Although the Prophet is thought to have organized the collection and distribution of *zakāt*, for the most part people were left pay the alms tax on their own to persons of their choice. This makes it very difficult to trace *zakāt* in the historical sources.

Most medieval Muslim thinkers believed that charity should begin at home, that is with one's family. Indeed, there were no orphanages in the Muslim world until modern times. It was simply assumed that families, extended families if necessary, took care of their own. Widows either remarried or resided with male members of their biological families. Obviously, not everyone had family members to protect them, and some were forced to beg. Public begging was regarded as disgraceful for respectable (*mastūr*) people, but not everyone could afford to protect their honor. Beggars, including women and children, frequently congregated outside mosques at the time for Friday prayers. One medieval literary work tells the story of a man who dragged his aged mother in front of the congregation in an effort to attract their sympathy. The story is intended as satire, but this sort of scene may not have been uncommon.

In addition to being a social category, poverty could also be indicative of a type of piety. The term *faqr* not only denoted lack of wealth, but also dependence, particularly dependence on God. As such, the poor could be regarded as pious people who put their trust in God alone. Poverty in this sense was not distinct from asceticism (*zuhd*), which emphasized the need to abandon worldly things in order to devote oneself to the worship of God. There are obvious parallels with Christian monasticism and hermiticism, and the Sufi biographical dictionaries make no secret of the early Muslims' admiration for Christian hermits. Perhaps the most famous woman to participate in this ascetic trend was Rābiʿa al-ʿAdawiyya, but female piety was usually expressed in private, and thus rarely appears explicitly in written sources.

The classic expression of the Islamic virtue of poverty appears in Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālī's *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn*. There, al-Ghazzālī lays out an ascending scale of poverty in which the mystic progressively renounces material things. In this scale, al-Ghazzālī incorporates asceticism as the first step on the path to abandoning the material world, which he regards as the "enemy of God." By the thirteenth century, however, Sufis were less interested in poverty as a spiritual value. Scholars such as Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī and Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn al-ʿArabī shifted Sufism toward mystical philosophy. While the importance of poverty as a spiritual value never disappeared, it was of diminished importance in the most intellectualized Sufism that predominated in the late Middle Ages and early modern period.

One factor in the downgrading of poverty as a

spiritual value was the increased political influence of Sufism and the patronage that resulted from this influence. From at least the twelfth century on, rulers such as Nūr al-Dīn al-Zangī and al-Ẓāhir Baybars chose Sufis to be their spiritual advisors. In addition, the ruling elites of medieval Muslim societies began to direct large amounts of patronage to the Sufis, usually in the form of endowments (*waqf*s). For example, numerous Mamluk sultans founded Sufi monasteries (*khānqāh*s), which provided the mystics with food, water, a place to stay, and an organized routine of prayer. Under these circumstances, voluntary poverty did not seem to be such a great sacrifice. Scholars such as the Ḥanbalī Ibn al-Jawzī and Ibn Taymiyya denounced the claims of the Sufis to pious poverty as frequently fraudulent. Within Sufism itself, some adherents protested the new worldliness of Sufism by adopting antinomian practices.

At the same time, however, a new institution came into being, apparently modeled on the male-oriented *khānqāh*, which was devoted to women's spirituality and the protection of their virtue. This institution was known as the *ribāṭ*, a term that was previously used to refer to military outposts and Sufi convents, and which had strong ascetic connotations. Usually founded by a prominent female patron, the *ribāṭ* functioned as a home for single women, usually widows or divorcees. What makes it of particular interest is that not only the patrons and beneficiaries but also the administrators, or *shaykha*s, were women. The *shaykha* was charged with the responsibility of leading the women in the *ribāṭ* in prayer and *dhikr*, and with giving them lessons in Islamic law. Perhaps the most famous *ribāṭ* in Cairo was the Ribāṭ al-Baghdādiyya, founded in 1285 by Tidhkārbāy Khātūn, the daughter of the late Sulṭān al-Ẓāhir Baybars on behalf of Zaynab al-Baghdādiyya. Similar institutions are also known to have existed in Damascus, Jerusalem, and Aleppo. In some cases, a *ribāṭ* may have been established as a sister institution to a Sufi convent or shrine used by men. For example, Ḥasnāʾ bint ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn Wafā al-Shādhilī, a fifteenth-century member of the Wafā Sufi dynasty in Cairo, established a *ribāṭ* where she presided as *shaykha*. She located her *ribāṭ* near her family's *zāwiya*. Although some of the women who lived in these institutions were impoverished, others came from elite families and chose to live out their final years in pious poverty.

Widowhood was a common experience for women who reached an advanced age. Not all could live a life of pious retirement. Many widows lived from spinning, peddling, and trade. The fifteenth-century chronicler al-Sakhāwī notes that devaluation of the silver currency was particularly damaging for women who earned their wages from spinning. The value of their wages must have dropped precipitously, and, unlike workers employed by the Islamic endowments, they did not receive part of their wages in kind.

The poor, however, including women and children, were beneficiaries of a number of different types of Islamic endowments. The most prestigious of these were hospitals, many of which were founded by sultans, and enjoyed considerable financial support. The best-known medieval hospital was that founded in 1284 by Sulṭān al-Manṣūr Qalāwūn, al-Bīmāristān al-Manṣūrī. It was modeled on the hospital established by Nūr al-Dīn al-Zangī in Damascus. It contained separate wards for men and women, with the women being seen to by female attendants. Since the wealthy usually received medical care at home, the inmates of premodern hospitals were usually poor or insane. For those who died, Sulṭān Qānṣūh al-Ghawrī arranged to provide for their washing and burial. The sultan himself had lost some of his children in the plagues that struck Egypt in the early sixteenth century.

Education, on the other hand, was strictly segregated, at least in public institutions. More than 50 Qurʾān schools for orphans and poor children were established in medieval Cairo, but most benefited only boys. Girls from scholarly families did receive education at home, and the Mamluk period produced a number of prominent female scholars, especially in the field of *ḥadīth* studies. Nonetheless, no one seems to have thought it important to provide for the education of poor girls.

Women who resorted to begging to survive may have had better luck in the cemeteries of the medieval Islamic world. From the fourteenth century on (if not earlier), it became common to establish endowments benefiting the family mausoleum which provided food and water to the poor who visited the tombs. Usually the distributions took place on Friday evenings, the usual occasion for visiting the dead. The recipients of these alms were expected to pray for the people whose bodies were interred in the mausoleum. This exchange of alms for prayers is typical of Islamic charitable practice. In the Ottoman Empire, members of the elite established soup kitchens (*ʿimaret*s) to provide food and water to the poor on a larger scale. Previously, large endowments such as those established by Sulṭān Ḥasan for his mosque in Cairo or Sulṭān al-Nāṣir Muḥammad for his Sufi convent in Siryāqūs had given away their surplus food to the poor, but the *ʿimaret*, such as the one constructed by Hürrem

Sultan (Roxalena) in Jerusalem in 1552, fed hundreds of persons every day. Another feature of the administration of endowments in the Ottoman period is centralization. A good example of this is the Waqf al-Ḥaramayn in Algiers. By the late eighteenth century, this endowment not only controlled payments to be made to the shrine cities of Mecca and Medina, but also administered thousands of properties, many of them belonging to endowments benefiting the poor.

In the nineteenth century things began to change. Prior to this time, charity was usually a personal matter, in which the ruler played a role that differed from that of a private person only in scope. True, royal endowments were administered by the state bureaucracies, but in many ways the ruler was simply a Muslim who aided his less fortunate coreligionists. Furthermore, the practice of distributing charity was relatively untouched by bureaucracy. Recipients do not seem to have been asked to provide proof of their poverty, perhaps on the assumption that seeking charity was considered sufficiently humiliating to constitute proof of real need. Finally, despite some halting efforts to control the movements of beggars, until the nineteenth century the poor were free to seek alms wherever they could and from whomsoever they wished.

As in many other areas, the government established by Muḥammad ʿAlī in Egypt was at the forefront of the new changes. For the first time, Muḥammad ʿAlī established a series of state-run shelters that attempted to distinguish between the deserving and undeserving poor. This measure accompanied unprecedented efforts to control the movements and actions of ordinary Egyptian peasants, artisans, and the urban poor. People arrested for begging and considered worthy of aid were committed to shelters, many of them using existing *waqf* buildings, such as the hospital of Qalāwūn or the mosque of Ibn Ṭūlūn. Able-bodied men were put to work, and confinement in a shelter was increasingly used as a way to punish vagrancy and begging. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to see the shelters as purely coercive. In some cases, poor people, including widows with children and the elderly, took advantage of the charity of the Khedive to benefit from the state's largesse. For their part, the Khedives and Sulṭān Abdülhamid II made use of public gifts to the poor to build political legitimacy.

For many social reformers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the poor became an embarrassment. Just as women came under increased scrutiny from nationalists and social reformers keen to create a "modern" society by controlling how children were raised, the poor came to be seen less as objects of pity than as impediments to progress. The Egyptian reformer Labība Aḥmad arranged for poor girls to learn household management, embroidery, and handiwork, as well as making sure that they were taught good Islamic values. In Turkey, social reformers were influenced by the establishment of the republic to debate the role the new state should have in caring for children. While some insisted that the traditional emphasis on private charity would be sufficient, others argued for state intervention. Although the debate between partisans of state involvement and those of private initiative continues in Muslim societies today, the increasingly important role of the state in almost all aspects of people's private lives makes it unlikely that there will be a return to the premodern reliance on individuals as the primary benefactors of the poor.

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Egypt

Poverty in Egypt

During the 1970s and early 1980s, Egypt realized considerable progress in social and economic development. It achieved high rates of economic growth as gross domestic product grew by about 8 percent. Government expenditure on social services expanded along with this growth, leading to

improvements in the welfare of Egyptian households. Development progress was financed largely by resources from abroad (foreign aid and remittances) (El-Ehwany and El-Laithy 2002).

At the beginning of the 1990s, the government of Egypt engaged in a program of liberalization and privatization with the aim of modernizing the national economy and integrating it with the rest of the world. Since then, Egypt has moved from a centrally planned and public sector dominated economy toward a market based on one with emphasis on the formal private sector. Loss of employment in the public sector meant households depending on such income were faced with the risk of being unemployed and poor. In addition, the absorption rate for employment by the private sector has been much lower than the public sector, pushing the unemployment rates up and making employment in the informal economy a main venue for survival. The situation in the labor market has also affected Egyptians as consumers, not being able to adjust to changes in the prices of goods and services. The shrinkage in the public sector, especially in social sector spending, meant poor segments of the population lost their subsidies and coverage as beneficiaries of government social services. For the poorest of the poor who get financial assistance from the state, the decline in the real value of their social benefits represented an additional burden.

There is no one single definition of poverty. Poverty definitions vary from income-based (a level of income per capita in a household below which the basic needs of the family cannot be satisfied), to basic needs approaches (a set of minimal conditions of life, usually involving the quality of the dwelling place, degree of crowding, nutritional adequacy, and water supply, are specified and the proportion of the population lacking these conditions is used to estimate the degree of poverty), to participatory definitions (respondents from communities are themselves invited to identify their perceptions of their needs, priorities, and requirements for minimal secure livelihood). Each of these methods has different strengths and weaknesses. A more comprehensive and accurate picture can be drawn when the more quantitative measures (income-based and basic needs approaches) are supplemented and reinforced with the more qualitative ones (participatory definitions). In addition, lower and upper poverty lines are also indicated where those households living below the lower poverty lines are the ultra poor who have to displace food consumption to allow for non-food expenditures.

The nationally representative survey of 48,000 households in Egypt, the Household Income, Expenditure and Consumption Survey (HIECS) conducted by CAPMAS (Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics) in 1999/2000, indicates that 20.15 percent of the population, or approximately 12.9 million Egyptians, could not obtain their basic food and non-food needs, living below the lower poverty line.

Using the upper poverty line, overall poverty in Egypt rises to 49.6 percent, representing almost 30.28 million individuals. Poverty levels are higher in rural areas, based on both the lower and upper poverty lines. There is a strong regional dimension to poverty in Egypt, not only in wealth and natural resources, but also in how social and public services are distributed. Rural areas in all regions have lower poverty measures than their urban counterparts. Upper Egypt as a region has 50 percent of the urban poor and 70 percent of the rural poor of the country (El-Ehwany and El-Laithy 2002).

Gender dimensions of poverty

When discussing gender dimensions of poverty, the immediate focus of most studies is to look at the status of female-headed households. Incidence of poverty is found to be higher among female headed households* (where women are the main income earners in the household) around the world. Almost one-third of female-headed households living in urban areas participate in the labor force in Egypt. The rest depend largely on income transfers. In rural areas the labor force participation rate is 70 percent for women in female headed-households. The percentage of poor individuals in female-headed households in Egypt is slightly lower than the percentage in male headed households – 18.63 percent for male headed households, versus 17 percent for female-headed households in urban areas; and 21.58 percent and 19.81 percent for male and female headed households respectively in rural areas. This is due to the fact that female headed households are smaller in size, have higher per capita income and expenditure, and lower individual per earner ratio.

However, in order to capture the wider implications of gender differences in poverty we need to take a closer look at the differences in poverty between women and men in poor households. In a recent study (2002) using the income-based definition of poverty, Professor Heba El-Laithy of Cairo University addresses the key questions surrounding gender and poverty in Egypt. Looking at the gender differences among poor households rather than differences between female and male headed

households, she asks whether poverty has a woman's face in Egypt and whether women in poor households are particularly at high risk for being poor.

According to 1999/2000 figures, across all regions of Egypt, the percentage of poor women is slightly higher than that of men. In rural areas the incidence of poverty is significantly higher for women than for men. Women are overrepresented among all poor in both urban areas and rural areas. They constitute 50.1 percent of poor people, exceeding their share in the population by 0.9 percent points. The gap between women and men was -2.79 percent in Beni-Suef and 2.30 percent in Fayoum, pointing to a deterioration of living standards among women in Beni-Suef and relatively better living standards among women compared to men in Fayoum (El-Laithy 2002).

Education and poverty links

It is important to look at poverty among women in terms of its linkages to their educational status. Poverty is inversely correlated with educational attainment and this inverse relationship is stronger for women than men. The great majority of the poor have attained only primary level education or no education at all. Specifically, 25.75 percent of the poor population was illiterate in urban areas, and 35.3 percent in rural areas. Among the poor, there are more poor women with lower levels of education than men.

Over 44 percent of poor women and men live in households where the head of the household is illiterate. Illiterate women are also overrepresented among the poor. Household male-preference for education, especially in poor households, signifies that more girls continue to be uneducated than boys or have higher drop-out rates than boys. Young women's illiteracy rate, in 2002, was 32 percent compared to 17 percent for young men (UNDP 2004). Illiteracy has a direct negative effect on the ability to secure gainful employment. Without knowledge of reading and writing, choices of work and access to work become limited.

Employment as a way out of poverty

Women's employment and access to and control over income are key venues out of poverty. Yet, in both urban and rural areas, women's participation in formal labor markets is limited. Almost a third of the employed women are in agriculture. When they are working in agriculture, they are mostly unpaid family workers with limited access to and control of land. Overall female land holders represent only 5.7 percent of the total number of landholders in Egypt.

When they are in urban employment, they are in the shrinking public sector jobs, and in much fewer numbers holding jobs in the private sector. Most of the poor women are either unemployed or are in informal employment arrangements – 32.8 percent of urban poor and 26.12 percent of the rural poor are women out of work. In urban areas, men and women who are employed have the lowest incidence of poverty measures, and the unemployed have the highest incidence of poverty – 23.01 percent men and 22.39 percent women. The high unemployment among young poor points to the vulnerability of young graduates to poverty due to the inability of the economy to generate sufficient job opportunities (El-Laithy 2002).

While women's participation in the labor force increased faster than men's during 1980–96, their labor force participation rates are clearly much lower than those of men. According to the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 2003, the labor force participation rate of women aged 15–64 decreased between 1995 (23.9 percent) and 2001 (21.4 percent). Generally, the majority of women in wage employment outside agriculture tend to work within the service sector; only a small proportion of women work in industry. Due to the shrinking in the public sector, and the low absorption capacity of the private sector, many women have found work in the informal economy.

While operating in the informal economy is one of the key coping mechanisms for women in poor households, such jobs/activities have limited returns and no social protection. Moreover, formal labor organizing is weak or non-existent in those jobs that absorb the majority of women workers. Clearly economic organizing of women in rural and urban areas through more informal channels such as cooperatives, solidarity networks, and rotating saving funds arrangements are important coping mechanisms. While only a small percentage of these groups are registered with authorities, the solidarity among the members of the group and the support mechanisms are both financial (*gamʿiyyāt* or rotating saving funds) and non-financial in nature (for example, providing childcare and other forms of labor relief among the women, and advice on product design, markets, and cost-saving resources).

Conclusions

Egypt has ratified most of the international instruments concerning women, including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

Cultural Rights (CESCR); the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (CCPR); the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Hijab and El-Sohl 2003); the Millennium Declaration; and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. Egypt is also one of the Arab countries that has gone far in making efforts toward harmonization of national laws with CEDAW, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, and other related gender equality conventions.

The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the law and practices on the ground discriminate against women. The negative perceptions regarding women's education, and employment, while changing slowly toward more favorable attitudes, do remain. In addition to a relatively favorable legal environment for women, there are many national governmental and nongovernmental institutions that have the mandate on poverty alleviation and women's economic empowerment in Egypt and implement programs toward these ends.

Policies and programs to assist the poor require accurate identification of the key characteristics of the poor, men and women. An accurate identification of the poverty profile for Egypt would allow for better targeting of poverty alleviation strategies. Similarly, the causes of poverty (education, labor market distortions) need to be effectively identified to formulate appropriate sector policies. Building the human, financial, and other productive assets of poor women and men form the components of a multidimensional strategy to address poverty. Increasing the social and political assets of the poor through organizing can direct their resources to help themselves out of poverty.

* The definition adopted by the United Nations identifies female heads of households as "women (who) are financially responsible for their families," who are the "key decision makers and household managers," who "manage household economies on behalf of an absent male head", or who "are the main economic contributors." This definition points to the heterogeneity of these households, with obvious implications for targeted and diversified policy and programs for this population.

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Simel Esim

North Africa

Definitions and perceptions of the poor in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya are largely shaped by Islamic teachings and traditions. However, they are also shaped by the political, economic, and sociocultural changes that these four Muslim North African countries have been undergoing since their national independence in 1956, 1962, 1956, and 1951, respectively. The religious ethos is increasingly fused with larger issues related to the postcolonial histories of these countries, the processes of nation-building and identity formation, development policies and economic orientations, the nature of civil society and social life, as well as definitions of gender roles. As a result, attitudes toward the poor have been changing. Moreover, this transformation is taking place while new actors, including institutions, are responding to the poor. Thus, although Muslim individuals and communities in North Africa draw from shared religious, ethical, and moral sources in their behaviors toward the poor, their reliance on these sources reveals noticeable differences, especially with respect to the gender dimension of poverty.

Data on both the scope of female poverty and the responses of women to the phenomenon in any country of the region are scant. Yet such data would be most useful and pertinent today, since new dimensions and images of female poverty are emerging. A 2002 World Bank report estimates that 20 percent of the Moroccan population is under the absolute poverty line (about $1 per day), with two-thirds located in rural areas. The economically vulnerable population is estimated at 55 percent in rural areas and 33 percent in urban areas. In Algeria, 23 percent of the total population lives below the poverty line, the majority being

rural. Tunisia records the lowest rate of poverty in the region with no more than 7.6 percent of the population below the povety line, making it a success story in reducing deprivation across regional, class, age, and gender lines.

Experiences of poverty clearly differ across North Africa. Images of female beggars, homeless women, and street children are increasingly ubiquitous in the Moroccan and Algerian urban centers while they are visibly less so in Tunisia. To varying degrees, the majority of the poor in North Africa are women from rural areas who are illiterate, unskilled, and unprepared for the demands of urban living to which they are increasingly drawn.

A significant commonality in the region is the fact that poverty has been, until recently, defined through a masculine, economic lens. Definitions of and responses to poverty have remained largely based on the traditional distribution of gender roles and the assumption that men are the sole family provider and head of the household. Yet the number of female-headed households is on the increase: one out of four households in Algeria is female-headed; one in five in Morocco; and one in ten in Tunisia. The precariousness of their living conditions puts most of them among the most vulnerable groups.

According to the prescriptions of the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* and the teachings of the Prophet, Muslim communities of North Africa believe it is their religious duty to help the needy members of their communities. The ethical order of Islam does not, however, condone dependency, idleness, or beggary; on the contrary, it encourage individuals to be productive, creative, and proactive in finding sources of decent living. Hence, there is an important distinction between definitions of the "deserving" and "undeserving" poor that is reflected in societal attitudes toward the poor, attitudes that range from indifference to empathy.

North African communities have embraced the notion of distributive justice that encourages donations, charity, and alms giving. Their responses have included the provision of food and clothes to the needy, scholarships to educate orphans, and assistance in cases of disease, bankrupcy, or loss of income. Communities also expect their political leaders to give permanence to these practices through religious institutions and funds as well as secular initiatives and policies.

Women from the urban elite sector of society have played a considerable role in helping the poor throughout the Muslim history of North Africa. Through private acts of charity and the funding of religious institutions, they tried to reach out to the needy and especially the disadvantaged women and girls who often slip into poverty because they are abandoned, repudiated, widowed, disabled, or orphaned. The continuity of these acts has gained visibility during the struggles for national independence and nation-building. Private acts of donation from elite women evolved, since the second half of the twentieth century, into more structured organizations and associations that provide legal, educational, health, and vocational training to the needy.

Social protection mechanisms and safety nets, including family, kinship, and friendship networks, play a major role in providing social and economic assistance to poor women. These networks, though essential in alleviating female poverty, are gradually breaking down under the pressure of increasing urbanization and the impact on women of both structural adjustment programs and regional conflicts, such as the conflict in the Western Sahara and the Algerian civil war. This is happening at a time when governments are drastically reducing their spending on social services and more people are relying on safety nets to escape poverty.

Remittance flows from migrant workers are increasingly supporting needy members of migrants' families and their communities at home. Although the volume of transfers to family and kin is hard to estimate, the flows seem to increase noticeably during religious feasts and festivals.

The role of women activists and feminist organizations in North Africa has also been central in targeting female poverty. A growing number of organizations are providing poor rural women with basic skills to start income-generating activities. Others target vulnerable women by organizing them in vocational associations and cooperatives to safeguard their interests and promote their productive skills (such as carpet weaving and pottery).

Urban-based activism has pushed for the recognition that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon caused by a confluence of factors, including women's lack of access to education, health services, political influence, and legal rights. Whether poverty is chronic or transient, activists link women's vulnerability and the precariousness of their conditions to the biases inherent in the political and socioeconomic policies meant to help the poor. Activists and researchers from North Africa, such as Maghreb Egalité or Horizon 2000, are also forging alliances and networks of solidarity to fight for the state's recognition/integration of women in development plans and poverty alleviation programs.

Significant strides have been made in building

women's capabilities, especially in Tunisia, where women are the first to have been empowered by earlier revisions in discriminatory laws and greater access to education, training, and health services. In Morocco serious gains have been made over the last couple of years in the family status code (Mudawwana) as a major step toward reducing women's social and economic exclusion. In Algeria and Libya, the challenges facing women to gain greater access to resources are still daunting, despite the dynamism of women's organizations and rights activists.

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LOUBNA HANNA SKALLI

Turkey

In Turkey, unlike in most highly industrialized societies, the family has a significant welfare role; it provides transfers to individuals in case of need and is the main source of welfare because the state and other institutions do not work properly. Welfare of individuals relates to welfare of the family resource pool in coping with poverty (Kalaycioğlu 2003) and women play the most significant role in both management of the family resources and utilization of kinship networks. Mutual solidarity networks with political organization that appeal to families ideologically form a higher strategic means of coping with poverty. Expectations and needs of different generations, and an emphasis on examining political, social, and cultural meanings for the new generation result in the scrutiny of social solidarity networks.

The existence of poverty indicates that coping mechanisms have not worked. Factors such as the weakening of women's relationship with the social environment and women being forced to work outside the home are influential. Furthermore, patriarchal authority directs the strategies for movements of the family or members of the family; the male household head is the symbol of absolute power in the family and this order is never questioned. Hence, wives and daughters may be forbidden to work outside the home and women's experience of poverty may be harder than it is for men. Each individual within the same household experiences poverty in a different way.

Within the present system in Turkey, in terms of transfer, goods and services are allocated to individuals and groups through a social unit such as family, the state, or a religious institution. But poor households, which lack economic resources, cannot transfer those resources to their offspring.

In her study, conducted in Ankara, Senol-Cantek (2001) interviewed 50 women. Within poor households the reproduction of household practices is mainly carried out by the wife and the contribution of the husband is either not expected, or described as helping rather than sharing. The work of the housewife is identified as "haphazard," "tiring," and "unproductive." Also, the housewife is most affected by impoverishment caused by the necessity of production/reproduction and protection of "the home."

In addition to the lower quality of life, the poor housewife experiences social and cultural poverty since destitution is proportional to any increase in poverty. The reproduction of household practices alleviates the alienation brought about by work and depression; it is also considered to be a way of participating in production and the majority of the interviewed women perceived it as an automatic behavior. Poverty is inevitably transferred to the next generation. In line with the altruism of women, who postpone, refuse, or disregard their own needs, the most upsetting side of poverty is its reflection on the life standards of children. Women play an important role in meeting children's demands and they turn to hidden savings and kinship networks while younger women attempt to provide a better future for their daughters.

Another study (Erman 2001), of migrant Turkish women's lives and their participation in the labor market in the urban area, covering 44 women in Ankara's squatter settlements, found that patriarchy is reproduced in the lives of migrant women. This might be changed by utilizing experiences related to patriarchy in organized collective action that causes structural and cultural transformation of society. Second-generation migrant women are able to find pathways for themselves in the male-dominated world where they enjoy more autonomy. However, these efforts are not sufficient to challenge the patriarchal structure of the society.

Kardam and Alyanak (2002) claim that the most vulnerable women, deprived of the most basic needs of life, try only to meet the needs of each day at a time. Women suffer the social and psychological effects of poverty more intensely and try to sustain the social roles defined by their children and home. Assistance (food, firewood, clothing, educational scholarships) provided by municipalities, foundations, non-governmental organizations, and philanthropists has gained great importance. Such aid is described as the condition that "neither kills them nor makes them live" (Kardam and Alyanak 2002, 219), and obtaining it has become one of the major aims of these women. The provision of aid is related to the government's populist and clientalist policies in regard to a serious vote potential; however, findings show that aid is not provided by the government (for example, in this study it was stated that some women could not benefit from certain government services because they did not have good relations with the people operating the solidarity networks). It could be claimed that such policies sometimes sustain women in developing unethical ways of making use of the relevant networks.

Studies related to poverty have gained momentum since the 1990s. Although there is a vast array of research on urbanization and squatters, almost all of it focuses on the head of the family (Onat 1993, 37). Studies related to household living strategies focusing on women from squatter areas are almost non-existent.

Another important source concerning poverty is the Five Year Development Plan prepared by the State Planning Organization (2001). This argues that, according to the calculations based on the minimum food expenditure cost, 51.49 percent of the poor population in the country is composed of women and that women living in urban areas are more exposed to poverty than those in rural areas. It is also maintains that the importance of unpaid women's labor for survival strategies of the household is developed to cope with poverty, and this causes waste of time. They are prevented from working at regularly paid jobs through which they may benefit from social security rights. This also strengthens women's disadvantaged position in relation to poverty and it is stated that daughters receive less opportunity from educational funds than sons. There is a significant link between women's poverty and their status as widowed, divorced, and separated. It is also claimed that housewives comprise a significant portion of the poorest (SPO 2001).

The tables included in this entry give fuller information about women's poverty in Turkey. Table 1 gives an idea of the average monthly earning of the population. Data show that males earn more than females and imply that the worst scenario is in agriculture where female labor might be evaluated as cheap labor. Table 1 also shows the gender division of labor; for example, in the electricity, gas, and water sector no females are employed. Table 2 shows the percentage of household members by income source and main characteristics according to different measures, such as educational and marital status. However, since the data are gathered in household units, it is hard to evaluate the position of the female members of the household. In line with this information, Table 3 illustrates the situation of female members. The ratio of female headed households is the highest in the middle level of poverty. When the poverty level increases, the mean number of children also increases (3.4 for women living in absolute poverty and 2.6 for women living in relative poverty). Table 4 provides information about the male and female members of the household. According to Table 4, it could be said that women are poorer than men. However, the situation gets worse for never married women whereas

Table 1: Average monthly earning by main characteristics, 1994 (in thousands of TL)

Public			Private			
Female	Male	Male/ Female	Female	Male	Male/ Female	
						Educational status
5950.0	7260.1	1.2	1286.2	3152.2	2.5	Illiterate
5691.6	7885.1	1.4	1798.3	3850.0	2.1	Literate without diploma and primary school
5324.0	7663.7	1.4	3003.3	4956.9	1.7	General junior high school and high school
5881.2	9215.3	1.6	4134.6	5427.7	1.3	Vocational junior high school and vocational high school
7396.6	9691.7	1.3	8730.5	12910.5	1.5	University and higher
						Occupational group
6653.7	7768.9	1.2	4267.4	6390.8	1.5	Scientific, technical, professional, and related workers
8956.0	9390.3	1.0	11932.0	14169.3	1.2	Administrative, executive, and managerial workers
5396.5	7021.5	1.3	4157.8	6397.8	1.5	Clerical and related workers
3227.8	7802.3	2.4	2880.8	4967.0	1.7	Sales workers
4408.7	6514.4	1.5	2434.7	3567.6	1.5	Service workers
1457.3	6279.9	4.3	885.3	2196.3	2.5	Agricultural, animal husbandry, forestry workers, and fishermen
7778.3	9793.0	1.3	2111.6	4096.8	1.9	Non-agricultural production and related workers
						Branch of economic activity
2248.9	5732.3	2.5	862.3	2199.7	2.6	Agriculture
9776.2	11478.3	1.2	2744.8	4843.4	1.8	Mining and quarrying
7682.2	10727.5	1.4	2427.0	4864.8	2.0	Manufacturing
6608.6	10297.3	1.6	–	8164.9	–	Electricity, gas, and water
10436.0	11437.2	1.1	2931.9	4016.8	1.4	Construction
6000.1	7122.9	1.2	2922.8	3960.3	1.4	Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants, and hotels
5333.4	8023.2	1.5	6647.5	5098.4	0.8	Transportation, communication, and storage
7386.8	9081.2	1.2	4701.0	6094.9	1.3	Finance, insurance, real estate, and business services
6115.2	7404.7	1.2	2639.8	4297.3	1.6	Community, social, and personal services
						Size of establishment
3140.5	4234.2	1.3	1592.7	2571.8	1.6	Fewer than 2
5262.7	6506.0	1.2	2564.7	3900.7	1.5	2–4
6270.7	7761.0	1.2	2743.3	5016.2	1.8	5–9
6897.2	9009.3	1.3	3801.9	5914.5	1.6	10–19
7352.1	9196.8	1.3	2688.9	5680.0	2.1	20+

Table 2: Percentage of household members by income source and main characteristics
(population 12 years and over)

Have personal income				No income	Have personal income				No income	
Total	activity only	activity and non activity	non-activity only		Total	activity only	activity and non activity	non-activity only		
										Educational status
100.0	5.3	4.0	10.2	80.5	100.0	5.0	59.7	19.4	15.9	Illiterate
100.0	7.0	2.4	5.0	85.6	100.0	16.9	46.2	7.9	29.1	Literate without diploma and primary school
100.0	6.6	9.6	7.4	76.4	100.0	15.4	36.5	4.3	43.8	General junior high school/high school
100.0	12.2	22.9	15.4	49.6	100.0	17.1	51.5	9.7	21.7	Vocational junior high school and high school
100.0	9.4	63.1	8.4	19.2	100.0	8.7	75.4	8.0	7.9	University and higher
										Marital status
100.0	8.4	3.3	2.2	86.1	100.0	21.1	4.6	1.1	73.2	Never married
100.0	6.2	4.7	4.3	84.8	100.0	12.2	70.6	11.2	6.1	Married
100.0	15.1	23.8	25.6	35.5	100.0	23.1	39.6	17.0	20.2	Divorced
100.0	11.7	27.2	24.5	36.5	100.0	23.4	51.4	14.2	11.0	Separated
100.0	1.6	17.1	47.3	34.0	100.0	2.4	37.2	38.2	22.2	Widowed
										Household quintiles
100.0	6.5	4.8	8.9	79.7	100.0	13.1	47.5	11.7	27.7	The highest 20%
100.0	6.8	2.8	5.8	84.7	100.0	15.4	46.4	8.8	29.4	II. 20%
100.0	7.2	3.4	5.7	83.6	100.0	15.5	46.1	7.4	31.0	III. 20%
100.0	7.4	5.8	6.4	80.4	100.0	15.5	47.3	6.6	30.7	IV. 20%
100.0	5.3	9.1	7.7	77.9	100.0	16.2	44.7	6.3	32.7	The lowest 20%
										Employment status
100.0	18.0	14.4	1.3	66.3	100.0	21.0	63.8	0.3	14.9	Working
100.0	–	–	10.1	89.9	100.0	–	–	28.1	71.9	Not working
										Place of settlement
100.0	6.8	6.8	8.9	77.5	100.0	19.7	43.2	10.4	26.7	Urban
100.0	6.5	3.6	4.5	85.5	100.0	9.9	50.1	4.9	35.1	Rural
										Region
100.0	9.1	6.4	8.3	76.1	100.0	21.6	45.0	10.2	23.2	Marmara
100.0	9.9	6.9	8.5	74.6	100.0	16.3	50.6	8.3	24.9	Aegean
100.0	7.7	5.5	7.1	79.7	100.0	15.7	44.4	7.0	33.0	Mediterranean
100.0	4.5	5.8	7.8	82.0	100.0	12.4	47.9	9.7	29.9	Central Anatolia
100.0	4.4	4.9	5.7	84.9	100.0	11.9	47.8	5.7	34.6	Black Sea
100.0	1.2	1.8	3.6	93.5	100.0	7.3	45.5	4.3	43.0	Eastern Anatolia
100.0	5.2	2.1	2.6	90.1	100.0	12.7	41.4	4.9	41.0	Southeastern Anatolia

Source: taken from Social Structure and Gender Statistics using raw data from the Income Distribution Study 1994 by the State Institute of Statistics.

Table 3: Percentage of households by poverty type and main characteristics

		Absolute poor	Relative poor	Middle	Highest
Ratio of households (%)		5.6	27.7		
Average household size		6.6	5.2	3.4	4.7
Place of settlement					
	Urban	2.8	21.8	39.0	36.4
	Rural	9.3	33.0	36.7	21.0
Region					
	Marmara	1.3	18.3	40.5	39.9
	Aegean	2.6	22.4	46.7	28.2
	Mediterranean	7.7	29.5	37.1	25.7
	Central Anatolia	6.0	28.1	36.3	29.6
	Black Sea	8.1	31.0	36.3	24.6
	Eastern Anatolia	7.7	32.0	32.3	28.0
	Southeastern Anatolia	17.5	45.2	24.3	13.0
Mean number of children per woman		3.4	2.6	1.7	1.7
Infant mortality rate (%)		87.5	89.0	86.0	63.0
Child mortality rate (%)		18.0	16.5	12.5	11.0
Under five mortality (%)		105.5	105.5	98.5	74.0
Ratio of women head of households		6.8	6.9	10.8	5.2
Educational status of the head of household		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Illiterate	30.9	19.4	12.3	4.7
	Literate and primary school	65.1	68.2	63.1	52.9
	Junior high school/ high school	3.8	11.8	20.5	26.1
	Vocational junior high and high school				
	University and higher	0.1	0.6	4.1	16.3
Employment status of the head of household		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Not working	14.0	13.2	20.7	12.8
	Working/agriculture	50.0	34.6	25.2	19.2
	Working/non-agricultural	36.0	52.2	54.1	68.0
Status in employment of the head of household		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Regular and casual Employee	40.7	49.0	50.8	41.8
	Employer	0.7	2.2	4.3	16.8
	Self-employed	58.5	48.8	44.8	41.0
	Unpaid family worker	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.4
Social security and health insurance position of the head of household					
	Not covered by social security scheme	80.5	56.1	36.3	24.9
	Not covered by health insurance scheme	72.8	53.7	34.5	29.3

Source: taken from Social Structure and Gender Statistics using raw data from the Income Distribution Study 1994 by the State Institute of Statistics.

Table 4: Percentage of household members by poverty type and main characteristics (population 12 years and over)

		Female				Male			
		Absolute poor	Relative poor	Middle	Highest	Absolute poor	Relative poor	Middle	Highest
Educational status (aged 6–24)		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Illiterate	24.6	12.9	6.7	7.3	15.9	9.0	6.3	5.6
	Literate and primary school	72.3	76.8	71.0	66.9	74.4	72.7	65.7	62.0
	Junior high school/high school	3.1	10.2	21.7	24.7	9.6	18.0	27.4	31.0
	Vocational junior high and high school								
	University and higher	0.0	0.1	0.6	1.1	0.1	0.3	0.6	1.4
Educational status (aged 25 and over)		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Illiterate	66.6	49.9	34.6	23.6	27.8	16.3	8.7	4.6
	Literate and primary school	32.6	46.9	55.1	49.5	67.7	69.7	64.7	53.4
	Junior high school/high school	0.9	3.1	9.5	19.5	4.1	13.1	22.5	27.5
	Vocational junior high and high school								
	University and higher	0.0	0.1	0.8	7.4	0.3	0.8	4.1	14.6
Marital status		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Never married	39.8	35.9	24.1	32.8	41.0	39.1	29.9	37.9
	Married	53.5	57.1	65.6	60.5	57.5	59.5	68.1	60.5
	Widowed	5.8	6.3	9.2	5.8	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.2
	Divorced	0.7	0.4	0.8	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3
	Separated	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Employment status		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Not working	58.5	61.6	65.0	64.1	32.4	29.7	26.6	25.2
	Working/agriculture	39.0	34.0	26.5	22.8	44.2	31.5	23.5	19.9
	Working/non-agricultural	2.5	4.4	8.5	13.1	23.4	38.7	49.8	54.9
Percentage of unpaid family workers		82.6	77.2	66.0	62.2	26.7	19.7	10.1	18.0
Without social security protection		98.8	97.0	91.1	83.2	89.0	72.7	49.4	49.9
Without health insurance protection		75.9	57.2	36.6	35.1	76.3	58.3	37.4	38.4
Type of income		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Do not have income	88.9	85.8	78.1	78.2	42.8	36.1	21.7	31.3
	Only activity income	6.3	7.4	7.1	5.6	12.8	15.9	14.5	16.0
	Both activity/non-activity income	1.5	2.4	5.6	8.6	38.5	41.8	52.3	46.3
	Only non-activity income	3.3	4.5	9.2	7.7	5.9	6.2	11.5	6.5

Source: taken from Social Structure and Gender Statistics using raw data from the Income Distribution Study 1994 by the State Institute of Statistics.

the ratios are closer for both married male and female members of the household.

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Suheyla Turkyilmaz

Slavery

East Asia and Southeast Asia

Slavery in Asia

The myriad forms of bondage and unfreedom in the diverse social systems of Asia are expressed under a similar variety of vernacular terms, only some of which should rightly be translated as slavery. A definition of a slave is required, as a person of inferior status, regarded as the saleable property of another, for whom she or he performs obligatory work. Such slaves occur at many periods of history and in all parts of the world. Although there is a vast historical industry centering on the Atlantic slave trade and American slavery, systematic work on Asia and the Islamic world has been minimal. The racial and extremely negative associations of New World slavery, and the eighteenth/nineteenth-century campaign against it, made Asian scholars reluctant to foreground the issue.

An exception to this general neglect was provided by Marxist historians in Asia, some of whom felt obliged to locate in their own societies the "slave mode of production" at a time preceding the rise of "feudalism." The European category of feudalism had its closest analogies in Japan after about 1100, and Japanese Marxists rightly identified a slave category in the earlier (Heian) period, representing perhaps as much as 10 percent of the population. In Korea this category was even more pronounced and survived into the nineteenth century, whereas in China those looking for slaves playing a major role in production (as opposed to the considerable variety of domestic servitude) had to go back 3,000 years to the shadowy Shang dynasty.

In Southeast Asia, like many parts of Polynesia, and of the later-Sinicized parts of what is today China and Vietnam, direct control of people was more important for accumulating power than control of land, law-giving, or bureaucratic hierarchies. Various forms of bondage were therefore particularly salient in these areas up to the nineteenth century. Among these were forms rightly called slavery. Debt played a very large role as a source of bondage, and some of those bonded through debt should be considered slaves because they were saleable.

Most of the societies upon which neither strong states nor scriptural religions had yet made a major impact had a slave category, and in some cases it was a very large one. In the Philippines Antonio de Morga (1971, 274) observed, "slaves constitute the main capital and wealth of these islands," and "are sold exchanged and traded, just like any other article of merchandise." Such slaves were permitted to marry and to own property, and slave marriages were respected as valid like other marriages. A distinction needs to be made between closed systems in which the inferior status of the slave was so emphasized that upward mobility was impossible, and open systems that used slavery as a means to incorporate weaker and poorer groups into an expanding polity. The flourishing port-states of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries, most of them Islamic sultanates, were of this latter type.

The sale of women in China

Although in China slavery played a peripheral role in production, the widespread practice of selling children (until made illegal in 1949) sometimes took on the quality of slavery. When poor families sold their sons to wealthier or elite lineages, these could become either saleable and heritable domestic slaves, or adopted sons in a lineage in need of men. Whereas males could "belong in" a lineage and transfer in this way to a different one, females could only "belong to" a lineage, as James Watson (1980, 227) sees it. The large-scale market in female children served a variety of purposes, including training in the arts of entertainment and prostitution, personal maid-servants to wealthier women, concubines, secondary wives, and even child daughters-in-law (much cheaper than the adult variety).

Many of these bought girls could be treated as domestic slaves during childhood, but still marry as a principle wife at maturity. In Cantonese areas the bought *mui jai* ("little younger-sister") was seen as an inferior category of daughter, in a context where biological daughters were also destined to be "sold" out to another lineage. Some bought girls were treated as true slaves throughout their lives. As is common elsewhere, in other words, there was a greater range of possible outcomes for females sold as chattels than for males.

Islam and Southeast Asian slavery

The spread of Islam into the Archipelago and Peninsula from the late thirteenth century introduced a specific legal and universal category of slave (Arabic *ʿabd* for males and *ama* for females), and some Islamic provisions regarding the sale, treatment, and punishment of slaves found their way into Malay legal codes such as the *Undang-undang Melaka*. The Qurʾān legitimated the enslavement of conquered enemies, especially the women and children of men who had been killed. At the same time Muslim tradition discouraged the enslavement of fellow Muslims, and one *ḥadīth* (reported saying) of the Prophet promised eternal rewards for those who freed Muslim slaves.

In practice, a major consequence of the adoption of Islam by the expanding port-states of the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries was to direct much of their warring and raiding activity against non-Muslims of their hinterlands. Portuguese reports in the early 1500s show not-yet Muslim societies in Sunda (western Java), Balambangan (eastern Java), Bali, and eastern Indonesia as the principal sources of bought slaves. Stronger sultanates prohibited their own Muslim subjects being sold to outsiders. Java gradually ceased to export slaves in the sixteenth century as it Islamized and developed an elaborate corvée system of unfree labor to replace private slavery.

The Muslim states that continued to export their people in large numbers were those of the Bugis in South Sulawesi, for whom the line between slavery and freedom was unusually sharp. The ruler of one of the newly-Islamic Bugis states, Bone, scandalized his own family and fellow aristocrats in 1643 by demanding idealistically that they release their slaves in the name of Islam and pay them wages. Makasar, the then strongest South Sulawesi state, took a different view, and conquered Bone in defense of the traditional social structure. This may explain the continued role of slavery in that Muslim region into the twentieth century. By contrast, there are reports from the Manila area in the 1580s of an anti-Spanish revolt which failed, apparently motivated by the Spanish tendency to free slaves or at least undermine aristocratic control over them.

Slavery appears to have reached its peak in the flourishing seventeenth century sultanates such as Aceh, Banten, Patani, Makasar, Sulu, and Magindanao, which used conquered or purchased slaves for urban construction, manufacture, and even agriculture, as well as in domestic roles. Although most female slaves occupied domestic positions, there are reports of some being assembled for factory-like production of textiles. As these sultanates declined in wealth and military strength in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the slave trade became a matter of supplying largely domestic slaves to the more prosperous European enclaves and to wealthier Muslim traders and rulers. All around the borders between Islamized lowlanders and animist shifting cultivators and hunter-gatherers, raiding occurred from the former to enslave the women and children of the latter, as a means either to their eventual incorporation in the dominant lowland society, or to onward sale. In addition, a few specialized slave-raiding centers developed, of which Sulu in the island chain between the Philippines and Borneo was the most important between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries. Thousands of captives, a majority of them women and children, were taken each year from coastal communities in the Central Philippines and Borneo, for redistribution through Sulu.

Most of the unfortunate women who were captured in this way, often having seen their fathers or husbands killed by the raiders, remain anonymous. A few, however, emerge in the records, sometimes at the point of liberation. Some slaves made spectacular journeys, like the Southeast Asians offered as tribute to Chinese emperors in the fifteenth century, or two Papuan slaves bought in Batavia by a Chinese envoy in 1680 to present to a later emperor. One male Sumatran slave, known to history as Enrique, was purchased by Ferdinand Magellan in Melaka soon after the Portuguese conquest, and taken back with him to Lisbon. Magellan took him as a potential interpreter on the epic voyage of 1521–2 on which the navigator met his death, making Enrique one of the first to circumnavigate the globe.

Slave women in the European settlements

Both the Portuguese in Melaka (from 1511) and the Spanish in Manila (from 1571) did acquire domestic slaves from the societies around them, but their essential labor was provided through corvée rather than slavery. The Dutch East India Company, which established its major base in Batavia (Jakarta, 1619), and lesser ones in Ambon (1605), Banda (1621), Melaka (1641), and Makasar (1669), introduced slaves on a much larger scale as the labor force of the city. The initial slave population of Batavia was purchased chiefly from South India and Arakan, but from the mid-seventeenth century they overwhelmingly came from the Indonesian Archipelago, notably South Sulawesi,

Bali and the islands to its east, and Nias. The proportion of slaves fluctuated between 20 percent and 50 percent of the total population of Batavia before 1800, with a peak of 40,600 slaves in the 1779 census. Similar proportions were present in the smaller Dutch settlements such as Melaka and Makasar.

Although probably at least half of the slaves brought to the Dutch settlements were always women, the resident slave population in the censuses was predominantly male. The explanation for this is that male migrants to the city bought many of the female slaves as sexual partners and eventually wives, so that they show up in other categories. The large Chinese population of these cities showed a preference for Balinese women, whose offspring then contributed to building a permanent Chinese mestizo community in Java, known as *peranakan*.

The largest slave households (some over 100 strong) were those of prominent Dutch traders and officials. The mistress of such households was usually herself a Eurasian not very distant in her mestizo culture from the slave women in her entourage. The latter became child-minders, domestic servants, musicians, and dancers in such households. In the earlier years many became Christian and gave rise to the freed Mardika community later assimilated as Eurasians. But in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a growing racial distance, and an increased proportion of Muslim Bugis among the slave households, produced a tendency for freed slaves to assimilate to the polyglot, Malay-speaking Muslim community of Batavia, later known as Betawi.

The exception, of course, were those who through *de facto* or *de jure* marriage became part of the Eurasian or Chinese communities. This feature of the slave trade became more pronounced after 1800, as reformist British influence made the slave trade increasingly difficult – it was banned by the British parliament in 1807. The price of attractive women became several times higher than that of men, with first Bugis and later Nias women being the most valued. Not until 1860 was slavery itself made illegal in Dutch possessions, and the colonial authorities became serious about suppressing it in their far-flung territories only around 1900.

The British settlements of Penang (1786) and Singapore (1819) were also in desperate need of a female population. Despite the formal British opposition to the slave trade, women were available for purchase in both settlements at least through the 1820s, and in the Malay states with their Chinese tin-miners until the 1860s. The only category in the 1830 Singapore census to show a marked female preponderance was that of "Bugis and Balinese," with 4,421 women to 1,048 men.

Some of the Indonesian slave women who married their masters and fathered their children did become wealthy or prominent. The Balinese widow of the Chinese Captain of Batavia took over his official role in representing the Chinese community, as well as his business, in 1848. Other former slaves, usually the widows of wealthy men, are listed in Batavia records as substantial owners of slaves and other property. There were probably more women like the young Muslim Sumatran encountered by the French traveler Melchior Yvan in Singapore in the 1840s, who had been acquired as a slave concubine by a Belgian soldier in Dutch service, and taken by him to his home in Brussels disguised as a boy. Paul Gauguin's mistress and muse in 1893–4, "Anna la Javanaise," appears to have arrived in Europe in a similarly unfree state. If for some women slavery could be an avenue to upward mobility, for more it represented lifelong drudgery and vulnerability.

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ANTHONY REID

North Africa

The topic of women, gender and slavery in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt) is still a new field, although there is a rich body of evidence of the practice of slavery in this region as influenced by Islam since the seventh century. The sources are scattered but abundant in many *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) books, legal registers, travel accounts, and official colonial documents in the North African, British, French, Portuguese, and Spanish archives.

Female slavery is even less researched. Early exceptions include Abd al-Wahed (1931), while more recent works include Ennaji (1999), al-Ansari (2001), and Robertson and Klein (1983), which generally deals with Sub-Saharan Africa but contains some significant indications concerning female slavery in North Africa as well as the homelands of the enslaved populations taken to North Africa.

The historian Patrick Manning, in his book *Slavery and African Life*, exclaims: "The tragic hero of this tale [slavery in Africa], as usual in classical tragedy, is *male*" (Manning 1990, 3). In North Africa, the tragic victim of slavery is female. The number of female slaves was higher than male and females usually cost more than males, with the exception of eunuchs. The burden of women's exploitation was double. On one hand, the status of women in general in the social gender hierarchy was inferior and on the other, the marginalized status of the enslaved person deprived her of all civil rights. Thus, within the institution of slavery in North Africa there were two systems of slavery based on gender relations: one for women, the other for men. This was mainly because Islamic law stipulates that a female slave who gives birth to a child of her owner acquires certain legal rights and her child is free. In North Africa, the judicial and legal conditions allowed Muslim men to take one or several concubines besides his wife or wives. Paradoxically, the status of a concubine or odalisque (a word of Turkish origin referring especially to concubines in the seraglio of the sultan) changes to that of mother concubine (*umm al-walad*) if she bears a child by her master. The child receives the same rights as a legitimate free child. The *umm al-walad* also gains some legal rights and becomes free at the death of the master. The judicial rules regarding female slavery were mostly based on the Mālikī legal school and they are best described in the book entitled *Risāla*, by Ibn Abī Zayd al-Qayrawānī (a Maghribī Muslim judge who died in 996), one of the most popular books on Islamic jurisprudence in the Maghrib. The gender differentiated system in slavery is also partly due to the fact that slave owners had differing expectations for male and female slaves, which translated into different responsibilities, obligations, and defined roles. And these different responsibilities often determined the living arrangements of male and female slaves (such as the status of *umm al-walad* and the condition of a male slave soldier).

Men, under most interpretations of Islamic law, assumed all positions of leadership and in family life were allowed to take up to four wives and to have as many concubines as they desired (Gordon 1989). The very occurrence of concubinage, which could only be satisfied by a slave since a free woman was not allowed to be taken as a concubine, provides a partial explanation for the preference for women as slaves.

In households that could meet the expenses of having sexually segregated areas, there was a special quarter called a harem where wives, domestic slaves, concubines, and other female family members resided. Males outside the prohibited degrees of blood relationship were not allowed in the harem, with the exception of eunuchs. The mother of the male provider of the house served as a matriarchal figure; next came the wife or wives. It is important to note that in practice polygyny existed only in a very small percentage of society, usually among the wealthy. The positions and tasks of servants/enslaved women were structured in terms of the social position of the households, but were sometimes based on race or color. Generally, light-skinned Circassian young women who were thought to be beautiful were highly ranked, but they were few. The women of Ethiopian origin known as *ḥabashīyāt* were also "renowned for their beauty and sexual temperament" (Abir in Willis 1985, 124). The domestic slaves in the harem on whom domestic duties and other hard tasks lay were usually from Sub-Saharan Africa (Hunwick 1993). Almost all slaves quickly converted to Islam or were already Muslims; this was a grave contradiction of Islamic law (Sharīʿa), which insists on the enslavement only of "pagan" peoples, captured through a "legal" war.

Many European travelers, particularly during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, gave the impression that the enslaved women in Morocco existed only for domestic comfort and as sexual objects (Tharaud and Tharaud 1930). True, concubinage is confirmed and commented on by Muslim scholars, such as the following statement found in a collection of *nāwazil* (legal opinions) of al-Warzazi: "Concubines are to be acquired for less expense than a dowry, and all that entails. And one needn't worry about taking a small or large number of them, or about treating them equally, or about whether one should actually live with them or keep one's distance from them" (Ennaji 1999, 33). But it is evident that not all these women served as concubines to their masters. Male and female slaves were assigned numerous occupations, including tasks in the home, fields, oases, mines, and ports, or in the army.

There were some women who succeeded in securing an advantageous position, such as *umm*

al-walad; however, there were many who did not. The use of female slaves as wet-nurses, nannies, domestic servants, and even concubines was the logical extension of the pre-existing notion of women's status in gender relations. However, what they all had in common from being in servitude was being exploited. Although they contributed greatly to society, slaves did not represent themselves, or the slice of a society with whom they identified, but they represented the interest of the people they served with bare minimum compensation.

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CHOUKI EL HAMEL

The Ottoman Empire

Slavery was deeply rooted and ubiquitous in the vast, centuries-old Ottoman Empire. Although generally only the wealthier elements of society could afford to own slaves (*esir, abd, rıkk*), slavery in numerous forms was practiced in every Ottoman province from the Balkans, Asia Minor, and the Caucasus to the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa. Ottoman armies and slave drovers of various nations supplied the Ottoman markets with white and non-white men, women, and children, whom they seized outside the empire's borders in the Black Sea and Caucasus frontier zones and Sub-Saharan Africa. With two exceptions, slaves could be of any origin, race, or ethnicity: Ottoman subjects regardless of religion, race, or ethnicity could not be enslaved, and no Muslim of any land or provenance could be made a slave; a slave's subsequent conversion to Islam might hasten emancipation but did not guarantee it. (These criteria were honored except in the notorious case of the Janissary corps. In violation of Islamic law and Ottoman custom, from the fifteenth through the mid-seventeenth century, Balkan Christian subjects of the empire were taken as the sultan's own slaves [*kul*] to form this elite body of slave soldiers.)

As heirs to the territories and institutional lineage of Mediterranean and Near Eastern slaveholding societies, the Ottomans drew from a number of traditions in their exploitation of unfree labor. Above all, however, the Ottoman system was founded on Islamic principles and earlier Middle Eastern Islamic precedents. Islamic law's juristic framework and moral judgments set limits and conditions on the recruitment and treatment of slaves, and their manumission and rights as freed men and women. Since Islamic law regarded the enslaved as possessing a dual nature as both property and human being, slaves in the Ottoman Empire were entitled to appeal to the courts for redress and even monetary compensation in the event of malicious injury by a master, wrongful prolongation of bondage, or other mistreatment. Complaints brought by male and female captives against their masters or mistresses survive in the records of the Ottoman Sharīʿa courts, where cases of false enslavement, failure to honor a manumission promise, and, more rarely, egregious physical harm, constituted the bulk of such charges.

Slavery in the empire was on the whole an urban phenomenon, with most female and male slaves employed as household labor. Given the numbers of dependants and the social and spatial punctilios of elite Ottoman households, domestic work in larger residences posed special challenges, the more so since slaves were by definition cultural and linguistic outsiders. Smaller domiciles – households with only one or two slaves were in fact the norm – could be even more taxing if childcare was added to cleaning, laundering, intimate care, cooking, and marketing. Since the purchase price and upkeep of slaves represented a substantial investment to their owners, slaves may have enjoyed certain advantages over freeborn domestic help. Although free servants could in theory change employers, many servants were virtually indentured, having been contracted to another household at a young age by their impoverished parents. Clearly, much depended on the ethics of the receiving household and the capacity of the surrounding community to insist

on standards. The Islamic courts offered additional safeguards, but as a practical matter all servants, slave or free, first hoped for justice from the men and women for whom they labored.

Outside the domestic realm, male slaves were sometimes employed in mining, construction, and military service. Both male and female slaves were engaged in craft production for home consumption and, less commonly, for the market, notably by spinning, weaving, needlework, dyeing, and related textile processes. Both men and women were at times employed in agricultural work as well, but in contrast to the plantations of the Atlantic world, agriculture in Ottoman lands was overwhelmingly in the hands of male and female peasant labor.

Although the Ottomans were famous for their elite corps of slave soldiers (Janissaries), the numbers were only a small part of the total slave population, and the heyday of the practice was relatively brief. In fact, as in other Old World societies, females constituted the majority of slaves. The focus of the demand for labor on the maintenance of households and symbolic capital rather than on profit-making ventures accounts in part for the gender distribution of slavery. It is also explained by the class dynamics of the Ottoman gender system itself, which utilized low-status female workers, and less often eunuchs and male servants, to ensure the physical isolation expected of higher-status women. By attending to the world outside the harem and circle of intimates, female slaves and paid domestics served as guarantors of the comfort and status of privileged females.

The procreative impulses behind slaveholding put female slaves in an especially delicate and precarious position. In fact, some female slaves, from the moment of capture, were designated for concubinage. Because of their youth and beauty, these girls, some no more than children, commanded the highest prices in the empire's many slave markets, particularly in the central markets of Istanbul, Damascus, and Cairo. Some concubines (Turkish, *cariye*) achieved great wealth and status, including becoming the legal wives and heirs of their former masters. The most famous concubines were the various consorts of the Ottoman sultans, notably those in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, a period that came to be known as "the sultanate of the women." Girls who were especially comely and graceful were transported to the harem of Topkapı Palace to become imperial favorites, mothers of princes, and queen mothers (Turkish, *valide*), and as such influential actors in imperial politics. Those who were not so favored were eventually married off to officials of the realm. The harem quarters of most elite households had numerous slave denizens, in emulation of the palace. Many of these women ended as wives or otherwise respected members of the household. There was no stigma attached to having once been a slave. Although the slave trade was mostly a male enterprise, some women, often former slaves, were registered slave dealers. Other women, well-placed former slaves presiding over their own households, purchased and trained young slave girls, treating them as surrogate children for whom they arranged suitable marriages.

The many cases of female slaves who ended as queens, and male slaves who became royal confidants and viziers, and the many eye-witness accounts of the Ottomans' generous treatment of their slave charges have reinforced the representation of Ottoman slavery as a relatively mild form of bondage, characterized by humane norms, frequent emancipation, and easy integration of freed men and women into the larger society. The violence that was at the core of the enslavement process, and the coercion that undergirded the entire system, however, cloud that story. Although Ottoman slavery was not racially defined, evidence suggests that darker Sub-Saharan African men and women on the whole received harsher treatment, particularly in the southern provinces of the empire, where Sub-Saharan slaves were more plentiful. It is true that African women were often concubines, and so privy to the possibility of rapid emancipation if they bore their master a child. Still, in most regions African women tended to be more concentrated in the arduous and dirtier household occupations. Nonetheless, as in the larger society, slaves' gender was far more defining and limiting than race or ethnicity. All female slaves, whatever their nominal employment, were legally vulnerable to the sexual demands of their owners. Female slaves' universal vulnerability in this regard, and their lack of legal recourse, in a society that otherwise fiercely controlled extramarital female sexuality, must count against the picture of slaves' social mobility and gentle, even familial, treatment.

The Ottoman view of their slavery as essentially humane, and slavery's seeming sanction by Islamic scripture, led to a protracted debate about abolition over the course of the nineteenth century. The African slave trade was abolished in 1857, but slaveholding and to some extent the trade in white slaves lingered on for decades, until the Young Turk period in the early twentieth century. Slavery and varying forms of bonded servitude have outlived the Ottoman Empire in a number of pockets in the region, most notably in and around the Arabian

Peninsula. As in earlier eras, female domestic labor and female sexuality are at the center of demand.

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MADELINE C. ZILFI

Sub-Saharan Africa

Slavery in Africa covers a wide range of practices in different contexts. In the transatlantic slave trade, African slaves sent to the Americas (especially the United States, Brazil, and the Caribbean) provided an agricultural labor force in plantations. Men were therefore preferred over women for their strength and fetched a higher price on the slave market. Most slaves of the transatlantic trade followed traditional religions, although some were Muslim. Apart from the transatlantic trade, and predating it, there also existed an important domestic slave trade within Africa itself. The transatlantic trade sometimes spawned slavery systems within Africa, as they were supplied with slaves uprooted in the interior and brought to the coast. In other cases, African systems of slavery developed independently from the transatlantic trade, especially when it accompanied the establishment of big Muslim African empires in West Africa, such as the empire of Mali (thirteenth to seventeenth centuries), or the Fulani empires of Futa Jallon (Senegal, eighteenth to nineteenth centuries), Macina (Mali, nineteenth century), and Sokoto (Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, nineteenth century). Slaves could be exported to North Africa and the Middle East, with trade routes crossing the Sahara or running along the East African coastline and the Horn of Africa. But many slaves were exploited in Sub-Saharan Africa itself, working in plantations, mines, textile and livestock industry, or as domestic servants. The scale of internal African slavery was huge and slaves were counted in millions, constituting sometimes the majority of the local or regional population. The British outlawed the transatlantic slave trade in 1807, which in some places exacerbated patterns of domestic slavery within Africa, especially along the coasts. The internal African slave trade continued until the African interior was colonized by European powers at the end of the nineteenth century. However, if slave trade and raids were stopped by the European colonization, the existing slaves were not necessarily freed, and systems of domestic slavery have survived in some places until today.

The slavery existing within the African continent is the focus of this entry, since women and Islam played much more important roles in it than in the transatlantic trade. First, the internal slave trade was often organized by Muslim societies such as Swahili and Arabs in East Africa, or Fulbe, Hausa, Tuareg, and Diula (among others) in West Africa. As it is forbidden for a Muslim to enslave a fellow Muslim and the Qur'ān allows slavery as a means to spread Islam,* any non-Muslim society was potential booty. Raids were often organized in the name of the *jihād*, to spread the Qur'ān and convert captured slaves to Islam. However, if concubines and domestic slaves were often (superficially) converted, many conquered populations or slaves were forcefully maintained outside Islam. Converting non-Muslim communities would have prevented capturing them as slaves and would have dried up a flourishing trade. Allowing slaves to convert or to acquire important religious roles would have contributed to the abolition of the barrier that existed between masters and slaves and that legitimated their different rights. Economic and identity considerations often took precedence over the logic of the *jihād* and the spread of Islam. Second, women were often more valued or in higher demand than men, because of their docility, their productivity for labor-intensive tasks, and their capacity to reproduce the masters' or the slaves' groups. Since Muslim men could only have four wives and as many concubines as they could afford, concubines were in high demand. Concubines, who were consumption items, were worth more than laboring slaves, who were factors of production. In some cases, only women and children were enslaved, men being killed at war. In other cases, both men and women were enslaved. Men could be enrolled in the army or work in plantations. Apart from becoming concubines, women could also work in plantations or take care of domestic charges (fetching water and firewood, pounding grain, cooking – these female tasks sometimes being performed by male slaves). Slavery thus helped relieve the workload of Muslim women and thereby facilitated the practice of secluding Muslim women at home, which

allowed them to spend more time on leisure or off-farm activities, including trade.

Although slaves had a lower status, they could sometimes win the esteem of their masters, and influence them. Male slaves were often enrolled in the army and could gain power and prestige through their military success. They could even capture and own their own slaves. Some acquired high military responsibilities, the post of dignitaries or councilors, and the sultan or their master would often trust them more than his own relatives. Women too could acquire influence through their position of concubine. In some sultanates of Nigeria and Cameroon, there is a rule (dating back to the establishment of the sultanates, at the beginning of the nineteenth century) that the sultan must be the son of a "slave" mother, which confers on concubines influence over both the sultan with whom they sleep and the sultan to whom they give birth.

It is useful here to distinguish between open and closed systems of slavery. In closed systems of slavery, slaves are prevented from integrating in their master's family and are maintained in slavery over time. They can neither intermarry with their master, nor can they try to emancipate themselves through converting, study, or trade. If they bear any child by their master, these are considered slaves or, at best, half-caste. In open systems, on the contrary, slaves are progressively integrated into the family of their master (often seen as their "patron"). They intermarry with their master's family, are allowed to convert to his religion, and to become emancipated through hard work, study, or trade. After a few generations, there is no longer a distinction between slaves and masters. The integration is more rapid when slaves take part in the household mode of production and when their activities are not much different from those of their masters. In a pure closed system, slaves cannot escape their fate and slavery is perpetuated. In a pure open system, slavery disappears after a few generations.

Although there were local variations, most systems of slavery in Muslim Africa were semi-open, showing some openness for the integration of slave women and their children, but being rather closed to the integration of male slaves and their children. While free women were married, slave women were taken as concubines (slaves could generally not be wives and free women could not be concubines). When concubines bore the children of free men (usually their master) who recognized their paternity, they would be freed at the death of their master and their children were considered freeborn – they had usually the same rights as the children of the master born of free women. Though some stigma could sometimes be attached to having a mother of slave origin, this would no longer be an issue after a few generations. Although concubines had a lower status than wives and could not be treated on an equal footing with them, they constituted a source of sexual pleasure and prestige for their master and were in high demand. Concubines could even be preferred over freeborn wives because they had no family from whom they could seek support and were at the mercy of their master, being therefore generally more docile and trustworthy. Muslim systems of slavery thus showed openness by integrating concubines and their children. As a consequence, they had to face the slow erosion of the number of slaves, which triggered more slave raids in order to replenish the stock. On the other hand, when slave women "married" slave men or provided sexual services outside marriage or concubinage (being sometimes sexually abused by the master or his relatives who would then deny their paternity), their master would retain custody over their children, defined as slaves. When a master allowed one of his female slaves to marry one of his male slaves, the slave man would only gain rights over his wife and not over his own children, who would remain under the authority of his master. This is consistent with many local marriage practices in Africa, in which a husband acquires the rights *in uxorem* (control over his wife) without acquiring the rights *in genetricem* (control over his own children), unless he is a free man, lives in a patrilineal or bilateral society, and pays a substantial bride-price. Free women who owned slaves would also own the children of their female slaves. Slave men had more difficulties reproducing. Apart from the fact that some of them were castrated, they were prevented from marrying free women and had only limited access to slave women since many of them became their master's concubines. Slave men depended on their master's good will to be allowed to marry. In some places, the master had the obligation to provide his male slaves with wives; in others, the master had to choose between treating his slaves relatively well or facing the risk of having them run away. Moreover, providing an enslaved man with an enslaved wife had the advantage of reproducing the slave category, since the children took the identity of their slave father and depended on his master. The institution of slavery was perpetuated wherever slave men were prevented from marrying free women but allowed to marry slave women, especially in places where slaves were not progressively integrated into their master's family.

Another characteristic distinguishing open from closed systems pertains to the acquisition of the master's cultural and religious traits, including access to Islam. Systems that forced slaves to convert to Islam and encouraged them to go further in their religious practices and knowledge tended to be more open. Even though conversion to Islam was not automatically recompensed by freedom, it allowed for the progressive integration of slaves in the community of the masters (who sometimes distinguished between different generations of slaves, the eldest being highest in the hierarchy). Slaves could then take pride in being Muslim and define themselves as higher than non-Muslim free people on the social ladder. On the contrary, systems which prevented slaves from converting, advancing far in their religious studies, or playing any major religious role tended to be more closed and to maintain a stricter difference of status and rights between masters and slaves. A restricted access to Islam often goes hand in hand with restricted intermarriages and a lower integration within the master's family. Where domestic slavery has survived until today due to closed matrimonial strategies, such as is the case in a few places in Sahelian countries (most notoriously in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, but also in some of their neighboring countries), it is usually rationalized by being associated with "paganism" or "lower" forms of Islam.

The colonial administration, although it forbade slave raids and trade, relied heavily on the collaboration with local structures of power to run the colonies. After the conquest, the system of indirect rule, followed in most Muslim kingdoms or sultanates, maintained in power the very political structures that formerly relied on slave trade and raids. Because of its dependence on the local Muslim leaders, the colonial administration was keen to avoid a collapse of their social and economic structures. It therefore turned a blind eye to domestic slaves who, although officially "freed," often continued to depend so much on their master to access means of production (mainly land) or to be so indebted in the process that they gained no advantage from their new "freedom." When the colonial administration developed some measures to allow a progressive emancipation of domestic slaves (such as the possibility of buying their own freedom), they mainly benefited men. Slave women continued to be conveniently assimilated as concubines, entertaining the fiction that their forced labor was no more than domestic duties and that their selling was merely a matrimonial compensation. Concubines were seen as "practically free," and those who ran away from their master tended to be considered as wives rather than slaves, and to be returned to their master. The colonial administration feared that allowing women to escape their master's control would not only upset important allies, but would also increase prostitution. It was therefore convenient to consider the issue of concubinage as a domestic matter, covered by the Sharīʿa law, with which the colonial administration did not wish to interfere. It was only after gaining more confidence and independence from local political structures, and after coming under increasing scrutiny and pressure from the League of Nations or, today, the United Nations, that colonial and postcolonial administrations took serious measures to end domestic slavery. Although most systems of domestic slavery have slowly died out, some have survived until the present wherever masters in the most closed systems found ways to maintain control over slave women and their children. And although Islam has spread rapidly, present-day slaves or communities who continue to be associated with a former slave status are often considered as inferior Muslims and kept out of the higher religious functions by their former masters, which reinforces their lower social status.

Present-day local African discourses concerning Islam and slavery are ambivalent, and are not so different from those debating the pros and cons of European colonization. On the one hand, Islam is blamed – especially by Christian and former slave communities – for having legitimated slavery and some of the most gruesome and violent forms of human exploitation. On the other hand, slavery is presented – especially by former master communities – almost as a humanist enterprise, as a necessary step to emancipate formerly pagan people from their "superstitions" and to bring them to Islam.

* "Then slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them captives and besiege them and lie in wait for them in every ambush, then if they repent and keep up prayer and pay the poor-rate, leave their way free to them; surely Allah is Forgiving, Merciful" (Qur'ān, Immunity, 9:5).

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Quentin Gausset

Space: Architecture

The Ottoman Empire

In her article addressing the gendering of space in contemporary Cairo, Janet Abu-Lughod wrote that along with customary practices and Islamic legal texts, "Architecture assisted this process. Not only the devices of *mashribiyya* screening, but the layout of houses and even quarters created the strangely asymmetrical reality that women could see men but men could not see women, except those in certain relationships with them" (Abu-Lughod 1987, 167). Since this article appeared, there has been increasing attention paid to the intersections between women, gender, and space both in the larger Islamic world and in the Ottoman Empire during the early modern era. Among the more interesting areas explored in new research on Ottoman geographies and gender are the "imperial gaze" and its impact on the built environment, the complex role of the court eunuch in the processes of engendering space, and the ways in which non-elites of the empire were involved in gendering space.

The traditional perception of the relationship between space and gender was that the former was neatly divided into public and private spheres: public space was assigned to the male gender, private to the female. Ultimately this dichotomization of various types of space into essentialized categories of male/female, public/private has proved to be far too simple to explain the complex processes that gendered space in many areas of the Islamic world, including the Ottoman Empire during the early modern period.

In the early modern Ottoman Empire, access to various types of space, from the inner sanctums of the Topkapı Palace to the streets of Istanbul, was determined not only by gender but by myriad factors such as social status, a patron's life stage, wealth, spectacle, and ceremonial. It is now widely recognized that royal males were not the only members of the Ottoman court to shape different types of space through their patronage of architecture, the imperial progresses they staged, or the privileges they exercised through the manipulation of the royal gaze. Women of the Ottoman court, particularly the mothers and daughters of the sultan, were also active patrons of architecture and sought opportunities to display themselves, their piety and largesse, through the construction of palaces and charitable endowments, such as mosque complexes called *külliye*, and in grand royal processions that filed through the streets of the empire's capital and along the roads connecting its major cities. Further, court eunuchs were key players in the process of shaping the politics of the Ottoman Empire as well as the urban spaces of the empire and the more intimate quarters of the various harems in which they served from the late sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. Court eunuchs, with their unique position along the gender continuum and their powerful administrative role in the empire, are important but frequently ignored members of Ottoman society who must be considered in any analyses of gender and Ottoman architecture and space.

The gaze of the male sovereign

The Ottoman male sovereign's interest in manipulating his surrounding space and controlling the viewers in that space is a phenomenon well researched by historians and art historians of the empire. Necipoğlu has charted the gradual move of the Ottoman sultan during the formative years of the empire, from an ever-present, always visible force on the front line of battle, to an icon of absolute and centralized rule, physically accessible only by a select group of palace officials and visible to his subjects only during Muslim holidays and the weekly procession to the Friday prayer. As the Ottoman Empire became an increasingly centralized political entity, its rulers were influenced by the court protocols of Byzantine and Abbasid predecessors and codified imperial ceremonial so that the locus of power – the person of the Ottoman sultan – became increasingly visually and physically restricted from the public view except on very rare occasions.

Institutionalized by Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451–81), between 1477 and 1488 the Ottoman dynastic legal code, or the *kanunname*, changed the way in which justice was meted out by the sovereign. Abandoning public displays of largesse or gatherings with officials in the relatively accessible second courtyard of the Topkapı Palace, Sultan Mehmed began to change the architectural design of his residential quarters to be less accessible and he had a new Chamber of Petitions constructed in the more isolated third courtyard of the palace.

With his physical person now removed from the frequent view of his officials and visitors to the Council Hall, the sultan watched over his audience and the operations of the imperial council from a concealed window and appeared only very occasionally. Over the next two centuries, and particularly during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–66), more architectural changes were made in the palace to facilitate the growing interest in isolating the male sovereign and increasing the potency of the royal gaze. Dispensing justice from a protected and sequestered vantage point was not a new phenomenon among male monarchs in either the European or Islamic worlds. Inherited from the court protocols of the empires that had preceded his, the Ottoman sultan moved out of his subjects' sight at a time when the centralizing needs of a growing empire were becoming most acute.

The more reclusive habits of the early modern Ottoman sultan also shaped the domestic spaces occupied by the Ottoman sovereign. In the mid-sixteenth century, Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent moved from the sultan's domestic quarters in the palace, which were near the quarters of the male pages, to reside in the expanded harem quarters, which had been newly occupied by palace women, among them his famed favorite Haseki Hürrem (Roxelana). The architectural changes made to the harem quarters during the reign of Süleyman's grandson, Murad III (r. 1574–95), resulted in both a greater allocation of space and, more importantly, a new proximity of the women and the Black Eunuchs' quarters to the administrative heart of the empire: the Council Hall. As a result of these architectural changes, the corridor that connected the sultan's domestic chambers to the hidden window where he alone could observe his government in action became accessible to the elite palace women and Black Eunuchs. Now, they too could observe the machinations of the divan from a privileged, albeit smaller aperature located directly above the sultan's window.

Imperial women: the gaze, architecture, and ceremonial

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Ottoman chroniclers describe how the voices of women, specifically those belonging to the mothers of the sultans, could be heard from behind the royal latticed window of the council hall.

The *valide* (the mother of the sultan) of the Ottoman Empire was among the most elevated members of the Sublime Porte, particularly during the seventeenth century, when a series of infirm and underage sultans served as sovereigns. At this time the queen mother stepped into powerful positions of administrative control and skillfully learned to manipulate from concealed quarters what had once been exclusively under the royal gaze of the male sultan. Additionally, royal Ottoman women undertook the construction of architectural works, which in some cases allowed them to obtain a more comprehensive view of their subjects. For example, from Hadice Turhan's *hünkar kasrı*, a small pavilion appended to her Yeni Valide mosque complex in Eminönü, Istanbul, the *valide* was able to view the activities surrounding the customs houses in the busy harbor of the Golden Horn and the crowds entering the subsidiary buildings that comprised her foundation. By the time of the so-called era of the "Sultanate of the Women," imperial females had acquired a better understanding of the royal gaze and had themselves become manipulators of Ottoman architecture and space.

The landscape of Istanbul abounds with architectural works built by women during the early modern era. One author has calculated that 37 percent of the architectural foundations built in Istanbul during the mid-sixteenth century were commissioned by women connected to the palace (Baer 1983, 10). From Hürrem's prominent double-bath structure on the ancient Hippodrome of Constantinople, to the large mosque complexes of Eminönü and Üsküdar built by royal mothers and daughters such as Turhan, Safiye, Nurbanu, Kösem, Mihrimah, and others – and often containing schools, soup kitchens, and baths in addition to mosques – there is ample testimony to the important role that women played as patrons of architecture in the Ottoman capital. Outside Istanbul, building typologies not commonly associated with women were also undertaken by the mothers of the sultans as evidenced by Turhan Sultan's construction of two fortresses at the entrance to the Dardanelles. Many of the architectural works built by Ottoman women during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries represent more than good deeds undertaken by imperial women. With their epigraphic programs often proclaiming their patrons' status and links to the Ottoman dynasty, these structures serve as concrete responses to the physical restrictions concerning royal display of the imperial female body. Forbidden by cultural norms surrounding both their gender and their elite status in Ottoman society, the royal Ottoman woman used architectural works and elaborate ceremonial in lieu of presenting her physical self to be gazed upon by her subjects. For the Ottoman queen mother, or the sultan's wife or daughter, the architectural works she patronized in the Ottoman

landscape, both within the capital of Istanbul and in its provinces, became effective synecdoches: concrete symbols of piety, power, and presence in the empire.

Marginalized men? Gender, space, and the role of the Chief Black Eunuch

In the seventeenth century, the political power of the Chief Black Eunuch, known as the Darüssaade Ağası or Kızlar Ağası, was comparable to that of the grand vizier. Yet the role played by the Chief Black Eunuch has received comparatively little attention even though these members of the Ottoman administration both patronized architectural works and were forces in gendering the geographies of the empire.

The close financial links established between the Chief Black Eunuch and the pious foundations of the palace women, particularly the queen mother, have been investigated by Hathaway (1992a, 1992b, 1994). Several of the royal Ottoman women appointed the Chief Black Eunuch as the chief administrator of the vast resources attached to their foundations. For example, in Hürrem's endowment deed of 1540, which established the provisions for her Istanbul foundation, the Haseki mosque complex, the Chief Black Eunuch was entrusted with the management of all finances of the endowment. From the late sixteenth through the seventeenth centuries, the Chief Black Eunuch was appointed as the *nazır* or superintendent of the imperial foundations that supported the holy cities of Mecca and Medina; by the late seventeenth century he held the esteemed and lucrative office of Guardian of the Prophet Muḥammad's tomb in Medina.

A detailed study of the property holdings of the Chief Black Eunuch ʿAbbās, who held the office in the Topkapı Palace between 1667 and 1671, has revealed the extent to which these members of the Ottoman administration engaged in architectural patronage throughout the empire (Hathaway 1994). Exiled to Egypt, he founded a *zaviye*, or Sufi lodge near Cairo's Bāb al-Futūḥ and controlled several commercial ventures in Egypt. But while serving in the harem administration ʿAbbās Ağa also undertook several pious works in the capital of Istanbul. In the district of Beşiktaş he constructed the Mosque of ʿAbbās Ağa, an imperial tribune (*mahfil-i'l-hümayun*), a small school (*mekteb-i sıbyan*) and a fountain, the ʿAbbās Ağa Çeşme. In the *Hadikatü'l-cevâmi*, Ayvansarayî attributes twelve other fountains in Istanbul to the court eunuch, two fountains in Üsküdar, a double bath in Laleli, and in Eminönü, a single domed bath (Kızlar Ağası Hamamı), a primary school, and another fountain. In the district of Fatih, ʿAbbās Ağa took over the restoration of the fifteenth-century mosque of Sultan Mehmed I's daughter, Selçuk Hatun.

According to the *Hadîkatü'l-Cevâmiʿ*, Habeşi Mehmed Ağa (d. 1591) was the first of the Chief Black Eunuchs to have occupied that office, after the administrative offices were divided between the white (*babüssaade*) and the black (*darüssaade*) eunuchs. In addition to the Mehmed Ağa Mosque in the Fener district of Istanbul, he also constructed the fortress of İsmail on the Danube River, two small mosques in Üsküdar, a *medrese*, a fountain, and a school on one of Istanbul's central avenues, the Divan Yolu, and several other fountains around the city. Yusuf Ağa, the superintendent of Mehmed IV's mother's foundation, was also an architectural patron and erected a small mosque on the European shore of the Bosphorus in Sarıyer at the entrance to the Black Sea. By far the most active patron in the history of the Chief Black Eunuchs was Hacı Beşir Ağa who served during the reign of Sultan Mahmud (1730–54). Just outside the walls of the Topkapı Palace he built, in 1745, the Beşir Ağa mosque complex which included shops, a *medrese*, a fountain, a library, and a dervish *tekke*. Other architectural works in the capital included a *medrese* complex in Eyüp, fountains in Beşiktaş and Sarıyer, the Şengül bath in Üsküdar, a mosque in Kalenderhane, and the restored Karaağaç mosque in Sütlücü.

From the archives that record the lives and deeds of the Chief Black Eunuchs it is clear that these members of the Ottoman court were not only significant forces in shaping the urban fabric of the Ottoman Empire; they had also been affected by the same architectural changes in the Topkapı Palace that had provided the imperial women closer access to and a better knowledge of the workings of the government. Like the palace women who had learned the value of the imperial male gaze, the new location of the Chief Black Eunuch's quarters afforded a more strategic position from where its occupants could look in upon the workings of the Council Hall, oversee all traffic entering and leaving the harem, and have immediate access to the quarters of the queen mother.

Gender and the geography of lesser and non-elites of the Ottoman Empire

Beyond the harem of the imperial palace, the larger Ottoman cityscape was gendered in numerous ways and through a variety of institutions. Spaces clearly

gendered in time or location, such as the prostitutes' quarter, the rear section of the mosque, or the day or chamber for women only at the *hamam*, are the most easily read as they were often labeled with inscriptions or their use was described by contemporary chroniclers. Gender was an important factor determining the degree to which an urban space was accessible or prohibited to urban residents, but is is important to note that other factors, such as age, religion, and social status, were important criteria as well in determining the usage and gendering of space. Sections of cities, specific monuments, or sites could be gendered temporarily and acts of regendering a space occurred frequently in urban quarters, particularly during times of ceremonial or spectacle. The urban administration and elite patrons intervened frequently not only to prohibit women but also to provide urban spaces so that women could physically access markets, baths, or welfare services available in the city. Certain mosques, such as Gülfem Hatun's in Üsküdar, were built by patrons to provide prayer space for women. The great double bath built by Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent's favorite, Haseki Hürrem (Roxelana), on the grounds of the old Hippodrome had separate sections designated for males and females. There were, of course, several other baths in Istanbul that, if the structure had only a single-chambered caldarium, women could frequent, either on particular days or during specified hours. And there were baths such as the Avrat (Women's) Bath located in the quarter of Istanbul where Hürrem's large *külliye* was, which was frequented only by women.

While it was not widely condoned, non-elite women in Istanbul, much like their Byzantine predecessors, did frequent the markets of Istanbul. Attempts were made by Ottoman city officials to establish a special market, the Avrat Bazaar, where respectable women could buy and sell their wares without worrying about their safety, compromising their honor, or perhaps competing with the guilds. Located near the great mosque complex of Haseki Hürrem in Istanbul, the Avrat market was, according to the sixteenth-century English traveler John Sanderson, "the market place of women, for thirther they come to sell their wourks, and wares" (Sanderson 1931).

Our understanding of gender, and the people and processes which shaped the geographies of the Ottoman Empire, from the imperial harem of the Topkapı Palace to the larger urban landscapes of the empire, must expand to encompass the roles played by all genders in the empire from the sultan, to imperial women, to the court eunuchs. It must also extend to include the diverse ways in which both the elites, lesser elites, and non-elites of the empire participated in the gendering of the landscape during the early modern era through varied uses of the mosques, baths, courts, markets, streets, and domestic spaces of the Ottoman Empire.

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Lucienne Thys-Şenocak

South Asia

This entry outlines the nature of gendered space in South Asian cities to illustrate the way architecture deals with gender in design, and Muslim women's use of space.

Architecture and city planning in South Asia have rich heritages that hark back to the Indus Valley civilization of the fourth millennium B.C.E. Since then, treatises and tradition have influenced the production of the built environment. Race, ethnicity, class, and gender have also negotiated people's access to space in South Asia. A pre-existing notion of separate realms for men and women guided dwelling construction, neighborhood development, and settlement formation. The gender division of labor, based on a patriarchal society, was most influential in generating and perpetuating these separate realms; under the influence of patriarchy, cultural rules guided people's use of space. Later, colonialism and global capitalism reconfigured patriarchal practices in South Asia with subsequent implications on how women access space.

Following the spread and consolidation of Islam across South Asia, the manifest gendered space differed in Islamic milieus as a result of Islam's insistence on the preservation of feminine modesty through seclusion. For example, early Muslim dwellings in the cities of Gujarat withdrew from the adjoining streets in order to ensure women's privacy, whereas the Hindu dwelling considered

the adjoining street to be a domestic extension (Pramar 2005). Despite being a region of enormous cultural, geographic, and societal diversity, spaces for Muslim men and women in South Asia, for example in Old Delhi, Old Lahore, and Old Dhaka, were separate realms. Later, colonial urbanism in south India brought changes in the forms of houses and cityscapes, which influenced future city developments; the free-standing bungalow was preferred over the medieval inner-city courtyard *haveli* (house) and the mixed-use *mohalla* (neighborhood) was replaced with the residential zone (King 1984). Postcolonial modern architecture and planning in South Asia, allegedly gender-neutral, created spaces and allocated lands and resources, but in reality failed to benefit men and women equally. Although house design, for example, has undergone successive modifications from single-storey bungalows to multistoreyed apartments and modified notions of privacy and personal space, patriarchy still governs the role of women in the household. A gender perspective on the production and use of the built environment requires buildings, communities, and cities to offer people equal access to spaces for reducing existing gender inequality in South Asia (MHHDC 2002).

Given the attention women in South Asia have received in recent years in different fields in social sciences, architecture has so far remained aloof from women. Architectural education and practice in South Asia gained momentum following decolonization in 1947, and played its part in nation-building. Although architects, mostly male, played their role in the making of postcolonial spaces for living, working, and socializing, the sociocultural norms that were considered were more representative of men's needs and priorities than those of women. A lack of genuine concern for gender persists, despite attempts by academic and professional institutions to upgrade the architecture curricula in response to the fast changing societies of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan (IAB 2005, Ahmed 1986, IIA 2001).

Architecture in South Asia has been a gendered field. Attributes of the architecture field that Ahrentzen (1996, 74) noted make it masculine in the West are equally valid in South Asia. These attributes are first, male representation of the practice and profession; second, an emphasis on individualism and group isolationism in architectural training and education; third, the notion of the sanctity of the individual creator and an elusive knowledge base, founded on an art legacy of male practices and standards; and last, reference groups of highly paid male professionals. The presence of women in education and practice has increased since architecture's inception in the colonial era; women in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan constitute 16.7 percent (110), 22.6 percent (4,896), and 21 percent (539) of registered architects. However, the gradual increase in these numbers does not necessarily alter the male domination of the field; instead, women tend to work within a framework of rules and agenda set by men (Desai forthcoming). Women architects in India have already raised their concerns about the lack of gender perspective in education, practice, and building rules. Similar concerns are yet to emerge in predominantly Muslim Bangladesh and Pakistan. Architecture's consideration of women and women's space is a neglected and least investigated area in South Asia. Possible reasons for this neglect lie in the way the host society as well as its architects perceive architecture as a commodity, a symbol of power, and an expression of culture and identity, but rarely as an object for social consumption with a gender perspective. As a result, most people in South Asia fail to avail themselves of the services of a formally trained and professionally approved architect.

Gender and class influence people's access to public spaces. Absence of castes in Islam makes Muslim women's access to space dependent on class, differentiated in terms of income, education, and social background; in India, however, intercommunity disparity interacts with class. Violence against women all over South Asia, and strict adherence to Islamic laws in Pakistan in particular, restrict women's mobility. Gendered space in South Asia has originated from a private–public separation model. Society confined women within the private domain of a house to perform domestic works, chores, and childbearing, while men are allowed to work and socialize outside the house in the public realm. Women's spatial confinement has meant in practice that they are without control over decisions affecting their lives and spaces within the home. By confining women within the home, *purdah* maintains the separation between the masculine and feminine spheres. However, recent studies on where poor women work reveals the inadequacy of this private–public separation model (Bose 1998, Ghafur 2002). In between the private and public spheres, an intermediate "parochial" sphere has been seen to be operative in cities in India and Bangladesh. The parochial sphere is characterized by "a sense of commonality among acquaintances and neighbors who are involved in interpersonal networks that are located within communities" (Lofland 1989, cited

in Bose 1998). Women have been working to earn while performing housework in the private and parochial spheres. The parochial sphere constitutes an extended setting of women's spatial confinement.

Traditional gender division of labor is gradually changing as a result of women's greater labor force participation. Women are coming out of their homes to cope with household poverty in the face of dwindling male income. According to 1997 estimates, female percentages of the labor force in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are 42, 32, and 27 percent (MHHDC 2000, 57). The figure in Bangladesh is higher than in Pakistan and India because of women working in the garment industry. The increasing numbers of women working in the formal sector outside their homes has design (and planning) implications for living and working areas and urban spaces. Studies of the garment industry in Bangladesh show first, the emergence of women workers' separate lodging in the formal and informal sectors (Dunham 1994); second, compliance in the separation of working spaces for men and women (Siddiqi 1991); and third, women workers' increasing visibility in urban spaces (Nasreen 2002). That women reside, work, and move together is an attestation of the continuation of the existing notion of separate realms. Whether one approves of these separate realms or not, design interventions in the living, working, and public areas with more information, toilets, crèches, safety, and security for women are likely to reduce gender inequality.

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Shayer Ghafur

Turkey

The basic unit of the traditional houses in Turkey is the *oda*, room, round which both rural and urban houses are shaped. The room determined the traditional house forms and necessitated multifunctional arrangements: cooking, eating, sitting, and sleeping, all of which took place in the same space (Küçükerman 1988).

In traditional Turkish society, family structure caused an interpretation of the architectural elements, including the withdrawing unit, *oda*, and the interactive hall, *sofa*, in both rural and urban houses (Glassie 1989). Since marriages were based on patrilocality, the newly married couple was expected to live with the husband's family. Thus privacy became a major concern.

As the lifestyle in Istanbul was different from the rest of Anatolia, Istanbul defined the urban characteristics in the nineteenth century, whereas Anatolian houses maintained rural characteristics (Duben 1990a, 1990b). The overall family structure was closely associated with the typical two-storey Turkish house, in which a room was allocated for each of the couples living under the same roof (Eldem 1968, 1984).

In the urban form, as the number of rooms increased, gender roles became more distinct. The *harem* and *selamlık* were architectural elements seen in the homes of well-off families (Birkalan 1998, 25). In the rich houses of urban families, the *oda*s are connected to interactive *sofa*s, architectural elements that function as bridges for informal male and female gatherings and as spaces for common daily activities. Between the kitchen and the *selamlık* part of the house a structural element was implemented – a *dönme dolap*, or lazy susan, which women could use to serve meals without being seen (Günay 1981, Birkalan 1998, 24).

There is a connection between *sofa* and *sedir* in terms of pragmatic function. The *sofa* is usually

built to be any shape that allows other rooms to become as close to square as possible (Denel 1989, 54), while the windows are considered to be the "eyes" of the house. Protruding toward the street, the upper floors have more windows, which allows the concealed woman at home to have contact with the street while she is busy with needlework. Contrary to the belief that women in Islam were confined to the private space and did not participate in economic or artistic activities, the case of the Ottoman house reveals that women in fact participated vicariously in public life. The concealment of women from the public led to an expansion of artistic creation in the private realm, and women's subsequent active involvement in the society (Birkalan 1998, 26).

Gender roles were less defined in rural settlements, and the most common plan was the two-room house, daily activities taking place in one room.

The change in social structure and family patterns led to a change in house designs. The apartment buildings in the metropolis displayed, to a certain extent, bourgeois practices, accentuating the Turkish *salon*, the parlor. Traditionally, the *sofa* was directly connected to the entrance space (Birkalan 1999). With increasing rural–urban migration since the 1950s, a new, vernacular form emerged. The *gecekondu*, literally meaning a house built overnight, displayed the sensibilities of rural architecture mixed with the dispositions of the city style (Birkalan 2000, 2001, 2004).

Women architects are fairly new and their history is problematic, as they operate within the realm of patriarchy and in patriarchal forms. Turkey's first female architect, Leman Tomsu, graduated from the Academy of Fine Arts in 1934. The proportion of female architects was not more than 5 percent between the 1930s and 1950s. It reached 70 percent at the beginning of the twenty-first century. However, women still do not hold the most prestigious architectural positions. At first, architecture was seen as a man's job, since it was thought of as being part of the construction industry. This started to change in the last two decades. Nonetheless, it is very difficult to write the history of female architects (Tanyeli 2005, 12).

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Hande A. Birkalan-Gedik

Yemen

As elsewhere in the medieval Islamic world, many highborn women in Yemen expressed their piety through their patronage of charitable constructions. The first woman patron in Islamic Yemen was also its first and only woman ruler, al-Sayyida al-Ḥurra bint Aḥmad, also known as Arwa. A major political and religious figure in her own right, she became the effective ruler of the Ismāʿīlī Ṣulayḥid dynasty after her husband's retirement from public life, and the sole ruler for over 40 years after his death in 477/1084 and until her own in 532/1138. In order to reinforce her control over her domains, one of al-Sayyida's first acts was to transfer the seat of the Ṣulayḥid state from Ṣanʿāʾ to Jibla. There she built a large palace and a great mosque, which eventually contained her tomb. Although the palace is now in ruins, the mosque is still standing and continues to be a major pilgrimage site. However, women's architectural patronage reached its heyday during the Rasūlid dynasty

(626–858/1229–1454), claiming a third of the monuments commissioned, and thus second to the sultans themselves. Their financial independence, attested to by historical texts, allowed many mothers, sisters, and wives of the sultans to dedicate their efforts to civic affairs and to the patronage of charitable institutions. Hardly anything is known of women's use of space in religious architecture and only a fraction of Rasūlid monuments have survived, but it can be surmised that the monuments built by women were as lavishly decorated with paint and carved stucco as those built by their male relatives. To date, characteristics specific to monuments commissioned by women that might differentiate them from those built by men have not been identified.

Yemen is a society marked by strict segregation and rigidly defined gender roles. Architecture being an exclusively male domain, the few Yemeni women who studied architecture outside Yemen have not as yet had any impact on either public or domestic architecture. To this day, women's activities are largely tied to their homes whose architecture, constructed by men, reflects their role and status. In most mountainous regions as well as in the Ḥadramawt, the houses are tall constructions of many floors and are devoid of courtyards. They are divided following the same rules throughout, with the exception of the Tihama Red Sea coastal region where the houses have a courtyard as their central element. The ground floor is used for animals and for storing grains and other provisions, while the kitchen is found on the lower floors. The latter is the all-female sphere and is usually a dark and undecorated room. In the Tihama as well, the kitchen off a corner in the courtyard is usually a rudimentary undecorated space. Women use the courtyard for most daily tasks, such as cooking and washing. That male builders did not consider the kitchen a place worthy of care reflects the low status of household work. Only some highland kitchens may be decorated on the outside, thus reflecting the high status of its male proprietor, but never the inside.

Men's and women's social gatherings are strictly separate; this constitutes an important element in Yemeni society that is also reflected in domestic architecture. In most parts of northern Yemen, men's gatherings are held in the *mafraj*, the reception room located on the top floor of the house. It is the most elaborately decorated room in the house with large windows from which guests can enjoy the view. Reception rooms in other regions are all equally richly decorated: the *majlis* in Ḥadramawt, the *murabbaʿ* in Tihāma, and the *mabraz* in the southern regions. By contrast, the *dīwān*, the room used by women, is located on the lower floors. It is a multipurpose room that is more soberly decorated and with wooden shutters and screens that prevent women from being seen from the outside. In the Ḥadramawt, passages connect the houses or bridges connect the upper floors of those house that are adjacent to each other. These passages enable women to move freely between the houses, especially in buildings of up to seven floors.

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Noha Sadek

Space: Domestic

The Gulf

Domestic space in Islamic cultures is often assumed to be the female space of the private home, because it is a realm where men's presence and mobility are restricted, as opposed to public space, where women's presence and mobility are restricted. Yet in the Gulf, domestic space in the home is defined by both female and male presence. Moreover, there are public spaces within the home, while domestic spaces also exist outside the home.

In private homes in the Gulf men may entertain their male, non-related guests in the *ṣālūn* or formal sitting room. On such occasions, this room becomes a kind of quasi-public space, and is kept distinctly separate from the domestic space elsewhere in the home (including the kitchen, the family rooms, and bedrooms), which the women occupy; the only men allowed into these parts of the house where the women go unveiled are close relatives. Thus, in the home, domestic space is defined by the presence of women and only men who have a certain relationship with those women can enter. Such space is also defined by religious codes defining female modesty, since the private home substitutes for other kinds of covering that protect women from the male gaze outside the home, such as a headscarf or veil. Gulf architecture often features elaborate window screens that allow women to look out without being seen.

But while domestic space is inherently defined by kinship and gender, it is limiting to think of domestic space as purely or even primarily female space. Domestic space is also defined by the presence of men, since in Gulf societies it is considered a cultural impossibility for a woman to live in a household alone without some male relative providing formal protection/chaperone status. Widows live with sons or brothers; divorced women live with their parents, brothers, or adult male children.

Gulf cultures are patrilocal, with the newly married wife moving into her husband's home. When the husband lives with his extended family, domestic space becomes the site where female hierarchies are enacted and contested, between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, between co-wives, or between sisters. In households with no domestic servants, female relatives share domestic responsibilities under the supervision of the senior (in age and/or status) woman of the household. The division of labor within the household reflects status differentiation amongst the women that is marked by spatial practices, including sleeping arrangements and who controls the kitchen and pantry resources (see Ozbay 1999, 560 for a description of similar historical circumstances in Turkey).

Increasingly the trend amongst the upper and middle classes in the Gulf is for married couples to live in nuclear families in order to avoid the potential conflicts that result from living as extended families. Such a trend may reflect urban cultural ideals as regards polygyny. In Islam, the religious ideal for polygyny is that each wife of a man must be treated equally, and in the Gulf this is often interpreted to mean that each wife must have either her own house or her own wing of a house – in short, her own domestic space to rule over. Increasingly Gulf wives are seeking the same autonomy over their own domestic realm vis-à-vis not only co-wives but also female relatives of their husbands.

Yet, despite the trend toward living in nuclear families, living in an extended family remains a cultural ideal. One way that many families reconcile the tradition of living as extended family with young wives' desire for autonomy within their own domestic realm is by occupying several separate apartments in a single building. Some wealthy families live in residential compounds behind high walls, which house an entire extended family in which each nuclear family has its own house and thus its own domestic space. Other extended families live within a single residential structure but designate certain areas to be under the control of each married woman – one wing of the house for each family, for example, with a kitchen space supervised by the senior woman of that family.

In the domestic sphere, gender segregation is facilitated through spatial demarcations that define certain rooms as male and others as female. However, the actual use of such spaces is increasingly flexible. Men entertain non-kin only in the formal sitting room of the house, while non-kin women may be invited into the more interior,

private, domestic areas of the house. Yet women may also hold social gatherings for other women in the formal sitting room, during which time the men are forbidden from entering this space.

Oil wealth of the latter half of the twentieth century has led to the widespread importation of domestic servants in the Gulf, coming from non-Arab and even non-Muslim countries. These servants are found not only in elite households but even in middle-class households. In such cases, the mistress of the house plays the role of domestic manager, assigning tasks of cooking and cleaning to servants, but does not engage in such labor herself, or engages only in the tasks deemed critical to her role as domestic manager, such as the artful aspects of cookery. Foreign domestic servants transgress the boundaries of gendered spaces within the home. Female servants move freely among non-relative males in the household in which they work, a phenomenon that sometimes results in the sexual harassment and abuse of female domestic servants. Some prominent female Saudi writers have critiqued the dependence of Gulf women on foreign domestic servants, while others have described it as liberating Gulf women from domestic work burdens (see Arebi 1994).

Although domestic space generally reflects the dominant norms of gender segregation in the public space, this is not always the case. Domestic space may also be conceptualized as that which defines itself in opposition to the dominant cultural norms governing the use of public space. Domestic space is one place where the state is limited from enforcing social rules defining male–female interactions. Thus it may be a place for defying cultural or religious norms and the surveillant eye of the state, and one may encounter mixed parties in private Gulf homes, where middle- or upper-class men and women mingle freely.

Along these lines, it is important to recognize how the substantial expatriate communities in the oil-wealthy states of the Arabian Gulf defy dominant norms of gender segregation within their own living communities. Men and women mix freely behind the walls of expatriate living compounds, creating an extended domestic space in opposition to the gender-segregated public space of the wider society.

Domestic spaces also exist outside the home, even in commercial spaces, as when a Saudi restaurant demarcates a "family section" where men can only enter if accompanied by women, and tables are divided off by walls or screens to provide families with a simulation of domestic privacy.

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LISA WYNN

Iran and Afghanistan

Domestic space in Afghanistan is driven more by rural ideals since urban centers have been contested and become transitional spaces during decades of war. While domestic space in urban Iran is evolving to reflect a larger women's workforce and improved rights, the concepts of domestic space in rural Iran are similar to those in Afghanistan. Still, it is important to recognize that there are always exceptional cases, geographical areas and ethnic cultures where the borders of domestic space are cast differently in Iran and Afghanistan. Apart from familial variations resulting from education and diaspora influence, other variations include regional cultures where domestic space is delineated differently as a result of different ideas of domestic roles, such as in Nuristan, or according to ethnic culture, such as the *shinwairi* tribe in the Nangarhar district of Achin.

Fieldwork in Afghanistan (Kakar) supports the idea that domestic space is a place where women and children live for an extended period of time or, in the context of recent insecurity and war, a place where the uprooted (refugees and internally displaced persons) stay for at least a week or more. While a hotel room or a place where travelers rest or visit for a few days may have a gendered dimension, it would not be considered domestic.

When men live together for employment purposes in cities and district towns this space is not considered domestic, but an office – *daftar* – or dormitory. When a woman lives with male relatives but not children it is not usually considered domestic in rural areas since extended families are

expected to live together until the family is large; such an arrangement would be considered temporary. However, in Iranian cities where nuclear families often live separately, the space in which a woman lives with male relatives would be considered domestic. In rural areas, multiple women without children (for example, mother-in-law and daughter-in-law) would create domestic space. Domestic space also exists where children live without adult women but with relatives or caregivers. On the other hand, child servants of men living together would not make the space domestic. Therefore, a space becomes domestic in rural Iran and Afghanistan when women and/or children live in a space for a week or more.

Both sexual segregation in these societies and the gendering of household tasks shape domestic space. Those spaces typically associated with women's tasks such as childrearing, cooking, washing, and cleaning are termed domestic. Enclosed spaces within domestic quarters may also be considered domestic, for example gardens, even if both sexes share tasks associated with them. Domestic space becomes public when used for ceremonial or public decision-making purposes; for example, in Iran, "wakes" or funerary services may be held at the home, sometimes even with intermingling of sexes, or in Afghanistan, a room in a traditionally domestic space may be used for local council meetings. However, not all domestic spaces in a home become public; even at such events it can be assumed that certain areas such as the kitchen would remain domestic and often women would conceal themselves within them.

The control of resources and tasks in the domestic space in Afghanistan and rural Iran lies with the woman who has been married into the family the longest, though elderly widows or unmarried sisters of male members living in their brothers' households may also take precedence. Traditionally, it is the mother-in-law or oldest daughter-in-law who has control. Wakefield's (2004) research on decision-making in Afghan households reports how mothers-in-law often do not give their daughters-in-law any domestic decision-making power until they are well-established adult mothers with multiple children. Wakefield's and others' research at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit supports the idea that mothers-in-law control resources for domestic spending and distribution of work, and may even influence the choices of school enrollment.

A sort of domestic hierarchy exists in larger households where the head woman decides on the distribution of power among the women in the family. Power is allocated according to how much a woman might contribute to the overall family survival. This does not necessarily imply economic contribution, though bringing in money or the marriage of a higher social class woman into the family also contributes to her control of domestic space. However, power allocation is usually based on how well a woman helps to manage the burden of the family, how resourceful she proves to be, how much self initiative she takes, and the like. In other words, the mother-in-law is at the top of the hierarchy and judges who is best to control what resources, and daughters and daughters-in-law compete within this space (Kakar 2004).

In urban Iran, women's increased presence in the labor market often translates into more control over their income and domestic resources. However, in cases where women live in extended families this control varies to become, on the one hand, a reversal of the rural hierarchy, to a reinstatement of the rural hierarchy on the other where the resources are pooled and the mother-in-law or head of family makes the decisions. Yet extended family living is becoming rarer in urban Iran, and the latter scenario is more likely the case in urban Afghanistan, where working women more often live with extended family.

Diaspora experiences, education, and women's participation in the labor market are changing the traditional cultural ideals, boundaries, and concepts of domestic space in Iran and Afghanistan.

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Palwasha L. Kakar and Brandy Bauer

North Africa

In North Africa, local meanings attributed to domestic space are often ambivalent, with the home sometimes depicted as the irrational world of

women, at other times as a space both sacrosanct and pure. Blessings must be recited upon entering and leaving households, and people take great care to avoid introducing impure elements into the household. Seclusion of women within domestic space attests to the honor of a household. While mosque attendance for men is encouraged, for women, prayer at home is preferable.

Rules for conduct in North African domestic space are derived from the model of the Prophet Muḥammad and Qur'ānic verses concerning etiquette and hospitality. A frequently cited verse from the Qur'ān urges the wives of the Prophet to encounter unrelated male visitors from behind the safety of a curtain or *ḥijāb*. These edicts are frequently illustrated in traditional architecture, for example in urban houses where a central courtyard serves as a gathering place for guests of male family members, with a second floor screened in so that women can observe the men's activities unseen.

Everyday domestic space is associated with women and the family. If a man of the household intends to enter with a non-relative, custom dictates that he should make some noise or gesture to warn the women to retire to an inner room. Unaccompanied male visitors will leave upon learning that no men of the family are present, although unrelated women may visit freely. During the day, daily tasks within domestic space center around housekeeping and food preparation, although women may also engage in economic activities, such as weaving, sewing, or producing foodstuffs for market consumption. Although many North African women now work or attend school outside the home, they are still responsible for maintaining the cleanliness and order of the domestic space.

Although juridical interpretations concerning the rules of conduct in domestic space are numerous, there is little descriptive literature about domestic space in the countries of the Maghrib prior to 1830. Accounts written since 1830 indicate the preference for marital arrangements favoring patrilocal residence among extended families, with the bride coming to live with her in-laws after marriage. The ideal has shifted over the past 50 years toward nuclear families, particularly among the middle and upper classes.

Within the traditional extended arrangement, a hierarchical structure existed with the eldest female, typically the mother-in-law, at the top, followed by unmarried daughters and daughters-in-law. In the event of a divorce, a daughter could ideally return to live with her parents. The stereotypically tense relationship of the mother-in-law to her sons' wives has become almost legendary in North African lore, and domestic space could become a battleground for control of the household. The mother-in-law resented this interloper who threatened to steal away her son's affections, while the daughter-in-law hoped to produce male heirs as soon as possible to secure her position in the family. A stated preference for parallel cousin marriage, an ideal of the past if not always a reality, thus served not only to keep property in the family but also to promise a potentially more harmonious domestic space.

Multiple families can also occupy a single dwelling, with women becoming responsible for forging and maintaining strong ties among different, unrelated families. As Joelle Bahloul (1996) has written, prior to Jewish emigration from the region coreligionist dwellings also existed. Privacy dictates the separation of households by doors or curtains, but in overcrowded conditions the seclusion of women within the domestic space has not always been possible. Customs have also varied from urban to rural areas. Fatima Mernissi (1995) contrasts the fairly rigid seclusion of affluent women in the city of Fes in the 1940s with the relative freedom of movement enjoyed by her female relatives in the countryside.

Domestic space is flexible, capable of being transformed in times of festivity or sorrow into public space for weddings, birth and circumcision ceremonies, or funerals. In many parts of North Africa, such as in Morocco and Tunisia, wedding celebrations are often held in homes and frequently involve the mixing of unrelated men and women. In other parts of the region, as in Algeria, wedding parties may be segregated according to gender, with one part of the house reserved for women and another for men. Although some funeral rites necessitate the separation of genders, other customs involve men and women coming together in the home for Qur'ānic recitation or ritual meals.

With the increased entry of North African women into the public sphere since the end of the colonial era, the meanings of public space are more complex and ambiguous, and boundaries between domestic and public have also become more fluid. Nonetheless, across all social classes there is still a strong association with women and domestic space and a sense that unrelated men should not enter a home unaccompanied by a male relative. The rising popularity of Islamist movements has led many North Africans to call for a return to the enforcement of seclusion and the woman's role as a wife and a mother. Although this is an attempt to follow the example of the Prophet, an argument against these practices emphasizes that the wives of the Prophet did not retire from public life but conducted busi-

ness, fought wars, and imparted religious education to non-relatives.

In the past, the enforced separation of men and women was an ideal but not always a reality, and images of the strict segregation of the harem have perhaps been overemphasized by Orientalist travelers and scholars. Usually only very wealthy families could afford to fully seclude women within the domestic space, and even then, physical separation did not mean that public and domestic space were disconnected. Central to North African society, domestic space has always been a site for women to exchange information, negotiate and maintain links with other families (particularly through marriage), and participate in economic, educational, and religious activities.

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RACHEL NEWCOMB

Turkey

How to reconstruct a new type of home space has been a central issue in the modernization project of early Republican Turkey (Gürboğa 1996). As Deniz Kandiyoti expressed it, "modernization involved a selective appropriation of items of material culture, habit, and taste by different strata of society, creating styles that were also insignia of social status" (1997, 117). Domestic space referred, on the one hand, to an intimate place, but on the other, it emerged also as a private domain to be displayed for an imagined public. The transformation from the Ottoman traditional domestic space toward a construction of a Republican one had both architectural and social implications. In the urban Ottoman *konak* system, for example, a mansion lodged an extended family and was both architecturally and socially gendered. It separated the *haremlik* and the *selamlık* parts of the house, thus segregating not only different genders but also separating the private from the public domain (Ayverdi 1964).

The early Republican era, which promoted the increase in the visibility of women in public space, undoubtedly had a significant impact on many urban and elite circles trying to transform the segregated structure of the Ottoman domestic space. Nevertheless, this structure continued to survive in many provincial settings. Until the boom in the construction business during the 1960s and the 1970s, domestic space continued to lodge extended families that included grandparents, unmarried daughters, sons, and brides. Be it urban or provincial, the kitchen has always been a female space in the Turkish house, a key point in regulating power structures within the household. In many households, and in particular in provincial areas, the kitchen also functioned as a living room to allow women to both work and socialize while economizing on heating. In the transitional early Republican era, the kitchen continued to be ruled by senior women of the family. This was usually the mother-in-law, who would control the cellar property and the distribution of work in the kitchen. A trial period was needed for brides to rise in the female hierarchy to organize cooking or access the cellar. Oral history research reports that brides faced hunger while breastfeeding, or performed menial tasks in the kitchen before being allowed to cook. Bathrooms, as part of the domestic space shared by other members of an extended family, revealed important sexual implications. The fact that taking a bath after sexual intercourse was an Islamic obligation created quite a traffic in the house. Young married women had to fulfill this obligation surreptitiously, reporting intriguing hide-and-seek situations between brides and their in-laws. In short, women's visibility and vocality was a hierarchically controlled phenomenon for the early Republican households, particularly in the provinces.

Vernacular architecture revealed "material extensions" of the domestic space. The house with

a courtyard (*avlu*) offered an open air private domain within the domestic space. Social extensions also existed. The front doors of the houses opening up to neighborhood streets offered a gathering space for local women. Today, urban lower-class communities still continue this tradition by sitting/gathering in front of their apartment complex.

The transition from sharing a house with in-laws to having a house for one's own nuclear family brought new dimensions to domestic space in Turkey. The traditional concept of the *selamlık* as a male space and a public opening of the domestic space gave way to that of the *salon* or a *misafir odası* (guest room), a non-segregated place in the modern Turkish house. The *salon* emerged as a place carefully kept clean and untouched for outside visitors, and protected from daily use. A forbidden area for children's access, it became the staged representation of the family to the outside world, as imagined and contructed mainly by the mother figure of the house. With its remarkable distinction from other places in the house, the *salon* represented the formal aspect of the Turkish domestic space, where the heart of the family gatherings was the casual *oturma odası*, the living room (Ayata 1988).

With the exception of big cities and professional upper middle classes, neighborly relations have always been an important component of domestic space in Turkey. The neighbor's house, for many Turkish women, has been an extension of their own domestic space. The house in the absence of men gave women a free time to be mobile between a number of such domestic spaces, making each of them quasi-public female spaces. The more organized version of this is the *kabul günü* or simply the *gün*, referring to a special women's gathering, meeting regularly every month or so, where each member has her own particular day of the month (Tezcan 2000). The *gün*'s free access to abundant food and gossip still forms a commonly shared childhood memory. In many cases, the *gün*s also included an economic function (all women bringing gold to the host or card playing). The *gün* event undoubtedly transformed the domestic space into a female public space, a very convenient new construction of hospitality, socialization, and saving for women in Republican times.

The domestic space in urban life is also a space shared with the daily domestic worker, often simply referred to as *kadın*, the woman. Domestic labor, organized around the *evlatlık* (adopted girls) system in Ottoman and early Republican times (Özbay 1999), turned out to be an indispensable component of urban life following the internal migration from the 1950s (Ozyegin 2001). The urban professional house as a domestic space became a confusing workplace for both the domestic workers and the women who hire them, creating tensions over how to rule the kitchen or how to raise a child.

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ARZU ÖZTÜRKMEN

Western Europe

How do Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, from countries in North Africa, Turkey, the Middle East, and Pakistan, Sunnī and Shīʿī, control patterns of gender-based living space and segregation of the sexes? Muslims who have established residence in Western Europe have brought concepts of gender-based living space with them. They have, however, given these patterns a different interpretation. This interpretation is related to their situation as minority Muslims in a majority secular society. The first generation of immigrant women remain primarily indoors in the domestic environment and are not very visible outside the house. They speak the language of the outside world, the surrounding society, poorly at best. Within the home they are often the axis of domestic life. This means that activities traditionally associated with women are central, such as running the household, raising children, maintaining good relationships within the family, arranging marriages, and organizing parties, especially for weddings. In addition, women oversee the labor-intensive meals for ritual and religious festivals, for instance the *iftār* meals during Ramadan, *ʿīd al-fiṭr* (the feast at the end of the Ramadan), *ʿīd al-kabīr* (the ritual sheep sacrifice, which is the most important religious festival, one that celebrates the willingness of Abraham to obey God and sacrifice

his son Isaac). In addition, women organize gatherings in their homes with other women in order to study the Qur'ān and to discuss how to deal with their daily affairs, conflicts, and tensions from a religious perspective. During these gatherings, no men are allowed. Women also provide religious education to their children in the home, to their sons but especially to their daughters. Taking into account these activities, domestic space is often synonymous with religious space for these women.

The second generation of immigrant women also grew up in a domestic environment that is both female and Muslim. But in contrast to the situation in many of their countries of origin, their surrounding society – the public sphere – is not predominantly masculine but mixed, being both masculine and feminine, Muslim and non-Muslim. Moreover, Western European space is religiously neutral, or in any case non-Muslim, and in some cases even anti-Muslim. This diminished masculine atmosphere of the outside world is worthy of comment because it has had an effect on Muslim men. They have less space strictly for themselves. For this reason, they may establish their own spaces in the world indoors and try to create niches for themselves in the world outside. Often the result of this is that the domestic space, indoors, is more gender mixed and in the outside world personal spaces are created that are gender restricted, such as the coffee houses for men, and spaces that are especially Islamic, such as mosques. Mosques in Western Europe often have separate areas for women where prayer can take place and where other activities are provided, such as language classes and study of the Qur'ān, as well as social services such as health information and child education support. If there are no separate areas, then special hours are established to be women-only. At these times the mosque is open to women and closed to men and is therefore transformed into a gendered space in which women feel "at home." These outside niches become a gendered space between domestic and public space, between Muslims and non-Muslims. Especially the creation of these Muslim spaces outside, in migrant neighborhoods, makes Muslims visible in West European public space. This is one of the main controversies in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in cities.

In the most outside space, the world of Europe – outside the family and the home, and outside their own organizations – Muslims are frequently confronted by behaviors that challenge Islamic codes of proper conduct. The concepts of *ḥarām* (forbidden) and *ḥalāl* (allowed) in particular are key concepts by which Islamic rules of behavior are guided. These rules inform many areas of social life, defining notions of (ritual) pure and impure, male-female relationships, sexuality, and food practices. In the "outside" world, most other people are ignorant of these rules. As a result, Muslims can be inadvertently made to feel uncomfortable and are sometimes even forced to violate them, with the result that their own behavior can become inappropriate. Inside a Muslim environment, these rules are perhaps not always uniformly observed and they are sometimes the subjects of discussion. But if adherence to them varies, they are nonetheless seen as legitimate. The question then becomes one of how a Muslim handles the contradiction in situations that do not permit Islamic rules of behavior to be followed, forcing a person to violate them. Especially among young people who are trying to follow "the right path of Islam," there is considerable discussion of these concepts. Whereas older, first-generation immigrants may take the situation for granted, younger people reflect more on their situation, their choices, and their behavior in relation to these concepts. This important dialogue on the Islamic rules of *ḥalāl* and *ḥarām* by the younger generation has led to counter-discourses that are concerned less with strict obedience to rules and instead focus more on the intent of Islam.

So while the domestic environment is still perceived as women's space among Muslim immigrants in Western Europe, and in the home environment the affairs of women remain the central focus, outside the home, in the public sphere, things are more complex, less overtly masculine, and more secular.

Among Muslim women of the second and third generations, however, there is a visible shift taking place. Girls go to school and women work, shop, and seek outside entertainment. They move around easily in both the domestic and public spheres. Within the domestic sphere, the generational and other power differences between women remain important. But even here, another pattern is developing. Girls and women who are successful in the outside world, performing well at school and bringing in their own income, are now appreciated by the family and are given a greater say in things. Their place and position within the family is therefore less determinant of their standing. The first generation of mothers and mothers-in-law is even, to a certain degree, dependent on the younger women for their contacts with the outside world. This has enormous consequences

for relations between women, especially for the hierarchy between women of different generations. Therefore the internal organization of domestic space changes under influence of the interaction between domestic and public space.

The complexities of these shifts in gender roles within the domestic and public spheres are expressed in a number of ways. One of the most widely discussed, even at times contentious, is the increasing incidence of Muslim women who wear headscarves in public in Western Europe. In the home environment, women do not wear headscarves. By wearing headscarves in public, these women feel that they can access the secular public realm without sacrificing their values and their identities. Women consistently stress the point that they choose to wear the headscarf (Bartels 2005). In historically Christian Western European countries with liberal traditions, wearing the headscarf also provides devout Muslim women with the possibility of claiming space in the public arena for their religion, what Barbara Metcalf (1996) termed "making Muslim space."

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EDIEN BARTELS

Yemen

Yemeni houses are ordinarily inhabited by patrilocal extended families comprising three to four generations, and have separate entrances for men and women. Married couples occupy a floor or room in the house. The allocation of space fluctuates over time as women marry in and out, and the hierarchization of needs and rights, which is congruent with patterns of dominance and power, is reflected in it. The domestic domain has a firm place in economic and political history.

For the majority of women the domestic space is where their lives are spent. Their main tasks center on food processing, childcare, and (in rural areas) on fetching water and wood. The midday meal is a central focus of domestic life, although historically men and women did not share meals, and men ate before women.

Domestic space, which includes courtyards, gardens, and roofs, must not be entered by non-*maḥram* men (those who in principle are eligible to marry the women of the house) without permission. Space becomes domestic when shared by people who define themselves as *maḥram*. In practice the modalities of communication with non-*maḥram* depend on region, class, and ties between the male household head and visitors of either gender. Thus, a woman may cover her hair (and face) in the presence of non-*maḥram* coresidents or (at the other extreme) join her husband's male visitors. Coresidents who rarely communicate are young women and their brothers-in-law. Conflicts are most common between half-brothers and arise as a result of jealousy between wives.

Domestic space is transformed into public space on the arrival of non-*maḥram* guests and during daily ritual occasions where relationships between families are created and maintained, and competition enacted. Visiting relations are reciprocal only between status equals. Gendered space allows freedom of movement, but may be constrained by rules different from those governing space occupied by non-*maḥram*, as when unmarried girls are forbidden to attend women's daily gatherings.

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GABRIELE VOM BRUCK

Space: Female Space

Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Palestine

Flexibility is a key feature of spatial practices in the Arab world (Gilsenan 1982). Ethnographies reveal not an absolute dichotomy between female and male public space, but a wide and ever changing array of attitudes, conventions, and contests. Women's relationship to space has been a central concern of discourse and policy in colonial and postcolonial Arab states. Since their inception in the nineteenth century, Arab feminist movements sought the right of access to public space (Dabbous 2004, Hatem 1993). Women's growing presence in educational and professional arenas ranks among feminist activism's most significant achievements. This is perhaps most salient among urban and middle upper-class women, who had long been restricted to private space, as female seclusion was a sign of social prestige and economic position. But the expansion of the public sphere to elite women also benefited those long compelled to leave their homes. Working-class women's conditions improved as the entry of elite women lent a degree of respectability to public roles (Hatem 1993, 40). Private car ownership, women-only metro cars and shared taxi and bus etiquette help to facilitate women's movement outside the home. Access to public space does not translate to empowerment for all, however; for disadvantaged rural women who once tilled fields, emancipation has sometimes meant the freedom to stay indoors (Hill 1997, 138).

With the development of consumer culture during the twentieth century, women have emerged as public consumers as well as producers. In the 1930s, a fledgling public culture of cinemas became a gender and class battleground, as women-only matinees attracted both patronage and protest (Thompson 2001). While socialist policies in newly independent nations hampered conspicuous consumption, liberalizing trends in recent decades have spawned a vibrant commercial leisure sector. Today, cinema-going forms a regular date for engaged couples (Armbrust 1998, 419–22). Women now frequent hotels, restaurants, theaters, discos, cafés, and health clubs in growing numbers. Stores and malls have mushroomed, and shopping for home and family offers a public economic activity that affirms domesticity. By purchasing gifts, women do the work of kinship, forging and maintaining social and economic networks. They also uphold cultural norms of generosity and hospitality, and maintain and enhance family prestige (Forte 2001). Food markets provide another public arena for women's activity. As both buyers and sellers, women develop assertive public personas (Ghannam 2002, 112–14).

While gyms regularly offer women's hours, and a few all-women cafés have appeared, most public spaces are not formally segregated. Many inexpensive cafés remain restricted to men; others – particularly those frequented by struggling artists and intellectuals – provide "family" sections designed to shield women from harassment. Some upscale restaurants refuse entry to parties without women; all male groups are perceived to lower an establishment's character and caliber. A Damascene restaurant, al-Barjīs (named for the traditional women's game, *barjīs*), welcomes men, but appears designed for the women who often comprise the majority of its patrons, smoking hubble bubbles and playing cards and *barjīs* until the small hours. Cafés and restaurants like al-Barjīs, established in old merchant houses in Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut, Cairo, and Amman, possess an air of the traditional and the domestic (Salamandra 2000, 2004). The private feel of these public spaces renders them particularly attractive to and acceptable for women.

Given the premium Arab societies place on the appearance of female chastity, women adopt a range of reputation preserving strategies. Various forms of Islamic dress, *ḥijāb*, provide portable privacy (Papanek 1982, 150), signal a woman's respectability, and discourage harassment. Chaperones, often relatives, frequently accompany women on outings. Women also move in groups, walking arm in arm along the streets, sharing tables in cafés and restaurants. For elite women, revealing is as important as concealing. Interaction with the opposite sex is frowned upon, but unmarried women display beauty and wealth to attract desirable mates, and married women to signify family status (Salamandra 2004, 55–9). Upscale hotels, restaurants, resorts, cinemas, and health clubs offer a "class *ḥijāb*" (Armbrust 1998, 427) by restricting access to a select circle. In these semi-public leisure sites, elite women take advantage of a spatial

in-between-ness to see and be seen (Salamandra 2004, 52).

Cyberspace holds particular promise for women's participation. Men continue to dominate private Internet access in the Arab world; yet the role of an ever-increasing number of Internet cafés is difficult to assess (Wheeler 2004, 161). Women certainly frequent these spaces, circumventing restrictions on socializing with men through email, chat rooms, and weblogs. Cellular telephones allow for transgression of spatial gender norms. Virtual space helps professional women to avoid the reputation-compromising hazards of proximity, to be taken seriously, and to divert attention from their physical appearance. It also enables some to meet the challenge of working women everywhere: combining paid employment with childcare (Wheeler 2004, 146).

Local and satellite television airspace has also become feminized. In great numbers, women have entered the broadcast waves as writers, producers, editors, directors, performers, news anchors, and correspondents. Interactivity expands participation. Women's topical call-in programs, such as al-Jazeera's *Li-al nisā' faqat* (For women only), link women across the Arab world and the diaspora beyond. A women's satellite station, the Lebanese Hiya (She) TV, has emerged. Since their emergence in the 1960s, Arab dramatic series, *musalsalāt*, have addressed patriarchal abuse and depicted strong female characters. Progressive television program makers are among the most prominent champions of women's rights. Television serves as a bridge connecting women in their homes to a wider world.

Television and the Internet are but one instance of blur between public and private space. The Arab household, often the locus of political power, confounds simple public/private dichotomies. Women's visiting practices occur within domestic spaces, but are nevertheless critical to economic support (Singerman 1995, Hoodfar 1997) and the performance of social position (Salamandra 2004, Stolleis 2004). Women's networks take on particular impetus in situations of conflict. Sectarian political elites in civil war Beirut reorganized and even demolished working-class neighborhoods in part because women's intersectarian visiting networks threatened the authority and legitimacy of confessional politics (Joseph 1983). Domestic space becomes a site of political protest in Palestine. During visits, a public witnessing of resistance takes shape in the private realm, as women recount the sufferings and heroism of their sons and brothers in Israeli detention (Jean-Klein 2000). Just as the domestic becomes public, the public also becomes domesticated. Numerous Palestinian women's activist committees have emerged (Abdulhadi 1998, Peteet 1992, Taraki 2004), and offer women public activity beyond charity work (Gluck 1995, 5). Yet these organizations often mirror family sociality, and meet within the home (Jean-Klein 2003). The amorphous violence of resistance in Iraq appears to preclude the formation of women's activist groups. While no scholarly research has yet emerged, weblogs show women bearing the brunt of danger, their movements severely restricted by fearful families ("Riverbend" 2005, 16–17).

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Christa Salamandra

The Gulf

Female space is often read as being private space, in opposition to public space. This has particularly been assumed in Western scholarship on Gulf societies where strict rules of gender segregation and the seclusion of women have been predominant cultural norms. Yet a number of theorists have recently challenged this facile association of female with the private realm in rigid opposition to male, public space (see, for example, Nelson 1974, Afsaruddin 1999). In the Gulf, female space may be both public and private, and complex rules parcel out both kinds of social space for gendered use. Moreover, social norms that dictate how space is gendered changed dramatically in the last quarter of the twentieth century with the economic and social transformations of the oil economy.

Avoiding the simplistic, dichotomous association of male and female space with public and private realms requires an inquiry into the ways that both public and private spaces are gendered. Male entry into private, domestic spaces is defined by the presence of females in that space and how men are related to those women. The home in particular is a place where only men who are in the category of *maḥram* (a male relative with whom marriage is forbidden by incest taboos) may enter female spaces. Even when kinship relations permit the mixing of men and women in the home, certain spaces, particularly the kitchen, are considered predominantly female spaces and rarely entered by men. Other spaces within the home, particularly the formal sitting room (*ṣālūn*), are predominantly male spaces, but age and social hierarchies as much as gender determine who may use such spaces, so senior women of the household may entertain visitors in the *ṣālūn*, and while they do, men of the household are banned from entering.

In the Gulf, there are many public spaces carved out specifically for women's use. Certain boutiques, bank branches, schools, and gyms are designated for exclusively female use, and men are forbidden entry into these places, which are both staffed and patronized by women. Such gendered demarcation of space has often arisen as a result of market demand, to enable women to manage and spend their money without the presence of men.

Other public spaces are divided into separate male and female spaces. For example, in the 1980s, Saudi Arabia experimented with designating a separate seating area for women at the back of public transportation buses, but eventually eliminated this as a result of public pressure from conservatives who expressed concern about the way it facilitated unsupervised female mobility. Many restaurants in the Gulf are formally divided into male and family sections. Men may only enter the family section of a restaurant if accompanied by female relatives. This is a reminder that even spaces outside the home may be demarcated as domestic or family space, which is neither exclusively male nor female.

Other public places are divided off for gendered use by time slots. Examples include university libraries in Saudi Arabia, where women may use the library on certain days each week, during which men are forbidden entry, and amusement parks, which have one or two days each week during which only females and minor male children may use the park.

As late as the 1960s and 1970s, the market was a place where men shopped; women stayed away from this male-dominated public space, sending male relatives to do their shopping for them. But with the spread of oil wealth and disposable incomes for women, the market has become a place that both women and men simultaneously inhabit and use. This is particularly the case in spaces that represent imported forms of the transnational economy of the Gulf states, so it is more common to see Gulf women moving freely and alone through malls and international restaurant franchises than in traditional markets and coffee shops.

In public spaces, women's modest dress (ranging from cloak and headscarf to the full veiling of the face and gloving of hands) enables Gulf women to create their own private female space, protected

from the male gaze, while moving through public space, effectively "allowing them to inhabit both spaces simultaneously" (Afsaruddin 1999, 19). The presence of male family members may also serve as a kind of buffer that enables women to inhabit predominantly male public spaces, such as beaches, by protecting them from the encroachment of non-related males. So it is not uncommon to see fully-clad women bathing at beaches or picnicking by the shore in family groupings.

Social space is parceled out for gendered use according to both unspoken cultural codes and officially defined legal norms. It is the former which keeps women from sitting in cafés and outdoor coffee shops where exclusively men socialize and smoke the water pipe. In contrast, other spaces are formally designated for gendered use by the state and such spatial demarcations are backed up by legal force. This is particularly the case in contemporary (turn-of-the-millennium) Saudi Arabia, where mixed-gender schools and workplaces are officially forbidden (with the notable exception of Saudi hospitals, where men and women work and are treated side by side).

The formal designation of gendered space, backed by powerful social norms or legal force, is an important determinant of how space is used. Yet, following de Certeau (1984), it is important to also examine the creative ways that people use spaces in defiance of the ways that the dominant social order formally designates their use. So, for example, young people in the Gulf use malls as places to meet, flirt, and date, in defiance of a patriarchal order that proscribes male–female premarital liaisons, thus avoiding arranged marriages (see Wynn 1997). Mixed-gender spaces of touristic consumption may be appropriated by locals as well as regional tourists as places where men and women mix freely in opposition to "traditional" norms regarding the spatial segregation of the sexes. Examples include spaces designated for international tourism, such as hotels and nightclubs in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, as well as private resort areas for domestic tourism, such as Obhur Beach near Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

Besides tourism, another way in which transnational movements of people transform local cultural norms regarding gendered division of space is seen in the widespread phenomenon of imported domestic servants and expatriate workers in Gulf countries (see Abdel Meguid 1991). Housing facilities, walled compounds, and international schools for expatriate workers and their families are places where men and women mix socially, against predominant cultural norms defining the gendered use of space. Foreign domestic servants in many ways transgress the gendered designations of private spaces; Gulf women who avoid mixing with their countrymen often do not bother avoiding the company of male immigrant servants and drivers, particularly if they are not Arab or Muslim, and foreign female servants move freely among unrelated males in the Gulf households in which they work. In Saudi Arabia, where women are not allowed to drive, middle- and upper-class families often hire immigrant men as drivers. These immigrant men are allowed in the female, private space of the car, which unrelated Saudi men would never be permitted to share with a Saudi woman. These examples illustrate the ways that transnational labor markets and changing consumption patterns arising from the Gulf oil economy fuel the ad hoc codification of new cultural norms that map out a gendered use of space.

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LISA WYNN

India

India has the second largest Muslim population in the world. Statistically, both the poverty and literacy levels among the women in the Muslim community are higher than those in any other community in India. While compared to some other countries Muslim women in India enjoy greater freedom, they have their own set of challenges with regard to social, religious, and ecological issues. Since Muslim women are not part of a monolithic group, their issues, as well as their

respective solutions, vary from nation to nation. The focus of this brief entry is the involvement of one group of Muslim women with local developers on a religious urban environment issue: the struggle of a women's organization on the verge of losing a park, their adopted prayer ground in the city of Lucknow, in October 2004.

"Lucknow Nagar Nigam [Lucknow city development] is promoting encroachment here and a land mafia has its eyes fixed on the park, let us see how long we can withhold the pressure," says Begum Shehnaz Sidvat, a former interior designer who shares her concern for the future of an otherwise ordinary park with 2,500 members of Bazm-e-Khawateen, an organization founded in 1934 by Begum Sultan Hayat (Times News Network 2004) The park in question is called the Zenana Park (Women's Park), a patch of land in the midst of a crowded city, which comes alive as women of all ages and background pour in from different parts of the city every 15th of the month for their monthly prayer and *majlis*, or social gathering. The park is also famous for the annual special prayer, Salaat-e-Tasbeeh, a *nafl* or supererogatory prayer, glorifying Allah and pleading for forgiveness from sins. The original purpose of the organization was to find a place of their own where large numbers of women could gather for prayer meetings. Men are not allowed to enter the park while the women's meetings are in session.

News such as this sparked little or no interest for readers 50 years ago. Even at the present time, neither the park nor the related news item published in the *Times of India* appears to be of much importance in view of the numerous parks and open spaces being lost in the newly developed concrete jungle around the nation. The city of Lucknow has maintained an unbroken rich tradition and a dynamic belief in Islam, which supports women in their local milieu. The dominant theme in this story is the sacredness of an apparently ordinary piece of land and the fine line between the sacred and the profane. In addition, the park embodies the survival of the free spirit of Lucknow women in the face of male skepticism. The issue of the park brings to light the interconnection between the domination of women and the domination of land and shows that the park, an adopted prayer ground for the past 60 years, attests to the clear reality of the disenfranchisement of Muslim women in India and their triumph and empowerment as well.

The following comments from the article "Park Space" (Times News Network 2004), made by some of the group members, offer a clearer picture of the use of the park, its benefits, and the women's present predicament:

> "Men can go to the mosque, but where do we go? This provides us the ideal opportunity and the feeling of taking part in mass prayer is truly awesome," declared Umme Kulsum, a BA student.
>
> "We discussed the *ṭalāq* [divorce] issue threadbare and majority of women felt the wife should also be given equal right as the husband." "So were the ulema informed?" "Oh no, they get livid at the suggestion," affirmed Sadia Tasneem.
>
> "We have medical camps, discussion and symposium apart from religious discourse," mentioned Begum Shenaz Sidrat.
>
> "It feels great to be together for a few hours and forget about all hassles," confirmed Rukhsana Shamseer. She also suggested, "Muslim women in other cities should also follow female emancipation, Lucknow style."
>
> "The mere freedom to vent their spleen can be therapeutic," exclaimed Mehru Jehan.

Comments such as these echo the concern and the sentiments of the members with regard to prayer and community, the very core of Islam. Whereas these ideals are first and foremost, other reasons were given for the purpose of these gatherings. The more they began to identify and name their experiences, the more concerned the women became with their marginalized status in society as well as in their faith community. Consequently, the prayer meetings in the park became the core of a grassroots movement for addressing any issue, social, political, medical, religious, or environmental.

Bazm-e-Khawateen appeals to its members' sense of the place of prayer in their religiosity: if prayer is truly communitarian and women are excluded from the opportunity to pray, they are actively denied relationship with God and faithful passage by virtue of the fact that their lives are not guided by the harmony with God discovered in prayer. The park symbolizes the sacred space, the merging of prayer and community, the holy time. Neither the Qur'ān nor the *ḥadīth* bars women from attending public prayers. The Islamic orthodoxy in India restricts women's prayers to within the walls of the *zenana* (the women's quarters in a Muslim household), or they must pray in an enclosed area of the mosque; thus power inequalities and gender discrimination are exemplified and women are prompted to seek an alternative means to fulfill their religious needs in a communal setting elsewhere.

Throughout the past 300 years, during Nawabi and British rule, the inhabitants of the city of Lucknow have repeatedly drawn and redrawn the limits of the city and its environment. Changes in architectural forms, in the patterns of the

gardens and the riverbanks, in motifs of sculpture and religious imagery, in the molds and mood of verses, all reflect a continual flux. The Zenana Park in this situation symbolizes the objectification as well as domination of nature as it was restricted with artificial boundaries for public enjoyment in the past and as it is on the verge of being replaced by developers in the present. The idea of a women's religious and social congregation in a different sort of *zenana* questions the limits imposed by man on space; we are no longer sure about the definition of an "inside" or an "outside." Although the Nawabi palace complexes of yesteryear did have enclosed gardens exclusively for their women, the use of a park located in a public space for women-only gatherings is unheard of. In a sense, the old limits continue to exist with women relegated to a *zenana* of a sort: the park itself. However, the stifling walls of a stygian mosque have disappeared. The change can best be appreciated if a contrast is made with a description of the women's quarters of the first half of the nineteenth century. Then, the walls of the *zenana* were to be built higher than a man standing on a back of an elephant, so that he could not see over the walls. No-one was allowed to climb up a minaret or tower of a religious building without previous public notice having been given so that the women could conceal themselves. Today, the men drop off and pick up the women from the very gates of the park. While limits are still maintained, this is a curious externalization of the limits that were initially set within the household.

This is one of the many examples where women, despite opposition, stood their ground to challenge the existing system and make a radical difference in their lives. In pursuing a religious issue, they clarified concerns of other kinds, helping to shape social, political, economic, and environmental agendas that seek justice and inclusivity. Neither the lack of support on the part of local Muslim orthodoxy nor the absence of concerns on the part of the city and the developers halted the women's march toward a solution. The defining characteristics of the struggle are their strong sense of gender and religious identity. As stated in the newspaper article, "truly empowered women come in all shapes, sizes, all dresses . . . some even covered in head to toe in purdah."

What the future holds for the organization as well as the park remains to be seen. It is to be hoped that the community involvement in general and the women's involvement in particular will be included in the design and development of the park and the surrounding area without the park losing its historical, ecological, and unique feminine character.

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LINA GUPTA

Iran and Afghanistan

Underlying Iranian and Afghan female space in society is a homo-social culture where men and women generally socialize separately. This causes spaces to be gendered around the idealized roles of women and men. Culturally, men have most of the power of authority and decision-making over economic and political issues; the village square and the marketplace thus become male spaces. Women have decision-making power over domestic resources and tasks; domestic space is thus generally female space. However, female space extends beyond the domestic sphere to relate to the tasks associated with what an ideal woman should do. For example, women are expected to wash and cook and so certain times of the day and/or access points to water are female spaces. This means that particular wells may be designated female spaces, or if shared with men, certain times may be designated as women-only – usually early morning and late afternoon. Similarly, points along the banks of streams and rivers are designated as female space and may be related to time of day. However, in the cities and more densely populated villages, where resources are limited, there may be a curtailment of such spaces being exclusively female.

Female space also includes specific paths in the village and seasonal access to land. Though work on the land is ideally the role of men, poor families do include women in agricultural work. The

land that women work becomes female space at the expected time women do "their" tasks – weeding, hoeing, gathering and picking fruits, vegetables, and grain. Orchards and vineyards are often walled and are more acceptable places for women to work privately. When there is a lot of work, women may work in groups with female relatives and female neighbors helping; this is called *ashar* (from the Arabic *ḥashara*, meaning to gather or assemble; in Afghanistan the term carries deep cultural notions of communal responsibility). Men are expected to plough, irrigate, trim orchards and vineyards, and harvest, also often calling for a men's *ashar*, and the land becomes male space during the time of these activities. Men also supervise female relatives and do daily maintenance of the land. However, in Afghanistan women's work on the land is generally considered shameful, so those families who have the means do not allow women to do agricultural work beyond their courtyard garden (Grace 2004, 5–6). In rural areas, those with the least means tend to have greater fluidity in moving between female and male space (in order to meet their livelihood and survival needs), whereas members of higher social classes have the luxury of segregation and exclusive spaces of female decision-making. In Iran, however, the same phenomenon is observed mainly among the religious ruling elite and in some rural areas. The more educated segments of middle and upper classes, whether in rural or urban areas, tend to have more gender-integrated spaces.

In many rural communities, the entire village becomes a female space on *bazaar* days when all the men go to the market once a week. Often this means all women have access to orchards for picnicking and streams and/or rivers for swimming. Many rural communities in Afghanistan and Iran send their young and able bodied men (especially when the agricultural season finishes) to the cities and other countries for labor, leaving villages with very few, mostly elderly, men. At these times female spaces in the village expand.

These designations of rural female and male space generally apply to settled people only. Kuchis (Afghan nomads) and other semi-nomadic tribes (such as the Baloch, Lur, and Kyrgyz) have greater integration of female and male space, as all household members are needed to manage tasks for a livelihood predicated on migration. This also means that where spaces are integrated, men have more control of the decision-making unless there are no able adult men to make decisions.

In urban communities, some parks are exclusively female, while others may become female spaces or exclusively male spaces in the evenings. Gyms and stadiums often have specific hours for women but the time allocated is usually not equal to the time given men unless gyms cater exclusively to women. In Iran women are permitted into stadiums only to watch (rarely held) female-only sports events. However, in Afghanistan women do attend events with men and are often given a separate entrance and sitting area for families. Tea and coffee houses are generally men's spaces in urban and rural areas, unless they are specifically built with a family orientation. In Afghanistan, only men attend cinemas.

Following the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, the government formalized strict segregation of certain public spaces, thus rendering them female and male spaces. Schools remain segregated until university level, women enter and sit separately from men on public buses, and some buildings have separate entry points for women and men, though once inside, seating is integrated. However, this segregation does not extend to all public spaces, and shared taxis, markets, and restaurants generally integrate male and female space. Despite legislation, higher education and occupation rates in Iran, especially in urban centers, have created greater gender-integrated social spaces – more so than in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Afghanistan, while also an Islamic republic, has fewer formal mandates on segregated space, though cultural mores often enforce segregation where there are no rules – for example, in cities, women are given seats before men on public buses, typically near the front or closest to the door.

While the boundaries of female spaces are often defined by men, women have decision-making power and freedom within those spaces. Female spaces are often thought of as a woman's right, but the idealization of developed and Western countries and the increase in urban populations are encroaching upon female spaces of decision-making, often in the name of feminism.

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This entry is in part based on Palwasha L. Kakar's fieldwork for the study of livelihood and local governance at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.

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Palwasha L. Kakar and Brandy Bauer

North Africa

Social space in North Africa is usually gendered, meaning that most locations carry connotations of "male" or "female" depending on how a space is used and by whom. The gendered quality of a space may change throughout the course of a day and vary greatly from urban to rural areas. Spaces are gender segregated, both formally and informally, in order to avoid the mixing of unrelated men and women, though with women's increased presence in formerly "male" spaces such as the educational system or the workplace, commingling is often unavoidable. In these cases, transforming space into "female" space can involve partitioning off separate areas or wearing a veil to give the impression of an inviolable female space within a space that is now mixed.

Observers of North African social life have long noted the characteristic division of men and women into separate spheres, often termed as "public/political" and "private/domestic." These classificatory terms have been criticized for implying that activities associated with female space could not have significant economic, religious, or political resonance. In reality, space has never been so neatly divisible, and the definition of female space varies throughout different historical periods and among countries and social classes. Despite a dearth of sources before 1830, indigenous and colonial historical sources since point to women's active participation in social, political, and economic life. A close study of the historical records reveals women's presence in spaces that could be closed off to men for specific time frames in order to become female space, such as *ḥammāms*, saints' tombs, or Sufi religious processions.

The practice of separating space into male and female areas is thought to have its roots in both Mediterranean customs and religious precepts. A verse in the Qurʾān recommending that the Prophet's wives be separated from unrelated males by a curtain or *ḥijāb* has been interpreted to suggest both the necessity of separate spaces within the domestic sphere and veiling for women. These precepts can be observed in domestic architectural practices, where female space might be constructed above a male space such that women could observe unseen the activities of male relatives and their guests.

Some areas that in the past were considered the preserve of men have been increasingly mixed since independence, particularly as women have entered the observable workforce. Streets, cafés, and markets are notable examples, with mixed public spaces more common in urban than in rural areas. In cities, for example, women are present in the street in numbers equal to men during the day, yet at night the streets become male space again. Women are careful to avoid lingering in one place or appearing late at night for fear of being perceived as prostitutes. This pattern changes during the month of Ramadan and also during the hot summer months, when the street at night becomes a festive space for both genders.

In some urban areas professional women and students have begun to frequent cafés. Not all cafés are considered appropriate for women, who tend to sit discreetly in the back or on a second level sometimes specifically designated as female space. Women of all social classes can be found in the souks, both as buyers and sellers, though as merchants men still tend to predominate, particularly in rural areas. In agriculture, women perform a range of tasks necessitating their presence outside the home, including wood gathering and the retrieval of water from wells, herding, planting, and harvesting. With the increase of male migration to Europe, agricultural jobs that were once the territory of men have fallen to women. Girls and women usually work alongside each other, avoiding the company of men, thus transforming agricultural spaces into female space.

In public spaces where no official segregation exists, the creation of female space within mixed public spaces has become a common strategy. Women delineate female space through style of dress, veiling, and the avoidance of eye contact with men, and by seeking out the company of other women. Although official women's sections exist on some forms of public transport, such as the Cairo metro, in much of North Africa the division of public spaces into "male" and "female" is frequently informal and taken for granted. Women will often select train cars or bus seats occupied by other women, even when seats have not been strictly assigned by gender. This strategy is employed not only out of modesty but also to avoid harassment.

North Africans themselves are not of one mind about the division of space into male and female spheres, a division that can be both political and highly charged. As active participants in nationalist movements prior to the end of colonialism, women subverted notions of female space to smuggle weapons and information while escaping detection by colonial authorities. Today, gendered contestations of social space often reveal struggles within North African societies to define the position of women. Religious orientation, social class, and age

group are factors that affect how individuals view women's presence in different social spheres. The beach, for example, has been a contested site for those who advocate a stricter segregation of men and women in North African society, with Islamist groups often making deliberate social statements by attempting to separate swimming areas according to gender.

How to define or create female space within new, mixed social spaces is also an issue. Exercise clubs have grown increasingly popular in urban areas, with space reserved for women on specific days, at certain times of the day, or in different sections of the club. Women can also be found browsing the Internet at cyber cafés, often escaping parental and community controls to forge virtual, online relationships with men that would be impossible under the watchful eyes of family. Research on the gendered quality of North African social space must take into account the contested nature of space, particularly as ideas and definitions of female space are constantly changing.

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Rachel Newcomb

Turkey

The way female space has been constructed in modern Turkey is related to a historical negotiation between traditions dating back to the Ottoman era and the Republican reforms regarding women's emancipation and secularism. The Republican regime brought important changes in dress codes, voting rights, education and professional opportunities, and promoted Western art and culture. These reforms undoubtedly increased women's visibility and mobility in public spaces in both urban and provincial elite contexts. Yet, in many rural areas, female space in social life continued to follow traditionally gendered spatial patterns. How public space was gendered varied also, depending on its urban/rural or elite/popular contexts, and their regional variations.

Given the transportation and communication limitations of the early Republican era, reforms could only be spread through state institutions, such as the People's Houses (1932–51), elementary schools, or other state offices. People's Houses, semi-official public training centers, remained predominantly a male space, despite all the encouragement to include women in social and cultural activities. Oral history revealed that women felt intimidated about participating unless there was a particular women's activity such as a needlework exhibit (Öztürkmen 1998). The fact that People's Houses were framed as "serious" public domains where children were not allowed also discouraged women from these places. The state-controlled non-segregated elementary school system, however, allowed many girls access to national education. In fact, with the exception of the mosque, there was no enforced segregation in Republican public life, offering mixed access to transportation, education, health care, public offices, and streets. Nevertheless, new forms and conventions also emerged through Republican negotiation between tradition and modernity. Intercity buses, for example, offered mixed transportation, but created a new concept called *bayan yanı* (requiring a woman to sit next to another woman). Or in restaurants, it was very common to find the upstairs floor reserved for women or customers accompanied by women called the *aile salonu* (family hall).

The way educational space was gendered was more complex. As students, girls and boys had access to mixed elementary schools and universities from the beginning of the Republic. At the high school level, however, boarding or artisanry schools for girls were widespread along with mixed high schools. The first generation of educated young women were later employed as state employees of the early Republican era, working in high profile jobs as judges, doctors, or teachers. The national education system, in particular, had

always opened a space where women had high visibility and performance opportunities (Öztürkmen 2001, Tan, Ecevit, and Üşür 2000). The so-called *öğretmenler odası*, a room reserved for teachers' rest in schools, has also been a predominantly female space. Although women's presence in state and private offices also steadily increased during the Republican era, it is hard to call these settings female spaces. While state offices are administratively hierarchical, the social structure of the private sector may usually be paternalistic (Aycan 2001).

As for the female space in the rural context, it is possible to say that it reflected power structures inherited from Ottoman times until the transition to democracy in the 1950s. In small localities, social and economic status shaped social relations. Notable women ruled in their own female public spaces, having their own privileged seats at public baths or weddings. Until the material change brought about in the 1950s, the fountain remained one of the traditional public female spaces of the village. The workplace in village production also opened female spaces in the field, at the carpet loom, and during the collective production of winter food (*imece*) where storytelling and folk singing emerged as the main female folk genres. Entertainment was segregated in the rural context where weddings included a special women's henna night (*kına gecesi*). It was common for public spaces in cities and provincial towns to be gendered in time slots. The local public bath (*hammam*) or cinema was opened to women at particular hours. In many localities, women also created their own space along the beaches in the afternoons when their housework was completed. It was also a common practice in urban contexts that the so-called *gazino* musical entertainments offered special women's matinées (*kadınlar matinesi*).

The way the marketplace was gendered throughout Republican history illustrates a shift from the Ottoman tradition, where it was avoided by upper-class women. Following the Ottoman tradition, the female population in the marketplace in provincial towns in the early Republican era would consist either of the sellers of certain goods or servants shopping. This changed in later years, as women's presence in the local marketplace increased to a great extent. In its latest version, be it a supermarket or a street bazaar, the marketplace has turned out to be a predominantly female space. Streets have never been a female space, being more accessible during daytime and requiring appropriate clothing ("mantosuz çıkılmazdı" is a common phrase meaning one would not go out without a coat on). The front doors of houses in small localities were, however, a female space, operating as a socializing spot for neighbors. The prison system, where women convicts lived in a common room, also created a female space. It is also important to remember that such exclusively female spaces in prisons, among industrial women workers, in the *hammam*, and in many of the girls' schools opened the ground for liberated speech, developing a female jargon.

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Arzu Öztürkmen

Space: Ḥammām

Overview

Architectural development

The *ḥammām*, or Middle Eastern public bath, is predominantly an urban phenomenon. In rural areas, public baths are smaller and less elaborate buildings and not every village has one. The *ḥammām* evolved from Roman baths. Like these, it consists of at least four rooms: *al-maslakh*, the entrance and changing room; the *bārid*, the usually unheated first bathing room; the *wastānī*, a moderately heated second bathing room; and the *ḥarāra*, a third completely heated bathing room. Unlike their Christian predecessors, the Muslim conquerors of Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia immediately took to the phenomenon of the public bath they came across in these regions. They re-established the old bathing customs and immediately started building new public baths (Grotzfeld 1970, 26). Although the layout of the Roman baths was adopted, the size of the rooms and the proportions between the different rooms were often altered. When Amr ibn al-ʿĀṣ built a bath in seventh-century Fusṭāṭ (old Cairo), for example, he was ridiculed by the local population for the unusual size of his bath. Confronted with what to them was an extremely cramped space they baptized it *ḥammām al-fār*, "the mouse-bath" (al-Suyūṭī, cited in Buitelaar and Van Gelder 1996, 33-4).

From the twelfth century onwards, the baths were expanded and further Islamized. The famous al-Buzūriyya bath in Damascus, which was built between 1154 and 1171, for example, had numerous niches, side-portals and cupolas. As a result of the expansion of the Ottoman Empire from the sixteenth century onwards, the architecture of *ḥammām*s underwent strong Ottoman influences almost everywhere in the Middle East. They grew into monumental buildings, were more elaborately decorated and the second bathing room was extended and furnished with a central heated platform on which bathers could lie down for a scrubbing or massage treatment by the bath personnel. Morocco is the only country in the Middle East that escaped Ottoman rule. This explains why present-day Moroccan *ḥammām*s look much the same as the fourteenth-century palace baths in the Alhambra in Andalusia.

The ḥammām in Islamic doctrine

Naẓāfa and *ṭahāra*, (physical) purity and ritual purification, are important concepts in Islam. Particularly the stipulation that running water be used for the ablutions and the fact that one has to undress completely for the *ghusl* or major ablution explain much of the popularity of the *ḥammām*. Until recently, except in the modern quarters of Middle Eastern cities, most houses were not equipped with running water, nor did they allow enough privacy for the individual household members to fully undress. Despite its convenience, the *ḥammām* is a controversial issue among Islamic scholars. Even though sex segregation is strictly observed while bathing, there are worries about nakedness in the bath and the temptations this may give rise to. The famous mystic and philosopher al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), for example, discusses the pros and cons of the bath extensively in his much consulted *Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn* (Revivication of the religious sciences). He concludes that inspiration should be more important than perspiration: the heat in the *ḥammām* should remind one of the fires of Hell (Buitelaar and Van Gelder 1996, 187).

Besides the importance of purity, the popularity of the *ḥammām* can also be explained by the fact that Islamic doctrine allows for sensuous pleasure and disapproves of ascesis. Sexuality is not treated as an inevitable evil to secure procreation. Rather, sexual pleasure is perceived as a present from God to make life more pleasant on condition that it is legalized by marriage. In a recent handbook for Muslims in the modern world, marital sex is even described as a "pious act" that facilitates access to Paradise (Maqsood 1995, 33). In a climate where bodily pleasures are allowed and offering one's spouse sexual gratification is even considered a pious act, the *ḥammām* comes in handy as a place where one's attractiveness can be improved with all kinds of beauty treatments.

The meaning of the ḥammām to women

At a time when houses are increasingly equipped with running water and bathrooms, one would expect the popularity of the *ḥammām* to decline. In some countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen, this is indeed the case. Elsewhere, as in Turkey and North Africa, the old bathing

customs still flourish, especially among women. In Morocco, most urban women visit the bath weekly or bi-weekly. But even Moroccan and Turkish women from the countryside who migrated to Europe appeared to miss their visits to the bath so dearly that *ḥammām*s have been opened in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

Clearly, then, a private bathroom is no strong rival to the *ḥammām*. Both its warm, humid atmosphere and its social climate remain unparalleled. It is the most comfortable place to perform the elaborate sequence of activities that women carry out when taking a bath: sweating, scrubbing, shaving, hair washing, massaging, and last of all performing the *ghusl*, the major ritual ablution.

Sexuality

Marriage and other rites of passage, such as giving birth and concluding mourning following the death of one's husband, are marked by a visit to the *ḥammām*, which leaves one with rosy cheeks, a soft skin and a pleasant scent. It should therefore come as no surprise that there are strong associations between the *ḥammām* and sexuality, associations that are even institutionalized in marriage rituals. Traditionally, wedding ceremonies begin with the bride visiting the *ḥammām* with her friends who give her a special marriage treatment. Married women also use the *ḥammām* to enhance their attractiveness and thus hope to emotionally tie their husbands to them. Moroccan research on sexuality – which in practice is accompanied with much more taboo and ambivalence than one would expect considering the doctrinal attitude – shows that three out of ten women, especially older women, mention the *ḥammām* as the place where seduction is prepared (Naamane-Gessous 1998, 201).

Since a ritual ablution is required after sexual intercourse, a visit to the bath may not only precede but also follow lovemaking. The close relation between lovemaking and the *ḥammām* comes to the fore in the Moroccan equivalent for the proverb "no smoke without fire": "Only those who have done something go to prison and the *ḥammām*."

While major impurity as a result of sexual intercourse affects both men and women, impurity due to menstruation or childbirth is specific to women. Although according to the official doctrine this only means that women are more often impure but certainly not inherently more impure than men, in practice women tend to be more strongly associated with impurity than men. In North Africa, the boy's name Ṭahar, for example, meaning "the pure one" is much more common than Ṭahara, its equivalent for girls. While this expression of cultural dominance is discriminatory for women, it does legitimize their frequent trips to the *ḥammām*.

Sociability and privacy

Indeed, women tend to spend much more time in the *ḥammām* than men. What attracts them is that the *ḥammām* is the most public meeting place for women but at the same time offers them the greatest privacy. As yet, the Western notion of personal privacy, the right of the individual to time and space to oneself, is unfamilar to many Middle Eastern people. Individuals who withdraw themselves from company tend to be frowned upon. To most people, family privacy is much more important. Everyone recognizes the right of families to protect themselves against the intrusion of others than non-(pseudo) relatives. An even stronger principle in the organization of space is sex segregation. Especially for women, gender privacy plays a dominant role in the way a space is classified as private or public.

The division of space into male and female domains is, however, not neutral. As a result of asymmetric gender relations, men have more space at their disposal than women. They can also cross the boundaries between male and female domains more easily, and when this occurs, they have to make fewer adjustments in their conduct than women. In general, men respect the female privacy that reigns at home and spend much of their time outdoors. The house is, however, also the place where family members of both genders share family privacy. Since gender privacy is the more dominant principle, in the company of male family members, especially when these are older, women will adjust their posture, clothing, and conversation in accordance with how the rules of modesty expect them to behave in the presence of men.

One of the major attractions of the *ḥammām* to women is that it constitutes the only place where they do not have to remain alert lest their gender privacy be disturbed. For many, the *ḥammām* is the only place where they undress and expose their almost completely naked bodies and untied hair to the glances of others. This intimacy creates a unique atmosphere of relaxation. Because of the importance of gender privacy in the *ḥammām*, the presence of male children in the women's bath is surrounded with ambivalence. Most women are reluctant to give up the intimacy with maturing sons, and many prefer to take sons along to the bath as long as possible. In many cases, only when it has become very evident that their sons consciously begin to pay attention to the naked female bodies, as when other women begin to complain that a boy

who looks about six years of age begins "to open his eyes" or "to know," mothers can be persuaded by the owner of the bath not to bring along her son any more.

Equally important is that to many women, the *ḥammām* is the best place to go to meet women who do not belong to their inner circle of relatives, neighbors, and friends. In the *ḥammām* one catches up with news that stretches beyond the social talk of one's immediate surroundings. A visit to the *ḥammām* also offers the opportunity to extend one's network beyond one's *qurāb*, or "close ones." In former days, the *ḥammām* was a likely place for women to seek out potential brides for their sons. Not only could the physical condition and aptitude of a potential candidate to serve her seniors be checked, but the informal manner in which matters were discussed between women in the *ḥammām* was also a safeguard against any loss of face in the case such tacit negotiations would prove to be unsuccessful.

Furthermore, the intimate atmosphere created by shared nakedness not infrequently persuades a woman to unburden her heart to someone who happens to sit next to her. Episodes from life stories are sometimes literally inscribed in the body by scars and tattoos that have been applied to treat illnesses such as barrenness and spirit possession. Their coming into full view in the *ḥammām* easily leads women to exchange accounts on the vicissitudes of life. Sharing one's personal problems with a stranger who has no access to one's social network has the additional advantage that one does not have to be afraid that confidential details will be turned against one by means of gossip. In this sense, the (bi)weekly visit to the *ḥammām* offers an escape from the protective, yet sometimes suffocating atmosphere of family privacy that surrounds many women most of the time.

The fact that the *ḥammām* is a place where total strangers meet, and where women are beyond the control of male members of the family, adds to the ambivalence felt, particularly by men, about the institution. In the 1990s, the Taliban were quick to shut down women's *ḥammām*s when they came to power in Afghanistan. Critical female voices can also be heard. Strongly religious women feel affronted when confronted with the private parts of fellow bathers who don't bother to cover their loins and increasingly women complain about the lack of hygiene in the *ḥammām*. Also, career women, who meet others at work and do not have the time to spend hours in the *ḥammām* frequently bathe at home or visit the public showers that are increasingly being built. Yet even to them, an occasional visit to the *ḥammām* offers a welcome moment of relaxation. Besides facilitating the performance of the major ritual ablution and beauty treatments, the *ḥammām*'s greatest attraction remains its quality as the most "public private" space for women.

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Marjo Buitelaar

Space: Harem

Overview

The word "harem" refers to the female members of a household, or to the dedicated architectural enclosure in which they live. Few Islamic institutions can rival the harem in the concerted – even obsessive – manner in which it has been represented in art, literature, social theory, and political discourse. Although there is today a relatively consistent tissue of images that defines popular conceptions of the harem, this vision is thrown into question by the historical and geographical variability revealed by scholarly research. For its part, some of this research has tended to approach its subject teleologically, attempting to trace the historical unfolding, maturation, and institutionalization of an ideal, and thereby exhibiting totalizing tendencies of its own. In fact, "harem" is a word that has corresponded to many realities in different times and places – realities not necessarily organized within a logically coherent developmental program.

Etymology

The Arabic root *ḥ-r-m*, from which "harem" is derived, generally refers to prohibition, unlawfulness, veneration, sacredness, inviolability – in other words, it conveys the notion of a taboo (Ibn Manẓūr 1988, 615–19). Although its derivatives occur no fewer than 83 times in the Qur'ān – referring to dietary laws and prohibitions during the pilgrimage, the holy months, and the sacred precincts of Mecca in which it is forbidden to kill – not once does the word refer to women or to women's quarters. That connection is, however, established in certain classical Arabic dictionaries, where *ḥurma* is said to refer to something held sacred and inviolable, something which it is one's duty to honor and defend, and only in this specific sense to a man's wives and family (al-Jawḥarī 1287 A.H., 486; al-Fayrūzābādī 1289 A.H., iv, 110).

Another word derived from the same root is *ḥarīm*, which refers to those parts of a house or property (for example a well) whose use is forbidden to all but the rightful owner, and more particularly to "the part of the house into which one enters and upon which the door is closed" (al-Zabīdī n.d., viii, 240, al-Azharī 1964–6, v, 47). Once again, it is in this quite specific sense of the private quarters of a house that the women's apartments came to be known as the harem. The Persian word *andarūn*, which means "interior" and denotes the women's quarters of a house, is precisely equivalent to this term.

The common practice of referring to this arrangement as "sexual segregation" is inexact, as it is not based on sex alone. Adult men and women who are forbidden (*maḥram*, another derivative of the same root) from marrying each other by virtue of kinship – for example a brother and sister – can share a common space; in this sense, if the harem is a zone occupied by women, then it is necessarily forbidden (*ḥarām*) to men other than their kin.

Religious basis

Though "harem" does not denote women or women's quarters in the Qur'ān, there is a verse that has been taken as laying the foundation for the separation of men and women. It reads, in part: "And when you ask them [feminine] for something, ask from behind a veil (*ḥijāb*); that makes for greater purity for your hearts and for theirs" (33:53). Although commentators agree that "them" in this verse refers specifically to the Prophet's wives, they have usually generalized it to include all Muslim women, and have taken this verse as ordaining that men and women must be spatially separated (al-Qurṭubī 1364 A.H., xiv, 227).

The degree to which such separation is fundamental to Islam has been debated. Fatima Mernissi argues that the Prophet's home in Medina "created a space in which the distance between private life and public life was nullified, . . . in which the living quarters opened easily onto the mosque, and which thus played a decisive role in the lives of women and their relationship to politics" (1991, 113). However, there are prophetic traditions (*ḥadīth*) that suggest that this practice did not last – for example one that describes how the Prophet stretched a curtain between Ṣafiyya and the people to emphasize that she was his wife; and another that relates how ʿĀ'isha refused to admit the brother of her foster uncle into her apartment following the revelation of the "verse of the veil," until the Prophet gave her leave on the grounds of

kinship. There is even a tradition that admonishes men to "Beware of entering upon the ladies" (al-Bukhārī 1979, 62: 22, 89; 40, 166; 159).

The "verse of the veil" is, incidentally, the origin of the word *purdah* – after the Persian word for "curtain" or "veil" – that denotes female seclusion in India. Relatedly, the women's quarters are known there as *zenana*, after *zenān*, Persian for "women."

The segregation of women from non-*maḥram* men was generalized following the death of the Prophet, both under the leadership of the Caliph ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (r. 634–44 C.E.), known for his strict views concerning women, and as a result of the growing influence of peoples with whom the Arabs came into contact through military conquest (Ahmed 1992, 41–78).

History

Since residences with separate quarters for women were the province of only the wealthiest few, it has historically been royal and imperial harems that have provided the paradigm for discussions and representations of the harem. Evidence suggests that the first royal harems appeared during the Umayyad period (661–750 C.E.); by the ʿAbbāsid period (750–1258 C.E.), they had become established not only as fact, but also as mythology. Thus, within less than a century of his death, the Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–61 C.E.) was related by al-Masʿūdī to have had 4,000 concubines in his harem, "with all of whom he enjoyed conjugal relations" (1861–77, vii, 276); al-Khwārizmī went even further a few decades later, placing the number at 10,000 (1297 A.H., 137). Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809 C.E.), whose name is indelibly linked to tales of fabulous harems thanks to the *Thousand and One Nights*, is another illustrious ʿAbbāsid caliph known to have had many concubines.

But the importance of this period for the institution of the harem transcends caliphs and their concubines. Historically, the establishment of Islamic orthodoxy was deeply imbued with the mores and material reality of the ʿAbbāsid elite, and that is true in particular of gender relations. Thanks to successive military victories, upper-class ʿAbbāsid men had gained the ability to procure large numbers of female slaves unencumbered by the legal rights and protections enjoyed by freeborn Arab women. As foreign women thus became traded commodities, harems populated by chattels gradually replaced more equal matrimonial unions, heralding an acute decline in the status of women (Abbott 1946, 67). This is one of several ways in which the harem has played a determining role in the construction of gender in the Muslim world.

To varying degrees, Islamic societies established after the collapse of the ʿAbbāsid dynasty continued the practice of keeping harems. For instance, the Mughal Emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605 C.E.) had many consorts, placed by his contemporary Abū al-Faḍl at "more than 5,000." Such numbers, however, are better understood as indicators of a ruler's stature and prestige; thus, Abū al-Faḍl suggests that "the large number of women – a vexatious question even for great statesmen – furnished his majesty with an opportunity to display his wisdom" (1843–1949, i, 44). This is doubtless why the fact that the Mamluk ruler al-Ashraf Ināl (r. 1453–61 C.E.) had only one wife, Zaynab, and no concubines led the biographer al-Sakhāwī to write: "In that respect, he was indeed unique among kings" (n.d., xii, 44–5). Of course this statement pertains specifically to royal households; there is scant information on how the common people lived at the time, and what does exist tends to be circumstantial. For instance, Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Rāziq has argued on the basis of architectural evidence – oblique entrances and screened windows to block the view from the outside – that Mamluk women must have been secluded at all levels of society. While he also claims that this practice forced Mamluk-era builders to distinguish between the parts of the house reserved for women and those parts open to visitors, this view is not unanimously shared (1973, 178–81).

One context in which residences – at least those of the wealthier families – were separated into such sections was the Ottoman Empire. Known as *harem* (or *haremlik*) and *selâmlık*, women's quarters and "greeting place," this dichotomous spatial arrangement is commonly viewed as based strictly on gender; in fact, it is more aptly representative of a private/public cleavage, provided that this cleavage is not conceptualized in too close an analogy with its Western manifestations. On the one hand, the *harem* was an inner sanctuary for both male and female members of the household, while the *selâmlık* was a public stage for welcoming and entertaining guests of both genders; on the other hand, however, women engaged in social, economic, and even political activities from behind *harem* walls, suggesting that the word "private" fails to capture the full range of experiences in which women partook there (Hegland 1991, al-Sayyid Marsot 1978). Interpreting these concepts at least for late Ottoman Istanbul, it is also worth noting that only 2.29 percent of all married men

were polygynous; among those, furthermore, the average number of wives was only 2.08 (Duben and Behar 1991, 148–9). Thus, the *harem* was much more likely to be a monogamous (albeit extended) family's private quarters than a space dedicated to housing multitudes of women.

The low numbers just quoted are not unusual; surveys indicate that the proportion of polygynous households in North Africa and South Asia does not exceed 5 percent. Although much higher proportions – sometimes over 40 percent – are reached in Sub-Saharan Africa, harems are not common there. In Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia, communal ownership of land and the predominance of women in agricultural work make polygyny widespread, but seclusion impractical; by contrast, individual ownership of land and the predominance of male-dominated plough farming in Eurasia and North Africa make seclusion possible, but polygyny undesirable (Boserup 1970, 37–52, Goody 1973). This underscores the fact that "harem" is principally a system of female seclusion, and not just polygyny by another name.

Ultimately, as Islamic countries engaged in modernization attempts modeled after the West, women came to be viewed as gauges of success, and harems as embarrassing relics of a past best forgotten. It is no coincidence that a book describing such an experiment in Westernization is entitled *Turkey without Harems* (Olivero 1952).

A plethora of images

Throughout history, women have played a significant role in masculinist symbolic economies. Accordingly, the harem has figured prominently as a carrier of meaning, both in the Muslim world and elsewhere. And, as often happens with such laden concepts, it has had many different and sometimes contradictory meanings.

One of the characteristics most commonly attributed to the harem in Western thought is oppression. In the works of Montesquieu and other Enlightenment thinkers, the harem was viewed as a microcosm of oriental despotism – the master representing the sultan, and the subservient women, his "effeminate" subjects (Grosrichard 1979, 147–9). In nineteenth-century religious tracts, the harem was invoked to garner support for missionary work under the guise of restoring Eastern women's dignity through Christianity (Başcı 1998). In the writings of feminists such as Brontë and Wollstonecraft, it provided a tool with which both to mark the oppression of women as alien to civilized Europe, and to render feminism less threatening by displacing its target to distant lands (Zonana 1993). In the hands of anti-feminists, the confinement of harem women was used as a cautionary tale of what might happen to European women if they were granted the sexual freedoms that feminists supposedly demanded (Ridley 1983, 74).

In contrast to the Western view of the harem as pure oppression, many Muslim historiographers represented it as an instrument of power and den of intrigue, claiming that royal harem women brought ruin upon their countries by usurping sovereignty which was rightfully the ruler's. In ʿAbbāsid, Fāṭimid, Ottoman, and many other contexts, misogyny thus provided a vocabulary of protest when economic crises or military defeats made it useful to find a scapegoat. In truth, these women's social and political activities were not the exception but the rule, as they performed key mediating functions between the ruler and his subjects (Peirce 1993).

Another staple of Western discourse on the Orient was eroticism: the harem was represented as a monument to male scopic desire, a phallocratic fantasy where an army of women existed only to sexually service a unique master. Among the most common tropes in this discourse were the device of representing harem inmates as European, and therefore "safe" for transgressing Western men; the tendency to portray them as unindividuated pluralities; the careful attention given to their grooming practices such as the application of henna and the depilation of pubic hair; the great popularity of images such as the Turkish bath and the slave market; and the wildly exaggerated notions of harem women's sexual desires, including accounts of lesbianism, bestiality, and masturbation (Schick 1999, 197–226).

By contrast, some Muslim writers have approached the harem as an inviolable sanctum analogous to the Ḥaramayn – the holy sanctuaries of Mecca and Medina. The Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy has given the equation of domesticity with femininity the weight of divine law: writing that "The Arabic name *sakan*, to denote the house, is related to the word *sakina*, peaceful and holy, while the word *harim*, which means 'woman,' is related to *haram*, 'sacred,' which denotes the family living quarters in the Arab house," he warns against constructions that might violate the home's "womanly inwardness" (1973, 57). Stripped of such masculinist essentialism, the idea that seclusion engenders a female spatial autonomy that affords Muslim women freedoms their Western counterparts have historically lacked

is articulated by Leila Ahmed, who views the harem as a system that "enables women to have frequent and easy access to other women in their community, vertically, across class lines, as well as horizontally," and where "women share living time and living space, exchange experience and information, and critically analyze – often through jokes, stories, or plays – the world of men" (1982, 524, 529). This echoes the observations of the eighteenth-century British travelers Lady Mary Wortley Montagu and Lady Elizabeth Craven, that thanks to seclusion and veiling, Ottoman women "have in reality more liberty than we have" (Montagu 1763, ii, 33–4).

By its proximity to Europe, the Ottoman Empire was best situated to provide most of the stock images that came to constitute Western conceptions of the harem. In the seventeenth century, works like Michel Baudier's *Histoire généralle du serrail*, Ottaviano Bon's *A Description of the Grand Signor's Seraglio*, and Jean-Baptiste Tavernier's *Nouvelle relation de l'intérieur du serrail du Grand Seigneur* laid the basis for fantastic descriptions of imperial harems that remain as alive today as they were when first written. But these authors had never been inside a harem, and had to rely on native informants of dubious truthfulness, as well as each other. Though first-person narratives by the women who actually inhabited the harems are rare, they do exist and constitute valuable sources of information. For example, the *Humāyūn-nāmah* of Gulbadan Begum, daughter of the Mughal Emperor Bābur (r. 1526–30 C.E.) and sister of Humāyūn (r. 1530–56 C.E.), offers a fascinating account of the lives of royal harem women in India – as well as the political events during the reigns of the first three Mughal emperors. Most extant first-person narratives by harem women are more recent: Gayatri Devi's account of the Rajput court in Jaipur, Taj al-Saltana's memoirs of the Qājār court, and Leylâ Saz's account of the Ottoman court all belong to the early twentieth century (for a nineteenth-century view, see Fig. 5).

Space and gender construction

There is a great deal of variability in the ways the harem has been represented. But like any social institution, the harem is in essence a representation; and like the history of any social institution, its history is therefore largely that of its representation. Rather than searching for the true essence of the harem in religious texts or historical practices, it is more fruitful to conceptualize it primarily as a socially constructed space, often more imagined than physical, and to focus on how it has functioned to construct gender.

Feminist geographers stress the mutually constitutive nature of space and gender, arguing that the differences in the ways men and women experience space are not only a consequence of gender differences, but are also productive of them (McDowell 1999). As Doreen Massey writes, "geography matters to the construction of gender, and the fact of geographical variation in gender relations . . . is a significant element in the production and reproduction of both imaginative geographies and uneven development" (1994, 2). Massey's reference to geography must be understood in the broadest sense, as encompassing spatial structures not only natural but also artificial, not only physical but also imagined. As a spatial construct, the harem has historically played a fundamental role in the construction and reproduction of gender – not just in the Muslim world, but also in the West, where it has been an omnipresent trope for centuries.

Analyzing the relationship between space and alterity, David Sibley has shown that marginalization "is associated not only with characterisations of the group but also with images of particular places, the landscapes of exclusion which express the marginal status of the outsider group" (1992, 107). Segregation reproduces itself: spaces of otherness become not only repositories of "others," but producers of alterity as well. Whether the locus of patriarchal oppression or an autonomous space of feminine liberty, the harem system has provided the spatial basis of gender difference. And since spatial differentiation often coexists with power differentiation, it has been implicated in the production and perpetuation of power assymetries along gender lines. But that necessarily means that it is also a site of resistance; indeed, the ongoing political struggle over veiling and seclusion can be viewed as an aspect of spatial politics, a contest over the restructuring of space.

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İrvin Cemil Schick

Space: Mosques

Arab States (excepting the Gulf and North Africa)

Women's access to mosques throughout Muslim history has been regulated by a mixture of Islamic legal prescriptions and local norms. This entry focuses on women's access to mosques in the Arab states. In the early and medieval periods of Islamic history, the majority of Sunnī and Shīʿī jurists tended to discourage women's mosque attendance. This was in spite of a number of reliable, well-circulated reports (*ḥadīth*s) credited to the Prophet Muḥammad, which indicate that he allowed women to attend mosques and that women did in fact do so regularly during his time. Further, there are indications that in this early period, mosque precincts were used by women not just for prayer but also for socializing, seeking alms, and even conducting trade. Yet, in articulating their legal prescriptions, jurists relied on a limited number of relatively weaker *ḥadīth*s indicating Muḥammad's preference that women should pray at home. Moreover, they reasoned that women's presence in the public domain, and in particular in congregational mosques, would be a source of social disorder (*fitna*), that women could not be guaranteed safety when they traveled to mosques, and that praying in a congregation was not required of women as it was of men. Therefore, they deemed that women's prayer in their own homes was preferable. Notably, Ibn Ḥazm (456/1054), a prominent jurist of the Ẓāhirī school of law, opposed this consensus and argued that Muḥammad's precedent could not be overturned out of fear of social unrest.

Legal prescriptions, however, did not always determine historical realities. Women's mosque attendance and participation is characterized by tremendous diversity across time and place and dependent on numerous factors. These include discrepant issues such as whether the mosque itself is located in an urban or rural setting, whether or not specific local leaders or national governments have shown support for women's attendance, the socioeconomic status of individual women, and the receptivity of specific congregations or imams to women's participation. Given this variety, this entry attempts only to elucidate broad trends or patterns observed in the modern period in Arab countries (with the exception of the Gulf states).

In the modern period, juristic attitudes no longer evince the prohibitions of the early and medieval texts. An examination of several twentieth-century expert legal opinions (*fatwa*, pl. *fatāwa*) reveals that certain prominent jurists, including Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) and Maḥmūd Shaltūt (d. 1963), permitted women to attend mosques as long as they were properly covered.

In addition to this development in legal discourse, the social function of mosques has evolved considerably. This is readily apparent in urban areas of all the Arab countries. The onslaught of modernity and the increasing secularization of educational institutions has meant that mosques have often been adapted as centers for religious education. Urban mosques evince greater variety in accommodating women's presence. While some neighborhood mosques may not provide for women's attendance, the large congregational mosques often have rows set aside for female worshippers. Prominent examples of such mosques are the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, and the Azhar Mosque and the Mosque of ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ in Cairo. The amount of space allocated to women varies in these mosques depending on the size of the female congregation. The issue of devoting a separate space for women or of raising a barrier or physical separation between the rows of men and women is often left to the discretion of the individual mosques. Women's attendance at such urban mosques has on the whole increased over the last three decades, particularly with the rise of Islamist movements and the increase in the numbers of mosques built in urban and rural areas. In this context, it should be mentioned that women in the modern period, as in other times throughout Islamic history, use the mosque for various purposes in addition to worship, including peddling, begging, socializing, and relaxation.

In many Arab countries, mosques have become the front line of resistance to the state-sponsored secularization of daily life. Interestingly, it is in this context that women have reclaimed their right to attend mosques and to hold educational assemblies in them. This trend has been extensively analyzed in Egypt in Saba Mahmood's recently published work, *The Politics of Piety* (2005). Mahmood observes that women's attendance at mosques in Cairo has risen exponentially over the last two decades and encompasses women

of all socioeconomic backgrounds and that women participating in mosque activities exhibit a range of religiosity. Women attend mosques not just to perform congregational prayers, but more importantly to participate in study circles (*dars*, pl. *durūs*) devoted to the revival of Islamic ethics and conduct in all aspects of daily life. The rise of female religious leaders who organize and conduct these sessions is another interesting aspect of the modern mosque movement. Whereas such female religious leadership was often restricted to private forums, the contemporary Islamist movements have accommodated and even encouraged women's claiming of such roles and of public space in response to the threat of rapid Westernization and secularism. Patterns similar to those in Egypt are evident in Syria, where women are particularly active in Islamist movements, and where Sunnī and Shīʿī mosques show relatively high rates of female attendance in prayers and educational assemblies.

In addition to the general impact of modernity, specific national politics may also influence women's access to mosques. One such example is the recent rise of Shīʿī women's mosque attendance after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government following the United States-led invasion in 2003. During the decades of Saddam Hussein's rule, only Sunnī doctrines as approved by the regime were taught in public schools. Even the private education of Shīʿism was restricted and punishable. The fall of Hussein's regime had the unintended consequence of liberating Shīʿī women to attend their own mosques to participate in prayers and introductory classes for women in Shīʿī doctrines.

In spite of the changes arising from Islamic revivalism and its response to various aspects of modernity, women's attendance at mosques in all of these countries is far lower than that of men. Many rural mosques operate on the assumption that women will not attend, and do not have dedicated space for a women's section. Thus, the phenomenon of the largely urban women's mosque movement has limited relevance for women outside these areas; their religious education and prayer are largely confined to the private sphere and they continue to have limited access to mosques.

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Asma Sayeed

North Africa

Women's presence in North African mosques has increased considerably over the last decade. The trend toward more female attendance is the result of both socioeconomic opportunities and political strategies, and has created new options for female participation within the milieu of sacred architecture. Much of North Africa consists of two quite distinct ethnic groups comprised of the indigenous Imazighen, or Berbers, making up almost 90 percent of the population, with the other 10 percent claiming pure Arab descent. Religious distinctions are all but non-existent; ethnicity therefore plays no part in the ritual codes of practice required of any Muslim.

The Mālikī school of law dominant in the Maghrib since the spread of Islam to the region has been in agreement with the other three schools of Sunnī law concerning women's participation in communal and public prayer. Older (post-menopausal) women free of the "burden" of creating sexual tension, pose no threat to themselves or the honor of their families by performing their prayers in public. Segregation within the mosque itself is strictly imposed, but rarely in the Maghrib do mosques contain structural features, such as galleries built specifically for women, as in many mosques in regions further to the east. In North Africa, it is understood that women should pray behind the last row of men, because a man's prayer is negated if a female prostrates in front of him. Traditionally, women should not be heard, nor should they linger after offering their prayers.

Concerns regarding a woman's age, her looks,

and marital status pose a far more interesting quandary in light of the difference between the ethos and praxis of female mosque activity. According to early scholars of Islam, young, often attractive, and more importantly single women should forego using public mosques. In lieu of attending services inside mosques women of means often chose to express their piety through the patronage of religious structures (Fairchild Ruggles 2000). The construction of the Qarawiyin mosque in Fez, completed in 859 C.E. by the royal daughter of Tunisian immigrants, illustrates this trend. The opportunity to fund the construction of mosques, along with other pious facilities, was most recently made a national affair when all Moroccans were encouraged to donate to the best of their ability in order to erect the Mosque of Hassan II, also referred to as the People's Mosque. Completed in 1993, the structure, located in Casablanca, renowned for its size as the largest mosque in the world, includes spaces for purposes beyond the act of worship in which the complex fulfills the original intention of a mosque as a multi-purpose location for Muslims to congregate, pray, and study regardless of gender (Holod and Khan 1997, 55–61; see also 20–1, n. 29).

Who are the women attending mosques?

The rise of women practitioners in North African mosques is due to a number of factors, some of which result from new opportunities in general for women, both young and old; others can be understood as conscientious efforts by those in power; and still others are long-standing traditions of certain activities previously ignored by scholars.

Regardless of the shifts in attitude concerning women's rights to pray in mosques over the centuries, the reason most pious women choose to pray in domestic spaces is an indication of social status and financial realities. The reason most urban women in the Maghrib perform their prayers outside the mosque results from the need to perform extensive chores, either for themselves or their families and, more commonly, because they hold regular jobs that do not allow time for visits to the mosque. For rural women it is a luxury to take time out of their endless tasks, thus creating a situation in which prayer in a mosque is simply not an option. The wealthiest members of the female community are able to function without ever leaving their homes save for social events. These women have servants to perform the daily chores that would require a woman to enter the public sphere. Neither the pious wealthy nor religious poor neglect their duties as Muslims, and will stop what they are doing at the appropriate time to perform ritual cleansing and prayer, during which time they are free from all distractions. Any person in the process of prostration must be left alone without any interference.

Multitudes of women attend congregational prayers on Fridays to hear the *khuṭba*, but now also attend *ishʿāʾ*, *maghīb*, and *fajr* prayers throughout the week. Who are these females attending not only Friday prayers at the newly refurbished Masjid Tunis, or overflowing from the women's section of the Tajmuati Mosque during Ramadan? Mosques in Fez serve as appropriate examples, particularly because the city is considered to be one of the more conservative municipalities in North Africa. Many females attend institutions of higher education, and therefore are given the opportunity to leave their homes and have the flexibility of an academic schedule. The enrollment of females in universities has begun to exceed that of males. In addition, all academic institutions are equipped with designated mosque space within the schools for those who are still on campus during prayer times.

Opportunities for young women to visit mosques differ between urban and rural settings. Unlike larger cities, towns and villages tend to have fewer mosques available to the public in general. Without universities for the women to attend, young adult women have little reason to leave the home except for work. Women as well as men in rural areas often have too far to travel to attend mosques without it interfering with their livelihood. Therefore, the attendance of women in urban mosques is not only a result of their socioeconomic situation, but also a response to the simple fact that mosques are more abundant within city limits. While the majority of women attending these urban services are precisely the age category deemed least desirable in a mosque and the greatest potential for distraction, young university women attending prayer services, in general, are as focused or unfocused as their male counterparts.

Women and literacy programs

For many years after independence, several countries, particularly Morocco and Tunisia, enacted laws enforcing the opening of mosques to the public only during the regulated prayer periods. The intention has been to maintain control over the mosque space and to discourage easy

recruitment and organization of fundamentalists hostile to the ruling government. In 2001, King Mohamed VI of Morocco began a free literacy program throughout the country and designated the mosque as instructional space for both men and women. Now rural and urban women learn to read in mosques, and as a result, stay for formal prayers. In addition to improving the general literacy rate of the country, the monarch benefits from this act in several other ways. His Royal Highness demonstrates his own piety by invoking a time when mosques were a place of learning for the whole community. He is also discouraging Islamist activities in the mosques by employing teachers and non-governmental organizations sympathetic to his vision for a modern yet Islamic society – one in which women will be able to participate to a much greater extent because of their increased literacy, a distinct change from the current illiteracy, near the eightieth percentile.

The female-friendly shrine-mosque complex

In contrast to single mosques, or mosque-complexes, which primarily are frequented by men, the marabouts, a term used not only for saintly peo-ple but also for their shrines, offer loci for Moroccan women's piety. According to feminist scholar Fatima Mernissi, "visits to and involvement with saints and sanctuaries are two of the rare options left to women to *be*, to shape their world and their lives" (Mernissi 1996, 24, Rein forthcoming). Although men do visit these places, illiterate women constitute the majority of the population participating in Moroccan shrine practices today (see Fig. 6). Therefore, marabout shrines offer a unique opportunity within the contemporary Islamic world for the examination of both women's space outside a domestic context and class specific usage of a religious architectural type.

Quotidian and weekly practices take place in these spaces, where the women visit the saint's bier, often offering a form of *duʿāʾ*, or personal supplication, and then continue on to the space in the structure where a marked *miḥrāb*, orienting the pious toward Mecca, affords the women a place to prostrate themselves in a public, communal, and yet generally male-free zone. The unmatched proliferation of these spaces, the use of these loci as charged spiritual centers also by members of non-Muslim communities, and a distinct underpinning of political legitimization necessary for the continuation of these places, offer a unique expression of women's piety.

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Michelle A. Rein

South Asia

Conventionally, women in South Asia have had very limited access to the mosque, although this access has been growing in recent decades in forms and for reasons indicated later in this entry. Central prayer halls are usually occupied exclusively by men during congregational services. Although many larger newly-constructed mosques contain segregated spaces for women, in the form of separate rooms or balconies overlooking the main prayer hall, these are almost always smaller than those used by men and are often less well-made and well-maintained. These architectural forms – limited space and space of comparatively lesser quality for women and, in many cases, the total absence of such space – partly regulate women's access to the mosque. Built into this spatial politics is the prevalent perception in South Asia that since women's presence in the public sphere is conducive to sociomoral disorder (*fitna*), women ought to worship within the private confines of the home. Nevertheless, women's mosque attendance is increasing. This development is grounded not in any form of doctrinal revolt, but in a religious interpretive framework that sees itself as more authentically Islamic than those forces that would essentially exclude women from the life of the mosque.

Women's involvement in the establishment of mosques

Elite women have historically contributed to the construction of a number of significant mosque architectural projects in South Asia. The Khayr al-Manazil Mosque was built in 1561–2 in Delhi, India by the Mughal Emperor Akbar's wet-nurse Maham Anga. Begum Shahi Masjid, the earliest dated mosque in Lahore, Pakistan was built in 1611–14 by Maryam al-Zamani, mother of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir. The Stone Mosque in the Indian province of Kashmir is supposed to have been sponsored in the 1620s by the Empress Nur Jahan, queen of the Mughal Emperor Jahangir (Hasan 1994).

It is not known whether non-elite women participated in the funding of mosque construction in earlier centuries. In our own day, non-elite women participate in the construction of mosques through modest contributions made to construction committee members visiting homes seeking donations. Such contributions are often made, formally, through male members of the family (Hannan 2005).

Mosques with spatial arrangements for women

That Muslim women in South Asia have for centuries had, at least in theory, some access to mosques is evident in the spatial arrangements for women in several historic mosques.

Thus, the Adina Mosque of Hazrat Pandua, built in 1375 by Sultan Sikandar Shah in Maldaha (present-day Rajshahi in Bangladesh), contains a gallery for women. The Nagina Masjid (Gem Mosque) in Agra Fort, India, was built by the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan in the seventeenth century expressly for the women of his court. Mosques built by Sultan Ahmad Shah in the fifteenth century in Ahmadabad, the principal city of Gujarat in western India, contain a screened enclosure in the northern area for women. The Badshahi Mosque in Lahore, built by the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb in 1673–4, contains an enclosure for women (Hasan 1994).

Some larger urban mosques in South Asia built from the 1960s onwards contain halls and galleries for women. Some examples are the Baitual Mukarram Mosque and the Gulshan Azad Mosque in Dhaka, Bangladesh, the Shah Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan, and the mosque of the Lahore University of Management and Sciences. Women have access to various recently-built mosques in Tamil Nadu, a southern state of India; the village of Pudukottai in Tamil Nadu, like a number of rural areas in India and Pakistan, even boasts a women-only mosque. Construction of this mosque was spearheaded in 2004 by a local female social activist, Daud Sharifa, who along with other Muslim women in the area felt that the male mosque elders (local *jamat*) were not adjudicating justly on family matters, and that it would therefore be helpful if women could have their own place of worship with its own committee of female elders, who would be more sympathetic to women when ruling on matters pertaining to marriage, divorce, domestic abuse, and child custody. In this instance, then, women are reclaiming the mosque not only as a prayer space but also in the multifunctional spirit in which the mosque has been conventionally used in South Asia and elsewhere.

Women's access to the mosque

Even most of those spaces that do exist for women increasingly in mosques throughout South Asia are not used often except on Fridays, on the two annual Eid festivals, and during the month of Ramadan, when growing numbers of women attend the evening *taraweeh* prayers. Despite both popular belief and scholarly assertions (for example, Qureshi 1996, 59) that only men attend mosque in South Asia, there is evidence that women pray at various mosques in different parts of contemporary South Asia (D'Souza 2001). The existence of women's enclosures in centuries-old mosques and not only in contemporary mosques suggests that women's mosque attendance is not as recent and revolutionary a phenomenon as it might appear to be at first glance. What is beyond doubt, however, is that until recent times the numbers of women using the mosque have been very small. One reason is the consensus on most sides of the evolving discussion of women and the mosque in South Asia that women's mosque attendance, specifically their participation in congregational prayers, which constitute the central aspect of dominant mosque culture, is optional and undesirable. This consensus has been significantly shaped by the dominant school of thought on Islamic law, the Ḥanafī School, to which Muslims of the Sunnī majority sect in South Asia belong. Scholars and members of the Ahl-i Hadith minority sect, however, favor women's access to the mosque.

Most smaller urban mosques in South Asia and most rural mosques do not have any spatial accommodations for women. However, some rural regions in Pakistan and India have some women-only mosques. This is largely true in Shīʿī

communities, where community centers called *imambara*s often serve as shrine/mosque/meeting-place complexes.

As women throughout South Asia, especially urban South Asia, increasingly spend time outside the home, whether for education, employment, shopping, organized sociopolitical or religious activism, or other projects, women worshippers are seeking access to mosques in larger numbers. Attending congregational prayers and other events at mosques also allows women to socialize.

Social and religious interactions between local elite women and the female members of the families of Arab diplomats have also facilitated women's interest in mosque attendance in South Asia. Knowledge of women's greater access to mosques in the Middle East, in part transmitted through South Asian migrants to the Middle East, has prompted interest among some South Asian women in reclaiming the mosque as their own.

Since the 1990s, small groups of women throughout South Asia, often led by elite women, have begun to agitate for greater access to the mosque. However, it cannot be assumed that all or even most women want greater access to the mosque. Many, especially those who do not live within easy walking distance of a mosque with arrangements for women and who do not have private means of transport or easy access to public transport, are relieved that they are not, like men, required to attend the mosque. This is particularly true of non-elite married women with children who must do the daily heavy-duty household work typical of middle-class or lower middle-class life in South Asia. Other mundane or practical reasons for women's disinterest in mosque attendance abound. In Bangladesh, for instance, one reason many women do not visit the mosque, even to attend the Friday congregational prayer, despite living or working close to a mosque which welcomes women's attendance, is simply that they are loathe to venture out into the intense noon-time heat and humidity, preferring to remain within the cooler confines of the home or office. Many women do not attend the Eid prayers on account of the additional household work that preparation for Eid festivities entails. This means that elderly women with daughters or daughters-in-law able to attend to the necessary household work are more able to attend the mosque than others, as are relatively wealthy women with sufficient hired help at home. Some women find it discomfiting that an imam addressing a spatially segregated gathering of men and women before the congregational prayer will often exhort women to "obey" their husbands, to practice veiling (*parda*), and to avoid television and music. Or, some women agree with the Ḥanafī *'ulamā'* that it is more meritorious for a woman to pray at home than at the mosque. Still other women do not attend the mosque to avoid displeasing male and female family members with authority over them, namely parents, older brothers, husbands, and parents-in-law.

The question of whether increased access to, and attendance at, the mosque is an unqualified benefit for women is, therefore, complex. Scholars such as Diane D'Souza (2001) have discussed what benefits and costs women might incur from greater access to the mosque. D'Souza suggests that the view of the mosque as central to Muslim religious life is a largely male one and is not reflected in women's experiences and perceptions. She also argues that for women, as a marginalized group, participation in mosque activities entails certain costs; some men use women's participation as an opportunity to further socialize women into conservative notions of belief and conduct.

However, women attempting to reclaim the mosque have their own reasons for doing so. For some, access to the mosque makes it easier to offer prayers in a serene environment while traveling. For others, congregational prayers offer opportunities for strengthening bonds with fellow Muslim women and for acquiring Islamic knowledge directly, from sermons and religious lectures (*waaz*), instead of from male family members who attend sermons and lectures. For others, access to the mosque is, in part, a way to make women less marginal to the religious public sphere in their societies. Such women – who are most often well educated – seek to reclaim what they perceive as one of the rights granted women by Islam. Their goal is to socially empower women not by separating them from religion but from within the bounds of religion.

Women's mosque activities

Traditionally, women have participated in Friday and Eid congregational prayers at a number of mosques throughout South Asia, though in very small numbers. A second traditional mode of women's (primarily young girls') participation in mosque culture has been through the mosque school, where girls often study to recite the Qur'ān properly and receive other forms of rudimentary religious instruction along with boys.

One recent trend in women's mosque activities is women's segregated attendance at religious talks delivered by men. Furthermore, some women

preachers have begun to deliver lessons at mosques themselves, but only for women. A second trend is that women are also beginning to go to the mosque together to perform supererogatory prayers, such as the *taraweeh* prayers in the evening during the month of Ramadan and the *salat ul-tasbeeh*, and to engage in other devotional rituals such as Qur'ānic recitation and chanting of particular Qur'ānic words or phrases a specified number of times (*zikr*).

Women's mosques: changing trends

Women's increased presence in the spheres of higher education, work outside the home, and affiliation with social, religious, and political organizations means that more schools, colleges, and other institutions today provide spatial arrangements for women's prayers. Additionally, proliferating and expanding offices for women affiliated with Islamist organizations such as Jamaat-i Islami, whether in Bangladesh, India, or Pakistan, contain prayer spaces.

Since Islam does not require any special sanctified ground or space for the purpose of worship and prayer, it is easy for makeshift women-only mosques to proliferate. Thus, for example, in some present-day Pakistani cities one increasingly sees curtained prayer spaces for women appearing at parks, malls, hotels, and even on the side of the road. As women's presence in the mosque becomes more acceptable in South Asia, some women preachers in Bangladesh say they increasingly opt to gather at mosques instead of homes to free whomever hosts the meeting from the social obligation to serve refreshments. Women preachers also say that the pure (*pabitra*) atmosphere in a mosque enables congregants to focus exclusively on the lesson at hand, without being distracted by familial matters, thus cultivating a more intimate relationship with God.

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Maimuna Huq

Sub-Saharan Africa: West Africa

Introduction

Although Islam has been established in West Africa since roughly the eleventh century, its expansion to the wider population occurred mostly in the nineteenth century with the consolidation of European imperialism. Although characterized by multiple Sufi paths or *ṭurūq* (sing. *ṭarīqa*), Islam in West Africa shares a common adherence to the Mālikī *madhhab* with the Maghrib. In terms of practice, however, one *ṭarīqa* differs considerably from another. The Qadiriyya, one of the oldest Sufi orders (Mbacké 1998, 540), is followed in Mali, Senegal, Mauritania, and Nigeria. The Tijaniyya, whose founder is buried in Fez, is one of the largest brotherhoods in Senegal and adepts are also found in Nigeria and Chad.

It was not until the late 1970s, when the brotherhoods' power and influence underwent increasing criticism, that the role of women was re-evaluated. During the 1940s and 1950s, Senegalese students returning from renowned universities throughout the Muslim world brought back ideas that went against the grain of the Sufi orders. Known as *ḥyā'*, the revival movement denounced the dynastic power of the marabouts and emphasized close adherence to the Qur'ān and *sunna*. In Mali, the followers of this movement were known as Wahhabis, whereas in Senegal they became known as Ibadous. New practices, such as praying with arms crossed, wearing the Islamic veil or beard, not shaking hands with members of the opposite sex, and constructing new mosques that included separate women's quarters, became increasingly common. This ideological shift from Mālikī orthodoxy to Saudi Arabian-style orthopraxy has led toward the intensification of the "Sunnification" of West African Muslim society, particularly in urban milieus.

Men can be heard and women cannot be seen: women's marginalization in mosques

In a region where Mālikī Islam is the common denominator, the configuration of female space in the mosque differs widely. In Senegal, this

arrangement is particularly distinctive. Women are allocated a separate building situated in the courtyard of the mosque from where they can neither see nor hear the service directly. Such buildings are sometimes provided with crackling loudspeakers but the problem of not being able to see the imam has not been addressed until recently.

There are several factors connected to women's marginalization in places of prayer in West Africa. Theologically, according to the Mālikī *madhhab*, women – especially young women – are discouraged from praying in the mosque. For this reason, traditionally the mosque has been the domain of men and old women. Moreover, in Senegal, several sayings in Wolof attest to the taboo of young women being seen in the mosque, which range from them burying one husband after another to dying an early death (Cantone 2002, 29). A second related issue is the use of the veil: although traditional dress in West Africa does include a *mousoir*, this cloth is worn wrapped around the head and does not cover the bosom. Hence the veil (Fr. *voile*) worn by Ibadous is distinctive in that it is pinned or sewn under the chin.

The veil has rightly or wrongly come to be the symbolic marker of the Muslim woman as pious and practicing. In the feminist discourse both in Africa and the West, the veil embodies *enfermement*, or confinement:

> a kind of invisible enclosure (of which the veil is the only visible manifestation) circumscribing the space allowed for the movements and postures of their bodies (whereas men occupy more space, especially in public spaces). This symbolic confinement is secured practically by their clothing (Bourdieu 2001, 28).

Women in West Africa are far from occupying a marginal position in public space: on the contrary, one of the most accessible of all spaces, the market, is largely a women's domain. Yet in the religious sphere their presence is virtually inconspicuous because in the mosque men occupy a dominant position – be it spatial or other. The institutionalization of domination is most apparent in the context of the Sufi mosque. Here only women past the menopause can enter the building's sacred precinct but they are allocated a separate building, the so-called women's mosque (Wolof, *jakka jigeen-yi*). When asked why only older women are allowed to enter the mosque, most *marabouts* belonging to the Tijaniyya or Muridiyya brotherhoods explained that this is because they are no longer considered capable of attracting men and hence distracting them from their prayers. Evidence to support this can be found in the tenth-century text which lays out the principal tenets of the Mālikī school of law followed in West Africa. According to al-Qayrawānī, women, like slaves, may attend Friday prayer on condition that they stand behind the men and that they are not young: "Women stand behind the men's rows but young women must not leave their houses to go [to the mosque]" (al-Qayrawānī 1949, 95).

The women's mosque consists of a small building that is nothing more than an appendage to the main mosque. If the women's building is furnished with claustra or a gallery, (see Fig. 7) women praying inside have a limited visibility of the prayers in the main mosque. This, however, depends on the location of the women's building. It would be misleading to liken this situation with that in Muslim China, for instance. Here women's mosques comprise independent entities where women pray and perform other religious rituals amongst themselves (Jaschok and Shui 2000). Nor is the situation of women's prayer spaces comparable to the Moroccan model, which consists mostly of a separate, screened section within the mosque proper.

In Senegal's northeastern region, the Futa Toro, earthen mosques still punctuate the barren landscape. Those built in the nineteenth century under the leadership of Al-Hajj ʿUmar capture some of the elements of the Sudanese mosque style, consisting of square prayer halls supported by pillars outside which are pergolas covered with straw thatch and supported by wooden stakes. Because women are generally forbidden to enter the mosque, they can listen to Friday prayers from under the pergola from which they can barely see or hear the imam (see Figs. 8–9). In some areas, such as Casamance, southern Senegal, women pray outside the mosque altogether (Linares 1992). More progressive imams are generally favorable to the introduction of women's prayer spaces within the mosque. Such views, however, imply an *arabisant* background (that is, versed in Arabic as well as Islamic subjects) and a familiarity with Prophetic sayings (*ḥadīth*s) that state that women should not be prevented from going to mosques, such as: "When your womenfolk ask you for permission to attend the mosque, do not prevent them" (Doi 1996, 28).

In Mali, characterized by its distinctive mosque architecture made of mud, it appears that up until the reconstruction of the Great Mosque of Djenné in 1907, women did not pray in the mosque. This building, however, includes a gallery for women at the rear of the courtyard. Being devoid of fenestration, it is not possible to witness the prayer in the main prayer hall. Although the gallery was frequented only by elderly ladies, in 2001 the

author was invited to give a talk on the subject of the role of the mosque and women's participation, which was translated by a young imam who was trying to attract younger women to attend the mosque (see Fig. 10).

Nevertheless, according to Sanankoua, over the last two decades there has been an unprecedented proliferation of mosques, particularly those built in cement and with extra-local styles. With the increase of Islamization, especially in the urban context, women correspondingly have begun to display their religious commitment outwardly. By forming their own organizations, it has been possible for greater numbers of women to perform the *ḥajj*. The experience of Mecca and Medina brings with it an awareness that in the holiest cities of Islam women can and do participate alongside men in religious activities. As a result, upon returning to Mali, these women alert other women to the fact that "there is no need to reach old age in order to frequent the mosque or to dedicate oneself to Islam" (Sanankoua 1991, 109).

But among the category of women who cannot afford to travel abroad are women who offer their services to mosques. These women are often aged between 25 and 30 years and the fact that they do the cleaning allows them access previously denied to them. Similarly in Senegal, Ibadou women don the headscarf in order to access mosques and gain Islamic knowledge. By so doing, they affirm or strengthen their new religious identity.

Urban mosques: access, empowerment, and visual participation

In Ibadou mosques, women's spaces are not always designated by means of a physical barrier, other than veils, for they may simply pray behind men. However, when the mosque is full, usually for Friday prayers, women pray either outside in the courtyard and can follow the service through the open door of the main mosque, or they may pray in a gallery overlooking the main prayer hall. In the last five years, the issue of visibility has been raised in a variety of ways and women's visual participation is being taken increasingly into account.

Because the number of female worshippers is growing, the spaces allocated to them are now often insufficient. Among the reasons for their keen attendance is the fact that the sermons in Ibadou mosques are delivered in the local language or in French and are therefore comprehensible to the audience. Moreover, the content of sermons often treats contemporary issues or religious matters instructing them in their rights as women. This fact points to the importance of the educational role of the mosque and the degree of accessibility of a more inclusive vision of Islam.

However, the fact of young women donning the Islamic headscarf and frequenting the mosques has given rise to generational conflict which is expressed in the confrontation between Sufi and Ibadou Islam. In spite of Senegalese feminists' opinion that the headscarf amounts to a confinement, veiling is seen by Ibadou women as an appropriate means of accessing previously barred space and as such constitutes a form of empowerment. Furthermore, like other educational arenas such as universities, the mosque acts as a social space where women socialize amongst themselves and have a greater chance of finding like-minded Ibadou partners, in addition to serving as the spiritual center of their active religious lives.

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Cleo Cantone

Yemen

Throughout Yemen's history, royal women's piety expressed itself in the patronage of mosques and other religious foundations, such as *madrasa*s and *khānqāh*s (Sufi hostels). The Great Mosque, built by the Ṣulayḥid ruler al-Sayyida al-Ḥurra bint Aḥmad (r. 477–532/1084–1138) in her capital Jiblah, is the earliest known surviving mosque built by a woman patron. The queen's stature and importance is reflected in the presence of her tomb inside the mosque, in the northwest side of the

prayer hall, rather than in a separate tomb chamber. Although many monuments are no longer extant, we are able to know something about women's patronage based on historical and biographical sources. The most prolific of women patrons throughout Yemen's history were the royal women of the Rasūlid dynasty (626–858/1229–1454) who commissioned a great number of religious foundations, thus constituting the second largest group of patrons after the sultans, and for which they provided generous endowments. The surviving monuments display similar architectural and decorative features to those built by Rasūlid male patrons except that they are smaller in size. Moreover, Rasūlid women had the privilege of having painted decorations on the inside of their buildings, which were otherwise restricted to the monuments commissioned by the sultans. It is noteworthy that there is no evidence for burial provisions for Rasūlid women in their foundations and there are no surviving tombs. To date, the only known monumental tomb of a woman belongs to the Zaydīs, the rival dynasty of the Rasūlids. It is a domed chamber within the mosque complex of the Imām al-Hādī in Ṣaʿdah where al-Sharīfa Fāṭima bint al-Mahdī (d. fourteenth century), the sister of Imām al-Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn (r. 773–93/1371–90), is buried. However, it is not known if it was commissioned by her or by one of her male relatives.

Many women were teachers and scholars in their own right, but there is no information as to where they taught, although the home is the most probable venue as it is unlikely that they would have been taught in the mosque. Yemen's strictly segregated society is very much in evidence in the mosque. Moreover, there are no specific areas in mosques designated for women's prayers since they are considered a strictly male domain where the presence of women, and in particular young ones, is frowned upon. The prevailing view among both Zaydīs and Shāfiʿī Sunnī religious scholars – the two dominant schools of law – seems to be that women should not be present in mosques. Yemeni women usually pray in their homes, but there are, in contemporary Yemen, a small number of *musallā*s (prayer places) for their exclusive use. The *musallā*s, which are found only in Yemen's larger towns, are simple small structures that conform to the rules of discretion and modesty. Their entrances are positioned in such a way as to conceal their interiors, and they do not have courtyards that could expose the women to onlookers. An exception to the restriction of women's presence in mosques can been seen in some that have over time become shrines. The presence of a tomb of a holy man inside the mosque or adjacent to it turned the mosque into a pilgrimage site where women are allowed to pray for their fertility and well-being. The best known example is the twelfth-century mosque of al-ʿAbbās in the village of Asnāf, located about 40 kilometers southeast of the capital Ṣanʿā'.

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Noha Sadek

Tourism

Egypt

In Egypt, tourism is a variation on the kinds of travel and cross-cultural transactions – colonialism and imperialism, religious and intellectual pilgrimages, archaeology, anthropology, and more – that have for centuries been critical elements in building Egyptian national identities and subjectivities. Two very different cultural imaginations of Egypt shape tourist agendas. Western tourism is built around a fantasy of an ancient Egypt littered with the excavated monuments of a pharaonic past, and the West's colonial fascination with ancient Egypt has contributed to the elaboration of Egyptian national identity as ancient and pharaonic. Selim (2001) has explored the gendered implications of pharaonism, a form of Egyptian nationalism which identifies with ancient Egypt, in Egyptian art and literature. Other forms of Western tourism include desert safaris and "sun-sea-and-sand" tourism in the Sinai and along the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts.

Arab tourists, on the other hand, bypass the pyramids and engage with a more contemporary imagining of Egyptian culture. Within a Middle Eastern context, Egypt is less the "antique land" of Shelley than a contemporary cultural and media giant, broadcasting its movies, television serials, and popular music to the entire Arab world. Despite a long history of travel, trade, and pilgrimage linking peoples of the Middle East, Arab tourism in Egypt is directly related to the oil economy. According to Cole and Altorki (1998), the first Arab tourists to come to Egypt on a large scale were Libyans in the 1960s; oil wealth in the Arabian Peninsula countries led to the growth of Gulf Arab tourism, and with the Lebanese civil war in the mid-1970s, Arab tourism in Egypt soared. While the 1980s marked the heyday of Gulf Arab tourism in Cairo, Arab tourism is still a significant component of the tourism economy; in 1998, Arabs constituted approximately one-third of the foreign visitors to Egypt.

This touristic typology has gendered parameters. It is primarily Egyptian men who have romantic liaisons with Western and Asian tourists, especially in the beach resorts of the Sinai. Egyptian men are said to marry Westerners to avoid the expenses (such as paying the *mahr* [dower] and supplying an apartment for the newlyweds to live in) associated with marrying an Egyptian woman. In Egypt, Western sun-sea-and-sand tourism in the Sinai is popularly associated with sexual licentiousness for Egyptian men, as well as drug use.

In contrast, Egyptian critiques accuse Arab tourists of using their wealth to spread moral corruption via the sexual exploitation of Egyptian women. The arrival of the summer Arab tourist season changes not only the economic but also the moral landscape of Cairo. The national media has exposed the phenomenon of "summer marriages," in which wealthy Gulf males marry young Egyptian village women for short-term sexual pleasure, leaving them divorced and shamed in the eyes of their community at the end of the summer vacation season. The extent of this phenomenon is poorly documented, but public outcry has been sufficient that legislation has been enacted to protect Egyptian women from such exploitation.

Among Egyptians, the common stereotype about Arab (and especially Gulf Arab) tourists is that they come to Egypt to do things that are forbidden in their own countries: visit Egyptian prostitutes, have sex parties, drink alcohol, and gamble. Yet reality is more nuanced than this. Many young people from the Gulf spend their vacation in Egypt dating other compatriots. Some Saudi women, for example, use their Egypt vacation as an opportunity to meet and date Saudi men, and then continue these relationships after their vacation; it is one way that Saudi women avoid arranged marriages. The Egypt vacation creates an atmosphere where Saudi norms of gender segregation are relaxed, but male–female interactions are still basically constrained by Saudi social and cultural mores. As a fundamentally Saudi cultural phenomenon that takes place outside the borders of Saudi Arabia, the Saudi summer vacation in Egypt is an extraordinary example of transnational culture.

Analyses of service industry jobs in late capitalism (Hochschild 1983 is seminal) have often pointed out that it is performative labor in which women have an advantage because of cultural inculcation of gendered roles which better prepares them to engage in the kind of "emotion work" (cheery smiles and patient solicitude) that service jobs demand. The culturally specific implications of the emotion work required by the international tourism industry are somewhat more complicated

in Egypt. On the one hand, culturally-inculcated gender roles for Egyptian women, such as serving food and hospitality, translate well to a service economy such as tourism. On the other, smiling and friendliness with strangers are often regarded as sexual and inappropriate for women. Thus the emotional labor that is required by the multinational corporations that dominate international tourism is regarded by some Egyptians as a sort of sexual labor when performed by women. This translates into constraints on Egyptian women's participation in the tourism industry.

State intervention has attempted to survey and control sexual exchanges in the tourist economy. Partly because of this, it is considered respectable when Egyptian women engage in tourism work in the highly regulated and licensed formal tourism economy, as tour guides and hotel and museum employees and, indeed, there are many women working in such fields. It is considerably less common to encounter Egyptian women working in the lucrative but unregulated jobs of the informal tourism economy, except when their participation is mediated by male relatives, who initiate the tourist encounter (see Wynn 2003). Thus unlicensed guides and tourist "hustlers" are almost always men, but they may bring home tourists to meet their mother who contributes to the presentation of "traditional Egyptian hospitality" by feeding tourists a home-cooked meal.

Tourism is consistently a top earner of foreign currency and thus of critical importance to the Egyptian economy. Private sector tourism jobs bring in significantly larger salaries than government salaried bureaucracies, but provide less job security. Fluctuations in tourist revenues hinge on the world economy as well as on perceptions of safety in Egypt and the wider region. Terrorist attacks can severely depress the tourism economy, and the effect is particularly devastating for villages such as al-Gurna in Luxor which are next to pharaonic tourist sites and whose economies primarily revolve around tourism. Here, even for Egyptian women who are not working in tourism, the loss of jobs and income for their male relatives puts pressure on families and on women who manage household budgets. Yet the income-earning potential for people working in tourism is exponentially greater than that of government employees, making it a risk that many are willing to take.

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Lisa Wynn

Morocco

As international tourism has been integrated into national development strategies in contemporary Morocco, women's capacity to benefit directly as workers has been moderated by prevailing gender ideologies (sometimes expressed in religious idiom) that attempt, in the first instance, to limit female employment to stereotypically appropriate positions, and subsequently, to control women's earnings.

While perceived value and behavioral conflicts between Muslim and Western societies shape international tourism development in some Muslim nations (Din 1989), others (including Morocco) have emphasized the relationship between the tourism industry and economic growth, expressed as a better quality of life for future generations (Kelly Spurles 2004, 35). International tourism injects funds into a state to the extent that airlines, hotels, and other facilities and service providers pay taxes and goods are obtained locally rather than imported. Economic effects may be direct, defined as travel, lodging, and entertainment expenditures by tourists, as well as indirect, in terms of increased spending by tourism sector employees.

Critical analyses of tourism's potential as a motor for development have emphasized the extent to which tourism fluctuates due to fashion, weather, politics, and economics in both tourist-generating and tourist-receiving countries, leading to its instability as a source of foreign currency. Violence has a marked effect as travel shifts to destinations that are perceived as more geographically and culturally distant from conflict. The 11 September 2001 airplane hijackings in the United

States brought an immediate 11 percent drop in tourism arrivals in the Middle East overall, and a decrease of 10 percent in Morocco (Kelly Spurles 2004, 33), while the 1991 Gulf War brought a decrease in Moroccan tourism of 30 percent (Stafford, Belanger, and Sarrasin 1996, 83). Indeed, at the grassroots level, tourism workers observe annual and long-term trends in tourist numbers related to such things as weather, political and economic events, and changing tastes. These fluctuations motivate female tourism workers' decision-making with regard to saving in cash and in durable goods, working long hours during peak periods, and promoting long-term stability through investing in the educational and employment strategies of kin members.

Similarly, the capacity of tourism-oriented development to meet local priorities has been questioned. In Morocco, tourist water use practices exceed the capacity of the local system and result in the deterioration of physical structures as sewage treatment fails to accommodate increased waste generation, as well as in shortages in the rural mountain areas that provide water to the urban centers. The implications of tourism-induced water shortages for rural women's daily time budget are extreme as the distance to available water increases.

Control of income from tourism is subject to the dynamics of paternalism at both societal and household levels. In Tunisia, for instance, the wages of female hotel workers were paid to their fathers as head of household (Smaoui 1976). Another avenue of paternalism is the gendering of labor, as individual positions and entire trades are identified predominantly or exclusively with gender roles. In Morocco, many positions in the tourism industry are considered male or female, as access to tourism work is moderated by culturally specific beliefs about women's interaction with non-kin. Gender norms, expressed in religious, moral, and ethnic terms, regarding appropriate work and public behavior for women provide a discourse through which harassment and exploitation of female informal sector tourism workers is justified. Particularly among lower socioeconomic groups, women's work with foreigners is popularly associated with prostitution, both for historical reasons (subtle and overt exploitation by colonial administration) and contemporary ones (assumptions regarding Western norms of sexual behavior and wealth as a powerful source of coercive power). One guide to working in the tourist sector provides job descriptions that incorporate gender requirements in addition to necessary training and appropriate personality characteristics (Kelly Spurles 2004, 26). While international case studies suggest that jobs labeled female remain open to women even when male jobs have declined (due to a decrease in ongoing construction, for instance), this effect is complicated where "female" positions are associated with good cash-earning opportunities, as demonstrated by the increasing presence of men as intermediaries (through tour groups, hotels, and especially in herb shops) and even as artisans in the tourist sector henna trade (Kelly Spurles 2004, 208–9).

Kelly Spurles gives a detailed account of social organization and knowledge transmission among tourist sector henna artisans, drawing attention to the competing discourses deployed by artisans and other local actors who aim to alternately delegitimize this trade and to participate in it by securing some of its profits. She notes the numeric and financial importance of Moroccans (both domestic tourists and returned migrants) as a clientele for the tourist sector artisans, indicating that this new henna form links the practice of tourism to a broader Moroccan symbol system in which henna both indicates felicitous passage through life stages and ties these life stage rituals to Islamic orthodoxy through popular sayings and familiar *ḥadīth*s. "For domestic tourists and Moroccans residing abroad, the purchase of a henna design while engaging in tourism links the childhood experience of henna in the context of festivals with the adult experience of partaking in tourism as a ritual that locates them within the liminal solidarity of other global travelers" (Kelly Spurles 2004, 141).

Gender also enters into tourism analysis as a symbol for local culture (including religious practice), as both tour operators and the state present advertising images of women in various forms of traditional attire incorporating face veils and headscarves. This practice creates a model against which the validity and authenticity of local social forms are measured externally, depriving residents of the authority over the interpretation of their civilization (Fees 1996, 121). The predominance of female images reflects a tightly woven discourse of normative femininity in which roles are not freely determined by changing social and economic conditions but rather tied to the nation's image of itself.

Despite increasing attention to the gendered social, cultural, and economic impacts of tourism globally, this analysis has only recently and

partially extended to Morocco. Female tourism employment and entrepreneurship in the formal sector is an important area for future research.

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Patricia L. Kelly Spurles

Sub-Saharan Africa: East Africa

Tourism in East Africa is an important industry giving women a significant potential to earn a living offering services and goods to holiday-makers. While in the formal tourism business the workforce is mainly male, the informal tourism sector, especially the service job market, is an important income generator for women (UNED-UK 1999, 6).

The overall tourism sector in Sub-Saharan Africa has an annual growth rate of 5.8 percent (WTTC 2005), and is a source of much needed hard currency. East Africa is a particularly booming region; here the tourism sector has an annual growth rate of about 10 percent (WTO 2004). For instance, Tanzania has seen a remarkable increase in tourist arrivals in recent years, especially Swahili Zanzibar, which has evolved into a mass tourism destination.

Women in tourist destinations are affected to different degrees by tourism activities. Regarding the workforce in the informal tourism businesses in Zanzibar, about 25 percent are women. Here, the informal tourism sector is an entry point for women to participate in income generating activities. Business possibilities include the selling of small items such as local printed cloth; offering massages and henna body paintings to tourists; and working in small restaurants catering to employees from the tourist hotels. Prostitution is also a business, one which can bring a very high income. The advantages of working in the informal tourism sector are flexible working hours, little or no formal education requirements, and the relatively low investment costs to establish a business.

Many tourist destinations in East Africa are in predominantly Muslim areas, such as Malindi, Kenya, and Zanzibar, or are in cosmopolitan capitals with large Muslim populations, for example, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam. For some community leaders, there may be troublesome and contradictory issues raised by contact with tourists and with the image of Western life that tourists present. In general terms, service jobs such as selling handicrafts, washing clothes, and giving massages or sex work require varying degrees of close contact with the tourist clients, including an initial boldness in initiating the transaction. However, the tourists' lifestyle often clashes with the values of these communities. For example, the clothing worn by sun-seeking Europeans and North Americans may conflict with local standards of decency regarding proper clothing, especially for adult women. Less obvious issues stemming from tourists' lack of sensitivity about imposing their own cultural values include openly displaying Western consumerism, their independence of movement, and their seeming lack of respect for age and male authority, all of which may be seen by community leaders as too influential on Muslim youth, particularly on young women.

Another issue associated with the development of tourism are large-scale changes to the built environment. For many Muslim communities neighboring tourist areas, the whole organization of their daily life is impacted. Often agricultural land is transformed into hotels and venues for leisure activities. Women, who are responsible for subsistence farming, have to compensate for this loss of agricultural land either by looking for new arable land or by engaging in tourism-related business. Since the latter brings in cash, many women are pushed into tourism sector work by their husbands and other male family members once this benefit is seen. Yet the advantages to women are often mixed. Working in tourism ventures may lead to increased workloads for women, as they still have to manage their households and carry out their domestic tasks. Food that was once grown now must be purchased, which reduces the self-sufficiency of the family and makes them vulnerable to unforeseen situations, for example seasons when the expected numbers of tourists do not come. Moreover, the income women generate may become a point of dispute within their families; in some cases, they have to surrender the earnings to their husbands although in others, women acquire

financial autonomy through their labor in the tourism sector, which increases their self-esteem (Williams 2002, 10).

The more contact women have with tourists, the more likely they are to desire more independence at home. Although initially they may be open to censure within their families, over time they often increase their social status among kin through their income generating abilities. Women react in different ways, according to their religion, social class, and personal histories to the often contradictory changes that accompany development of tourism (Mung'ong'o 2003, 123).

The large East African resort areas are magnets for labor migrations. One popular destination is the Swahili coastal town of Malindi in Kenya where many women earn their living in the tourism industry and a substantial number are involved in prostitution. Sex work brings such a high income that the women involved in it can afford to be on their own without any financial support from their families. Most of the prostitutes in Malindi are not Muslim but are migrants and come from other East African ethnic groups. Muslim Swahili women are seldom involved in prostitution with tourists (although they do engage in other forms of tourist-related work); reasons for this include religious values and close familial control, and any sex work that does take place is highly clandestine. Ironically, the bold behavior of prostitutes working in the area gives tourists the erroneous impression that all local women are prostitutes. This is offensive to Swahili women and men in these communities.

The scale of tourism largely determines the level of impact on surrounding communities. In the big resorts associated with package tourism, local women and men are mostly excluded from the job opportunities and the income flows back to multinational corporations. The tourism practiced here is primarily self-contained (sometimes creating fenced communities with private beaches that echo colonial period segregation) and has little involvement with its setting, thus provoking displeasure from the host society. By contrast, small and medium tourism ventures in more integrated destinations offer many opportunities for informal businesses and local ownership, including job possibilities for local women. It is in these small- to medium-scale businesses where Muslim women are receiving the largest economic gains. Not surprisingly, it is often in these face to face, more personalized contacts where there are genuine opportunities for tourists to learn about and appreciate local cultures.

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ILLUSTRATIONS



Figure 1. Woman and vacuum cleaner. Photo Credit: Alexandru Balasescu.



Figure 2. Turkish girl embroidering. Ottoman embroidery was much sought after in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Engraving by Claude Du Bosc after a painting by Jean-Baptiste Vanmour. *Recueil de cent estampes représentant différentes nations du Levant, tirées sur les tableaux peints d'après nature en 1707 & 1708 par les ordres de M. De Ferriol, Ambassadeur du Roi à La Porte, et gravées en 1712 & 1713 par les soins de M. Le Hay* (Paris, 1714).



Figure 3. The Apartheid Wall, ruled illegal in 2004 by the International Court of Justice, encloses Palestinians in dusty, urbanized areas while confiscating their fertile land and groundwater resources. Photograph taken in Abu Dis by Gustaf Hansson, Thursday 8, July, 2004 (Photo used by permission of photographer, g@toolautoacademy.org).



Figure 4. Cover page of November 2000 issue of Al-Bīʿa wa-al-Tanmiya (Environment and Development). Photo credit: Environment and Development, 5(32), published November 2000 by the Middle East Centre for the Transfer of Appropriate Technology, http://www.mectat.com.lb/contents.



Figure 5. Cross-section of the Ottoman imperial harem from A.I. Melling, *Voyage pittoresque de Constantinople* (Paris, 1819), vol. 2, pl. 14. Though this scene is of course imagined, it is noteworthy that the harem is depicted as a space in which women are busily engaged in productive everyday activities, and not one where naked concubines idle the day away lounging on pillows in anticipation of their master's visit. (Still, note the artist's subtle concession to Orientalist conventions in the form of two women engaged in amorous embrace in the lower right-hand corner.) (Typ 815.20.5660P, Department of Printing and Graphic Arts, Houghton Library, Harvard College Library).



Figure 6. Woman about to perform ablutions inside the shrine of Sidi Abdel Kader Sliman in Figuig, Morocco, 2000. The stone near her foot is used for purification before prostration and prayer. Photo Credit: Michelle A. Rein.




Figure 7. Women's prayer building screened by claustra work. Thies, Senegal. Photo Credit: Cleo Cantone.



Figure 8. Guede Mosque in Guede near Podor, Senegal. Western façade with a pergola where women pray. Photo Credit: Cleo Cantone.



Figure 9. Champ des Gardes, Podor. The pergola is used for eating and gathering as well as for prayer. Photo Credit: Cleo Cantone.



Figure 10. The main entrance to the Great Mosque of Djenné, Mali. The women's gallery is situated at the opposite end of the courtyard, on the western façade. Photo Credit: Cleo Cantone.

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